of Congress to the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan and the hotels of Uganda to show the vast conspiracy at work. Sharlet puts his finger on some troubling phenomena, particularly evidence of religious intolerance and indoctrination in parts of the U.S. military. But a deeper reading of Christian (and especially evangelical) history would have spared him some angst. Ever since the religious revivals of the early nineteenth century, well-connected and pious Americans have been organizing themselves to proselytize. The United States is littered with organizations once dedicated to that purpose but now used for other things (the YMCA and Oberlin College, for example), and U.S. missionaries have been engaged in the politics of the developing world for two centuries. But somehow after all these generations, the United States is not a theocracy yet, and the pluralistic country of today is substantially less vulnerable to the imposition of evangelical orthodoxy than ever before.

**Western Europe**

**ANDREW MORAVCSIK**


Foreigners looking to Europe often see the stereotype of a strife-torn continent of intolerant secularists threatened by teeming masses of religious radicals. Yet scholars who study the politics of immigration in Europe find more complex and nuanced patterns. One of the best efforts to make sense of it all is this book by Dancygier on the sources of immigration politics in Germany and the United Kingdom. She refutes the polemics of Islamophobes by showing that beliefs about ethnicity and religion on the ground have almost nothing to do with the patterns of discord. Instead, clashes tend to break out over scarce public resources, such as housing, schools, and state jobs. Where immigrants succeed in claiming their share of such resources, natives often signal their restlessness by voting for radical right parties or harassing their foreign-born neighbors. Where immigrants fail to gain these resources, they themselves are likely to protest violently against the state. Statistical data and insightful urban case studies confirm this, as does a concluding section extending the argument across Europe.


The higher they rise, the harder they fall. In the 1980s and 1990s, Ireland, once an impoverished backwater from which generations fled, conjured an economic miracle. Fueled by foreign direct investment and real estate speculation, the “Celtic tiger” became a vibrant consumer society with high-tech industry and widespread homeownership, a place to which immigrants flocked. After 2007, the party ended in a morass of insolvent banks, bad mortgages, and unpaid public debt, ultimately sending the proudly independent country begging to the International Monetary Fund. As befits a Bloomberg reporter, Lynch peppers his account of these events with numbers and descriptions of boardroom antics and complex financial deals. As in any good
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Irish yarn, however, more memorable are the larger-than-life personalities. Séan FitzPatrick turned the tiny Anglo Irish Bank into a financial giant, only to play golf while it collapsed, after which he retired on his wife's generous pension and stuck the government with a $17 billion bill. Yet amid all the details, this well-reported narrative leaves one wondering exactly what crucial mistake Ireland made. Was it financial and political corruption, incompetent financial regulation, membership in the eurozone, a misguided faith in low-tax policies, an overreliance on foreign investment, fundamental imbalances in the economy, the guaranteeing of toxic assets, or Irish cultural beliefs—or all of the above?


More has been written about Charles de Gaulle than any other politician of the past half century. His story appeals especially to those who believe that a "great man" armed with a grand vision and traditional wisdom about statecraft can still make a mark in a chaotic world. No doubt, de Gaulle's policies revitalized France, domestically and internationally. In the 1960s, his assertion of an independent French nuclear capability, call for a new bargain with NATO, expansive notion of national sovereignty, support for the gold standard, pursuit of dirigiste economic planning, and sympathy for nonalignment triggered panic in other Western capitals but made France a prominent global player. In retrospect, however, de Gaulle's greatest foreign policy achievements were unrelated to the concerns of his contemporary critics: a more supranational European Union, the definitive end of French colonialism, France's strengthened international economic status, and a stiffer Western resolve in Berlin. This book presents some of the best work from a new generation of historians seeking to understand the tensions between rhetoric and reality in this enigmatic statesman.


The European Union ranks among the most extraordinary political achievements of modern times. It has abolished tariffs, established a common currency, and spread peace and prosperity to new democracies across Europe. Yet most observers agree that the basic motivations underlying European integration are banal: to facilitate business transactions, coordinate regulatory systems, and get rich quicker on an exceedingly interdependent continent. Few Europeans are true believers in a federal ideal, and their national political identities are not converging. Each of the 27 national debates among intellectuals and commentators about the meaning of Europe remains insular and idiosyncratic. This creative volume brings together a pan-European team to present these diverse discussions and reflect on the differences and similarities among them. Unlike traditional federalist supporters of Europe (and their nationalist critics), the authors assembled here do not view
the continent’s ideological diversity as evidence of the EU’s failure. The fact that one finds new ideas and approaches each time one crosses one of the (now invisible) borders within the EU instead, they argue, a unique source of strength, resilience, and creativity.


To most foreigners, Austria is an enigma. Measured by trade, immigration, or diplomacy, it is among the world’s most open countries. Yet its politics and society, not to mention its unintelligible dialect of German, remain closed to outsiders. What most people know are traditional clichés. Austria markets itself with *The Sound of Music*, Mozart, and Alpine skiing. Critics attack it the same way: the recent success of a provincial right-wing party led many to view Austria as a land of incorrigible neofascists, for which it was sanctioned by the EU. Lendvai, a top journalist with 50 years of insider access to Viennese circles, offers a more sober perspective on Austrian political life. He unpacks the backroom deals, personal idiosyncrasies, and, above all, partisan maneuvering behind successive governments. This goosy approach leaves one wishing to know more about social and cultural trends, rising immigration, economic globalization, European enlargement, and the other things that have transformed Austria into one of contemporary Europe’s most successful countries. For understanding elite party politics, however, there is no better place to start.

**Western Hemisphere**

**RICHARD FEINBERG**


Brands takes aim at those mainstream historians writing on Western Hemisphere relations who have portrayed the United States as an overwhelmingly powerful hegemon whose destructive interventions are responsible for the region’s sufferings. Delving into Latin American archives, Brands counters that Latin Americans have been active participants in their own history—in both their domestic politics and international diplomacy. During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow often had poor understandings of these local dynamics, so their ill-designed policies frequently failed; even those strategies that momentarily succeeded generated blowback and unintended consequences. As Brands persuasively argues, the true story of Latin America’s role in the Cold War lies in the dynamic interactions between international forces and domestic actors. Tragically, both the United States and the Soviet Union exacerbated the region’s already polarized politics, and the ensuing violent clashes rendered asunder fragile democracies. Fortunately, today many citizens in Latin America and many in Washington policy circles have drawn the right lessons from history, seeking to strengthen democratic institutions—and not overreacting to the provocations of the latest crop of neopopulists.