administration was too assertive in its policies after 9/11, although he also discusses some of Bush’s now-forgotten successes, such as his handling of relations with rising powers such as Brazil and India, and notes that a more experienced and better-supported Bush compiled a much more solid diplomatic record in his second term. When Rothkopf criticizes Barack Obama, he generally faults the president for being too passive on foreign policy rather than too active. Rothkopf does credit Obama with some achievements, such as the successful hunt for Osama bin Laden and the decimation of the core al Qaeda organization, but he argues that in general the administration has failed to follow a coherent strategy for dealing with profound global upheaval.

HAL BRANDS

Western Europe

Andrew Moravcsik

The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall

Berlin Now: The City After the Wall
BY PETER SCHNEIDER. TRANSLATED BY SOPHIE SCHLONDORFF. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014, 336 pp. $27.00 (paper, $15.00).

Sarotte’s lively and engaging book scrupulously details the events of November 9, 1989, when the world watched in shock as the Berlin Wall came down. Sarotte argues that the opening of the wall was “accidental and contingent.” It was certainly unforeseen and unintended by world leaders. Neither Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, who sought to reform Soviet communism, nor U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who a few years previously had called on Gorbachev to “tear down this wall,” really expected that East Germany would open up. Leaders in East Berlin never issued a definitive order to allow people to pass through; rather, their contradictory commands freed border guards to act autonomously. Yet the book also shows—somewhat contrary to Sarotte’s thesis—that the fall of the wall reflected deeper, perhaps inevitable historical trends. By late 1989, neither the Soviet government nor the East German authorities were willing to use force to block the changes unfolding in Berlin. Sarotte’s blow-by-blow account tells readers much about how events developed on that fateful night, but less about how the Soviet bloc had reached the point of no return.

A quarter of a century later, Berlin is once again a global metropolis. Schneider has reported from the city since the early 1960s and his coolly ironic takes on life there reflect a characteristic Berliner attitude. The brief essays in Berlin Now cover the city’s architectural decline, from classical grandeur to modernist compromise; its odd aversion to preserving the remnants of the wall; its sordid history of prostitution; the reasons why women from the East prefer men from the West (but rarely the reverse); Marxist radical chic; Berlin’s right-wing and anti-immigrant violence; the long controversy over whether to repatriate artwork stolen by the Nazis; the city’s celebrity club bouncers; and much more. Anyone
who loves this unique city—or simply plans to visit it—should read this book.

Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty, and European Integration
BY REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN.
Cambridge University Press, 2014, 263 pp. $95.00.

EU “opt-outs,” special exemptions from EU policies, are likely to be in the news in the coming years as the British seek to renegotiate the terms of their membership in the union. This book examines what actually happens when a government secures an opt-out, as Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and others have done on issues such as social policy, border controls, the euro, defense, and asylum and immigration. The academic theory and language in this book are unnecessarily complex, yet its basic point is important: opt-outs can actually strengthen the EU. They aid progress by permitting the union to move ahead on vital policies, preventing individual members from gumming up the works. Once those policies are in place, they often become so important that the states that have opted out find quiet ways to become as involved as their domestic politics will permit. On the surface, the EU might seem to be a legalistic body, but, as this book demonstrates, its true decision-making and enforcement processes are based on unwritten norms.

When the Facts Change: Essays, 1995–2010
BY TONY JUDT. EDITED BY JENNIFER HOMANS. Penguin Press, 2015, 400 pp. $29.95.

Judt, who died in 2010, was among the most celebrated historians of contemporary Europe. He was also a trenchant and insightful essayist. This book collects his best work in that genre. Profound and prescient, these short, readable pieces cover a range of topics: the meaning of the Cold War and its end; Israel’s relationship to the Holocaust; the world order after 9/11; the lives of great thinkers and the decline of European systems and institutions, from railroads to social democracy. Underlying these topics is a set of Judt’s deeper concerns—Judt’s editor calls them “obsessions”—including the changing role of the state, the ideological purposes of foreign policy, the role of memory in public life, and the enduring effects of history. Were all that not enough, this book would still be worth reading solely for Judt’s widow’s description of the historian’s rigorous work habits—an account that definitively counters the myth that talented writers achieve greatness effortlessly.

Managing the Euro Area Debt Crisis

Cline offers the most detailed, data-rich, and policy-relevant analysis of the euro crisis yet to appear. Yet the interpretation he puts forward, although shared by many in the European financial and political establishments, is hardly uncontroversial. In Cline’s view, the euro system is in crisis primarily because some eurozone members have accumulated too much sovereign debt, and not because Europe suffers from insufficient demand, distorted exchange rates, or a lack of economic competitiveness. Cline argues that it would be disas-
torous for any country—even Greece, whose economic woes are currently dragging down the rest of the EU—to exit the eurozone because of the risk that investors would soon lose confidence in other countries. Thus, the EU’s current response represents the only feasible option: Greece should continue to receive some modest debt relief from creditors and the EU, and Greece and other indebted EU countries, including Ireland, Italy, and Portugal, should continue to run large fiscal surpluses indefinitely. Cline’s empirical analysis is impressive, but skeptics will note that his conclusions rest on two speculative assumptions: running perpetual surpluses will not stunt economic growth, and any withdrawal from the euro would be so costly as to make such threats not worth taking seriously. Recent events in Europe seem to be calling both of those assumptions into question.

Western Hemisphere

Richard Feinberg

Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape
BY ARCHIBALD R. M. RITTER AND TED A. HENKEN. Lynne Rienner, 2014, 373 pp. $79.95.

Leadership in the Cuban Revolution: The Unseen Story

Since inheriting the reins of power from his ailing brother Fidel in 2008, Raúl Castro has allowed Cubans to open small-scale businesses. Some 450,000 Cubans, or about ten percent of the active work force, quickly took advantage of the new policy, opening private restaurants and bed-and-breakfasts, setting up taxi companies and beauty parlors, and offering their services in construction and electronics repair. In Entrepreneurial Cuba, two veteran Cuba watchers, the social scientists Ritter and Henken, interview many of these new business owners, detail the regulations governing their activities, and calculate the effective tax rates they pay. Particularly valuable are the chapters on the remaining underground economy—businesses not yet able or willing to come out of the shadows—and the contributors’ judicious assessments of the new regulations governing the still forming but promising worker-managed cooperative sector. Overall, the authors recognize the significance of Raúl’s reforms while finding them insufficient to pull the Cuban economy out of its doldrums. Certainly, Ritter and Henken would applaud U.S. President Barack Obama’s recent decision to authorize U.S. firms to engage with Cuba’s new entrepreneurs.

Kapcia takes readers on a well-informed tour of Cuba’s ruling elite. Although based primarily on existing sources, his sketches of leading personalities are engaging and thoughtful. However, his core argument—that other commentators have overplayed the centrality of Fidel Castro—is not altogether persuasive. Kapcia identifies three main components in the current power center: “stalwarts” and Communist Party functionaries resistant to change; reform-minded “specialists” and technocrats characterized by their quiet