anxiety about the United States’ prospects might be one of the cultural forces responsible for the country’s persistent strength; rather than resting on their laurels, Americans continually and even neurotically poke at their social fabric, looking for tears that need mending.

*The War of 1812: Writings From America’s Second War of Independence*
EDITED BY DONALD R. HICKEY. Library of America, 2013, 928 pp. $40.00.

The indispensable Library of America has produced a valuable collection of documents and contemporary accounts of the War of 1812. The war was ostensibly fought over British attempts to restrict U.S. trade and force sailors on American-flagged vessels into service in the British Royal Navy. It was, however, vehemently opposed by most U.S. trading and mercantile interests and was most strongly supported by farmers and other interior dwellers. One of the many merits of this volume is that, through speeches and accounts of official meetings, readers are able to see the war through the eyes of the defeated—and there was no group for whom the War of 1812 was a worse disaster than Native Americans. Ultimately deserted by their British allies, the Native American tribes who lived between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River suffered a series of defeats at the hands of American forces that left them defenseless before the accelerating tide of settlement along the frontier.

**Western Europe**

*Andrew Moravcsik*

*In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence*
BY RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES. Oxford University Press, 2013, 256 pp. $29.95.

*Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire*
BY CALDER WALTON. Overlook Press, 2013, 448 pp. $35.00.

Spies and surveillance have dominated headlines all across Europe in recent months. These two books help illuminate how contemporary espionage took shape. Jeffreys-Jones focuses on Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, arguing that its finest hours were during World War II and in the early stages of the Cold War. By the 1960s, the British could no longer keep up with either U.S. technological prowess or the Americans’ unilateral impulsiveness. The relationship fell into decline; today, it is no longer special.

To understand what the British were really up to in those years of decline, readers can turn to Walton’s far more thoroughly documented study, which describes the role of the United Kingdom’s intelligence agencies in defending and then liquidating the British Empire. This included intensive involvement in brutal counterinsurgency operations, colonial repression, and widespread torture, but also quite a bit of sensible, moderate advice that tended to be ignored by colonial administrations. The records of these events, suppressed by the British
government for half a century, make for fascinating reading.

The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How Health, Family, and Employment Laws Spread Across Countries

Linos argues that the adoption of particular health and family policies in one country can increase support for them in others. Technocrats draw on specific experiences elsewhere to fine-tune domestic policy proposals. More surprising, everyday voters—even in a country with an exceptionalist self-image, such as the United States—see the adoption of policies by other large countries as a signal that the proposals are feasible and fair. This would seem utterly implausible if Linos did not document it with public opinion data and historical case studies from Greece, Spain, and the United States. For scholars, the book poses as many questions as it answers. For policymakers, it suggests novel ways to build support for policy innovations.

Narrating Trauma: On the Impact of Collective Suffering
EDITED BY RON EYERMAN, JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, AND ELIZABETH BUTLER BRESEE. Paradigm, 2011, 336 pp. $113.00 (paper, $37.95).

In this book, a team of sociologists revisits some of the most horrifying cases of mass slaughter from the past century, including many episodes during World War II, the Cultural Revolution in China, the Greek Civil War and Cypriot partition, and the mass refugee crises in southern Africa. To a surprising extent, they find that politics and ideology, rather than the sheer moral horror of violence, have determined what subsequently registered as a painful and traumatic event, defined who was treated as a perpetrator or a victim, and dictated who deserved restitution. Political polarization leads Colombians to view kidnappings as individual private misfortunes rather than public problems. One-party rule led Poland to suppress the true story of the Katyn massacre of 1940, in which Soviet secret police forces killed more than 20,000 Polish nationals. The Holocaust sensitized the world to Jewish suffering yet desensitized many Israelis to Palestinian suffering. Germans view the Allied bombing of World War II as deserved retribution, whereas the Japanese view it as a complex and ambiguous national trauma. Readers might disagree with these conclusions, but the book makes a convincing case that the moral lessons of the last century remain ambiguous and contested.

The Art of Lobbying the EU: More Machiavelli in Brussels. 4th ed.
BY RINUS VAN SCHENDELEN. Amsterdam University Press, 2013, 390 pp. $55.00.

Academics and practitioners generally go their separate ways, barely paying attention to each other. Occasionally, however, a scholarly book emerges whose scope, clarity, and focus on a vital issue allow it to cross the theory-praxis divide.
This latest edition of van Schendelen’s classic work synthesizes the most important lessons that political scientists, management scholars, and the best public affairs professionals have learned about how to lobby the European Union. Mastering the EU process is hard, as the five pages of abbreviations at the beginning of the book attest. Yet knowledge helps lobbyists pick which buttons to push when dealing with EU policymakers. Although the book is not an easy read, it makes even complex questions—such as whether lobbyists are a force for Europe’s democratic legitimacy—concrete and accessible to the average reader. It is hard to imagine anyone succeeding in Brussels without knowing what is in this unique volume.

The Fall of the Celtic Tiger: Ireland and the Euro Debt Crisis
BY DONAL DONOVAN AND ANTOIN E. MURPHY. Oxford University Press, 2013, 256 pp. $65.00.

Although its subject matter and the text itself are a bit dry, this book is the best so far on the Irish financial crisis of 2008. The authors trace the well-known contours of the financial crisis that swept over Ireland, the government’s response, and the debate that has followed. They explain how an investment boom triggered a housing bubble. When the bubble burst, it took the banking sector with it. Private actors were at best shortsighted and at worst criminal, and public authorities, notably the Central Bank of Ireland, failed to discharge their regulatory duties. The fact that during the boom, politicians failed to push against the irrational optimism of the financial sector reflects the cozy personal style of Irish politics. The media and economists failed to inform the public about the growing risks. The authors conclude that the government had no practical alternative to issuing a much-criticized comprehensive bank guarantee, which, combined with irresponsible government borrowing and spending during the boom years, quickly fueled public-sector deficits.

Western Hemisphere

Richard Feinberg

The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy Toward Argentina

As U.S. President Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977, determined to restore purposeful idealism to U.S. foreign policy, a brutal military dictatorship in Argentina was systematically torturing and murdering thousands of suspected leftists. In his fast-paced, engrossing account, Schmidli chronicles the fierce internal struggles within the White House and the State Department, where political appointees dedicated to transforming Carter’s idealism into concrete policies battled career diplomats accustomed to maintaining cordial relations with anticomunist regimes such as Argentina’s. Schmidli concludes that, despite subsequent policy vacillations, the United States extracted some important concessions from the