



LIECHTENSTEIN INSTITUTE
ON SELF-DETERMINATION
AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Liechtenstein Colloquium on European and International Affairs

Creating Stability and Prosperity in Afghanistan and the Region

Preparatory Materials

October 26-29, 2006

Hotel Bristol and Palais Liechtenstein, Vienna, Austria

The objective of this conference is fourfold:

1. To consider the future of Afghanistan and the region as the country moves from immediate post-conflict (re)construction to address issues including sustainable peace, domestic stability, and economic viability as a nation;
2. To develop new ideas for economic incentives, for training initiatives, and for building national capacity in order to combat narco-trafficking, facilitate legal exports, and enhance border security;
3. To consider new initiatives that will address security challenges at local, national, and regional levels while also addressing broader challenges vis-à-vis the emerging international system;
4. To create ideas that will facilitate continued international commitment to and engagement in Afghanistan and the region, including the sustainable development of its economy, infrastructure, and energy capacity.

Selected Issues to be Covered

Security Challenges in Afghanistan and the Region

- Internal and Local Security
- Narco and Organized Crime
- Border Security
- Regional Security
- Strategic Perspectives and Interests of Regional Powers
- Long-Term Interests of Outside Powers
- Efficiency of Military and Defense Forces
- Special Police Units

Economy, Infrastructure, Energy, Natural Resources, and Mining

- Employment
- Business (small, medium, large)
- Alternative Agriculture
- Training and Education
- Roads
- Rail Infrastructure
- Construction
- Tunnel and Bridge Challenges
- Energy Creation (including hydro and coal)
- Energy Transfer
- Exploitation of Natural Resources
- Mining
- Transport of Raw Materials

Rule of Law, Effective Governance

- Problems of Corruption
- Suspected Involvement of Public Officials in the Narcotics Trade and Other Illegal Activities
- Failure of Poppy Eradication Programs

Key Outside Actors

- European Union
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization
- Private Sector

The colloquium structure builds in part upon findings from previous LISD-sponsored meetings and colloquia undertaken as part of the project “Building State and Security in Afghanistan,” convened in Petersberg/Bad Honeff, Vienna, Princeton, and Istanbul. Summaries from the Istanbul and Vienna meetings follow.

CHAIR'S SUMMARY

STRENGTHENING AFGHANISTAN AND THE REGION

July 21-24, 2005

Hotel Four Seasons, Istanbul Turkey

SEVEN POINT ACTION PLAN

The international community (IC) reaffirms the continued commitment of its involvement and assistance to both the Afghans and their neighbors. This should convince all people of the region that the international community will continue its support for the long term and make clear to the population of Afghanistan *and* its neighboring states that the IC will remain with its presence and assistance and that the IC will not tolerate any negative interference.

1. Afghan capacity building
2. Regional initiatives
3. Energy policy, water management, environment, and alternative livelihoods
4. Reaffirmation of strong and sustained international support
5. Seeing through and ameliorating existing projects
6. Economic support of the private sector and promotion of sustainable projects
7. Implementation of the constitution

A New Post-Bonn Compact

A common and joint plan of Afghanistan and the IC on priorities for immediate and mid-term action that includes timelines, benchmarks, and monitoring mechanisms is needed.

For immediate action:

- Capacity building
- Civil Service reform, including the establishment of a training academy
- Accelerated SSR
- Address effectively the drug problem and corruption

For mid-term action:

- Education
- Private sector economy
- Democratization and civil society
- Regional cooperation

1. Develop a Vision

- Articulate Afghans' vision for the next 5, 10, and 20 years, including benchmarks, timelines, yearly program planning, and target dates for necessary legislation (for next 5 years).
- Put priority on development activities that strengthen sub-national administration and areas outside of Kabul and that provide the resources needed to provide visible services in the districts and reinforce positive government presence, with built-in anti-corruption measures.
- Adjust donor funding and focus to facilitate the transition from peace-building to long-term development support: multi-year programs and longer-term contracts focusing on improving existing projects instead of the development of new initiatives.

2. Establish Benchmarks for Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation

- Create a project to establish a “Joint State-Building Task Force” to harmonize and optimize criteria and instruments among partners and to harmonize different political goals of reconstruction and stabilization.
- Chart out realistic international partnerships with benchmarks for expected donor involvement to enable planning and require new transparency of donor funding and a budget for explaining the use of funding to the Afghan public.
- Require a percentage of funding to be transferred through the GOA, as well as through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund with flexibility to be used by the GOA on areas within the Development Plan or articulated vision.
- Denote clear timelines and monitoring mechanisms in combination with benchmarks.
- Establish formal and ad hoc mechanisms for the continued and improved management of international community programs and resources including formal mechanisms for strategic management in Kabul, under Afghan government leadership.
- Formalize arrangements at the level of Special Envoy/Representative, to ensure coordination and mitigate conflict among international actors and continued donor engagement.

SEVEN POINT ACTION PLAN: The Three Key Projects

1. Afghan capacity building

- Expedite transition to Afghan-led management of state-building and construction
- Emphasize national ownership
 - Reinforce policy of “*Afghanization*” of programs and initiatives.
 - Support traditional mechanisms such as *Arbakee* (tribal police) and *jirga* mechanisms and better integrate them into newer international/government-backed systems.
 - Guarantee consultation on new programs with Afghan constituents.
 - Ensure the employment of a progressively increasing number of Afghans within program implementation, paired with international advisors, with growing levels of responsibility
 - Prioritize programs that focus on capacity building of the civil service at ministerial and provincial levels. Include on-the-job training for the next generation.
 - Include substantive capacity building measures in reconstruction programs.

- The Afghan Administrative Academy:

Academy for Public Service Training
by Amin Saikal

Given Afghanistan's acute need for a skilled civil service with appropriately trained personnel, there is virtue in the establishment of an effective public service training academy. Appropriate preparation of civil servants and administrations has proved to be central to effective state-building in many different contexts, and there is no reason to think that Afghanistan and other disrupted states are exceptions to this rule.

The Afghan Government has taken a number of important steps in this area. It would be useful to augment the Afghan Government's efforts with contributions of expertise from a number of leading academic institutions with proven track records in the field of administrative training. Potential contributors, under the coordination of LISD, at the initial stage could be Princeton University, the Australian National University, and the United Nations University. These institutions, in conjunction with the Afghan Government, would be responsible for crafting and running a program for an initial two-year phase, with the objective of training a sufficient number of Afghans and attracting sufficient international funding to set the project on a path of local ownership and larger-term sustainability.

2. Regional initiatives

- Build on existing regional arrangements to increase regional security
 - Send a clear message from the international community to neighbors against interference in Afghan internal affairs.
 - Establish a regional forum and broader regional security framework which includes Iran, India, Turkey, and the Gulf States, able to negotiate on various sectors (i.e. energy, infrastructure, labor, drugs, health, counter-terrorism) which could be incorporated as a customs union.
 - Continue and promote trilateral forums with Pakistan and the international coalition.
 - Build on existing relationships and structures such as a potential Kabul Declaration Process, tripartite relations between the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and trilateral cooperation between the UK, Iran, and Afghanistan.
- Critical infrastructure initiatives
 - Establish critical infrastructure projects such as the rail-links from Mashad to Herat and Kandahar to Queta in order to link through Afghanistan the EU and Central and South Asia.
- Promote regional trade and economic integration
 - Focus on trans-border employment initiatives and necessary infrastructure to facilitate employment and trade linkages with near neighbors.
 - Strengthen the role of OSCE and cooperation with it in Afghanistan, especially with regard to policies in regulation rights, labor exchanges and an integrated regional labor market in Central Asia.
 - Prioritize regional projects such as: Dashtijum hydroelectric station on Panj River between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, etc.
 - Intensify transportation, communication networks, and trade corridors with the region.
 - Strengthen links of Afghanistan to the European TRACECA network and activities.

3. Energy policy, water management, environment and alternative livelihoods

- Focus grants on organizations that will work with local Afghan organizations or substantively with specific government agencies such that technical assistance and/or resources are provided to Afghan authorities, i.e. ministries (with a clear handover strategy and maximized training of young Afghans)
 - Promote civil society initiatives and creation of think tanks and professional study groups that facilitate cross-sector, regional, and international exchanges.
 - Engage Indian-Pakistani joint partnership of a civil service academy.
 - Promote inter-ethnic and inner-regional dialogue which emphasizes increased interdependence with neighbors, not just donors.
 - Foster cooperation with Central Asian states on electricity, water, and natural gas cooperation (three spheres in which these states conduct successful cooperation) *before* they become an issue of contention.
- Domestically develop a legal framework, promote investment, prioritize infrastructure, and move on privatization
 - Provide safe and stable environment to invigorate economy.
 - Insurance/security coordination to protect investment (improved legal framework for investment, land disputes to advantage legal business).
 - Prioritize management training for emerging business, government, and NGO managers.
 - Increase access to start-up funding and mentoring for mid-level businesses (\$100,000-\$300,000), medium-sized credit access, business plan training, and matchmaking business partnerships (business support).
 - Open Kandahar and Khost airports to civilian traffic and make airport access to traders and businessmen easier.
- Pursue a comprehensive counter-narcotic strategy with a robust and resourced alternative livelihood strategy
 - Move attention and resources from a counter-narcotics strategy of forceful eradication to concentration on a socio-economic consensus against poppy production which includes increased alternative livelihood assistance, a new focus on market generation, distribution, transportation and access.
 - Jumpstart the process of building infrastructure that facilitates agriculture, improves secondary roads, and spurs internal trade.
 - Create a temporary fund for agricultural subsidies and credit to incentivize and facilitate agricultural production.
 - Promote domestic, regional, and international partnerships.

Additional Recommendations

1. Guarantee Increased Security for Afghanistan and its Neighbors

- Prioritize and enhance national security reform.
- Build effective police forces and promoting the rule of law, especially jumpstarting necessary political reforms which must form the basis of police and security sector development.
- Prioritize immediate public security by increasing attention to police *field* training, and promotion of tribal police so that local security is improved.
- Incorporate political and economic dimensions in Security Sector Reform to ensure maximum impact, re-evaluate current status of SSR and identify step-by-step approach, with appropriate resources and technical expertise to ensure an Afghan-owned, joined-up approach to achieving all 5 pillars.

- Increase civil-military coordination, including improved transfer of local knowledge, continuity between troop rotations and of staff.

2. Improve Performance of Provincial Reconstruction Teams

- Try to harmonize the rules of engagement and *national caveats* between NATO allies on the ground, particularly among the PRT-providing nations.
- NATO/coalition should strengthen coordination with regional UNAMA offices and regional police chiefs.
- PRTs must pro-actively work to ensure neutral and secure political space for Afghan civil society.
- Streamline PRTs actions with the government activities.
- Ensure that PRTs have the requested and necessary skill sets (city planning, etc.).

3. Invigorate Democratization Efforts

- Establish a long-term strategy for local elections which spurs a process to define the roles of mayors, governors and local councils.
- Assist in enacting of legislation defining villages, districts, and their relationships with provincial and central government levels.
- Create an International Democratization Trust Fund to support the long-term process of holding elections in the region, and to build long-term accountability mechanisms.

Authors' Meeting of L.I.S.D. Afghanistan Program

CHAIR'S SUMMARY

BUILDING STATE AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

December 10, 2004
Hotel Bristol, Vienna, Austria

In this fifth LISD meeting on Afghanistan, international experts analyzed and debated critical issues facing the new Afghan state after the inauguration of the first democratically elected president, Hamid Karzai, in 2004. In terms of state-building, issues included the conduct of the soon-to-be held parliamentary elections, institutional design, culture and education, as well as the establishment of infrastructure and vital economics. Regarding security issues, areas of concern included narcotics, disarmament and re-integration of former combatants, PRTs, and more generally, the role and impact of the international community. Discussions focused on the pragmatic details of these policy debates and developed larger, more theoretical questions of state-building, legitimacy, and viable institutions. It became clear that in the shadow of international attention to the elections in Iraq and now the natural catastrophe of the recent tsunami in Asia, continued international attention paid to Afghanistan has varied both in terms of actual assistance and financially. The meeting generated a number of recommendations and lessons for Afghanistan and the international community, which are also relevant for building state and security elsewhere.

Building The Afghan State

Parliamentary Elections

Summary

Great gains have been achieved in political representation, but much remains to be done in improving participation and ensuring that the elected administration is able to actually effect change. The November 2004 presidential election reflected ethnic voting patterns and interests. Upcoming parliamentary elections have the potential to exacerbate these tendencies and reify existing power structures. While the successful conduct of the presidential elections has tested the electoral mechanisms within the country, and the ability of the Afghans and the international community to get constituents to register to vote as well as assess their willingness to get to the polls, the parliamentary elections are expected to test the fragile political consensus and the power and efficiency of the Karzai government and international community to re-engage potential spoilers.

Recommendations

- *Eliminate the Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) electoral system.* SNTV is an undesirable electoral framework which not only hinders the current administration but may also result in a highly fragmented legislature. A substantial disparity between the popular vote and number of allocated parliamentary seats could easily occur, which would serve as an invitation to spoilers.
- *Provide substantial security measures.* Security provisions for parliamentary elections will be even more vital than during the recent presidential elections. There have been several incidences of candidates being threatened.

- *Facilitate the development of a party structure.* While it is crucial that such parties are democratically and representatively forged, the international community has a key role to play in training, providing models, and funding the provision of information to such entities.
- *Focus also on the ongoing support for local elections.* The electoral process will not stop with parliamentary elections. District and local elections will very much require electoral machinery and donor support. The democratic experiment in Afghanistan will also be greatly impacted by the legitimacy of local leaders and their support from the central government. Primary concentration on parliamentary elections at the expense of ignoring local elections would miss an important state-building opportunity.
- *Start planning now for the transition of current leadership.* Present stability is perceived to depend heavily on a strong central leader, currently judged to be due to the dynamism of Hamid Karzai. Post-conflict countries consistently revert to conflict or fail in the democratic experiment when facing an initial handover of power. Keeping this upcoming transition in mind will help frame the creation and building of sustainable institutions.

Legal and Constitutional Developments

Summary

The adoption of a constitution is a very important sign of progress. Nonetheless, different interpretations of “constitution” do exist and portend the possibility of future tensions. In Afghanistan, the current state of “constitutional” governance consensus depends heavily on personality, and not yet on institutions. Building the processes needed to institutionalize rule of law has only just begun. The delays in concentrating on justice mechanisms have already threatened the state-building effort, and new, immediate attention is needed to consolidate peace in legal and enforceable rules.

Recommendations

- *Create guidelines for negotiating and settling the contradictory tenets of existing laws.* The state’s *modus vivendi* as it negotiates overlapping state, customary, and Islamic law is currently unclear. Most of the judiciary only possesses access to and is trained in Islamic law.
- *Delimit Supreme Court independence in applying religious law.* A fundamental challenge for legal reform is the establishment of an independent Supreme Court. Through the combination of Article 3 (no law can be contrary to the provisions and beliefs of Islamic law) and Article 121 (granting the explicit power of judicial review), the current Supreme Court possesses dangerously broad and independent powers.
- *Reinvigorate and prioritize judicial reform and improve donor coordination.* The lack of donor coordination in general and delays by the lead donor nation in particular has been directly responsible for the poor judicial reform. The donor community should forge a single unified vision of judicial reform and prioritize the rule of law as a primary goal of institutional development. Without judicial reform, and immediate attention to courts and prisons, the millions being poured into police training will be ineffective. These projects must occur together.
- *Identify and build key pockets of judicial competence.* Choose key dispute areas in which to funnel international resources. At a minimum, establish a limited competency in critical urban areas for the adjudication of property disputes, which form the bulk of Afghanistan’s judicial caseload.
- *Identify or create a resolution mechanism for key categories of disputes in the short-run, with an eye to long-term institution building.* Land ownership and family relationship disputes possess the ever-present potential to snowball into larger political disputes, particularly if such disputes occur along ethnic cleavages.

Governance Structure

Summary

Full centralization of power needs to precede decentralization, but not to the detriment of developing local government capacity. Lessons learned from South Asian neighbors demonstrate that, given the will and administrative capacity to implement decentralization, some constitutional protection along with a concrete timetable, tremendous improvements in social welfare are possible through local organization. To be viable, a decentralization program needs to be detailed enough to ensure adequate capacity to distribute resources, as well as possess strong channels of communication with the central authority.

Recommendations

- *Organize fiscal and political decentralization around pre-existing local governance structures.* Fiscal and political decentralization efforts should build on pre-existing structures. However, a decentralization program should also seize the opportunity to democratize such structures.

The Economy and Infrastructure

- *Security and Economics:* The lack of security in Afghanistan is largely linked to the lack of economic opportunities. Many who fight for regional warlords do so for economic reasons. In the short-run, the reconstruction of destroyed and damaged infrastructure and the building of new infrastructure is seen as the more viable way of generating employment opportunities. This will require the continued support from the international community.
- *Security and Infrastructure:* The lack of transport infrastructure – a lack good roads as well as a lack of any railroads does not negatively impact the economic development and the security of Afghanistan. But besides offering new and rapid ways to connect the regional capitals – hence to finally establish national cohesion and enhancing the influence of the nation’s capital – it is also important to link the various regions of Afghanistan with neighboring states, and to eventually offer economically advantageous transit capabilities through the country in East-West and North-South directions.
- *Special Railroad Infrastructure Project:* The construction of a working railroad system – one within the country as a circular rail line and the other connecting subparts/regions of Afghanistan to the neighboring states. Rail lines from the north linking Mazar-e-Sharif via Baghlan to Kabul; from the west coming in to Herat and linking it with Kandahar and then further northeast to Kabul and with spokes out connecting Afghanistan with Iran (via Mashhad), Pakistan, Tadjikistan will afford the state with excellent connections to neighbors. The railroad can be connected from Kandahar to the South-East to Quetta (Pakistan) and further on to Shikarpur and Sukkur; and within Afghanistan a cross sectioning through the country, for instance from Kabul to Herat – may become a major contribution to the future of Afghanistan.

The construction of a railroad would address three important dimensions:

1. The enhancement of economic interaction and the contribution to regional stability and national cohesion;
2. The positive impact on the regional trans-national contact and interaction;
3. The offer of major, extensive labor intensive projects, i.e. high amounts of employment, thus a major contribution to take thousands of young unemployed “off the road,” and provide them with a serious source of income.

This would also provide – not to be underestimated – a source of national pride, namely to participate in a project which may enhance national prestige and really change the future of the country. A functioning railway system will encourage extensive, direct foreign investment also with heavy industries, permit the export of heavy raw materials and natural products such as minerals, petroleum, natural gas, and timber, etc., and finally, offer the state to become a throughway from Europe via Asia Minor over to South Asia.

Simply stated, it should become possible to travel by train from Vienna via Istanbul to Tehran, and further on to Herat and Kandahar and Kabul, and from there to Islamabad and into India, New Delhi. Such a rail connection would clearly have a lasting effect on the structure and economic as well as strategic situation of the subcontinent, not to speak about the entire region. Furthermore it may also add positively to DDR and employ thousands of demobilized and unemployed young Afghans; to offer new ways for direct foreign investment and international financial and economic interests.

The Role of NGOs

Summary

Non-governmental organizations are a diverse and loosely defined category of players in the current state and security-building project. While some are more legitimate than others, NGOs tend to have excellent access to and understanding of the local reality at the grassroots. Despite some criticism of the NGO role, foreign governments have also heavily relied on the existing capacity of NGOs to deliver services.

Recommendations

- *Speed up the provision of a just and viable NGO policy in Afghanistan.* The NGO community itself is eager to have a defining policy and registration process in Afghanistan to improve donor coordination and access as well as to ensure quality of services and advocacy. The international community should play a role in pushing for a policy that sets a free and respectful relationship with NGOs and the central government.
- *Create a lessons learned mechanism from the NGO community with a process for sharing with outside partners.* Not only do NGOs need a more complete monitoring and evaluation mechanism that allows for the identification and publicizing of lessons learned, but government, donor, and military actors in Afghanistan could benefit from the local view of NGOs.

BUILDING SECURITY IN AND AROUND THE AFGHAN STATE

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Summary

Initially, the US Department of Defense set about creating PRTs in several cities in Afghanistan, each with a complement of 50 to 100 US military personnel, plus civilian aid and political advisors. The PRTs main objectives are security, reconstruction, strengthening the influence of the central government, and monitoring and assessing the local/regional situations. In addition to the PRTs, military/civilian civil operations teams are operate around Afghanistan, performing some of the same functions as the PRTs on a reduced scale. Though much has been done to improve the security of Afghanistan, PRTs will continue to provide the de jure response to a lack of security in many parts of Afghanistan. Because each PRT has been constituted in a different way, there is need to take account of the various existing PRT models and examine whether such

models can be more efficiently organized or resourced. Participants differed on how one should optimally leverage the PRT capacity beyond the strict security realm. Two options emerged: the first being that PRTs should concentrate exclusively on their core competencies, the second argument called for extending the PRT mandate to build on larger reconstruction efforts that have showed some success.

Recommendations

- *Develop an understanding of PRT best practices.* Because of differing orientations and priorities within the donor community, a wide diversity of local needs and changing security requirements from one province to another, the PRTs around the country have different organizations, resources and mandates. However, there has been no common accounting of best practices, or wider participation in assessing what strategies have worked.
- *Develop and publicize a clear but flexible PRT operational mandate.* While each PRT needs some flexibility in adapting a specified mandate to local and regional conditions, a clear mandate will be important in clarifying responsibilities and forming appropriate expectations of the PRT role. Some participants stated the desire to emphasize “positive” security developments has created a gap between public perceptions and the security reality on the ground. Key to managing expectations is publicizing the planned role for each PRT. While individual PRT donors may perceive their roles differently, some participants noted that local Afghans often do not differentiate between them in their expectations of security provision.
- *Clarify the PRT role in security provision for upcoming parliamentary elections.* A contentious lead up to the parliamentary elections is expected to test the ability of the international community to ensure basic security.

Combating the Narco-Economy

Summary

Proliferating opium production and on-sight processing is a new and dangerous development which poses a grave danger to the central government’s monopoly on the use of force, as it provides significant economic resources to local leaders, regional challengers, and increases the power of organized crime. Increasingly, it is not only opium production but the processing of opium in mobile and modern Afghan laboratories that should concern the international community, as well as increased linkages with international crime and with international drug networks.

Recommendations

- *Prioritize and resource a comprehensive alternative livelihood and development program to provide a viable “out” from opium harvesting.* The narco-economy will continue to thrive as long as it provides economic security. It is important to maximize on the current donor commitment and move beyond short-term, limited impact eradication programs to implement a long-term development strategy in place that assists communities to end poppy production. The counter-narcotic plan must address growing internal demand, and regional demand as well as Afghanistan’s “supply” problem. International attention should focus on the nexus between production, processing and international organized crime, and resisting the criminalization of local farmers. Improved training for police and border services capable to stopping organized crime will be essential. However, the political interface of organized crime with regional political powers will continue to threaten the integrity of the state if a solution cannot be found.

The DDR Process

Summary

Though the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has gotten underway in many parts of the country, there is continued concern that the approach is not holistic. The process has focused on disarmament and demobilization, while little has been done to address the reintegration part of the process, even though the reintegration of people is the key to the success of the whole process. Moreover, DDR has not focused on Kabul and other areas more difficult to disarm.

Regional Relations

Summary

Regional relations have long been problematic from the perspective of domestic Afghan capacity, politics, and interests.

Recommendations

- *Clarify the responsibility for border security and ensure capacity to fulfill the necessary roles.* The provision of border security has been problematic from the perspective of domestic Afghan capacity because six groups currently share this responsibility, with their various goals, capacities and backers potentially coming into conflict. Key to this will be clear policies and enforcement of revenue collection as border fees represent a major income for regional leaders. Assisting the central state in capturing this revenue will be key to its stability.
- *Continue encouraging dialogue between regional neighbors.* Particularly India and Pakistan, who have key stakes in Afghanistan's economic development because of the pipeline potential, should be encouraged to cooperate in the provision of border security.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Summary

The international community will need to continue to play a critical role in providing stability and encouraging the growth in government capacity. As we know from recent World Bank research, a majority of current post-conflict states are likely to return to conflict within five years. If the international community does not want to watch significant conflict re-erupt in Afghanistan in the coming years, they need to demonstrate long-term, committed financial and political involvement. The international community will continue to grapple with the dilemmas and contradictions involved in forging organically-created and sustainable institutions in the country, while undertaking immediate post-conflict stabilization measures and fulfilling a security role that the Afghan government cannot yet ensure.

Recommendations

- *Forge a post-Bonn compact.* As parliamentary elections mark the conclusion of the Bonn Agreement, members of the international community and the new Afghan government should forge the next compact to establish benchmarks for mission success. A radical disconnect in definitions of mission success could undermine and potentially de-legitimize the intervention effort. The international community and the Government of Afghanistan should establish reasonable benchmarks in five arenas (financial assistance should be conditioned upon these discrete indicators):

1. political and civic development;
 2. security and rule of law;
 3. public finance and administration;
 4. social recovery;
 5. economic recovery.
- *Provide for improved donor coordination and management.* Ideally, a mechanism for managing coordination (both an external component for the donor level and an internal component at the host country level) should be worked out prior to intervention, despite the considerable time pressure. Advance coordination and consultation will preview inconsistencies between ambitions and political will and help forge a better match of mandate and resources.
 - *Aggressively recruit and train the next generation of civil servants.* The entire project of the new government of Afghanistan will rest on the quality of its civil servants and their ability to carry out its orders. While attention is being paid to police and army training, the issue of effective civil service training and reform has been sidelined. Not only does this effort need to be adequately funded by the international community, long-term trainers and advisors should be made available to ministries to assist in policy development, training, and identification of new managers. Given the reality of a two-decade war, special attention will have to go to recruitment and training to replace the ageing population of former civil servants.
 - *Focus on assistance to the government of Afghanistan to implement its constitution.* The constitution has legitimacy as a road map. The international community, whether through a Post-Bonn compact or through bilateral agreement must develop concrete steps to assist the GOA to implement the provisions of the Constitution. But the constitution's dictates are not broad enough for all that needs to happen. Constitution-support must be integrated with support for the expected Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan and other national development planning. This support must include an honest and transparent examination of donor political will and likely timetables of aid drawdown.
 - *Transparency in evaluation of lead country responsibilities.*
 1. Religion, Human Rights and the State: The final wording of the role of Islam in Afghanistan's constitution is more strongly worded than was widely expected, leaving the door open for more conservative interpretations of the country's laws. This and the concern about human rights should be reviewed in the future, perhaps in conjunction with a constitutional review.
 2. Civil Service Reform: A competent civil service will be the key to political administration and the delivery of basic services and security. In order to increase competence and decrease corruption, a livable salary must be paid to the police and civilian administrators and their training needs to be improved. Civil service reform should also include improved revenue collection efforts, since this would provide the basis for paying improved and regular salaries.