

# Pricing in the Presence of Peering

**Euiwoong Lee**

David Buchfuhrer

*Lachlan Andrew*

Ao Tang

Steven Low


**Engineering & Applied Science  
Caltech**



# Outline


- Inter-domain routing on Internet
- Pricing to maximize revenue
  - Model
  - NP-hardness
- Approximation algorithm
  - Local prices
  - Max-cut based algorithm

# Inter-domain routing



# Inter-domain routing

- Inter-domain routing determines next ISP & thus egress router
  - e.g. BGP
- Intra-domain routing determines path from ingress to egress router
  - e.g. OSPF (shortest path routing)



# Inter-domain routing

- Inter-domain **routing policy** determines the macroscopic structure of Internet
  - AS-level routing & peering structure
  - Not just physical connectivity
- Inter-domain routing policy optimizes
  - Bandwidth revenue/cost
  - Performance
  - Other policy objectives (that may be hard to quantify)
- Generally not shortest-path algorithm
  - Dominate implementation: BGP

# Our goal

- Understand routing and peering structure of Internet
- ... that results from interaction of economics and routing protocol
- This talk
  - Tier-1 ISP prices tier-2 ISPs to max revenue
  - Tier-2 ISPs can peer if price too high
  - How to price?
  - What is the resulting peering structure?

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# Model

- Tier-1 ISP charges each Tier-2 ISP by data carried

- Tier-2 ISP pairs can build links (“peer”) to bypass Tier-1

- Revenue to Tier-1 ISP:


- If  $\phi(\text{price to A}, \text{price to B})$

- > “peering” cost

- 0

- else

- $(\text{price to A} + \text{price to B}) * \text{traffic}$



Goal: decide price for each ISP to maximize revenue



# Modeling assumption

- No competition – only one Tier-1 provider
- “Peering cost” is recurring cost, not one-off
- Traffic between Tier-2 ISPs =  $W(\text{sum of prices})$
- Peering decision based on Tier-1 charge

# Willingness to peer

- Earlier model: ISPs peer if cheaper *overall*

- $\phi(a,b)=a+b$

- ISPs peer if it is cheaper for *both*


- $\phi(a,b)=\min(a,b)$

$$\phi(u, v) \leq c$$


- Symmetric:  $\phi(a,b) = \phi(b,a)$
- Increasing:  $b \leq c \Rightarrow \phi(a,b) \leq \phi(a,c)$
- Left continuous, nonnegative

# Demand weight


- Previous work: Demand constant
- If provider too expensive, ISPs throttle demand



- $W$  and  $\phi$  determine whether *finite* prices optimal
- Left continuous, non-negative
- Finitely many local max  $xW(x)$



# Example



5 from (A, B), 7 from (B, C),  
0 from (A, C)  
4 from (B, D), 6 from (C, D) → 22 is the optimum

The peering arrangement of the optimum  
= (A, C)

# Problem formulation

Given *graph*  $G = (V, E)$   
*cost function*  $c : E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$   
*willingness to peer*  $\phi : \mathbb{R}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$   
*demand weight*  $W : \mathbb{R}^+ \cup \{\infty\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+ \cup \{0\}$



For pricing function  $\mu : V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+ \cup \{0\}$

$$R(\mu) := \sum_{\substack{(u,v) \in E \\ \phi(\mu(u), \mu(v)) \leq c(u,v)}} (\mu(u) + \mu(v)) W(\mu(u) + \mu(v))$$

|   |
|---|
| $\text{P1: } \max_{\mu} R(\mu) =: \text{opt}(G, c)$ |
|---|

# NP- and APX-completeness

- APX – approximable to a constant factor
- PTAS – approximable to *any* constant factor
- **Theorem** P1 is APX-complete
- Proof: Max-cut-3 reduces to P1 polynomially



# Outline


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# Observation: local revenue

- For each vertex  $v$ , (assume that we charge 0 to others)

$f(v)$  : max possible revenue from  $v$

$g(v)$  : charge to  $v$  to get  $f(v)$






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


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$$F(V) := \sum_{v \in V} f(v) = 5 + 12 + 12 + 8 = 37 > \text{opt}(G, c)$$

# Max-cut: 1/4 Approximation

1. Compute link weights

$$d(e) := \sum_{v \in e} g(v) \mathbf{1}(g(v) \leq c(e))$$

2. Appr. max-cut algorithm:  $(X, \bar{X})$
3. (WLOG)


$$\mu(v) = \begin{cases} g(v) & \text{if } v \in X \\ 0 & \text{if } v \in \bar{X} \end{cases}$$

## Theorem

$$R(\mu) \geq \frac{1}{4} \text{opt}(G, c)$$

# Computing $f$ and $g$

- Non-convex 1-D optimization
- Raising price reduces revenue-bearing edges
  - Optimize for each subset of edges
- Optimal price  $g$  may be infinite
  - If so, optimal revenue  $f$  may or may not be



# Extensions and open questions

- Better than 1/4 possible? How?
  - At forefront of theoretical computer science
- Costs of carrying traffic
- Peering decisions not based purely on price
  - Re-interpret  $W$  as probability of not peering?

# Conclusion

- Peering/pricing affects Internet routes
- Maximum provider revenue hard to calculate
- 1/4 approximation based on Max-Cut