of the Department of Defense in development work further muddies the waters.

Western Europe
ANDREW MORAVCSIK

In the era of blogs, sound bites, and op-eds, Anderson is an old-fashioned intellectual. A British historian who teaches at UCLA, his preferred medium is the 50- to 70-page essay, in which he summarizes and critiques the best historical and theoretical literature on a subject. One might think that such an approach would generate dry academic debates of little interest to practitioners. Yet Anderson is among the most insightful and policy-relevant analysts of modern Europe—even if he tends at times to exaggerate the pessimistic. His essays in The New Old World—on France, Germany, Italy, Cyprus, Turkey, and, above all, the European Union—combine a Marxist’s hardheaded appreciation for the centrality of economic and political self-interest with a traditional historian’s sense of detail and contingency. Typical is Anderson’s masterful chapter on Turkey. It explains, more lucidly than any comparable work, how the domestic and international options that face politicians in this critical country are decisively shaped by a century of historical influences.

A specter haunts Europe: that of an EU superstate populated by unelected bureaucrats in Brussels who are expanding their reach into every aspect of Europeans’ lives. Euroskeptics—including a former president of Germany (Roman Herzog), Tory politicians in the United Kingdom, and obliging journalists and columnists around the continent—have propagated the myth that 80 percent of the EU countries’ new laws and regulations originate with the EU. Their protests have fueled movements to democratize EU institutions, limit the scope of the EU’s policy activities, or populate the European Parliament with right-wing extremists. Now comes Bertoncini’s book, a comprehensive policy study with real numbers. It turns out that only 12 percent of French laws from 1987 to 2006 originated in Brussels, a proportion that is actually declining. Why so low? Because the EU’s activity is concentrated in only a few areas: half of its regulations are agricultural, and most of the rest concern trade, fishing, and industrial standards. The bulk of modern states’ policies—those having to do with social welfare, health care, pensions, education, law and order, defense, and infrastructure—require the hefty fiscal power that national governments retain and that the EU lacks.

Arthur Koestler has sunk into unjust obscurity. Few still read his once ubiquitous novel Darkness at Noon, with its lurid description of how the Stalinist show trials used totalitarian tactics to persecute fellow Communists. Yet who has a better claim to be the archetypal figure of twentieth-century Europe than Koestler?
Recent Books

Born an upper-class Jew in the waning years of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, he was successively a Zionist settler, an intellectual star in Weimar Berlin, a convinced Communist, a brilliant journalistic observer of the Spanish Civil War, an anticommunist Cold War intellectual, an anti-death-penalty advocate, and a proponent of parapsychology and Eastern mysticism—living long enough to pop magic mushrooms with associates of Dr. Timothy Leary. Scammell, a Columbia professor and prize-winning biographer of the Soviet writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, has written a gripping chronicle of Koestler’s life that captures the essence of a man who reflected so many of the great political and cultural currents of his time. Koestler was, to quote the subtitle of the British edition of this book, an “indispensable intellectual.”


Every happy economy is happy in its own way; unhappy economies are all alike. When the “Celtic tiger” was growing by close to ten percent per year, floating on foreign investment to a per capita income above that of its old imperial neighbor, many extolled the unique virtues of the Irish. Yet just as in Japan, Italy, the United States, and elsewhere, when the boom ended in Ireland, it inevitably uncovered a toxic combination of lax regulation, property speculation, and political corruption. Wealthy land speculators had cornered urban markets, driving housing prices up by 500 percent in a decade. Bankers on the take had provided the financing, and corrupt politicians had facilitated tax evasion. State assets were sold for a song. Now Ireland’s GDP is shrinking fast, its housing prices are in free fall, its banking system has collapsed, and its gross indebtedness outstrips that of Japan. O’Toole’s argument is that Ireland, like other rapidly developing countries, went too quickly from a premodern economy to a postmodern one based on free-market ideology while retaining the essentially clientelistic politics of the past. To this day, corruption in Ireland remains unpunished, and Irish politics, unreformed.