

NOONAN, Harold. *Kripke and Naming and Necessity*. London: Routledge, 2013. x + 237 pp. Paper, \$29.95—provides Routledge’s answer to the need faced by every series of guidebooks in philosophy to offer an account of an author, Saul Kripke, and a work, *Naming and Necessity*, that simply cannot be ignored. Since there are any number of rivals in print, it is surprising that the publisher’s blurb fails to mention the feature that most distinguishes this volume from others: the extent of sympathetic coverage of critical responses to Kripke’s work. The novice will get a generally quite careful introduction to the basics of Kripke through this work, though the same novice may be left wondering why Kripke’s work is as highly regarded as the author says it is, given that the author almost always seems to think that Kripke is wrong. The greatest value of the volume will perhaps be for the reader who is already acquainted with Kripke’s classic book and related papers, but interested in the inevitably divided current state of opinion on the issues Kripke discusses.

The guidebook is pretty strictly limited to Kripke’s single best-known work, with brief discussion of ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ and ‘A Puzzle about Belief’ as these become relevant. Kripke’s Locke Lectures were not published in time to have allowed the author to take note of them even if he had been inclined to do so, but *Philosophical*

*Troubles*, which appears in the author's bibliography, does offer a paper 'Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities' on same topic, one highly relevant to the topic of naming. However, since Kripke set that topic aside in *Naming and Necessity*, and perhaps because there has not yet been enough time for critical responses, Noonan sets the topic aside as well.

After a short initial overview in chapter 1, perhaps more easily appreciated by more experienced readers, Noonan turns in chapter 2 to background on the philosophers most discussed in *Naming and Necessity*: Frege and Russell and Quine, but also Searle and Strawson. Noonan does a very good job in trying to explain just what was the state of play in 1970, and why Kripke begins just where he does, something that is seldom done in expository works as carefully as it is done here. (In discussing the background to Kripke, Noonan rightly ignores certain sensationalistic and unscholarly attempts to read novelties introduced in Kripke's lectures back into the previous literature.) The last few pages of this otherwise excellent chapter do not belong in it, good though they may be of their kind. These pages, quoting and discussing works of Quine that date from well after 1970, and which Kripke therefore could hardly have considered or discussed when he first gave his three-lecture series that year, really belong in a later chapter, along with discussion of other critical responses from the 1980's and 1990's.

The two biggest chapters, number 3 on naming and number 4 on necessity, alternate exposition of Kripke with exposition of critics of Kripke, especially the earliest and best-known ones. The exposition of Kripke is virtually always accurate and not seldom insightful, though there are bound to be differences at least of emphasis between any two expositors. (I myself would, for instance, give more weight to connections between Kripke's defense of *de re* modality and his insistence that the metaphysical notion of necessity must not be confused with analyticity, and to how Kripke's notion of rigid designator differs from Russell's notion of proper name, which foreshadows Kaplan's notion of direct reference. Also, I would put a lot less weight to Kripke's much-hedged throw-away remarks to the effect that there may be *a priori* contingents.) The critics and counter-critics discussed are generally the most important or influential, and generally the most important points made on both sides are brought out, though again there are bound to be differences of opinion about the merits of the argument advanced. (I myself think that Noonan takes Evans's Madagascar example much too seriously, and Soames's discussion of counterfactual propositional attitudes not at all seriously enough. But an 800-word review is obviously not the place to debate such issues.)

Chapter 5, on natural kind terms, is shorter, because though the subject is large, Kripke's published remarks on it are brief; and though Kripke and Putnam are often mentioned in the same breath in this connection, it is not safe to project views of the one onto the other. Noonan rightly underscores the importance of Kripke's discussion in the Appendix to *Naming and Necessity*, brief and guarded though it is, of the *a priori* sources or background to *a posteriori* necessity. Overall, Noonan has probably identified the strongest rival to Kripke's position with his tilt towards the contextual relativity emphasized by Lewis.

A useful glossary follows the body of the text.

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