

Money, Price Level and Output in the Chinese Macro Economy

Gregory C Chow^{*}

Princeton University
gchow@princeton.edu

Yan Shen

Peking University
yshen@ccer.edu.cn

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Abstract

Following a monetary history of the Chinese macro-economy, an error correction model to explain inflation from 1954 to 2002 is presented that passes the Chow test of parameter stability in spite of institutional changes. A VAR explaining the logs of price level, output and money supply yields impulse responses that support the Friedman proposition that output reacts to money shocks first but the effect is short-lived and prices react later but the effect lasts longer. A similar VAR using US data shows the same pattern of impulse responses as the Chinese case, confirming the universality of the Friedman proposition as stated in Bernanke (2003).

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I. Introduction

This paper presents an abridged history of China's macroeconomy from the early 1950s to 2004. It is abridged because only three macroeconomic variables, money stock M , real output Y and the price level P are analyzed. The basic hypothesis concerning the co-movements of these three variables is due to the work of Milton Friedman (1994). A major proposition guiding our work is that when money supply increases, whatever the cause, real output will first increase before the price level increases but real output will die down more rapidly than prices. This proposition will be used to explain the changes in the price level and output in relation to the changes in money stock in China's macroeconomic history from the 1950s to 2004. This is done in section II.

In section III we will explain the price level and inflation statistically by first estimating a linear regression of $\log P$ on $\log(M/P)$. If this regression is interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relation, or a cointegrating relation, between $\log P$, and $\log(M/Y)$, the residuals can be interpreted as deviations from equilibrium or errors in the explanation of $\log P$, to be denoted by u . To explain inflation as measured by $\Delta \log P$, we use as explanatory variables its own lagged value, $\Delta \log(M/Y)$ and $u(t-1)$. The coefficient of $u(t-1)$ is expected to be negative because a value of $\log P$ above equilibrium in the last period will tend to dampen price increase in the current period in this error-correction equation to explain inflation. This section updates the work of Chow (1987) and follows the methodology of Engle and Granger (1987). One interesting result is that the parameters of this error-correction equation explaining inflation are temporally stable from 1954 to 2002 as confirmed by the Chow (1960) test using 1979, the year economic reform started, as the break point.

We estimate in section IV a VAR to explain the changes in the three variables, $\log M$, $\log P$ and $\log Y$, denoted by the vector x . The VAR is a vector regression of $\Delta x(t)$ on $x(t-1)$ and $\Delta x(t-1)$. By the maximum likelihood method of Johansen (1991), the coefficient matrix of $x(t-1)$ is found to have rank one, to be written as ab' . The vector $b'x(t-1)$ corresponds to the regression of $\log P$ on $\log(M/Y)$ in section III, and turns out to be similar numerically. Using this VAR we compute the impulse responses of $\log P$ and $\log Y$ to unexpected changes in $M2$. The dynamic effects are found to be consistent with the major propositions of Milton Friedman stated above on the effects of money supply on price and output, and as recently summarized in Bernanke (2003).

Section V compares the impulse responses estimated by using US and Chinese data with M1 replacing M2, and finds that the general patterns are quite similar in spite of the institutional differences between these two countries. Section VI concludes.

It is worthwhile in the introduction to state the possible contribution of this paper and the position that we take to avoid possible misunderstanding. On our presentation of monetary history although the facts are well-known our interpretation is perhaps original and provides a background for the econometric analysis to follow. On the reliability of Chinese data, we believe that the data selected are reliable for econometric analysis as illustrated by examples presented in Chow (2002) and elsewhere. We ask a skeptical reader to keep an open mind and see what the analysis of this paper will show. Concerning the possible effect of institutional changes after 1978, it is our purpose to find out whether the effects of money on prices and output and whether the relation between inflation and the ratio of money supply and output remained the same after economic reform. The fact that China had a planned economy before 1979 does not rule out the possibility that the mechanism explaining inflation remains valid. Just witness the inflation of over 16 percent in 1961 which could be explained by the large reduction in output and a substantial increase in money supply. When the first author started using the error-correction model to explain inflation in 1985, data up to only 1984 were available and were used to estimate an equation that was capable of predicting in 1985 (before the fact) – see Chow (1987) for a revised version of this study.

Although the VAR model used is crude, it helps to summarize the statistical properties of the data and sheds light on our main question as to whether the Friedman empirical proposition is valid. This paper should not be viewed as a contribution to testing a macroeconomic theory based on sound micro foundations, but only as a test of an empirical proposition proposed by Friedman. The empirical validity of the Friedman proposition as stressed by Bernanke (2003) for the Chinese economy appears to us as an important question to study. When we estimate a similar VAR using US data we do not claim that this is a contribution to macro-econometric studies of the US. Our purpose is to find out whether the empirical validity of the Friedman proposition uncovered from the Chinese data is also found using similar US data. If the answer is positive, we can conclude that the Friedman proposition is empirically valid for both China and the US even when the conclusion is based on crude VAR models that may ignore many important elements of

both economies. We will test the robustness of the impulse responses in the US case by adding interest rate as an additional variable.

II. A Brief Monetary History of the Chinese Macro-economy

In this section we provide a brief explanation of the important movements of price and output in response to changes in money supply where money supply itself can be the result of other factors. This is a simplified economic history but it can be interesting to the extent that money supply changes can be explained and the resulting movements in price and output are consistent with Friedman's proposition as stated at the beginning of this paper. We start with an explanation of the large price changes, and then explain the large output changes.

Table 1 provides five sets of data from 1954 to 2002: General retail price index P at the end of the year (column 2), the inflation rate measured by 100 times $P(t)/P(t-1)$ (column 3), real GDP index Y (column 4), M2 at the end of the year in 100 million yuan (column 5) and M1 at the end of the year (column 6).

Table 1 Price Level of China and its Determinants

Year	General retail price index	P_t/P_{t-1} x100	GDP index	M2	M1
1952	0.8227	99.6	22	74.50314	64.6
1953	0.8506	103.4	25.1	82.00875	79.0
1954	0.8705	102.3	26.6	90.20963	87.4
1955	0.8793	101.0	28.3	94.85521	89.9
1956	0.8793	100.0	32.3	132.3043	120.0
1957	0.8926	101.5	33.7	139.0515	133.9
1958	0.8947	100.2	41.2	194.0242	213.5
1959	0.9028	100.9	44.6	226.401	257.4
1960	0.9308	103.1	43.9	256.6131	289.3
1961	1.082	116.2	30.9	286.1142	359.2
1962	1.1229	103.8	28.9	233.48	353.5
1963	1.0567	94.1	32	214.0444	365.6
1964	1.0177	96.3	37.2	214.5185	352.4
1965	0.9904	97.3	43.5	246.5319	399.6
1966	0.9875	99.7	50.9	285.2925	454.5
1967	0.9801	99.3	44.5	309.5001	499.1
1968	0.9809	100.1	44.2	335.6512	520.6
1969	0.9698	98.9	52.7	336.8679	505.6

1970	0.9676	99.8	65	320.8612	506.6
1971	0.9603	99.2	69.5	357.9469	553.8
1972	0.9581	99.8	71.5	404.8609	586.7
1973	0.9639	100.6	77.5	454.3348	681.4
1974	0.9691	100.5	78.3	494.3595	769.2
1975	0.9706	100.2	84.9	525.0772	845.4
1976	0.9735	100.3	82.6	573.4608	900.6
1977	0.9934	102.0	89	595.6617	905.6
1978	1.000	100.7	100	668.1896	954.7
1979	1.02	102.0	107.6	867.0332	1208.1
1980	1.081	106.0	116	1178.303	1486.2
1981	1.107	102.4	122.1	1453.783	1707.0
1982	1.128	101.9	133.1	1761.087	1972.9
1983	1.145	101.5	147.6	2247.387	2291.5
1984	1.177	102.8	170	3171.021	3233.0
1985	1.281	108.8	192.9	4188.024	3450.1
1986	1.358	106.0	210	5460.866	4393.8
1987	1.457	107.3	234.3	7154.482	5173.1
1988	1.727	118.5	260.7	9378.91	6376.4
1989	2.034	117.8	271.3	11836.63	6804.6
1990	2.077	102.1	281.7	15293.4	6950.7
1991	2.137	102.9	307.6	19349.9	8633.3
1992	2.252	105.4	351.4	25402.2	11731.5
1993	2.549	113.2	398.8	34879.8	16280.4
1994	3.102	121.7	449.3	46923.5	20540.7
1995	3.561	114.8	496.5	60705.5	23987.1
1996	3.778	106.1	544.1	76094.9	28514.8
1997	3.808	100.8	592	90995.3	34826.3
1998	3.709	97.4	638.5	104498.5	38953.7
1999	3.598	97.0	684.1	119897.9	45837.3
2000	3.544	98.5	738.8	134610.3	53147.2
2001	3.516	99.2	794.2	158301.9	59871.6
2002	3.47	98.7	857.4	185007	70881.8

Data Sources: *China Statistical Yearbook (2003)*, for general retail price index, 1978 - 2002 (pp.313), GDP index, 1978 – 2002 (pp. 58), M1 and M2, 1990 – 2002 (pp. 704). The 1952 – 1977 data for the indices are also from earlier years of *China Statistical Yearbook* but directly taken from Chow (2002), page 120. The pre-1990 M1 is constructed as currency in circulation plus demand deposits. The pre-1990 M2 is approximated as linking currency plus savings deposits data with the official M2 series, where the linking factor is $1.58 (\text{official M2 of 1990}) / (\text{currency} + \text{savings deposits in 1990})$.

To explain inflation we consider a weak form of the quantity theory of money because the functional form of the quantity equation $Mv=PY$ may not be correct empirically. The weak form states that, with Y held constant, P tends to increase as M increases; with M constant, P tends to

increase as Y decreases, and P constant, Y tends to increase as M increases. The quantity theory as specified by the particular functional form of the quantity equation may not be empirically valid even in the long run for various reasons. First, interest rate affects v and may not be constant in the long run. Second, interpreted as a demand for money equation $(M/P) = Y/v$, it implies an income elasticity of unity which may be empirically incorrect. We take from the quantity theory not the exact quantity equation but a weaker proposition as stated above. To explain P we first find out whether the variable M has changed if the relative change in M is much larger than the change in Y . We also examine whether Y has changed and if so it is expected to have a negative effect on P . These basic ideas are used to interpret the major changes in prices and output in China. The explanation is given verbally and informally in this section, and more formally in statistical terms in the next section.

We first examine the major changes in the price index and its relation to changes in M and possibly to Y , the latter asserting a negative effect. The data of Table 1 reveals that all episodes of inflation were associated with substantial increase in the ratio M/Y . In 1961 the price index increased by 16.1 percent while money stock (measured by $M2$ in this exposition but $M1$ will do as well) increased from 226.4 in 1959 to 286.1 in 1961, or by 26.4 percent and the real output index decreased dramatically from 43.9 in 1960 to 30.9 in 1961. The dramatic decline in output was a result of the economic failure of the Great Leap Forward Movement that had started in 1958.

In the era of economic reform after 1978 there have been episodes of inflation in 1985, 1988, and 1993-5. Money stock increased from 2247.4 at the end of 1983 to 4188.0 at the end of 1985, or by 86.3 percent in these two years, more in percentage terms than for any previous two years. The inflation rate in 1985 was 8.8 percent. The reason for the rapid increase in money stock was the banking reform policy introduced in 1982-3 to allow the banks more autonomy to extend credits, perhaps similar to the autonomy introduced for state-owned enterprises in the reform process. From the end of 1986 to the end of 1988 money stock increased from 5460.9 to 9378.9 or by 71.7 percent in these two years. The government did not slow down the fairly rapid increase in money supply perhaps because it did not understand the mechanism of inflation as we specify in section III. The inflation rate in 1988 was 18.5 percent. The reason for this inflation rate to be higher than the rate in 1985 is the delayed effects of the substantial increases in money supply for several

years prior to 1988 while the percentage increases in the years prior to 1983 were much smaller. It has been observed that inflation in 1988, together with government corruption, were the two major causes of discontent among the population and indirectly of the tragic Tiananmen Incident on June 4, 1989.

From the end of 1991 to the end of 1996 money stock increased from 19349.9 to 76094.9 or by a factor of 3.93 in 5 years. The inflation rates in 1993, 1994 and 1995 were 13.2, 21.7 and 14.8 percent respectively. The large increases in money stock in these years were the result of Deng Xiaoping's Southern Expedition in February 1992 in which he set forth a policy of further reform and opening and urged rapid development of the economy. Banks received the green light to expand credit for investment projects. It was Zhu Rongji as Governor of the People's Bank or Central Bank and later as Vice Premier who managed to stop the rapid increase in money supply after 1996 (as seen in Table 1). He did so mainly by the administrative means of assigning credit quotas to the People's Banks of different provinces and succeeded in stopping inflation. A provincial People's bank's president would lose his job if the credit quota were exceeded.

We next turn briefly to the effects on output associated with the large increases in money supply in the above episodes. Since the average rate of annual growth of real output was about 9.5 percent from 1979 to 1998, any increase much above that average can be considered large. Output increased by 170/147.6 or 15.2 percent in 1984 and by 192.9/170 or 13.5 percent in 1985 when money supply increased very rapidly in 1983-4. It increased by 260.7/234.3 or 11.3 percent in 1988, and by 449.3/398.8 or 12.7 percent in 1994. This is a part of the history of China's economic fluctuations as measured by changes in total output.

The data in Table 1 terminate in 2002, but macroeconomic developments up to the second quarter of 2004 are also consistent with the Friedman proposition that increase in money supply first leads to increase in output and then to increase in prices. Money supply increased rapidly in 2002-3 mainly as a result of the large inflow of foreign exchanges acquired through large trade surplus and large inflow of foreign investment. The acquired foreign exchange was converted into high power money in the banks. This led to rapid expansion of money and credit and to increases in investment and output in 2003. The annual rate of increase in M2 was about 13 percent in January 2002, rose to over 18 percent at the end of 2002 and to over 21 percent in mid-2003, and was

reduced to about 18 percent in the beginning of 2004. China's real GDP increased at a 9.1 percent rate in 2003 and a 9.8 percent rate in the first quarter of 2004 as compared with 8.0 percent in 2002 (see Table 1). Signs of inflation began to show in the last quarter of 2003, with the rate of inflation rising to 3.8 percent annually in April 2004 (the highest rate in seven years).

In presenting this abridged history of the Chinese macroeconomy we have to be aware of the possible inaccuracy of the Chinese official data on which our exposition is based. Support for the usefulness and reliability of most official Chinese data has been given in Chow (1985; 2002, pp. 90-91, 152-3; 2004, pp. 59-63). The accuracy of the data given in Table 1 can be inferred partly by using them to interpret economic reality based on confirmed economic hypotheses. The above discussion of the effect of money on prices and output is an example, while other examples can be found in Chow (2002). The accuracy of economic data and the validity of well accepted economic hypotheses in explaining the data help to reinforce each other. The fact that official output statistics in Table 1 show a large reduction of real output in 1961 from 43.9 to 30.9 suggests that official statisticians are willing to report large economic failures of China. We hope that the reader will be able to form a better judgment on the accuracy of these data after reading the remainder of this paper.

Nevertheless Young (2003) has raised questions on the accuracy of Chinese output data. His main point is that if we deflate output in money terms by its implicit deflator to obtain real output, the estimate of increase in real output is too large if the deflator underestimates the true inflation rate. By replacing the output deflator by another official price index, such as the retail price index shown in his Table 3 for deflating output of the Secondary (industrial) sector, we will get a smaller rate of growth of real output. The most dramatic difference between the two results is found in Young (2003, p. 1233) for the growth of GDP in 1989 when his alternative estimate shows a negative 5 percent and the official estimate shows a positive 4 percent (from Table 1, $271.3/260.7 = 1.041$). The alternative estimate is grossly in error. First, the retail price index in 1989 was abnormally high according to the explanation given in section III below (see Figures 2 and 3 and Table 2 for the two large positive residuals in 1988 and 1989 and the verbal explanation following Table 2). Second, *China Statistical Yearbook 1990* (Tables 10-29 and 10-30) provides data on outputs in physical units of individual industrial products and most of them show an increase in 1989 as compared with 1988. Third, China's real GDP was growing at 11.3 percent in


1988 and a reduction to the official rate of 4.1 percent in 1989 was a very large reduction. Peaceful demonstrations did not start until April and the Tiananmen Incident occurred on June 4, 1989. We can reasonably assume that for the first six months of 1989, real GDP was increasing at least at 7 percent annually as compared with 11.3 percent the year before. To get a negative growth of -5 percent for the entire year would require an annual rate of decline in output of about -17 percent (3.5 in the first half and -8.5 in the second half) in the second half of 1989, which is highly unlikely. Much of the revision of output growth given in Young (2003) is due to this very large difference of -9 percent in one year.

III. An error-correction model to explain inflation in China

This section updates the work of Chow (1987) to explain the change in $\log P$ by its lagged value, the change in $\log(M/Y)$ and an error-correction term, where M denotes money supply and Y denotes real output. $M2$ is used because our simple model fails to include the rate of interest which may affect the demand for $M1$ more than it affects $M2$ as an increase in the interest rate would tend to reduce the demand for $M1$ relative to the interest yielding deposits in the remainder of $M2$. Results from using $M1$ for money stock will be reported in section IV for comparison with corresponding results for the United States.

After pointing out in the previous section the relation between changes in the price level and associated changes in money stock or real output in the major inflation episodes (real output being less volatile than the money stock except for the year 1961) we examine the statistical relation between $\log P$ and $\log(M/Y)$. Figure 1 plots $\log(P)$ against $\log(M2/Y)$ over the entire sample period. Overall, the plot suggests that in the long run, the relation between $\log(P)$ and $\log(M2/Y)$ is approximately linear.

Figure 1 Plotting $\log(P)$ against $\log(M2/Y)$



The long run relation between $\log(P)$ and $\log(M2/Y)$ is then estimated by regressing $\log(P)$ on $\log(M2/Y)$ and a constant:

$$\log(P) = -0.7127 + 0.3738 \log(M2/Y), \quad \text{Adjusted } R^2 = 0.9639.$$

(0.031) (0.0102)

Following Chow (1987; 2002, p. 124), the lagged value of the residual u_{t-1} of the above regression is used as an independent variable representing the error correction term in estimating the equation that explains the inflation rate $\Delta \log(P)$:


$$\Delta \log(P) = -0.0009 + 0.1603 \Delta \log(M2/Y) + 0.55 \Delta \log(P_{-1}) - 0.031 \Delta \log((M2/Y)_{-1}) - 0.169 u_{-1}$$

(0.0065) (0.0429) (0.108) (0.052) (0.055)

Adjusted $R^2 = 0.6274$.

The residuals of the above model are plotted in Figure 2 to examine how well this model explains the data:

Figure 2 The Residual Plot for Model 1 (including $\Delta \log((M / Y)_{-1})$)



As $\Delta \log((M / Y)_{-1})$ is not significant, it is omitted in the following regression:

$$\Delta \log(P) = -0.00017 + 0.155\Delta \log(M / Y) + 0.525\Delta \log(P_{-1}) - 0.1575u_{-1}, \text{ Adjusted } R^2 = 0.6328.$$

(0.006)
(0.042)
(0.0924)
(0.0512)

Figure 3 plots its residuals and Table 2 presents the data on the residuals from the two models:

Figure 3 Residuals Plot for Model 2 (without $\Delta \log((M/Y)_{-1})$)




Table 2 Residuals for Model 1 and Model 2

Year	Model 1	Model 2	Year	Model 1	Model 2
1954	0.0147977	0.0170414	1979	-0.0144812	-0.0121256
1955	0.0190982	0.0183888	1980	0.0066371	0.0044539
1956	-0.0167619	-0.0154329	1981	-0.0408543	-0.0431887
1957	0.0286838	0.0230097	1982	-0.0263746	-0.027474
1958	-0.0162445	-0.0149646	1983	-0.0381648	-0.0373604
1959	0.0025254	-0.0002004	1984	-0.03873	-0.038349
1960	0.0047668	0.0045939	1985	0.0132897	0.0124603
1961	0.0598597	0.060335	1986	-0.0463408	-0.0438876
1962	-0.018769	-0.0270627	1987	-0.0171425	-0.0164363
1963	-0.0483036	-0.043342	1988	0.0764033	0.0780104
1964	0.0230726	0.0265138	1989	0.0282354	0.0319061
1965	0.0038139	0.0072676	1990	-0.0986465	-0.0970142
1966	0.0217711	0.021822	1991	-0.009471	-0.0130061
1967	-0.0323494	-0.0304916	1992	0.0048834	0.0040563
1968	-0.0088929	-0.0138018	1993	0.0545428	0.0550307
1969	0.006617	0.0048992	1994	0.0996994	0.100275
1970	0.0373395	0.0421248	1995	0.0256512	0.0273882
1971	-0.0079749	0.0002567	1996	-0.0041078	-0.0047449

1972	-0.0028541	-0.0034836	1997	-0.0041265	-0.0069718
1973	0.0073827	0.0054422	1998	-0.0105428	-0.0137002
1974	-0.007269	-0.0067967	1999	-0.00578	-0.008478
1975	0.0018947	0.0008898	2000	0.0071973	0.0046898
1976	-0.0177193	-0.0153195	2001	-0.008238	-0.0087092
1977	0.0205188	0.0184406	2002	-0.0212666	-0.0226344
1978	-0.0072758	-0.0043201			

The last error correction equation, with the lagged change in $\log(M2/Y)$ omitted, explains the data well. All coefficients have the right sign, including the negative sign for the lagged error or residual in the cointegrating equation estimated by least squares. However, we have found very large residuals in the years 1961, 1988 and 1993-4. The 1961 residual was associated with the Great Leap, with a large increase in money supply and a large reduction in real output in 1961 the effect of which is not sufficiently captured by our equation. The 1988 residual can be attributed to the government announcement, for the sake of controlling inflation at the time, that after December 1988 no price increase was to be allowed. Such an announcement had the effect of inducing retailers to raise their prices in the fall of 1988 before the December deadline. The 1993-94 residuals can be attributed to the effect of Deng Xiaoping's Southern Expedition further opening speech in 1992 which was followed by the Chinese people and government officials seizing the opportunity to follow Deng's urge to expand investments, leading to inflationary pressure as demand for investment goods increased, more so than our equation can explain. In general the equation shows that the theory explains the data well and that the residuals can be used to interpret historical events. From 1997 to 2002 China experienced deflation as shown by the price index in Table 1 while the residuals of our error-correction equation presented in Table 2 are small, showing that our model explains successfully price decreases as well as price increases.

It would be of interest to find out whether the parameters of our error-correction equation changed after 1979, the year economic reform started to change a planned economy towards a market-oriented economy. We all agree that changes in Chinese economic institutions took place after 1979. However such changes in economic institutions need not change the relation between changes in \log price and the determinants given by our equation. The Chow test for testing the null hypothesis of stability of all parameters in our error-correction equation yields an $F(4,41)$ statistic of only 0.78, as compared with the 5 percent critical level of 2.60 and the one percent critical level of 3.51. Hence the null hypothesis of parameter stability is easily accepted. The

result of the stability test further supports the validity of our error-correction model in explaining inflation in China.

IV. A VAR Model with Cointegration

In this section we report on a VAR explaining the vector Δx composed of $\Delta \log(P)$, $\Delta \log(M2)$ and $\Delta \log(Y)$ by $x(t-1)$ and $\Delta x(t-1)$. The coefficient matrix of $x(t-1)$ is written as ab' where b' is the transpose of the cointegrating vector. The cointegrating equation $b'x$ was estimated in section III by regressing $\log(P)$ on $\log(M2/Y)$, as suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) under our assumption that the coefficients of $\log(M2)$ and $\log(Y)$ are opposite in sign and equal in magnitude. We first apply the method of Johansen (1991) to find the rank of the coefficient matrix of $x(t-1)$. Table 3 reports the trace statistics for the number of cointegrating relations:


Table 3 Johansen Cointegration Test
Series: LOG(P) LOG(Y) LOG(M2)

Eigenvalue	Trace Statistic	5 Percent Critical Value	1 Percent Critical Value	Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
0.27	35.34	34.91	41.07	None *
0.26	19.91	19.96	24.60	At most 1
0.10	5.16	9.24	12.97	At most 2

* Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level. Critical values are taken from Enders (2003, p. 403), the panel of critical value for the case with a constant in the cointegrating vector.

The result supports using one cointegrating relation among $\log(P)$, $\log(Y)$ and $\log(M2)$. Hence the rank of the coefficient matrix for the lagged dependent variables is one, and the normalized cointegrating equation is $b'x_{t-1} = \log(P_{t-1}) + 0.6509 \log(y_{t-1}) - 0.5 \log(M2_{t-1}) + 0.3498$. Figure 4 compares this cointegrating equation with the residuals u_{t-1} from regressing $\log(P)$ on $\log(M2/Y)$. It shows that the cointegrating equation and the vector $u(t-1)$ estimated in section 1 exhibit similar behavior.

Figure 4 Plotting the Long-run Relation and Residuals from the OLS Regression




As the Johansen Cointegration Test shows one cointegrating relation, we estimate a vector error-correction VAR assuming one cointegrating relation, numbers in brackets are standard deviations

$$\begin{bmatrix} \Delta \log(P_t) \\ \Delta \log(y_t) \\ \Delta \log(M2_t) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -0.163 \\ (0.06) \\ -0.24 \\ (0.14) \\ -0.07 \\ (0.15) \end{bmatrix} b' x_{t-1} + \begin{bmatrix} 0.54 & 0.137 & 0.11 \\ (0.11) & (0.07) & (0.05) \\ 0.06 & 0.46 & -0.17 \\ (0.26) & (0.16) & (0.13) \\ 0.22 & 0.53 & 0.43 \\ (0.28) & (0.17) & (0.14) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \log(P_{t-1}) \\ \Delta \log(y_{t-1}) \\ \Delta \log(M2_{t-1}) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -0.015 \\ (0.009) \\ 0.064 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.045 \\ (0.02) \end{bmatrix}$$

We are interested in finding out how the price level and real output respond to monetary shocks in the Chinese economy. According to Friedman (1994, p.48), because of price rigidity, the effects of monetary shock will first show up for log output over two to three quarters. Such effects tend to dissipate over time. "The effect on prices, like that on income and output, is distributed over time, but it comes some twelve to eighteen months later, so that the total delay between a change in monetary growth and a change in the rate of inflation averages something like two years". This proposition is confirmed by the studies on US data (Sims (1980), Bernanke and Mihov (1998)) and empirical studies for "virtually all countries" (Bernanke (2003)). However, whether the Chinese data exhibit a similar pattern has not been thoroughly studied. This question is of particular interest since some researchers argue that the institutional differences between the Chinese economy and those of the highly developed economies could make a fundamental difference in explaining the relation between money, price and output (e.g., Peebles (1992)).

We quantify the dynamic effects of monetary shocks on real output and prices by calculating the impulse responses based on the VAR model presented in section 2. Figure 5 plots the impulse responses of $\log(Y)$ and $\log(P)$ to shocks to M2 over 20 years, respectively. The ordering of these three variables in calculating the impulse responses are P, M, and Y. With this ordering the immediate response of $\ln P$ is zero by construction to agree with the prior assumption. Effects of changing the ordering to M, Y, P will be reported in Section V. The result suggests that the dynamic relations between real output, money and price conform Friedman's proposition. In the first year after the expansionary monetary shock, most of the impacts are on real output (the lower panel of figure 5). In the second year, the impact on real output die down quickly, but reaches its maximum for price (the upper panel of Figure 5). The impacts on price then die out over a long horizon.

Figure 5 Impulse Responses for Chinese M2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.



V. Comparing the Impulse Responses from US data and Chinese Data

While the impulse response functions for the Chinese data reported in section IV are consistent with Friedman's predictions, the VAR specification is not the same as in empirical studies for other countries. To compare our results with results based on US data, we use the same VAR specification for the US as given in section IV.

The US annual data is extracted from the dataset prepared for the Fair model provided by Ray Fair in the website <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/>. As only M1 is available in that dataset and it is of interest to reexamine the Chinese impulse responses based on M1 as well, we estimate the VAR model using US M1, real GDP and GDP deflator over the sample period 1966 – 2002 and record the impulse responses of US real output and price level to shocks on US M1 in Figure 6. To make the impulse responses comparable we use Chinese M1 and report the impulse responses in Figure 7.

Figure 6 shows that the general patterns of the responses of real output and price level to monetary shocks agree with Friedman's proposition. The response of output occurs sooner than the response of price but dies down quickly. The response of price peaks at two to three years and dies down much more gradually. Furthermore, by examining the output and price responses using M1 instead of M2, and after changing the ordering of the variables to M, Y, P instead of P, M, Y, we will find that the impulse responses calculated from the US data (Figures 8, 9 and 12) and from the Chinese data (Figures 7, 10 and 11) to be quite similar and to follow the pattern just described.

Figure 6 Impulse Responses of Real Output and Price to US M1 shocks

Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.





Figure 7 Impulse Responses of Real Output and Price to Chinese M1 shocks



The three-variable VAR may be subjected to omitted-variable bias since some relevant variables such as interest rate are not included. To examine the sensitivity of the above results, we augment the US case with the interest rate to get a four-variable VAR. The interest rate we use is Moody's AAA series downloaded from www.economagic.com. Similar to steps in section III, $\log(P)$ is first regressed on a constant, $\log(M1/Y)$ and interest rate to get the residuals as a measurement of the equilibrium relation. Then the four-variable VAR system is estimated and the corresponding impulse responses are plotted in Figure 8.

Figure 8 Impulse Responses of Real Output and Price to US M1 shocks
After Adding Interest rate

Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.




Figure 8 shows that the impulse responses of output and price changes little as compared with Figure 6. It implies that omitting the interest rate does not change substantially the impulse responses of the US data.

To examine the possible effects of the ordering of the variables Figures 9, 10, 11 present respectively the impulse responses based on the US M1, Chinese M1 and Chinese M2 using the ordering M, Y, and P. Figure 12 presents the impulse responses for the US four-variable system in the order of M, Y, P, r. The results show that the general pattern remains the same as before

using the ordering P, M, Y. It also shows that the simplified three-variable VAR system is valid in showing the general validity of Friedman's proposition for both China and the US.

Figure 9 Impulse Responses of Real Output and Price to US M1 shocks
Order M, Y, P




Figure 10 Impulse Responses of Real Output and Price to Chinese M1 shocks
Order M, Y, P

Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.





Figure 11 Impulse Responses of Real Output and Price to Chinese M2 shocks
Order M, Y, P

Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.

Response of DLNP to DLNM2



Response of DLNY to DLNM2





Figure 12 Impulse Responses of Real Output and Price to US M1 shocks
Order M, Y, P, r



VI. Conclusions

Judging from the estimated error correction equation of section III, we can conclude that our specification of the factors affecting inflation can explain the Chinese data well. The equation passed the Chow test for parameter stability when the sample was divided into the pre- and post-reform periods. Thus institutional changes after major economic reforms did not affect the validity of our equation to explain inflation. In spite of institutional differences between China and the more developed Western economies from which empirical support for Friedman's propositions was drawn, the same theory of inflation and of the effects of monetary shocks on price and output applies. When the first author mentioned the proposed research to Milton Friedman, he responded confidently, "you will find the same effects for China." This paper illustrates the power of economic theory and the stability of economic parameters if the

theoretical model is properly specified to explain economic reality, a viewpoint that Milton Friedman has conveyed to his students and the economics profession for over half of a century.

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