This brisk and accessible book summarizes the policies and controversies over U.S. immigration between 1892 and 1954, when Ellis Island was used to process immigrants to the United States and/or hold those scheduled for deportation. As Cannato explains, the island was not just part of the story of immigration; it was also part of the story of the expansion of the federal government and the development of the progressive, bureaucratic state. After 1891, when the federal government replaced the states as the regulators of immigration, federal inspectors, faced with thousands of new arrivals each week, had to translate vague congressional mandates into concrete policies and then defend the consequences of their decisions in a contentious political environment. Cannato is particularly successful at showing the influence of the progressive movement on both the creation and the implementation of changing immigration law. Not all of American Passage is equally useful; most readers will be more interested in Ellis Island in its heyday than after 1924, when much more restrictive immigration laws came into force, and Cannato's accounts of the squabbles among Ellis Island bureaucrats are perhaps a little more comprehensive than most readers need. Still, the subject is important enough and Cannato's treatment fresh enough that anyone with an interest in immigration or progressive politics will want to consult it.

The latest volume of Starr's magisterial history of California covers the post–World War II era, when California's prosperity and cultural exuberance astonished the world—and when many of the seeds of the state's current travails were sown. The diversity and complexity of mid-century California make this a difficult story to tell; Starr's technique of focusing sequentially on different cities and different topics helps readers see the state whole. His mastery of the history of the state allows Starr to write with equal authority about the rise of the freeway and the rise of Eastern spirituality, about the influence of the jazz pianist Dave Brubeck and the role of the Beach Boys. In particular, war played an enormous role in the shaping of modern California: World War II accelerated California's growth, as the federal government created a manufacturing base there for the defense industry that led to a massive migration of African Americans to the West Coast, and Cold War defense expenditures not only fueled California's economy but also financed the University of California system. Although Starr sometimes struggles to balance the many subjects and narrative strands that make up his story, Golden Dreams remains a landmark study of the greatest U.S. state.

Western Europe
Andrew Moravcsik

Beginning exactly 20 years ago, the diplomacy surrounding the reunification of Germany in 1989–90 transformed world
politics. Sarotte’s readable and reliable diplomatic history will no doubt take its place as the classic overview of this period. It is sensible, balanced, and well documented, drawing on what is now an extensive international body of primary and secondary sources. In her view, 1989 was a unique opportunity brought about by two men: the Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev and West Germany’s Helmut Kohl. She thereby downplays the contributions of Washington and Paris, both of which played positive, but less decisive, roles than American and French accounts suggest. Yet the final settlement—a reunified Germany in NATO, rather than some sort of confederation—was decided not by statesmen as much as by people on the streets of East Germany, who forced the pace and the form of reunification. Thereafter, Gorbachev’s irresolute bargaining stance, along with the West’s shortsightedness, led Moscow to settle for weak assurances about the future expansion of NATO. The resulting resentments rankle Russians to this day.


This volume exemplifies the new “international history” of 1989—more multilingual and more attentive to social and cultural underpinnings than traditional diplomatic history. Nineteen historians, many of them young, analyze the policies of different countries, drawing on sources in local languages and archives. The overwhelming impression of the period is one of leaders struggling unsuccessfully to

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maintain control, first by attempting to retard the process of German reunification and then by seeking to synchronize a German settlement with a deal on some overarching structure, perhaps a "common European home." Instead, the outcome came quickly; those who had the most influence were those who improvised best. This perspective demolishes some conventional myths. The volume's contributors show that there was no quid pro quo, as many still believe, between Germany's demand for reunification and France's demand for a single EU currency. They portray the British foreign policy bureaucracy, contrary to its reputation, as actively supportive of German reunification—with the sole exception of Margaret Thatcher. And they offer new insights into why Mikhail Gorbachev unconditionally assented to a reunited Germany within NATO. In the end, the contributors hint that the existing NATO and German structures won out, above all, simply because there was no legitimate alternative to them.

Deutschland einig Vaterland: Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung. 
This book is the leading German-language history of the events of 1989. In addition to summarizing the diplomatic history, it explains the reasoning behind West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's activist diplomacy. In Rödder's view, Kohl was driven most by domestic electoral calculations. A cautious man in most things, the chancellor's first instinct was to follow the advice of his Foreign Ministry; he refused to press publicly for reunification.

With the prospect of the opposition Social Democrats (who were already ahead in the polls) stealing the issue, however, Kohl reversed himself in November 1989. He sprang a unity initiative, keeping even his coalition partners, the Free Democrats, in the dark. At a stroke, Kohl gained the political advantage at home and abroad. Despite his conservative credentials, he became Germany's most popular politician, especially in the East. Soon, France followed along with an EU deal, and Gorbachev proved willing to permit not only Germany's reunification but also its membership in NATO. Kohl had gambled and won.

Of the statesmen involved in the epochal events of 1989, French President François Mitterrand is perhaps the most enigmatic. His distinctive political genius lay in the manipulation of ambiguity: he always kept multiple options open until the last instant, disguising underlying contradictions with presidential pomp and grand ideals. He launched a socialist experiment, nationalizing one-third of France's economy, then embraced free markets and hard money. He ignored Franco-German relations and European integration for years, then championed both. He advocated a European confederation to block U.S. hegemony, then tenaciously defended NATO. Schabert, a German professor with exceptional access to French sources, offers a uniquely well-documented treatment of
Mitterrand's German diplomacy. He explodes the myth that Mitterrand opposed German reunification, but his portrayal of the French president as a European idealist is less persuasive. Instead, two other factors best explain Mitterrand's behavior: concern for his own political survival, which always came first, and events on the ground in Germany, which he grasped sooner than most and which meant that reunification was inevitable. Having played a weak hand, Mitterrand had to make the best of it, and, as usual, he did.


One reason that established political parties are in decline across Europe is the rise of small, single-issue parties devoted to radical right-wing, green, or ethno-territorial causes. Some of these niche parties succeed; others fail. What explains their diverging fortunes? Meguid's core insight is that their success is due less to their intrinsic appeal than to the strategic choices made by big mainstream parties in their competition with one other. Following the logic of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," mainstream parties permit small parties to rise so that these draw voters away from their main competitors. This insight allows Meguid to explain both why parties fail in hospitable contexts (think of the unsuccessful Swedish Green Party) and why they succeed in seemingly auspicious circumstances (the Front National in France). Her conclusions are confirmed by data spanning three decades and by case studies of the French right, the British Green Party, and the Scottish National Party.

Western Hemisphere
RICHARD FEINBERG

Brazil as an Economic Superpower?

In this timely volume, Brainard (recently appointed to the senior international position at the U.S. Treasury) and Martinez-Diaz (a scholar at the Brookings Institution) concede that the Brazilian state's past fostering of national enterprises laid the foundation for the success of the country's global firms today—in petrochemicals, aerospace, biofuels, and export-oriented agriculture. Rather than posit statism and capitalism as exclusionary opposites, the Brazilian experience suggests a logical and gradual sequencing between the two models of development. The book also identifies two main challenges for Brazil: the need to transfer its natural-resource wealth into investments in infrastructure, education, and technology, and the need to overcome its deep-seated fear of exposure to international markets. In a particularly strong chapter, the Brazilian trade expert Pedro da Motta Veiga sharply criticizes President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for reviving an ideologically driven policy seeking trade with less developed markets—which has yielded scant economic results—and for