

*A World of 'Good and Evil'?*  
*The Return to Morality in International Affairs*  
**Final Report of the Princeton Colloquium on Public and International  
Affairs**  
**April 25-26, 2003**

Office of the Dean  
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs  
Princeton University

*As the United States and the international community seek  
to rebuild Iraq, the importance of understanding the relationship between  
morality and foreign policy cannot be overstated.*

Shirley Tilghman  
President, Princeton University

*A full articulation of ethics and world politics must consider  
the ethics of war and peace, the ethics of human rights, the ethics of international  
political economy, and the ethics of world order.*

Reverend J. Bryan Hehir  
President, Catholic Charities USA. and Distinguished Professor of Ethics and  
International Affairs at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service

*Policy is the meeting place of the world of power  
and the world of morality,  
in which there takes place the encounter and reconciliation  
of the duty of success that rests upon the statesman and  
the duty of justice that rests upon the civilized nation he serves.*

Reverend Hehir quoting John Courtney Murray

*The world environment is such that America can only harm, not defend, the  
interests of its citizens by assuming, even as a rhetorical device, a battle of good  
and evil.*

Former Political Counselor at the United States Embassy in Athens Kielsing

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## II. Executive Summary

The inaugural Princeton Colloquium, *A World of 'Good and Evil'? The Return to Morality in Public and International Affairs*, brought together philosophers, diplomats, economists, journalists, political scientists, international lawyers, historians, scholars of religion and practitioners, the Colloquium to address -- from multiple disciplines and perspectives -- the pressing issue of the relationship of morality and policy.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, posed the pivotal questions of the Colloquium: "Is this really a new era of morality or just an endless circle from Woodrow Wilson through Franklin Roosevelt and back to today? Does morality in international affairs mean something different today than it did in the past?"

Some participants responded by challenging the very title of the Colloquium, suggesting perhaps a "turn to" rather than "return to" morality, implying that morality has never before had a firm place in US foreign policy. Others, viewing today as a continuum with the past, argued that the current situation is not a "return to morality" because morality has always been a part of public and international affairs. Still others, differentiating morality and moralism, challenged the very premise that domestic and foreign policy has ever had anything to do with morality. And finally, some posited that morality has always played a role in policy, but what we are experiencing today, while not discontinuous with the past, has a whole new edge.

The Colloquium addressed other fundamental questions of the interplay between morality and foreign policy. What does it mean to frame American foreign policy in moral terms? To what extent is moral analysis useful in confronting 21st century challenges? Does viewing global affairs through the dichotomy of good and evil serve to clarify or to constrain foreign policy decision-making? What alternative frameworks might be available to guide US policy and the shape of our global society? What would a more nuanced understanding of morality require?

The Colloquium generated debate without consensus, questions without conclusions. This outcome in itself invites further inquiry. Is the phenomenon of morality so malleable that it has no meaning -- or all meanings -- in its application to international decision-making? Have humanitarian concerns -- such as non-combatant immunity -- become such a given in international decision-making that morality is the expectation, not the exception? Is the definition of morality ultimately so relative that it has become a self-serving, rhetorical, even political device rather than a common behavioral benchmark against which global policy can be weighed? Is morality so tightly woven into religious and cultural values that it cannot be extracted as an objective standard?

Continuing to ask why the topic of morality in international affairs leaves us with so many divergent views, yet such a shared sense of urgency and importance, is the key Colloquium outcome. As Dean Slaughter concluded the final panel discussion, “What I hope all of you take away from this Colloquium are more questions than answers and a sense of determination to engage yourself in those questions and to continue in a collective national debate.”

### **Are we experiencing a *return to morality* or a *turn to something new*?**

The Colloquium generated a spectrum of opinions on this central question, ranging from Leslie Gelb’s sense of the marked newness to Roger Wilkin’s sense of deep continuity. The underlying lesson emerged that, though there is considerable precedent and valuable historical context, there is indeed something new. There are new expectations of humanitarian interventions, new assumptions about the protections afforded non-combatants, new acceptance of morality’s place in political dialogue. But, even if this new moment can be objectively identified as a positive step forward, we must still beware of its genuine dangers and inherent complexities.

Leslie Gelb, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, presented a most compelling argument that we are experiencing a “a new era” of increased attention to human rights and international law, as he observed, “Morality now matters in discussions of foreign policy.”

Gelb’s position that this is a “relatively new beast” was set forth in a recently published article in *Foreign Affairs*, in which he argues that the shift towards morality occurred within the past few decades. It was not until the Carter/Ford presidential campaign, and Jimmy Carter’s attack on Henry Kissinger’s failure to tend to human rights issues, that “the morality of foreign policy start(ed) entering into active political combat.” By the end of the Reagan administration, “human rights was part of the foreign policy agenda.” The “next jump” was the adoption of democracy as a major American political goal. Observed Gelb: “It really is unimaginable for me to think of the United States having gotten involved in a Bosnia or a Kosovo or Somalia ... before the last 20, 30 years. I think there is a real change.” Although morality “generally doesn’t prevail...it can’t be ignored and is part of the mix, a huge step forward historically.”

Gelb identified one of the biggest changes as the locus of the conversations about human rights. “International lawyers were concerned about rights of man and fair treatment issues and they ... wrote alone. For hundreds of years you had issues of the morality of war and just war being discussed, but they weren’t discussed by people with power.”

Morton Halperin, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the Open Society Institute’s Washington, DC, office, agreed with Gelb that there is a “greater intensity and respectability” for human rights and democracy now, observing, “we have now reached the point where the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is becoming a

reality.” But Halperin tempered Gelb’s position, concluding the present turn to morality is a “matter of degree...rather than something fundamentally new.”

Michael Walzer, Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, built on the observation of changed expectations, noting the modern significance of just war’s requirement of respect for non-combatant immunity. Walzer concluded, in the recent war in Iraq, “there was a far greater effort than in the past to avoid or minimize the risks imposed on the civilian population” -- “just war has become something like a military necessity.”

Bill Kristol, editor of the *Weekly Standard*, argued that it has never been possible to separate the discussion of morality from international affairs: “good and evil are real and they’re really relevant to international affairs. And no one seriously has ever thought they’re not except for some sort of extreme Morgenthalian academic.” Yet, Kristol noted, since September 11<sup>th</sup> the United States has undergone a dramatic shift in attitudes towards foreign policy. “In a weird way,” he concluded, “the polemicists of the right and the left are perhaps more correct than the sensible policy-makers of the center in sensing that something big has happened to American foreign policy.”

“So I think we are in a new moment,” Kristol concluded, “and the key to understanding new moments is things change more than you expect. That’s what it means to be in a new moment. You don’t revert to the mean. You don’t go back to the status quo ante.”

Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, President, Catholic Charities USA and Distinguished Professor of Ethics and International Affairs at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, embraced both themes of newness and continuity, asserting this “is an old topic with a new edge -- new in its complexity, new in its intensity.” Hehir emphasized the importance of the historical context, observing, “[t]here is a story that stands behind how we got here.” Hehir traced the evolution of the relationship of politics and morality in the US from the “realist triumph of the post-World War II period” when moral norms were suspect and it was feared that “normative discourse would distort good policy making,” through the Vietnam era and the Cold War to the 1990’s “when the debate shift[ed] dramatically in substance and tone to one of humanitarian military intervention.”

Referencing Gelb’s *Foreign Affairs* article, Hehir commented “we should not think that we are the first to try... the discussion of the moral dimensions of world politics, but we need to acknowledge that there is something new about the effort.” Hehir concluded that “ethics is now securely included in the academy, the diplomatic arena, and the strategic arena, in discussions of politics and strategy. It belongs there, it is treated as if it belongs, and while it may not always win the argument, it is not absent.”

Brady Kiesling, former Political Counselor at the United States Embassy in Athens, likewise perceived a combination of the old -- even the ancient -- and the new. Analyzing the current Bush Administration’s dualistic approach to foreign policy as a new emphasis on good versus evil, Kiesling observed that Bush seems to “have strayed, presumably

unconsciously, into an ancient, muscular theology of a universe locked in permanent combat between the forces of light and the forces of darkness.” Characterizing such an approach as both a break with the past, and as ultimately harmful to US national interests, Kiesling made an impassioned plea for a return to a visionary foreign policy which identifies American interests with the world’s -- a shift from the current approach, which Kiesling described as a mixture of “Jacksonian populism and aggressive nationalism,” back to the “old and honorable alliance of Hamiltonian pragmatism illuminated and made palatable by Wilsonian idealism.”

Panelist Ana María Berejano of Universidad de los Andes provided an outside-in perspective, challenging the title of the Colloquium and asking ‘what return?’ Although acknowledging that US rhetoric has become more moralistic since September 11, Berejano noted that for the most part, the shift is not seen by Latin Americans as a return, “but rather a continuation of what has become a routine of the US wrapping up in moral discourse a series of policies which are not only dictated by strategic and/or economic interests, but that at times have also clearly contradicted the very moral principles and values that they purport to uphold.” Berejano reminded the audience “for most of Latin America the memory of a time of war accompanied by a resounding moral discourse does not seem so distant, neither in space, nor in time.”

At the “look at all the precedent” end of the spectrum, Colloquium participants pointed out how Woodrow Wilson professed the United States to be “but one of the champions of the rights of mankind” and, in his 1937 “Quarantine” speech, Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared, “There must be recognition of the fact that national morality is as vital as private morality.” Others reminded how, more recently, Ronald Reagan christened the Soviet Union the “evil empire.” Princeton Professor of History Paul Miles outlined the role of moral arguments in the War of 1812, the Spanish American War, and WWI, emphasizing the moralistic rhetoric of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, but noting that “historians, quite predictably, have not been of one accord in viewing the roots of the moral argument or its significance for the history of US foreign relations.”

Princeton’s Dayton-Stockton Professor of History Sean Wilentz noted parallels between today’s “moralism” and the “Young America Movement” of the 1840s and 1850s, “a group of truculent, belligerent expansionists who truly did believe in the uplifting of the oppressed around the world.” While Josiah Ober, Princeton’s David Magie ’97 Class of 1897 Professor of Ancient History, provided an historical background on the religious and secular roots of the “just war theory,” Valerie Hunt, Professor of Political Science at Southern Methodist University, reviewed US immigration policy, noting “ethical dimensions have been present in the immigration policy process for quite some time” and citing a late 19<sup>th</sup> century immigration principle which mandated potential immigrants be chosen or excluded on the basis of moral character.

Roger Wilkins, Professor of History and American Culture at George Mason University, argued that there had been more historical precedent than Leslie Gelb conceded, asserting, “Americans have always had an impulse to justify some foreign policy actions

on some grounds of human morality.” Wilkins first referenced the Declaration of Independence as an international appeal to the “decent opinion of mankind” and then considered the Gettysburg Address through a foreign policy lens, pointing out that “because [Lincoln] made the Civil War a war for human rights, he made it impossible for the English to come in on the side of the Confederates.” Wilkins noted the historical tendency of the United States to use the “white man’s burden” as moral justification for intervention, citing President McKinley’s annexation of the Philippines as one example, and concluding “the American impulse to justify our foreign policy adventures in moral terms is long, rich, and deep.”

### **What are the complexities, the dangers and the nuances of this “new edge”?**

When Reverend Hehir claimed that the Colloquium was addressing an “old topic with a new edge – new in intensity and new in complexity,” what was he referencing? What are the complexities of this new era? What are the pitfalls and how can we avoid visiting -- or revisiting -- them?

Miquel Nadal, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Spain, touched the essence of the complexity with his comment: “morality or principles are at the core of any public policy, be it domestic or be it international. The major question is what principles, and, more importantly, who defines them, who applies them, who enforces them, and who defends them.”

A first step is to determine what we mean by “morality” and then whose morality we are referencing. Reverend Hehir considered the definition of morality from legal, academic, and theological perspectives. When evaluating morality in foreign policy, he said, one must remember that each of these perspectives is interconnected. “The legal and the moral constantly relate in the arena of jurisprudence. The moral and the religious are in constant dialogue, for religious traditions have been a part, not the only part but a major part, of the traditions from which we draw moral ideas.”

Though we may be able to recognize with some certainty when there is an absence of morality, when an actor or argument is amoral or immoral, how can we know when morality is present? The relativity of the term was captured by Paul Miles, who asked in his panel, “What do we mean by the term moral argument? In the grand sweep of United States foreign relations, it is an argument that seems to have employed every sense of the adjective moral.”

Brady Kiesling distinguished between the moralities of the individual as actor and the state as actor. Articulating the tension experienced by the individual policy maker in honoring both his/her personal moral code and respecting diverse global moralities. Kiesling concluded, “States are amoral actors. Foreign policy, however, is devised and carried out by individuals whose every action has moral content. Foreign policy must be



true to the value system of its practitioner, but must also recognize and adapt to the competing moral universes within which that policy must succeed or fail.”

If the adjective “moral” has been used for every possible foreign relations perspective and if there is a universe of competing moralities, does the word have any meaning beyond the highly subjective? For some – perhaps more cynical – Colloquium participants, professions of morality were seen as little more than convenient rhetorical screens for the pursuit of state interests.

Other participants disagreed, claiming there has been and can be sincere, even heart-felt, distinctions between good and evil, between immoral and moral in the making of American foreign policy. Leslie Gelb argued “a number of the people who have made the decision to go into Iraq did so, not on fake moral grounds, but on real moral grounds. You may disagree with that; you may think it’s dangerous, but I think it was in their minds and in their hearts.” Along a similar vein, Bill Kristol proposed that, by definition, a moral foreign policy includes a clear recognition of evil and appropriate action in response.

As some participants claimed a clear distinction of good and evil on the global front, Susan Neiman, Director of the Einstein Forum and author of *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy*, warned that, in addition to overt evils, such as international terrorism, there also exists that evil which “seduces by seeping into structures which further our short-term interests, while making it easy to forget their long-term consequences.”

Notre Dame’s Professor Emeritus of Government and International Studies, David Leege, added a warning of the critical relationships between religion and morality in the reactions of nations: “Particularly in times of uncertainty or threat, nations will first turn to religion to reduce uncertainty and then nations will scapegoat to mobilize against the threat.”

During the Colloquium’s final panel, Anne-Marie Slaughter reflected on Princeton Professor Peter Singer’s insight that the practice of international morality is to regard other people’s countries as our own. Slaughter then pushed the boundaries of the definition of morality in our global society by challenging panelists and audience alike with questions such as “Does morality in foreign policy mean promoting democracy? What is the morality of a doctrine of preemption or even the threat of the use of force?”

Leading deeper into the question of whose morality we are referencing, Slaughter queried whether we have now correlated morality and democracy. In response, Kiesling summed up the practical need to take into account other nations’ perspectives of what is moral – otherwise we may find ourselves playing in a very big game with a very small team: “If there is a contest between the sons of light and the sons of darkness,” he said, “we are starting pitcher and clean-up batter for the team of light. There is only one problem -- the

rest of the team.” As Sean Wilentz noted: “One person’s book of virtues might very well be another person’s book of hypocrisies.”

Hehir touched similar concerns as he observed that the new US national security strategy blends the normative and the empirical, presenting a unipolar worldview, unilateral privilege and preemptive duties of intervention. Finding the implications “problematic in the extreme,” he concluded that our new foreign policy “redefines the geographics of national security... to transnationality” and redefines sovereignty in a way that “maximizes the sovereignty of the US and makes conditional the sovereignty of all other states.”

Slaughter too, while affirming that “sound foreign policy should recognize evil where we see it,” wondered whether “talking about the world in terms of good and evil, as if we, the United States, know what is good and what is evil, may ...undermine the pursuit of the very goals I wish us to achieve.” Halperin underscored Slaughter, advising that to create “the kind of world we need to build” will require nations to work with the US, not because “they’re afraid that Rumsfeld’s troops are going to land, but...because they agree with us. And that requires recognizing that what we see as right or wrong may be different than what others see as right or wrong.”

Bejarano also stressed the significance of multiple moral perspectives. She argued for a degree of moral relativism, calling upon policy makers to take into account the moral perspectives of “those other two thirds of the world who simply lack the power to impose their moral views as the right ones, and to understand that to every situation there are at the very least two competing interpretations based on different judgments of what is right, and what is wrong.”

Professor Jeffrey Herbst, Chair of the Department of Politics at Princeton, discussed the variety of viewpoints on morality within, as well as between, global regions: “Few countries have a monolithic view of morality in international affairs other than their belief that they’re acting morally most of the time.”

Florida State University Religion Department Chair, John Kelsay, provided evidence for the variety of viewpoints within a culture or religion, commenting, “Islamic leaders are still disagreeing about what constitutes a legitimate and illegitimate action, and are attempting to reconcile traditional concepts of fairness with the more recent western conceptions.... It’s important to get a sense of the conversations Muslims have about political justice and honorable combat.”

Brady Kiesling and Katherine Marshall, Counselor to the President of the World Bank and Director of the Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics, pushed the boundaries of the debate even further. Kiesling questioned whether there might be “room for a more moral allocation of America’s resources, for example, on things like AIDS, world development” and whether the promotion of such an allocation should be the responsibility of the foreign policy community. Marshall responded by listing three major

moral problems: “the billions of people who are in... incontestably abject poverty conditions;” “the degrees of inequality... and extremes of wealth by nation and by groups within nations,” and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. A moral foreign policy, Marshall argued, is the mobilization of available national and international resources to confront these challenges.

Acknowledging complexities and dangers arising from the fluid definition of morality and the multiple global perspectives of “good and evil,” Colloquium participants nonetheless questioned if there might be a global arbiter to somehow reconcile these competing moralities. Some panelists pointed to the United Nations as a universally recognized morally legitimating body. Michael Doyle, Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, noted “in the modern corpus of international law, through the UN Charter, the UN Security Council has been identified as a unique repository of legitimacy -- the notion of right authority tied to just causes.”

While the Colloquium never intended to resolve the tension between good and evil in foreign policy, it successfully highlighted how policy choices and human values are inextricably entwined and the many repercussions – positive and negative – of framing foreign policy in moral terms. There was considerable consensus that applying the dichotomy of good and evil can be useful and clarifying in the analysis and creation of international policy. As Susan Neiman, citing Michael Walzer, noted, moral clarity requires striving to discover “true reality, an immediacy of vision, along with distance and coolness.”

There was further agreement that some situations inherently require more moral examination than others. The panel on weapons of mass destruction agreed that the framework of good and evil is appropriate to describe and analyze WMDs. Jonathan Schell, Peace and Disarmament Correspondent, *The Nation* and Harold Willens Peace Fellow at the Nation Institute, reasoned that while usually “actions are evil, not things... a nuclear weapon is not just a stone on the beach. It's an artifact. So once you have actually constructed the thing, a moral evaluation is proper because a weapon is intended for use and it has consequences.” Halperin argued that only when the United States is willing to recognize that “the nuclear devices that we developed in World War II and dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were... fundamentally evil in the sense that they threatened the survival of our race on this planet” could the US begin the process of reducing the risks of nuclear war.

Dani Rodrik, Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, warned against oversimplifying the analysis of international events and phenomena into good and bad, citing the example of globalization. Discussing the positive and negative impacts of specific policies on the development of globalization, Rodrik concluded, “the real debate about globalization is not, and should not be, about ... globalization as good or bad.” Adding another warning against oversimplification, Ambassador Dennis Ross, Director of the Washington Institute for Near

East Policy, reminded his audience that the Arab-Israeli conflict is far from “a morality play, where one side is all right and the other is all wrong.” Summarizing the concern of oversimplification, Kiesling cautioned, “America can only harm, not defend, the interest of its citizens by assuming, even as a rhetorical device, a battle of good and evil.”

Halperin and Kristol debated the appropriateness of the recent imposition of a moral framework on foreign policy. Halperin concluded that there has “not [been] enough restraint” on the part of the Bush administration in imposing its moral views, adding, “I think that humility and an understanding that problems are inherently difficult and uncertain is lacking.” Kristol, on the other hand, argued that the United States greatest mistake was in exercising restraint in 1991, summarizing, “There are times when one has to limit one’s commitment to morality and international affairs, but the problem...since the end of the Cold War, has been much too great a willingness to do that. For which we have paid a great practical price, in my view.”

Neiman summarized the discussion of complexity, danger and nuance in one compelling comment, concluding that morality was an appropriate referent in a post-September 11 international environment yet maintaining that “the moral of September 11th is not that the notion of evil is unworkable, but simply that it’s complex. One paradigm isn’t nearly enough to contain it.”

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The following sections of the Final Report presents a summary of each of the Colloquium's keynotes, panels, lectures and roundtables and, as appropriate, notes the topic, the sponsors, the panelists, key quotations, and summary text of each discussion. Quotations and perspectives from the following summaries are also represented in the preceding Executive Summary.

### **III. Keynote: *The Role and Use of Moral Principles in a Changing Political Context***

**Speaker: Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, President, Catholic Charities USA; Distinguished Professor of Ethics and International Affairs, Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service; Dean of the Harvard Divinity School, 1998-2001; Director of the Office of International Affairs, US Conference of Bishops, 1973-1983**

**Sponsor: The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs**

President Tilghman, thank you very, very much for an overly gracious introduction. It is enough for me to simply say that it's a joy to come back to Princeton where I have many friends, and even more intellectual debts because of the intellectual resources of Princeton faculty that have enriched my life. It is a particular privilege to say yes to an old and very respected friend, your new Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School. It was a major act of brigand and larceny to steal her from Harvard, but I only say that because I have some abiding loyalties to the small college north of here. Nevertheless I am grateful to come and participate in just the kind of innovative event that Dean Anne Marie Slaughter turns out not simply yearly but monthly and weekly. It is no small privilege for me to be part of this symposium. Anne Marie asked me to talk on the question of moral principles and world politics, a modest topic to be sure. I do it with both appreciation for the topic, but with some apprehension of doing it at Princeton, indeed, a double apprehension. First the place and the topic: names from Princeton resound through the corridors of this question: Paul Ramsey from the Department of Religion, perhaps the most published ethicist on war and politics in the 20<sup>th</sup> century; George Kennan's contributions from Princeton over the years to this topic, multiple and different contributions; Michael Walzer to whom we are all in debt, all of us who try to deal with this topic; and Michael Doyle and Richard Ullman, and Paul Sigmund, the names simply go on. This is an intimidating assignment. Secondly there is the topic and the program. When Anne Marie asked me to speak on this over the phone in a rush, I thought for sure that it would be like all those other conferences I had gone to over the last 25 years, where there are ten panels, and one of them is on ethics and international relations. So you can say almost anything you want because no one will contest you. But I then looked at the program and found out that every panel was on ethics, morality, religion 1 and international affairs. A talk like the one I have been asked to give inevitably will trespass on these other panels, and will be brought under scrutiny from what has already

been said and what will be said. Nevertheless I must proceed. The title, “Moral Principles in the Midst of Political Change”, is really shorthand for my topic. It is shorthand for the topic of ethics and foreign policy, morality and foreign policy. Principles do not exhaust moral reasoning. Indeed, when one asks what the resources are that we can draw upon to think about normative questions in world politics, I think it is possible to distinguish three repositories. First, there is the language of the law, the language of legal versus illegal actions, the language of Anne Marie Slaughter’s discipline of international law. Secondly, there is what I might call the language of the academy on this topic, the language of moral philosophy which tends to speak in terms of right and wrong as distinct from legal and illegal, but not separate from legal and illegal. Thirdly, there is what might be called the language of the sanctuary, where the discussion is often about good and evil, and where the discourse is theological and religious. Now of course these three sources for addressing normative questions in world politics are not self-contained, isolated repositories of ideas. The legal and the moral constantly relate in the arena of jurisprudence. The moral and the religious are in constant dialogue, for religious traditions have been a part, not the only part but a major part, of the traditions from which we draw moral ideas. So there is a way in which this normative discussion is as rich and as deep as the multiple panels of this program indicate. Moreover this topic is an old topic but now with a new edge. We should not think that we are the first to try this, the discussion of the moral dimensions of world politics, but we need to acknowledge that there is something new about the effort. One of the standard journals we all read in this field of course is *Foreign Affairs*, and the most recent opening editorial in *Foreign Affairs*, by one of your speakers, Les Gelb, said nothing less than the following. I quote him: “Something quite important has happened in American foreign policy making with little notice or digestion of its meaning. Moral matters are now part of American politics and the politics of many other nations. They are rarely, even in this new age the driving forces behind foreign policy, but they are now a constant force that cannot be overlooked when it comes to policy effectiveness abroad or political support at home.” My attempt to summarize and discuss this old topic with a new edge will unfold in three questions. First, how did we get here, how did we get to the point of the *Foreign Affairs* editorial or this conference. Secondly, where are we now, after the experience of terror and war, and the complexity that falls out from that, where are we on this topic right now. Thirdly whence may we go on this topic, as a country and as an international system.

**I. How Did We Get Here** To put the Gelb essay in context one needs to say that this is an evolutionary story. While Les talks about something quite new, it is new in its intensity, perhaps new in its complexity, but in fact there is a story that stands behind how we got here. It is not something all of a sudden, and we are not beginning from scratch as we try to think about norms, foreign policy and world politics. To be concise about the story, let it begin in the United States with what might be called “the realist triumph” of the post World War II period. The realist triumph was the way in which, after World War II, the rise in American political science of the discipline of international relations was shaped powerfully by those who held a realist vision. They brought to that vision a deep suspicion of moral norms in foreign policy. We all know the story. Realists were concerned that the introduction of normative discourse would distort good policy

making, effective policy making. Or realists were concerned that the introduction of normative language, ideas and goals into foreign policy would produce the familiar problem of good intentions and bad consequences, for normative goals were broad, sometimes vague, and could promote the very kind of crusades that world politics could not sustain. Now there was always more complexity to the realist story than is sometimes admitted. For major protagonists like Hans Morgenthau, or George Kennan, and preeminently Reinhold Niebuhr, first warned about the moral dimensions of analysis of foreign policy and then happily went about their work of trying to combine moral restraint and political analysis. But there was an image of the realist triumph that in fact said you should keep these two worlds entirely separate. That image was expressed sometimes gently, sometimes rather ferociously as in one of Dean Acheson's dicta. Acheson sat on the Ex-Comm during the Cuban missile crisis and was frustrated in his proposal that we should bomb Cuba, because Robert Kennedy introduced what he thought were moral restraints that ought to be observed. You may remember Acheson left the Ex-Comm and about a month after the Cuban missile crisis he went to the University of Massachusetts to give a lecture on morality and foreign policy. He opened the lecture this way; he said there are two kinds of problems in life, moral problems and real problems. And then he launched into his discussion of morality and foreign policy. The consequence of the realist triumph was that for about a generation there was little attention given in the principal policy debates, I think, to a disciplined discussion of moral norms. They were cultivated in other settings. That was when Paul Ramsey was cultivating them here at Princeton. But they were seldom introduced into the center of the policy process. The next part of the story is the role of Vietnam. Vietnam, I think, was a catalyst to the introduction of moral norms into the center of the policy process. Once again we are indebted to Michael Walzer in his *"Introduction" to Just and Unjust Wars*, where he made the point that his political opposition to the war sent him in search of moral opposition. He came upon a tradition (the Just War ethic) already developed, to which he promised he would make a contribution after using it effectively during the Vietnam debate. That contribution is there for all to see, and you will hear it again this afternoon. I believe the Vietnam debate by its very intensity made it a catalyst to joining broader normative concerns and foreign policy, but it was hard to make a systematic contribution in the midst of those conflicted years. The catalyst, however, set afoot a recognition that there were a series of questions in world politics that required more than what I might call empirical analysis, more than analysis that arises from the disciplines of politics and economics, and particularly military strategy. Embedded in these questions there were always moral concerns. The question was not whether to introduce morality into foreign policymaking; the nature of foreign policymaking as a human enterprise by people who are always human beings, and representing other human beings, means that it is simply a question of whether you address the moral factor explicitly and in a disciplined and systematic way, or whether you subordinate the moral factor, and it is used without examination. The catalyst of Vietnam opened the door for three moments of change that bring us to the present time. The first was the rise of the human rights movement in the 1970s, something which Dean Slaughter is intimately associated with. The 1970s are the dates for the emergence of an extensive analysis of human rights and foreign policy, but of course the roots of this lie in the founding of the United Nations.

While one could always make a moral argument that there were responsibilities for the human community either as individuals or states - to respond to human rights violations, until the founding of the United Nations, the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, and the language of the Charter, it was hard to make a political and legal argument that there were moral responsibilities that states needed to fulfill regarding human rights violations within other countries. In a sense the human rights documents lay like an intellectual time bomb just below the surface of the international system, brought to the surface precisely in the 1970s by a complex set of circumstances, people and ideas. Without entering the story in detail let me simply advance the proposition that since the 1970s there has emerged an intellectual, organizational, political and legal movement surrounding the concept of human rights which has made an enormous difference in the policy of states, and the polity of world politics. Secondly, the contribution of the 1980s was the nuclear debate. Once again the nuclear age by that time was 40 years old, but it was the revival of the intensity of the Cold War in the early 1980s and rapid technological developments in weaponry which gave a new edge to an old question. The dense debate about nuclear strategy that was part of the nuclear age is not something to be reviewed here. But one can at least acknowledge how a question we had lived with for 40 years took on a new urgency. The traditional Just War ethic held that the only morally legitimate use of force must be a limited use of force. Behind that proposition lies the pedigree of two very different individuals. For, I submit, it was two different individuals that taught the western world to talk about and think about politics, strategy and ethics. This odd pair was a nineteenth-century Prussian general, and a fifth-century African saint. The Prussian General, of course, was Clausewitz, who said that war was the extension of politics by other means, that war did not mean one left the rational universe, but that in fact war could be contained and justified on reasonable grounds. The fifth century African Saint was Augustine, who argued that war could not only be rationally justified, it could be morally justified. But the architecture created by Clausewitz and Augustine meant that war must be limited. And the phenomenon of the nuclear age was precisely the threat of a use of force that was intrinsically unlimited. While the specific nuclear debates are not our concern here, one of the things that happened in the midst of this debate was to drive back to the surface of public discussion a fundamental principle of the moral order in the most conflicted area of world politics. It is the principle of the protection of civilians in warfare; non-combatant immunity, or as Ramsay always called it, the principle of discrimination. I use this idea because it illustrates how the joining of the normative and the empirical order over time makes a difference. The history of this anecdote extends from the middle of World War II to this present year, and our present reflection emerging from yet one more war. In the middle of World War II a little known article by an American Jesuit named John Ford, "*The Morality of Obliteration Bombing*", took on the existing Allied policy of civilian bombing and argued that while World War II was justified by its objectives, it was not justified in the way it was being pursued. That article has enough significance for me at least that I continue to assign it today over 50 years later. But in terms of the impact of the article let us consult another source. McGeorge Bundy's definitive book, *Danger and Survival*, gives a detailed account of the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the midst of his narrative Bundy makes the point that in the final debate leading up to that decision, no one, no one in the



upper reaches of the American government ever raised the question about bombing civilians. The reason Bundy said, was that the question had already been settled at Dresden and Tokyo. It is a remarkable example of the cost of transgressing and then obliterating a moral principle in the policy process. The effect is to blind political actors to the consequences of their actions. What is even more remarkable is the journey from the middle 1940s until today. Partly because of the attention of the nuclear debate to targeting doctrine, to the nature of deterrence, and to the question of intentionality and its moral significance, the ancient principle of noncombatant immunity took on a new saliency, a new weight and a new importance. The story that has evolved from the 1980s is an ever increasing attention in the general public, in the professional military and in the media about this question of the protection of civilians in war. The principle is enormously complicated, for it does not say that if civilians are killed the war is unjust. It does say if civilians are targeted, purposely threatened or disregarded in the planning of the war, the war is morally deficient, and likely unjust in its execution. We are still in the midst of an ongoing story on this question, but it is a story with a learning curve that illustrates change within the political and strategic order. This is not the place to explain it in further detail, but the record is clear and can be followed. The problems are not solved. We have shifted from a discussion of strategy to tactics. The strategy of World War II, purposely bombing civilian centers, is no longer followed or defended. The debate about tactics, the use of cluster bombs near civilian areas, the discussion of the bombing of dual use targets in Gulf War I, and to some degree the reservations about bombing some of those targets in Gulf War II is part of this ongoing argument. Again, I can only use it as an example of where we have come from. Third, the third chapter in this evolution of moral norms and foreign policy is the decade of the 1990s, where the debate shifts remarkably in substance and tone. Those of us who have worked on the problem of ethics and war during the Cold War found ourselves with a different problem before us. For almost 50 years the central problem for both strategists and moralists was how one avoided catastrophic violence. Human beings held in their hands a capacity to do destructive damage in a way that other generations could not have imagined. The destruction would take a matter of moments rather than the long drawn out human agony of destruction we had come to know in World War I and World War II. How avoid catastrophic violence; that was the problem at the heart of deterrence. With the collapse of the Cold War weapons of mass destruction did not go away. We will come back to that. But what did change was the central policy agenda. The dominant topics of the 1990s were not about Moscow and Washington, or Berlin and Paris. The dominant discussions were about Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, places which never reached the front pages of the 50 years of the Cold War, nor were hardly ever on the radar screen of any policy planner. The problem was not how to prevent catastrophic violence, the problem was what moral obligation existed to stop creeping chaos. The problem was not the classical great power problem of states locked in mortal combat, either actual or threatened. The problem was what about states that lived on the periphery of world politics, where massive human suffering and violence was occurring, and where there were no "vital interests" to drive one to do anything. That problem received a great deal of attention. It also resulted in horrendous mistakes. A generation perhaps represented more adequately in this room than by my undergraduates at either

Harvard or Georgetown, a generation that had come out of World War II and therefore always understood the meaning of the phrase, “never again”, knew exactly what it meant, knew exactly what lessons were taught by it, and were committed to see it be realized, “never again”. That generation and others came to recognize again the phenomenon of genocide, before our eyes, visible, tangible, and never mentioned in the policy process, so we are told by works published in the past year. The debate of the 1990s about humanitarian military intervention joined two sources of the normative tradition. It was distinctly a debate about the relationship of the moral and the legal, and the consequence of that debate for the political. For the choice of humanitarian military intervention had to confront the problem that the legal order held that intervention was clearly a threat to international order and was justified in only the most extreme cases like genocide. While the genocide problem was the most extreme example of the 1990s, most cases did not rise to the level of genocide. Hence I submit the humanitarian intervention debate of the 1990s was a classical case of international jurisprudence. The moral arguments were interventionist. The legal arguments were restrictive about intervention, and the political decision making was left strung out between the failure to join the moral and legal in coherent fashion. Indeed the final point to be made is that by the end of the 1990s we had not settled the debate. Kosovo if anything brought it to a new intensity, as some international lawyers found it illegal to take action, while others on moral grounds argued it was imperative to learn from the lessons of Rwanda and other places, and that action was demanded. But we finished the 1990s without final resolution, lacking coherent moral, legal, and political consensus. This is my overly long story of where we’ve come from, from the realist triumph to a position at the end of the 1990s where the moral argument cuts across not only the issues I’ve talked about but in fact four major areas of world politics. A full articulation of ethics and world politics must consider the ethics of war and peace, the ethics of human rights, the ethics of international political economy, and finally the ethics of world order. Each of these has a developed architecture, but the challenge of the new period I submit, is that the developed architecture of these four distinct problems now must be related in a transverse method of analysis that brings these principles from different places and forces them into both confrontation and collaboration. Indeed, the Iraq case illustrates the way in which multiple normative problems are compressed in a single issue. The Iraq case involved weapons of mass destruction, to some degree a throwback to ethics and nuclear questions; secondly, claims about human rights and intervention; thirdly, arguments about the world order question of who should authorize intervention; and finally questions about legitimate moral authority to take action in a world of divided legal and political positions.

**II. Where Are We** Where are we today on the question of moral principles and world politics. The narrative I have sketched, while more lengthy than it should have been, only glancingly engages the empirical policy debate, the political, strategic and legal issues of where we are. Yet good analysis of morality and foreign policy should follow the guideline of John Courtney Murray, who wrote in the late 1950s that analysis of foreign policy meant that the *questio facti* preceded the *questio juris*. The question of what the nature of the problem was had to be understood from the inside out in order to do good moral analysis. The question then is what is the *questio facti* of the present moment.

Where are we, not in normative terms, but in the nature of the political order. In a recent article in *National Interest* Phillip Zelikow from the University of Virginia, who both acknowledges in the article and is acknowledged by others to be a contributor to the most recent national security statement of the United States (to which I will return) opens his analysis this way. He says that the key question of international politics and U.S. national security policy today is whether a genuinely new era has dawned since the end of the cold war. In response to his question he moves immediately to the events of 9/11 to say that this event crystallizes the conviction that in fact we have a new era. I think the analysis must move in two steps. There have been two stages of evolution of the *questio facti* that bring us to the present term. The first are the changes of the last decade, and now the changes of this decade. The changes of the last decade resulted from the collapse of the Cold War order, and the entrance into what we call somewhat clumsily the post-cold war world. The essence of the problem I think that we faced in the 1990s was that the collapse of the Cold War brought about a double transformation of world politics, a change in the structure of power, and simultaneously a change in the principles of order of world politics. The structure of power is the classical realist question, who rules, who defines the order, who are the major states, and what is the relationship among them? The collapse of the bipolar world raised the question then of what took its place, and we had multiple contenders with many authors. Unipolarity, multipolarity, multidimensional international system; again a debate that never found resolution. Perhaps the more complex debate was the change in the principles of order which had a longer lineage than simply the Cold War. By the principles of order I mean those basic ideas that often are referred to as the Westphalian legacy in world politics. Arising out of the seventeenth-century, crystallized over four centuries, and embodied in the United Nations. The Westphalian legacy I think is composed of three factors. First of all, the primacy of the sovereign state as the principal actor in world politics; secondly the principle of nonintervention as the governing norm among states; and thirdly, a conviction that religion ought to be separate from politics because prior to the Westphalian order the religious wars of Europe had decimated one third of the population of Central Europe. In a process that dates back at least to the 1950s, all three of these principles of sovereignty, nonintervention, and to some degree the separation of religion and politics, all had been eroded by the time we got to the 1990s, but never exhausted. States were still and are still the dominant actors in world politics, but as Bob Keohane and others have taught us, formal sovereignty does not translate into operational sovereignty. Sovereignty exists, indeed it is held by more numerous states than ever before in history, but it does not produce the classical results that sovereignty used to yield in terms of self-control of one's own destiny. Nonintervention was not eroded as quickly as sovereignty, but the challenges of the 1990s raised arguments that it should be eroded somewhat. Finally in terms of religion and politics, however much it might seem wise to create an absolute chasm between the two, the problem is that by the last quarter of the twentieth-century, it was virtually impossible to do good briefings on foreign policy if one had no understanding of the nature of religion as a public force. How did one understand Latin America and Central America without the Catholic Church; or how did one understand peaceful transition in South Africa without Bishop Tutu. And why were the problems of Jerusalem never simply reducible to city planning. These were the kinds of questions that

drove the religious factor to the surface of the public debate. Well, that dynamic of the 1990s, the change in the structure of power, and the change in the principles of order, was a very large order to handle for U.S. foreign policy. We were only into the midst of trying to get our hands around it, when, of course, the problem of this decade arose, namely terrorism. Once again one can only summarize what the *questio facti* was that emerged from the attacks on New York and Washington. The three dominant characteristics we had to incorporate into our view of international politics were the following. Terrorism was transnational; we saw that a group of private individuals could wreak damage halfway around the world in a fashion that we thought only states could execute. Secondly, this transnational terrorism was also a form of transcendent terrorism; it was driven in many ways by a mix of religious and political arguments, precisely what Westphalia feared. Thirdly, it also was traditional terrorism; it purposely struck at civilians. And so we were confronted now with changing principles of order, changed structure of power, and finally this phenomenon of transnational terrorism. Where are we in trying to respond? The document that tries to do this most fulsomely from the perspective of the United States is the recent statement, "The National Security Strategy of the United States", which has already been discussed in this symposium, so I hope I am not being redundant. I simply want to use it as a reference point for a couple of reasons. First of all, it's objective is to define present American strategy, and while our debate has been focused on Iraq, this document has much larger and broader goals and implications. Secondly, the scope of this document involves, to some degree, an attempt to settle the debates of the 1990s about what the structure of power is, and what the U.S. role in the world ought to be. Thirdly, the document has had a catalytic effect generating commentary across the political spectrum. The character of the document that is interesting for this symposium is that it is explicitly an attempt to blend normative and empirical analysis. Once again Professor Zelikow makes explicit that one of its goals is how to define the role of moral principles in world politics. I find its explicit attempt to do that a much better way than subordinating moral values once again as some of the realist arguments would do, and simply not attending to them. But one can appreciate the objective of the national security statement in its mix of normative and empirical data, and yet not be convinced by its final product. I submit it is the beginning of a debate, not the end of it, and both its empirical and normative dimensions must be engaged. The empirical premise of the document is a decisive choice of what the structure of world politics is and ought to be, and that is a unipolar world. It begins with an assertion of the vast gulf between American power and all other states in the world. The significance of that description has always drawn some critique, and I think still should, but it has about it a certain compelling quality, particularly if you are talking only about military power. The document then becomes more complicated as it draws a moral and legal corollary from this empirical analysis. That moral and legal corollary says that the unique power the United States possesses gives it, or yields to it unique duties in international politics. Now the fact that there are duties that flow from power is uncontested, but the question of who specifies the duties, and what limits exist upon them is another question. Self-definition of our duties may be purchased at the prices of substantial resistance to them by others in the world. The conclusions that flow from this document are precisely what make me think it needs to be only the beginning of a debate. From a unipolar view of the

world the document affirms a unilateralist privilege to take action when and where we think necessary if we can't get multilateral help. Secondly, it argues that the power we have can and should be used preemptively if necessary, and part of that argument is that deterrence on which we have depended for 50 years, no longer is dependable. Finally, the argument is that the responsibilities that come with the unique power means that there is, again, a privileged status for U.S. decisions to intervene in other nations. I find these conclusions troubling in the extreme. I am willing to say it should be the beginning of a debate, I certainly am not prepared to conclude it ought to be the end of a debate. And the doubts and disagreements flow from both the empirical analysis and the way it is joined normatively. That is not to say there is nothing that is positive in the document, that would not be my intent, but it is necessary to distinguish elements. Let me give you some sense of how I think the implications for American foreign policy that flow from this need to be debated. First of all, the status and role of sovereignty; this is a classic question for both law and morality, for empirical analysis of world politics, and normative analysis. Usually the moral analysis of sovereignty lays stress on setting limits on sovereign claims, for sovereign claims traditionally have been expansive in their nature. The proposal of this document redefines sovereignty in this expansive sense. Again, Professor Zelikow argues that an underlying theme of the document is that it redefines the geography of national security from territorial boundaries being the significant guideline to what constitutes a security threat, to what he calls transnationality, meaning that fault lines within society are the sources of danger. Now there's no question that the rise of transnationality in multiple ways, from economics through transnational actors to terrorists, is a major characteristic of world politics. But if transnationality is to be a normative guideline for the use of force, I think it opens the possibility of a significant tilt in the direction of wider use of force in the international system. Transnationality brings the prospect and possibility of reform, but transnationality in the security area I think needs to be tested rigidly before it is accepted. So my point is, what is the status of the state and its sovereign role in this document. John Ikenbury from Georgetown argues that it maximizes the sovereignty of the United States and makes conditional the sovereignty of all other actors. That seems to me to be problematical in the extreme. A second problem is the way force is now related to human rights and nonproliferation. Clearly the traditional ethic of war has asserted the valid claim that at times force is necessary to secure justice. But it has held with equal force the principle that war is an ultima ratio, that everything needs to be tested carefully before this becomes necessary, and it should never become normal. The essential problem I see is in the evolution of this new strategic doctrine is that there seems to be a way in which force becomes a potential instrument to adjudicate human rights problems, and force becomes an incorporated part of nonproliferation policy. Obviously human rights policy has always recognized that human rights violations could reach a certain standard, for example like genocide, where force would be required. But I submit that the overriding conception of human rights policy was that it was about the political order, the responsibility of states to use a multiplicity of tools to try to rectify human rights policy. Force was not normally understood as a likely instrument of human rights policy. Secondly, regarding nonproliferation, again it seems to me that this is about a security issue, and indeed is a highly complex question of how you balance the security of the

international system with the possibility that sovereign states who hold the right to use force might turn to the building of weapons of mass destruction. So it is an issue of war and peace. Nevertheless, nonproliferation policy, I submit, until very recently has been understood as a diplomatic policy. If force is now going to be regularly introduced into the question of what one does about the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the ancient ethical questions of who decides when the threat has risen to an appropriate level, how we decide that question, and what is a proportionate response to the threat, seem to me not to be something to be yielded to a unipolar conception of the world, normatively or empirically. Finally, intervention; the debates of the 1990s for many of us were how to expand the reasons to intervene in order to prevent creeping chaos. But there always was a problematical open end to the question. That is to say, if you said it should not just be genocide, it also should be ethnic cleansing that justified force, or failed states that justified force, then the question of how far you go down that road was precisely the open-ended question. Did weapons of mass destruction fit into an argument that they threaten systemic safety and were, therefore, a case of justifiable intervention? We have now used that argument for Iraq. It does seem to me that it is necessary to remember the original function of the nonintervention principle. It was to restrain major states from having a justification for war that was not aggression. The nonintervention principle sought to distinguish the internal behavior of states from external behavior. The soft underbelly of that distinction was the human rights argument. But the value of it was that it established high standards for resorting to force. The question of whether intervention, expanded on humanitarian grounds should also be expanded to include intervention to address the threat or the development of weapons of mass destruction, involves striking a balance between the demands of global security and the danger of unleashing multiple claims to resort to force. To resolve this tension, we are clearly in need of a coherent theory of force, human rights, nonproliferation, and intervention. And we will have to draw on those four distinct areas of normative discourse to develop such a theory.

**III. Whence May We Go?** Here, I will simply identify problems and not explain them. In addition to the unfinished arguments that I have just listed there are other arguments that are ahead of us. First of all, religion and world politics: the movement from the realist triumph to the present day has meant that ethics is now securely included in the academy, the diplomatic arena, and the strategic arena, in discussions of politics and strategy. It belongs there, it is treated as if it belongs, and while it may not always win the argument, it is not absent. There is not the same degree of integration of religion in world politics, but I believe that is an equally necessary task. The goal is not one of advocacy, promoting religion. It is rather to address a phenomenon that has deep, powerful, potential public impact on the role of states, nations and in the lives of individuals. How do we understand that, how do we think about it in analytical terms? How does it stand as part of the normal equation of how world politics is understood. That task is still ahead of us. The integration of politics and ethics is way ahead of where politics and religion in the international arena is. Secondly the relationship of the international system and the state, particularly this state. The questions of world order raise sub-themes about the role of international institutions, state power, and, very importantly, nongovernmental organizations, whether one is talking about human rights or military intervention, or

international development. Thirdly, policy and the public: John Courtney Murray once said that policy is the meeting place of the world of power and the world of morality, in which there takes place the encounter and reconciliation of the duty of success that rests upon the statesman and the duty of justice that rests upon the civilized nation that he serves. That means that while power is discussed professionally in defined circles of governance, the use of power in moral terms is the business of every citizen of a democracy. It is for that reason that this kind of enterprise in which you are involved is preeminently necessary and of great worth. Thank you very much.

#### **IV. Keynote: *Is Peace Still a Possibility in the Middle East?***

**Speaker: Dennis Ross, Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Special Middle East Coordinator in the Clinton Administration; Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the Bush Administration; Lecturer, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University**

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In his keynote speech, *Is Peace Still a Possibility in the Middle East?*, Ambassador Ross discussed ideas from his forthcoming book, *The Missing Peace*, observing that the Middle East situation “is not a morality play in which one side is right and the other wrong.” Ross expressed some hope that the time has come to “end the war process and begin the peace process,” in both Israel and Palestine. After describing how conditions (since the Clinton Administration’s proposals were rejected in December 2000) have deteriorated to where “neither side believes they have a partner for peacekeeping in the other side,” Ross outlined what Israel, the Palestinians, the US and the Arab world must now do. Ross emphasized the urgency for a strong public stance by all parties for “de-legitimization of all violence” that “would not necessarily stop terror, but would send such a powerful peace signal.” The recent road map, he observed, can only be useful as a condition of peace. “One cannot impose peace. One can only create the condition for peace.”

Ross explained how different conceptions of what constitutes a “just” solution and the ways in which these different ideas have played out before the Israeli and Palestinian public are at the root of previous peace-seeking failures. In the 2000 proposal, the Israeli government was prepared to give the Palestinians ninety-seven percent of the territory of the West Bank, one-hundred percent of the Gaza Strip, contiguous borders, the return of all Palestinian refugees, as well as a thirty billion dollar repatriation fund. To the Israeli public, Arafat’s rejection of these terms meant that Arafat was not serious about peace.

Equal suspicion and despair exists on the Palestinian front, Ross explained as Israeli strikes in retribution for terrorist attacks are viewed as collective punishment which Palestinians interpret as meaning that Israelis “don’t look at them as being real human

beings." Continuing settlement activity along the West Bank evidences further proof for the Palestinians that the Israelis are not serious about negotiation. Cementing these doubts, Ross said, is misinformation about the actual terms of the 2000 proposal. Arafat told his people that he had been offered limited sovereignty and . . . small Palestinian islands in an Israeli sea, when he was offered 97% of the territory."

Despite this lack of faith on both sides, Ross said, there seems to be recognition on both sides that the violence must stop. Although Sharon's government may be more right wing and less willing to make concessions than Netanyahu was prepared to make in 2000, the devastating correlation between the violence of the last two years and economic recession are creating domestic pressures on the Israeli government to "end the war process" and get back to peace negotiations. The Palestinian public realizes that, with over two thousand dead, more than fifteen times that number wounded and seventeen percent of the population living under the poverty line, the last two years of violence have been a complete disaster. In marked contrast to the mood two years ago, seventy-one percent of Palestinian's now want to see an end to violence.

Further, Ross observed the emergence of a genuine "homegrown" reform movement in Palestine and maintained there is now an overriding impulse amongst Palestinians to reform the Palestinian Authority. Although it is still impossible to attack Arafat directly – he remains an icon and symbol of his people – many realize that Arafat is no longer a "pathway to the future," but merely a "reflection of the past." All these pressures may converge to end the war process and restart a peace process.

Ross underscored that all parties involved have certain responsibilities in light of this tenuous opportunity for peace. Arafat may have made being a victim a strategy for negotiation, but any lasting peace will require "a recognition that Palestinians have to be responsible" and condemn any terrorist attacks. The Palestinian authority must make it clear "There is a legitimate way to pursue the cause and illegitimate way to pursue the cause and those who pursue it illegitimately are enemies of the cause."

The Arab nations, Ross argued, must also unite and create an "Arab umbrella of support" for Abu Mazen by embracing him publicly and investing money into the PLA. Currently, Abu Mazen does not have authority in Palestinian society and the only way he can gain it is by showing he can produce and deliver. He will not have the leverage to make concessions that are at the heart of self-definition and identity without legitimacy.

Ross concluded by outlining the role of the United States in guiding the two sides towards a peace settlement. The recently released "roadmap" devised jointly by the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN, should not be regarded as a dictate of what should happen, but serve as a backdrop from which to guide negotiations. "Given the gap in interpretation on every single point," Ross said, "it is not a performance-based road map - it is a basis on which to debate performance." It is up to the US, then, to assure that when either side uses the same words, they understand the same things by them. The US will have to be clear that both sides will be held accountable to commitments, for "in the



absence of accountability, in the absence of any consequence in unfulfilled obligations, you guarantee that there will continue to be unfulfilled obligations.”

**V. Keynote: *Our Withheld Tribute to Virtue: Morality, Hypocrisy, and the Misprojection of US Power***

**Speaker: Brady Kiesling, former Political Counselor, United States Embassy, Athens**

Sponsor: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

I am honored to be here today at the Woodrow Wilson School. Dean Slaughter, I congratulate you and your colleagues for this scrutiny of a critical moment in American history. Your ambitious program does not limit itself to the traditional narrow question of what kind of foreign policy will best safeguard the security, prosperity, and democratic institutions of the American people. This is the traditional duty of diplomacy, as it is the traditional duty of the U.S. President. States are amoral actors. Foreign policy, however, is devised and carried out by individuals whose every action has moral content. Foreign policy must be true to the value system of its practitioner, but must also recognize and adapt to the competing moral universes within which that policy must succeed or fail.

Today we have an Administration that at the mid-point of its first term has gradually unveiled a profoundly different moral and political agenda from that of its predecessors. The President and his advisors are comfortable with a rhetoric - and apparently a world view - of the American government as the arbiter of good and evil in the world. The logic of good and evil is politically impeccable. It has helped mobilize for the President the populist energy and anger unleashed by 9/11. It has muted meaningful political debate, helping his party win the mid-term elections, making political pressure for tax cuts and big military spending increases unstoppable. Successfully maintained, it will win the President a second term.

My contention, however, is that the world environment is such that America can only harm, not defend, the interests of its citizens by assuming, even as a rhetorical device, a battle of good and evil. American foreign policy has slipped, to use the terminology of Walter Russell Mead in his stimulating book *Special Providence*, into a frenzy of Jacksonian populism and aggressive nationalism, at a time when America has no meaningful external limits to the exercise of its power. History suggests that under such circumstances disaster is a frequent result. I see this conference as an opportunity to rally, albeit painfully late, America's traditional foreign policy community in support of an old and honorable alliance of Hamiltonian pragmatism illuminated and made palatable by Wilsonian idealism.

It is self-evident to me, it is self-evident to you, it is self-evident to President Bush that we are the good guys in any war between good and evil. America is, by definition, the

greatest country on earth, the highest point of human civilization. If there is a contest between the sons of light and the sons of darkness, we are starting pitcher and clean-up batter for the team of light. There is only one problem, the rest of the team.

My recent experience is with Greece. A few days ago a responsible Greek newspaper, pragmatic, center-left pro-government To Vima, Greece's Washington Post, chose to publish the following letter to the editor, from a senior in a Greek public high school in an upper middle class suburb. "The terrorist policy of the superpower directly and indirectly threatens mankind and the environment. Humanity now has a sacred duty to respond. We need to protect human life, dignity, and freedom and avert the total destruction of our planet. For all these reasons and for many others we must struggle to eliminate the American threat against universal peace and security, to restore the authority and credibility of the UN, and to permanently end the danger of mass terrorism by the USA. We must likewise raise the consciousness of the world's peoples so that they can democratically elect their governments without the guidance and guardianship of the hawks of Washington, who arbitrarily and dictatorially impose their own democracies. In other words, we seek the disarmament of the Americans."

I would be happy to dismiss young Vangelis as a campus radical. And perhaps he is, I don't know. But I do know that his fear and anger have become the mainstream view of Greeks across the whole political spectrum. Every Greek newspaper is full of stuff much stronger than this, by grown, professional journalists, whose prose is contorted by anger and even hatred of the United States. A whole Greek population has come to the conviction that the United States is evil and dangerous, or at least that its leaders are. Few other than high school students are naïve enough to believe that America can be disarmed, but most Greeks would agree that the world is under threat and the only safe course is for the world to band together to resist us.

Greeks have historical and sentimental and rhetorical reasons for resenting us. They have disagreed with us plenty of times before when we were probably right and they were certainly wrong. But this is different. We have lost our reliable friends, the traditional pro-U.S. politicians and intellectuals. The anger has spilled over into ordinary interpersonal relations, including with Foreign Ministry diplomats, for the first time in my many years of experience with Greeks.

Greeks and Europeans saw a very different war from the self-congratulatory war Americans experienced on Fox TV, and they were horrified and furious. Greeks saw mangled babies, ruined buildings, a systematically looted and destroyed state, and crowds of angry, miserable people, with the kids who greeted our troops with flowers either dismissed as staged or else shown as a grudging footnote. Which view of the war is truer? It depends.

If this were just Greece, this would not be a problem. If Greeks, whose attitudes still have much of the Middle East in them, felt this way, we could guarantee that the whole of the Middle East felt the same or much worse. It was also painfully clear, as the debate got

increasingly bitter with our allies in NATO and with our European colleagues in the UN Security Council, that this time at least, the Greeks were no longer at the extreme fringe of European public opinion.

If we are good, and the rest of the world disagrees with us, then the rest of the world is evil. We have already seen the demonization of France and Germany. Their efforts to repair relations with us bring us up against one serious flaw of a policy of good and evil. We have, and know we have, important political and economic interests with our newly evil partners. But having launched the anger of an aroused and unreflecting American public against an evil foe, we cannot call back that anger without an expenditure of political capital our President will not expend.

### Theology

One of my central objections to the U.S. invasion of Iraq was my conviction that the moral universe in which the current U.S. Administration seems to operate, a moral universe in which preventive war is justified, is not one that others find intelligible. I hope you will permit me a brief theological excursus. Nothing in my personal experience has led me to believe that God intervenes in affairs of state, but I have profound respect for the power of religious sentiment as a tool of statecraft, both for good and for ill.

"Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just," wrote Thomas Jefferson. And most of us would agree that Thomas Jefferson's God was probably a just one. But there is nothing in theology that dictates that God has to be just. Montesquieu summed it up pretty well: "if triangles had a god, he would have three sides."

Certain medieval cultists read the more gruesome bits of the bible, particularly in the Old Testament, and concluded from it that God the Creator must be evil. They set up in opposition to him a purely spiritual God, the source of good, with permanent warfare between the two. I am far from suggesting that President Bush worships an evil divinity. Still, I find compelling a recent suggestion that President Bush has strayed, presumably unconsciously, into an ancient, muscular theology of a universe locked in permanent combat between the forces of light and the forces of darkness. This dualist doctrine is well adapted to imperialism, at least to judge from the role of Mithraism and Manichaeism in ancient Rome's imperial expansion, but is considered a dangerous heresy by most modern theologians.

One problem with dualism, as with the clash of civilizations, is that it tends to become self-enforcing. It crystallizes human reactions. Though most world leaders do not have the luxury of the "moral clarity" that dictates that Saddam Hussein was part of an "Axis of Evil" while Ariel Sharon is a "Man of Peace," their populations find it easy to be sucked into divisions between light and dark, and to sign on enthusiastically to the idea that they are good and we, specifically the United States, are evil. Born-again American certainty of knowing we are virtuous absolves us of the responsibility to seem virtuous, and gives our adversaries the same luxury. The means - war or terrorism - are sanctified

by the end, the triumph of our light over their darkness. It is no accident that the Pope and most other religious leaders, fearful of heresy and determined to maintain a more rational moral calculus of just war, denounced our invasion of Iraq.

Europeans have shrunk away in recent generations from any clear and strict division between good and evil. A long, bloody history of divinely-mandated warfare, and the existence and mixed performance of state churches have encouraged a substantial degree of secularism and an explicit or implicit moral relativism. Europeans will fight for their intellectual integrity in seeing the world in terms of shades of gray.

But if a gun were held to the heads of Europeans, and they were forced to declare between black and white, I am guessing that 80 percent of them would conclude, at least at the moment, that the United States is evil rather than good. I suspect that the percentage of Middle Easterners would be closer to 95 percent; I'm not qualified to speak for Asians or Latin Americans, but the trend is probably similar. For me a logical conclusion from this is that U.S. interests would not be the beneficiary of too Manichaean a distinction between good and evil.

### Ideology

The depressing thing about studying ancient history, as I did, is discovering from Thucydides that human moral calculus has changed scarcely at all since the 5th century BC. The moral calculations of Thomas Jefferson are still instantly recognizable. The agonies of the League of Nations over protecting human rights and preventing war were little different from the agonies of the 1990s in coping with Yugoslavia, just more nobly expressed.

It is easy to conclude from history that human nature is not really improvable, at least in this life. That is the Jacksonian view, though a view colored by the belief in good and evil. The neoconservatives, though they may not believe in good and evil, have implicitly renounced faith in human progress, adopting the power politics of the schoolyard as their model of human interaction. That view misses a crucial point. Human nature may be deeply flawed to the point of being unimprovable, but human institutions can evolve and progress.

I started out as a soft-headed California liberal, for whom tolerance and rationalism were the highest virtues. I hope to be one again when I die. To the extent I had opinions as an infant diplomat in the mid-80s, I was unhappy at how often the US sacrificed what I thought of as our democratic and humane values to the exigencies of resisting the Communist menace. By the time I knew them, the Communists seemed fairly pathetic as a justification for supporting grimy dictators and corrupt oligarchs. I had liked Jimmy Carter's espousal of human rights, and was discouraged that human rights, though adopted as a foreign policy instrument by the Reagan Administration and its successors, were only for our adversaries and to a token number of countries, like Belarus today, insignificant to our interests.

(Note: there are occasional noble exceptions to this rule, thanks to courageous U.S. diplomats and effective NGOs.)

The Cold War ended and it seemed to me that a new day of enlightened internationalism was free to dawn. I was profoundly influenced by the success of George Bush the elder and Secretary Baker in responding to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein had violated the one rule of international behavior that everyone seemed to agree with, that thou shalt not invade another sovereign state for purposes of annexing it. Kuwait needed to be restored, both to confirm that international law was not completely meaningless, and to prevent a major threat to the world's energy supplies. We built a coalition, wrapped it in the UN flag, got non-military contributors to pay for our services, and showed the world that the US was a useful country to have around, the world's policeman.

There were moral and practical reasons for not finishing off Saddam in 1991. We cared about international legitimacy, we were beginning to sicken ourselves with the slaughter of defenseless Iraqi soldiers, and we also had in the back of our minds that the balance of power in the region would be upset, leaving Iran a dangerous threat, if Iraq were demolished. I certainly had no problem with those arguments. I was in Greece then. Greeks were sentimentally opposed to Gulf War I, and only reluctant allies, but our correct handling meant there was no lasting damage to U.S. interests in Greece.

President Bush the elder illustrated a decent vision of a new world order, but derived no personal political benefit from it. I found his renunciation of "the vision thing" disappointing, and I went casting about for a new vision that offered some prospect of human progress.

I will tell you a guilty secret. I believe in the European Union. They have the vision thing. Yes, I know. Our contempt for the EU is fashionable and growing. Brussels is a snake pit, and 15 or 25 countries cannot run as tough and efficient a foreign policy as we can. But my experience of trying to rebuild Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union convinced me that the EU can do things we can't, precisely because there is a vision. In Romania and Armenia we were ineffectual at anything beyond maintaining a certain tolerable stability amid rampant corruption by dreary oligarchs. But the EU is a successful force for democracy and development, at least in Europe.

I don't mean that EU development bureaucrats are smarter than USAID bureaucrats, or more energetic, or more idealistic, or even better funded. But no bureaucratic skill, no amount of money, will implant democracy in a country unless both rulers and ruled are captured by some shared vision. And the EU offers it. I saw how Greece was transformed by its EU vision from being another Balkan state into something genuinely European. I watched Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia gradually transforming themselves. Romania and Bulgaria are at last moving on the same track, and Turkey, its candidacy accepted, is for the first time willing to introduce difficult democratic reforms of a kind we never cared to insist upon even during our days of maximum leverage.

Working in Armenia in the late 1990s I saw that our democracy assistance programs could not, in the absence of some vision, overcome the social, economic and political pressures propping up a corrupt authoritarian status quo. And Armenia is an easy case, a small, homogeneous country with strong ties to the US and a large diaspora to prop up US assistance funding levels.

For the democratic reform process I can tell you flatly that, as far as most of the world is concerned, the US currently has no useful vision to offer. We used to have one, an idealistic vision of the community of nations, a vision energized by pragmatic Cold War calculations but not completely captive to them. That vision was instrumental in the triumphant rebuilding of post-war Western Europe and the creation of the EU. Our vision since 9/11, what we project to the world, is simply a defensive, angry, sullen and selfish response to fear of terrorism. This vision, if it is a vision at all, earns no respect but only fear in return. It is certainly not seen as providing a model of society or governance to be emulated.

### Iraq

The only thing that may save American honor in Iraq is that a prudent plurality of the Iraqi people have been willing to convey to waiting TV cameras -- and in many cases sincerely believe, despite the debacles that accompanied the first days of military occupation -- that a few months or years under President Bush is an acceptable price to pay for ridding them of decades of rule by a family of monsters. In any case, they have no choice but to pay it.

The United States had no useful legitimacy in the Middle East when we began the war, and we have gained none since. It mattered very little that our soldiers fought as cleanly as they knew how. The absoluteness of our power has meant that we would be branded by the Muslim world with the shame of all the deaths, all the mutilations, and all the crimes committed since our invasion began. Our troops did not loot, did not wantonly murder, but they were ill-equipped and ill-led to cope with the collapse of Saddam's regime. By protecting the Oil Ministry while failing to protect the Iraqi National Museum and Library, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks have written themselves into the history books as vandals of the same order as the Mongol warlord Hulegu in 1258. Kurdish gratitude will buy us nothing from the great mass of the Iraqi population.

There is little hope of implementing a democracy in Iraq that we will be fond of, not only because of Iraq's manifold problems but also because of ours. Democracy in the US grew up in the context of a humanist philosophy that saw the individual as the fundamental measure of morality, that looked for progress in this world, that used God as justification for behaving morally as individuals, not as a state. The Iraqis have little experience with this intellectual tradition, and have little of it to look for from us currently. A top-down democracy based on divine sanction will look very different from what we had in mind, and I fear that we have no choice now but to get used to it.

After Iraq, our policy regarding the Muslim world is at a crossroads. The U.S. has spent money a shrinking economy could scarcely afford to fight a war whose benefits to the American people remain inscrutable. We have undertaken massive, expensive responsibilities for rebuilding Iraq, as for Afghanistan, responsibilities we will not be able to live up to. Financial constraints and overstretched military manpower argue against new foreign adventures in the near term, particularly a continued project to "democratize" Syria, Iran, and any other potential threats, presumably, though we do not say so explicitly, to Israel, since they are not threats to the United States.

### Terrorism

There is a widespread conservative belief, one my personal experience of the Middle East tells me is fatuous and dangerous, that we are the victims of terrorism because Islamic extremists doubt our strength and resolve, and that the easy cure for terror is, as with Iraq, a massive and disproportionate display of American strength and resolve. I believe the problem of terrorism is the opposite. Terror is almost by definition a weapon of despair, used by the weak against the strong. Against a militarily, economically, and politically all-powerful enemy, terrorism is the only weapon that offers the weak any hope, even if not a realistic one, of changing an unacceptable status quo.

Our war in Iraq did nothing to reduce the threat. Bin Laden's brand of Islamic absolutism had little or nothing to do with Saddam's Iraq though it may flourish in the new one. We have in any case no obvious alternative but to continue the same counterterrorism course as before. This means a systematic law enforcement campaign based, as before our invasion of Iraq, on close international law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, backed, in the limited instances where it is necessary, by the resources of the U.S. military.

In the case of Palestinian terrorism, we are in a morally untenable situation. We have identified ourselves, for Palestinians and their European sympathizers, as the guarantor of a status quo of creeping Israeli annexation of the Occupied Territories. This status quo is one that in any humanist moral framework would be intolerable. But we are also the only faint hope for bringing about a Palestinian state. Thus, the Palestinians have of late exempted the U.S. from terrorist attacks, though the certainty of massive retaliation has not deterred Palestinian terrorism against Israelis. September 11 added new fervor to our insistence on a set of rules of the game that excludes terror, at a time when the Palestinians believed they had no other means of putting meaningful pressure on the Government of Israel to accept a Palestinian state within viable borders.

We have confirmed to the Muslim world our absolute power, while offering little assurance that we will use it justly, we have guaranteed that most Muslims will continue to blame America for the past two generations of failure, humiliation, and repression. It would be excellent if they were to take personal responsibility for collective action to shape their destinies, rather than search for external scapegoats. But again I see no signs that human nature is about to transform itself.

## Lies and Hypocrisy

My impression as the second Bush administration took office was this was a group united by a tough-minded pessimism and deep cynicism regarding human nature. It rejected with contempt the idea that either human nature or human institutions have progressed since the dark ages. It was fixated on America's military security, even before September 11, and seized upon technological progress, particularly in military hardware and intelligence gathering, as the core arena for struggle. At a certain point, I assumed, we would drift into a standard, fairly mindless America-first policy with a healthy dose of isolationism. Regrettable but not too dangerous.

Indeed this is what I saw happening, at least at the start. Our breathtaking double standard on disarmament treaties, our poltroonery on the International Criminal Court, our dim and selfish rejection of Kyoto or any restraint on greenhouse gases, fell into an old, predictable, lamentable pattern of U.S. populism and parochialism. Since the Congress had already pronounced these treaties dead before the new Administration came to power, the practical differences may not have been great, but I and most of our international interlocutors found the new rhetoric of refusal crass and brutal in comparison to Clinton's doleful excuses.

But we have clearly moved in the past few months beyond that predictable pattern. September 11 has totally shifted the balance of power within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, unchaining a new and frightening rhetoric, unchaining practically limitless resources for any bureaucrat savvy and unscrupulous enough to manipulate public fears.

Even on the most primitive level, it is bad for U.S. interests abroad when an American president adopts a rhetoric of transcendental morality combined with a policy viewed by 90 percent of the human race as brutal, cynical and selfish. Were we to present a view of the world based on rational interests, our world interlocutors would have more hope of finding ground for shared interests. Were we to have a policy whose moral basis was somehow humane, we could hope for cooperation at least from those countries with similar values.

Since we do not have those, we should at least have enough sense to pay the tribute vice pays to virtue, and emulate President Clinton in successful hypocrisy. But this is an Administration that rejects hypocrisy as unworthy of a state enjoying absolute power. In that case, it should also reject lying. In an age of global information, it is impossible to tell one story to the American people and another to the rest of the world. A harmless lie told to manipulate the American voter or to delude the U.S. Congress becomes, I would submit, less harmless as it crosses our borders.

To justify our war with Iraq we told a number of lies to the American people, about the Iraqi threat, about Iraqi involvement in September 11. These lies served the bureaucratic and budgetary purposes of Secretary Rumsfeld and his brain trust. They served the electoral purposes of Karl Rove and his political operatives.



They produced a sense of fear and cynicism among our allies, and contributed to the near-universal belief that oil was the underlying motive for our intervention. They damaged our credibility, and mean in practice that, for example, no discovery we make in Iraq regarding weapons of mass destruction will be accepted unless validated by the United Nations and Dr. Blix. This will be a domestic political problem now, as well as an international one.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

When I resigned from the State Department I was convinced that America had forsaken a perhaps short-sighted, certainly lazy but fundamentally decent internationalist foreign policy for a unilateralist one that was manifestly short-sighted, selfish and – dare I say it? -- evil. I had personal experience of enough successful examples of multilateralism to believe America's political and economic security depends on reinforcing, not weakening a multilateral framework of international law. There was no compelling reason for a change. But it is painfully clear that a weak and uninformed president, unglued by the September 11 tragedy and misled by his own rigid and fundamentally unchristian religiosity, has allowed a coalition of ideologues to make irrelevant the traditional diplomatic instruments of U.S. power projection. The war in Iraq, founded on lies and half-truths, was simply a step toward a more complete power grab by one ideological faction, garnished of course with massive and unjustified new resource shifts at the expense of a staggering US and world economy.

September 11 and the shift of American policies towards a new kind of millenarian brutality underscored for me that there may be a broader moral principle at risk. Congress and the courts have shown themselves willing to set aside basic constitutional protections on behalf of American citizens and residents. The checks and balances of the American system cannot be taken for granted. Nor are there meaningful checks and balances on us in the international system, unless the need to finance our ballooning deficits imposes one. Never before has America been tempted by the lure of such unchecked power in the world. For now, I see little prospect of the rest of the world uniting against us. But we have a new and frightening strategic doctrine that not only has no evident limits but which by its own logic suggests it should be indefinitely repeated.

What power is there on earth to stop us short of some catastrophic failure? I submit that there must be one. I do not believe it will be Iraq. We will make a hash of Iraqi reconstruction, as we have been painfully unable to live up to our promises in Afghanistan. At a certain stage this Administration or the next will walk away and find some way to distract the American people from the ensuing chaos. But I have no faith that there will be an accounting.

A more likely check on our triumphalism would be the failure of our current economic experiment. It may well prove that the world loses its willingness to fund our balance of payments deficit, to continue shifting investment capital to American safe harbor and the

dollar. The American business community may at some point grow frightened of the trade implications of our policy, either because we deliberately or accidentally scuttle the WTO and the rest of the multinational mercantile system, or because our policies generate such distaste that we find ourselves shut out of major markets by formal or informal boycotts. This will take a while to be felt.

But there is something for the short term. Princeton used to be the heartland of a brilliantly successful foreign policy coalition, between Wilsonian idealists possessed of a compelling humanist vision of the world and the practical knowledge to use it, and Hamiltonian pragmatic mercantilists, who built up international law and international institutions in the service of American economic interests. This coalition now lies in tatters. Many of its practitioners have attempted to come to terms with a hard-nosed neoconservatism, hoping to have influence. But they are discovering that in one thing at least the Administration is truthful: this is an Administration at war, and you are for them or against them. Prisoners get sent to Guantanamo.

Personally, I think the time has come to stand up to the schoolyard bullies in Washington, not on partisan political terms but to defend threatened national values and interests. We should demand from the American electorate, from the American business community, from the academic world, a foreign policy based on understanding that the world's interests and our interests are inseparable. America's security is enhanced by a clear, strong, and universal system of international law, policed by strong international institutions that we dominate through a generous allocation of our energy, skill, funding, intelligence-gathering capability, and military prowess. The alternative is Hobbesian and dark.

America had a vision once, and its vision made us a great power in the world. We must not be deterred or manipulated away from finding that vision again. Thank you.

## **VI. Panel: *President Bush's National Security Strategy***

Sponsor: Center of International Studies

Moderator: Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs; Director, Center for International Studies; Director, Research Program in International Security

Panelists:

Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Bill Kristol, Editor, *The Weekly Standard*

The *President Bush's National Security Strategy* panel addressed both the validity and

implications of George W. Bush's national security strategy, most specifically the doctrines of regime change and preemptive action. William Kristol and Michael O'Hanlon, two prominent commentators on United States foreign policy (often with opposing political views) were surprisingly in agreement on many issues. Both commentators outlined their understanding of the premises of the Administration's security strategy and their views on the "new era" that the United States entered on September 11, 2001.

Moderator Aaron Friedberg introduced the panel topic, reviewing Bush's national security strategy, as stated in the National Security Strategy document of September 2002. Friedberg described how the Administration considers the greatest security threat facing the United States to be cooperation between radical terrorists and rogue states that seek weapons of mass destruction. Using the moral language of "good versus evil," the Administration has introduced regime change and preemptive action as integral parts of long-term United States security strategy, declaring that nations sponsoring or harboring terrorists are not entitled to sovereignty. The Bush team, standing firmly on certain non-negotiable principles, has determined that the security of the United States rests on the promotion of political transformation.

O'Hanlon made clear his agreement with the substance of the Administration's security strategy, though he felt strongly that announcing a policy of preemption in public is seldom wise. He argued that the notion of preemption is not new and pointed out that in the 1990's, the US "threatened preventive or pre-emptive military strikes" in Iraq, North Korea, and Kosovo. Openly discussing the doctrine, however, represented a departure from past practices. According to O'Hanlon, United States officials should have learned from past experiences that preemptive action usually fails when publicly announced in advance, and succeeds when implemented either quietly and quickly or decisively and overwhelmingly. "It may be worth having smart conservatives like Bill Kristol occasionally give speeches mentioning pre-emption now and again because you do want to make people a little more intimidated that you are prepared to use force in this new era." But, said O'Hanlon, "I don't see how the Administration benefited from the announcement or why the administration needed the [public] argument."

O'Hanlon observed that the Bush Administration created challenges for itself by "talking so publicly and so vigorously about the concept." The problem with the current approach is that the Bush Administration has reinforced the United States' image as a unilateralist superpower, thereby damaging relationships with the rest of the world. Furthermore, he argued, invoking a doctrine of "preemption" was unnecessary to justify war in Iraq or Afghanistan. Defense against aggression was ample justification for the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the Administration could have made the problems caused by Saddam Hussein clearer in the months leading up to the Iraq invasion. Also, the combination of threats and use of preemptive language in the context of the "Axis of Evil" made the North Koreans perhaps feel they really need nuclear weapons even more than they might have thought they needed them before."

O'Hanlon continued his analysis of Bush's National Security Strategy, noting that, in addition to the doctrine of preemption, "there's a lot of old-fashioned Pentagon military deterrence doctrine in this document." O'Hanlon went on to observe that "much of it basically was written by the Clinton administration." One major change, "just as striking as the parts of the report about military pre-emption, are the very favorable words about China and Russia - the effort not to pick a fight with those two countries - even though, just a year before, at the Pentagon in particular, there had been a lot of talk about viewing China as the next hegemonic competitor of the United States."

O'Hanlon commented on how the National Security Strategy also devotes a sizable section to other aspects of national security, including preventing failed states and increasing development aid, but added that the moral "incompleteness" of the document lies in "an insufficient attention to the problems of the developing world." His critique of the document noted that "the rhetoric of liberating peoples from their oppressive regimes and helping them, which we've seen so much of in the Iraq debate, has not been sufficiently generalized to other parts of the world. So, on morality, the administration actually hasn't gone far enough."

"The pre-emption part is wrong on the cosmetics but right on the substance," O'Hanlon concluded, while "the morality part is right in the cosmetics but insufficient in the substance and lacking sufficient attention to a big part of the world."

Panelist Bill Kristol, after stating his agreement with much of O'Hanlon's commentary, disagreed with the "picture of continuity" drawn by O'Hanlon, arguing instead that the United States, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, is currently undergoing a dramatic shift in attitudes towards foreign policy. "In a weird way," he concluded, "the polemicists of the right and the left are perhaps more correct than the sensible policy-makers of the center in sensing that something big has happened to American foreign policy."

"So I think we are in a new moment," Kristol observed, "and the key to understanding new moments is: things change more than you expect. That's what it means to be in a new moment. You don't revert to the mean. You don't go back to the status quo ante." Noting the "compelling analogies" between current moment and post-World War II when the Cold War paradigm began to materialize, Kristol compared Bush's current situation to "Truman, who expected to begin his presidency by simply finishing up World War II, bringing the troops home from Europe, and expected, like Bush, to be a domestic policy president."

Kristol stated that the recent war in Iraq was the biggest war the US has fought since Vietnam, and is indicative of the new path in American policy. The rapid sequence-- September 11 terrorist attacks, war in Afghanistan, and war in Iraq -- is momentous and, for Kristol, these events taken together represent a departure from the status quo.

Kristol agreed with O'Hanlon that preemption is not entirely new. Using the example of

Israel's attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, Kristol questioned, "Is Osirak still the exception or is it more now the rule? Are there going to be lots of Osirak-type situations in the future? I think Bush thinks, unfortunately, Osirak is not a one-shot deal and Iraq is not a one-shot deal."

In his view, the Bush Administration brought discussion of preemption to the public in order to demonstrate to Americans and the rest of the world that the US has entered a different era. Responding to O'Hanlon's concern that going public with the preemption doctrine might have been strategically unwise, Kristol commented that Bush "didn't need to advertise this new doctrine. But maybe he was right to do so, both from the point of view of building American public support and in the sense alerting the world to this doctrine." Kristol took a stand that preemption is an appropriate response to new problems and that the promotion of democracy, especially in the Middle East, is key to national security interests.

Kristol went on to observe that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were proof that the United States' hands-off approach to dealing with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern regimes has failed. The Administration's decision to embrace regime change was important because it meant the United States would "not simply accept the status quo everywhere in the world as unchallengeable," and instead would be "willing to make a moral claim."

Kristol summarized that American leadership in a dangerous world is essential and tools like regime change and preemption must at times be utilized. Cautioning against falling prey to either of two extremes, excessive moralism and hard-headed pure realpolitik, Kristol concluded: "There are times when one has to limit one's commitment to morality and international affairs, but the problem since the end of the Cold War has been much too great a willingness to do that for which we have paid a great practical price, in my view."

Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter provided summary commentary on the panel discussion, underscoring that the United States has indeed entered a new era and noting a number of points upon which the two panelists had agreed. The Dean emphasized the "dramatic realignment" in political debate the panel had evidenced: no longer are realists and human rights defenders at odds. Today, elements within the Bush Administration are in agreement in many ways with liberal interventionists and human rights advocates. "What you're seeing now is possibly a coalition between people who want regime change because they're worried about terrorism and people who want regime change because it's the right thing to do."

## **VII. Panel: *Should Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) be Viewed through the Lens of Good and Evil?***

Sponsor: Program on Science and Global Security

Moderator: Frank von Hippel, Professor of Public and International Affairs & Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security

Panelists:

Morton Halperin, Director, Open Society Institute, Washington Office; Open Society Institute; Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Former Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff

Jonathan Schell, Peace and Disarmament Correspondent, The Nation; Harold Willens Peace Fellow at the Nation Institute

Panelists Mort Halperin and Jonathan Schell discussed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within a moral framework, each considering whether WMD are inherently evil or whether they might be morally acceptable if kept in the right hands. Moderator Frank von Hippel began by discussing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which “views nuclear weapons as unmitigated evil” and commented on how the United States uses “a different prism of good and evil. It is all right for good countries to have these weapons and even use them as long as evil regimes are blocked from acquiring them.” Both panelists concurred that current US policy on nuclear weapons is fundamentally mistaken and that the US must be prepared to give up its own nuclear weapons in order to avoid extermination.

Jonathan Schell began by proposing that nuclear weapons represent the “principle moral choice of past century” and of this one. Nuclear weapons have put “human extinction within the compass of human power ...instantaneously alter[ing] the terms on which life was given to human beings on earth.” Thus, Schell argued, the starting point of any discussion must be the possible darkness of the future, a “to be or not to be of nuclear annihilation,” a “cancellation of unborn.” Schell declared “extermination is the characteristic evil of our time.” A “threat to the future whether of a nation or the human species or even of a different species is a threat not only to life but to all that life is for.... Every act of extermination is a crime against life and against the meaning of life.” Schell noted the strategic nature of nuclear weapons under the doctrine of deterrence -- using terror and intimidation to achieve goals and added that economic sanctions may need to be added to the category of weapons of mass destruction.

Schell clarified that the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty is either an abolition treaty or a double standard, stating there is no way to stop proliferation as long as nuclear weapons countries are committed to keeping their own. He perceives the US as trying “to ratify the

double standard” on nuclear weapons, and as going to war in Iraq to preserve the WMD double standard.

Schell concluded emphatically that what is necessary is a commitment to live in world without nuclear weapons. This is “not a utopia”, he stressed, but rather “a practical solution to an urgent problem...The price of being safe from the danger of weapons of mass destruction is getting rid of our own.”

Panelist Mort Halperin provided several perspectives for addressing the question of whether WMDs are evil. The first is to conclude that nuclear weapons are inherently evil, whoever possesses them. The second is to view states, rather than weapons, as potentially evil, and that “that good states are entitled to get whatever weapons they need to defend themselves” while evil states should be prevented from obtaining WMD. The view that “it’s OK for certain states to develop nuclear weapons but not for other states” has historically been arbitrary and is not necessarily linked to notions of “good” or “evil.” Halperin concluded that the US has usually espoused the second view and has never been willing to say that nuclear weapons are evil. The United States has never wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons, and has always felt entitled to develop, employ and share nuclear weapons when it is in the national interest to do so. Halperin contrasted this approach to policy on chemical and biological weapons, where the United States is now party to treaties which ban “not only the use of those weapons but also their possession by any state and the threat by any state to use those weapons.”

Halperin proceeded to give an overview of the way the US has historically treated nuclear weapons. In WWII, the US believed it had right to use nuclear weapons because certain enemy states were evil. Subsequent policy has been formed from the idea that there are situations, like WWII, where it is moral to use nuclear weapons. In the Cold War this view was applied to the USSR. It was taken for granted that the US did not want the USSR to have nuclear weapons and believed deterrence was possible only with an effective and credible threat. Based on that belief, the US resisted efforts to limit the right to use nuclear weapons, developed various kinds, and set forth to “educate” other countries that nuclear weapons are not evil, but states are evil and nuclear weapons are conventional. Since the end of World War II, the US has helped Britain and France to develop nuclear weapons, encouraged Germany and Japan to put US weapons in their territory, and trained Germans in the use of nuclear weapons.

According to Halperin, debate over the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty in the US was characterized by the argument that these treaties stigmatized nuclear weapons, which undermined the US position that weapons are neutral while states have the potential for evil. The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty declares that the only states that can legitimately possess nuclear weapons are the US, UK, France, China and Russia, which, Halperin noted, is clearly not a division of good and evil states by US standards, i.e. India cannot possess them while China can. Halperin noted one major

exception to US nuclear policy -- Israel. The US did not press Israel to sign the treaty, although, according to the treaty Israel was not allowed to possess nuclear weapons. Halperin observed that the US's nuclear posture has remained relatively unchanged from the time of the Cold War, even though, since the collapse of the USSR in 1990, we live in a world where US military power cannot be matched by any one nation in the world. Perhaps one small change is that in today's US policy, in contrast to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, states appear to be entitled to possess nuclear weapons based on whether they are good or evil. The US has come to terms with Israel and India possessing nuclear weapons, and abandoned efforts to make Indians and Pakistanis sign the nuclear test ban treaty. Halperin noted that entitlement to possess nuclear weapons has not been based on whether a state is democratic, since Pakistan is not, nor is it about support for terrorism or willingness to proliferate nuclear weapons, again citing Pakistan. Iran and Japan both adhere to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, but quietly maintain options to develop nuclear weapons, and there is a clear consensus in both countries that, if certain thing occurred, nuclear weapons would and could be quickly acquired. Still, in US policy eyes, Iran is "evil" but Japan is not.

Halperin proposed that it is a fundamental mistake to label all nuclear devices as 'weapons,' since this term implies that their use is consistent with the laws of war, which have to do with proportionality, destruction of legitimate targets and civilians. Yet no one has been able to use nuclear weapons under laws of war, rather, they are used as devices to create fear and intimidation. Halperin disagreed with the widespread Republican objection to the test ban treaty and pointed out the US hypocrisy in its distinctly different policies toward biological weapons versus nuclear weapons. Since the US doesn't have a need for the former, it can preach getting rid of those, but as long as it has a need for the latter, there is a different set of rules.

Halperin concluded that, because weapons of mass destruction are the only thing that can threaten our survival, US security interests are in doing the opposite of current policy. We should stigmatize them; declared that are not legitimate; lower stockpiles in the US to as low a level as possible, and put them beyond use. The US must be prepared to take the necessary steps to give up nuclear weapons: bring them all home; commit not to deploy them overseas; renounce the first use of them; refrain from sharing them; and ratify treaties prohibiting their production. The US must make clear that it does not intend to use nuclear weapons and views them as evil.

Overall, the panel agreed it was appropriate - and useful - to evaluate Weapons of Mass Destruction "through the lens of good and evil." Halperin called the "nuclear devices that we developed in World War II and dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki...terrorist devices which are fundamentally evil in the sense that they threatened the survival of our race on this planet." And Schell observed, although usually "actions are evil, not things," a nuclear weapon presents an exception because it "is intended for use and it has certain consequences that we know very well which can be the deaths of many, many millions of people."



### **VIII. Panel: *Just War: From Moral Thought to Military Practice***

Sponsor: Center for Human Values

Moderator: Josiah Ober, David Magie '97 Class of 1897 Professor of Ancient History, Department of Classics, Princeton University

Panelists:

Michael Waltzer, Professor of Social Science, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and Editor of *Dissent*

Michael Doyle, Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Edwards S. Sanford Professor of International Affairs, Princeton University

John Kelsay, Richard L. Rubenstein Professor of Religion and Department Chair, Florida State University

The panel, *Just War: from Moral Thought to Military Practice*, examined, from both a Western and an Islamic perspective, the relevance of just war theory in the most recent war in Iraq. Panel moderator Josiah Ober introduced the history of just war theory, and its two primary components. "Many civilizations, including Islamic civilizations, have laws, rules and conventions regarding both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*." Acknowledging that despite these "manifold resources," just war theorists were facing a profoundly challenging moment in history, Ober asked: "Are those resources adequate in an era in which a doctrine of preemption is openly proclaimed by a hyper-power as legitimate justification for war? In a world in which preemptive doctrine is conjoined with a rhetoric that emphasizes the right to use force in order to promote good and to oppose evil? In a world in which states and coalitions of states are no longer the only entities capable of going to war? In a world of perpetual war, not against states as such, necessarily, but against terrorism, that is, against a mode of being and acting in the world, that, by definition, resists laws and rules?"

Panelist Michael Walzer observed that just war theory has come to govern our discourse on war, and to be the most familiar set of doctrines, concepts, and ideas by which we discuss the morality of war. He noted how, in the recent Iraqi war debate, both the war protestors' condemnations and the Bush administration's justifications were mired in the language of law. "It has never been clearer," Walzer said, "that *jus in bello*, justice in the conduct of war, respect for non-combatant immunity, is closely linked to, perhaps even necessary for the success of the war. For all wars are now, at least in part, wars for the hearts and minds of the civilian population, and you don't win hearts and minds by killing the people whose hearts and minds you are trying to win."

Looking at the conflict in Afghanistan, Walzer claimed that Bush Administration had not yet demonstrated that the conflict was justified. "The first goal of any just conflict should be local legitimacy – a government that commands sufficient support that it doesn't have to rule by brute force." The lawlessness in Afghanistan today, Walzer explained, was proof that the Administration had not met the requirement.

Panelist Michael Doyle argued it was time for a new doctrine of preemptive war. Currently, preemption follows the strict *Caroline* standard which was established in 1837 after British forces in Canada crossed the US border to burn a ship that was supplying a rebellion in Canada. The US condemned the attack, but both the U.K. and the US had other matters to attend to, so the British apologized for the attack, implicitly accepting Daniel Webster's claim that preemption was only legal when the threat was immediate, overwhelming, and left no other choice.

Doyle maintained that the *Caroline* standard is an "utterly unrealistic standard of preemptive self-defense." Article 51 of the UN Charter authorizes member countries to defend themselves only after they have been attacked. Article 39, however, gives the UN Security Council - recognized by the Charter as the "unique repository of legitimacy" and, in Doyle's words, the right to authorize use of force to stop "gross and systematic abuses of human rights, including ethnic cleansing short of genocide; to relieve a population's suffering from extreme forms of social collapse, for example, as in Somalia, and even,...as in the case of Haiti, take preventive action." Doyle proposed a variable architecture to allow states the right of preventive and preemptive war. The UN Security Council should retain that legitimacy, but multilateral regional institutions—like NATO, OAS, and the African Union—should also be able to approve preventive action, provided they "have chosen in advance the standards that justify appropriate preemption." Doyle concluded that the US action in Iraq should not have been permitted under just war theory and a "coalition of the willing" does not earn the legitimacy inherent in multilateral regional institutions.

Panelist John Kelsay introduced the audience to Islamic theories of just war, emphasizing the importance of understanding the way that justice is embodied in the Islamic political order. Kelsay argued that, during war, Islamic traditions urged fighters to avoid harming non-combatants. "If we went down through the centuries," he said, "and looked at the judgments of the learned class, I think that we could see that Islamic tradition regarding honorable combat, in effect, reflects almost all of the criteria associated with the *jus ad bellum* and the *jus in bello*." As a living tradition, Islam's influence is continually debated and, as such, there has recently been debate among Islamic fundamentalists regarding this issue.

Kelsay also commented on recent discussions regarding the relationship between Islam and terrorism. "Post-September 11<sup>th</sup>, the discussion of Islam and fighting has tended to swing between two assertions: either Islam has nothing to do with fighting of the type illustrated on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, or Islam has everything to do with it. Neither is

accurate." "It's important," Kelsey cautioned, "to get a sense of the conversations Muslims are having about political justice and honorable combat."

Kelsey used a series of statements as examples of the of this internal Muslin debate. First, in June 2002, an Al-Qaeda spokesmen claimed divine law supports indiscriminate tactics against the United States and its allies because the US has been responsible, directly and indirectly, for the killing of Muslims. Thus, rather than committing acts of terror, Al Qaeda was, from their perspective, executing a form of reciprocal justice. The next month, dissident fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia agreed with Osama bin Laden's contention that the US and its allies had wronged Muslims. They agreed with bin Laden's goals but condemned his tactics of targeting innocent people. In November 2002, in what seems to be a partial response, bin Laden released a letter to the US that restated his grievances with American policy. He then argued that if America claimed to be a democracy and each person had a right to change policy, all Americans were responsible for their government's actions. He also claimed that Muslims could kill proportionately to their civilian casualties.

All three panelists acknowledged the need to adjust just war theories to changing world circumstances. Each culture has its concepts of what constitutes a just war, but the panelists, especially Kelsay, were optimistic that the tensions between the UN's just war guidelines and certain traditions can and will be worked out.

### **IX. Panel: *The Nature of Good and Evil***

Sponsor: Princeton University Council on the Humanities

Moderator: D. Graham Burnett, Assistant Professor, Department of History and Program in History of Science, Princeton University

Panelists:

Susan Neiman, Director of the Einstein Forum, Potsdam; Author, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy*

John V. Fleming, Professor of English and Comparative Literature, Princeton University

Caryl Emerson, Chair, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Princeton University

Moderator Professor Graham Burnett introduced this panel as an opportunity for

"humanistic, philosophical-cum-literary discussions to engage with the concerns of policymakers." Three panelists with different backgrounds each drew from his or her respective body of knowledge to address the issue of "good and evil." Susan Neiman provided a philosophical examination of evil; John Fleming discussed of the concept of evil as explained in the writings of Saint Augustine, and Caryl Emerson, an expert in Slavic languages and literature, contrasted approaches to evil in Western and Russian literature. In examining the philosophical, theological, and literary traditions surrounding the treatment of good, and particularly, evil, these three panelists provided invaluable texture and context for some of the more foreign policy-focused discussions

Neiman focused on historical cases in order to explore the evolution of the concept of evil, beginning with the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which left survivors in despair and was considered by contemporaries as evil. Now, Neiman contrasted, the fact that "an earthquake could leave thinkers as unsentimental and savvy as Voltaire to write long columns mourning the end of philosophy, can make us feel wistful, if not positively envious of the age whose confidence could be shattered by an earthquake." A change in the philosophy of evil resulted from the earthquake, as philosophers became less inclined to "connect sin and suffering."

Neiman related the disaster to current events, remarking that: "Earthquakes and plagues strike the righteous and the rotten alike. When terrorists actively scorn those distinctions, they show their scorn for the very idea of morality."

The connotations evoked by the word Auschwitz, Neiman argued, reveal a further evolution in the human understanding of evil. "The limits crossed at Auschwitz were moral limits," she said. "The deliberate industrial murder of millions of people has come to function as shorthand for absolute evil." Indeed, now, "comparing Lisbon to Auschwitz seems to risk moral as well as a conceptual confusion." In wondering what it was that made Auschwitz worthy of iconic status -- more people have died under dictators and more painful methods could have been used -- Neiman cautioned that "comparisons of evil can quickly degenerate into exercises in comparative suffering."

Neiman concluded by noting the continued usefulness of the concept of evil, as certain events - the crucifixion, the Holocaust, September 11- are so shocking that they "cry out for words like evil."

Panelist John Fleming followed Neiman with a discussion of Saint Augustine's writings on good and evil. He focused particularly on Augustine's efforts to refute Manichaeism, the belief that "the entire material world...adhered to the principle of darkness" and that the universe "was animated by the struggle of two co-equal and polar forces, good and evil, light and darkness ...God and Satan."

Augustine's efforts led him to focus his attention on the Book of Genesis for most of his life, which led to his great work, "The Confessions." Contrary to Manichean thought,

Augustine "insisted that evil was a privation, not an effective principle of agency, let alone co-equal in its power with God's agency." This theme led to Augustine's definition of evil as "the absence of good," which Fleming described as "not philosophically satisfying." Fleming explained that in "the practical experience in the world, evil looks very much as though it has agency because it is associating with that absolute dynamo of freewill agency - namely human thinking,"

For Augustine, "the chief concept regarding both good and evil is love and the relationship between the will and love." As Fleming pointed out, Augustine could not imagine a world without love. "Love is simply there." Fleming went on to explain Augustine's interpretation of the story of the Garden of Eden - man as higher reason, woman as the sensual or aesthetic senses - and the constant struggle or negotiation between the reason and the desire. For Augustine, evil is the conquest over good, "over a properly ordered hierarchy."

Panelist Caryl Emerson presented her analysis of the problem of good and evil in the context of an examination of novels, specifically, a comparison between the role of the novel in Russia (and Eastern Europe) and western countries. She began by asking: "Is reading fiction an escape of moral responsibility or is it indispensable training for that responsibility? Shouldn't people who read novels be encouraged to do something more serious, more real, more relevant, more proactive?"

Although this question has been argued for a long time in the Western humanities, when it comes to "the prose of Russia and Eastern Europe, the debate hardly exists, because the role of the novel in those countries has been, compared with the modern West, extraordinary." While French and British texts may rely on "money, career, ambition, social class, high office, marrying well, and sex" as central stimulants, "as anyone who has sampled Dostoyevsky or Tolstoy knows, the great Russian novel is a moral text."

Emerson observed that the different roles of the novel in the two hemispheres could be explained, at least in part, by the differences in "real life" between the regions. She pointed out, "ever since the mid-17th century, real life of Russian politics, current events, economics and religion was heavily and capriciously censored." The closed and repressive nature of the societies of the East resulted in the life of novels becoming "real life." These fictional worlds "paradoxically...came to be read as more free and more truthful than what was available out there about real life ... overwhelmingly about right and wrong."

Emerson next considered the role of the novel in the West, "prosperous, boisterous, impatient, can-do America," -- where the emphasis is on "user-friendly" art forms and "instant gratification." In the West, with its free and open society, there was no need for an alternate world. Yet, because of the fast pace of life in the West, one of the great benefits of reading novels for Westerners is that by its very nature it slows one down and inclines one to solitude.

Emerson concluded that there is a marked contrast between the East and the West in their view of the relationship of the novel to the evil in the world. In Russia and Eastern Europe, where the outside world was considered evil, the "primary value of the humanist was to seal politics out and protect from any politics leaking in... Keep Tolstoy, Tolstoy; keep Pushkin, Pushkin, regardless of what the Party wants them to say." In the West, where the outside world was not seen as intrinsically evil, the tendency has been to make the novel relevant to outside events, to look for "evil inside the text," and match it up with the outside world, "hoping to shock the world that otherwise is given over completely to America's two great intoxicants: consumerism and entertainment."

### **X. Panel: *Morality and American Democracy***

Sponsor: Center for the Study of Democratic Politics

Moderator: Larry Bartels, Donald E. Stokes Professor of Public and International Affairs; Professor of Politics and Public Affairs; Director of the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University

Panelists:

Valerie Hunt, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist University

David Leege, Professor Emeritus of Government and International Studies, University of Notre Dame

Karen Stenner, Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University

The panelists presented three distinct issues within American domestic politics -- immigration, political culture, and tolerance. The three presentations intersected as each panelist considered the effects of "crisis" or "threat" on political opinion and behavior. Valerie Hunt focused on immigration and found that willingness to discriminate against non-US citizens rose immensely when connected to a terrorist threat. David Leege focused on political culture, rising patriotism in the face of national threat, and the increase in religious rhetoric within the United States. Karen Stenner discussed linkages between intolerant beliefs and changing levels of social and economic threat. Each participant considered his/her findings within today's policy context.

Panelist Valerie Hunt opened by noting that while "moral dimensions of evaluations seem to possess little room in the overall spectrum of evaluative dimensions (meaning economic forces, political forces, partisan forces) that influence migration policy process," in actuality, "moral and ethical dimensions have been present in the migration policy process for quite some time." She presented a number of "less than laudable turns" in the history of US immigration policy, including the "notion of moral turpitude"

which has based immigration on subjective qualities. For example, potential immigrants who were single and female were accused of “feeble-mindedness. She also discussed the problem of “moral characterization of deservedness by national origin,” as when historically the United States has favored Northern European immigrants over their Southern or Eastern neighbors, and has discriminated especially against immigrants from Asian countries. Hunt noted the discrepancy in the application of moral standards in US refugee policy, highlighting especially the differing policies with regard to Cuban and Haitian immigrants. Although US government officials have claimed a moral distinction between economic and political refugees, Hunt posits that the “realpolitik perspective at work here is one of an opportunity to embarrass the Cuban Communist regime as well as to apply international pressure on that regime.”

Hunt addressed how September 11 changed the US commitment to taking in refugees and the “moral touchstones” the US decision makers used prior to 9/11. Hunt opened the question of the appropriateness of these changes in the context of our redefined understanding of national security. Is it now “more important to privilege other perspectives such as security and economic considerations, and to de-emphasize moral and ethical dimensions of evaluation? ... How does the public define and distinguish the rights of citizens from the rights of its non-citizens?”

Hunt’s research and polling data on these questions revealed a number of thought-provoking conclusions. She found that: “To a large degree, how an issue is framed or understood influences how a public makes these distinctions between a good immigrant and a bad immigrant, or the necessity of taking a moral perspective of opening doors or closing doors.” When asked whether non-citizens should have fewer rights than citizens, “an overwhelming number felt that there should be no distinction.” However, when the question was framed, during the same time period, with a reference to terrorism, (i.e. “Given the efforts of the government to curb terrorism, should it be easier to investigate non-citizens than citizens?”) the percentage of respondents who favored this policy option significantly increased.

Hunt observed that the tendency to constrict the rights of non-citizens during times of crisis was not new and cited two historical examples. The Alien Sedition Acts of the late 1790s were prompted by US fears of the presence of French sympathizers. Again, in the Palmer raids of 1918-1921, the first Red Scare led Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer to initiate well publicized raids against radicals and leftists, particularly non-citizens. More recently, Gallup Polls have showed skyrocketing support of national ID cards after the September 11 attacks.

Panelist David Leege’s research focused primarily on cultural theory and his observation of different reactions by nations to the perception of heightened threat. “Particularly in times of uncertainty or threat, nations will first turn to religion to reduce uncertainty and then nations will scapegoat to mobilize against the threat.”

Leege discussed one reaction to threat that is evidenced in the way we speak about, label and package policies. He pointed to the way that policy issues are “packaged through more powerful cultural symbols that have political advantages during candidate or policy campaigns.” Leege referenced the “old political axiom says that if you can’t beat them at the game, change the issue labeling.”

Leege observed how “Great political communicators develop masterful ways of speaking American.” Their “speech writers and handlers also sanctify their addresses with powerful cultural, often religious symbols of American purpose such as shining city on a hill, a thousand points of light, freedom, democracy, free enterprise, Christianity, or prodigal generation.” Phrases such as “evil empire,” “Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country,” and “You are either with us or against us” resonate within the public consciousness. Leege concluded, “Life is simple and more secure through powerful symbols of action.”

Leege’s research considered “the manner in which presidential campaigns use cultural symbols to control the size and composition of the electorate.” He has isolated four types of cultural appeals used by the parties in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. “First,” he found “patriotism in the face of threat, and that’s what we’re returning to these days in American politics.” Leege predicted that patriotism will play a significant role in the 2004 presidential election, stating that “the patriotism and xenophobia, cold war campaign style developed by Nixon and Reagan was also used by Bush and Bush ’43 in the 2002 election. And we’re going to see it in spades in 2004. We’ll know who the non-patriots are in 2004.” The other three types of cultural appeals have been “race, through a sense of relative deprivation; gender, and religion through notions of moral order.”

One of the significant observations that emerged from Leege’s research was that “unlike other highly developed western democracies, where religious beliefs and practices are almost historical artifacts,” according to one recent survey, “they remain not only alive but perhaps even growing among the young [in the US].” Leege concluded, “It should come as no surprise that American politicians take pains to display their righteousness, and take recourse to religious language to signify national and personal values.”

Leege acknowledged, “Skepticism aside ...many politicians and citizens embrace deep values about the scope and purposes of the political community.” He added, “Particularly those converted from a different way of life are likely to interpret both daily life and politics through categories of good and evil. Candidate Bush was not just being autobiographical or whistling Dixie when he spoke of a prodigal generation.”

Leege concluded that “cultural conflict terms and particularly religious language have come to dominate American domestic politics and campaigns” and “it should come as no surprise then that after several decades of the cold war, race, gender and religious value conflict, discourse about American foreign policy should come to be dominated essentially by religious terms....This is American politics now.”



Panelist Karen Stenner addressed different aspect of American democracy – tolerance of difference. Stenner argued that innate “authoritarianism” – the predisposition among a segment of the population to use political structures to enforce similarity – can be triggered by a perceived threat to shared norms.

Stenner drew on current psychological and political research in describing the proportion of society made up of authoritarian personalities, those who feel most comfortable in an atmosphere of shared values. Such personality types feel threatened by diversity of viewpoints and tend to support government restrictions on aberrant beliefs or behaviors. They may particularly endorse moral regulation, including “attitudes toward school prayer, abortion, homosexuality, gay rights, protecting gays from job discrimination.”

In many situations, polling of political opinions can discern no significant differences between authoritarian personalities and different personality types (e.g., libertarians). In situations of normative threat, however, “authoritarians” react by becoming less tolerant and demanding government or societal intervention against the perceived threat. The resulting intolerance is not just directed at the area of normative threat - it is generalized. Stenner commented that: “Bill Clinton’s activities in the Lewinsky scandal contributed more to racial, political and moral intolerance in the US than just about anything in the last 20 years.”

Stenner cautioned that there are significant and sobering implications for modern liberal democracies since “racial, political and moral tolerance are among the most important requisites for liberal democracy, to live in peace with and treat with respect if not necessarily affection, members of other racial and ethnic groups.” As democracies flourish, political viewpoints proliferate. However, while libertarians fight to “augment racial, political and moral tolerance where those things seem to be under threat,” Authoritarians take the opposite reaction, “manning the barricades basically demanding moral regulation, political repression and the like when society seems to be becoming more diverse, more different.” Given such a dynamic, Stenner concluded, pluralistic democratic politics can become more conflictual, not less. Fortunately, there are ways to mitigate this dynamic. One, Stenner pointed out, concerns the importance of effective leadership, which can help assuage the concerns of those threatened by change or diversity and create a climate of opinion that encourages tolerance.

During the question and answer session, Stenner responded to several questions by discussing the results of her research in greater detail and drawing a distinction between conservatives and authoritarians. The former are threatened by change over time; the latter are threatened by diversity in the present. Authoritarians would be comfortable living in a benevolent dictatorship, even if it is evolving, as long as popular opinion is relatively homogenous. Stenner also pointed out that the proportion of society made up by authoritarians does not seem to differ among cultures.

**XI. Panel: *Remaking the World in America's Image: A History of Occupation***

Sponsor: Department of History, Princeton University

Moderator: Harold James, Professor of History, Princeton University

Panelists:

Volker Berghahn, Seth Low Professor of History, Columbia University

Sheldon Garon, Professor of History, Princeton University

Jeremy Adleman, Professor of History, Princeton University

Charles S. Maier, Leverett Saltonstall Professor of History, Harvard University

The panel *Remaking the World in America's Image: A History of Occupation* examined historical examples of US intervention and nation-building to create a context for analyzing the prospects and challenges of the US occupation of Iraq. Post-World War II Germany and Japan were emphasized as models of successful reconstructions through occupation, but panelists were pessimistic about the chances for similar triumph in Iraq, noting that, thus far, the Iraqi situation appears to more closely resemble unsuccessful nation building attempts in Latin America. Panelists made a key distinction in comparing these historical examples--the difference between construction and reconstruction. The US was successful in reconstructing Germany and Japan largely because these countries already possessed the foundation for strong political institutions, while Latin American countries had to overcome unstable economic and political traditions and greater social fragmentation. In his opening remarks, Moderator Harold James reminded listeners that "political rebuilding, reshaping societies" has always been "a precondition and a building block...for peace."

Panelist Volker Berghahn opened with a discussion of US involvement post-World War II Germany. Berghahn suggested that, given lessons learned from Germany, the present Bush Administration would do well to devote more attention to Iraq's historical development and make a far greater commitment of resources to rebuilding. "There is not going to be a stable democracy, a stable, pluralistic, democratic political system unless you also have economic construction, economic welfare, prosperity." The US rebuilding effort in post-World War II Germany featured not only political restructuring, but also economic rebuilding, a focus that resulted from the hard lessons learned and disastrous outcomes of insufficient support given to Germany after World War I. Economic recovery in Germany, facilitated by the Marshall Plan, which had the support of the American public, greatly assisted political stabilization. In Berghahn's view, Americans currently seem unwilling to devote the necessary resources for such a comprehensive

rebuilding plan in Iraq.

Panelist Sheldon Garon discussed the Iraq occupation in the context of the US occupation of post-World War II Japan. Citing news reports that the administration plans to model the postwar Iraqi government on that of post-World War II Japan, Garon said, "The good news is that the current administration takes history seriously. The bad news is that they haven't gotten it right...and getting the history wrong may have very serious consequences." He pointed to four major flaws in the administration's analogy between present-day Iraq and 1945 Japan. First, the occupation of Japan was longer (lasting from 1945-52) than the current administration appears to anticipate staying in Iraq. Second, the occupation of Japan required enormous military manpower. Third, after the war, the Japanese government remained effective, so the US was able to govern indirectly. Fourth, Japan had a long tradition of democratization. Garon noted that the widespread looting or disintegration of civil society evidenced in Iraq was never present in post-World War II Japan. All this meant that in Japan, the US could "*revive* democratic tendencies" rather than attempt to create them from scratch. Garon concluded, while democratization and reform are not impossible in Iraq, "Iraq lacks nearly all of the preconditions [that were] present in Japan."

In contrast to Japan and Germany, panelist Jeremy Adelman addressed US interventions in Latin America as "the story of what to avoid." Although Latin America might have been the region in which success would be most likely for US interventions, given the absence of geographically close rivals to US influence, Adelman concluded that the US may actually have hindered the construction of viable sovereign states with strong civil societies in this region. Adelman explained that in Latin America, "The United States stepped in to construct, not reconstruct, sovereign states where there was a political vacuum; to create client regimes that would be more capable of ruling than the regimes that did not have access to the resources or the threat of US military occupation." US attempts to create "client states" resulted in governments that were distinguished by their limited national sovereignty, internal fracturing, and absence of civil society. If they were held together politically, it was often by an autocrat or dictator. Unable or unwilling to build democracy from the ground up, the US often supported military regimes to get rid of prior military regimes, with little concern for the legitimacy of Latin American political institutions. As a result, the US often appeared to overstay its welcome in Latin America, and when civilian governments did come into power, instability generally followed. Based upon America's track record so far in Iraq, Adelman concluded that there seem to be strong parallels between the current situation in Iraq and previous involvement in Latin America.

Panelist Charles Maier drew from the remarks of the three previous panelists to provide a comparative perspective, underscoring that the key distinction to be drawn in evaluating US occupations is between construction and reconstruction. In Germany and Japan, the US was fighting cohesive enemies in coherent nations. In contrast, the Iraqi army has been virtually eliminated, and with it, much of the previously existing power base in Iraq. Whereas the US could draw upon existing traditions of liberalism in Germany and Japan,

the lack of such a legacy in Latin America – and possibly in Iraq as well – make these cases far more difficult. Maier also cautioned, “Unless economic institutions are supported, welfare provided, and reforms enacted, political modifications will be hollow.” Maier focused on the length of occupation, noting that the commitment to training and cultural immersion that existed prior to US occupations of Germany and Japan appear to be absent in the present occupation of Iraq. He also pointed out that terrorism will be an additional challenge to US rebuilding efforts in Iraq.

Maier reflected the consensus of the panel by ending on a cautious note, stating that while it is not inconceivable that Iraq could develop into a workable pluralist regime, stabilization will be challenging.

## ***XII. Panel: The Return of Morality in International Relations: A Comparative Perspective***

Sponsor: Council on Regional Studies

Moderator: Jeffrey Herbst, Professor of Politics and International Affairs; Chair, Department of Politics, Princeton University; Director of the Council on Regional Studies

Panelists:

Ana María Bejarano, Universidad de los Andes

Miquel Nadal, Partner, Roca Junyent Lawyers and Consultants and former Deputy Foreign Minister of Spain

Robert Keely, former US Ambassador to Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and Greece

*The Return of Morality in International Relations: A Comparative Perspective* explored a number of recent developments in the inclusion of "morality" in foreign policy. While each of the three panelists took a different approach to issues, all three shared concerns about US unilateralism and were, to varying degrees, critical of moral diplomacy that could alienate the US from its partners.

Moderator Jeff Herbst emphasized that although each of the panelists had extensive regional expertise, they could not be viewed as representing the viewpoints of any particular region. "Obviously no region has one view of morality in international affairs," Herbst said. "Indeed, regions have many different views. Few countries have a monolithic view of morality in international affairs other than their belief that they're acting morally most of the time."

Panelist Miquel Nadal began with the observation that "morality or principles are at the core of any public policy, be it domestic or be it international. The major question is what

principles, and, more importantly, who defines them, who applies them, who enforces them, and who defends them." At the domestic level, the answer "is the community of citizens and institutions." Nadal urged "basically the same answer" should apply at the international level. "Principles should be set and defended by the international community, by the community of nations, and by international institutions." International institutions, Nadal argued, must "adapt to a changing reality." He recommended that the United Nations adapt its charter to include preventive attacks and eliminate bans on international involvement in domestic affairs.

Nadal conceded that "when it comes down to practice, things are not that easy to implement." In practice, he said, "it happens very often that reality is not black or white. It happens very often that it is a matter of options between grays, light gray, or darker gray. And then the question becomes much more difficult and from a moral point of view, much more arguable." As an example of such shades of gray, Nadal gave Western cooperation with Pakistan, which is "not the best example one can think of in terms of showing respect for democratic values or for respect for human rights." Outlining other difficulties with principled foreign policy, Nadal cautioned that overly moralistic discourse - such as "with us or against us" rhetoric - can tend to "polarize the position of different actors." Additionally, as was in true in the case of Germany reaction to the Iraq intervention, the "dynamics of domestic politics" can often affect foreign policy decisions, diminishing the role of principles.

Although recent transatlantic divisions over Iraq might suggest unsurpassable conflicts between the EU and the United States, in reality, Nadal suggested, members of the international community are not significantly divergent on fundamental issues. He pointed out that, in fact, for the first time since World War II, the "main actors in the international community - the United States, the EU, China, and Russia - are pushing in the same direction, in the sense that none of them has any territorial ambitions ... and they share basically the same principles, and there is a wide range for agreement between them." Nadal found evidence of this commonality in such examples as Russia's acceptance of the admission of the former Soviet Union states into NATO, China's admission into the WTO, and the rise of the EU. He used examples of institutional integration to demonstrate that conflicts of interest can be resolved, and noted a "happy coincidence" that the actors coincided with the UN Security Council permanent membership.

Nadal concluded by citing Kennedy School Dean Joseph Nye and emphasizing that as a world hegemon, the US "has a special interest and a special responsibility in the management of world affairs." US interests, he said, are better defended if it uses multilateral institutions especially in combating terrorism. Additionally, in order to gain complicity and legitimacy, the US must act with international institutions, rather than against them. According to Nadal, the main issue that the US currently faces is the need "to understand that, in the end, going multilateral means that the benefits you reap from the process outweigh the costs of depending of other countries."

Ambassador Robert Keely, former US ambassador to Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and Greece, drew from his experience to discuss the role of morality within a diplomatic setting. He began by defining diplomacy, and noted the importance of pursuing it honestly. "There is a best weapon in diplomacy, and there are lots of bad weapons," he said. "The best weapon is telling the truth. It's unbeatable."

Keely recapped the run up to the US war with Iraq, observing that "what happened in our diplomacy was that we kept changing the justification." Arguments about the terrorist threat, Iraqi possession of WMDs, violation of Security resolutions, or the brutality of Saddam's regime were all "diversions." He reminded the audience of US complacency in response to violations of Security Council resolutions by Turkey, Croatia, Sudan, and Indonesia. "We were intent on making war against Iraq from the very beginning and all of this was not telling the truth diplomatically."

Though he denounced "conspiracy theories," Keely maintained that US justifications for war on Iraq are the result of "a hijacking of our foreign policy" by a "neoconservative cabal" which suggested removing Saddam from power as far back as 1996. Kelly cited three documents that specifically advocated Saddam's removal from power. The first was written by Paul Wolfowitz in 1992 advocating war against Iraq. The second, which advocated removing Saddam from power and restoring Hashemite rule in Iraq, was a memo entitled "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm" authored in July 1996 by a group headed by Richard Perle. Keely ended by reading from the third piece, a January 1998 letter that called unequivocally and explicitly for regime change in Iraq. This letter, which emanated from the Project for a New American Century, was signed by eighteen persons - including eight who currently hold senior positions in the Bush administration.

Panelist Ana María Berejano began her remarks by questioning the title of the colloquium, recalling that when she heard that it was focused on the "return of morality in international relations, [her] first question was: 'what return?'" Although she acknowledged US rhetoric has become more moralistic since September 11, Berejano said that "for the most part," the shift is not seen by Latin Americans as a return, "but rather a continuation of what has been a routine of the US wrapping up in moral discourse a series of policies which are not only dictated by strategic and/or economic interests but that at times have also clearly contradicted the very moral principles and values that they purport to uphold."

Berejano reminded the audience that "for most of Latin America the memory of a time of war accompanied by a resounding moral discourse does not seem so distant, neither in space, nor in time."

Entitling her remarks "Latin America US Relations, Moral Divergence and Convergence," Berejano explored three central themes of the last decade: the promotion of democracy, rule of law and human rights; free market economics, and the war on drugs. In regard to the promotion of democracy, rule of law and human rights, she posited

that there has been "increasing moral convergence" between Latin America and the US due to the US behaving "more consistently in this area, resorting less to covert actions, and behaving more openly" and cooperating with Latin American governments. Berejano also credited Latin America's "ambitious process of transition to democracy."

On the second theme, the promotion of free market economies, Berejano noted the transformation of the economies of Latin America from the state matrix to the unfettered workings of markets. This is an issue, she said, in which there is increasing contention between the views of the US and those of most Latin Americans, who judge "economic freedom" by its results - unemployment, poverty, inequality, and a shrinking public sector unable to compensate with adequate social policies. Although the United States sees its democracy building and free market economy promotion policies as compatible, Bejano said that "free market democracy" in Latin America has become an oxymoron. The failure of US regional policies has led them to be "increasingly seen among Latin American public, if not necessarily but by all the region's governments, as evil."

On the third theme, the "so-called war on drugs," Berejano explained that there has been "some convergence at least in the short term" between the US and Latin America on moral and strategic interests. However, Latin American public opinion is not against only the drug trade but also the strategy the US has used which strips Latin American governments of their autonomy to design their own policies. Forced eradication, the increased role of militaries in these conflicts and other elements of the anti-drug policy have undermined democratization efforts. In this instance, Berejano concluded, the lens of morality has hindered policy progress, as "the shared moral reading of the problem of drugs has not only locked the parties in a black and white, good versus evil, way of looking at [the problem], but it has also precluded the consideration of policy alternatives that may turn out to be not only more effective but also less harmful." Adding to this policy impasse, she continued, is the link between terrorism and drugs, which gives a clear rationale for pursuing the drug problem through military means.

According to Berejano, Latin America has fallen to the bottom of the US foreign policy concerns. The exception, she noted, is Colombia, which harbors three terrorist organizations. The Colombia case is more complicated. Although there is an elected president who cooperates with the US and no weapons of mass destruction, Berejano anticipates that the country is likely to "become the test case for the US war against the evil marriage of drugs and terrorism in its own Latin American backyard."

### ***XIII. Panel: Historical Roots of American Moralism: Slavery, Foreign Policy, and the Search for Redemption***

Sponsors: Program in American Studies & Program for the Study of Religion

Moderator: Sean Wilentz, Dayton-Stockton Professor of History; Director of the Program in American Studies, Department of History, Princeton University

Panelists:

Paul Miles, Professor of History, Princeton University

James Moorhead, Princeton Theological Seminary

The panel *Historical Roots of American Moralism: Slavery, Foreign Policy, and the Search for Redemption* examined the role of moralism in America's domestic and foreign political traditions.

Moderator Sean Wilentz, in his opening remarks, acknowledged that moralism "is an endless topic that touches all parts of the American experience." Wilentz examined the type and magnitude of the influences that American religious and secular moral traditions have exerted on political discourse and decision-making in our nation's history. He identified the power moral arguments can bring to bear on the political process as well as the hindrances they may create, concluding with the insight "one person's book of virtues might very well be another person's book of hypocrisies."

Panelist James Moorhead focused primarily on the role of religious morality in the abolition movement. He explained how religion was a catalyst for nearly two centuries of anti-slavery sentiment and political action. Moorhead described the socially and politically divisive process by which Americans, especially Northern Protestants, overcame a moral apathy toward slavery that had been long-seated in the western tradition. "In 1688, several members of the Society of Friends or Quakers in Germantown, Pennsylvania, just outside Philadelphia, made one of the first recorded protests in North America against the system of slavery. They based much of their argument on the Golden Rule, and they also asserted that there existed no more justification for the enslavement of Africans than for the perpetual bondage of white people." This event began a series of moral arguments, both Enlightenment-secularist and biblically-based, against the continuation and extension of slavery in the late 17th century.

Moorhead contrasted the effectiveness of moderate, gradualist anti-slavery sentiment with the rigid Abolitionism of William Lloyd Garrison in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, concluding that the powerful moralism of the anti-slavery movement was at times counterproductive in the political arena. "Abolitionism was in many ways one of the most morally admirable protest movements, and yet there was, within many branches of it, a lack of a willingness to compromise in a practical political way that could ultimately promote not success but failure." Moorhead closed with an example to underline his argument: "In 1844, in the Presidential Election, one of the most catastrophic events I believe in American history occurred. And that is James K. Polk was elected President of the



United States. He was not only a nonentity, he was a dangerous nonentity who got us into war with Mexico and provoked many of the later sectional crises. His opponent, Henry Clay, was opposed to getting involved in this adventure. Clay lost narrowly. And one of the reasons he lost is that the abolitionist liberty party took away enough votes in New York State to deliver it to Polk."

Moorhead summed up his talk by explaining that "moral argument is sometimes essential but always dangerous," noting the strong tendency of moralism to polarize political systems and make them more prone to militancy.

Panelist Paul Miles began his remarks describing the difficulty of working with the term "moral" in foreign affairs. "What do we mean by the term moral argument?" Miles asked. "In the grand sweep of the United States foreign relations it is an argument that seems to have employed every sense of the adjective moral. That is relating to principles of right and wrong or confirming to a standard of right behavior or sanctioned by one's conscience or ethical judgment."

Miles described the historical influence of American morality and a sense of American exceptionalism on our nation's most important foreign policy decisions -- choices to go to war. He selected three wars that, like the recent confrontation in Iraq, were wars of choice: the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, and World War I. Recounting the dilemmas that James Madison, William McKinley, and Woodrow Wilson faced in their decisions to go war against England, Spain and the Central Powers respectively, Miles drew out the importance of the dichotomy of American material interests and American morality in understanding the United States' decisions to enter three controversial wars.

First, Miles reminded the audience of the moral strain in American politics characterized by Daniel Webster, who insisted that America only fight wars to "serve justice as clear as heaven." Yet Webster also acknowledged the existence of a powerful American claim to moral exceptionalism that entailed the right to use force for American interests. Next Miles recalled that President Woodrow Wilson -- most remembered for his dreams of a liberal peace -- did not hesitate to use force on America's behalf. Miles cited Wilson's wartime claim: "It is fearful to lead a peaceful people into war, but right is more precious than peace."

According to Miles, the foreign policy rhetoric of a number of American presidents -such as Wilson and McKinley - elevated moral principles above material self-interest in justifying American actions, even when material concerns weighed heavily on American policymakers. Nonetheless, there is not necessarily a contradiction between adherence to moral principles and promotion of self-interest in American foreign policy. Today both morality and pragmatism continue to factor heavily in international decisions.

Wilentz and the panelists pieced together several broader conclusions, showing connections between the two cases presented -- abolitionism in domestic policy and decisions to go to war in foreign policy. The panel members agreed that excessive

moralism -- or a belief in moral exceptionalism -- can prove dangerous in both domestic and international politics, due to the inability to compromise and the tendency to arouse anger and suspicion among rival viewpoints.

In response to a question for the audience, Wilentz noted his concern that the moralism espoused by elements of America's current government may lack adequate "checks and balances" elsewhere in government. But he added that the presence of firm moral voices in American politics is essential to bringing the proper political and social energy to issues that demand attention and action. The three panelists noted that moral argument has been most effective in American political discourse when it is not excessively rigid or hostile to opposing viewpoints. He cited the Civil Rights Act as an example to a peaceful, constructive response to a powerful moral campaign.

The panel highlighted the fact that the depiction of political issues as moral issues has served historically to energize social reforms as well as expedite international involvement. Moralism, however, carries the risk of giving rise to rigid or dogmatic policies. It should thus be at least partially constrained in the political realm by a system of checks and balances. Moralism has been most successful at securing political outcomes when tempered by pragmatic concerns. Uncompromising moralism has historically proven unsuccessful. Wilentz, summed up the consensus, "Where morality is strongest, blind spots of hubris, pride, wait to turn it out."

#### **XIV. Lecture: *The Rights and Wrongs of Globalization***

**Sponsors:** Center for Health and Well Being & The Research Program on Development Studies

**Lecturer:** Dani Rodrik, Professor of International Political Economy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Speaker Dani Rodrick's central message was that rather than arguing about the "good" and the "bad" of globalization, people should realize that "globalization actually is something that we design." It is time to redirect our approach to globalization. People either love globalization or hate it. According to Rodrick, "The real debate...really should be about the individual rules, both at the national level, and at the international level, that we're coming up with." These rules, which are being "actively made up as we go along," govern national and international economies and the process of globalization.

An assessment of the impact of globalization on economic development depends on the region of the world. Asian economies, particularly China, Vietnam, and India, have benefited tremendously from globalization, witnessing increases in exports, foreign investment, and international economic integration. Latin America, on the other hand,

has mostly seen disappointing economic performance as well as unsatisfactory distributive outcomes. According to Rodrick, “it’s very difficult to identify a single country in Latin America that is doing better in the 1990s than it was prior to 1980” -- despite the fact that the countries of Latin America have tried “harder to integrate deeply with the world economy than China, or India, or Vietnam have, across a much broader spectrum of policy areas.”

Another paradox between integration efforts and actual performance is that of international economic governance. Rodrick observed that efforts to open up economies and create global structures, as has been achieved with financial markets, have produced tremendous integration yet poor results. He observed that “the net resource transfers that financial market integration has been able to achieve ... have ... also been quite disappointing.” In contrast, countries have done very little work to integrate labor markets, but “the gains would be huge” with the smallest multilateral attempts to ease restraints on international labor mobility. Rodrick recommended “relatively marginal relaxation in the existing restrictions on international labor mobility...some kind of a temporary work visa scheme that would add only a couple of percentage points to the existing labor force in the advanced industrial countries.”

Rodrick flagged another mismatch in national economic policymaking between the conventional wisdom regarding the “right policy framework” for economic growth and the reality of growth and development around the world. Evaluating the growth record of countries in the last decades and the type of reforms in these countries, Rodrick argued that an extremely low correlation exists between high performance and adherence to “the Washington consensus.” He cited the example of Latin America, which saw higher growth rates prior to the 1980s than in the 1990s. Yet, the pre-1980 policies guided by principles of import substitution, inward orientation, and populism are now widely derided. The disappointing results of the 1990s, on the other hand, followed lauded structural reforms based on the Washington consensus.

Rodrick noted that China, which has achieved increasingly liberalized market mechanisms, veered greatly from the type of policies that any economist trained in the United States would recommend. Rather than engaging in “wholesale institutional remaking of the economy,” China liberalized at the margins and created a two-track reform structure in which a market system operated on top of a pre-existing state-ordered system. The country achieved phenomenal growth, in consequence, but without the damaging side effects in redistribution that come with pure market orientation.

The example of China “opens our minds to the multiplicity of ways in which high-order principles of good, sound economic reasoning can actually be implemented, in ways that are much more sensitive to existing institutional constraints as well as existing institutional opportunities.” Rodrick identified “where we have gone wrong” as taking “higher order economic principles and attach[ing] to them very specific institutional guidelines.” Instead we should recognize that a variety of reforms and regimes can lead

to the same high-order principles instead of insisting that countries adopt particular operational structures.

Rodrick outlined four lessons revealed in a cross-country, historical review of successful reforms in the last few decades. First, a range of small reforms, not a holistic economic restructuring, is what affects growth in the early stages. This is “good news” in that economic growth is consequently not as difficult to start as perceived. Second, policy changes were typically a combination of orthodox and heterodox elements, as demonstrated in China as well as other countries in East Asia, Brazil, and Chile. Third, economic innovations that worked in one country do not necessarily succeed in other countries. This discouraging observation “needs to make us much less ambitious in terms of the role of the outside advisor, of the World Bank or of the economist from Cambridge, MA or Princeton, NJ.” Fourth, “sustaining economic growth is much more difficult than initiating it.” Most growth transitions “fizzled out” because of an absence of solid institutional underpinnings, able to withstand and adapt to external shocks.

Rodrick concluded with a reiteration of his initial message that “globalization is not this synthetic, fully technologically driven process; that it does make a difference what kind of rules we choose.”

#### **XV. Roundtable: *The Bush Presidency As Viewed by Washington Correspondents***

Sponsor: Program in Leadership Studies

Moderator: Fred Greenstein, Professor of Politics, Emeritus; Chair, Program in Leadership Studies

Panelists:

Dan Balz, National Political Correspondent, *Washington Post*

Carl Cannon, White House Correspondent, *National Journal*

Jeanne Cummings, Staff Reporter, *Wall Street Journal*

Mike McCurry, Partner, Public Strategies Washington, Inc.; Press Secretary to President Bill Clinton (1995-1998)

Todd Purdum, *New York Times*

This concurrent roundtable, part of a conference organized by Princeton Professor of Politics Emeritus, Fred Greenstein, conducted a preliminary assessment of the Bush presidency. Dovetailing with the Colloquium, a panel of White House correspondents

and President Clinton's press secretary, Mike McCurry, shared in intellectual inquiry and anecdotal revelation. The roundtable discussion attempted to come to terms with the broad question of whether September 11 fundamentally changed the Bush presidency and George W. Bush himself, and if so, how.

Although conversation was not primarily focused on the topic of morality, the panel lent insights into the workings of the Bush administration and its approach to media and policy decision-making. Overall, panelists characterized President Bush as having matured as a politician and as running a disciplined administration. While sharing frustrations about getting information from the Bush White House, the panelists expressed a common appreciation of Bush's linguistic abilities - and blunders.

Panelist Dan Balz described with wit that the panel intended to provide an insider's perspective, the "view from the cockroaches in the briefing room." Noting that "everybody who has ever interviewed George Bush has often come away with a feeling of frustration," he provided an overview of the Bush presidency based on his observations and several interviews over the past decade. Balz shared highlights of an interview he conducted in 1994, following a debate between gubernatorial candidate George Bush and incumbent governor Ann Richards of Texas. Bush was perceived to have narrowly survived the debate and, when asked by Balz whether he wanted to have another debate with Richards, Bush responded "absolutely not." Balz said that "It told me that Bush had a clear understanding as a political figure of his own strengths and his own weaknesses... He survived that moment in the campaign but he wanted to concentrate on the things that he could do best."

Interviewing Bush again several years later as a presidential candidate, Balz sounded out Bush's position on a variety of policy issues. Bush was reticent and it was apparent that "he, unlike Clinton, never wanted to grapple with all the nuances, the details, the ins and outs of policy, in part...because he did not want to reveal what he didn't know to people who might judge him harshly." A year later, when Balz returned to interview President Bush on the eve of his inauguration, Bush remembered their encounter the year before and looked at Balz "very intently, not with a real sense of hostility but certainly to deliver a message and said 'you were testing me.'" Balz perceived Bush to have become "completely open, completely undefensive, and very aware of everything that was going on and how he had seen it". He had developed a mature sense of political intuition or "smarts" and gained the confidence to "operate as a political figure."

In late September 2001, Balz and Bob Woodward interviewed Bush to discuss the effects of September 11 on his presidency. Balz found the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> Bush to be "entirely confident, not simply about the political understanding of what he was doing but also the policy." In contrast to "some of the domestic policies which Bush had to study as if a student at Yale or as an adult having to master a new subject... post-September 11<sup>th</sup> strategy was something that was in his mind wholly, a creed for himself. There wasn't anybody in the world who knew this subject better than George W. Bush." Balz observed that Bush actively thought about "how a leader should lead" rather than micro-

manage the details. Concluding that, after September 11, “the Bush we’re seeing is in many ways the same Bush who has always been there, but a Bush who is both more mature as a political figure and probably more confident,” Balz still wondered whether “this style of leadership that he has put forward as a war time leader will translate into being also a domestic President.”

Panelist Carl Cannon focused on Bush’s rhetorical style, proposing that the difference between Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bush might just be the “accent,” since the content of Bush’s remarks, when scripted, is not insubstantial. Bush expresses himself with a “simple eloquence” to which “the American people have started to respond.” Consequently, members of the media and academia are now beginning to take him seriously. Cannon proceeded to paint a portrait of the two Bushes that co-existed prior to September 11. One expressed himself with “uncommon eloquence,” the product of excellent speechwriters. The other Bush, unscripted, spoke in sometimes muddled and incomprehensible phrases, of which Cannon provided several humorous examples. According to Cannon, by September 11, “this dichotomy had never really gone away” and it was “on that morning that it was important that these two Bushes move at least a little bit toward each other.” Cannon emphasized that “the country needed that and that was Bush’s challenge in the weeks that followed.”

Panelist Jeanne Cummings focused on how Bush runs the White House and the difficult relationship between the media and the press office. She characterized Bush as an “extraordinarily strong and shrewd manager... disciplined and message-oriented.” If his “foreign policy stars,” Rumsfeld and Powell, are bickering, this aids Bush by elevating him and diminishing them. Although “it’s confusing to our allies, unsettling to Americans... ultimately it puts him in a position of being the manager, the man in charge.” Similarly, Bush sought executives or good managers to run his domestic cabinet. Cummings noted that while they are “an experienced group of people, they are not stars. Working groups are organized in secrecy, run by a core group that is very close to the White House. While they have control, they neglect to consult more closely with the Hill. Cummings noted how that Bush team views “Capitol Hill almost like they do the world now – they’re going to build a coalition of the willing every time that they have a piece of legislation.” The downside is that you cannot effectively form a coalition for every piece of legislation the White House seeks. “Right now, like Turkey, there are some members that they expect to be in the coalition of the willing that just aren’t willing to show up.”

Cummings noted another challenge that Bush’s style presents for the White House. Bush “doesn’t tend to do the little things,” such as hosting social events at the White House. He is “lofty” and somewhat isolated and there is “no interaction with the everyday people.” Unlike President Clinton who’d go on foreign trips and “head right out into the streets ...and - as his Secret Service went crazy – dive into the middle of these crowds,” Bush prefers to limit his interactions to top-level officials. To illustrate a “rare error” made by the tightly disciplined White House, Cummings described how the tax bill sent to Congress was effectively dead for 48 hours before the White House switched gears and began discussing alternatives. Cummings also described how it took about a year to get

used to the White House style in that they “actually say what they mean in the simplest terms.”

Panelist Todd Purdum seconded Cummings’ remarks about how difficult it was to get information from the Bush White House, observing “it’s very hard to get anyone to talk in private, to give you a behind the scenes story about how a decision came to be, about why, who won, who lost, what the motives were.” Purdam noted that the “exception is foreign policy, which does play itself out in public apparently because the President is at some level willing to tolerate that disagreement in helping formulate his policy.” Purdam characterized the press office liaisons as reclusive and tight-lipped and “quite willing, at a brass tacks level, to threaten reporters with lack of access in a very overt way that I can hardly ever remember happening in the Clinton Administration.”

Purdum also defended the criticism of the media as not being sufficiently aggressive in challenging the White House. It is difficult to get Bush to expound on an issue -- unlike Clinton, with whom the problem “was to get him to stop expounding on any one of a number of topics. It’s not because he’s not articulate and it’s not because he doesn’t have a deep belief about it, but he repeats with theological consistency the same irreducible arguments... and no matter how many times you might wish to engage him in an expansive policy discussion,” he won’t do it. Furthermore, the media takes its lead from the public – “when a President is popular and riding high and the President’s storyline is fundamentally one of success, it’s very difficult to create a counter narrative to that storyline.”

Panelist Mike McCurry began with the observation that “the role of the press secretary is to be a piñata for the White House press corps and to stand there and let them whack long enough until something interesting finally spills out.” However, unlike the Clinton White House operation, “nothing interesting ever spills out of the [Bush] team”

McCurry outlined a number of reasons why the media has treated Bush more gently than Clinton. First, “September 11 restored the importance of the presidency in terms of America’s leadership in the world and how we confront that dangerous world.” The press, “whether or not they openly acknowledge it, have through their coverage of President Bush, recognized that diminishing or tarnishing a President might in fact be a dangerous thing...” Second, although the basic organizational structure of the White House has not changed much since the 1970s, the Republicans tend to be more realistic and adept in working with the media. According to McCurry, “the built-in discipline of what it takes to communicate effectively... gives a Republican media operation at a White House a natural advantage when it comes to message discipline...” The third reason McCurry claimed was that “the press, in their heart of hearts, sort of like George Bush and... never really liked Bill and Hillary Clinton that much.” Bush does not “coddle” the media but is instead very parsimonious about how much information is shared. He has proven very effective, in part because he’s had a “victory of overcoming low expectations” in contrast to Clinton who was never able to achieve the promise of high expectations.

**XVI. Closing Conversation: *The Return to Morality in Foreign Affairs: A Closing Conversation in Honor of Richard Ullman***

Sponsor: The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Moderator: Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University

Panelists:

Richard Ullman, David K. E. Bruce Professor of International Affairs, Emeritus, Princeton University

Katherine Marshall, Director, Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics, Counselor to the President of The World Bank

Leslie Gelb, President, Council on Foreign Relations

Morton Halperin, Director of the Open Society Institute's Washington, DC, Office and the Open Society Policy Center; Director, Center for Democracy and Free Markets; Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

Jan M. Lodal, Chairman, Lodal and Company; former Principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy and Deputy for Program Analysis at the National Security Council

Roger Wilkins, Clarence J. Robinson Professor of History and American Culture, George Mason University

This final panel *The Return to Morality in Foreign Affairs: A Closing Conversation in Honor of Richard Ullman* took the form of a facilitated discussion, allowing the six participants to engage each other and the moderator, Anne-Marie Slaughter, in a free-flowing conversation on major Colloquium themes.

Slaughter began by praising Professor Richard Ullman for his contributions to the field of international relations. "If there were a foreign policy school of common sense liberalism, its father would be Richard Ullman."



Pulling together conceptual highlights from the previous two days, Slaughter quoted from Leslie Gelb's recent *Foreign Affairs* article, which contended that a "new era" had begun in morality and foreign policy, marked by increased attention to human rights and international law. Slaughter initiated discussion by asking whether this was indeed a new era, or an "endless circle from Woodrow Wilson through Franklin Roosevelt and back to today?"

Panelist Mort Halperin responded that there is a "greater intensity and respectability" for human rights and democracy now, but felt that it was "matter of degree...rather than something fundamentally new."

Leslie Gelb posited that while international lawyers have been concerned about human rights for hundreds of years, the issues "weren't discussed much by people with power. They were discussed by people in academia." According to Gelb, it was not until the Carter/Ford presidential campaign, and Jimmy Carter's attack on Henry Kissinger's failure to tend to human rights issues, that "the morality of foreign policy start(ed) entering into active political combat." By the end of the Reagan administration, "human rights was part of the foreign policy agenda." The "next jump" was the adoption of democracy as a major American political goal. Now, although morality "generally doesn't prevail...it can't be ignored and is part of the mix, a huge step forward historically."

Roger Wilkins argued that there had been more historical precedent than Gelb conceded, citing the Declaration of Independence as an international appeal to the "decent opinion of mankind." Wilkins also considered the Gettysburg Address through a foreign policy lens, pointing out that "because [Lincoln] made the Civil War a war for human rights, he made it impossible for the English to come in on the side of the Confederates." Finally, Wilkins noted a historical tendency of the United States to use the "white man's burden" as moral justification for intervention (he cited President McKinley's annexation of the Philippines as one example), concluding that "the American impulse to justify our foreign policy adventures in moral terms is long, rich, and deep."

Gelb countered, disagreeing with Wilkins' analysis, and arguing that the Declaration of Independence and Gettysburg address were not foreign policy statements. Gelb reiterated his belief that "we do learn, we do change," and compared recent international perceptions of genocide to those during the Holocaust to emphasize his point.

Richard Ullman and Halperin discussed the impact of the Cold War on foreign policy. Ullman raised the issue of the "twofold shadow" – military and ideological – enduring from the Cold War. "We have this capability but we don't have an enemy and when one is buying military forces, when one is trying to explain a policy that depends upon them, it's convenient to have an external foe to serve as a reference point." Ullman warned against allowing Islam to replace Communism "in that spectrum of causes." Halperin described the moral imperative of fighting evil during the Cold War. "We did not seek to promote democracy because we thought that there was a higher moral

imperative - not morality but a different kind of moral imperative - which led us to having to fight that evil, the same morality that led us to align ourselves with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany.”

Discussing the relationship between morality and democracy, Halperin rejected “the notion that there are some countries that are not ready for democracy” and lamented the gap between rhetoric and policy by US and international financial institutions in not promoting democracy more strongly. When Slaughter challenged him with the idea that democracy promotion might result in theocratic states in a country such as Iraq, Halperin maintained that the separation of church and state is a “particularly American view,” and that the right relationship can be found between religion and the rights of individuals. Gelb added that the push for democratization a decade ago was “premature” and that while it was “very important” to promote the processes of democracy, we should focus less on elections and more on rule of law and freedom of the press.

Panelist Katherine Marshall outlined three moral problems: the billions of people who live in abject poverty; the disparity of wealth among nations, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Marshall discussed the idea “greed line” in addition to a poverty line, and noted the difficulty of the “equation of 30 million people infected in Africa and the maximum 50,000 people with access to antiretroviral therapy.” Ullman pointed out the improbability that the US will find the moral power to take action in Africa, India, or China when health care progress within the country for HIV/AIDS is already lagging. Slaughter emphasized the difficulty in finding moral clarity because of the lack of a direct cause. Halperin, Ullman, and Slaughter concurred that, in future years, leaders are likely to look back and wonder how they missed the pandemic, both within and outside the country.

Panelist Jan Lodal responded to Slaughter’s final question on the morality of a doctrine of pre-emption and threat of use of force, noting that the United States has always accepted the first use of force as moral. He cited imminent attack and genocide as cases where it is seen as not only correct, but imperative, to preempt. Lodal admitted that issues then arise as to the extent of human rights abuses or the degree of threat that warrants preemption. He emphasized the new challenges that biological weapons and new technology pose and the difficulty of adapting the moral framework of just war to meet those challenges.

Halperin added that a policy of preemption, while not “immoral per se,” is “extraordinarily dangerous” and undermines the universal norms that the US must, for its own security, continue to strengthen. Halperin stressed the importance of maintaining “articulated rules that we are willing to apply to ourselves and to everyone else in the same way.”

During the question and answer period, debate developed about the continued utility of the United Nations in confronting current challenges. From the audience, Michael Doyle, UN Assistant Secretary-General, observed that the two enduring purposes of the UN are to create a forum for dialogue and allow for collective legitimization. He added that while

“there are embodied in the UN a series of ideals that would lead us to believe that someday it might be the institutional vehicle of a zone of peace, in the meantime the UN was designed to deal with normal states.” Panelist Gelb provoked with the comment that the United Nations is “a building on 43<sup>rd</sup> Street, populated by a lot of international bureaucrats...that houses major power politics.” Deadlocks in the UN are thus merely an extension of dissent among major powers. Panelist Halperin disagreed “profoundly,” pointing out that the “first Bush administration recognized that the UN was something more than a building [and] that the UN Security Council, when the major powers could cooperate, actually was a body that could make rules which were binding. “

Brady Kiesling raised another question from the audience on the role of morality in the allocation of foreign policy resources, particularly in defense spending. In response, Panelist Lodal minimized the significance of the defense budget and advocated broader fiscal policy changes, stating that “maybe there’s 100 billion a year to be played with here, that’s a lot of money but it’s a lot less than the tax cut.” Panelist Marshall disagreed, observing that from the perspective of the development agenda, allocation is extremely significant, particularly when one deals with the “comparison between an aircraft carrier and education costs.”

As panelists wrapped up their thoughts, discussion turned primarily to recent foreign policy decisions. Gelb expressed hope we would not return to “that great era of self-restraint where there was no concern about morality.” He felt that interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Somalia would probably not have occurred twenty or thirty years ago when morality was largely ignored. Gelb also emphasized the role of morality in the decision-making of the Bush administration, stating that, while one might not agree with the conclusions they reached, “a number of the people who have made the decision to go into Iraq did so, not on fake moral grounds, but on real moral grounds.”

Halperin countered, pointing out that the problem with the Bush administration was that there was not enough restraint, and that “the action is directed in the wrong ways and based on the wrong principles. I think that humility and an understanding that problems are inherently difficult and uncertain is lacking.” Wilkins added that although the United States is attempting to promote democracy in the Middle East, “we didn’t have a good, robust, democratic debate in this country about going to the war.”

In closing Ullman remarked, “We haven’t really come to terms with what we mean by morality in international affairs. That’s perhaps to be expected. There would be a multitude of definitions among the members of this table.” Although there was divergent opinion on a number of points, there was a general consensus on the importance of the issue, and the need for further dialogue. As Slaughter concluded, “what I hope all of you take away from this colloquium are more questions than answers and a sense of determination to engage yourself in those questions and to continue in a collective national debate.”