Dynamic Oligopoly and Optimal Patent Design[Job Market Paper]
This paper studies optimal patent policy design.
The paper constructs a dynamic oligopoly model of innovation
with intellectual property. Firms invest in both
R&D and also litigate with each other to resolve patent
disputes. The effects and interactions of several different
patent policy instruments are studied jointly. The
paper provides some qualitative rules for how patent policy
might vary across industries with different underlying
characteristics. The differences between static and
dynamic patent models are demonstrated, as well as the
complexity and tradeoffs of mixing different patent policy
instruments to form "patent strength".
A Grid Algorithm for Solving Repeated Games with
Imperfect Monitoring
This project develops new computational methods for the
computation of the Abreu-Pearce-Stachetti equilibrium
correspondence in games with imperfect monitoring.
Theoretically, the proposed algorithm improves on the
standard Judd-Yeltekin-Conklin algorithm by giving precise
error bands on the difference between the computed
approximate APS operator and the true APS operator. Early
tests show some speed advantages for the grid algorithm in
practical applications.
A Java package (rgsolve) for analyzing
two-player repeated games with perfect
monitoring. This package implements the
algorithms of Dilip
Abreu and Yuliy
Sannikov. The software was developed with
Dilip Abreu, Benjamin
Brooks, and Yuliy Sannikov.
Pure
Strategy SPNE Payoffs: A three-firm repeated Bertrand pricing
game in a
differentiated product demand
system
(20 price actions per firm, δ = 2/3)
AuctionSolver
Downloadable,
freeware, software for calculating Nash equilibria in
several different auction mechanisms. Includes a
2-bidder, N-bidder,
and symmetric solver. The N-bidder solver allows the user to choose
from several different solution methods, including (i) fixed
point iterations (ii) backwards shooting and (iii)
projection methods
Game
Solver
Solves for Nash
equilibria in two-player M
x
N normal form
games. One can calculate for all equilibria reachable
via the Lemke-Howson algorithm, or enumerate all extreme
equilibria in the game via the EEE-I algorithm.
General
Equilibrium Solver
Solves for general
(competitive) equilibrium prices and allocations in an N household, M firm economy with an
optional public sector. Can handle simple exchange
economies, and economies with production, taxation,
etc. The model is static. The algorithm uses is
a modification of Herbert Scarf's simplical subdivision
algorithm.
GAMUT (a suite of
Java classes for generating strategic-form games, designed
for testing game-theoretic algorithms)
To run the software and applets on this
website, make sure you have the most recent version of the
Java Runtime Environment. The JRE may be downloaded here.