Politics matters because it deals with:
1. Public v. private interests
2. Efficiency v. distribution
3. Processes
4. Institutions
5. Rules
6. Leadership
7. Coalition building
8. Bargaining

Good Policy:
- Frame the problem, set a goal, choose a policy to maximize costs and benefits

Good Politics:
- Identify actors and their interests, build coalitions, and exploit rules.

Good Practice:
- Incentives, persuasion, culture and procedures.

Elements of Political Analyses for Public Policy –
A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING!

Institutions:
- Rules of the game, framework for political incentives.

Interests:
- Economic situation (are they workers, consumers, managers, investors) and ideology.

Ideology:
- Beliefs, religion, range across very different issues, not always independent of interests.

Information:
- Shapes policy environment, and key part of political strategies.


Memory Jog: We used the NYC recycling program: the plan was to cut the program unless it could be supported on basis of economic as well as environmental benefits. Lay out the politics and the interaction between the political and policy dimensions. Key groups of supporters and opposition.

Week 2: Ethics and Public Policy

Dawn Yamane Hewett

Why are ethics important in policy making?
- Whoever assumes ethical high ground has upper hand in policy debates.
- Policy outcomes based on utilitarian arguments argue a greater good for greater number of people, i.e. a Pareto improvement is invalidated assuming a rights-based approach to policy outcomes

Bottom Line: She who makes the ethical rules is right

Rights-based versus utilitarian approach?
- Right-based => all humans are ends in and of themselves, cannot compare outcomes between rights of individuals, and individual projects/approaches matter. (Ex. – Americans with Disabilities Act)
• Treat individuals as ends rather than means.
• Often cannot and should not compare outcomes.
• Individual projects matter. Aggregate outcomes may not be important.

Favored by small groups within a society, minority groups; tend to build coalitions of small or minority groups to bolster claims

Problems:
1) Where do rights come from?
2) Are rights judgments arbitrary? Different perspectives on what is right
3) Can rights based approaches deal w/ outcomes?
4) No degree of importance on what rights are more important than others or how to assess outcomes when one right is privileged over another
5) Focus on individual problems rather than collective problems

Utilitarianism => Greatest good for greatest number
• Values individuals equally
• Logic of cost-benefit analysis
• Morality consists of rising above normal claims of rights

Favored by large groups, majorities; accused of being a-ethical (not unethical); may adopt rights strategies to overcome these objections

Problems:
1) May not be able to calculate utility meaningfully – difficult to calculate both greatest good and greatest number (can create moral problems in and of itself)
2) Can impose costs on already disadvantaged groups.
3) Can lead to unacceptable outcomes (ex. torture)

Resolving conflicts between utility and rights: Compensation
• Compensation – project is efficient and desirable if the losers could be compensated and there are some residual gains

Alternative ways to resolve conflicts
• Blur the issue
• Blur the framework

Lessons:
1) Utilitarianism is way of resolving collective choice problem that is favored by diffuse majority. Rights-based favored by smaller groups whose preferences may be blocked by numbers based approach
2) Utilitarianism avoids moral/ethical implications of cost-based approach. Can one be created within utilitarianism?
3) Resolving conflicts centers around compensation, i.e. project is efficient and desirable if losers are compensated and there are residual gains. But some individual beliefs do not fit into the market system.
4) If winners and losers are not clearly identified and willing to conform to system, trouble arises
5) Important to remember that whatever framework is adopted induces moral high ground.
6) Coming to a consensus necessarily involves a deliberative process. The deliberative process is equally important to the outcome, because the losers have to be convinced. Deliberation more likely to lead to compromise.

Week 3: Leadership

Why do we study leadership?
1) To explain policy outcomes (success or failure in leadership is a key variable in explaining outcomes).
2) In order to lead better.

What explains success and failure in leadership?

1) Context (the situation in which the leader acts)
   • Are there competing leaders advancing alternative claims?
   • What are the historical circumstances (e.g. 9/11, a time of war, etc.)?
- What are the characteristics of the constituency? What is the leader’s relationship with them? Because constituents may hold a leader accountable at the polls, their receptiveness matters. The more extreme your position, the more you need to engage in coalition-building.

2) Character (innate style and characteristics – e.g. charisma, personality, etc.)

3) Skills (these, as opposed to character, can be learned)

- **Understanding your situation.** Leaders will often face the classic principal agent problem, whereby she must rely on others to implement policy for her.
  - Potential Problems
    1. The agents have divergent preferences (do not want to strive towards the goals the leader advocates because of 1) ideological differences, 2) laziness/self interest, or 3) miscommunication).
    2. The agents are not fully competent.
    3. It is difficult to monitor the agents.
  - Potential Solutions
    1. Selecting agents carefully.
    2. Monitoring carefully (e.g. creating a board to do so)
    3. Making sure communication is clear.

- **Managing people effectively.**
  - Define your mission, link activities and processes to that mission, and measure the performance. This improves your ability to get from point A → B.

- **Understanding how people make decisions, and motivating them.**
  - i. Coercion.
  - ii. Making them believe that what you what is morally and ethically “right”.
  - iii. Make them feel as though you value them and their contribution.
  - iv. Reciprocity.

**Two types of leaders:**

1) Some have a “good vision.”
2) Others can translate someone else’s good vision into reality.

**The thoughts David Lewis left us with “at the end of the day”:**

1) Leadership is necessary to create good policy.
2) We often have trouble disengaging leadership from the policy ends for which it is used (e.g. we don’t like to think of Hitler as being an effective leader because we oppose that which he was leading people to do).
3) Part of leadership is knowing your own skills and limits, and choosing people to pick up your slack (i.e. Dubya).
WEEK 4: States and Markets

Markets v. Government: Which is more effective at determining the allocation, use and distribution of resources – markets or government? We usually compromise between the imperfect market and the imperfect government. How do we make this choice? Theory of “non-market failure” helps compare.

Pros of government intervention (Galbraith):
• Government able to identify and remedy market failures
• Negative externalities and public goods may require government intervention
• Example: Japanese government successfully intervened to guide and target gov’t policy

Pros of market forces (Friedman, Adam Smith):
• Idealized perfectly competitive market → full employment and efficient use of resources
• Large gov’t agencies often mismanage tasks and resources → inefficient
• Example: Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) used to illustrate success of markets

Public policy intervention (government) often justified because of market failures along two lines: efficiency and distributional equity. Types of market failure include externalities (pollution, education), public goods (national security), monopolies (produce less than efficiency quantity because of increasing returns to scale), imperfect competition (information asymmetry) and distributional equity (market produces less-than-efficient income distribution).

Why are non-market (govt) interventions often problematic? Demand for non-market solutions (i.e. govt intervention) is distorted: public interest groups, system of political rewards and de-coupling of benefits and burdens (few who benefit lobby hard, while many who will pay marginally don’t organize). Supply of non-market solutions is also distorted: no competition (one provider = govt); difficult to define/measure outputs; no bottom-line (profit statement) nor termination mechanism to cut unsuccessful programs.

We neglect implementation problems, but can mitigate non-market failure if we anticipate it.

Both markets and governments are prone to shortcomings and failures, so how do we compare?
• Efficient use of resources requires that firms set price = marginal cost BUT most firms don’t
• How then can the market system still be more efficient than non-market systems?
• Non-pricing efficiencies (such as technological efficiency) enhance market performance
• Non-market inefficiencies (such as increasing production costs) outweigh market inefficiency
• Differences in monitoring/enforcement also help explain non-pricing efficiencies and non-market inefficiencies: with markets, there are competitive producers and customers help control performance; consumer oversight is spotty with government and no competition
• Can also evaluate market/non-market alternatives based on degree of participation and accountability ---> inconclusive about whether market/govt is better with these criteria

Conclusion: “Rather than being a pure choice between markets or governments, it is usually a choice between different combinations of the two.” Even a market-based economy should have government control pure public goods (defense/national security) and even a non-market economy will benefit by incorporating some market forces (school vouchers in public schools). Wolf argues that markets perform better than non-market systems in short-term efficiency and long-term growth and that non-market failure outweighs market failure. Opponents argue that non-market systems manage social equity, participation and accountability better, but extreme forms of non-market systems (i.e. USSR) failed here, too.

Lecture notes: Perfectly competitive markets should be efficient, but they are often less than ideal because of externalities, increasing returns, barriers to entry, monopolies, asymmetric information, public goods and other coordination failures. Market allocation also results in significant inequalities of income and well-being. The state can intervene to “perfect” markets and reach efficient allocations: provide public goods (e.g. security); solve coordination problems (e.g. property rights); get prices right (tax to internalize externality); regulatory intervention (e.g. antitrust policy). State also helps redistribute, but problems with implementation: free riding; no performance or price mechanisms; redistribution tilted towards politically influential groups.
WEEK 5: State Capacity and Reform

What is the State? Set of institutions, backed up by means to enforce rule.

Why is State Capacity Important? Without states we have no economic reform. Weak states don’t provide public goods, implement policy or perform fairly or effectively. Strong states invite political pluralism.

What should states do? A) Provide public goods not provided by market b) Establish framework that market operations, ie (enforce contracts and promote economic growth). C) Maintain political order and govern D)

What can states do? Make and implement policy. States need compliance and consent from society.

What should states need to do to affect serious economic and political reform? Build Institutional, Technical (establish and manage macroeconomic policies) Administrative (ability to provide basic services, investments in human resources, gather inputs for decision making) Political state capacities (channels by which society can demand reform, be represented, and engage in conflict resolution).

A State strengthens political legitimacy by building procedural democracy, maintaining rule of law (not personality—corruption), establishing independent bureaucracies. Hard in practice because: opposition hard to anticipate, reforms not seen as being wishes of the people.

Grindle: Role of Civil Society: Hold gov’t accountable, work in partnership w/ state. Think about how states reassert institutional capacity by defining and negotiating new rules to govern economic and political behavior and forge new institutional structures to assert dominance.

Grindle showed that the failed states of Mexico and Kenya had to do with states lack of capacity to respond to political constituents, implement policies, provide public services. In reponse to the corrupt and ineffective governments, constituents demanded: A) Autonomy from the state B) A voice in elections; C) Accountability D) Representation in policy debate E) Institutional controls on violations of laws and norms

Week 6: Bureaucracy

Lewis Lecture

Why care about bureaucracy?
• Bureaus make policy
• To understand state capacity
• To better understand non-market failures

What are some problems with bureaucracies?
• Organization Problems
  o Internal conflict
  o Conflict among agencies
• Lack of clear mission

• Lack of responsiveness
  o Preference divergence
  o Monitoring
  o Competence

Wilson - Bureaucracy

Chapter 9: Compliance

• Principal-agent models
  o address the question of how a principal (e.g., the manager of a gov’t bureau) can arrange incentives confronting an agent (e.g., a lower-level worker) so that the latter does what the former wants

• Shirking - arises when a principal cannot observe an agent’s behavior

• Difficult to avoid shirking in a gov’t agency b/c:
  o outcome may be unknowable
  o every agent is likely to have multiple principals
  o agents will bring their own political preferences, professional standards to the job

• Choice of incentives constrained by type of organization:
  (E.g., production, procedural, craft or coping organization)

Chapter 10: Turf

• Bureaucracies often prepared to accept less money with greater control than more money with less control

• Attach great importance to autonomy or turf

• 2 aspects of autonomy: external (jurisdiction) and internal (shared sense of mission). Increases in budget and jurisdiction supported as long as it does not compromise either aspect of autonomy.

• Expansionist, imperialist impulses of bureaucracies are overstated (many agencies decline the chance to grow)

• Turf problems are large and largely insoluble when the government has within it dozens of agencies working on similar policies

• Agencies that grow painlessly are usually research organizations with supportive constituencies, undisputed jurisdiction and coherent sense of mission

Chapter 17: Problems

• Several factors constraining bureaucracies (compare/contrast with private sector)
  o Accountability (getting agencies to serve agreed upon goals)
  o Equity (treating citizens fairly)
  o Responsiveness (reacting reasonably to special needs and circumstances)
  o Fiscal Integrity (need complete, detailed plans)
  o Efficiency (obtaining greatest output for given level of resources)

• Bureaucracy is perceived as inefficient. But economic definition of efficiency is too narrow: government has other valued outputs — reputation for integrity, confidence of the public, support of important interest groups
Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies

- Traditional Weberian distinction between bureaucrat’s technical skills and politician’s responsiveness to broad social interests and advocacy of political principles - still relevant, but incomplete picture.
- Convergence of functions
- Bureaucrats engage in policymaking, but their “political game” is different from the one played by ‘parliamentary politicians.’ Must carefully juggle interests of key groups, rather than advance broad claims.
- Politicians - more concerned with how policy affects particular interest group; bureaucrat is more concerned with technical and administrative aspects of implementation

Bureaucratic Dynamics

- Normative controversies over politics and bureaucracy:
  - role that politics should play in admin of public policies
  - whether top-down model of political-bureaucratic relations is appropriate
  - respective roles of Congress and the Pres in directing admin policymaking
- Empirical controversies...
  - Who controls bureaucracies?
  - Dominant paradigm: triumvirate of interest groups, bureaucracy and congressional committee
  - Newer idea: elected officials such as Pres and/or members of Congress control bureaucracies
- Principal-agent theory:
  - elected officials have political incentives to control the bureaucracy (assumes hierarchical relationship)
  - suggests that overhead democracy is possible

WEEK 7: Implementation

Tendler, Judith. *Good Government in the Tropics* (Introduction, Chapter 3, 6)
Rise of a “consistently flawed body of advice about how to improve government” in developing countries. Usual bad advice: 1) Reduce size of gov’t; 2) end programs susceptible to corruption; 3) use market-like pressures and incentives to perform. Too little attention paid to gov’t successes.

This comes about from:
1) overemphasis on failures in public sector
2) encouraging adoption of best practices from dissimilar countries or regions
3) label whole countries [or regions] as good or bad performers
4) obsession with markets “creates a propensity for misinterpretation of good performance”
5) beliefs about how developing countries work contradict evidence about “industrial performance and workplace transformation” (IPWT) in industrialized countries
6) too little investment in changing the system of centralized and highly defined labor-management relationships.

Examples of **bottom-up implementation**: Brazil’s Emergency Relief Project of 1987. Changed traditional structure, where public servants were hired based on political loyalty to local officials. Moved power out of hands of governor to a state-level department, created community action groups (CAGs) of local business owners, civil society leaders, and gov’t agency representatives that would evaluate projects and set priorities. **Decentralized decision-making structure, increased efficiency, minimized corruption/cronyism.** Empowered skilled low-level bureaucrats, who had existing knowledge of the issue, needs of the communities. Earned greater trust within the communities. CAGs **increased level of public deliberation and awareness.**
Much of current advice offered to developing countries is misguided, ignoring evidence about the conditions under which service organizations perform well. **What actually leads to better performance:**

- Workers showing high dedication to their jobs.
- Public demonstration of admiration and respect for the work and dedication of employees.
- Better job conditions (multitasking, job enlargement, greater discretion).
- Customization of work.

Gov’t can be a strong moral presence creating a calling to public service.

**Three-Way Dynamic:** local, central, and civic.

Just like civil society can make good gov’t, good gov’t can make good civil society. NGOs don’t have a monopoly on flexibility and client-orientation.

**Inadvertancy:** Sometimes successful results are obtained inadvertently. Analyse, and apply in future.

**Wilson Bureaucracy, Chapters 3, 5, 6**

Government **goals** are often vague—this can lead to different interpretations of the tasks. It’s good when government agency’s tasks can be inferred freely and unambiguously from its stated goals. Becomes basis of a strong organizational culture, results in a sense of mission. Tasks with clear goals create a culture of high ethic and service.

**Organizational culture:** a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks and human relationships within the organization. Systems of coordinated action. Every agency has one. Tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to as enthusiastically as those that fall within. Organizations with two conflicting cultures will experience conflict.

Governments deal with more external constituencies than the private sector—makes it more difficult to concentrate on the “internal life” of the organization.

Not enough discussion in government of what the organization should do and how to incentivize [is this a word?] people to do it.

**Government operators** are the front-line workers in the government, that do the work with the public that justifies the organization. It is their performance that determines the level of satisfaction with the agency. They need not vague goals, but operational goals—ones that can actually be accomplished.

*“Idealists may frame laws; realists have to administer them.”*

Tasks of implementation: Execute, Interpret,Prescribe.

A lot occurs between delegation and execution.

Success vs. Failure in implementation: may mean different things to different groups. Goals are sometimes unclear, change in process, different groups may have different roles.

**Top-Down Model of Implementation:**

- Involves intellectual analysis.
- Start with policy goals and work forward.
- Focus on impediments to implementation.
- Evaluate whether goals were met.

Top-Down model runs into problems with **Principal-Agent Relationships**, the phenomenon occurring when one party relies on another party to implement its goals and cannot have perfect monitoring of the implementation process. Raises concerns of:

- Preference divergence
- Monitoring
- Competence

**Elements of Preference Divergence:**

- Miscommunication
- External influence (interest group environment, patronage networks, corruption)
- Ideology and Culture (situational imperative; unique agency history and culture; composition of agency workforce—professional, civil service, education)
Elements of Competence:
- Relying on people, organizations that you do not control
- Limited capacity
- Complexity of joint action
- Limited resources

An example of the Top-Down Model: Strategic Management
- Define mission and desired outcomes (performance measures), assess environment, involve stakeholders
- Align activities, processes, resources, implementation tools
- Measure performance

Tools for implementation: regulation, contracts, grants, public-private partnerships, volunteerism, tax law changes [?], monitoring, licensing.

Tools for Evaluation: administrative feasibility, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, political feasibility

Bottom-Up Implementation Recommendations:
- Build capacity of front-line officials
- Foster increased commitment to basic policy goals
- Give lower-level officials more autonomy, discretion
- Enhance professionalization (customized, not routinized/standardized)

**WEEK 8: Electoral Incentives**

*Forms of Government: Majoritarian vs Concensus Systems*

**Majoritarian** concentrates political power in hands of a bare majority
- Is exclusive, competitive, adversarial
  - Majoritarian → single-member district plurality or majority system
    - Winner-take-all: candidate supported by largest number of voters wins and all other voters remain unrepresented
      - Party gaining a nationwide majority or plurality of the votes tends to be overrepresented in terms of parliamentary seats
  - **Plurality and Majority Formulas**
    1) plurality rule: candidate who receives the most votes, whether a majority or a plurality, is elected
      - 12 of the 36 democracies used this formula in period 1945-96
      - eg: U.S., United Kingdom, India, Canada, Jamaica, and more
    2) majority formula: requires an absolute majority for election
      - sometimes involves a run-off second ballot b/n top two candidates
      - this method is frequently used for presidential elections—in France, Austria, Portugal, and, since ’94, in Columbia and Finland
    3) majority-plurality formula
      - on the first ballot, an absolute majority is required for election, but if no candidate wins a majority, a plurality suffices on the second ballot
      - used in France for elections to the legislature
    4) alternative vote
      - a true majority formula: voters are asked to indicate their first preference, second preference, and so on among the candidates
      - if a candidate receives absolute majority of the first preferences, s/he will be elected; if no such majority, the candidate w/ lowest number of first preferences is dropped and the ballots w/ this candidate as the first
preference are transferred to the second preferences; this process repeats until there’s a majority winner
- used in Australia

**Consensus**
- sees majority as a minimum requirement, seeks to maximize size of majority
- Seeks broad participation and agreement
- Characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, compromise
- **Consensus** → proportional representation (PR)
  - Aim is to represent both majorities and minorities
  - Translates votes into seats proportionally

**Proportional Representation** formulas

1) The List PR system (this is the most common one)
   - the parties nominate lists of candidates in multimember districts
   - the voters cast their ballots for one party list or another (although they are sometimes allowed to split their votes among several lists)
   - the seats are allocated to the party lists in proportion to the numbers of votes they have collected
   - eg: Austria, Finland, Spain, Switzerland, Israel, France, and more

2) Mixed Member/Proportional system
   - some proportion of legislators are elected by plurality in single-member districts and the others are elected by list PR
   - each voter has two votes: one for a district candidate and one for a party list
   - eg: Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Venezuela

3) Single Transferable Vote (STV) system
   - differs from List PR system in that voters vote for individual candidates instead of for party lists
   - ballot contains names of the candidates and the voters are asked to rank-order the names
   - 1) any surplus votes not needed by candidates who already have minimum quota of votes required for election are transferred to next most preferred candidates on the ballots; 2) weakest candidate is eliminated and his or her ballots are transferred in same way
   - often praised b/c it combines the advantages of permitting votes for individual candidates of yielding proportional results, but it’s not used very much
   - eg: Ireland, Malta, and Australia (for Senate elections)

**Forms of Government: Parliamentary vs Presidential Regimes**

- **Parliamentary**
  - strongest links between executive and legislature
  - prime minister sits in legislature, is usually leader of majority party or main party in government coalition
  - agenda setting power rests with government
  - government at risk of falling if it loses legislative support (vote of no confidence)

- **Presidential**
  - separation of powers between executive and legislature
  - executive term in office usually fixed and not dependent on legislative majority
executive and legislature share agenda-setting powers

WEEK 9: SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Main Theme: Without a minimal level of security, sustainable economic development is not possible. There is a paradigm shift for international security from a concern with protecting and enhancing the security of states to the protection and security of civilians. Often the problems that lead to insecurity occur within failed states, so effective nation building is crucial.

Main Question: Which comes first, security or development? This is the question we attempted to answer in our Shining Path memo.

Broader Notion of Security Threats: No longer just military threats, includes actions that:

- Threaten drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state.
- Threaten to significantly narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to civil society and other entities within the state.

Causes of Insecurity Under This Definition:

- Local conflicts involving paramilitaries, mercenaries, or warlords who control resources like oil or drugs.
- AIDS
- Famine
- Control of Water Resources
- Climate Change
- Lack of Workable Justice System
- Economic Disparities/Globalization
- Migration
- Drug Trafficking

Objections to This Broader Notion of Security Threats:

- Security is more fundamental than the other threats.
- The broad categorization causes a diversion of resources.
- May limit the basis on which issues that become "security issues" can be seen to matter.

Specific Example of AIDS: Large percentages of the military in many countries are infected. In countries with high infection rates, those infected include members of government and business elites, and their loss weakens institutions and retards growth. Loss of large numbers from the workforce in general hurts economies, while government resources that could be used in other ways must be allocated to fight AIDS.
• **Specific Example of Civil Wars:** These take place predominantly in weak states, and impact directly on the civilian population and society at large. The violence results in economic problems that hinder development:

  - Monopolistic control of trade, often in drugs and arms.
  - Exploitation of labor by threatening violence.
  - Government funding transferred to military.
  - Protection money extracted.

• **Failed States:** Breeding grounds for insecurity, and after September 11, the status of failed states has become increasingly important for international security. Characteristics of failed states:

  - Rise in criminal and political violence
  - Loss of control over borders
  - Rising ethnic, religious, and cultural hostilities
  - Civil War
  - Terror against own citizens
  - Weak institutions
  - Bad infrastructure
  - Inability to collect taxes
  - Corruption
  - Basic food shortages

• **Solutions?**

  - Lasting cease-fire
  - Transitional administration
  - Roads made safe for travel and commerce
  - Train police, administrators
  - Restore rule of law

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**WEEK 10: Interest Groups and Advocacy Groups**

**Interest groups** – usually associated with specific economic interests

**Advocacy/activist groups** – usually associated with social issues

Many groups have characteristics of both

**Interest Groups:** Form among individuals and organizations with aligned interests (pluralist theory). But need to overcome free-rider problem (why join group if I can get benefits of collective action without bearing the costs?). Negotiate and make compromises.

  - Group formation more likely when:
    - With smaller groups with easily identified constituents
    - Key actors have a lot at stake
    - Sense of efficacy
    - Limited alternative ways of getting desired results

  - Informational aspects of interest group activities. Inform group members about best policies and about what politicians are doing. Inform politicians about best policy options and that group members care.

**Advocacy Groups:** Much in common with interest groups, but also differences. Group goals often respect as a group, group autonomy, or change in society’s moral or religious practices. Often goals are not material, divisible, or substitutable, so hard to negotiate compromises. Less likely to succeed in political activity than interest groups, but can occasionally have large effects on political structure.

  - Tactics and strategies:
    - Publicity and drama
Litigation
- Can use interest group tactics
- Deal with collective action or free rider problem
  - Committed volunteers and nonmaterial selective benefits

**Groups and the political process:** Effectiveness usually related to actual or potential ability to mobilize (number/resources of members). In most democracies, political parties rely heavily on interest groups for electoral support and policy development.
  - Parliamentary systems: policy developed via cabinet consensus. Interest group involvement less visible.
  - Presidential system: w/ separation of powers, more visible interest group involvement.
  - Proportional representation: likely to see some parties as direct political arm of specific groups
  - Majoritarian/plurality systems: interest groups less directly linked to specific parties

**Lessons from Why We Lost the ERA**
- The very structure of a voluntary political organization tends to produce an inability to hear or understand what others are saying. Volunteer activity encourages ideological purity and allows individuals to make choices for which they are not accountable. Activists can learn to ask to what degree their having freely volunteered their time exonerates them from accountability. Watch for the tendency to drift into decisions without realizing that a decision is being made.
- Committed activists also need to question their almost automatic rejection of the muddled thinking and compromise that characterize mainstream discussion of most issues. They should become more willing to listen to legislators, churches and other groups that are sympathetic to their views but not totally sympathetic to them.
- On the organization level, more democracy usually means better information. Although organizations have their faults – they can become rigid, self-absorbed and deaf to the voices of the rank and file – they remain one of the few conduits through which the lessons of one experience can be applied to another.
- The institutions of adversary democracy, geared only to winning, losing or bargaining, provided few forums in which the issue could be discussed frankly and amicably. Public debate led only to polarization.