In logic, a consistent theory is one that does not contain a contradiction.^{[1]} The lack of contradiction can be defined in either semantic or syntactic terms. The semantic definition states that a theory is consistent if it has a model; this is the sense used in traditional Aristotelian logic, although in contemporary mathematical logic the term satisfiable is used instead. The syntactic definition states that a theory is consistent if there is no formula P such that both P and its negation are provable from the axioms of the theory under its associated deductive system.
If these semantic and syntactic definitions are equivalent for a particular logic, the logic is complete.^{[2]} The completeness of sentential calculus was proved by Paul Bernays in 1918^{[citation needed]}^{[3]} and Emil Post in 1921^{[4]}, while the completeness of predicate calculus was proved by Kurt Gödel in 1930^{[5]}, and consistency proofs for arithmetics restricted with respect to the induction axiom schema were proved by Ackermann (1924), von Neumann (1927) and Herbrand (1931)^{[6]}. Stronger logics, such as secondorder logic, are not complete.
A consistency proof is a mathematical proof that a particular theory is consistent. The early development of mathematical proof theory was driven by the desire to provide finitary consistency proofs for all of mathematics as part of Hilbert's program. Hilbert's program was strongly impacted by incompleteness theorems, which showed that sufficiently strong proof theories cannot prove their own consistency (provided that they are in fact consistent).
Although consistency can be proved by means of model theory, it is often done in a purely syntactical way, without any need to reference some model of the logic. The cutelimination (or equivalently the normalization of the underlying calculus if there is one) implies the consistency of the calculus: since there is obviously no cutfree proof of falsity, there is no contradiction in general.
Contents
Full article ▸
