layaia (1967), but Tomaru finds these deals grossly insufficient, and she criticizes Japanese leaders for their general unwillingness to deal forthrightly with war responsibility issues.

Tomaru's book developed from her Oxford doctoral thesis and remains in a dissertation-style format. This leads to some repetition and makes for less than exciting reading. The effort is worthwhile, however, as Tomaru's arguments are clear and well supported by data from an array of Western and Asian sources. Her study sheds much new and interesting light on the immediate post-World War II history of Southeast Asia.

E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
San Jose State University


Harold Macmillan's application to join the European Economic Community (EEC), announced in the House of Commons in July 1961, and Charles de Gaulle's veto of that application, announced at his celebrated press conference of January 14, 1963, frame a crucial episode in postwar European history. The British bid marked a sea change from Commonwealth to continent, and although that shift has endured, the failure of the initial negotiations shapes British policy to this day. Had de Gaulle failed to block Britain, it is likely that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would never have been created, transatlantic commercial tensions would have been reduced, French prominence in world affairs would have waned even more quickly, the Franco-German relationship would have had far less resonance, the domestic British view of Europe would have been far more positive, and the European Union (EU) would today be a less fully developed international institution. No surprise, therefore, that the episode has spawned lively historical debate in recent years.

This book by Oliver Bange contributes important new empirical insights concerning the rhetorical tactics of various governments during the British accession negotiations. Bange makes two broad interpretive points. First, the British bid for membership did not fail, as many argue, due to tactical errors on the part of the British government, but because of fundamental interstate conflicts of interest. Second—his "main thesis"—the underlying national interests engaged in this crisis did not involve "insoluble economic or organizational problems" but the "irreconcilability of the goals behind 'Grand Designs'" elaborated by Konrad Adenauer, de Gaulle, Macmillan and John F. Kennedy, (pp. 7-8). Bange stresses in particular the Anglo-American Nassau agreement of December 1962 as precipitating de Gaulle's veto.

These claims are hardly new. Most analysts empha-

size both British errors and the geopolitical roots of Gaullist opposition. Bange simply sides with one part of the conventional wisdom against the other. Yet he does break some new documentary ground. His major contribution is to detail how the governments of West Germany, Great Britain, the United States, and France manipulated public information and impressions, an aspect of this historical episode hardly touched upon by other scholars. Every government sought to spin the issues for domestic and foreign consumption, and Bange offers a gripping account of the resulting cynical "blame-shifting" in the endgame of the negotiations. The British cooperated with the Kennedy administration to pin the blame on de Gaulle. British officials leaked false (exaggerated, if not wholly fabricated) intelligence suggesting that de Gaulle's aim was a genuinely independent Europe that would reach a separate accommodation with the Soviet Union. Moving to the continent, Bange shows that de Gaulle schemed throughout the episode to appear more conciliatory than he actually was.

Bange is one of the few, for example, to give "la note Peyrefitte" of August 1960—the strategy document penned by de Gaulle's later press secretary, Alain Peyrefitte—its full due. He presents convincing rhetorical evidence that de Gaulle read and implemented its cynical plan for appearing to negotiate in the EEC as a "good European" (albeit one with a certain idea of Europe) in order to secure substantive benefits while obstructing the construction of supranational institutions and British membership. Adenauer, too, dissembled. The old Rhinelander cultivated public ambiguity, thereby seeking to satisfy the demands of both "Atlanticists" and "Gaullists" within his governing coalition.

While the negotiations were thus doomed from the start, these efforts at disinformation meant that the specific breakdown in January 1963 was the result of a complex and often tacitly collusive behavior by the major governments involved. Once various leaders realized that the negotiations were certain to collapse (at the latest at the time of de Gaulle's press conference), each sought to pin the blame on the other, even at the expense of continuing efforts to reach a compromise. Stung by criticism from the other five members of the EEC ("the Five"), de Gaulle had succumbed to Adenauer's "compromise proposal" to continue negotiations. Yet the British and Americans sought to precipitate a clear break, so as to cast blame squarely on the French, and Adenauer was not displeased to have the negotiations out of the way. In the endgame of a hopeless negotiation, the rhetorical edge came to matter more than anything else.

In reconstructing these tactics, Bange reports a considerable amount of valuable archival research focused on West Germany and the Anglo-American relationship. This is welcome, since the existing literature has accorded the calculations of the Adenauer and Kennedy governments far less attention than the calculations of Macmillan and de Gaulle. In analyzing Adenauer's Germany, Bange adds subtle documentary
detail to the well-known story of how Adenauer’s constant efforts to balance conflicting domestic demands. He reminds us also that Adenauer’s collusion may have been critical to de Gaulle’s success, since it helped to block a potential counter-alliance of the Five with Britain and the U.S. against France. In addition, he offers intriguing glimpses into the motivations of key German decision makers, describing how Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder constrained his criticism of Adenauer’s European policy to assure the old chancellor’s continued support for his own political career, and how Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard’s opposition to de Gaulle was muted by his own previous support for European integration.

Bange’s emphasis on rhetorical manipulation is of more than antiquarian interest. He renders modern scholarship on European integration a real service by seeking to distinguish rhetorical tactics from underlying objectives. Many rhetorical positions have been uncritically accepted by scholars as expressions of true underlying national preferences. Many of the most important books written immediately after the episode were penned by journalists (or based on their reportage). Bange succeeds brilliantly in demonstrating why one cannot be too skeptical of such public justifications.

To be sure, Bange’s analysis suffers from some very specific weaknesses. First, as its title indicates, the book covers a very short period. Whereas most such works trade the extended process from 1957 onward through which the British and French moved toward their positions on membership, Bange reaches the fall of 1962 in a few short chapters; almost the entire book is devoted to the three-month period up to the end of January 1963. Second, whereas Bange cites German archives and interviews in detail, as well as some from Britain and the United States, he pays relatively little attention to French sources. There are no interviews and only cursory attention to archival sources, ignoring even published primary sources—for example, the *Documents Diplomatiques Français* or the massive, now indispensable three-volume memoir by the late Peyrefitte, *C’était de Gaulle* (1994), based on the press secretary’s verbatim notes at confidential cabinet and personal meetings with the general. Bange tends to take Anglo-American speculations about what sort of compromises with de Gaulle might be possible as evidence that they were possible. Third, Bange appears to have stopped researching sometime in 1993 and includes almost nothing that became available since that time. Many obvious archival and primary sources are absent. In addition, the bibliography ignores the lively scholarly debate relating to this episode over the past five years. Bange does no more than does drop a couple of citations to his own work and one to his mentor. He does not cite, let alone engage, the evidence and interpretations found in recent (and indispensable) volumes written or edited by Richard Aldous, Anne Deighton, Paul-Marie de La Gorce, Wolfram Kaiser, Richard Lamb, Sabine Lee, N. Piers Ludlow, Alan Milward, Gustav Schmidt, Georges Soutou, Jacqueline Tratt, Maurice Vasse, John Young, and myself, as well as Peyrefitte.

Bange’s neglect of the scholarly debate suggests a deeper weakness, namely a lack of overall interpretative focus. While brilliant in his reconstruction of diplomatic tactics, Bange tells us far less about underlying national interests than he claims—thus rendering the main thesis of the book, namely that competing geopolitical visions rather than economic interests or policy mistakes blocked agreement, speculative at best. Any serious effort to distinguish rhetoric from interest must analyze both. Bange’s book contains a severe mismatch between evidence and interpretation. His best empirical analysis documents rhetorical tactics that, even in his own interpretation, are epiphenomenal. Without a firm sense of the underlying domestic structures and pressures that give rise to the “national interest,” we cannot know what effect tactics had—that is, whether de Gaulle, Macmillan, or Adenauer might have accepted a particular compromise, had it been on the table. By contrast, his central claim that interests involved competing “geopolitical visions” is backed by little more than a few pages, largely containing the type of uncritical analysis of personal beliefs that recent scholarship has rendered obsolete (e.g. “The roots of . . . de Gaulle’s . . . certain idea of Europe . . . can be traced back to the 1940s” [p. 22]). He reasserts, for example, the central importance of the Nassau Agreement in de Gaulle’s calculations—an interpretation that has been rendered almost untenable in light of scholarship demonstrating that de Gaulle took the decision to veto days, if not months or years, before Nassau. Bange discusses the ongoing EEC and the Multilateral Force (MLF) negotiations in parallel, as if the connection between them was self-evident.

In doing so, Bange ignores the revisionist claim that the underlying Anglo-French conflict of interest was driven by conflicting export interests, not competing geopolitical “grand designs.” Neither Macmillan nor de Gaulle could credibly compromise these commercial interests, notably French support for and British opposition to the CAP (not competed until 1971, whereupon the British were permitted in). Bange reasserts the conventional geopolitical view without acknowledging—let alone refuting—this economic account. While this assumption of the “primacy of geopolitics” is perhaps reasonable for Adenauer, it severely distorts any balanced understanding of British, French, and American policy and therefore of European integration as a whole in this period.

The omission from this book of any serious analysis of underlying national interests is regrettable, above all, because Bange misses a unique opportunity to marshal this evidence in what could perhaps have been a major contribution to the broader debate about national motivations. The results might have surprised Bange himself, for much of the evidence in this book is strikingly consistent with the revisionist emphasis on
commercial concerns. As we have seen, Bange documents that many assertions of vital national interest were in fact rhetorical tactics, and this manipulative rhetoric tended to emphasize either geopolitical concerns (as in Macmillian’s inflated warnings about the future of the Western alliance and his effort to buy off de Gaulle with military cooperation) or European ideology (as in Peyrefitte’s note and de Gaulle’s consistent effort to cloak the pursuit of narrow commercial interest in the language of transatlantic politico-military conflict). Even Adenauer seems to have viewed the Franco-German treaty as much as a means of maintaining his domestic political coalition as an instrument of concrete foreign policy. By contrast, little evidence supports Bange’s presumption that concerns about NATO and the MLF decisively influenced the course of the EEC discussions. If we properly discount the tactical manipulation of “grand designs,” their importance wanes. In their place emerges what many scholars view as the true underlying continuity of postwar European integration: namely, the conflict among Anglo-American, French, and German commercial interests. For all its insights about rhetoric and tactics, Bange’s book leaves most fundamental interpretative issues in the early history of the EEC to others.

ANDREW MORAVCSIK
Harvard University

ASIA


Known as the great synthesizer of neo-Confucian philosophy, Chu Hsi provided a comprehensive understanding of the world, from its personal and moral to cosmic and natural dimensions. Like other Sung philosophers, he expressed many of his views in commentaries, letters, and conversations. Yung Sik Kim’s study brings together Chu’s dispersed ideas and describes the system of concepts and categories that Chu assumed but did not present systematically. Limiting his aim, Kim focuses specifically on the natural or cosmic dimensions.

Strictly speaking, and as Kim recognizes, Chu Hsi did not have a natural philosophy. Unlike Western thinkers, Chinese thinkers did not distinguish sharply between culture and nature, animate and inanimate objects, or matter and spirit (or mind). For Chu Hsi and neo-Confucian philosophers, the cosmos was a continuum constituted of ch’i (configurations of energy), ordered by means of li (patterns, principles), and characterized by constant change. Although moral, social, and political issues were Chu’s primary philosophical concern, they were not separate from his ideas about the cosmos, for the li of particular things and affairs were all interrelated and were manifestations of the one li of the cosmos. Specific concepts, such as li and ch’i, applied to all spheres of activity, human or otherwise.

Like the ideas of many of his contemporaries, Chu’s ideas were in part a response to Buddhist and Taoist challenges to Confucianism, a response that incorporated, without acknowledgment, aspects of those rival traditions. Staying true to the Confucian emphasis on the reality of all things, Chu assumed, unlike Buddhists, that everything was real, even though not all things could be experienced through the senses. From this viewpoint, Chu can thus be seen as responding to Buddhist metaphysics with a neo-Confucian natural philosophy. Still, his natural philosophy was intertwined with his moral and social philosophy.

In part one, Kim discusses the fundamental concepts in terms of which Chu and others understood the world. Belonging to the system of beliefs textually based in the Book of Changes (I Ching) and deriving from varied sources, these concepts include li, the “investigation of things,” ch’i, yin-yang, the five phases, the numbers, the images, the spirits, Heaven, the sages, and several concepts of change. Part two addresses the content of Chu’s knowledge of the natural world. Here Kim uses the Chinese categories of heaven and earth, the myriad things, and man (i.e. human beings) to organize his discussion. Part three deals with two different issues. The first is Chu’s attitudes toward the various kinds of specialized knowledge, such as calendrical astronomy, harmonics and music, geography, divination, alchemy, and medicine. Like many neo-Confucians, Chu acknowledged that such specialties had varying degrees of importance, but ultimately they were “lesser ways” and lacked the supreme value of moral knowledge. Kim compares Chu’s thought with ideas in the Western scientific tradition regarding such concepts as motion and change. Kim makes clear that certain problems arise or do not arise depending on the basic assumptions with which one begins.

Kim brings to our attention many fascinating aspects of Chu’s ideas, but his concern is not the kinds of problems of interpretation and translation that now interest many leading contemporary scholars. For instance, he translates ren as man or men, meaning all human beings, and so continues a Sinological tradition that has both blurred important social distinctions and offered an ahistorical reading of Chinese philosophical texts in certain respects. Sometimes Chu did specifically mean “men” (i.e. elite men), but other times the reference was to all human beings, including women. Using a traditional approach, Kim acknowledges that he is attempting to present the ideas from Chu’s perspective.

This study contains numerous quotations from Chu’s writings, many useful tables, a character glossary of Chinese names and terms, extensive notes, and a good bibliography. The notes are especially helpful for those who read Chinese but who are not overly familiar with