argue that Americans’ priorities are so misplaced because of a “Threat-Industrial Complex” that hypes international dangers. Clear and Present Safety makes some effective points about the costs of ill-considered war, and as memories of World War II and the Cold War recede, it is possible that Cohen and Zenko’s reasoning will appeal to new generations of policymakers. Yet readers who can recall the consequences of the United States’ turn inward in the 1920s and 1930s will find Cohen and Zenko’s proposals disturbing; history suggests that the only foreign policy costlier and riskier than one that pursues global engagement is one that shuns it.

The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order

Brands and Edel belong to a new generation of American foreign policy thinkers and practitioners. Most of this generation begins its analysis with the failure of the United States to create the stable, peaceful, and democratic world order that presidents from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama tried to build. Many react to that failure by embracing some form of retrenchment. Brands and Edel, in contrast, worry about what the world would look like if the United States pulls back. For them, U.S. foreign policy should be less about building utopia than about preventing disaster. World order is a fragile thing, human nature is as flawed as it has always been, and the abyss is never far away. China, Iran, and Russia, they argue, are not merely geopolitical nuisances. They are attacking the values and institutions of open societies with all the tools of the information age. Unless met with resolute American power guided by wise strategies, they will return the world to an age of catastrophic war. This is an unfashionable message, but Brands and Edel have a lot of history on their side. Having squandered so many of the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War, the United States must now contend with a harsher world, under a darkening sky.

Western Europe

Andrew Moravcsik

Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle Over Freedom and Security

Globalization means that the domestic policies of one country can influence the welfare of other countries. This interdependence affects an ever-widening range of regulatory matters in areas such as environmental protection, macroeconomic policy, and individual rights. As compared to the security conflicts and tariff disputes of centuries past, today’s regulatory fights mobilize a broader range of domestic bureaucracies, civil society groups, and other political actors—some with the ability to form political alliances across borders. In this brief book, two scholars examine a recent series of such disputes
between the United States and its European partners over coordinating transnational flows of information about airline passengers, bank accounts, and commercial transactions. In general, the United States sought more access to data for the government and private firms, whereas the EU favored more individual protections. The authors show that negotiations over these issues, both within and across nations, tend to be complex and fraught, not least because they pit intense commercial and security interests against deep-seated norms of individual privacy. When it is expedient, groups representing these interests have mobilized internationally. The book shows government officials, NGOs and legislators reaching across borders in this way. Yet it remains unclear what effect transnational activity had on the ultimate policies Europe and the United States chose, which generally have tracked relative power and interests.

The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War
BY MICHAEL COTELY MORGAN.

In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act—an accord among the United States, the Soviet Union, and virtually every European country—formalized the era’s East-West détente. This book represents perhaps the most richly documented account of the negotiations, which are best remembered for enshrining a strongly Western conception of human rights but also sketched out a far broader code of conduct for East-West relations, including the mutual recognition of stable borders. Most of the participants hoped the agreement would stabilize and legitimate the status quo and thus tone down the Cold War, although a few Western countries hoped the document might ultimately help bring down the Soviet bloc. Morgan endorses the widespread belief that the agreement was decisive in ending the Cold War. This is odd, because his own evidence belies such a claim. The accord was nonbinding, and efforts by Western diplomats to promote human rights soon collapsed into diplomatic acrimony. In the early 1980s, the Soviets and their henchmen handily crushed opposition groups in Eastern Europe. Only the atrophy of the Soviet system and the eventual entry into office of Mikhail Gorbachev—neither caused by the Helsinki agreement—eventually put an end to the Cold War.

The Academy of Fisticuffs: Political Economy and Commercial Society in Enlightenment Italy
BY SOPHUS A. REINERT.

The eighteenth-century Enlightenment marked a decisive historical turning point: from that moment on, a distinctively modern conviction spread that durable progress toward peace, tolerance, and welfare was feasible. Previous political and social theorists tended to believe instead that self-interest inclined individuals to commit acts of unspeakable evil against one another—a fate only intermittently softened by virtuous leaders or altruistic religious beliefs. Most people think of the Enlightenment as centered in France, Scotland, and perhaps Germany. In this erudite and engaging intellectual
history, Reinert makes the case for the critical role played by a pioneering group of Italian political economists who gathered in the cafés of Milan, notably Cesare Beccaria and the brothers Pietro and Allessandro Verri. They studied the socializing impact of commerce and espoused the inalienable rights of man not to suffer cruel punishment—just as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant did elsewhere. This suggests not just that the Enlightenment was more widespread than many think but also that the twin processes of market globalization and state formation already at work in that era made it inevitable—although in this case, as in France, large doses of caffeine helped.

_The Responsive Union: National Elections and European Governance_
BY CHRISTINA J. SCHNEIDER.

Nearly all commentators, even staunch federalists, echo the Euroskeptical charge that the European Union is a distant institution populated by unaccountable technocrats and double-dealing politicians. Most social scientists go along with this story as well, arguing that almost all European issues are too obscure and complex to generate sustained and meaningful popular attention and engagement. This important book turns the conventional wisdom on its head with a simple yet profound observation: in reality, the EU responds to the democratic demands of its citizens. The governments of member states, constantly worried that the public could suddenly notice and mobilize around an EU issue, habitually stake out strong negotiating positions that appear to defend clear social interests. Schneider also reveals a narrower phenomenon: governments delay EU decisions that might trigger unfavorable outcomes until after national elections—and their counterparts in other capitals generally play along. One might conclude that European governments collude to fool all the people all the time by pushing unpopular policies only when their citizens aren’t looking. In the end, Schneider remains ambivalent about how much the public controls EU policy and about the prospects for meaningful democratic reform in Europe.

_Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives Following the 1973 Crisis_
BY LAURENT WARZOLET.

The two decades following the oil crisis of 1973 were a decisive period in the history of the EU. During that time, governments launched the Single European Act, harmonized regulations, promoted financial and monetary integration, and suppressed traditional industrial policies—a combination of policies often described as “neoliberal.” Now, historians with access to primary documents can explain in detail how and why this happened. Although Warzoulet is sometimes tempted to exaggerate the range of potential choices governments faced, in the end, his book proposes some clear answers. Governments freed up markets because they had little choice: the major alternatives, notably the protection and subsidization of national champions, had
proved costly and ineffective. Leaders turned to the EU to coordinate the shift not because European idealists persuaded them to do so but because it seemed the optimal way to commit one another to collective liberalization: the EU was large enough to be effective without being as diverse and unwieldy as global institutions. Yet the result was not uniformly neoliberal. Policies such as regulatory protection, social welfare provision, and state support for agriculture and other declining sectors remained essential elements of a distinctively balanced European model.

**Western Hemisphere**

**Richard Feinberg**

**Ctrl-Alt-Delete: How Politics and the Media Crashed Our Democracy**

*BY TOM BALDWIN.* Hurst, 2018, 320 pp.

Baldwin has worked as a Washington-based political reporter, a top London newspaper editor, and the communications director for the British Labour Party. In this book, he traces the politicization of print and TV journalism, the rise of web-based scandalmongers, the ever more sophisticated big-data techniques that election campaigns use, and the recent exploitation of all the new technologies involved to undermine democracy by nefarious forces, from domestic extremists in the United States and Europe to Russian President Vladimir Putin. His basic argument is hardly controversial: digital technology has changed how people analyze, manipulate, and understand politics. Yet he does show how deep-seated the problem is. These trends have been building for decades. The fact that those who contributed to them, or sought to combat them, often had little idea what they were doing—or what the long-term consequences would be—does not bode well for Baldwin’s concluding proposal to rescue democracy through a “soft reboot” of digital technology. Nonetheless, Baldwin’s journalistic personality—curious, garrulous, and ironic—shines through the many amusing anecdotes about how things got to be this way.

**Deported Americans: Life After Deportation to Mexico**


**The Migrant Passage: Clandestine Journeys From Central America**


During the Obama administration, nearly three million people were deported from the United States, a large majority of them to Mexico. As a result, nearly half a million deportees who grew up in the United States, many identifying as Americans, now live in Mexico, where they have struggled to adapt. Drawing on heart-rending interviews with deportees, Caldwell argues that “deportation is particularly cruel for functional Americans. It not only undermines family connections, career paths, and other attachments, but also strikes at the core of people’s identities.” Caldwell