



FULL MOTION VR

for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Verification

Alexander Glaser and Tamara Patton PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security Suzhou, China, November 1–5, 2016

BUILDING FROM LIVE EXERCISES

➤ UK-Norway Initiative

UKNI Managed Access exercises took place in Norway in 2008 and 2009, and in the UK in 2010. The exercises were underpinned by a framework which included a hypothetical treaty between two fictitious countries: a weapon state and a non-weapon state.

Inspectors deployed a number of techniques and processes, including radiation monitoring, tags and seals, digital photography of the tags and seals, CCTV cameras, and an information barrier system for gamma measurements.


UK-US Cooperation

From 2002 through 2011, the United Kingdom and United States conducted four major managed access exercises, concluding with an extensive Warhead Monitored Dismantlement exercise.





Images from the UK-Norway Initiative








"FMVR provides a flexible and powerful way to extend the research community's ability to examine larger numbers of options and technology combinations for verification approaches."

The brain doesn't much care if an experience is real or virtual.



Jim Blascovich and Jeremy Bailenson Infinite Reality: The Hidden Blueprint of Our Virtual Lives



THE SYSTEM

WorldViz Walking Virtual Reality System



QUESTION SETS FOR VR

➤ 1. ARCHITECTURE

- ➤ Existing versus dedicated facility?
- ➤ Should the structure prioritize disassembly efficiency or verification?
- ➤ How "integrated" can inspectors be in the facility?

> 2. VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY

- ➤ Explore differences in protocols for different technologies, e.g. attributes vs. template-matching
- ➤ Chain-of-custody technology: how to track weapons and components?

> 3. MANAGED ACCESS

- ➤ How can hosts grant inspector confidence without revealing classified information?
- ➤ How can inspectors gain confidence without gathering any proliferation-sensitive information?


Elements of a

CASE STUDY


Refining a Verification Approach

MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION

www.verification.nu




MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION



VIDEO

nuclearfutures.princeton.edu/vr






SCENE 1

Buddy tags at a storage site

SCENE 2


Buddy tags with a possible UID system

www.youtube.com/watch?v=AMSvrxg-at4 (silent) and www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVR-ioOoOhg (sound)




VIRTUAL RADIATION

- ➤ Radiation signatures of materials are relevant for many aspects of nuclear verification, and it is therefore important to include radiation in our models.
- Several previous efforts with static radiation fields
- ➤ Our goal: Quasi real-time treatment of nuclear radiation for multiple/movable components and various types of detectors




INFORMATION BARRIER EXPERIMENTAL (IBX) 1/2




- ➤ Built in Spring 2016 at Princeton University (as part of a final course project)
- Uses template-matching approach with open-source software

INFORMATION BARRIER EXPERIMENTAL (IBX) 2/2







NEXT STEPS / WAY FORWARD

- ➤ Virtual reality offers an exciting new pathway to support experts and governments in developing and refining verification approaches for nuclear arms control
- ➤ In particular, collaborative VR exercises may offer environments to explore new concepts for addressing verification challenges (especially those relevant for onsite inspections); VR exercises can therefore lay the basis for live exercises and new policy initiatives
- ➤ We hope to hold VR exercises to both engage students on arms-control issues and develop best practices for more formal government exercises

MORE

nuclearfutures.princeton.edu/vr

www.verification.nu (coming early 2017)