Copyright 1996 The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company
HEADLINE: Added U.S. broadcasts send message in Serbia
BYLINE: ROY GUTMAN; Newsday
WASHINGTON - Signaling growing support for demonstrators
demanding the ouster of Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic,
the United States Wednesday expanded Voice of America
broadcasts into Serbia about the unrest and warned anew
against a police crackdown.
Some 150,000 students and political opponents of Milosevic
marched through Belgrade Wednesday, the biggest demonstration
to date. Mocking Milosevic, they chanted ""Come out, Martian''
at the Serbian presidency building, referring to Milosevic's
failure to acknowledge the protests now in their 17th day.
In fact, Milosevic for the first time took notice of the
protests Wednesday. State television reported that as students
passed the presidency building and delivered an open letter,
guards invited them in to talk with Milosevic. But the
students, caught off guard, demanded that the news media be
invited to join them. The Serbian leader apparently declined.
In another concession, state television announced the
dismissal of Mile Ilic, party boss in Nis, another scene of
big demonstrations. Nis was one of 15 cities where the
opposition won municipal elections, only to have them annulled
by Milosevic.
Wednesday's demonstration surged in size from Tuesday,
apparently in reaction to Milosevic's closure of B-92,
Belgrade's last independent radio station. To help replace the missing source of news, the State Department announced that
VOA broadcasts into Serbia will incorporate reports from B-92
staff.
In Washington, a senior State Department official said the
administration has decided ""we will not prop up'' Milosevic.
""Let me just be very clear about the position of the United
States,'' spokesman Nicholas Burns said Wednesday. ""The United
States is taking the side of democracy in Serbia. '' Burns
demanded that Milosevic honor the results of municipal
elections on Nov. 17, which his Socialist party lost to a
coalition of opposition parties.
Encouraging dissent within the Milosevic regime, Burns also
praised five judges of the Serbian Supreme Court who ""very
courageously'' criticized that court's decision to uphold
Milosevic's annulment of the election result.
In London, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, in a
""very tough'' meeting with Serb foreign minister Milan
Milutinovic, demanded that there be no violent suppression of the demonstrations, Burns said. Milutinovic promised that
force will not be used to disrupt the protests, but Talbott
told him ""we would judge the Serbian government based on its
actions, not on these promises. ''
Administration officials believe the expansion of VOA coverage
could have a significant impact on Serbian internal politics,
not only because of its content but by giving the
psychological signal of outside support, administration
officials said.
The U.S. government-funded station already reaches 10 percent
of the Serbian population, making it the most-listened-to
foreign news medium, and Wednesday expanded its broadcasts by
30 minutes to two hours per day. VOA's inclusion of reports
from B-92 staff is expanding its reach, formerly only to the
outskirts of Belgrade, to cover an audience throughout
Serbia.
In the first of the expanded broadcasts Wednesday night, the
radio carried accounts about protests in Belgrade and three
provincial cities. ""B-92 asked us to do it,'' said Frank Shkreli, head of the South European division. ""We're happy to
be there. We're providing a service. ''
Copyright 1996 P.G. Publishing Co.
HEADLINE: RWANDA CHIEF'S VISION SETS AFRICAN AGENDA
BYLINE: ROY GUTMAN, NEWSDAY
Last summer, when the current central Africa crisis was a troubling speck on the horizon, the soft-spoken, slightly built Rwandan strongman paid a visit to
Washington.
Hutu extremists were using the refugee camps they controlled in eastern Zaire to launch attacks on Rwanda, one of the world's smallest, poorest and most densely populated countries, struggling to recover from a genocidal civil war.
More than 1 million Tutsi had died at the hands of the Hutu, and a million Hutu had fled into exile when the Tutsi finally gained the upper hand.
Paul Kagame, the Tutsi Rwandan vice president and defense minister, told
officials in Washington that he had a simple remedy: an invasion of Zaire to
close the camps and repatriate the refugees.
If the international community would not separate the Hutu ''criminals'' from the other refugees, ''maybe Rwanda should be given a mandate and we should solve it,'' Rwanda's ambassador to Washington recalled Kagame telling one group. The
United States and other powers didn't respond to Kagame's overture.
When Rwanda's forces crossed into Zaire and fulfilled Kagame's vision earlier this month, the protest in Washington and elsewhere was only pro forma.
Once, it would have been an outside major power setting such an agenda. Tiny Rwanda's success illustrates a new direction in African affairs, where a small
country can have a sizable impact by using the implicit backing of a major power to impose its will.
But it also raises questions, such as whether the previous international
focus on humanitarian and human rights issues has been shunted aside by Rwanda's political needs.
Most of the camps have been closed since the fighting, and upward of a
half-million refugees have returned to Rwanda - but at the cost of escalating
instability in Zaire and uncertainty about the fate of 200,000 to 750,000 more
refugees still in Zaire.
Some humanitarian aid experts have attacked the Clinton administration for
paying too much attention to Rwanda's security, rather than the relief of human suffering.
But top State Department and White House officials and leading outside
experts speak in awe of Rwanda, casting the tiny land as the Israel of central
Africa.
''They could see that we weren't going to get rid of this cancer on the map
of Zaire. They acted with some degree of decisiveness in order to create facts
and solve the problem,'' said Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the Reagan administration. ''We were sitting on our thumbs,'' he told Newsday.
''Rwanda's leadership (doesn't) deal in slogans, but in realities,'' said
Richard Bogosian, the special U.S. envoy who crisscrossed the region during the crisis. ''The country they are most similar to is Israel; the Israelis deal with facts, not slogans.''
Esteem for Rwanda is proportionate to the results of its policy: the closure of the camps, the dramatic, sudden return of refugees and the dispatch into the bush of Hutu extremists who had run the camps and kept the refugees there.
Rwanda's short-term success also is having spillover effects in the region, and it may lead to a long-term realignment of outside powers in Africa.
The U.S. role in the events appears to be mainly that of ''friend of Rwanda'' and a brake on outside intervention.
''They don't listen to us, necessarily. They listen to themselves,'' said a
senior administration official. ''Relative to others in the international
community, we are perceived as being for the most part friendly.''
Said Bogosian: ''We didn't have that big a political agenda.''
But France did. As Belgium, the former colonial power, withdrew from playing a leading role in central Africa in recent years, France sought to fill the vacuum. France had armed and trained the Hutu regime that conducted the genocide against Rwandan Tutsis in 1994, and after Kagame's forces came to power, the French - with U.S. support - mounted ''Operation Turquoise,'' which effectively ensconced the Hutu militias in their bases on the Zaire-Rwanda border.
The crisis began late last month, when a local Zairean official in Kivu
province, which borders Rwanda, announced the expulsion of more than 100,000
ethnic Tutsis who had lived in the region for two centuries. Many of them had
fought with the Rwanda Tutsis under Kagame in 1994. The so-called Banyamulenge
had Kagame's backing and the leadership of Laurent Kabila, a rebel from Shaba
province who is not a Tutsi, and they decided they would not leave without a
fight.
Rwanda, complaining that the Zaire army was firing artillery into its
territory, staged an incursion into Zaire, and the Zaire army, unpaid for years, undisciplined and apparently leaderless, scattered.
As the crisis built, France demanded an international humanitarian
intervention in eastern Zaire but insisted that U.S. troops join. Zairean leader Mobutu Sese Seko, convalescing at his French Riviera chateau from cancer
treatment, willingly agreed, obviously hoping to regain control of his lost
territory.
Rwanda was flatly opposed. ''There is a near pathological distrust of
intervention force in that region,'' said Rwanda's ambassador to Washington,
Theogene Rudasingwa. ''In 1994, when a million people were killed, at that
moment the international community decided to disengage and withdraw. No one
thought they had changed for the better.''
The United States resisted French demands by repeatedly seeking details of
the exact goals for an intervention. The turning point in the crisis occurred
two weeks ago, after Canada decided it would lead the intervention and launched a public campaign to enlist the United States. President Clinton reluctantly
agreed, but attached many conditions.
At his headquarters in Goma, Zaire, Kabila worried. ''He viewed this in terms of the future of Zaire,'' said Roger Winter, director of the U.S. committee for Refugees, a Washington-based nonprofit advocacy group.
Kabila, a one-time leftist who led a rebellion in Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province in the 1960s, has publicly stated that his aim is to overthrow Mobutu. He feared that the arrival of foreign forces in Goma would destroy his newfound advantage.
On Nov. 12, just after Canada persuaded reluctant Clinton aides to join the
force, Kabila struck pre-emptively. After reportedly heavy fighting, he moved
into the camps and unloosed the human tidal wave.
Kabila, with Winter's assistance, then made contact with the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda to explain his objectives and seek enough leeway to carry them out.
Bogosian confirmed that he had met Kabila but declined to give details of the
discussion. But Winter said Kabila came away from the meeting satisfied.
''The humanitarian agencies got it wrong in 1994; they gave us 2 1/2 years of absolute horror,'' said Winter of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. ''In my view, this was the biggest hostage crisis in memory.''
Copyright 1996 Newsday, Inc.
HEADLINE: RWANDA'S BOLD STEPS PAY OFF / ZAIRE INVASION EMPTIED CAMPS
BYLINE: By Roy Gutman. WASHINGTON BUREAU
Washington - Last summer, when the current crisis in central Africa was a
troubling speck on the horizon, the soft-spoken, slightly built Rwandan
strongman paid a visit to Washington.
Hutu extremists were using the refugee camps they controlled in eastern Zaire to launch attacks on Rwanda, one of the smallest, poorest and most densely populated countries, struggling to recover from a genocidal civil war. More than 1 million Tutsi had died at the hands of the Hutu and a million Hutu had fled into exile when the Tutsi finally gained the upper hand. Paul Kagame, the Tutsi Rwandan vice president and defense minister, told officials here he had a simple remedy: an invasion of Zaire to close the camps and repatriate the refugees.
If the international community would not separate the Hutu "criminals" from
the other refugees, "maybe Rwanda should be given a mandate and we should solve it," Rwanda's ambassador to Washington recalled Kagame telling one group.
The United States and other major powers did not respond to Kagame's
overture. When Rwanda's forces crossed into Zaire and fulfilled Kagame's vision earlier this month, the protest in Washington and elsewhere was only pro forma.
Once it would have been an outside major power setting such an agenda. Tiny
Rwanda's success illustrates a new direction in African affairs, where a small
country can have a sizable impact by using the implicit backing of a major power to impose its will.
But it also raises questions such as whether the previous international focus on humanitarian and human rights issues has been shunted aside by Rwanda's
political needs. Most of the camps have been closed since the fighting and upwards of a half-million refugees have returned to Rwanda but at the cost of
escalating instability in Zaire and uncertainty about the fate of 200,000 to
750,000 additional refugees still on the march in Zaire.
Some humanitarian aid experts have attacked the Clinton administration for
paying too much attention to Rwanda's security rather than the relief of human
suffering. But top State Department and White House officials and leading
outside experts speak in awe of Rwanda, casting the tiny land as the Israel of
central Africa.
"They could see that we weren't going to get rid of this cancer on the map of Zaire. They acted with some degree of decisiveness in order to create facts and solve the problem," said Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the Reagan administration. "We were sitting on our thumbs," he told Newsday.
"Rwanda's leadership don't deal in slogans but in realities," said Richard
Bogosian, the special U.S. envoy who criss-crossed the region during the crisis. "The country they are most similar to is Israel. The Israelis deal with facts,
not slogans."
Esteem for Rwanda is proportionate to the results of its policy: the closure of the camps, the dramatic, sudden return of refugees, and the dispatch into the bush of Hutu extremists who had run the camps and kept the refugees there.
Rwanda's short-term success also is having spillover effects in the region, most of which remain to be measured, and it may lead to a long-term realignment of
outside powers in Africa.
The United States' role in the events appears to be mainly that of "friend of Rwanda" and a brake on outside intervention. "They don't listen to us,
necessarily. They listen to themselves," said a senior administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Relative to others in the international
community, we are perceived as being for the most part friendly." Said Bogosian: "We didn't have that big a political agenda."
France, however, did. As Belgium, the former colonial power, withdrew from
playing a leading role in central Africa in recent years, France sought to fill the vacuum. France had armed and trained the Hutu regime that conducted the
genocide against Rwandan Tutsis in 1994, and after Kagame's forces came to
power, the French with U.S. support mounted "Operation Turquoise," which
effectively ensconced the Hutu militias in their bases on the Zaire-Rwanda
border.
The crisis began late last month when a local Zaire official in Kivu
province, which borders Rwanda, announced the expulsion of more than 100,000
ethnic Tutsis who had lived in the region for two centuries. Many of them had
fought with the Rwanda Tutsis under Kagame in 1994. The so-called Banyamulenge
had Kagame's backing and the leadership of Laurent Kabila, a rebel from Shaba
province who is not a Tutsi, and they decided they would not leave without a
fight.
Rwanda, complaining that the Zaire army was firing artillery into its
territory, staged an incursion into Zaire, and the Zaire army, unpaid for years, undisciplined, and apparently leaderless, scattered. Kabila and the Banyamulenge attacked the fleeing Zaire army and the Hutu militia allied with them.
As the crisis built, France demanded an international humanitarian
intervention in eastern Zaire but insisted that U.S. troops join. Zaire leader
Mobutu Sese Seko, convalescing at his Riviera chateau from cancer treatment,
willingly agreed, obviously hoping to regain control of his lost territory.
Rwanda was flatly opposed.
"There is a near pathological distrust of intervention force in that region," said Rwanda's ambassador to Washington, Theogene Rudasingwa. "In 1994, when a million people were killed, at that moment the international community decided to disengage and withdraw. No one thought they had changed for the better." The United States resisted French demands, by repeatedly seeking details of the
exact goals for an intervention.
The turning point in the crisis occurred two weeks ago, after Canada decided it would lead the intervention and launched a public campaign to enlist the
United States. President Bill Clinton reluctantly agreed, but attached many
conditions.
At his headquarters in Goma, Zaire, a major concentration of Hutu refugees,
Kabila worried. "He viewed this in terms of the future of Zaire," said Roger
Winter, director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, a Washington-based
non-profit advocacy group.
Kabila, a one-time leftist who led a rebellion in Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province in the 1960s, has publicly stated his aim as to overthrow Mobutu,
widely viewed as one of the most corrupt regimes in Africa. He feared that the
arrival of foreign forces in Goma would destroy his newfound advantage.
"He said to me that an international force will have the effect of
stabilizing my enemies, preserve the interahamwe Rwanda Hutu militias, allow the government to grow stronger, and freeze the military situation on the
ground," Winter recalled.
On Nov. 12, just after Canada persuaded reluctant Clinton aides to join the
force, Kabila struck pre-emptively. "We have to change the equation before the
international force comes," Winter quoted him as saying.
After reportedly heavy fighting, Kabila moved into the camps and unloosed the human tidal wave. Kabila, with Winter's assistance, then made contact with the
U.S. Embassy in Rwanda to explain his objectives and seek enough leeway to carry them out. Bogosian confirmed he had met Kabila but declined to give any details of the discussion. But Winter said Kabila came away from the meeting satisfied.
What has pleased Kabila has upset many among the relief agencies who
sustained the East Zaire camps and had supported an international intervention. These same agencies, in the absence of much focus by western governments, have
functioned as the eyes and ears of the world, and suddenly found themselves shut out of the region by Kabila, the de facto power in eastern Zaire. Fearing the
worst for the refugees, some are openly clashing with the government and each
other.
Last week, the U.S. ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Gribben, said in a radio
interview that he believed only a few tens of thousands" of Rwandan refugees
were stilll scattered in the bush - far below the estimates of up to 700,000 of the UN High Commission of Refugees.
Whatever the figure, the situation remains far from clear, according to
Gerald Martone of the International Rescue Committee, one of the most effective of the U.S. relief organizations.
"We should all be humbled by these events. The way these camps emptied out in a couple of hours is something that defies our understanding. I am in awe of the complexity of it. I'd be cautious about what it portends."
Copyright 1996 Newsday, Inc.
HEADLINE: MISSION EXTENDED / CLINTON: BOSNIA STILL NEEDS TROOPS HELP
BYLINE: By Roy Gutman. WASHINGTON BUREAU
Washington - Conceding that he had underestimated the complexity of the task, President Bill Clinton said yesterday that U.S. soldiers will not return from
Bosnia next month but will stay on as part of a trimmed NATO force for 18 more
months.
Clinton said NATO forces had "succeeded beyond our expectations" in their
military aims of separating the warring parties, demobilizing soldiers and
storing heavy weapons. But he added that troops are needed to prevent an
outbreak of hostilities.
"Quite frankly, rebuilding the fabric of Bosnia's economic and political life is taking longer than anticipated," he said at a news conference. Until the
U.S.-backed Muslim-Croat federation is able to defend itself and municipal
elections are held, Bosnians "will need the stability and the confidence that
only an outside security force can provide," he said.
Defense Secretary William Perry said the U.S. presence in Bosnia will be
reduced to 8,500 troops next year and 5,500 in 1998 from a high earlier this
year of about 20,000. The overall NATO force will drop in size from a high of
60,000 to 31,000 next year and about 13,500 in 1998.
"The conditions for peace still do not exist in Bosnia, and there's still the danger that if our forces were to leave Bosnia next month, the war would resume, having thereby lost the very great benefits we got by going in," Perry said.
"The operation was a success, but the patient is still in danger of dying."
He left open the door to a possible extension of the U.S. presence beyond
mid-1998. "I believe they will be out in eighteen months," he said.
The announcement got mixed reviews on Capitol Hill. "I don't think that the
president has kept his word on the commitments he made to Congress last year,"
said Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas). "He said that he would keep the
mission to a year. He didn't. He said that he would arm and train the Bosnian
Muslims. He hasn't."
Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.), the only Democrat to vote against the
deployment, said the United States "continues to be drawn deeper and deeper into a situation from which we appear unable to extricate ourselves."
But Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) indicated support for the mission, provided
the United States shows leadership in four objectives: maintaining freedom of
movement in Bosnia, allowing refugees to return home, ensuring honest local
elections and bringing war criminals to justice.
The decision was practically unavoidable after America's NATO partners
coupled their pleas for an extension of the mandate with a warning that they
would depart unless U.S. forces remain. Although Republican presidential
candidate Bob Dole raised no public objections to extending the deployment,
Clinton delayed the decision until he won his second term.
In another development, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was admitted to
Walter Reed Army Hospital this week for treatment of what administration
officials said was cancer. He has cooperated with Clinton at every turning point of the peace process.
Perry took personal responsibility for the administration's "error of
judgment" in suggesting that the deployment could be completed in one year. He
said the limited military tasks laid out in the Dayton, Ohio, peace accords of
November, 1995, were completed in a year, as anticipated. However, "I was wrong, particularly in my belief that having done these tasks, we would have
established the conditions which would allow us to leave Bosnia," he said. "I
take responsibility for that because that was not the president speaking . . .
It was our speaking to him and saying we can do a twelve-month mission."
Clinton did not mention the single most contentious issue in Bosnia - the
fact that almost no refugees have returned to their homes, as was agreed to at
the Dayton peace conference. He said the aim in the next year is "to prevent a
resumption of hostilities, so that economic reconstruction and political
reconciliation can accelerate."
But Perry cited three potentially explosive areas: the failure to resettle
refugees, the failure to hold municipal elections and the absence of an
agreement on which side will control the strategic town of Brcko.
"There is a fertile breeding ground for violence, for localized conflicts,
which could escalate, get out of control and lead to a general war," he said.
Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said only
that the NATO force will "be there to ensure . . . a proper climate of security" and will not have the responsibility of enforcing freedom of movement for
citizens.
NATO will step in only when local or UN forces "are no longer able to deal
with a situation," he said.
Shalikashvili said NATO forces will detain war criminals "should they fall
into their hands incident to the conduct of their normal operations."
Foreign Affairs The countries where President Bill Clinton has sent or withdrawn U.S.
ground troops. (SOURCE: World Almanac; Department of Defense; Associated Press
Somalia.) Former President George Bush sends about 7,000 U.S. troops to Somalia
to safeguard food delivery. Following a disastrous firefight in October, 1993,
Clinton decides to withdraw all troops by March, 1994. Macedonia. About 300 U.S. troops are sent to Macedonia to help prevent the conflict in the former
Yugoslav republics from spreading. Haiti. Clinton in 1994 sends 20,000 U.S.
troops as part of a UN-authorized mission to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to
power. Up to 700 troops remain in the country. Rwanda. About 3,000 troops were sent in 1994 to the region to help a humanitarian relief effort. Kuwait. About 3,500 troops are sent in September to Kuwait in response to Iraqi incursions
into Kurdish areas in the north. In 1994, Iraq moved troops south toward Kuwait and Clinton responded with another troop buildup in the region.
Bosnia-Herzegovina. About 19,000 troops are sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina to
monitor Dayton peace accords last spring. About 14,000 currently are in Bosnia
and Clinton decided yesterday to allow 8,000 U.S. troops to remain after the
withdrawal deadline. Zaire. A force of up to 5,000 troops is to be dispatched
to Zaire and surrounding countries to assist a UN-led humanitarian relief
effort. The Bosnia Saga How U.S. troop strength in Bosnia-Herzegovina has
changed following the Dayton peace accords: November-December 1995. First few
hundred soldiers, mostly engineers and logistics experts, begin to prepare the
way for the deployment. January, 1996. About 2,000 troops in Bosnia and more on way as Army struggles to bridge Sava River. Spring. U.S. troop strength in
Bosnia peaks at 19,000; total strength of NATO peace Implementation Force, or
IFOR, reaches 58,000. August-September. Drawdown under way, U.S. troop strength falls to 16,000. September-October. Addition of an Army INCHES covering force
INCHES to protect the withdrawing troops pushes troop total up to 17,000. Mid-November. About 14,000 troops remain. Dec. 20. Originally the last day of
IFOR mission, but 8,000 U.S. troops to remain.
Copyright 1996 Newsday, Inc.
HEADLINE: ON FOREIGN SEAS, ROUGH SAILING / CRISES ON THE HORIZON FOR NEW CLINTON TEAM
BYLINE: By Roy Gutman. WASHINGTON BUREAU
Washington - The lid that President Bill Clinton managed to clamp on foreign crises during the campaign may pop off soon in unpredictable ways, leading to
challenges as well as opportunities for his still-unnamed national security team in the second term, according to foreign policy experts.
Rough sailing lies ahead in part because the waters in the post-Cold War era are still uncharted.
"The next four years are going to be the most difficult years the United
States has faced internationally since 1945, without any doubt," said Paul
Goble, a foreign affairs analyst now with Radio Free Europe. "The challenges are so diverse and so many, and we have no mental template to make sense of things."
Critics within the administration say Clinton, who emphasized domestic policy at the expense of foreign affairs early in his first term, compounded the
challenges by redefining U.S. international priorities. He placed terrorism, the drug trade, international crime and the environment at the top of his concerns, rather than striving to control political developments region by region.
The full plate of problems also presents the team that will replace Warren
Christopher and William Perry, secretaries of state and defense, respectively,
with a chance to make their mark if Clinton allows them.
Examples abound of crisis and opportunity: in the Middle East, Africa and
Bosnia, to name a few.
Take central Africa, a region long neglected by the United States and now
seemingly on the edge of an explosion. The conflict between tiny Rwanda and
sprawling Zaire, which set a million Rwandan refugees in flight into the Zairean interior, could be the start of a regionwide conflagration.
"This could be the biggest geopolitical crisis in Africa since 1960, if not
before," said Lionel Rosenblatt, head of Refugees International, an independent humanitarian group. Three crises coincide: the Zaire government's loss of
control of its Kivu province to rebels supported by neighboring Rwanda, the
flight of Rwandan Hutu refugees, and the succession to the corruption-plagued
government of Mobutu Sese Seko, the ailing president of Zaire.
Here as in nearly every other region of the world, the United States appears to be the only country that can lead the international community even in a
limited intervention to restore facilities so humanitarian aid can flow once
again.
Belgium, the former colonial power, long ago abandoned any responsibility for Zaire, once known as Congo. France, which has tried to take the lead, is viewed with suspicion in Rwanda for its role in backing Mobutu against Rwanda in the
past. The U.S. administration recently proposed an African intervention force,
but it is not yet in place. Clinton is disinclined to send U.S. ground troops into a highly unstable situation in the absence of U.S. economic or security
interests.
But Zaire's loss of control over the province "could be the beginning of a
volcanic eruption along the colonial borders," Rosenblatt said.
In the Middle East, Clinton's administration suffered a humiliating setback
at the start of September, when Iraq regained control of much of northern Iraq, leading to closure of a covert CIA operation aimed at overthrowing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the withdrawal of all U.S. government employees. The losses
were cloaked by Clinton's decision to launch 44 Cruise missiles at radar sites
in southern Iraq.
With the collapse of the "safe haven" for Kurds in the north, the U.S. policy of "dual containment" - isolating Iran and Iraq by labeling them terrorist
states - has failed, according to experts. Not only is Hussein stronger than
before, but Iran, far from being isolated, is now launching diplomatic
initiatives to address regional problems.
Yet alternatives are available. "Dual containment became a phrase to cover
the fact we have no policy," said an expert at the State Department, who spoke
on condition of anonymity. "Can a relationship be established with Iran? I'd like to test the possibility."
Iran's UN ambassador, Kamal Kharrazi, proposed in a Washington Post op-ed
article last week to discuss with Washington the common goal of ending the civil war in Afghanistan. The State Department dismissed the offer, saying the primary matter Washington wants to discuss with Iran is its alleged support of
international terrorism, making clear the priority it gives to fighting
terrorism over resolving a regional conflict.
"The problem is that we got into a competition" with Sen. Alfonse D'Amato
(R-N.Y.), who led congressional demands to block other relations with Iran, said the State Department expert. "The fact is that Iran's regional policy is relatively benign."
Iran, by virtue of its location, large Kurdish population and rivalry with
Iraq, also has potentially common interests with the United States with regard
to Iraq.
"Of course, we can talk to them. You can do it if it is in your own
interest," said Albert Wohlstetter, head of the consulting firm Pan-Heuristics
and a leading strategic thinker who has advised several Republican
administrations. "Just never give them the impression we will reward them in their malefactions."
Another country demanding U.S. policy attention is Turkey, a pivotal NATO
ally critical to U.S. security interests in the region and now ruled by a
minority Islamic fundamentalist government. State Department experts say that
Turkey was taken for granted in Clinton's first term and that the United States must make tough decisions that will require expending diplomatic capital to
ensure that Turkey remains in the NATO alliance.
Among the actions are convincing the European allies to overcome their
antipathy to a secular Muslim state and allow Turkey to join the European Union.
The new national security team also faces the option of refocusing U.S.
diplomacy from Christopher's quest for an Israel-Syria accord and concentrating on negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Clinton defused a massive flare-up of violence in September by calling an
urgent summit between Israeli Prime Minister Benjanmin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat. Now the agreement to conclude quickly an
accord handing over Israeli control of the West Bank town of Hebron has stalled and is in need of another kick-start.
At his news conference Friday, Clinton implied that priorities in the Middle East have shifted. "The first and most important thing we can do is to nail the agreement on Hebron," he said. "If we can clear the Hebron hurdle . . . I
believe that will open the door to go on and fulfill all the other challenges
that are now before us."
In Asia, the administration has to decide whether to placate China by curbing Taiwan's drive for a UN seat or to confront China, should tensions resume over
the island republic. "If our relationship with China sours because of Taiwan, it will lead to an aggravation of other disputes over proliferation of nuclear
weapons, trade, and a generally hostile relationship," said Selig Harrison, an
expert on Asia with the Carnegie Endowment, an independent think tank in
Washington.
Another decision to be made is in Bosnia, where Clinton is weighing whether
to maintain a sizable NATO presence including thousands of U.S. troops or to
withdraw most forces. The administration claims it has brought peace to Bosnia, but most observers speak of an armistice in view of the failure to repatriate
the 2.2 million displaced people to their homes or to arrest war criminals
indicted by the new Hague Tribunal.
For NATO troops to arrest war criminals would require a presidential
decision, for it entails risk of casualties among NATO troops and a change in
relations between NATO and the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs have resisted
resettling Muslims and Croats who were "ethnically cleansed" from their
ancestral homes in the Drina and Sava river valleys, and requiring their return would raise tensions but ultimately permit NATO to withdraw its troops. Without justice and the return of refugees, war is likely to resume when NATO leaves,
observers said.
U.S. officials said Clinton, in this as other areas, is loath to risk
American lives and generally prefers to allow problems to simmer. The fear is
that he will soon have to deal with multiple crises and have little idea of how to cope.
"For fifty years we were confronted by another superpower," said Goble. "But now we are challenged by a geopolitically complex world. Our elite hasn't
figured it out. They are not stupid, but this is a world they didn't live in."
The Houston Chronicle
December 5, 1996
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
November 29, 1996
Newsday
November 28, 1996
Newsday
November 16, 1996
Newsday
November 11, 1996