

Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

Alexander Glaser

Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University

13 December 2006

Revision 10

“Bhabha’s Vision”

The three-stage program as outlined in 1958

STAGE 1

Pressurized heavy-water reactors using natural uranium fuel

Rationale: simple technology, produce plutonium, no access to enriched uranium needed

STAGE 2

Fast-neutron (breeder) reactors using plutonium from PHWRs for initial cores

Rationale: increase plutonium stockpile, while reducing uranium-ore requirements

STAGE 3


Advanced thorium reactors (thermal and fast, Pu/U-233 as fissile isotopes)

Rationale: finally use large domestic thorium-resources, achieve self-sufficient large nuclear program

- Apsara Research Reactor
- Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC)
- Boron Enrichment Plant (BEP)
- Central Workshops
- Plutonium Reprocessing Plant
- Purnima I, II, & III Research Reactors
- Uranium Conversion Plant
- Uranium Enrichment Plant
- CIRUS Research Reactor
- Dhruva Research Reactor

- Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS)
- Kota Heavy Water Plant


INDIA NUCLEAR FACILITIES




Copyright © 2003 Monterey Institute of International Studies.
All rights reserved.

STATUS OF SELECTED FACILITIES/SITES

- Already under safeguards
- Offered for Safeguards
- No safeguards envisioned





© 2006 Europa Technologies
Image © 2006 DigitalGlobe


© 2006 Google™



**Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
(PFBR) construction site**




Nuclear Facilities and Materials at the Kalpakkam / IGCAR Site



Madras-1
(170 MWe)


Madras-1
(220 MWe)

About 170 kg of plutonium per year
Fissile fraction: about 77%



Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant (KARP)
100 MT(HM)/yr

Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRFRP)
in planning stages
(capacity on the order of 10-15 MT(HM)/yr)



PFBR
(500 MWe)

Plutonium requirements
for operation in
civilian and military mode?

Cumulative local plutonium production by 2010: *more than 4000 kg*
Reprocessed fraction: *unknown (but presumably high)*


Local plutonium stockpile is likely to be (much) higher due to spent fuel transfers from other sites
Spent fuel from the Kaiga-1 and -2 reactors would add about 2000 kg of plutonium

KARP could separate more than 10,000 kg of plutonium by 2010

Reactor Model and Simulations

for the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR)

Computational System for Neutronics Calculations



Nuclides in Burnup Calculations

130 Actinides
850 Fission products
720 Activation products

130 Actinides										Cm-243	Cm-244	Cm-245
850 Fission products										29.1 a	18.10 a	8500 a
720 Activation products												
							Am-240	Am-241	Am-242	Am-243	Am-244	
							50.8 h	432.2 a	141 a	7370 a	10.1 h	
					Pu-237	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242	Pu-243	
					45.2 d	87.74 a	$2.411 \cdot 10^4$ a	6563 a	14.35 a	$3.750 \cdot 10^5$ a	4.956 h	
					Np-236	Np-237	Np-238	Np-239	Np-240			
					$1.54 \cdot 10^5$ a	$2.140 \cdot 10^6$ a	2.117 d	2.355 d	65 m			
U-232	U-233	U-234	U-235	U-236	U-237	U-238	U-239					
68.9 a	$1.592 \cdot 10^5$ a	0.0055	0.7200	$2.342 \cdot 10^7$ a	6.75 d	99.2745	23.5 m					
		$2.455 \cdot 10^5$ a	$7.038 \cdot 10^8$ a			$4.468 \cdot 10^9$ a						
Pa-231	Pa-232	Pa-233	Pa-234									
$3.276 \cdot 10^4$ a	1.31 d	27.0 d	6.70 h									



Fuel Pin and Assembly Characteristics

	Core and axial blanket	Radial blanket
Pellet diameter:	5.330 mm	12.760 mm
Gap thickness:	0.185 mm	0.185 mm
Cladding thickness:	0.450 mm	0.600 mm
Outer diameter of fuel pin:	6.600 mm	14.330 mm
Fuel pins per assembly:	217	61
Lattice pitch:	13.50 cm	
Outer width across flats:	13.16 cm	
Thickness of hexcan:	0.32 cm	
Inner width across flats:	12.52 cm	
Available volume in assembly:	135.75 cc per cm	
Fuel fraction:	35.66%	57.46%
Void fraction:	5.13%	3.38%
Cladding fraction:	13.90%	11.63%
Sodium fraction:	45.31%	27.53%


Data retrieved or inferred from the IAEA Fast Reactor Database (www-frdb.iaea.org)

Also: S. C. Chetal et al., *The Design of the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor*, Nuclear Engineering and Design, 236 (2006), 852-860

Fuel and Radial Blanket Assemblies



PFBR Core Layout





PLOT WINDOW

12/06/06 19:11:28

PFBR FULL PIN Model v/ 14 zones

probid = 12/06/06 19:09:02

basis: XY

(1.000000, 0.000000, 0.000000)

(0.000000, 1.000000, 0.000000)

origin:

(20.25, 19.48, 1.00)

extent = (3.00, 3.00)

Edit cel 13

Cell 13

xyz = 0.00, 7.79, 1.00

CURSOR CellLine


PostScript ROTATE

COLOR SCALES 2 LEVEL

XY YZ ZX

LABEL off off

[Click here or picture or menu](#)





PLOT WINDOW

12/06/06 19:31:16

PFBR FULL PIN Model w/ 14 zones

probid = 12/06/06 19:09:02

basis: XY

(1.000000, 0.000000, 0.000000)

(0.000000, 1.000000, 0.000000)

origin:

(67.52, 62.38, 1.00)

extent = (15.00, 15.00)

Edit cel 33

Cell 33

xyz = 0.02, -7.77, 1.00

CURSOR CellLine


PostScript ROTATE

COLOR SCALES 2 LEVEL

XY YZ ZX

LABEL off off

[Click here or picture or menu](#)



Main Operational Characteristics


Power level: 500 MWe
1250 MWth (40% thermal to electric efficiency)

Cycle length: 180 effective full power days (EFPDs)
Reloading pattern: 1/3 of the core and 1/8 of the radial blanket
on average: about 60 plus 15 elements, respectively
540 EFPDs for average fuel element in core
1440 EFPDs for average fuel element in the radial blanket

Capacity factor: 75%
on average: 1.52 reloads per year


Data retrieved or inferred from the IAEA Fast Reactor Database (www-frdb.iaea.org)

Methodology




Results


Average Plutonium Inventory in the Fuel Elements of the Core



Average Plutonium Inventory in a Fuel Element of the Radial Blanket



Plutonium Isotopics in the Blankets



Plutonium Isotopics in the Blankets of a Fast Neutron Reactor

(Why is it weapon-grade?)

		Heavy water reactor	Fast neutron reactor
U-238	Fission x-section	0.064 b	0.023 b
	Capture x-section	1.111 b	0.257 b
Pu-239	Fission x-section	253 b	1.815 b
	Capture x-section	112 b	0.505 b
Fissions per absorption in Pu-239		69%	78%
Assume 1% Pu-239 in 99% U-238			
Absolute absorption in plutonium		75.8%	7.7%

Annual Reload/Discharge Analysis

ANNUAL RELOAD

	U-235	U-236	U-238	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242
Core	4.0 kg	3.1 kg	3074.5 kg	2.7 kg	655.4 kg	279.4 kg	47.5 kg	26.5 kg
Axial Blanket	3.1 kg	2.4 kg	2449.8 kg	0.0 kg	0.0 kg	0.0 kg	0.0 kg	0.0 kg
Radial Blanket	3.4 kg	2.6 kg	2617.1 kg	0.0 kg	0.0 kg	0.0 kg	0.0 kg	0.0 kg
Total	10.5 kg 0.13%	8.1 kg 0.10%	8141.4 kg 99.77%	2.7 kg 0.3%	655.4 kg 64.8%	279.4 kg 27.6%	47.5 kg 4.7%	26.5 kg 2.6%
Overall Total Fissile Fraction	8160 kg 0.13%			1012 kg 69.5%				

ANNUAL DISCHARGE

	U-235	U-236	U-238	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242
Core	2.4 kg 0.08%	3.1 kg 0.11%	2862.5 kg 99.81%	2.2 kg 0.2%	541.6 kg 60.2%	284.7 kg 31.6%	44.9 kg 5.0%	26.6 kg 3.0%
Axial Blanket	2.5 kg 0.10%	2.5 kg 0.10%	2388.7 kg 99.80%	0.016 kg 0.030%	51.76 kg 96.543%	1.78 kg 3.323%	0.055 kg 0.103%	0.001 kg 0.001%
Radial Blanket	2.2 kg 0.09%	2.6 kg 0.11%	2500.2 kg 99.80%	0.056 kg 0.058%	91.04 kg 94.265%	5.26 kg 5.449%	0.215 kg 0.222%	0.005 kg 0.006%
Total	7.1 kg 0.09%	8.2 kg 0.11%	7751.4 kg 99.80%	2.3 kg 0.2%	684.4 kg 65.2 %	291.7 kg 27.8%	45.2 kg 4.3%	26.6 kg 2.5%
Overall Total Fissile Fraction	7767 kg 0.09%			1050 kg 69.5%				

Annual Reload/Discharge Analysis

		ANNUAL DISCHARGE							
		U-235	U-236	U-238	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242
Core		2.4 kg 0.08%	3.1 kg 0.11%	2862.5 kg 99.81%	2.2 kg 0.2%	541.6 kg 60.2%	284.7 kg 31.6%	44.9 kg 5.0%	26.6 kg 3.0%
Axial Blanket		2.5 kg 0.10%	2.5 kg 0.10%	2388.7 kg 99.80%	0.016 kg 0.030%	51.76 kg 96.543%	1.78 kg 3.323%	0.055 kg 0.103%	0.001 kg 0.001%
Radial Blanket		2.2 kg 0.09%	2.6 kg 0.11%	2500.2 kg 99.80%	0.056 kg 0.058%	91.04 kg 94.265%	5.26 kg 5.449%	0.215 kg 0.222%	0.005 kg 0.006%
Total		7.1 kg 0.09%	8.2 kg 0.11%	7751.4 kg 99.80%	2.3 kg 0.2%	684.4 kg 65.2 %	291.7 kg 27.8%	45.2 kg 4.3%	26.6 kg 2.5%
Overall Total		7767 kg			1050 kg				
Fissile Fraction		0.09%			69.5%				
Blanket Subtotals		53.6 kg of plutonium with a fissile fraction of 96.6% contained in the axial blanket							
		96.6 kg of plutonium with a fissile fraction of 94.5% contained in the radial blanket							
		150.2 kg of plutonium with a fissile fraction of 95.3% contained in both blankets combined							

Annual Reload/Discharge Analysis

ANNUAL DISCHARGE

	U-235	U-236	U-238	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242
Core	2.4 kg 0.08%	3.1 kg 0.11%	2862.5 kg 99.81%	2.2 kg 0.2%	541.6 kg 60.2%	284.7 kg 31.6%	44.9 kg 5.0%	26.6 kg 3.0%
Axial Blanket	2.5 kg 0.10%	2.5 kg 0.10%	2388.7 kg 99.80%	0.016 kg 0.030%	51.76 kg 96.543%	1.78 kg 3.323%	0.055 kg 0.103%	0.001 kg 0.001%
Radial Blanket	2.2 kg 0.09%	2.6 kg 0.11%	2500.2 kg 99.80%	0.056 kg 0.058%	91.04 kg 94.265%	5.26 kg 5.449%	0.215 kg 0.222%	0.005 kg 0.006%
Total	7.1 kg 0.09%	8.2 kg 0.11%	7751.4 kg 99.80%	2.3 kg 0.2%	684.4 kg 65.2 %	291.7 kg 27.8%	45.2 kg 4.3%	26.6 kg 2.5%
Overall Total Fissile Fraction	7767 kg 0.09%			1050 kg 69.5%				

ANNUAL MAKEUP

	U-235	U-236	U-238	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242
	1.4 kg 0.25%	0.4 kg 0.07%	551.2 kg 99.68%					
Total Fissile Fraction	393 kg + 160 kg 0.25%							
Makeup + Discharge	8.5 kg 0.10%	8.6 kg 0.10%	8302.6 kg 99.80%					
Total Fissile Fraction	8320 kg 0.10%							

Breeding Ratio

$$BR = 1 + \frac{M_{\text{DISC}} - M_{\text{LOAD}}}{M_{\text{DEST}}}$$

Only fissile isotopes are considered for the determination of the breeding ratio
For uranium-plutonium fuel, these are U-235, Pu-239 and Pu-241

Fissile material is consumed by fission or neutron capture

$$BR = 1 + \frac{738 \text{ kg} - 711 \text{ kg}}{440 \text{ kg}} \approx 1.06$$

Values quoted in the literature: 1.05-1.10

Gretchenfrage

“Will India use the weapon-grade plutonium generated with the PFBR for its nuclear weapons program?”



ANIL KAKODKAR INTERVIEW

Breaking Up (a Nuclear Deal) Is Hard to Do

India nuclear chief Anil Kakodkar has no apologies for the implementation of a landmark India-U.S. nuclear pact.

NEW DELHI—Anil Kakodkar is a legendary figure in India's rise to nuclear statehood. Now pressure is building on the self-described technocrat to prove his diplomatic mettle as well. A historic nuclear agreement between India and the United States is riding on India's plan to segregate its nuclear establishment into civilian and military components (*Science*, 20 January, p. 318). As chair of India's Atomic Energy Commission in Mumbai and secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy, an agency with 65,000 staff and a \$1.2 billion budget, Kakodkar has been asked to draw the civil-military line.

The stakes are high. The India-U.S. agreement, signed on 18 July 2005, would end a 30-year embargo on nuclear trade with India stemming from its refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. As part of the deal, India has committed to designating which of its nuclear facilities are civilian and can be placed under international monitoring. Those labeled military would be neither under safeguards nor eligible to receive imported nuclear technologies or fuel. Before the agreement can go ahead, the U.S. Congress must amend laws; congressional action will hinge on acceptance of India's separation plan.

In negotiations since December, India has taken a hard line, tagging all nuclear R&D facilities, including its fast-breeder reactors, as military. In a sign of how fraught the talks have become, Kakodkar acknowledges that India

and the accord with the U.S. Ho depend on tough political and nuclear issues. Resolving the 1962 spent "living" the wharves that ab In di w p f

Q: What is happening with the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal? Is the separation plan the sticking point?

The determination of what is in the civilian domain ... is an Indian determination, and we think that we have done a very objective job. That is what is under debate right now.

Asking for a specific set of safeguards. That amounts to changing the goalposts.

Q: If the political leadership demands it, would you be willing to accept changing the goalposts?
Where is the question of my willingness? I am a

765

www.sciencemag.org **SCIENCE** VOL 311 10 FEBRUARY 2006
Published by AAAS

NEWSFOCUS

Mild-mannered but hard-nosed. The fate of a landmark India-U.S. nuclear agreement appears to rest on Anil Kakodkar's judgment of how much of India's nuclear establishment can be placed under the watchful eyes of international inspectors.

Q: You are not averse to the idea of separation?
We cannot

Q: So categorically the breeders will not go under safeguards?

No way, because it hurts our strategic interest.

Q: The strategic interest of security or strategic interest of energy security?

Both. It hurts both because it is linked through the fuel cycle. Putting the Fast Breeder Program on the civilian list would amount to getting shackled, and India certainly cannot compromise one security for the other.

Science, Vol. 311, 10 Feb. 2006, pp. 765-766



Anil Kakodkar: "The safeguard arrangements of India will not be of the type which are applicable to the NPT states."

What is the significance of India insisting that its Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam should not come under safeguards?

The development of Fast Breeder Reactor technology and the development of its associated fuel cycle technology have to go hand in hand because breeders have to operate in a closed cycle mode. In the development of breeders, we have to go through evolution of several fuel cycle technologies, not one. For example, the PFBR will initially be on the mixed oxide fuel system. We will have to reprocess and re-fabricate the mixed oxide fuel. Then we want to take it to the

<http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrp/print.pl?file=2006031701821100.htm&date=2006/03/17/&prdt=th&>

Refueling Options for the PFBR


(Annual requirement: 1012 kg of plutonium with a Pu-FIS fraction of 69.5%)

	Core	Axial Blanket	Radial Blanket	CANDU
	900 kg 65.2% Pu-FIS	54 kg 96.6% Pu-FIS	97 kg 94.5% Pu-FIS	(unlimited supply) 77.1% Pu-FIS
Option 1	1012 kg (plus 38 kg surplus)			

Footnote

Isotopics of plutonium recovered from
spent fuel of heavy water (CANDU) reactors

Plutonium Isotopics of Heavy Water Reactor Fuel




Plutonium Isotopics of Heavy Water Reactor Fuel

		Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242
6.0 MWd/kg	at discharge	0.07%	74.92%	20.05%	4.19%	0.77%
	cooled	0.07%	75.60%	20.23%	3.32%	0.78%
7.0 MWd/kg	at discharge	0.09%	71.71%	22.23%	4.89%	1.08%
	cooled	0.09%	72.48%	22.46%	3.88%	1.09%
8.0 MWd/kg	at discharge	0.11%	68.75%	24.18%	5.52%	1.44%
	cooled	0.11%	69.58%	24.46%	4.39%	1.46%
9.0 MWd/kg	at discharge	0.13%	66.03%	25.90%	6.09%	1.85%
	cooled	0.13%	66.91%	26.24%	4.85%	1.87%
10.0 MWd/kg	at discharge	0.16%	63.52%	27.42%	6.61%	2.29%
	cooled	0.15%	64.44%	27.81%	5.27%	2.33%

Plutonium compositions in CANDU fuel irradiated to various discharge burnup levels.
Decay-corrected compositions are for a five-year storage period before reprocessing of the fuel.

Fissile Fraction of Plutonium Recovered from 5-Year-Cooled PHWR-Fuel




Refueling Options for the PFBR

(Annual requirement: 1012 kg of plutonium with a Pu-FIS fraction of 69.5%)

	Core	Axial Blanket	Radial Blanket	CANDU
	900 kg 65.2% Pu-FIS	53.5 kg 96.6% Pu-FIS	96.5 kg 94.5% Pu-FIS	(unlimited supply) 77.1% Pu-FIS
Option 1	1012 kg (plus 38 kg surplus)			
Option 2	762 kg (plus 191.5 kg surplus)	not reused		250 kg
requires chopping of core fuel and separation of axial blanket segments prior to reprocessing				
Option 3	646 kg (plus 254 kg surplus)	not reused	not reused	366 kg


Nuclear Facilities and Materials at the Kalpakkam / IGCAR Site



Madras-1
(170 MWe)


Madras-1
(220 MWe)

About 170 kg of plutonium per year
Fissile fraction: about 77%



Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant (KARP)
100 MT(HM)/yr

Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRFRP)
in planning stages
(capacity on the order of 10-15 MT(HM)/yr)



PFBR
(500 MWe)

Plutonium requirements
for operation in
civilian and military mode?

2000 kg of Pu for initial core
1000 kg of Pu for initial reloads
1000 kg of Pu needed to produce
400 kg of weapon-grade Pu
plus 750 kg of extra core-Pu

Cumulative local plutonium production by 2010: *more than 4000 kg*
Reprocessed fraction: *unknown (but presumably high)*

Local plutonium stockpile is likely to be (much) higher due to spent fuel transfers from other sites
Spent fuel from the Kaiga-1 and -2 reactors would add about 2000 kg of plutonium

KARP could separate more than 10,000 kg of plutonium by 2010

What Does All That Mean?

Fissile Material Inventories and Production Capacities in South Asia

(military material only)

India		Pakistan	
Plutonium	HEU	Plutonium	HEU
Estimated Inventory (as of 2006, rounded)			
500 kg	(sub weapon-grade)	90 kg	1300 kg

Inventories are roughly comparable in terms of nuclear-weapon equivalents
(about one hundred each)

Source: Mian et al., *Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the U.S.-India Deal*
Science and Global Security, 14: 117-143, 2006

Fissile Material Inventories and Production Capacities in South Asia

(military material only)

India		Pakistan	
Plutonium	HEU	Plutonium	HEU
Estimated Production Capacities (as of 2006)			
32 kg/yr	(20 kg/yr equivalent)	12 kg/yr	100 kg/yr
Potential Future Changes in Production Capacities (beyond 2010)			
-9 kg/yr after shutdown of CIRUS in 2010	(expandable)	--	(expandable)
PFBR		Khushab-2	
up to 150 kg/yr		10-40 kg/yr	

(The planned power level for the Khushab-2 reactor is unknown; the given range corresponds to a thermal power of 50-200 MW)

Conclusion

About 150 kg of weapon-grade plutonium will be generated annually
in the blankets of the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

once the reactor is operated under equilibrium conditions
and achieves a capacity factor of 75%

Straightforward options exist that allow for
“diversion” of weapon-grade plutonium from the blankets
by topping-up the PBFR-core with CANDU-plutonium

(e.g. OLD CORE + 250 kg of CANDU-Pu → NEW CORE + 100 kg of WPu + 190 kg of PFBR-Core-Pu)

CANDU-plutonium will be needed for the initial cores of the PFBR anyway

Given the current dynamics of the South-Asian nuclear weapon programs,
it seems implausible that the DAE would *not* consider/exercise this option *sooner or later*

(suspicions/allegations will arise *sooner or later* that the PFBR is used for weapons purposes)