

NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY

VERIFYING DECLARATIONS OF PAST FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION

Alexander Glaser

Princeton University

PVTS-SGS Workshop on Verification Technologies Beijing, June 15–16, 2015

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
World Stockpiles of Fissile Materials

1345


1380 tons of highly-enriched uranium

499

495 tons of separated plutonium



WILL WE EVER KNOW HOW MUCH FISSILE MATERIAL EXISTS WORLDWIDE?



RECONSTRUCTING HISTORIC FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION

Many aspects of declared production histories can be reviewed for consistency even without verification

(for example, by comparison with historic krypton emissions)



DATA EXCHANGE AND NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY

Verification could begin with data exchanges (e.g. sharing of available operating records) and, eventually, envision onsite inspections

Nuclear archaeology is based on nuclear forensic analysis of samples taken at former production facilities

Source: Ole Ross and <u>www.francetnp2010.fr</u>

Science & Global Security, 1993, Volume 3, pp.237-259 Photocopying permitted by license only Reprints available directly from the publisher © 1993 Gordon and Breach Science Publishers S.A. Printed in the United States of America

Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Production

Steve Fetter^a

Controlling the production of fissile material is an essential element of nonproliferation policy. Similarly, accounting for the past production of fissile material should be an important component of nuclear disarmament. This paper describes two promising techniques that make use of physical evidence at reactors and enrichment facilities to verify the past production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In the first technique, the concentrations of long-lived radionuclides in permanent components of the reactor core are used to estimate the neutron fluence in various regions of the reactor and thereby verify declar of plutonium production in the reactor. In the secon

technique, the ratio of the determine whether a g enriched uranium, whi which can be used in r "nuclear archaeology," ties and thereby lay a

INTRODUCTION

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Science & Global Security, 22:27-49, 2014

Science and Global Security, 19:223–233, 2011 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0892-9882 print / 1547-7800 online DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2011.616124



Nuclear Archaeology for Heavy-Water-Moderated Plutonium Production Reactors

Alex Gasner and Alexander Glaser

ing Quadrangle, Olden Street, Princeton, NJ 08544

Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Princeton University Engineering Olden Street Dringston M.I. Organical University Engineering There is growing interest in a set of methods and tools that can be used to characterize past fissile material production activities, using measurements and sampling at s been dubbed "nuclear archaeology." The logy relies on measurements of the isotope



Nuclear Archaeology for Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment **Plants**

Sébastien Philippe and Alexander Glaser

Nuclear Futures Laboratory, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering,

Gaseous diffusion was historically the most widely used technology for military production of highly enriched uranium. Since June 2013, all gaseous diffusion enrichment plants worldwide are permanently shut down. The experience with decommissioning some of these plants has shown that they contain large amounts of uranium parti-

ed at the 51st INMM Annual Meeting, timore, MD, July 11–15, 2010. Department of Geosciences for advi

of graphite-moderated plutonium produc-Tethod (GIRM) determines the cumulative ereby estimates the cumulative plutonium

on of this particular method is that it can ors, which represent only one class of re-

ed plutonium production. In this article, aphite moderated reactors by analyzing

support structures and other core com-

We present results of neutronics calcula-

valuating the robustness of the method


for applications in arms-control treaty


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NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY THE CASE OF PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION

COMPUTER MODEL OF NRX/CIRUS

(40-50 MW, HEAVY-WATER MODERATED, NATURAL-URANIUM FUELED)






A. Gasner and A. Glaser, "Nuclear Archaeology for Heavy-Water-Moderated Plutonium Production Reactors," Science & Global Security, 19, 2011

MANY ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT AS IMPURITIES IN ALUMINUM

RESULTS FROM ANALYSIS OF HISTORIC ALUMINUM SAMPLE FROM MANHATTAN COLLEGE ZERO POWER REACTOR (MCZPR)




Element	Content	
5 Boron	2 ppm	
12 Magnesium	<100 ppm	
14 Silicon	1900 ppm	
22 Titanium	200 ppm	
23 Vanadium	<100 ppm	
24 Chromium	<100 ppm	

Element	Content	
26 Iron	5100 ppm	
28 Nickel	<100 ppm	
29 Copper	1400 ppm	
30 Zinc	200 ppm	
40 Zirconium	<100 ppm	
82 Lead	<100 ppm	

Need to identify isotope ratios that correlate well with neutron fluence

ARCHAEOLOGY FOR CANADA'S NRX REACTOR


EVOLUTION OF SELECTED CHLORINE RATIOS, SIMULATED DATA



A. Gasner and A. Glaser, "Nuclear Archaeology for Heavy-Water-Moderated Plutonium Production Reactors," Science & Global Security, 19, 2011

ARCHAEOLOGY FOR CANADA'S NRX REACTOR

"LOOKUP TABLES" CAN BE USED TO MAP FLUENCE VALUE (IN FUEL CHANNEL)
TO LIFETIME PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION OF REACTOR




A. Gasner and A. Glaser, "Nuclear Archaeology for Heavy-Water-Moderated Plutonium Production Reactors," Science & Global Security, 19, 2011

NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY WOULD HAVE BEEN USED TO VERIFY NORTH KOREA'S PLUTONIUM DECLARATION

FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF GRAPHITE SAMPLES COULD CONFIRM TOTAL PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION IN NORTH KOREA WITHIN AN UNCERTAINTY OF $\pm 2~$ KG





The banner reads: "Let's protect Dear General Kim Jong II desperately!" Credit: CNN/Brian Rokus. 2008

Unit cell of the DPRK Yongbyon reactor

PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS

BY TYPE AND COUNTRY

	Graphite moderated		Heavy-water moderated	
	H₂O cooled	CO ₂ cooled	H₂O cooled	D ₂ O cooled
United States	Hanford			Savannah River
Russia	"Tomsk-7"			
United Kingdom		Calder Hall		
France		G-Series		Célestin
China	"Jiuquan"			
Israel				Dimona
India			Cirus/NRX	Dhruva
Pakistan			Khushab	
DPRK		Yongbyon		

A. Glaser, "Isotopic Signatures of Weapon-grade Plutonium from Dedicated Natural-uranium-fueled Production Reactors and Their Relevance for Nuclear Forensic Analysis," *Nuclear Science & Engineering,* September 2009

WHAT'S NEXT FOR NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY?

NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY FOR HISTORIC PRODUCTION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM HAS YET TO BE DEMONSTRATED



Equipment in storage from the gaseous diffusion plant in Pierrelatte, June 2009, www.francetnp2010.fr



Storage area for cylinders of depleted uranium in 2001 at K-25 Site, Oak Ridge, TN


Nuclear archaeology for uranium enrichment is potentially more challenging because it is less obvious which signatures in equipment and waste materials would be most effective for verifying cumulative production of HEU


S. Philippe and A. Glaser, "Nuclear Archaeology for Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Plants," Science & Global Security, 22, 1 (2014)


PREPARING FOR FUTURE VERIFICATION


MANY DIFFERENT MATERIALS, PROCESSES, AND SITES HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION


THE CASE OF PLUTONIUM












TO ALLOW FOR FUTURE VERIFICATION, STATES COULD:

Agree on the most important types of operating records to be preserved
 Catalogue, characterize, and preserve waste materials

TEST BEDS FOR NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY

To begin countries could offer single sites or facilities as test beds and invite partners with similar production facilities to engage in "site-to-site exercises" to jointly demonstrate verification approaches and measurement techniques




Left: Windscale Piles, <u>www.sellafieldsites.com</u> Right: G2/G3, Marcoule, <u>www.francetnp.fr</u>

"THE CLOCK IS TICKING"

SHUTDOWN ENRICHMENT PLANTS AND PRODUCTION REACTORS ARE BEING DECOMMISSIONED OR DEMOLISHED



Demolition of the K-25 uranium enrichment plant began in December 2008 and has been completed in 2012 Source: Bechtel Jacobs



China's unfinished underground plutonium production complex (Project 816), near Chongqing Source: CQTV