dent faced. It is impossible not to admire the sheer volume of materials (archival documents, public papers, and a range of historical and analytical treatments) that she synthesized in order to assess the real importance of presidential rhetoric. At the same time, the foreign policy specialist or historian may find some of the necessarily brief treatments of context frustrating. For example, Bostdorff notes, in her chapter on Jimmy Carter and the Iranian hostage crisis, the speculation that candidate Ronald Reagan cut a deal with the Iranian government to ensure that Carter’s efforts would not succeed while he was in office. Bostdorff provides no critical perspectives or evaluations of these charges.

The heart of Bostdorff’s analysis is a formal dissection of presidential rhetoric, using a method developed by Kenneth Burke, a theorist of rhetoric. Putting language at the center of concern and finding motivation within the texts, Bostdorff attempts to discover how each president portrayed the “crisis” situation, the style the president employed in managing the crisis, and the bases of identification of allies and enemies he encouraged in the public. Through this method, she intends to illuminate differences in style and substance among the presidents and derive some insights about the nature of crisis promotion in contemporary presidential politics. (Bostdorff’s use of Burke’s method will be new to many political scientists, who may find it difficult to wade through the textual analyses.)

The differences, as expressed in close readings of each case, are subtly drawn and produce sometimes surprising insights. Bostdorff finds that President Ford, for example, departed from the standard practice of crisis promotion when the Mayaguez was seized off the coast of Cambodia. Whereas other presidents inflated such events, promoting crises to promote their own leadership, Ford himself was silent on the matter. His public affairs staff provided only brief descriptions of events as they developed. When the crisis ended, Ford described the events and his actions only briefly. Bostdorff suggests that Ford’s silence was a deliberate rhetorical strategy to bolster his standing as a national leader. Unelected, Ford desperately sought to cultivate legitimacy as president by allowing his staff to portray him as competent, active, and busy responding to the problems of the day. Aware of his own difficulties with public speaking, Ford limited his public speeches and even his answers to questions at press conferences. In this way, he was able to maximize the political benefits attendant to the crisis—by saying less.

In stark contrast, Jimmy Carter initially spoke frequently about his handling of the Iranian hostage crisis, emphasizing publicly the principles by which the United States would manage the affair. At the same time, by constantly reiterating principles but rarely reporting progress, he undermined public perception of his efficacy as a leader. “The idealism of Carter’s rhetoric,” Bostdorff writes, “also constrained his crisis management by narrowing the range of policy options he could pursue to those that he deemed consistent with the moral principles he set forth” (p. 159).

Of course, the analysis of Carter points to a critical question Bostdorff dodges: To what extent is rhetoric a reflection or a cause of presidential policy in a foreign crisis? Bostdorff considers explicit political planning in conjunction with the psychic vulnerabilities of American presidents, without placing anything above the texts of presidential speeches, both improvised and committee-crafted. The real role of rhetoric as reflection and as source of, or substitution for, policy remains to be explored.

John Kennedy, she argues, established formal mechanisms and legal justifications for crisis promotion and management, an infrastructure that remains. While there are recurrent patterns in presidential rhetoric, the infrastructure has grown and strengthened. Bostdorff concludes: “The relationship between power and discourse appears to be symbiotic. The president’s control over foreign affairs allows him to indulge in crisis promotion; at the same time, crisis promotion frequently helps the commander-in-chief to expand and consolidate his power. This is a dangerous combination indeed” (p. 234). Scholars of the presidency—and of foreign policy more generally—owe Denise Bostdorff a debt for framing this problem of modern democracy so sharply.

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Part of the professional creed of political scientists is the belief that narrowly focused academic volumes—preferably monographs—are the most worthy. Yet this has not consistently been true of the scholarly study of the European Community. To be sure, the field was launched in the 1950s and 1960s by a series of monographs by Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye, and others. The next two decades, however, saw a series of substantively broad-ranging yet theoretically sophisticated volumes assessing the state of the European Community, including those edited by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Helen and William Wallace and Carole Webb, Albert Shugia, and (most recently) Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann.

Like its distinguished predecessors, each of the books reviewed here has two stated purposes: to document the current condition of European integration and to theorize about it. The 1992 Project, edited by Dale Smith and James Lee Ray, contains 12 essays, four on integration theory and eight on specific topics ranging from defense cooperation to the role of subnational development agencies. Without striving for comprehensive coverage, the authors uncover a wealth of interesting information. Several essays cut sharply against the grain of conventional wisdom. John Conybeare rigorously grounds his skepticism about the future of transatlantic trade relations in optimal-tariff theory. Paulette Kurzer offers a provocative analysis of the European Monetary System as instrument and indication of the “passing away” of social democracy and the postwar settlement in small corporatist democracies (p. 140). David Garnham traces in intriguing detail the Anglo-French flirtation in 1990 with an anti-German alliance. Russell Dalton and Richard Eichenberg seek to revitalize the study of public opinion and integration.
As its title suggests, *The Maastricht Debates and Beyond*, edited by Alan Carwyn and Glenda Rosenthal, does aim at comprehensiveness—and splendidly achieves it. Second volume in a biennial series sponsored by the European Community Studies Association, it contains a rich and timely collection of 23 essays on European Community developments over the past two years. The reader senses the unusually astute eyes and firm hands of two editors committed to maintaining a strong standard of selection and execution. The essays are uniformly concise and focused, yet lively.

Carwyn and Rosenthal seek to provide a detailed overview of issues ranging from immigration to telecommunications and (though with less enthusiasm than Smith and Ray) to provide social scientific explanation of those events. In the service of the first goal, special mention must be made of the useful, detailed review of the Uruguay Round negotiations by Finn Laursen; Sir William Nicholl’s analysis of the Maastricht negotiations, which reflects an intriguing mixture of federalism and skepticism; and the especially thorough treatment accorded Germany and the EMU negotiations. On the latter topic, David Andrews and Wayne Sandholtz document (as widely reported at the time) the initial success of Helmut Kohl’s personal efforts to strengthen, at least on the margin, the German commitment to monetary integration. Particularly insightful is Paul Welfens’ analysis of the macroeconomic contradictions of Bundesbank policy.

Here, too, are contributions that employ social-scientific analysis to generate unexpected insights. Dale Smith and Jürgen Wanne make elegant use of descriptive statistics to determine who wins and who loses by “Europe 1992.” Walter Goldstein provides a tough-minded review of the European Community’s internal tension between market liberalism and industrial policy. Robert Geyer carefully compares British and Norwegian socialism in the new Europe.

Yet, while both books mention fundamental theoretical questions of European Community studies, they ultimately decline to provide distinctive answers to them. The current conjuncture of the Community has raised many such questions, many closely linked with enduring concerns of comparative and international politics: How does the relative power of the Commission and member governments vary across issues? Does Community integration strengthen or weaken the state internally? Under what conditions and in what ways does membership in the Community alter the relative influence of domestic political groups? Has national support for European integration undergone a fundamental process of politicization, transforming a “passive” into an “active” consensus? Under what conditions do European countries share an underlying interest in moving from “negative” to “positive” integration, that is, from market liberalization to the joint provision of public goods like macroeconomic stability, environmental protection, and a common defense? Is the Community evolving into a new sort of polity, or do present trends presage an extension of long-term patterns?

If a theoretical theme can be discerned in these two volumes, it concerns the last question. Both books stress the increasing complexity and diversity of the European Community. For Smith and Ray, complexity emerges, above all, from the Community’s institutional structure. The European Community is one of the few international organizations with a supranational officialdom possessing significant, though limited, autonomy. With the inclusion of another actor and forum, what Robert Putnam has termed a “two-level game,” played by statesmen on domestic and international “boards,” becomes a “three-level game.” (Indeed, Smith and Ray hint that Community external relations and transnational coalitions add a fourth and fifth level!) At the same time, the Commission seeks to empower subnational actors, thereby further diffusing political power. In his analysis of regional policy in *The Maastricht Debates*, Gary Marks asserts that “we are seeing the emergence of a multilevel governance, a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional, and local” (p. 392). A causal link between greater complexity in policymaking and greater diffusion of political power is surely an important proposition about the development of the European Community (although, it must be added, a more highly debatable one than either volume hints). My own view is that on balance, far from undermining the state domestically, the Community actually strengthens it.

Even if we provisionally accept the hypothesis that complexity is diffusing power in some issue areas, simply to celebrate complexity is to make a virtue of necessity. The next step, an essential one for social scientists, moves from observation to explanation. What is the theoretical significance of complexity and diffusion of power? Under what conditions does the relation hold? What are the implications for integration? Here both volumes leave the field to others. Despite their admirable ambition in this regard, Smith and Ray do not move beyond the metaphor of “three-level games” to theory—retreating, instead, in their concluding chapter, to the reassertion that political union is a sort of European destiny. Perhaps constrained by the format of their book, Carwyn and Rosenthal, too, make little attempt to postulate an overarching model or a common set of hypotheses, contenting themselves, instead, with the modest conclusion that intergovernmental negotiations between member states appears to remain central. Marks asserts only that the starting point must be the assumption that the Community is a “complex, open-textured and fluid” polity. But if this is the theoretical starting point, what is the endpoint?

The problem is not a new one. It closely resembles the predicament facing theorists of “complex interdependence” in the 1970s, who found that the assumption that everything is connected to everything else is, ultimately, no assumption at all. Only the more detailed analyses of trade and capital interdependence since the mid-1980s, firmly grounded in explicit microfoundations, have provided strong testable propositions. The study of interdependence has grown richer as a result. Similarly in European Community studies, analyses such as those found in these two books perform an indispensable function by opening our minds to a wide range of possibilities; but it now falls to theoretically structured empirical analyses to help separate the wheat from the chaff. It is here—more than in reviews of recent events—that social scientists can claim a distinctive comparative advantage over the myriad annual reviews of the European Community that have sprung up in recent years.

There are two complementary paths forward. The first, as Leon Lindberg notes in the Smith and Ray volume, is to develop more explicit, generalizable theories of economic interest, interstate bargaining, and
international regimes. Modern theories based on specified causal mechanisms at the micro level offer many of the tools to move beyond ideal-typical description to explanation. Recent works by Giandomenico Majone and George Tsebelis, for example, suggest subtle, counterintuitive consequences of complexity in the Community. The second path is to pursue serious cross-issue, cross-national, and cross-temporal comparative analysis. The sudden success of the 1992 initiative has encouraged, among scholars, a historical myopia in European Community studies that is more pervasive, yet considerably less justified, than that of the 1960s. Moreover, there is a dangerous tendency to generalize from specific issues or single decisions. Only explicitly comparative analysis—within the Community and between the Community and other organizations—can tell us whether the current conjuncture is the continuation of old politics under new circumstances or the emergence of a new institutional patterns of politics altogether.

This sort of sustained social-scientific inquiry is quite consistent with the careful analysis of recent events found in these two books. One hopes that forthcoming volumes of this type will serve as vehicles to unite the two.

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For the reader looking for new arguments or evidence about change in the world economy, this book will be a disappointment. On the other hand, it offers a succinct, albeit one-sided, summary of familiar arguments and data about the world economy in four areas (each treated by a different author): the new world economic order, the continuing power of multinational enterprises, the decline of American hegemony, and the marginalization of the poor developing countries.

The underlying theme is that national policies still matter in the new world economy. Manuel Castells, in the opening essay, argues that the "developmental state," a code word for Japan, played a fundamental role in affecting the transformation of the world economic structure in recent years" (p. 23). Martin Carnoy writes that although "multinational enterprises are powerful economic actors...nations-states can also be key actors in shaping what multinationals do," especially in promoting local human-capital development and research and development financing (p. 93). Stephen C. Cohen is even more emphatic that national policies dictate success. He points primarily to a "set of institutional innovations" pioneered by Japan that employ the state as gatekeeper, the keiretsu industrial organization, and the targeting of key technologies and industries (p. 100). Finally, Fernando Henrique Cardoso concludes that developing nations, too, can succeed if they pursue the right policies: "Either the South (or a portion of it) enters the democratic-technological-scientific race, invests heavily in R&D, and 'endures the Information Economy' metamorphosis, or it becomes unimportant, unexploited and unexploitable" (p. 156).

The theme of the book is directed against those who claim that freedom (individualism) and global markets have triumphed and that national policy choices must be subordinated to economics. This theme is welcomed as a corrective to an earlier overemphasis on interdependence and dependence, to which some of these same writers contributed, particularly Cardoso. But the authors are a bit one-sided in what they consider the right national policies to be.

They see Japan as the preeminent leader of the new information economy. In fact, Japan lags in the information age. According to Bill Baumol and his associates (Productivity and American Leadership), both Japan and Europe have a smaller share of their labor force in the new information and service sectors than does the United States (57% and 59%, respectively, compared to 71% in the United States). In addition, the United States is more competitive in the information economy. Recent studies by McKinsey, the international management consulting firm, show that American manufacturing and service industries have restructured well ahead of Japan and Europe and today enjoy a substantial lead in the information sectors that is, telecommunications, software, computer networking, multimedia technologies, and financial services. Ignoring these data, the authors also give no hint of the fundamental structural problems faced in Japan (and Europe). Recently, Japanese investment and growth have slowed precipitously. In 1992, Japanese manufacturing productivity dropped 6.2% while that of the United States rose 4.2%.

The volume is also over a decade old. It repeats the litany of criticism of U.S. policies in the 1980s but says nothing about the downsizing and productivity improvements in American industry in that decade or the powerful surge of American exports from 1986 to 1992. American manufacturing productivity grew at a rate of 3.5% per year in the 1980s, against a rate of 2.5% per year in the 1950s and 1960s, and American exports doubled over the five years prior to 1993, regaining market share around the world. There is much to criticize in American policies in the 1980s, but it is an overreaction to label these policies "a romantic reaction, a return to the simplicities and uncertainties of America's uplifting past" (p. 123).

The failure to see the drawbacks of Japanese—or the benefits of American—policy choices leads to curious recommendations for European policy. Europe is counseled neither to deregulate aggressively as in "Europe 1992" or to exploit trade and investment opportunities with the low-wage countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics as the United States deregulated and shifted production to the Asian advancing nations. Instead, Europe is urged to maintain its welfare system, develop national champions (even though elsewhere the authors acknowledge this strategy has failed), and pursue a European-level response involving "substantial amounts of government action in order to protect and transform the structure of European industries in profound ways" (pp. 95, 143). No mention is made of Europe's near-catastrophic unemployment problem (12%), budget deficits in Europe that on average are larger than the U.S. deficit (5.1% compared to 4.5% in 1992), or wage and benefit costs in Europe that far exceed those in Japan and the United States and cripple European competitiveness, precisely in those sectors where former communist countries could supply European markets much more efficiently and equitably.

The essay on developing nations is more reflective.