

# DISARMAMENT HACKING 2.0

TOWARD A TRUSTED, OPEN-HARDWARE  
COMPUTING PLATFORM FOR  
NUCLEAR WARHEAD VERIFICATION


**Moritz Kütt, Malte Göttsche, and Alexander Glaser**

Princeton University

57th Annual INMM Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, July 2016

# NUCLEAR WARHEAD VERIFICATION

## KEY CONCEPTS OF (PROPOSED) SYSTEMS



*edited by D. Spears, 2001*

### ATTRIBUTE APPROACH

Confirming selected characteristics  
of an object in classified form  
(for example, the presence/mass of plutonium)

### TEMPLATE APPROACH


Comparing the radiation signature  
from the inspected item with a reference item  
("golden warhead") of the same type

### INFORMATION BARRIERS

Technologies and procedures that  
prevent the release of sensitive nuclear information  
(generally needed for both approaches)

# BUILDING AN INFORMATION BARRIER

USING A SINGLE-BOARD COMPUTING PLATFORM  
WITH OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARE (AND AT MINIMAL COST)




[www.redpitaya.com](http://www.redpitaya.com)

(RedPitaya launched as a Kickstarter campaign in 2013 raising more than \$250,000 in 4 weeks)




# RED PITAYA

## XILINX ZYNQ-7010 SYSTEM-ON-CHIP (ARM CORTEX-A9 + ARTIX-7 FPGA)




[www.redpitaya.com](http://www.redpitaya.com)





*Moments from MAE 354/574, Spring 2016*








*Canberra Model 802 Sodium-Iodide detector  
in lead shield/collimator*


*Information Barrier  
Experimental*



# DIGITAL DATA ACQUISITION APPROACH



# DATA ACQUISITION



## ANALOG-TO-DIGITAL CONVERTER (LTC2145-14)

14-bit resolution ( $2^{14} = 16384$  states)

125 MHz sampling rate, i.e., voltage levels recorded every 8 nanoseconds

Generates about 220 MB/s of data

*(in fact, closer to 500 MB/s as values are stored as 32-bit integers)*




## FIELD-PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY (FPGA) AND MICROPROCESSOR

1. Circular buffer in FPGA is continuously filled with data from ADC
2. When an incoming pulse is detected, data acquisition continues for a few microseconds before data acquisition is stopped (to prevent overwrite)
3. Post-trigger data is written to memory and trigger is re-armed

# INFORMATION BARRIER EXPERIMENTAL


## VOLTAGE PULSES ACQUIRED BY THE RED PITAYA





# DETECTOR RESOLUTION

$\Delta E/E \approx 6\%$  AT 662 keV



MODE OF OPERATION





Power-up and High Voltage



## Calibration


Thoriated welding rods wrapped around the sodium-iodide crystal provide a robust signature for calibration; spectrum includes, in particular, 2.6 MeV line from thallium-208 decay

First used in Sandia's Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS)



# SELF-CALIBRATION SPECTRUM

THORIATED WELDING RODS ONLY; 600 SECONDS





### Template Acquisition

IBX can acquire and store up to three templates

Upon startup, the device checks for previously recorded templates and indicates their presence; this feature is convenient during development and testing, but may be impractical in a true inspection setting





Inspection



### Match / Mismatch


LEDs indicate which template shows closest similarity with the inspected item

If the inspected item is substantially different from all templates, a “no match” situation is signaled




# COMPARING RADIATION SPECTRA

(IBX WITH SODIUM-IODIDE DETECTOR, 60 SECONDS, ~175,000 counts)



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
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


WHAT'S NEXT?



# EVALUATING REAL DATA

4.5 kg OF WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM, 15-MINUTE MEASUREMENT TIME  
DEVICE ASSEMBLY FACILITY, NEVADA, JULY 2016




# CAN WE MAKE IT LEAK INFORMATION?

VERIFICATION CHALLENGES ATTACKING THE IBX ON BOTH  
THE SOFTWARE AND THE HARDWARE LEVEL





# SUMMARY AND WAY FORWARD



## TOWARD OPEN-HARDWARE COMPUTING FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

- Simple and transparent design
- Low cost (~ \$700)
- BUT: Needs transition to fully open hardware



## IBX (OR A SIMILAR DEVICE) AS A PROTOYPING PLATFORM

- Exploring and benchmarking advanced algorithms
- Implementing all functionalities/computations on FPGA (avoiding CPU)
- Enabling verification challenges for broader hacker community

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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