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Journal Issue: Children and Welfare Reform Volume 12 Number 1 Winter/Spring 2002

The 1996 Welfare Law: Key Elements and Reauthorization Issues Affecting Children
Authors: Mark H. Greenberg Jodie Levin-Epstein Rutledge Q. Hutson Theodora J. Ooms Rachel Schumacher Vicki Turetsky David M. Engstrom

Endnotes

  1. The programs that were repealed and whose funding was folded into the TANF block grant were the AFDC program, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program, and the Emergency Assistance program.


  2. For an overview of allowable spending under TANF, see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Helping families achieve self-sufficiency: A guide on funding services for children and families through the TANF program. Washington, DC: DHHS, 1999.


  3. For detailed information about state policies, see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program: Third annual report to Congress. Washington, DC: DHHS, August 2000. See also the Web site of the State Policy Documentation Project (SPDP), a joint project of the Center for Law and Social Policy and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, at http://www.spdp.org/.


  4. Caseload data is available online at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/stats/.


  5. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Indicators of welfare dependence: Annual report to Congress. Washington, DC: DHHS, 2001, table TANF 2.


  6. U.S. General Accounting Office. Welfare reform: State sanction policies and number of families affected. GAO/HEHS-00-44. Washington, DC: GAO, 2000.


  7. Goldberg, H., and Schott, E. A compliance-oriented approach to sanctions in state and county TANF programs. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 2000.


  8. Primus, W., Rawlings, L., Larin, K., and Porter, K. The initial impacts of welfare reform on the incomes of single-mother families. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1999.


  9. In 1997, some 48% of families receiving assistance indicated that either their general health or mental health was poor. See Loprest, P., and Zedlewski, S. Current and former welfare recipients: How do they differ? Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1999.


  10. Cash assistance expenditures fell from nearly $23 billion in 1994 to $11.5 billion in 2000.


  11. For further discussion of this topic, see Greenberg, M. Beyond welfare: New opportunities to use TANF to help low-income working families. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, 1999. See also Lazere, E. Unspent TANF funds at the end of federal fiscal year 2000. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2001.


  12. U.S. General Accounting Office. Welfare reform: Challenges in maintaining a federal–state fiscal partnership. GAO-01-828. Washington, DC: GAO, August 2001.


  13. In 1998, 55% of black children, 31% of Hispanic children, and 21% of white children lived with only one parent. See U.S. Census Bureau. Marital status and living arrangements: March 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, March 1998. See also updated Census Bureau data. Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics. America's children: Key national indicators of well-being. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, tables, pp. 69–70.


  14. Sawhill, I. Welfare reform and reducing teen pregnancy. The Public Interest (Winter 2000) 138:40–51.


  15. Ventura, S.J., and Bachrach, C.A. Nonmarital childbearing in the United States: 1940–99. National Vital Statistics Reports. Vol. 48, no. 16. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, October 18, 2000, pp. 2–6.


  16. Murray, C. The coming white underclass. Wall Street Journal. October 29, 1993, at A14.


  17. About 20 states established a family cap under an AFDC waiver prior to 1996; 3 more did so by 2000. See Stark, S., and Levin-Epstein, J. Excluded children: Family cap in a new era. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, February 1999, p. 1.


  18. Levin-Epstein, J. Teen parent provisions in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, 1996.


  19. Ooms, T. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing on Welfare and Marriage Issues. Washington, DC. May 22, 2001.


  20. The National Marriage Project. The state of our unions: The social health of marriage in America, 1999. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, 1999.


  21. Ooms, T. Toward more perfect unions: Putting marriage on the public agenda. Report presented at the Family Impact Seminar. Washington, DC. July 1998. Available from tooms@clasp.org.


  22. See Rector, R. Welfare: Broadening the reform. In Issues 2000: Candidates briefing book. S.M. Butler and K.R. Holmes, eds. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2000; Horn, W.F., and Sawhill, I.V. Fathers, Marriage and Welfare Reform. In The new world of welfare. R.M. Blank and R. Haskins, eds. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, pp. 421–41.


  23. Oklahoma's $10 million is available for a range of activities including public education, training of state employees to offer relationship skills workshops, improving data and research, and working with faith-based groups and community leaders.


  24. See note 19, Ooms. See also Rubiner, L. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing on Welfare and Marriage Issues. Washington, DC. May 22, 2001.


  25. For example, the Fathers Count bill, introduced in 1999, awarded grants to community-based organizations that, among other activities, promoted marriage as a means of ensuring responsible, involved fatherhood. This bill passed the House overwhelmingly in 2000, but stalled in the Senate and was reintroduced in 2001.


  26. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Public Law 104-193, title IX, section 905. The law allows spending of federal TANF funds on family planning, but not on abortion and other medical services.


  27. Hutson, R.Q., and Levin-Epstein, J. Linking family planning with other social services: The perspectives of state family planning administrators. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, 2000; and Cohen, M. Tapping TANF: When and how welfare funds can support reproductive health or teen parent initiatives. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, April 1999.


  28. See note 26, PRWORA, title IX, section 912. The program is administered through the Maternal Child Health Services Block Grant.


  29. Daley, D., and Wong, V.C. Between the lines: States' implementation of the federal government's section 510(b) abstinence education program in fiscal year 1998. New York: Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States, 1999.


  30. Congress approved $20 million for fiscal year 2001 and a total of $40 million for fiscal year 2002, under Special Projects of Regional and National Significance; Community-Based Abstinence Education Project Grants.


  31. In 1999, teen parents accounted for about 4% of all "adults" in the caseload, and another 0.4% of all "children." See note 3. The teen parent status is "unknown" for a significant percentage of the caseload—5.2% of the children and 0.5% of adults, or nearly 287,000 teen recipients.


  32. See note 26, PRWORA, title I, section 103, 110 Stat. 2135–37. The law also called for the U.S. Department of Justice to study the link between statutory rape and teen pregnancy, and to educate state and local criminal law enforcement officials on statutory rape prevention and prosecution (title IX, section 906). Because these provisions did not come with funding, however, communities have done little to implement such programs.


  33. Matthews, M., and Shelley, S. Turned away, misinformed, denied—Teen parents' experiences in welfare offices. Youth Law News (July–August 1999) 20(4):7,12.


  34. Kirby, D. Emerging answers: Research findings on programs to reduce teen pregnancy. Washington, DC: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 2001. See also Jemmott, J., Jemmott, L., and Fong, G. Abstinence and safer sex HIV risk-reduction interventions for African American adolescents: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of the American Medical Association (May 20, 1998) 279:1529–36.


  35. See Bos, J.M., and Fellerath, V. LEAP: Final report on Ohio's welfare initiative to improve school attendance among teenage parents. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corp., 1997; Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau. Wisconsin's Learnfare program. Madison: Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 1996; Mauldon, J., Malvin, J., Stiles, J., et al. Impact of California's Cal-Learn program demonstration project: Final report. Berkeley: UC Data, University of California, Berkeley, 2000.


  36. The evaluation of California's "learnfare" program suggests that teen mothers who are married or have steady boyfriends are at greater risk of a subsequent birth. See note 35, Mauldon, et al.


  37. Levin-Epstein, J. Seeking supervision: State policy choices in implementing the TANF minor parent living arrangement rule. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, 1999.


  38. The percentage is not known exactly, because 15 states have separate two-parent programs and do not report their data to the federal government. See note 31, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, table 10:7.


  39. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. HHS awards welfare high performance bonuses: Higher increases in job placements and earnings reported. Press release. Washington, DC: DHHS, December 16, 2000.


  40. The 1999 "illegitimacy" awards went to Alabama, California, the District of Columbia, Michigan, and Massachusetts. See Romero, D., Chavkin, W., Wise, P.H., et al. State welfare reform policies and maternal and child health services: A national study. Maternal and Child Health Journal (2001) 5(3):199–206.


  41. One study estimated that child support reduces poverty among children by 5%. See Sorensen, E., and Zibman, C. Child support offers some protection against poverty. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2000; and Garfinkel, I., and Heinz, T. Child support enforcement: Incentives and well-being. Paper presented at the Conference on Incentive Effects of Tax and Transfer Policies. Washington, DC. December 8, 2000.


  42. Meyer, D. Child support and welfare dynamics: Evidence from Wisconsin. Demography (1993) 30:45–62; Seltzer, J. Child support and child access: Experiences of divorced and nonmarital families. Focus (2000) 21:54–57; and Doolittle, F., Knox, V., Miller, C., and Rowser, S. Building opportunities, enforcing obligations. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corp., 1998.


  43. For poor, single female-headed families that receive child support, it is the second largest component of family income after earnings, amounting to 26% of the family's budget, or $2,000 per year. (Other components include earnings at 38%, cash assistance at 20%, and other income at 16%.) See Sorensen, E., and Zibman, C. To what extent do children benefit from child support? New information from the National Survey of America's Families. Focus (2000) 21:34–37.


  44. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Child support enforcement: FY 2000 preliminary data preview report. Washington, DC: DHHS, July 2001. Available online at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/
    prgrpt.htm    . See also U.S. General Accounting Office. Welfare reform: Child support an uncertain income supplement for families leaving welfare. GAO/HEHS-98-168. Washington, DC: GAO, 1998.


  45. Poor families eligible for child support are significantly more likely to receive it if they have participated in the child support program. Sorensen E., and Halpern A. Child support enforcement is working better than we think. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2000. See also note 41, Garfinkel and Heinz.


  46. Although 40% of children with a nonresident parent are living below the poverty level, 23% of nonresident fathers are poor. See Sorensen, E., and Zibman, C. A look at poor dads who don't pay child support. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2000.


  47. See Lyon, M. Characteristics of families using Title IV-D services in 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999. See also note 44, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.


  48. See the following papers available on the Center for Law and Social Policy Web site at www.clasp.org: Roberts, P. Family law issues and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996; Roberts, P. A guide to establishing paternity for nonmarital children: Implementing the provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996; and Turetsky, V. Child support administrative processes: A summary of requirements in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (1997).


  49. States must meet five performance measures and have reliable data to qualify for federal incentive payments, and these payments must be reinvested in child support–related activities. New penalty, audit, and reporting requirements also were enacted. See Roberts, P., and Turetsky, V. New federal child support legislation on computer penalties, incentive payments, medical support, and other topics. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, July 28, 1998.


  50. Among families with a support order already in place, collection rates increased from 34% to 68% between 1995 and 2000. See note 44, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, as well as preceding annual reports.


  51. Under AFDC, states were required to "pass through" the first $50 of support to families receiving assistance, and the costs were shared between federal and state governments. When TANF was enacted, the pass-through requirement was repealed. States were allowed to continue the practice, but with no federal cost sharing, and less than half the states have opted to do so. See Turetsky, V. What if all the money came home? Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, June 2000; and Roberts, P. State policy re: pass-through and disregard of current month's child support collected for families receiving TANF-funded cash assistance. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, January 1999.


  52. See note 46, Sorensen and Zibman, p. 3; and Sorensen, E. Low-income families and child support: Latest evidence from the National Survey of America's Families. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2000, figure 1.


  53. Program administrators say the rules have contributed to computer systems delays, increased staff and training costs, difficulties in redirecting support payments to former TANF families, confusion among parents, and audit problems.


  54. Meyer, D., and Cancian, M. W-2 child support demonstration evaluation, phase 1: Final report. Madison: University of Wisconsin–Madison, Institute for Research on Poverty, April 2001.


  55. See Fishman, M., Tapogna, J., Dybdal, K., and Laud, S. Preliminary assessment of the association between state child support enforcement performance and financing structure. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, August 2000. See also Freeman, R., and Waldfogel, J. Dunning delinquent dads: Child support enforcement policy and never-married women. Focus (Spring 2000) 21:27–30; and Turetsky, V. You get what you pay for: How federal and state investment decisions affect child support performance. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, December 1998.


  56. The federal government reimburses states 66% of their program costs through an open-ended entitlement funding stream, and states fund their matching share of costs with some combination of state general or special funds, assigned welfare collections, and federal incentive payments. See Fishman, M., Dybdal, K., and Tapogna, J. State financing of child support enforcement programs. Final report to Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, September 1999.


  57. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 21 million children's health: Our shared responsibility—The medical child support working group's report to Congress. Washington, DC: DHHS, August 2000.


  58. Martinson, K. Serving non-custodial parents through welfare-to-work grants: Labor market characteristics, employment barriers, and service strategies. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, October 1998.


  59. For example, attention has been focused on informal support, imputing income when setting orders, arrearages, and welfare cost recovery policies. For a discussion of these issues, see Turetsky, V. Realistic child support policies for low income fathers. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, March 2000.


  60. Pearson, J., Thoennes, N., and Griswold, E. Child support and domestic violence: The victims speak out. Violence Against Women (1999) 5:427–48; Brandwein, R., ed. Battered women, children, and welfare reform: The ties that bind. New York: Sage Publications, 1999; and Turetsky, V., and Notar, S. Models for safe child support enforcement. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, October 1999.


  61. The law also permits states to set lower state income eligibility levels and to make age and income exceptions for children in protective services.


  62. For details, see Blank, H. Helping parents work and children succeed: A guide to child care and the 1996 welfare act. Washington, DC: Children's Defense Fund, 1997; and Greenberg, M. A summary of key child care provisions of H.R. 3734. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, 1996.


  63. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Fiscal year 2000 state spending under the Child Care and Development Fund. Washington, DC: DHHS, Child Care Bureau, December 17, 2001 update. Available online at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ccb/research/
    00acf696/overview.htm    .


  64. Calculations based on figures from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. New statistics show only small percentage of eligible families receive child care help. Press release. Washington, DC: DHHS, December 6, 2000; and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. State spending under the Child Care Block Grant. Fact sheet. Washington, DC: DHHS, November 12, 1998.


  65. See Schumacher, R., Greenberg, M., and Duffy, J. The impact of TANF funding on state child care subsidy programs. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, September 2001.


  66. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families. Access to child care for low-income working families. Washington, DC: DHHS, October 1999. See also Collins, A., Layzer, J., Kreader, J., et al. National study of child care for low-income families: State and community substudy. Interim report. Prepared by the National Center for Children in Poverty and Abt Associates for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Washington, DC: DHHS, November 2000, p. 36.


  67. The Children's Defense Fund. A fragile foundation: State child care assistance policies. Washington, DC: CDF, 2001.


  68. Schumacher, R., and Greenberg, M. Child care after leaving welfare: Early evidence from state studies. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, October 1999.


  69. Adams, G., Snyder, K., and Sandfort, J. Getting and retaining child care subsidies: How policy and practice influence parents' experiences. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, forthcoming.


  70. See Gish, M. State programs under the Child Care and Development Fund. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2001. See also the State Policy Documentation Project Web site at http://www.spdp.org, Child care provision after leaving cash assistance; American Public Human Services Association. Child care at three: Survey of state program changes. Washington, DC: APHSA, 1999, p. 2; and Blank, H., Behr, A., and Schulman, K. State developments in child care, early education and school-age care 2000. Washington, DC: Children's Defense Fund, 2001.


  71. See note 66, Collins, et al., p. 6.


  72. To encourage certain types of providers to participate in the system, however, more than 20 states have implemented differential reimbursement rates. For example, some states pay higher rates for nationally accredited programs or programs that serve children during nontraditional hours or that serve children with special needs. See note 70, Blank, Behr, and Schulman.


  73. For a brief overview of the Medicaid program and populations served, see http://www.hcfa.gov/
    pubforms/actuary/ormedmed/DEFAULT4.htm    ; and http://hcfa.hhs.gov/stats/hstats99/blusta99.htm, tables 11, 26, and 34.


  74. For a summary of other Medicaid-related changes under the 1996 law, see Center for Budget and Policy Priorities. An analysis of the AFDC-related Medicaid provisions in the new welfare law. Washington, DC: CBPP, 1996.


  75. Guyer, J., and Mann, C. Taking the next step: States can now expand health coverage to low-income working parents through Medicaid. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1998.


  76. See Ku, L., and Bruen, B. The continuing decline in Medicaid coverage. New Federalism: Issues and Options for States, Brief no. A-37. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1999, tables 1 and 2. See also U.S. General Accounting Office. Medicaid enrollment: Amid declines, state efforts to ensure coverage after welfare reform vary. GAO/HEHS-99-163. Washington, DC: GAO, September 1999, pp. 6, 11–12; Dion, R.M., and Pavetti, L. Access to and participation in Medicaid and the food stamp program: A review of the recent literature. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research, March 2000, pp. 11–13, and Appendix B; and Families USA Foundation. Losing health insurance: The unintended consequences of welfare reform. Washington, DC: Families USA, 1999, p. 16.


  77. For example, nearly 80% of parents of eligible uninsured children mistakenly believed that Medicaid receipt is subject to time limits. Perry, M., Kannel, S., Burciaga Valdez, R., and Chang, C. Medicaid and children: Overcoming barriers to enrollment: Findings from a national survey. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, January 2000, p. 9. See also Stuber, J., Maloy, K., Rosenbaum, S., and Jones, K. Beyond stigma: What barriers actually affect the decisions of low-income families to enroll in Medicaid? Issue Brief. Washington, DC: George Washington University Medical Center, Center for Health Services Research and Policy, June 2000.


  78. See note 77, Stuber, et al.; Ellwood, M. The Medicaid eligibility maze: Coverage expands, but enrollment problems persist. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, September 1999; Smith, V., Lovell, R., Peterson, K., and O'Brien, M. The dynamics of current Medicaid enrollment changes: Insights from focus groups of state human service administrators, Medicaid eligibility specialists, and welfare agency analysts. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 1998; and Maloy, K., Pavetti, L., Shin, P., and Darnell, J. A description and assessment of state approaches to diversion programs and activities under welfare reform. George Washington University Medical Center, Center for Health Services Research and Policy, August 1998. See also note 76, U.S. General Accounting Office, pp. 18–24; and Dion and Pavetti, pp. 13–15.


  79. A review of state "leavers" studies found considerable differences among states, but typically at least 20% of children and most adults were no longer receiving Medicaid after leaving TANF. See Greenberg, M. Participation in welfare and Medicaid enrollment. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 1998. See also Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. "Leavers" and diversion studies: Summary of research on welfare outcomes funded by ASPE. Washington, DC: DHHS, 2000; and Loprest, P. Families who left welfare: Who are they and how are they doing? Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1999, chart 11.


  80. See note 77, Perry, et al., p. 6.


  81. Ellis, E., and Smith, V. Medicaid enrollment in 50 states: June 1997 to December 1999. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, October 2000, p. 18.


  82. See Holahan, J. Why did the number of uninsured fall in 1999? Policy brief. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, January 2001; and Guyer, J. Uninsured rate of poor children declines, but remains above pre-welfare reform levels. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, September 2000.


  83. In April 2000, based on evidence that a number of states had failed to correctly determine continued Medicaid eligibility for families leaving TANF, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) directed all states to review their case closures and reinstate families whose Medicaid assistance had been terminated erroneously. In addition, because children who receive SSI are generally eligible for Medicaid, HCFA also directed all states to obtain a list of children who had lost SSI and to ensure that they were enrolled in Medicaid. See State Medicaid Directors Letter, April 7, 2000. Available online at http://www.hcfa.gov/
    medicaid/letters/smd40700.htm    .


  84. For a brief overview of the SCHIP program, see http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/
    01fsschip.html    .


  85. See note 81, Ellis and Smith, p. 6.


  86. See note 82, Guyer, pp. 1–2.


  87. U.S. Department of Agriculture. Characteristics of food stamp households: Fiscal year 2000 (Advance Report). Alexandria, VA: USDA, Food and Nutrition Service, Office of Analysis, Nutrition, and Evaluation, June 2001.


  88. See note 87, U.S. Department of Agriculture, table 1.


  89. For a general overview of food stamp program structure and rules, see http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/MENU/
    about/about.htm    . For a more detailed discussion, see Food Research and Action Center. FRAC'S guide to the Food Stamp program. 10th ed. Washington, DC: FRAC, 1999.


  90. The original Congressional Budget Office projections estimated that $27.7 billion, or about half the original projected spending reductions from the 1996 law, would be attributable to reductions in food stamp program eligibility and benefits, including restrictions on immigrant eligibility. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The depth of the food stamp cuts in the final welfare bill. Washington, DC: CBPP, August 14, 1996.


  91. Based on preliminary data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. For a summary of monthly participation numbers, see http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/fsmonthly.htm.


  92. Castner, L. Trends in FSP participation rates: Focus on 1994 to 1998. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, November 2000, pp. 16, 23.


  93. U.S. General Accounting Office. Food stamp program: Various factors have led to declining participation. GAO/RCED-99-185. Washington, DC: GAO, July 1999, p. 10.


  94. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The decline in food stamp participation: A report to Congress. Alexandria, VA: USDA, Food and Nutrition Service, Office of Analysis, Nutrition, and Evaluation, July 2001.


  95. It has been estimated that 65% of former welfare families that left the food stamp program still had incomes below food stamp eligibility standards. See Zedlewski, S.R., and Brauner, S. Declines in food stamp and welfare participation: Is there a connection? Assessing the New Federalism, Discussion paper 99-13. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1999, pp. 20–21. See also note 79, Loprest, chart 11 and table 4.


  96. Rangarajan, A., and Gleason, P.M. Food stamp leavers in Illinois: How are they doing two years later? Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, January 2001, pp. 68–70.


  97. Zedlewski, S., and Gruber, A. Former welfare families continue to leave the food stamp program. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2001. See also note 93, U.S. General Accounting Office, pp. 13–14.


  98. In early 1999, the Department of Agriculture wrote to all states stressing the importance of complying with food stamp protections in determining food stamp eligibility and benefits when evaluating TANF applications and closing TANF cases. http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/.


  99. For an overview of the evolution of the foster care program from AFDC, see Frame L. Suitable homes revisited: An historical look at child protection and welfare reform. Children and Youth Services Review (1999) 21(9–10):719–54.


  100. Although the connection between poverty and maltreatment is not fully understood, the risk of abuse or neglect is 22 times greater for children living in families with annual incomes below $15,000 than for children living in families with incomes greater than $30,000. Sedlak, A.J., and Broadhurst, D.D. Third national incidence study of child abuse and neglect: Final report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996, pp. 5-1 to 5-8. Also, though less than 3% of children receiving AFDC during the study period moved into foster care, nearly 60% of children in foster care came from families that were, or recently had been, receiving AFDC. See Chapin Hall Center for Children, University of Chicago. Dynamics of children's movement among the AFDC, Medicaid and foster care programs prior to welfare reform: 1995–1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, March 2000.


  101. As per the technical corrections in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Public Law 105–133.


  102. Since the law was enacted, the poorest single-mother families have experienced a decrease in disposable income. See note 8, Primus, et al.


  103. The 1996 law prohibits states from sanctioning single custodial parents for failure to comply with work requirements if the parent demonstrates that she or he is unable to obtain needed child care for a child under age six, but it is not clear if TANF recipients are aware of this exception. They may believe that they risk losing cash assistance if they do not comply with the work requirements. In addition, the exception does not apply to lack of child care for children age 6 or older—yet a number of states include failure to supervise children up to the age of 10 or 12 within the definition of "neglect."


  104. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Child maltreatment 1999: Ten years of reporting. Washington, DC: DHHS, 2001.


  105. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means. 2000 green book: Background material and data on programs within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001, p. 720. This apparent paradox may be due to children remaining in foster care for longer periods of time. See Wulczyn, F.H., Brunner, K., and Goerge, R.M. An update from the multistate foster care data archive: Foster care dynamics 1983–1997. Chicago: Chapin Hall Center for Children, University of Chicago, 1999.


  106. See Shook, K. Does the loss of welfare income increase the risk of involvement with the child welfare system? Children and Youth Services Review (1999) 21(9–10):781–814. See also Wells, K., and Guo, S. The impact of welfare reform on foster care and child welfare: A case study: Reunification of foster children in the first entry cohort. Paper presented at the 40th Annual Workshop of the National Association for Welfare Research and Statistics. Scottsdale, AZ. July 29–August 2, 2000.


  107. Paxson, C., and Waldfogel, J. Welfare reforms, family resources, and child maltreatment. In The incentives of government programs and the well-being of families. B. Meyer and G. Duncan, eds. Chicago: Joint Center for Poverty Research, 2001, pp. 1–47.


  108. Fein, D., and Lee, W. The ABC evaluation: Impacts of welfare reform on child maltreatment. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates, 2000.


  109. Geen, R., Fender, L., Leos-Urbel, J., and Markowitz, T. Welfare reform's effect on child welfare caseloads. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, February 2001.


  110. Geen, R., Waters Boots, S., and Tumlin, K. The cost of protecting vulnerable children: Understanding federal, state, and local child welfare spending. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1999.


  111. For example, under the 1996 law, states may transfer part of their TANF funds to Title XX, subject to certain limits. Specifically, no more than 10% can be transferred to Title XX for services to children and their families whose income is below 200% of poverty.


  112. See note 27, Cohen; and Christian, S., and Ekman, L. A place to call home: Adoption and guardianship for children in foster care. Denver, CO: National Conference of State Legislatures, March 2000.


  113. Berns, D., and Drake, B. Uniting child welfare and welfare reform. Children's Voice (Fall 1999) 8(5):20–23; and Berns, D., and Drake, B.J. Combining child welfare and welfare reform at a local level. Policy and practice (March 1999) 57(1):26–34.


  114. U.S. Census Bureau. America's families and living arrangements. March 2000 Current Population Survey Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, June 2001, detailed table no. C2.


  115. See note 3, SPDP Web site. Separate state programs and state-only TANF funds (June 2000). See also note 112, Christian and Ekman; and Generations United. Grandparents and other relatives raising children fact sheet: Subsidized guardianship programs. Washington, DC: Generations United, June 2001.


  116. Although child-only cases are a steadily increasing share of the TANF caseload, representing nearly 30% of the TANF caseload in 1999, this is largely because other types of cases are declining more rapidly. In addition, children living with relatives make up only a small fraction of the child-only cases. The majority of these cases involve children living with parents who, for a variety of reasons, are ineligible for TANF assistance. See note 3, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.


  117. Nearly 30% of children in foster care live with relatives. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau. Report to Congress on kinship foster care. Washington, DC: DHHS, June 2000, p. 7.


  118. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means. 1998 green book: Background material and data on programs within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998, p. 298. In addition to a new assessment tool (the Individualized Functional Assessment, or IFA) to determine childhood disability under the Zebley decision, other factors contributed significantly to the increased caseload, including: (1) creation of an outreach program; (2) expansion of the category of mental disorders considered disabling; and (3) the recession of the early 1990s, which is thought to have resulted in more children meeting the income criteria of the SSI program. See Mashaw, J.L., Perrin, J.M., and Reno, V., eds. Restructuring the SSI disability program for children and adolescents: Report of the Committee on Childhood Disability of the Disability Policy Panel. Washington, DC: National Academy of Social Insurance, 1996.


  119. For an overview of this coverage, see Georges, C. A media crusade gone haywire. Forbes MediaCritic (September 1995) 3:1, 66–71.


  120. See note 118, Mashaw, Perrin, and Reno, p. 1.


  121. See U.S. General Accounting Office. Supplemental Security Income: Progress made in implementing welfare reform changes; more action needed. GAO-HEHS-99-103. Washington, DC: GAO, 1999.


  122. SSA's interpretation defined childhood disability as an impairment that "causes marked limitations in two broad areas of functioning or extreme limitations in one such area." See Part IV in Social Security Administration. Federal Register (February 11, 1997) 62(28):6408–32, and section 416.925, in particular. See also U.S. General Accounting Office. Supplemental Security Income: SSA needs a uniform standard for assessing childhood disability. GAO/HEHS-98-123. Washington, DC: GAO, May 1998.


  123. The letter says, "...a large percentage of [the children expected to] lose assistance based on the SSA's definition of disability will be disabled children who are truly in need of assistance....The SSA is proposing to define 'marked and severe' as meaning listings levels severity or any equivalent level of severity. Congress never intended and did not require this level of severity." Senators Kent Conrad, Edward Kennedy, John D. Rockefeller IV, Max Baucus, Christopher Dodd, John Chafee, Tom Harkin, James Jeffords, Patrick Leahy, and Tom Daschle. Letter to President William J. Clinton, dated April 14, 1997.


  124. See the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 20: Employees' benefits, Chapter 11, Social Security Administration. Part 404: Federal old-age, survivors and disability insurance; and 416: Supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and disabled.


  125. For a discussion of the differences in the final regulations, see Yates, T. New rules, same standard: The Social Security Administration adopts new rules for evaluating SSI childhood disability. Journal of Poverty, Law, and Policy (May–June 2001), 35(1/2):59–78.


  126. U.S. Social Security Administration. 2001 annual report of the Supplemental Security Income Program. Baltimore, MD: SSA, Office of the Chief Actuary, May 2001, table V.D3. Available online at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
    SSIR/SSI01/Redet_CDRdata.html    .


  127. The total number of redeterminations for the years 1997 through 2000 was 191,049. Of those, 90,899 (48%) were initially ceased. On reconsideration or appeal a number of these cessations were continued so that, by the close of 2000, the number of cessations was 74,066 or 39% of the initial redeterminations. However 6,653 of the cases were still pending, so the final cessation rates could be lower, as low as 35%. The office of Chief Actuary at SSA estimates, based on past experience and trends, that the final cessation rate for these years will likely be about 37%. Author's personal conversation.


  128. About 80% of SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid because of their eligibility for SSI. See note 105, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, p. 225. Thus, unless these teens meet other Medicaid eligibility criteria, they will lose their coverage.


  129. For example, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), adolescents are permitted to receive special education services until age 22. In addition, under the federal foster care program, Congress recently made changes to help children transition to independent living, rather than simply cutting off support at age 18.


  130. Much of the congressional concern stemmed from the fact that noncitizens use public benefits at higher levels than citizens. For further discussion of this topic, see note 118, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Appendix J. Recent analysis notes that noncitizen households tend to have lower household income and more children than citizen households have. When controlling for poverty and number of children, however, noncitizens actually use public benefits at levels equal to or lower than those of citizens. See Fix, M., and Passel, J.S. Trends in noncitizens' and citizens' use of public benefits following welfare reform: 1994–97. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, March 1999.


  131. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the immigrant eligibility changes in the welfare law would save almost $23.7 billion over 6 years, accounting for about 44% of the $54.1 billion savings initially projected for the law. See Congressional Budget Office. Federal budgetary implications of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. CBO Memorandum. Washington, DC: CBO, December 1996, p. 27. The savings were significantly reduced when subsequent legislation in 1997 and 1998 modified the immigrant provisions of the 1996 law.


  132. Zimmermann, W., and Tumlin, K.C. Patchwork policies: State assistance for immigrants under welfare reform. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1999, p. 15, figure 1.


  133. Generally, "qualified" immigrants include persons admitted for legal permanent residence, refugees, immigrants paroled into the United States for at least one year, and immigrants granted asylum or related relief. See note 26, PRWORA, title IV, section 431. The 1996 immigration law added certain abused spouses and children as another class of qualified immigrants, and the 1997 Balanced Budget Act added Cuban/Haitian entrants.


  134. State options were subject to requirements to "deem" the income of sponsors, however, whereby the income and resources of an immigrant's sponsor are counted as the immigrant's when making eligibility determinations. See note 132, Zimmermann and Tumlin, p. 27. The sponsor's affidavit of support is legally enforceable and remains in effect until the sponsored immigrant attains citizenship or accumulates 40 qualifying quarters of work. See U.S. General Accounting Office. Welfare reform: Many states continue some federal or state benefits for immigrants. GAO/HEHS-98-132. Washington, DC: GAO, 1998, pp. 6–7.


  135. The principal amendments to the original 1996 law include the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the Agricultural Research, Extension and Education Reform Act of 1998, and the Noncitizen Benefit Clarification and Other Technical Amendments Act of 1998.


  136. Only Alabama opted not to provide TANF and only Wyoming elected to deny nonemergency Medicaid to preenactment immigrants. See note 132, Zimmermann and Tumlin, p. 60, table 25.


  137. For a detailed discussion of the 1998 modifications, see Carmody, K., and Dean, S. New federal food stamp restoration for legal immigrants: Implications and implementation issues. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1998.


  138. Provisions were enacted to retain benefits for "qualified" immigrants who were receiving SSI when the 1996 law was enacted, and to allow benefits for new applicants who were residing in the United States when the law was enacted and who were (or subsequently became) disabled. A further modification continued SSI for "not qualified" immigrants who were residing in the United States and receiving SSI at the time of enactment, but unlike "qualified" immigrants, "not qualified" immigrants who subsequently become elderly or disabled will not qualify for SSI, even if they were residing in the U.S. when the law was enacted.


  139. Overall, the modifications under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 were estimated to reverse $11.4 billion of the $23.8 billion in savings from restrictions on immigrant benefits under the 1996 law. See National Conference of State Legislatures. Supplemental Security Income. Immigrant policy issue brief. Denver: NCSL, 1998.


  140. See note 132, Zimmermann and Tumlin, pp. 22–23.


  141. See note 121, U.S. General Accounting Office, p. 16.


  142. See U.S. General Accounting Office. Medicaid: Demographics of nonenrolled children suggest state outreach strategies. GAO/HEHS-98-93. Washington, DC: GAO, 1998; and Schlosberg, C. Beyond outreach and informing: Getting serious about covering uninsured children in immigrant families. Policy and Practice (December 1998) 56(3):54–63.


  143. See note 130, Fix and Passel, p. 2. See also Fix, M. Comment on welfare reform and immigration by George Borjas. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2001, figure 1.


  144. Capps, R. Hardship among children of immigrants: Findings from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2001, table 1 and figure 2.


  145. See, for example, Zimmermann, W., and Fix, M. Declining immigrant applications for Medi-Cal and welfare benefits in Los Angeles County. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1998, pp. 2, 4, and table 1.


  146. See, for example, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. A quick guide to "public charge" and receipt of public benefits: Summary. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, INS, October 18, 1999.


  147. See note 132, Zimmermann and Tumlin, p. 26.


  148. Cited in note 143, Fix and Passel, p. 2.


  149. See, for example, Gordon, R. How welfare "reform" punishes poor people. Oakland, CA: Applied Research Center, 2001.


  150. Under Executive Order 13166, "Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency," issued August 11, 2000, all federal agencies were directed to take "reasonable steps to ensure meaningful access to their programs and activities by [limited English proficient] persons," based on the fact that not serving this population because of their inability to speak English may be a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. In response, the Department of Health and Human Services (and other federal agencies) issued guidance to help address the hurdles people not fluent in English were encountering when trying to obtain services. Such help may include providing interpreters, translations, and other assistance as needed. See Federal Register (August 30, 2000) 65(169):52,762–74.


  151. The bill, H.R. 969, was introduced on March 8, 2001, in the U.S. House of Representatives to nullify Executive Order 13166 and to prohibit use of funds under any provision of law to promulgate or enforce any executive order that creates an entitlement to services provided in any language other than English. The bill was referred to a House subcommittee on March 15, 2001, and as of December 2001 no futher action had been taken.