

# PEACE AND THE FUTURE IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

17-20 June 1999

Triesenberg, Liechtenstein

## Summary

### Objectives, Context, and Issues for Discussion

This year's Liechtenstein Colloquium was held to examine, develop, and discuss feasible, credible, and manageable models for solutions – in the strategic, humanitarian, political, and economic spheres – to provide for peace, stability, and prosperity in Southeastern Europe. The colloquium focused on the aftermath of the Kosovo refugee crisis and the NATO intervention in Serbia. In fact, the sessions were held just as KFOR troops began moving into Kosovo. The topics of discussion were broad, however, and covered issues applicable to the entire region of Southeastern Europe. The colloquium encouraged an open, unrestricted, and constructive dialogue that included both the practical and the theoretical, as well as unconventional ideas and solutions.

The participants contributed in their personal capacities to the discussions of five major issues covered each at separate sessions. A keynote speaker started each session by presenting the topic and the most relevant points of discussion. The participants were encouraged to give due overall consideration to the following additional topics:

- the sub-regional and regional framework;
- the potential for regional cooperation/integration into the European Union, and how the integrative role of the EU could "europeanize" the entire region;
- domestic and regional programs to facilitate: Repatriation, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Regionalization;
- the extent to which the "Europeanization" of the region could promote the reconstruction of its infrastructure and the recreation of regional cooperation networks;
- fighting crime of all types and maintaining basic individual security;
- for the children and adolescents: (objective) education and professional training, programs to prevent unemployment and keep children off the streets, and psychological counseling for the youngest suffering from war/refugee-related trauma;
- democratization - along with the protection of moderate leaders and opposition parties;
- religious and cultural issues - and how they interact with local political culture;
- regional security, stability, and arms control, affected through regional demilitarization and arms-control regimes buttressed with verification and other confidence-building measures;
- the interests of the community versus the interests of the nation-state;

- the role of outside powers as it relates to regional security cooperation, specifically NATO vis-a-vis the Russian Federation;
- the influence of the outside world coming particularly from the diaspora, refu-gees, allies, and other sources.

### Summary of Sessions

The following summary was made by the Chairman of the Colloquium on the basis of the discussions between participants at individual session. The summary does in no way purport to reflect the opinions of and/or positions taken by participants, nor to offer a complete overview of the discussion. It is the sole responsibility of the Chairman.

#### *Multiethnicity versus Homogeneity*

The question was raised whether it was possible to have a multiethnic state in the Balkan region. Some participants recognized grounds for optimism, and pointed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as a model for ethnic cohabitation. Others argued that multiethnicity would never work in the Balkans, and drew attention to the danger that Macedonia's Albanian population would become a new under-class. If the Kosovo situation were not to be stabilized, it was argued, it would in due course endanger the future and stability of Macedonia.

#### *Role of other Interested Countries*

The future role of the Russian Federation in Kosovo was debated. In particular, it was questioned whether the Russian executive, military and foreign policy apparatus were all working toward the same policy goals in the Balkans. The role of Turkey in the region was also discussed, specifically the ways in which the Ankara-Athens relationship influences Turkey's position.

#### *Children and the Youth*

The Kosovo conflict has had a particularly disastrous effect on children, due in large part to the fact that one out of every four Kosovars is younger than 12 years of age. Deep concern was raised about the psychological state of this new generation, raised in a time of war. Special attention must be paid to the needs of children and teenagers in the post-conflict period, as current family and educational structures may be inadequate to deal with post- traumatic stress and other emotional problems caused by life as a refugee and losing one's family members. It was noted that the Albanian Ministry of Education had devised summer courses for Kosovar children to respond to some of these needs until it was safe to return to Kosovo. These programs had no financial support, however, and the teachers were often asked to carry them out voluntarily.

#### *Cost for Albania and the Republic of Macedonia*

Albania and Macedonia had both received a huge influx of refugees. Refugees accounted for 18 percent of the population of Macedonia, which had imposed a huge burden on the already strained governmental resources. Support from the international community had not been sufficient to cover all the needs. Moreover, most of the funds provided in the form of international aid was going to nongovernmental organization (NGOs), rather than to the government (in Albania, only 10 percent of the aid was channeled through the governmental). Bilateral cooperation between Tirana and Skopje was suggested to strengthen their respective international positions.

### *Ownership of the Reconstruction Program*

There was general consensus that for the reconstruction of Kosovo to work, aid organizations would need to directly engage the local population and include them as active managers of the projects. The relief efforts should avoid turning the Kosovar Albanians into wards of the international community. The decision to appoint a civilian High Representative from the U as well as the absence of any locally available civil servants were two significant problems. The term "competing philanthropic imperialism" was used to describe how Kosovo would be further victimize<i>i if these two main problems were solved. One must always be aware of the potential danger that powerful philanthropic organizations and actors may try to pursue objectives in their own interest rather than towards the need emanating from the local situation.

### *Refugee Return*

At the time of the meetings (June 1999), participants' discussions were based on estimates that 10 percent of the refugees would return immediately, while another 50 percent would return before the start of winter. Several participants argued that any efforts aimed at preventing the return of refugees were unlikely to prove successful; they would return no matter what the international community advised them to do. Since most returning refugees would be re-building their own houses by themselves, it was proposed that the best assistance would be to provide them with the means for the rebuilding. It was also noted that the flow of Kosovar returnees might not be unidirectional: some people who returned to Bosnia after the war were so devastated by what they found that they returned to their host country. The most important lesson is that both the rapid exodus of refugees (due to ethnic cleansing), as well as the nearly equally rapid return, have taken the relevant international organizations by surprise and to a certain degree unprepared for the scale of the problems.

### *Leadership*

The point was raised often that Serbia needed to provide the international community with a credible alternative to the present regime in Belgrade. If such an alternative appeared, the international community should be prepared to assist the Serbian opposition directly. While the participants agreed that there was a need for political change in Serbia, there was no consensus on how these changes could or should be achieved. Some participants considered it necessary that Serbia change from within, while others argued that domestic political oppression and control of the media within Serbia made external pressure an indispensable element in any effort to change the domestic political situation.

### *Elections*

Regarding Kosovo, the view was expressed that the international community tends to view elections as a panacea for overcoming the democratic deficiencies in post-conflict situations. It was argued that the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, were conducted prematurely and with negative consequences. The risks associated with premature elections include domestic radicalization, the formation of ethnically-based political parties, and the entrenchment of those already in power.

The same line of argument was applied to Serbia. As long as opposition in Serbia was divided and weak, and as long as no unified movement existed to replace the Milosevic regime, there would be little chance for electoral success. The view was also expressed that certain "opposition leaders" were still making political deals with President Milosevic behind the scenes. The point was also made that the more time would pass, the better were the chances for President Milosevic to regain control. The international community should try its utmost to foster the development of a completely new Serbian

leadership - exactly how was left unanswered. It can be very difficult to replace a dictatorial regime through elections, since it can be almost impossible to hold such elections in a free and fair manner.

### *Civil Society*

There was agreement that the region needed a new social contract based on institutions that foster participation. The private sector, the church, local government, and a free and pluralistic media could play an important role. While an internal development is a prerequisite for democratization, external assistance and practical lessons in democracy-building and democratic culture were also needed. Moreover the democratization process would only be partially successful if the region continued to ignore and did not deal frankly with its recent past. The experience of post-World War II Germany could serve as a positive example for how to deal with a nation's history - though it is difficult to compare Yugoslavia to Germany or the Balkans to Central Europe.

The media plays a key role in shaping public opinion in the region. Returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) should be provided with radio receivers, and a radio station should be established to broadcast over the territory of Kosovo as well as over Serbia.

### *Targeting Assistance and Aid to Serbia*

The Western countries had promised that Serbia would not receive reconstruction aid as long as President Milosevic remained in power. Serbia would however continue to receive humanitarian aid. In this context, it was discussed where the ambiguous line between "humanitarian" and "reconstruction" should be drawn. It became clear that such a line would be somewhat arbitrary and artificial. Some participants argued that the definition of "humanitarian" aid should be widened so as to include the re-establishment of electricity, water supplies, communications, and certain other important infrastructure projects (bridges, roads, and rail-ways) that were also of vital importance for neighboring states. In order to assist the neighboring states and help the region as a whole, it was suggested that the international community could undertake certain reconstruction projects with or without the acquiescence of the Yugoslav government.

How, then, would it be possible to help the people of Serbia without simultaneously giving support to the current regime? This difficult question was never fully answered. Abstaining from giving assistance to Serbia would have serious repercussions for the recovery of the region as a whole - the neighboring states would be affected. In light of the region's inter-dependence, it was advised that a comprehensive long-term strategy for the Balkans be adopted. Some participants were of the view that for a successful stabilization of the domestic situation in and the reintegration of Serbia into the international community it was important to indicate to its people that the "outside world" was not hostile towards Serbia nor the Serbian people, but willing to provide assistance. In order to stabilize the uncertain domestic situation and to open Serbia for the concerns of the international community it was important to send clear signals that the outside world is not only bombs but aid as well.

### *Disarmament*

The point was raised that a "balance of power" philosophy should not be the basis for any future regional security framework. Such an outlook promotes the goal of military parity and deterrence, which could further exacerbate the security fears of neighboring states and encourage a regional arms race. Such an arms race would impose a serious strain on the already fragile economies of the region, to say nothing about increasing the likelihood of future war. Collective security, it was suggested, could be the basis for an alternative security concept, although no specific ideas for how this goal could be achieved were put forth.

### *The Role of the Market*

The opinion was put forth that as economic forces tend to disregard ethnic rivalries, economic development is therefore a key ingredient for sustainable development. Building on the experience of Western Europe, the economic integration of the Balkans could constitute the basis for a lasting peace in the region. It was imperative, however, that this regional integration take place within the larger context of the European integration process. In addition to economic reconstruction, old structures and psychological patterns associated with the communist and autocratic legacy must be overcome.

### *Borders*

It was debated whether peace in the Balkans could be achieved by redrawing international borders. On the one hand the situation on the ground seemed to evolve steadily towards a separation of Kosovo. Furthermore, insisting on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the most certain way of alienating and radicalizing the KLA, which had insisted on independence for Kosovo. On the other hand, opening up the possibility of redrawing maps in the region could be a recipe for continued armed conflict in the region - no part of South-Eastern Europe was "ethnically pure", and the redrawing of borders would necessarily involve a massive displacement of population to create ethnic enclaves. Those against the redrawing of borders noted that the emphasis had shifted from concern over a "Greater Serbia" to concern over a "Greater Albania". Several participants stated emphatically and unequivocally that redrawing borders could never be a solution to the problems in the region and therefore should not even be considered. For them, regional integration and multiethnicity seem the only feasible solutions.

### *The Stability Pact*

The view was expressed that at best the Stability Pact could facilitate the integration of the region into Europe; at worst, it would serve as a means of further containing the Balkans and separating them from the rest of the continent. Some concern was expressed about the underlying motives of the international community: beyond the "war of principles" waged against the Milosevic regime, there was also the political imperative of preventing a massive flow of refugees into European countries. The Schengen Accords concluded among the EU member states were presented as an example of further retrenchment of the Union.

The importance of the Stability Pact would lie in stabilizing the region by including it in the European integration process. Doubts were expressed if the political will for such an incorporation indeed existed on the part of the EU member states, and whether the financial means required would ever be made available. It was suggested that nationalism could be overcome by increasing cooperation within the region itself.

The attitude of NATO and the EU toward the region was also discussed. A reliance on the international community to end conflicts - hence "humanitarian intervention" - and to establish a civilian administration may lead to a renewal of the mandate regime. Such a regime is unacceptable to many who insist that the prevalent paradigm must be one of inclusion. The view was expressed that such inclusion and integration into Europe could only be achieved by way of a solution that provided for freedom of movement; doubts were expressed, whether the political will for such a solution existed.

### *Collective Guilt*

Two diverging views were presented on whether the entire population of Serbia should to some extent share guilt for the atrocities committed against the Kosovar Albanians. Participants of the first view noted post-Apartheid South Africa's use of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (as well as the

example of Germany after WWII) as convincing evidence of the important need for collective societal "soul-searching" by populations that have lived under a repressive regime. Reducing the guilt to one person, or to a small group of people, would hinder the possibility for reconciliation and lasting peace. Those of the opposite view, however, argued that the Serbians, far from being the regime's willing executioners, were themselves the biggest victims of the Belgrade regime.

### Possible Recommendations

The following set of recommendations was elaborated by the Chairman of the Colloquium on the basis of the discussions between participants at individual sessions. While the recommendations result from these discussions, they do not purport to reflect the opinions of and/or positions taken by participants; nor do they cover all points of discussion. They are thus the sole responsibility of the Chairman.

#### *Strategic Dimensions*

Prioritize and support the establishment of internal security throughout Yugoslavia. Confiscate all firearms and arrest all dangerous criminals immediately (especially those criminals recently released from prison for mop-up operations in Kosovo).

Beware of the potential spill-over violence into Montenegro, the Sanjak region, and/or Vojvodina; there may be the need of the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* around Kosovo and these regions.

Establish coherent and cohesive rules regarding decriminalization throughout Kosovo and ensure their consistent enforcement in all the KFOR sectors. Try to counteract also all kinds of illegal actions and behavior, including black market. Focus special attention on the behavior of the young returnees.

Integrate the KLA into a new civil administration, minimize their armaments, cut their arms supply roots, and eliminate potential infighting. The danger of alienation and radicalization should be countered through the involvement of KLA and its members in administrative and reconstruction processes.

An agreement on the comprehensive disarmament of the region should be concluded and implemented consistently by all parties and states concerned.

The process of disarmament, pacification, and reconstruction should be started immediately. The oncoming winter, the upcoming U.S. elections, the increasing resentment of refugees in host countries, and growing donor fatigue all show that the time for achieving these priority goals is very short. For the time being, no change of borders should be considered for the permanent status of Kosovo; rather a combination of maximum self-governance and autonomy, along with and regional integration under EU guidance, should be employed.

#### *Domestic Policy Situation*

President Milosevic and the current regime should be isolated from the negotiation process and their role eliminated wherever possible. The international community must make it clear to the Yugoslav population that reconstruction aid and economic assistance will come once Milosevic and his regime are no longer in power. Instead, support and assist the peoples of Yugoslavia whenever possible, independent of religious or ethnic efforts. A combined strategy ought to be employed to combat organized crime (decriminalization), to encourage till" development of new leaders (democratization), and to open the country to its neighbor" (regionalization)

Promoting and supporting new, non-corrupt, and un-compromised leaders; and taking a balanced and reasonable position vis-a-vis demands from Kosovar Albanians, Bosnians, and Montenegrinians.

Focus on opposition leaders and their constituencies but beware of rivalries among and between those in Serbia and those in exile. Be careful regarding corrupt and compromised opposition leaders who are too embroiled with the region. Support should be given to the formation of independent media in the region. For example, the population could be provided with radios and other means of accessing and distributing information.

Assistance should be given especially to the young returning refugees in the form of counselling and education.

Support the establishment of another power center besides Belgrade within the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Involve KFOR military engineers in building bridges and urgent infrastructure projects. This eliminates the risk of having to negotiate with Milosevic while keeping the reconstruction funds out of his hands so he cannot capitalize on the beneficial effects of such projects.

Hold the Serbian leadership responsible for breaches of law. Bring to justice all those who are indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, whether they reside in Serbia, Croatia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina or elsewhere. Beware of the influence of organized crime and the negligence of corrupt governments.

For the time being, do not push for elections in Kosovo or Serbia. In light of the fragile political situation, premature elections might consolidate the division of political allegiances along ethnic lines and ascertain a renewed victory of the nationalists.

Focus on modernization in an effort to combat the ideas and myths of 18th and 19th century nationalism prevalent in the region's oral history, family tradition, and identities. Promote the participation of women in all aspects of society, from politics to business to education. Promote the ideas of integration, multiple identities, European integration and equal opportunities for all peoples in the region, independent of their race, gender, or religion.

The development of a civil society should be supported and promoted. Train teachers, draw out young leaders (the generation below age 30) and bring women more into the decision-making process. Prepare for a conference of regional young leaders.

### *Humanitarian Dimension*

Humanitarian assistance must be distributed equally, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation. Subjecting the region to "competing philanthropic imperialism," i.e., a situation where foundations, NGOs, etc. try to impose their policy and interests on the region irrespective of local needs, must be avoided. NGOs and incoming foreign aid should be coordinated via an international clearing house.

A hands-on approach to the reconstruction of the region should be adopted. The local population and particularly the local youth should be involved in objective needs assessment and be given the tools to start reconstruction projects. Encourage stewardship - the personal involvement of the local population in any international assistance and reconstruction project.

### *Economic and Regional Dimension*

Long-term sustainability should characterize all humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects. A comprehensive vision of regional aid and assistance should be established.

Encourage bilateral cooperation among the neighboring states in South-Eastern Europe, in particular between Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. Emphasis should be placed on financial cooperation, infrastructure projects, and education.

Try to establish as soon as possible a common currency zone amongst the states of the former Yugoslavia and their neighbors.

A customs union in South-Eastern Europe should be created so as to allow for greater interregional interaction and for the possibility of negotiating interregional currency arrangements. This would also assist in combating corruption and fraud while enhancing bilateral arrangements. The formation of new legal, financial, and fiscal institutions should be supported at both the national and regional levels.