far better protected than they were in the 1950s. For workers, the shifting political climate meant the potential costs of striking were reduced as the potential benefits at least remained the same.

Franzosi is also helpful when he turns his attention to the employers' reaction to strike activity, the strike wave of the 1969 autunno caldo in particular. The shift in production from large- to small-scale business firms, a pattern prevalent in Italy over the last few decades, has been a response by business managers to strike problems. Workers in small firms are much less likely to strike than ones employed by larger concerns. In the same vein Franzosi notes that the introduction of new technologies, e.g., robotics in the Italian auto industry, was intended to achieve the same objective. Robots do not go out on strike.

Finally, Franzosi's volume may prove to be small consolation for the foreign tourists frustrated in their Italian sojourns by the occasional work stoppage. But the book does provide a thorough and sophisticated account of the sources of their discontent.

Leonard Weinberg, University of Nevada, Reno


This study by a noted political economist at the London School of Economics contains two volumes in one. The first presents an economic analysis of trends in interregional disparities in the economic performance within the EU; the second proposes a "network" analysis of European integration.

The first half, the analysis of interregional economic disparities, rests on two econometric results drawn from a data-set employed in the author's previous work: (1) structural funds have fueled convergence of economic standards between core and periphery; (2) even without such assistance, peripheral regions within the EU have tended to grow more rapidly than core ones, leading to convergence of living standards and policy preferences. Structural funding may accelerate convergence, but it does not create it. From this follows, by way of policy prescription, the proposition that the deepening of the single market can help as much or more than financial transfers to generate peripheral growth. More provocatively:

It is no longer necessary to maintain the myth that the expenditure of large sums from the EU budget is justified on the basis that the poor regions are declining in relation to the core, nor that past expenditure has not led to a reduction of the cohesion gap. (176)

The results, generally convincing, challenge two approaches currently popular among economists: "agglomeration" models of economic growth, based on path-dependent locational economies, and classic Heckscher-Ohlin models, in which trade follows factor endowments. The findings are blurred only by the nagging Greek and Mezzogiorno exceptions and by considerable residual interregional variation in
the impact of regional funding, depending on the effectiveness of subnational implementation—both of which remain intriguing puzzles for political scientists. More careful analysis linking the micro- and macrolevels would be useful. Recent work has uncovered substantial cross-regional variation often obscured by aggregate analysis of this kind, but more tractable using case study methods.

The second half of the book broaches theoretical debates in integration theory. If economic transactions drive domestic convergence, what role is there for formal integration? Here the results, termed the “convergence model,” are more metaphorical than theoretical or empirical—and have only a loose connection with the previous data analysis. The EU, this book argues, is best seen as a set of “networks” through which a multitude of subnational, national, and supranational actors interact and learn. For political entrepreneurs—presumably supranational ones are meant—such networks are superior to more explicit links because they are non-threatening to existing actors, administratively efficient, flexible in response to change, and rich in information. They are the first step toward formal organizations; it is such networks that eventually generate integration.

The network metaphor is, of course, familiar to students of European integration. It is a widely-held—perhaps the most widely held—view of the EU, whether under the rubric of “multilevel governance,” “Politikverflechtung,” or “policy networks.” Yet, studies of networks must face two related questions: Do opportunities for network construction actually lead to intense interaction among social actors? Does such interaction, when it takes place, have a significant impact on policy? Leaving aside the oft-cited case of big-business groups and high technology policy, there is as yet little empirical confirmation that transnational networks are robust, nor that they change policy outcomes.

Indeed, recent research suggests the surprising resilience of the nation-state. Even in the case of structural funding—a policy deliberately designed, at least in part, to strengthen alternatives to the nation-state—there are few cases in which networks of private groups, supranational and subnational officials have circumvented the will of national governments. Oft-cited examples (e.g., Scotland) dissolve on closer inspection; the bulk of spending (e.g., Objective 1 programs) remains firmly in national hands; interregional networks are thin; case studies of France, Italy, Britain, and Germany suggest that, exceptional cases aside, programs tend to bolster, not undermine the existing distribution of domestic influence.

Despite its provocative purpose, this book does not pose an empirical challenge to these findings. It speculates about the “public interest” justifications for some EU programs (e.g., DG XII’s FLAIR program seeks to “improve food safety and quality”), which is said to represent something more than national interest, and hypothesizes that such programs may help construct dense networks of interaction in the political and sociological sense. Yet no evidence is presented that such networks actually emerge, control important political resources, nor wield influence. Hence, it still remains for scholars to conduct empirical research and theoretical analysis of causal pathways by which networks influence European public policy.
The empirical identification of several dozen EU programs, however, neatly compiled in tabular form, provides a promising basis for such efforts.

The contributions to general integration theory are less sure-footed. A bold critique of the intergovernmentalist approach conflates it with Realism. Realists, as the author correctly notes, assume invariant (or irrelevant) national preferences and permit national strategies to change only in response to appropriate changes in the political environment. Liberal intergovernmentalists, however, lay primary emphasis on variation in underlying national preferences, which in turn reflects domestic and transnational societal pressures, as represented by domestic institutions. Intergovernmentalism, moreover, explicitly treats supranational institutions (e.g., majority voting, delegation to the Commission and Court) as means through which governments secure interstate bargains. Hence the proposal with which the book closes, namely that intergovernmentalist accounts be supplanted by those that stress preference convergence and institutional construction, is perhaps overstated.

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**America/Americas.** By Eldon Kenworthy. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. Pp. xvi, 189. $35.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.)

The two volumes under review comprise an oddly complementary pair, Cohen’s by presenting a comparison of the channels for public participation in U.S. and Dutch foreign policymaking, and Kenworthy’s by focusing on the influence of discourse or language on U.S. foreign policy. Taken together, they reinforce current thinking about the importance of ideas, institutions, and the interactions among these variables for foreign policymaking.

Cohen’s comprehensive study examines the ways domestic institutions determine the degree of public access to foreign policymakers. The author explores the constraints imposed by the political system—its legal-constititutional structure and the organization of foreign policy authority—as well as by “public opinion institutions”—including political parties, national legislatures, media, mass opinion, and interest groups.

The U.S. and Dutch cases provide some notable points of comparison. The U.S. doctrine of separation of powers creates multiple points of access to the political system, whereas the concentration of political power within the Dutch cabinet means that parliament and, hence, the public have little influence on Dutch foreign policy. Similarly, the bureaucratic structures and the cultural norms of participation in the two states differ: In the United States there exist no clear institutional channels for the expression of foreign policy preferences, while the expression of these preferences is culturally acceptable; therefore, individuals seek direct forms