This seminar is designed to introduce the history, institutions and policies of the European Union, as well as some of the social scientific theories that best explain them. What social, political, and economic forces have propelled the process of European integration forward toward a single European market, currency, foreign policy, regulatory policy, and citizenship? What accounts for the successes and failures of integration in particular times and in particular matters? What is the future of this multinational experiment? What can it tell us about similar efforts elsewhere in the world?

Students in this course are expected to do all of the reading, to write a two-page response papers for three of the sessions, and to submit a research paper on an agreed research topic. This paper is to involve original empirical research or theoretical analysis on the subject of regional integration in Europe or elsewhere. The final two weeks of the semester will be devoted to collective presentation and critique of these papers.

The grade for the course will be calculated as follows: 25% on class participation and reading, 20% on written response papers, and 55% on the final research paper. The paper will be due the first day of exam period. No extensions will be granted unless agreed before the 6th week of the course or due to medical or similar excuse.

Copies of the following books are available for purchase from the Coop:

*Desmond Dinan, An Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994).*
Recommended readings have been included on the syllabus for students seeking a broader basis on which to write research papers or participate in discussion.

**LIST OF TOPICS**

1. The European Movement and the EC, 1945-1957: Federalists and Functionalists
3. “Europe 1992” and “Behind-the-Border” Liberalization: Supranational or Intergovernmental?
4. Monetary Integration and a Single Currency: Towards the EMS and EMU
7. Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: Diplomacy through Drinks and Doctrine
8. Representation, Regulation and Citizenship: Is there a “Democratic Deficit” in Brussels?
9. The Future of European Integration: Centralization or Fragmentation?
(1) TOWARDS THE EC, 1945-1958: FEDERALISTS AND FUNCTIONALISTS

What the motivations of governments that founded the Council of Europe and the European Coal and Steel Community, and sought to found the European Defense Community? Whence came their domestic political support? Who belonged to the postwar "European movement," what did they believe, and what influence did they have on national governments? How did they differ from interwar advocates of European unity? Why did integration start with a parliament, human rights, coal and steel? Why did governments construct quasi-constitutional institutions? Why did defense cooperation fail? What are the core differences between the federalist (ideological and geopolitical) and functionalist (economic) interpretations of this period and which is more persuasive? What is the difference between the economic interpretations of Jean Monnet, David Mitrany, and Alan Milward? How do the theories of integration proposed by Haas (neo-functionalism) and Moravcsik (the tripartite "liberal intergovernmentalist" model) differ from the federalist and functionalist approaches considered last week? How well do the four approaches do in explaining the course of events from 1955 to 1960? More specifically, did the motivations and process behind the founding of the EEC differ from those behind the EDC, the ECSC, and the Council of Europe? How does Jean Monnet’s performance in 1957 compare to his brilliant success in 1950? What explains the choice of international institutions? Was there “neo-functionalist” feedback from the ECSC to the EEC?

Desmond Dinan, An Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 9-34.


**Recommended:**


**(2) CONSOLIDATING THE COMMON MARKET, 1958-1975:**

**NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS**

*What explains the relative ease with which governments liberalized industrial trade in the 1960s and the extreme difficulty they encountered in liberalizing trade in agriculture? How is ultimate success in agriculture to be explained? What do different theoretical views of integration contribute to an explanation of this period? More specifically, which countries and societal groups within countries favored integration and why? How did governments bargain? Which aspects of policy were left in the hands of national governments and which were delegated to centralized rules and authorities—and why? What were the longer-term effects of prior commitments to the customs union and the CAP? What explains stronger and somewhat more successful efforts to reform European agriculture in the 1990s?*

Dinan, Even Closer Union?, 39-64, 199-201, 206-227, 325-333.  
Moravcsik, Choice for Europe, Chapter 3 (pp. 159-237)  
Recommended:


Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 273-365.

(3) "EUROPE 1992" AND BEHIND-THE-BORDER LIBERALIZATION: SUPRANATIONAL OR INTERGOVERNMENTAL BARGAINING?

How does trade liberalization through the harmonization and removal of “behind the border” regulations differ from tariff and quota removal? What implications does this have for the national interests of European governments? Why did such pressures rise in the early 1980s? Since almost any domestic regulation has implications for trade, how did European governments limit the impact of liberalization? Why and how did Commission officials and European Parliamentarians wield influence over the Single Act? How much influence did their leadership and entrepreneurship have on the final outcome? Why do authors disagree? What was the role of multinational business? How would we know? Is this confirmation, finally, of neo-functionalist predictions?


Moravcsik, Choice for Europe, Chapter 5, pp. 314-378.

Recommended:


**4) MONETARY INTEGRATION AND A SINGLE CURRENCY: TOWARD EMS AND EMU**

*Why do governments seek to stabilize exchange rates? Why do they favor a single currency as a means of doing so? Under what conditions has it been possible? How can we explain the pattern over time of no convertibility until 1958, stable exchange rates under Bretton Woods until 1973, failed regional cooperation under the “Snake” until 1979, slowly strengthening cooperation until 1991, and a transition to monetary union (a single currency) thereafter? Which governments favor which kinds of exchange-rate stabilization? Does Do some governments wield more power than others? What explains the particular form of the single currency—*
the autonomy of the ECB, the scope of its membership, and other rules of the regime? To what extent do these findings confirm the arguments of Tsoukalis, Cohen, Moravcsik, Krugman, Brittan, Ross, or Jones?


Moravcsik, Choice for Europe, Selections from Chapters 1, 6 (pp. 41-49, 379-447, 457-471).


Ross, Jacques Delors, 39-50.


**Recommended:**


Moravcsik, Choice for Europe, Chapter 4 (pp. 238-313).


**(5) EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY:**
WHY CAN'T EUROPE GET ITS ACT TOGETHER?

What exactly is at stake in European foreign policy, defense policy, and immigration/asylum/police cooperation? What are different national positions on these issues and how do we explain them? Why does Europe seem to have so much difficulty cooperating in these areas? Is it because so much is at stake substantively? Because of commitment to traditional symbols of sovereignty? What best explains the conditions under which and areas in which Europe has been able to cooperate? Was the EU’s handling of the Bosnian crisis a failure for Europe? Would more intensive European cooperation have changed the outcome?

Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 465-497.

Moravcsik, Choice for Europe, 447-457.


Other Materials on the Bosnia Crisis.

Recommended:


(6) MULTI-LEVEL REGULATION: AGENDAS, ENTREPRENEURS, INTEREST GROUPS AND GOVERNMENTS

What are the various reasons why governments might delegate regulatory functions to supranational authorities? What are the
political implications of doing so? How do governments seek to maintain control? What determines how successful they can be at doing so? How does the resulting “multi-level” European policy process differ from those in its constituent nation-states? Does it differ across issues? What has been the outcome in environmental policy? In regional and structural policy—an area in which the system is designed specifically to empower subnational actors against national governments? Are outcomes of the European process suboptimal? What might improve the process?


**Recommended:**


(7) ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: JUDICIAL DIPLOMACY THROUGH DRINKS AND DOCTRINE?

How did Europe emerge as a “constitutional polity” in which European law is supreme to national law and the European Court of Justice is its definitive interpreter? What are the most important differences among interpretations of this process? Is such an arrangement in the interest of EU member states? What control do they retain over its future evolution? Is this sort of arrangement stable in the future? What might threaten it? Are their parallels with the experience of the US in the 19th and 20th centuries? If so, what do they suggest about the role of courts in a democratic, federal polity?

Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 295-306.


Recommended:


(8) REPRESENTATION, REGULATION, AND CITIZENSHIP: IS THERE A "DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT" IN EUROPE?

Why are EC institutions so non-participatory and non-majoritarian? Why do they grant such restrictive citizenship rights, compared to modern social European welfare states? How does this influence the outcomes of EC policy-making? Of national policy overall? Can such an arrangement be justified normatively in the democratic late 20th-century? On what basis should we evaluate EC institutions? What are the implications, advantages and disadvantages of different proposals to remedy it? How might answers to these questions apply to other countries (like the US) and other international organizations? Does this mark the demise of the European welfare state?

Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 257-292.


**Recommended:**


Paul Pierson, “Social Policy and European Integration,” in Moravcsik, Centralization or Fragmentation?, 124-158.


(9) THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CENTRALIZATION OR FRAGMENTATION?

On what reliable social scientific basis can we make reliable predictions about the future of European integration? What challenges does European integration face today and in the future? Has the EU reached the end of the possibilities of the technocratic, undemocratic style of integration with which integration began? Is there any justification for further centralization of authority? Are deepening and widening compatible or contradictory? What does the disappointing outcome of the recent IGC tell us?


Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, “Policy Framing: Interest Groups and the Lead-up to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference,” West European Politics 20.3 (July 1997), 111-133.


Recommended:

Andrew Moravcsik, “The Prospects for European Integration: Managing Deepening, Diversity and Democratization,” in Moravcsik, ed., Centralization or Fragmentation?, Democracy, 00-00.


(10) REGIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: NAFTA, ASIA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

How are other attempts at regional integration similar to and different from the European case? How is such variation to be explained? Are the same theories and methods applicable? What do they predict? What other factors need to be considered? More broadly, is regionalism the wave of the future or the residue of the past? Are the US and European Community going to get along in the future?


Moravcsik, Choice for Europe, 494-501.

Joseph Grieco, “Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas,” in Mansfield and Milner, Political Economy, 164-187.


**Recommended:**


Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
