

We have listed them above as being the stabilization of the CIS, the securing of oil supplies (which means the stabilization of the Middle East), and the promotion of free trade. This last point shows that success is not easily achieved; but we only mean that the U.S. will do everything it can to reach this objective, and it still can do much.

Other international problems are more remote from American concerns and priorities. In that sense, too, America today has become a relative power. But what country is today able to replace the U.S. as an "ideological myth," both attractive and repulsive at the same time?

<sup>1</sup>This article was written in June 1992, before Clinton's election.

<sup>2</sup>In "Post Victory Blues," *Foreign Affairs* 71:1 (1991-1992).

## European Federalism and Modern Social Science: A Rejoinder on the Maastricht Referendum

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In the last issue of this journal, I suggested that the outcome of the recent French referendum on the Maastricht treaty, whether strongly positive, strongly negative or, as it actually turned out, a "petit oui," would be unlikely to divert the medium- and long-term evolution of the EC.<sup>1</sup> I offered three reasons: (1) few of the provisions of the Maastricht treaty directly promote further integration, while most current EC programs (CAP, Europe 1992) remain secure; (2) monetary integration depends on the policies of a few core states acting, in the long term, largely on the basis of their economic interest; (3) public opinion does not in general directly constrain West European foreign policies (certainly not in France), while conceivable anti-European coalitions of parties and elites that might constrain policy indirectly appear unelectable and unstable.

In the same issue appeared a response, at somewhat greater length, by Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia and George Ross, two subtle and well-informed analysts of French politics, who raise some insightful criticisms of my argument.<sup>2</sup> Although Meunier and Ross intend to "reply" and "disagree" with my initial article, there is substantial agreement between us. We agree that the actual provisions of the Maastricht treaty are "modest and conservative"; that public opinion has been, up to now, unimportant in the history of the EC; that decisive popular rejection of the treaty could transform the "short-term" evolution of the EC; and that future European integration is not guaranteed by functional factors, but requires a favorable constellation of domestic issues as well (Meunier/Ross, 58-59).<sup>3</sup>

Meunier and Ross's most profound disagreement with my position, therefore, lies not in their contrary assessment of the past, but in their assertion that the past no longer matters. In their view, Maastricht marks a "watershed" in the medium- and long-term evolution of the EC, because large numbers of citizens are now mobilized *in an unprecedented way* to pressure European governments with regard to the EC. Therefore, they argue, "one cannot generalize the future of the Community from its past history" (Meunier/Ross, 65). Today, given broad popular mobilization, the most

effective—perhaps the only way to promote further European integration is to forge an alliance between pro-European supranational and national leaders, on the one hand, and mass publics, on the other. This in turn is possible only by creating stronger European institutions, particularly in the foreign policy area, and by redressing the “democratic deficit.” The best strategy of institutional creation is to give politicians a broad mandate, as in the Maastricht treaty, that will encourage them to mobilize constituencies around a European agenda whenever the appropriate moment arises (Meunier/Ross, 60-61, 63). “The history of the Community is replete with forgotten grandiose proposals and evolute declarations” that seemed insignificant, but “later proved to be of fundamental importance” (Meunier/Ross, 60).

In response, I shall limit myself to two sets of observations, the first concerning the implicit federalism underlying Meunier and Ross’s approach, and the second regarding the deeper question of the limits to social scientific analysis in a case such as this.

#### FEDERALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM

Meunier and Ross’s conception of how the EC works is a curious combination of *dirigisme* and democracy. In their criticism of my argument, they stress the independent power of public opinion, yet they ultimately turn to an account of the EC in which supranational and national officials play the leading role. This leads them to be at once pessimists and optimists: pessimists because public opinion is turning against the EC and optimists because bold leadership—and particularly a democratization of the EC—could recreate an idealistic consensus for Europe (Meunier/Ross, 60-61, 63-64).

This tension between “bottom-up” and “top-down” interpretations can be resolved only if we understand that Meunier and Ross’s view of the EC is classically, if largely implicitly, federalist. (By federalism, I mean a specific positive theory of how the EC evolves, not a normative commitment to European integration—which, by the way, we share.) The basic premise of federalist theory is that public opinion will respond to strong supranational leadership and bold institutional initiatives, if only leaders can muster the “political will” to exploit opportunities for radical reform, binding themselves to policies that commit them to transcend narrow self-interest. Meunier and Ross not only view public opinion as decisive in the process

of national interest formation, but assert that it is highly responsive to appeals from European leaders. The antidote to the perennial “crisis” of integration is more integration—the so-called “bicycle theory,” with which Meunier and Ross associate themselves.<sup>4</sup>

Because supranational institutions and ideals shape individual interests, the failure to move forward must be seen as the result of an underlying *institutional* failure, rather than ambiguous or conflicting interests among the member-states. This view is not uncommon in the Commission, where the popular euphoria surrounding Europe 1992 between 1988 and 1991 is widely seen as the result of skillful supranational political entrepreneurship.<sup>5</sup> If current public opinion does not appear to be supportive of Europe, this is only due to “the absence of a genuine European political culture,” which results in a sort of false consciousness; only democratization and European idealism can raise it (Meunier/Ross, 63-64). This approach differs from my more functionalist approach, which reverses this causality: European institutions must work within the constraints set by national interests, which I calculate largely (though not exclusively) in terms of economic interest and domestic partisan coalitions, not public opinion. Meunier and Ross are suspicious of such “functionalism,” into which, they write disapprovingly, I “strangely slip” (Meunier/Ross, 57).

A striking example of Meunier and Ross’s commitment to the federalist proposition that institutional commitments can alter fundamental identities and interests of citizens and politicians is their treatment of common foreign and defense policy.<sup>6</sup> If only the EDC had been ratified in 1954, they speculate, Franco-German military union might have been consummated, the Algerian War avoided, the Soviet Union overthrown earlier, and Europe able to act effectively in the former Yugoslavia (Meunier/Ross, 64). Similarly, unless there is a rapid movement toward political union today, a political apocalypse awaits. Movements of the extreme right might interpret rejection as “legitimation for nationalism and justification for pursuing their heinous endeavors.” Warring Bosnians and Serbians would come to believe that “European countries were more interested in looking inward than in committing themselves to solve the Yugoslav crisis.” The U.S. might react “negatively,” believing that “integration would suddenly stop and a state of ego-tism, heightened nationalism, and chaos would cover Europe” (Meunier/Ross, 67). In short, the strength of European institutions creates a set of expectations that exercise have a decisive stabilizing force on world politics.

Individuals (not just in Europe but across several continents) respond to institutional change by developing entirely different preferences and values.<sup>7</sup>

This is a bold claim, but not unprecedentedly so. It has in fact long been associated with European federalism, championed by leaders like the venerable Italian MEP Altiero Spinelli. For decades, Spinelli heaped scorn on the attempts by Jean Monnet, the High Authority, Commission, and European leaders to work with member governments to achieve a slow functionalist evolution of the ECSC and the EC toward political union—a strategy he termed a “fantastic technocratic illusion” built on weak foundations.<sup>8</sup> Instead, Spinelli summoned EC leaders to link major institutional innovations with direct appeals to the European public. This approach rests on an extraordinary faith in the power of international institutions and supranational ideals to alter the perceived interests of individual citizens and, thereby, their governments. Meunier and Ross are not hostile toward the Commission, as was Spinelli, but otherwise their suspicion of functionalism and their belief that radical political innovation, particularly when grounded in democratic principles, creates its own constituency, is quintessentially federalist.<sup>9</sup>

What we know about European integration suggests that the federalist faith is a weak reed, whether as an analysis of the past, a diagnosis of the present, or a prognosis for the future. Turning first to the past, attempts by supranational and national leaders to push the EC faster than its slowest members were willing to move—from the Commission’s mishandling of the 1965 crisis to Delors’s support for the “Dutch draft” in 1991—have consistently led to disaster. (The activities of the Court of Justice constitute a striking exception, for reasons both material and normative.<sup>10</sup>) Delors’s apparent success in handling the recent monetary committee that bore his name, which Meunier and Ross cite approvingly (“a Delors designer product”), stemmed above all from his willingness to tailor his proposals to the wishes of central bankers and the existence of an underlying Franco-German agreement. This is not to deny Delors’s distinctive political genius, but simply to insist that he is most effective when working well within the constraints of preexisting national interests.<sup>11</sup>

The failure of the EC to develop anything resembling a common foreign and security policy in the four decades since the EDC debacle, while EC policies in other areas have proceeded apace, suggests that structural factors, not

policy errors or institutional failures, have been at work. Even if the EDC had passed, there is little reason to assume that Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, or François Mitterrand would or could have maintained European control over a French army any more than they maintained European control over the French nuclear industry under Euratom. Nor is there evidence that any other postwar German, British, or Italian seriously contemplated such a possibility outside of NATO.<sup>12</sup>

Turning to the present, Meunier and Ross diagnose the trend toward a “Europe à plusieurs vitesses” as a consequence of the weak popular support for Europe over the past few months (Meunier/Ross, 68-69). This is an odd claim, since the Maastricht treaty, which Meunier and Ross see as proclaiming the common commitment to federal union, itself enshrines—and had to enshrine—the two-track principle. Moreover, they ignore the steady trend toward two-track solutions in the EC over the past two decades. During this period, institutional flexibility has become essential to the continuation of European integration. The EMS, for example, could have functioned initially only among a subset of the member-states, and *no* European analyst today believes that EMU can function, at least for the foreseeable future, outside of a core of countries. Intergovernmentalists argue, moreover, that the credible threat of a “two-speed Europe,” far from being an obstacle to integration, has for quite some time constituted the strongest source of political pressure *in favor of further progress*.<sup>13</sup>

As for Yugoslavia, careful analysis reveals that *even with majority voting* there was insufficient support among West European governments for any sort of military intervention, threatened or actual.<sup>14</sup> The unwillingness to intervene early with sanctions and diplomatic pressure resulted not from the failure of collective institutions, but to a combination of misjudgment about an unprecedented situation and a fundamental lack of interest in the region. Indeed, by treating Yugoslavia as an institutional failure, Meunier and Ross overlook a profound aspect of the tragedy there, which lies not in the failure of Western governments to act to defend their vital interest, but in the lack of any such interest. While tragic, the reticence of democratic nations to employ force is also legitimated by precisely the public opinion that Meunier and Ross deem so important. Opposition to costly, open-ended intervention, unlike monetary institution-building, *is* a foreign policy issue on which the public consistently mobilizes. Finally, it seems only too

obvious that right-wing nationalists, whether West European or Yugoslav, do not calibrate their cruelty to the current fortunes of the EC.

Alternative anti-European coalitions in France remain, as I predicted, extremist and unstable. French politics continue to pivot around a left/right split and government policy remains staunchly pro-Europe, even after a massive victory of the Gaullist-led Right. The European issue was relatively unimportant in the parliamentary elections. Nor does it appear to matter within the new government, where pro-European forces are strongly represented. As one deputy remarked on the solid support for Philippe Séguin as President of the Assembly: "Les clivages sur Maastricht ne pèsent pas . . . Il ne faut pas confondre le débat sur Maastricht et l'élection du président de l'Assemblée nationale."<sup>15</sup>

Turning to prognoses for the future, the potential role for European idealism is unclear. Even if federalism was a potentially viable strategy immediately following World War II, is there reason to believe that the values on which it is grounded endure in the collective consciousness nearly a half century later? Joseph Weiler has recently questioned whether values exist today capable of assuming the dynamic role previously played by the ideals of peace, prosperity, and cosmopolitanism.<sup>16</sup> Efforts by François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl to defend the Maastricht agreement by invoking the values of the founding fathers fall on unsympathetic contemporary ears. All in all, it seems more plausible to interpret the sudden burst of enthusiasm about the EC in the late 1980s as an aberration, rather than as a potential motor for future European integration. One can certainly doubt, along with Weiler, that the goal of political unification and the fear of chaos emanating from the East, the two ideals to which Meunier and Ross allude explicitly, is an adequate motivating force.

#### SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HISTORICAL DISCONTINUITY

Yet, having challenged the implicitly federalist view presented by Meunier and Ross, I now turn to my second observation, which concedes the inherent shortcomings of precisely the sort of arguments I have just advanced. In a profound sense, the conflict between the federalist position and my own is unresolvable. This is so because of Meunier and Ross's contention that we are in the throes of fundamental historical discontinuity. This claim permits them to reject as inapplicable to the "new" post-Maastricht community any

historical or contemporary data I or others might present. "Old evidence," they argue, "does not help" (Meunier/Ross, 63). They are, moreover, correct in rejecting such evidence, given their prior beliefs.

Each of my arguments above, based as they are on the expressed interests of states, can be effectively criticized in this way. The interests and identities of the member-states (and Serbian nationalists) might have been different if the Yugoslavian crisis had arisen after thirty years of EDC. If the outcome of the referendum had been a "petit non," perhaps the opposition of the present government would be different. If the member-states had made an earlier effort to involve their citizens in decision making, a more "mature" political culture might have developed, securing support for Maastricht.<sup>17</sup> A different set of institutions might have radically altered the credibility of French monetary policy in the eyes of international financiers.<sup>18</sup> And so on. Since such claims are not easily testable, we are left with the clash of counterfactuals, as the first two articles in this exchange attest.

The problem is unavoidable, because it is fundamental. Social scientific analysis, insofar as it seeks to generalize about the future on the basis of fundamental assumptions drawn from the past and present, often introduces a hidden conservative bias into debates such as this one. Almost by definition, generalization from the past is at its weakest when deployed to predict sudden historical discontinuities. We know, moreover, that a sudden crisis often clears political space for the realization of new and radical ideas.<sup>19</sup> Given that the EC itself is an unprecedented political experiment, we should be particularly cautious about rejecting novel or unprecedented claims about its dynamics. Absent a detailed study of interest formation in European integration from 1957 to the present, we cannot determine the relative importance of interest, ideology, and domestic politics in national policy-making during previous periods of institutional innovation. And while a close examination of electoral behavior and contemporary discourse may tell us much about the nature of that political space today, the instability of public opinion and political allegiances makes it difficult to generalize into the future.

European federalism is perennially inspiring, because it appeals to our ideals rather than our expectations.<sup>20</sup> We can always imagine institutions that might induce member-states to act in a more enlightened way. Similarly, we can imagine a public more informed, involved, and idealistic with regard to Europe. For a half century, the European federalist movement has invoked

this idealism to press for deeper integration: where member-states do not agree, the answer is qualified majority voting; where qualified majority voting is insufficient, the answer is a stronger Commission, Parliament, and Court; where strong institutions do not suffice, the answer is democratization. Despite the failure of federalist strategies, the EC has developed, if haltingly, in this general direction. Hence we can never banish Meunier and Ross's conjecture that European citizens and politicians, constrained as they are by circumstance, live a history of their own choosing.

<sup>1</sup>Andrew Moravcsik, "Interests and Ideals in the European Community: The French Referendum," *French Politics and Society* 11,1 (Winter 1993): 45-56.

<sup>2</sup>Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia and George Ross, "Democratic Deficit or Democratic Surplus?: A Reply to Andrew Moravcsik's Comments on the French Referendum," *ibid.*: 57-69. Further references to this article are included in parentheses in the text.

<sup>3</sup>Meunier and Ross briefly attempt to characterize my view as pure Realism, in which variations in state preferences result solely from "games states play," and "national interests" do not have "important domestic sources." But this has never been my position, either in the article they criticize or in

anything else I have written. See "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," *International Organization* 45 (Winter 1991): 55, in which I argue that "domestic analysis is a precondition for systemic analysis, not a supplement to it." For a general theoretical defense of this position, see my *Liberalism and International Relations Theory* (Harvard University, CFIA Working paper No. 92-6, 1992), 51 pp.

<sup>4</sup>The bicycle theory is not a theory, but simply the metaphorical claim that if the EC stops moving forward, then it will provoke a crisis ("fall off") and slip backwards. See Meunier and Ross, p. 66.

<sup>5</sup>This is Ross's own view. See George Ross, "European Community Politics and the New Europe" (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Center for European Studies, mimeograph, 1992), 37 pp. On page 61 of their joint article, Meunier and Ross cite the example of the "Delors Committee."

<sup>6</sup>We have no disagreement over the short-term prognosis; Meunier and Ross's more interesting arguments concern the long-term influence of institutions. Cf. Meunier and Ross: 59-60.

<sup>7</sup>Meunier and Ross's position is not that European powers would be bogged down in a Bosnian adventure for the second time in a century, but that the threat would render intervention unnecessary.

<sup>8</sup>Altiero Spinelli, *The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), p. 30. Cf. Meunier and Ross: 64-65.

<sup>9</sup>This is quite radically at variance with modern scholarship on "regimes," which see them as functional sets of international rules facilitating cooperation between governments that are so inclined. But the EC, it must be conceded, is no ordinary international economic regime, and the forces underlying its development may be different. See Robert G. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>10</sup>Anne Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "The Law and Politics of the European Court of Justice: Law as a Mask," *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993): 41-76; Geoffrey Garrett, "The European Internal Market: The Political Economy of Regional Integration" (paper prepared for the Ford Foundation Workshop on Multilateralism, Stanford University, Stanford CA, 1990).

<sup>11</sup>My interpretation is drawn from interviews, over the past year, with one member of the Delors Committee and the chief negotiator for a European government. This is similar to Delors's role in the Single Act. See Moravcsik, "Negotiating...": 46-47.

<sup>12</sup>For an interesting consideration of this counterfactual, which supports my conclusions, see Alessandro Sili, *Europe's Political Puzzle: A Study of the Fouchet Negotiations and the 1963 Veto* (Cambridge MA: Harvard

University Center for International Affairs Occasional Paper No. 17, 1967). On Euratom, in which de Gaulle responded to majority voting by undermining the organization, see Lawrence Scheinman, *Euratom: Nuclear Integration in Europe* (International Conciliation No. 563) (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1967) and Christian Deubner, *Die Atompolitik der westdeutschen Industrie und die Gründung von Euratom* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1977).

<sup>13</sup>Moravcsik, "Negotiating...."

<sup>14</sup>For two close analyses of the Yugoslav crisis that reach this conclusion, see James B. Steinberg, *The Role of European Institutions in Security After the Cold War: Some Lessons From Yugoslavia* (Santa Monica CA: RAND Note N-3445-FF, 1992), 52 pp. and Lily Gardner Feldman, "The EC in the International Arena: A New Activism?" in *Europe and the United States: Cooperation and Competition in the 1990s* (Study Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives) (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 141-160.

<sup>15</sup>*Le Monde*, 4-5 April 1993, p. 6. I am grateful to Sophie Meunier for pointing out this quotation.

<sup>16</sup>Joseph Weiler, "Fin-de-siècle Europe: Ideological Change in the EC," Paper delivered at the Study Group on European integration and Domestic Policymaking, Harvard University Center for European Studies, March 17, 1992.

<sup>17</sup>Taking the two-level game hypothesis seriously, as I do, but rejecting the view that public opinion is important, might lead analysts to the conclusion that the EC has functioned effectively in large part precisely because it was relatively undemocratic, insulating governments from special-interest pressure. This is consistent with contemporary analyses of foreign economic policy.

<sup>18</sup>We would do well, however, not to ignore what evidence there is. Meunier and Ross overlook my initial article, where I drew on the historical record of the EMS to demonstrate that long-term policy trends have not been disturbed by crises of confidence, absent a change in real economic fundamentals. See "Idealism and Interest": 49-51.

<sup>19</sup>See, for example, the essays in Peter A. Hall, ed., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

<sup>20</sup>Federalism appeals to a strand of liberal internationalism common, if in different forms, to all advanced industrial democracies. See Ralph White, "The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi," in Peter M. R. Stirk, ed., *European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), pp. 23-40.

James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1992)

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Study of international migration long languished in a kind of limbo or ghetto. Its interdisciplinary nature relegated it to marginal status in disciplines like sociology or political science. It seemed to be an arcane, esoteric subject matter of less than critical significance. International relations theory paid scant attention to it, although scholars like Raymond Aron, in his magnum opus *Peace and War*, understood it to be part of an emerging transnational society.

The enduring contribution made by James F. Hollifield in this important and ambitious work is to connect the issue of international migration to major theoretical and philosophical debates in the social sciences and beyond. As in a Greek tragedy, however, the very strength of the book becomes its fatal flaw—the analysis is so far-ranging that theory and thesis overstep the conclusions that prudent analysis warrant. There is much to be praised in this work. On balance, its insights outweigh the doubts raised by reservations concerning the empirical basis for some key arguments. I found myself concurring with much of the analysis, but disagreeing with several central parts of it.

The book begins with a review of theories of international relations as they pertain to international migration. The author questions realist, statist assumptions of sovereignty and state control. He finds the theory of hegemonic stability more useful, and particularly embraces John Ruggie's notion of embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. Liberal notions of rights spill over into international relations. The key argument holds that the extension of rights-based politics to international migrants decreased state capacity to regulate international migration. Hence, the growing saliency of migration problems and issues. He also argues that the globalization of the economy creates market forces, namely employer demand for foreign labor, which state intervention can do little to alter.