

Public Attitudes towards Cultural Authority and Cultural Diversity in Higher Education and the Arts

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For much of the past two decades, controversy has rocked America's universities and cultural institutions. Within the arts, well-publicized battles over controversial photographs, installations and performance pieces --- from the Robert Mapplethorpe controversy to the Brooklyn Museum affair --- pitted defenders of modernism and artistic freedom against champions of traditional values and public decorum.¹ Within higher education, universities were castigated as preserves of "political correctness," dominated by "tenured radicals" who sought to replace traditional western culture with an ill-formed goulash reflecting the preferences and identities of a broad array of ethnic, racial, gender and lifestyle special-interest groups.²

Many have noted that the quality of this debate has not been outstanding.³ Some influential critics have relied less on reasoned argument than on passionate accounts (the specifics of which often turned out to be distorted) of lurid cases of artistic license or political excess. Defenders of cultural institutions have often responded piecemeal to the particulars of specific attacks, or else have dispensed abstract pieties about artistic or academic freedom that fail to come to grips with critics' charges.

Yet if the rhetoric has been superficial the issues are fundamental. For conflicts over education and the arts bear directly upon the nature of cultural authority, especially religious and professional authority, in American democracy; upon the receptivity of the native-born to the new immigration of the late twentieth century; and upon the mode and manner of cultural reproduction during an era in which all signs indicate that traditional bases of cultural authority have weakened as cultural diversity has increased. How the widely perceived tension between greater diversity and weakened authority is resolved --- whether it produces a "twilight of common dreams" (as Todd Gitlin put it) illuminated only by the blaze of intergroup conflict, or an efflorescent democratic culture --- will depend on the shape and strength of our institutions

and on how well we master the “arts of democracy” with which this book is concerned.⁴

In this chapter we review the results of a 1993 survey of a statistically representative cross-section of non-institutionalized U.S. adults, to see what those outside the theatre of battle make of the issues around which controversy has raged. We conclude that mass opinion is more moderate and in many ways more sophisticated than public rhetoric. If published accounts of controversy have often depicted a two-sided battle between radical multiculturalists and tradition-minded conservatives, the structure of public sentiments is more nuanced in at least three ways. First, attitudes towards cultural authority and cultural diversity are *not* polarized: Most opinions hew to the center of the ideological spectrum. Second, attitudes towards cultural authority do *not* follow in lock step from attitudes towards cultural diversity: supporters of multiculturalism do not have much more or less faith in cultural elites than their opponents. Third, and most important, respect for the value of high culture --- specifically modern art and the classics of western literature --- is *not* associated with the devaluation of cultural diversity: indeed, people who value high culture are somewhat more likely than others to endorse some multicultural educational reforms.

The Arts and Education as Battlegrounds

Many observers, including some social scientists, have argued that the debates over education and the arts are part of a broader “culture war” that pits religious conservatives or “traditionalists,” who believe in God-given moral imperatives, against secular progressivists, who espouse moral relativism and seek to exclude religion from public life.⁵ In this view, hostility to modern art, a reluctance to open the traditional canon to new works, support for English-only language policies, and distrust of the judgment of (secular) professionals all follow from the traditionalist worldview. By contrast, support for expanding the canon and or bilingual

education, appreciation of modern and postmodern art, and respect for the cultural authority of professors and curators are part of the progressivist world view.

Studies of public opinion on other issues (including our own) have found little support for the existence of a “culture war,” if by that we mean that Americans are strongly divided on many issues along progressivist and traditionalist lines. The public’s attitudes on most social issues gravitate to the center; most people derive their attitudes on most issues from experience or specific considerations, rather than broad ideological postures; and most social attitudes – abortion being the great exception -- actually became less rather than more polarized during the last quarter of the 20th century.⁶

Nonetheless, between 1990 and 1995, many journalists came to the opposite conclusion, convincing themselves that the United States was in the throes of a full-fledged culture war. Indeed, the term “culture war,” which appeared in the press only rarely during the 1980s, was employed with escalating frequency during the first half of the 1990s. Our review of newspapers on the Nexis data base indicated that whereas the phrase appeared in two or three articles per month between January 1990 and late 1991, references rose steadily thereafter to approximately fifty (distinct) articles per month by late 1994 and early 1995.⁷ Whether or not social and cultural conflict actually increased in the United States during this period, attentive newspaper readers would certainly have concluded that it had.

The arts and education, especially higher education, were among the most visible arenas in which the cultural contests of the 1980s and 1990s were fought. Indeed, one might say that these institutions were the *loci classici* of the cultural politics that sprang into public consciousness with conservative attacks on campus “political correctness” and the National Endowment for the Arts in the late 1980s. More than one third of all references to “culture war” in the U.S. press between 1990 and 1993 (as these were recorded in the Nexis system) were

about higher education and the high-culture arts. (Many more concerned the popular media.)

No less a belligerent than William Bennett, President Reagan's Chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, described the "culture war" as a battle "about music, art, poetry, literature, television programming, and movies; the modes of expression and conversation, official and unofficial, that express who and what we are, what we believe, and how we act."⁸

Part of the visibility and salience of attacks on universities and arts institutions reflected their sponsorship: Several conservative foundations supported a network of academic associations, publishing houses, and student groups that promoted the attack on the universities.⁹ Many conservative Christian social-movement groups, as well as some Republican politicians, found it convenient to highlight government grants to "obscene" or "sacrilegious" artists in fund-raising appeals and campaign speeches.¹⁰ Part of the attention lavished upon conflicts in universities and the arts is explicable by their immediacy: photographs with in-your-face sexual or religious imagery and lurid (if rarely entirely accurate) tales of innocent college students crucified at the alter of "political correctness" have the capacity to engender shock and dismay.

In any case, campus controversies and arts-funding scandals received attention disproportionate to their number or significance, as isolated events were taken as emblematic of broad cultural trends. With respect to the arts, the fact that only a dozen or so grants out of tens of thousands by public arts agencies were suitable for condemnation by those agencies' adversaries is at least as remarkable --- and, if one takes it as a sign of timidity, at least as sobering --- as the fact that those grants were made at all.

In the field of higher education, reports of the trashing of western civilization turned out to represent a fevered reaction to modest reforms. As Bryson (1999) concluded from case studies of four very different English Departments, campuses themselves (with some well

publicized exceptions) were the calm eyes at the center of the canon-war hurricane. Elite departments turned disagreements into spirited intellectual contests among entrepreneurial professors who, whatever the outcome, remained free to teach what they pleased. In non-elite departments, curricular decisions were dictated by the realities of university distribution requirements, what textbook publishers offered, and student preferences --- faculty are happy to teach nearly any decent book if only their students will read it --- leaving little time or occasion for philosophical contention.¹¹

Bryson's results are consistent with those of a 1990 survey of English-Department faculty conducted by the Modern Language Association. That study found that although works by women and African-American authors were included in modern literature courses (courses in pre-modern literature were largely unchanged) such additions provided modest leavening to syllabi dominated by canonical figures. And while just over half of the departments had introduced courses on women writers or writers of color, almost 80 percent offered specialized courses on Shakespeare; and the typical institution offered as many sections of the latter as sections in all of the courses on women and authors of color combined.¹²

Public Opinion and the Arts of Democracy

Even if the press exaggerated the magnitude of change and the severity of conflict, such reports could have influenced markedly Americans' perceptions. Our purpose here is to explore the extent to which public battles over the arts and higher education reflected (or shaped) the underlying structure of American sentiments, as captured by a sample survey of more than 1,400 noninstitutionalized Americans aged 18 and over. These men and women were interviewed in their homes in spring of 1993, a period of relative calm before the escalation of culture-war rhetoric that preceded the 1994 mid-term elections.

It may be worth asking both why we should be interested in public opinion, and whether surveys are capable of measuring it. As to the first, measuring public opinion is a central ritual of American democracy. This reliance on attitude surveys to characterize the public mind is a relatively novel and highly consequential aspect of contemporary politics. Whereas “public opinion” in other epochs was constituted in salons, coffee shops, or public squares, today it reflects specific practices of survey design and implementation, the results of which insert themselves as social facts into political discourse. Quite apart from whether the percentage of the public that favors or opposes bilingual education or government grants to artists reflects “true” attitudes (in so far as such things can be said to exist), such a result, once reported in the press, serves to structure and constrain public debate.¹³

Because of this, the results of attitude surveys have significant political implications for both cultural democrats and elitists. If one believes that the public has legitimate claim on the policies of universities or nonprofit arts institutions, then the weight one gives critical voices will depend, to some extent at least, on whether their views represent those of the constituencies for whom they claim to speak. If one believes that universities and cultural institutions should be unbuffeted by fashions that sway the broader culture, then one must understand public opinion in order to fend off the forces of philistinism.

But do surveys really tell us what people think? Most polls invite respondents to affirm or reject an opinion (declared or embedded in a question) that the survey’s authors have constructed. An affirmation does not mean that the respondent fully accepts the position endorsed, only that affirmation approximates his or her view more closely than rejection. Moreover, as survey experts are quick to point, many people construct opinions on the spot to oblige pollsters. If people have not thought much about an issue, their responses may be driven by details of question wording. If they have thought a lot about it, their opinions may be too

complex and ambivalent to be captured in brief precoded responses.¹⁴

Even so, attitude surveys can teach us a lot about the direction and structure of people's views, albeit not the specifics of what they believe. For one thing, surveys are excellent inoculants against partisan claims to represent the masses and against the natural tendency to infer the distribution of public sentiments from their visible expression in collective action and talk-show debate. Equally important, inspecting the relationship between different items in an attitude survey --- the extent to which people who take a certain stand on one issue take a predictable position on a second --- permits inference about the way that people reason about matters of controversy. Analyzing the ways in which responses to opinion surveys fit together helps us recover the narratives that structure the opinions of the public or of particular groups within it. Such narratives are often different and less ideological than those that animate public speeches and newspaper editorials. In other words, attitude surveys cannot reveal the public mind in stark clarity, but they dispel illusions and offer intriguing hints about the ways that people understand their world.

Specifically, we believe that data from the 1993 General Social Survey can help us understand Americans' views of cultural authority and cultural diversity. By "cultural diversity," we refer to heterogeneity with respect to racial and ethnic groups understood to be "minorities": in the United States, cultural diversity ordinarily refers to communities of color, including persons of Asian, African, Latin American, and Native American Indian descent. Debates about cultural diversity address the inclusiveness of institutions as manifested by the backgrounds of persons (faculty or students, curators or actors), of cultural objects (books in a curriculum, paintings in galleries), or of languages (as in controversies over bilingual education in the schools).

By "cultural authority" we refer to acknowledged legitimate authority of specialized elites

to evaluate objects, ideas or actions in specific spheres of collective responsibility. Societies vary in the extent to which such authority is vested in anyone at all, in the degree of consensus about what kind of people possess it, in the extent to which authority in different domains is spread amongst many elites or concentrated in one or a few, and in the extent to which its exercise is embedded in the state, in private organizations, or in more general discursive formations.

Compared to other wealthy nations, the United States's pattern of cultural authority has been unusual in at least two ways: first, it has been relatively weak and strongly contested in the domain of arts and letters; and, second, at least since the Progressive era, cultural authority has been concentrated in densely connected networks based in universities and the professions.¹⁵

Conflicts over the arts and education often challenge established modes of cultural authority from several directions. Some proponents of "diversity" castigate those who hold cultural authority for maintaining cultural hierarchies that arbitrarily exclude work by nonwhite or female artists, authors, scholars and musicians. At the same time, attacks on modernist (and postmodern) art, and on "political correctness" (sometimes a code word for attention to "cultural diversity") in the universities have often entailed a rejection of professional authority, an antinomian appeal to the "common sense" of the American public that works, in so far as it does, precisely because cultural authority (in the arts and humanities) has never been very effectively established.

Of course, the most influential of these critics (for example, Hilton Kramer, Allan Bloom, William Bennett) are no strangers to universities and other cultural institutions themselves: Such critics often speak on behalf of the traditional canon and in the name of a no-longer dominant view of the humanities, drawing upon their own professional credentials to underscore their arguments. Thus combatants in cultural conflict construct both their

protagonists and villains – culturally diverse groups, “great” art or literature, the academic “establishment,” and so on --- in multiple and sometimes inconsistent registers. Indeed, debates over education and the arts are complicated, to say the least, because they present themselves both as conflicts *within* a professorial and intellectual elite, in which each side claims the mantle of professional expertise, *and* as populist uprisings against secular cultural authority of any kind.¹⁶

Our study had three objectives. We wanted to find out if attitudes towards cultural authority and cultural diversity in the arts and education were as *polarized* as the rhetoric suggested. We wanted to know if the general public’s opinions on the various issues that had become implicated in public debates *cohered* into the clusters of interlinked opinions marked out by conservative critics and their liberal opponents. Finally, in so far as we identified lines of cleavage, we were eager to learn how Americans of different genders, races, ages, and levels of educational attainment differed in their views.

Are attitudes polarized?

The 1993 General Social Survey contained eight questions designed to tap respondents’ views on these conflicts (see Table 1 for exact wording).¹⁷ In each case, respondents were presented with a statement and asked to indicate whether they agreed, agreed strongly, disagreed, or disagreed strongly with the sentiments it expressed. The items tapped attitudes towards the role of the classics in high school and college curricula, the capacity of “great books” to transcend their cultural origins, bilingual education in the public schools, reform of the canon to include literature by women and people of color at the expense of traditional works by white men, whether excellence can be found in popular and folk culture as well as the fine arts, whether teachers and professors can be trusted to decide what students should read, and

whether many people are capable of recognizing

Table 1: General Social Survey Attitude Items

Interviewers presented each of the following statements to the respondents in turn, asking respondents to indicate, for each, “whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with” the statement. Bracketed expressions are mnemonic references provided by the survey organization. These are used in some subsequent tables.

***I trust the judgment of the teachers and professors who decide what high school and college students should be reading.

*** High schools and colleges make students spend too much time reading “classics” that have little relevance in today’s world.

*** The great books are universal in their appeal: There is no "white literature," "black literature," or "Asian literature," there is only human literature.

***It is better for everyone is English is the only language used in the public schools.

*** It is a shame when traditional American literature is ignored while other works are promoted because they are by women or by members of minority groups.

*** Only a few people have the knowledge and ability to judge excellence in the arts.

*** Modern painting is just slapped on: a child could do it.

*** Artistic excellence can be found in popular and folk culture just as much as in the fine arts.

quality in the arts. In some cases, the statements were phrased tendentiously in order to provoke varied reactions.

Given that these topics are hardly dinner-table staples in most American households, respondents were strikingly able to produce opinions. Just between 4 percent (on the issue of bilingual education, which had been in the news) and 11 percent (on replacing traditional literature with work by women and minorities) confessed that they did not know how what they thought about the issues in question. Just over 10 percent were unsure how they felt about the role of the classics, 8 percent were not sure if great books are universal, and 7 percent had no opinion about modern art. These percentages are high by the standards of such surveys: by comparison, just 4 percent said “don’t know” when asked if a book advocating homosexuality should be removed from their local public library, 3 percent were unsure if government spent too little or too much money on assistance for the poor, and fewer than 2 percent failed to express an opinion on whether gun buyers should be required to obtain police permits. Nonetheless, most respondents were sufficiently comfortable with the issues to express themselves to interviewers.

For all those who did respond to each question, Table 2 indicates the percentage choosing each of four options: “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” In each case, we report results separately for all respondents and for college graduates only. We look separately at the latter because we assume that controversies about higher education and the arts are typically more salient to college graduates than to other people. We wondered if college graduates’ attitudes differed from those of other Americans and if their views were more polarized than those of the public at large.

**Table 2: Percentage Responses:
GSS Cultural Authority and Cultural Diversity Items**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N
<i>Trust faculty to choose what students read</i>					
All	4.56	58.60	31.88	4.97	1482
College grads	4.70	60.84	28.98	5.48	383
<i>Too much em- phasis on classics</i>					
All	4.12	33.75	53.18	8.94	1431
College grads	2.92	14.85	62.33	19.89	377
<i>Great books universal</i>					
All	12.98	64.42	20.26	2.34	1456
College grads	19.47	56.05	22.11	2.37	380
<i>English only in schools</i>					
All	11.32	36.89	42.62	9.17	1537
College grads	10.49	35.81	41.18	12.53	391
<i>Shame to replace traditional literature</i>					
All	8.10	58.77	29.03	4.09	1419
College grads	9.33	52.00	32.27	6.40	375
<i>Only few can judge art</i>					
All	5.87	43.32	41.43	9.38	1482
College grads	4.35	31.46	49.10	15.09	391
<i>Modern painting just slapped on</i>					
All	4.89	35.85	48.88	10.39	1473
College grads	3.43	23.22	55.15	18.21	379
<i>Excellence in folk and popular art</i>					
All	12.44	82.57	4.58	0.41	1463
College grads	19.43	76.17	3.89	0.52	386

Source . 1993 General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center. "Don't knows" not included. For exact wording of items, see Table 1.

The General Public. Responses to questions about education indicate that Americans are more uncertain than sharply divided with respect to the authority of the classics, the desirability of expanding the canon to admit works by authors from previously underrepresented groups, confidence in educators' stewardship of the curriculum, and even the contentious issue of English instruction in the public schools. Most respondents were willing to "trust the judgment of the teachers and professors who decide what...students should be reading," but very few said they felt strongly about this and more than one third withheld their trust, again, however, with little passion. (The General Social Survey asked this question again in 1998, and the results were very similar.)¹⁸

Asked to respond to a provocatively worded assertion that students waste too much time reading the classics, just over one third rose to the bait, with most disagreeing. Again, strong opinions were notable for their rarity. Indeed, other evidence points to the fact that Americans are divided in their views of the importance of the classics, but not rancorously so. A 1998 telephone survey of registered voters found a bare majority agreeing with the statement that "every college student should have to study the classics of Western Civilization in order to graduate," with a large minority expressing disagreement and a similarly small number of "strong" opinions.¹⁹

Respondents were more willing to agree with a statement, also provocatively phrased, bemoaning the substitution of works "promoted because they are by women or by members of minority groups" for "traditional American literature." Yet, even though the wording seemed calculated to maximize the proportion of sympathetic responses, fewer than one in twelve strongly agreed, and more than one in three dissented.²⁰ Between 1993 and 1998, when the General Social Survey repeated the item, opinion shifted towards multiculturalism, with only 56 percent in 1998 (compared to 66 percent) of those who expressed opinions endorsing the statement, 44

percent disagreeing, and an unusually high proportion (15 percent) declining to answer.

Respondents appear more comfortable with the notion of literary universalism: More than three quarters agreed that "there is no `white literature,' `black literature,' or `Asian literature,'..." but that "the greatest books are universal in their appeal." Just over one in ten endorsed this view "strongly," the largest percentage taking a "strong" position on any item. (It is not clear in what measure these responses reflected aversion to the ethnic segmentation in literature, admiration for "great books," or perhaps other messages that respondents found in the complex proposition with which they were confronted.)

Responses to the question about the exclusive use of English in public schools were split almost evenly between those who favored at least some bilingual instruction and those who favored English only. Approximately 10 percent of respondents took strong positions on each side, more than for other questions, but still surprisingly few for an issue that had been hotly debated, is linked to feelings about immigration, and has appeared on ballots in state elections.

Questions dealing with the arts also revealed much diversity of opinion, and relatively few strongly held positions. Respondents were about evenly split between those who agreed and disagreed with the classically elitist position that "only a few people have the knowledge and ability to judge excellence in the arts." Fewer than 6 percent were willing to endorse the statement strongly, however, and fewer than 10 percent opposed it strongly. Five years later, in 1998, opinion had shifted noticeably in the direction of populism, with 57 percent disagreeing, 17 percent of them "strongly."²¹

A majority of respondents disagreed with the statement denigrating the work of modern painters, although two of five agreed; fewer than 5 percent strongly endorsed the negative view, however.²² By 1998, opinion had turned more cosmopolitan, with just over 30 percent agreeing and 14 percent of respondents taking vigorous exception.²³

Responses to the statement that "Artistic excellence can be found in popular and folk culture just as much as in the fine arts" were the most lopsided, reflecting a nearly unanimous rejection of the aesthetic ideology that once sharply privileged high culture.²⁴ Fully 95 percent of respondents agreed, and only six of the 1463 respondents took vigorous exception to an assertion that most educated Americans would once have deemed philistine. Nonetheless, even in this case, respondents were reluctant to express strong opinions, with just over 10 percent agreeing "strongly" with the popular stance.

Overall, the responses demonstrate that Americans endorse universalism and reject a narrowly highbrow definition of aesthetic merit by wide margins, but that they hold divergent opinions about virtually everything else. Large minorities of respondents don't trust educators to create curricula, think that students have to read too many "classics," want English to be the only language of instruction in the public schools, are sympathetic to the substitution of works by women and people of color for "traditional American literature," believe that one must have special skills or abilities to judge excellence in art, and agree that "even a child" could produce modern painting -- with small majorities taking the opposite positions. The pattern of responses implies uncertainty and tentativeness more than polarization, however, because only the hot-button issue of English in the public schools causes even one in five respondents to take polar positions. For all other items, the ratio of moderate to extreme responses ranges from 5.5:1 (the greatest books are universal) to 7.2:1 (substituting works by women and minority-group members for "traditional American literature"). Most Americans, it seems, have either thought too little about these issues to feel comfortable with extreme positions or, if they *have* considered them, see enough merit on each side to find the extremes unappealing.

College Graduates. It stands to reason that people who have graduated from colleges and universities are more likely to care about what goes on in them than are less educated

Americans. And because college graduates participate more actively in the arts than others, it seems reasonable that arts-related topics will engage them more deeply as well. Consequently, we looked separately at the opinions of respondents who reported having graduated from college. Perhaps, we thought, opinions have become polarized among the most highly educated, even if the rest of the public has been indifferent.

For the most part, the views endorsed by college graduates are similar to those of other Americans. This is especially true of confidence in faculty curricular judgment, the universality of the great books, and, to a lesser extent, bilingual education and the expansion of the curriculum. The primary difference between college graduates and respondents with fewer years of formal education is that the former are more willing to take strong stands in defense of traditionally defined high culture *and* in favor of cultural diversity and cultural democracy. Thus 40 percent of respondents with less than college degrees, but only 15 percent of college graduates, agreed that the classic receive too much emphasis in U.S. education; 20 percent of college graduates – but just 5 percent of other respondents – disagreed *strongly* with this assertion. Similarly, almost half the respondents without college degrees but just over one in four college graduates, agreed that “modern painting is just slapped on”; and more than twice as many college graduates (18 percent compared to 8 percent) took *strong* exception to this view.²⁵

At the same time, college graduates evinced a more democratic perspective on taste than other respondents. Whereas well over half of the other respondents endorsed the statement that “only a few people can really appreciate great art,” only 35 percent of college graduates supported this view. By contrast, twice as many college graduates (15 percent as compared to 7 percent) disagreed with it strongly. And although nearly everyone endorsed the populist position that excellence can be found in popular and folk culture as easily as in high art, fully 20 percent of college graduates, as compared to fewer than half that many nongraduates,

said that they “*strongly*” agreed.

Conclusions on Polarization. There are three things worth noting about these patterns. First, as expected, college graduates are great defenders, although not the only defenders, of both classical and modern high culture. This is consistent both with the conventional notion that universities inculcate respect for the arts *and* with arguments by such sociologists as Pierre Bourdieu and Randall Collins that college graduates represent a kind of status group committed to defending a high culture from their command of which – “cultural capital” in Bourdieu’s terms -- they derive much prestige.²⁶ Although this result seems overdetermined, it does suggest that we must not be too quick to believe the Cassandras who claim that higher education no longer instills respect for canonized art and literature.²⁷ We shall have more to say about this later.

Second, and more surprising, college graduates as a group evince a more democratic view of culture than other Americans, expressing faith in the majority’s ability to judge quality in the arts and refusing to draw strong qualitative boundaries between high culture and other forms. This is surprising for two reasons. If college graduates benefit from their command of prestigious forms of culture, it would seem to be in their interest to endorse, and to claim a privileged relationship with, the established cultural hierarchy. That they fail to do so is news. For another thing, many scholars and journalists have depicted the United States as engulfed in a war over the value of established culture, with populist philistines arrayed against the defenders of the classical faith. James Hunter, for example, has written that “multiculturalists wish to increase the recognition, power, and legitimacy of various minority groups, in part through a delegitimation of an ‘oppressive’ mainstream American culture.”²⁸ For this and other reasons, he argues “multiculturalism undermines the authority of cultural norms and cultural institutions.”²⁹ Yet it seems that we find the same kinds of people, especially college graduates, overrepre-

sented on both sides of the trenches. This suggests that the opposition the high culture and multiculturalism be a false one. Again, we shall have more to say about this below.

Third, college graduates are more likely to give emphatic responses – to report not just that they “agree” or “disagree” but that they do so “strongly.” This tendency is small --- like other people, most college graduates hew to moderate positions -- but it is statistically significant for all items but two (bilingual education and trusting professors to decide on curricular matters). Only attitudes towards bilingual education --- where 10 percent strongly agree and 12 percent strongly disagree --- show signs of polarization. In other cases, college graduates tend to choose only one of the two polar alternatives. Thus 20 percent of college-educated respondents disagree strongly with the proposition that students have to read too many classics (compared to 3 percent who strongly agreed); and almost 20 percent strongly agree that excellence can be found in folk and popular culture, compared to just over half of 1 percent who strongly demurred from this view. In other words, consistent with the notion that these issues are more salient to them, college-educated respondents are more willing to take strong stands on these items, but (except on the subject of bilingual education) not in a way that indicates that opinions are polarized. In other words, these data suggest strongly that the cultural battles that have raged around academia and the arts neither reflect sharp division in the views of Americans (either college graduates or the general public) nor had much effect on those views.

Are Attitudes Ideologically Coherent?

Even if Americans’ views on cultural authority and cultural diversity are far from polarized, it is still possible that, consistent with the “culture war” story, people’s attitudes (strongly held or not) might cluster into coherent ideological packages. If so, such a structure could serve as a

scaffolding around which broad polarization might yet occur.

We explored this issue by looking at a matrix of correlation coefficients, statistics that range from -1 (if x , then not y) to 1 (if x , then always y), with 0 representing statistical independence (knowing x tells one nothing about y).³⁰ If the conservative culture critics are right about how the sides line up, we would anticipate the following:

Traditionalists

Not enough emphasis on classics

Great books are universal

English only in the schools

Don't revise the canon

Only a few can recognize good art

Modern painting is just slapped on

Excellence in high culture

Don't trust teachers and tenured radicals

Progressivists

Too much emphasis on classics classics

No universal literature

Bilingual education

Make the canon more inclusive

Anyone can recognize good art

Modern painting is serious art

Excellent in all kinds of culture

Trust teachers and professors to decide what students read

Table 3: Patterns of Association Among GSS Culture Items (Kendall's Tau-b)

Table 3a: Correlation matrix of GSS culture items for full sample

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>
1) TRSTPROF	1.000							
2) CLASSICS	-.042	1.000						
3) GRTBOOKS	.075**	-.081**	1.000					
4) ENGLISH	.027	.080**	.019	1.000				
5) PCLIT	-.039	.006	.124**	.201**	1.000			
6) JUDGEART	.151**	.182**	-.049	.127**	.066*	1.000		
7) MODPAINT	-.110**	.238**	-.051	.201**	.170**	.113**	1.000	
8) EXCELART	-.014	-.071*	.149**	-.008	.043*	-.088**	-.036	1.000

Table 3b: Correlation matrix of GSS culture items for college graduates

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>
1) TRSTPROF	1.000							
2) CLASSICS	-.079	1.000						
3) GRTBOOKS	.099*	-.197**	1.000					
4) ENGLISH	-.010	-.032	-.045	1.000				
5) PCLIT	.023	-.018	.117*	.278**	1.000			
6) JUDGEART	.151**	.157**	-.054	.165**	.090*	1.000		
7) MODPAINT	-.156**	.280**	-.136*	.169**	.168**	.131*	1.000	
8) EXCELART	.050	-.162**	.178**	-.133*	-.124*	-.165**	-.164**	1.000

Table 3c: Correlation matrix of GSS culture items for respondents with no more than a high-school education

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>
1) TRSTPROF	1.000							
2) CLASSICS	.024	1.000						
3) GRTBOOKS	.037	-.070*	1.000					
4) ENGLISH	.059*	.119**	.011	1.000				
5) PCLIT	-.040	.004	.163**	.138**	1.000			
6) JUDGEART	.165**	.145**	-.042	.129**	.058	1.000		
7) MODPAINT	-.102*	.162**	-.004	.201**	.142**	.090*	1.000	
8) EXCELART	-.009	.018	.152**	.065*	.230**	.027	.064*	1.000

Source . 1993 General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center. "Don't knows" not included. Wording of items can be found in Table 1. *= $p < .05$ **= $p < .001$.

The first headline is that there is little evidence of ideological coherence of any kind. Correlations among items, though often statistically significant, are also quite low: The highest for the general public is .24. (Where opinions are ideologically coherent, so that items essentially measure the same underlying world views, coefficients of .50 or greater are common.) As it happens, the strongest positive correlation is between two items that are often portrayed as negatively associated: People who think that schools should continue to teach the classics also take modern painting seriously.

Indeed, of twenty-eight pairwise correlations only ten were statistically significant and consistent with the conventional wisdom described above. Almost as many – eight statistically significant associations – *contradict* the conventional wisdom. (Another ten pairs of opinions are essentially unrelated to one another.) In other words, the notion that solid blocks of ideologically unified traditionalists and progressives vie for control of our universities and cultural institutions, although possibly correct as a characterization of mobilized interest groups, provides no purchase in understanding patterns of response among a cross-section of the U.S. population. If in 1993 there was a culture war in progress, clearly most of the population had not enlisted on either side.

Of course, there is plenty of reason to doubt whether one should expect to find ideological coherence in the general public's attitudes towards these matters. Rather one might expect it to appear in the opinions of highly educated men and women for whom the issues are more salient.³¹ Indeed, more responses were significantly associated for the college graduates than for those with less education, and the number of correlations consistent with the conventional wisdom rose from ten to thirteen (with seven continuing to contradict the conventional wisdom, and eight pairs still unassociated). Degrees of association remain modest, but they do indicate somewhat greater ideological coherence in the opinions of more educated

respondents.

Almost all of this coherence reflects significant associations among five of the eight items: bilingual instruction in the schools, expanding the canon to include works by women and authors of color, whether many people can judge excellence in art, whether excellence is as likely to be found in popular and folk culture as in high culture, and views of modern painting. College graduates who oppose bilingual education and opening up the canon are also somewhat more likely than others to deride modern painting, believe that few people can judge aesthetic quality, and say that excellence is more easily found in high culture than in other forms. Cultural democrats -- people who think that excellence can be found in any cultural form and that most people can identify good art -- are also more likely to favor bilingual education and expanding the canon, and are more willing to defend modern art. None of these tendencies is very strong, but they are all sufficiently marked that one would not likely find them by chance.

Other patterns, however, demonstrate that the polarity that conservative critics have constructed is not evident in the opinions of the American public, even the college-educated public. Support for the role of the classics in schools is associated not with conservatism, but with commitment to cultural democracy: an expansive view of how many people are qualified to judge art, of the excellence of folk and popular cultures, and with support for modern painting. Also inconsistent with the conventional wisdom is the fact that respondents who endorse two “traditionalist” views -- a belief in literary universalism and the belief that only a few people can judge quality -- also express more confidence in professional educators.³²

If the structure of opinion among the college educated affords only partial and equivocal support for the conventional wisdom, patterns among respondents with high school diplomas or less provide none at all: only eight of twenty-eight correlations are significantly consistent with the “culture-wars” story; nine significant associations contradict it; and eleven pairs of opinions

are not related at all.

Some differences between college graduates and those who stopped schooling with high school are instructive. Whereas college graduates who agree (and agree strongly) that excellence can be found in folk and popular art are *less likely* to deplore replacing traditional American works with multicultural fare and *more likely* to defend modern painting, the pattern for the least educated respondents is the reverse. These and other results suggest that for college graduates, equating the value of popular and folk culture reflects a democratic openness to art and culture of many kinds. By contrast, for the least well educated, the same equation appears to reflect a rejection of all cultural authority, and a *devaluation* of many kinds of art. Put another way, the most educated respondents tend to reject hierarchy in order to elevate the bottom, whereas the least educated tend to reject hierarchy as a means of devaluing what has been at the top.

Beyond Binary Oppositions: A Multidimensional View

We have seen that no single-dimensional explanation suffices to capture the complexity of Americans' beliefs (even as these are expressed in responses to prefabricated survey questions) about cultural authority and cultural diversity. In particular, the notion that conservative traditionalism and multicultural liberalism exhaust the space of opinions on these matters turns out to be especially implausible.

What then *does* explain how people respond to these items? In order to pursue this question, we eliminated two of the items -- whether excellence can be found in folk and popular culture (because there was so little disagreement about it), and whether the great books are universal (because the question was confusing) --- and submitted the rest to a "factor analysis": a statistical program that places items that are associated with one another into clusters and

provides some statistical guidance in deciding how many are necessary to apprehend the complexity of people's responses.³³

The results indicated that three distinct dimensions structure people's responses. These three dimensions are

1. *orientation to high culture* (measured by attitudes towards the literary classics and modern art);
2. *resistance to multiculturalism* (tapped by attitudes towards bilingual education and expanding the literary canon); and
3. *rejection of cultural authority* (reflected in distrust of educators and the view that most people can judge art).³⁴ .

Far from representing binary oppositions, these three dimensions tapped distinct and largely independent points of views. In the statistical analyses that follow, each of these dimensions is measured by a scale summing each respondent's score on the two items on which each dimension is based.

Explaining attitudes

Having identified the dimensions that appear to structure people's attitudes towards cultural diversity and cultural authority, we can now begin to explain why people vary along them. We use "explanation" in the special sense, limited but illuminating, common to this kind of research: the prediction by statistical means of a person's position on scales representing each of the three dimensions. To accomplish this, we look at many other "variables" (aspects of identity, life experiences, or other beliefs) on which people differ, and ask how these differences are associated with people's positions on the dimensions of interest (attitudes towards high culture, multiculturalism, and cultural authority). In order to distinguish between the "effects" of different characteristics, we use a statistical method called "multiple regression analysis" to examine each variable while "holding constant" effects of all the rest. Thus we can interpret results as representing the difference between people who differ with respect to any given variable but are similar with respect to all other characteristics of which we have taken account. The characteristics we use to predict the attitude measures are age, race, gender, years of formal education, residence in the Southeast, income, membership in a conservative Protestant religious denomination, and political conservatism.³⁵

In addition, we use four scales based on the addition of other separate measures. One combines three items tapping support for legally sustained racial separation into a measure of *racism* (of a particularly crude variety).³⁶ A second scale, *tolerance*, is based on responses to fifteen questions about whether advocates of various unpopular opinions should be permitted to speak in public, teach in a college or have a book in the local library.³⁷ A third scale, *confidence* in professional institutions, sums measures of the respondent's confidence in education, the press, medicine, and the scientific community.³⁸ A final scale sums measures of attendance at

several kinds of arts events and several related attitudes into a measure of *commitment to the arts*.³⁹

We shall discuss the three dimensions (our three kinds of cultural attitudes) one at a time. In each case we start by examining the way in which people's identities and experiences are associated with their cultural attitudes (without considering their attitudes in other domains); then we look at the relationship of cultural orientations to other attitudes; and finally we examine together the effects of those characteristics *and* attitudes that are associated with the perspective we are trying to explain, in order to see the effect of each with the others taken into account. We separate the measures in this way because a strong (if not unassailable) case can be made that personal characteristics are causally implicated in the development of the attitudes they predict. By contrast, the link between attitudes in one realm and attitudes in another is more logical than causal, representing affinity rather than sequence.⁴⁰ We put them together, in the end, in order to understand to what extent personal characteristics influence cultural attitudes by shaping other aspects of a person's world view, and to what extent their influence is independent of the other attitudes measured here.

We shall focus on major findings described in broad strokes. Readers interested in additional technical detail should consult Table 4, which presents results of the multiple regression analyses, and follow the endnotes that accompany our discussion.

Table 4: OLS Coefficients for Predictors of GSS Cultural Attitude Measures

Independent Variable	HIGH CULTURE			REJECT AUTHORITY			MULTICULTURALISM			
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	
Age		-.009			-.074*		-.048	-.127**		-.116*
Black	-.058*		-.034	-.007			.140**		.068	
Female	.091**		.049	.011			.116**		.121*	
Rural	-.056*		.023	-.052			-.007			
Hispanic	-.015			-.026			.065			
South		.015			-.065*		-.002	-.049		
Income	.039			-.011			-.091*		-.097	
Religiously Conservative Denomination	-.062*		-.039	.007			.004			
Education	.286**		.218**	.139**		.184**	.101**		.509**	
Political Conservatism	-.083			.029			-.253**	.340		
Art commitment		.259**	.181*		.064			.099		
Tolerance		.226**	.140*		.143*	.104		.031		
Confidence		.035			-.159*	-.132*		-.034		
Racism		-.122*	-.107*		-.087			-.178**	-.113*	
EducationX Political Conservatism										-.637*
Adj. R ²	.119	.221	.221	.033	.047	.065	.066	.136	.147	
N	1221	328	331	1284	332	371	1256	338	402	

Source. 1993 General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center. For each dependent variable, model 1 includes demographic and attribute predictors, model 2 includes attitudinal scales and arts commitment only, and model 3 combines significant or near-significant variables from both models. Ns vary because some questions appeared only on two ballots of the GSS, and some combinations of variables restricted the sample to one of three GSS ballots.

*=significant at .05 or less; **=significant at .001 or less.

Support for high culture. Respondents who scored high on this dimension rejected both the notion that schools focus too heavily on classics *and* the dismissive characterization of modern art. We expected that more educated respondents would evince more allegiance to high culture, because many studies have found the number of years a person has gone to school to be the best predictor of his or her participation in and attitudes towards high culture.⁴¹ As expected, educational attainment is by far the best predictor of positive attitudes towards high culture among the sociodemographic variables, with an effect three times as large as that of any other. Considerably smaller, but still statistically significant, differences exist in the views of women (more supportive) and men, between Euro-Americans (more supportive) and African-Americans, and between people who live in rural areas (less supportive) and others.

Members of theologically conservative Protestant denominations are also significantly less supportive of high culture than others. We initially attributed this difference to the inclusion in the scale of a measure of attitudes towards modern art, government support for which had been the target of highly publicized attacks by some evangelical leaders. To see if we were correct, we separately examined predictors of the scale's two components – view of modern art and position on the role of the classics in school curricula. To our surprise, members of theologically conservative denominations have more negative sentiments towards the classics as well as towards modern art, and the size of the differences are almost identical. Apparently, religious and secular conservatives part company in their view of the importance of the traditional works of high culture.⁴²

It was no surprise that people who attend arts events, enjoy classical music and like their friends to be “cultured” would rank high on this dimension, as both scales tap an underlying interest in the high-culture arts. Indeed, this is the case. What *was* surprising is that political tolerance is almost as strongly related to positive attitudes towards the classics and modern art

as is high-cultural participation and taste. Moreover, racist attitudes are *negatively* and significantly associated with support for traditional high culture. When we look simultaneously at the effects of both personal characteristics and other attitudes on support for high culture, we find that differences related to gender, race, residence and religion stem from the fact that these characteristics shape other attitudes and behaviors – especially *participation in high culture* – that influence attitudes towards the arts directly.⁴³ By contrast, fully 75 percent of the positive effect on attitudes towards high culture of educational attainment persists even after we take account of the fact that more educated people attend more arts events, are more politically tolerant and are less likely to endorse racist views than those with less education. Apparently schooling succeeds in instilling respect for the value of high culture, even among people who do not personally participate in the arts. (Schooling also engenders support for the arts because it has such a strong effect on people’s own arts participation, but that mechanism appears to be of secondary importance.)

Support for multiculturalism Respondents who scored high on this dimension do *not* regret the displacement of traditional male authors by women and authors of color in university curricula, and support the use of languages other than English in public-school classrooms. We expected that education would be associated with support for multiculturalism, because research has shown that the highly educated tend to be cultural “omnivores,” enjoying many kinds of cultural forms; and because they ordinarily express lower levels of racial or ethnic prejudice.⁴⁴ In fact, the more educated *are* significantly more sympathetic to multiculturalism, as are women and African-Americans.⁴⁵

A few proponents of multiculturalism have implied that assertion of the value of traditional western culture represents a thinly veiled rejection of multiculturalism, or even a distaste for the “cultural others” themselves.⁴⁶ We suspect that this is too simple, and that one can be

partial to Euro-American high culture because one likes it, not because one dislikes people who are not Euro-American. At the same time, research on symbolic racism suggests that cultural attitudes *may* be extensions or displacements of intergroup antipathies, with cultural representations of a group bearing a burden of hostility otherwise directed to the group itself.⁴⁷

For this reason, we anticipated that the less racist the respondent, the more he or she would favor multiculturalism. Indeed, racism is indeed significantly and negatively associated with opposition to multiculturalism.⁴⁸

Curiously, though, self-described political conservatism is even *more* strongly associated with opposition to multiculturalism than is endorsement of crudely racist positions. Students of racial attitudes disagree with how to interpret such results. Some would argue that positions on policy issues related to cultural diversity (for example bilingual education and curriculum reform) are structured by *both* racial views and matters of philosophical principle unrelated to race. These scholars might interpret our findings as indicating that philosophical considerations are even more important than racial views in determining opposition to multiculturalism. Other scholars contend that changes in the political landscape have led to a conflation of racism and conservatism --- that is, a situation in which people define themselves as “conservative” partly on the basis of attitudes that reflect subtle forms of racial stereotyping and aversion. As declines in the proportion of Americans endorsing crudely racist positions have made the latter poor predictors of most policy preferences, more subtle correlates of racial intolerance (like “conservatism”) have picked up the explanatory slack. In this view, then, the fact that conservatism and racism together explain about 15 percent of variation in people’s positions on the multiculturalism scale reinforces the suspicion that opposition to multicultural reforms is often a form of symbolic racism.⁴⁹

Interestingly, the effect of conservatism is significant only for the more educated re-

spondents, and the effect of education depends upon how respondents placed themselves on the scale of liberalism-to-conservatism. For self-described liberals, higher education is strongly associated with support for multiculturalism; for self-described conservatives, it is associated with opposition. Thus it seems that education polarizes opinion by increasing the salience of multiculturalism, and therefore the correlation between political ideology and attitudes, for conservatives and liberals alike.⁵⁰

Rejection of cultural authority. Respondents who score high on this final dimension reject the proposition that only a few people are capable of judging excellence in art and are reluctant to trust educators to choose what students will read in school. One might expect that education would instill faith in the authority of cultural elites, by exposing people to such elites and also leading them to view themselves as possessing legitimate cultural authority by dint of their own training. This is not the case: Consistent with the notion that the highly educated participate in an antinomian “culture of critical discourse” and exhibit a chronic disposition to question authority, formal education is actually the strongest *positive* predictor of rejection of cultural authority.⁵¹ Older people and those living in the South are also less likely (respectively) to question cultural authority than the young and people in other parts of the U.S. These effects are small, but sufficient to refute the claim that middle America has rejected the authority of a cultural establishment it views as a left-wing “cultural elite.”⁵²

We expected attitudes towards cultural authority to be related to attitudes towards professional authority of other kinds. Specifically, we anticipated that people who expressed little confidence in physicians, scientists, journalists and educators would also have populist attitudes towards judgments about art and literature. Our expectation was confirmed by a modest but statistically significant association in the expected direction.

The most striking finding about attitudes towards cultural authority, however, is that they

are very hard to predict: Even with both sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes included, the statistical model explained (that is, rendered predictable) only about one sixteenth of the variation in responses. We suspect that different Americans reject authority for quite different reasons --- some out of grudging resentment and others out of a Whitmanesque faith in the capacity of the common woman or man --- and that these different motives are associated with very different antecedents, making them unlikely to be well predicted by a single statistical model.

Closed Minds and Tenured Radicals: Are Universities Responsible for Generational Differences in Cultural Attitudes? The conservative critique of higher education asserts that there has been a generational trend towards civilizational decline (*i.e.*, rejection of high culture, rejection of cultural authority and support for multiculturalism) and lays blame for this supposed trend at the gates of higher education. We evaluated this argument by dividing our sample into three age cohorts --- pre-baby-boomers (born before 1947), baby boomers (born 1947-1960), and post-boomers (born between 1961 and 1975) --- and examining differences among them, focussing especially on people exposed to the effects of higher education.

There are actually two versions of the conservative story. We refer to the first, articulated by Allan Bloom in *The Closing of the American Mind*, as the *theory of boomer exceptionalism*. In this view, things began to go wrong in the 1960, when the baby boomer generation seized control of America's campuses, laying waste traditional educational values as cowardly liberal administrators capitulated to their demands. If this were the case, we would expect to see sharp declines in support for high culture among the baby boomer generation, accompanied by sharp increases in support for multiculturalism and rejection of cultural authority. We call the second approach *tenured-radical theory*, Roger Kimball set it forth in

his book *Tenured Radicals*. Not all boomers were corrupted, so the story goes, but the bad eggs went disproportionately into college teaching. The diffusion of barbarism awaited their elevation to the tenured professorate, just in time to corrupt the values of “Generation X.” If this is the case, we should see a particularly sharp decline in support for high culture, increases in support for multiculturalism, and greater rejection of cultural authority in the post-boomer cohort. Moreover, in each case, the generational change should be greater for respondents who attended college than for those who were unexposed to the academic milieu.

Both of these accounts prove inconsistent with the evidence. Support for high culture evinces no decline from one cohort to the next, and years of education predicts respect for high culture as well for younger as for older respondents. Support for multiculturalism *does* increase with the boomer cohort (and it stays higher among the post-boomers); but the increase is visible at all levels of education, so it cannot be attributed to the effects of higher education. (It more likely reflects a decline in racism as the baby boomers came of age.) Similarly, boomers and post-boomers are less accepting of cultural authority than their elders but, contrary to conservative criticisms, the change is actually *less* pronounced among those exposed to higher education.⁵³

Conclusions: Public Opinion’s Democratic Vistas

In this final section, we shall return to the broader themes that animate this volume. Whereas to this point we have been cautious in presenting and interpreting our data, in this section we shall take more liberties, exercise more interpretive license (even to the point of speculation), and address normative, as well as positive, concerns. Our normative stance is both conservative, in the sense that we wish to conserve the great art and culture of the past, and democratic, in that we hold an inclusive understanding of the arts and culture, favor widespread diffusion of many

cultural forms, and are reasonably optimistic about people's capacity to make their own choices about culture and the arts.

From this normative standpoint, we find the results of this inquiry into public opinion encouraging for at least three reasons:

1. First, our analyses refute the notion that Americans (at least any sizable number of them) are engaged in a clash of coherent ideologies between traditionalist conservative and secular progressivist forces. Neither the views of the general public as a whole nor of college graduates constitute the coherent packages that culture warriors of the right and (to a lesser extent) the left have attempted to construct. Cultural conflicts in our schools, universities, and arts institutions reflect not a struggle between two well defined sets of values, but rather a set of loosely related contests knit together more by strategy and convenience than by common ideology.

2. The worst fears of both liberals and conservatives are largely imaginary (with respect to public opinion, if not necessarily with respect to organized social movements, of course). Liberals may take cheer in the fact that (after one controls for political conservatism and other factors) fundamentalists and Evangelicals are no less sympathetic to multiculturalism than other Americans. And supporters of high culture (though not opponents of multiculturalism) are likely to be *less*, rather than more, racist in orientation than opponents of classics and modern art. For their part, conservatives may be pleased to learn that university education and generational change have not had the radicalizing impact attributed to them. Other things equal, younger generations are no less oriented to high culture than their elders.

3. Third, and perhaps most encouraging, whereas conservative cultural critique presupposes and constructs an opposition between Euro-American high culture and the cultures of women and people of color --- "a culture war over the value of traditional Western civilizati-

ion versus the works of Third World authors and thinkers” --- it appears that most Americans are not buying it.⁵⁴ Support for traditionally defined high culture is driven by formal education and cosmopolitan values: Far from representing a form of symbolic racism, belief in the value of high culture is *negatively* associated with racism and *positively* associated with political tolerance. By contrast, opposition to multiculturalism reflects, to some extent, symbolic racism, as well as more general political conservatism. Despite the efforts of critics of cultural diversity to construct an opposition between traditional high culture and cultural pluralism, support for both is associated with high levels of formal education and racial tolerance.

None of this is to deny that cultural conflict exists, that activists form alliances across many different issues, or that social-movement elites hold more coherent ideological understandings of disparate issues than ordinary noncombatants. Nor is it to deny that rhetoric about "culture wars," or recitation of discourses that link previously disparate issues, may eventually contribute to creating the very conditions they purport to describe. Rather, it suggests that explanations for conflict over education and the arts must be sought not in the structure of public opinion, but in the specific institutional logics of these fields and in the strategies and tactics of mobilized social movements.

Indeed, given the energy that the right has poured into struggles over education and the arts, it is surprising that Americans' attitudes are as *unpolarized* as they are. We suspect that our findings provide a clue as to why efforts to foment broad-based conflict over the arts and education have not been more successful. To erupt into a culture war, differences in opinion should both pit one form of culture against another at the symbolic level and be rooted in structural cleavage (for example, membership in identity groups or political organizations) that permit identities to crystallize around symbolic struggles. Instead, we find that the strongest supporters of the traditional canon *and* of the alternative to it both come from the same social location, *i.e.*,

the ranks of the highly educated, and that those who support one are also likely to support the other.

Moreover, perhaps reflecting the victory of the celebrated American faith in cultural democracy with the rise of mass higher education, the college-educated steadfastly refuse to play the role of "cultural elite" into which some have tried to cast them. Instead, higher education is associated not only with support for traditional culture and multiculturalism, but also with democratic attitudes towards cultural authority and a broad definition of aesthetic value.

The absence of a large constituency for cultural hierarchy would seem to indicate a sea change in educated opinion, given the cultural and institutional dominance of hierarchy at least through the 1950s. It is difficult to pinpoint the timing of that change. It appears that at some point higher education stopped inculcating an exclusive version of cultural hierarchy and began instead to produce an openness to and appreciation of a wide range of cultural forms. This change coincided with a shift in the social meaning of the arts, such that interest and participation in high culture became attached to an attitude complex including tolerance, social liberalism, and skepticism towards authority.⁵⁵

It may also have marked a shift in the form of cultural reproduction from intergenerational transmission of a fixed hierarchy to transmission of a capacity for cultural adaptation and flexibility. Whereas in past generations, prestige was mapped hierarchically onto cultural forms in a manner that reflected the stratification of their audiences, contemporary education imparts, instead, a standardized ability to display "individualized" tastes that enact identity and defy categorization. If so, the ranks of the highly educated will yield few willing conscripts to culture wars in higher education and the arts; and, as the stakes of such wars ultimately matter the most to the highly educated, even the most bellicose generals will find it difficult to raise large armies.

We suspect that this augurs well for cultural democracy, albeit cultural democracy of a particular kind. However one defines it, cultural democratization first entails an expansion of cultural diversity, so that art forms or genres cannot be dismissed because they failed to be sacralized in the late 19th century or because of their association with nonwestern or nonelite social groups. Second, cultural democracy entails a rejection of narrow conceptions of cultural authority, so that more voices can be heard in conversations about artistic quality.

The cultural hierarchy that reigned in the United States for most of the 20th century --- a system that associated artistic quality with nonprofit institutions created and governed by urban upper classes, supported by philanthropic contributions, and closely tied to university specialties --- provided a neat but flawed solution to the problem of defining and expanding access to excellence in the arts: “neat,” because it sustained a lot of good art in ways that the market could not; “flawed” because it embedded definitions of excellence in the status culture and identities of the upper classes upon whom high-cultural institutions relied for leadership and support. The institutions of that system remain largely intact; but the system’s ideological erosion can be witnessed in the near unanimity with which Americans refuse to view excellence as limited, or even more easily found, in high culture than in popular or folk art; and in the large plurality of the most educated Americans who regard the ability to identify excellence as widespread. The challenge is to nurture institutions that are consistent with this more democratic ethos. The challenge is not to eliminate cultural distinction, but to establish a basis for identifying and promulgating excellence that is independent of class, race, and gender --- in other words to liberate artistic hierarchies from social-structural constraints. Thus stated, this a utopian vision. The practical question is: how closely an actually existing society can approximate it?

In addressing this question, it is important to recognize that each of the constructs with which this chapter is concerned – cultural authority and cultural diversity – comes in two very

different forms. As we have seen, some people reject cultural authority because they reject many kind of culture: this *nihilistic antinomianism* is associated with rejecting both traditional high culture *and* multiculturalism. By contrast, higher education appears to inculcate in many Americans an *expansive antinomianism*, an inclination to reject artificial distinctions in order to affirm the value of many genres and cultural traditions.

Likewise, there is more than one route to cultural diversity. One approach, favored by classical cultural democrats, is *collaborative and deliberative*: Communities come together to celebrate their many strands, schools expose children to the wealth of cultures to which they have access, and artists and writers from different traditions share their work and even collaborate around common projects. We see examples of this in the French experiment with cultural animation, in community arts projects throughout urban and rural America, and in some programs in the schools.⁵⁶ The other route, theorized less but practiced much more, is through the market: As technological change permits narrow-casting, commercial enterprises can bring to market many more types of culture, tailored to the tastes of ever smaller audiences, thus fostering both diversity and innovation. The classic example here is the field of music, where the massive changes engendered by digitalization are transforming the economic logic of the music industry virtually overnight.

With respect to cultural authority, expansive antinomianism is clearly superior on normative grounds to its nihilistic alternative. With respect to cultural diversity, the normative conclusions are less clear. The collaborative approach to diversity is deeper and more inclusive: it permits cultural critique in which many voices can be heard and underlying assumptions can be made explicated. But it is also very labor-intensive (and therefore expensive, either in contributed time or in philanthropic donations), and is therefore unlikely to occur except during periods in which broad-based change-oriented social movements are politically active.

By contrast, the market has provided an extraordinarily efficient means of implementing cultural diversity (and, indirectly, by sidestepping institutions congruent with the existing cultural hierarchy, in fostering democracy), but the market is a risky ally. For one thing, whether markets foster diversity and excellence, or hierarchy and monoculture, depends upon the details of industry structure, technology, and the incentive structures the latter produce. In large part due to the effects of the internet and digitalization of cultural products, the market is a source of abundance today, but we cannot count on it remaining so in the future. Typically, new technologies have unleashed innovation and diversity, which is ultimately limited by the efforts of oligopolistic competitors to control markets and maintain stable revenue flows --- efforts that have typically limited diversity.⁵⁷ Moreover, market-fostered diversity presents a risk of fragmentation: cultural democracy requires not just diversity, but mutual awareness and respect; by contrast, emerging marketing practices reinforce segmentation of taste cultures.⁵⁸

In considering the prospects, it may be useful to consider the way the differing approach to authority and diversity might intersect. *Nihilistic antinomianism* is clearly destructive. Tied to collaborative cultural action, it leads to repression rather than democracy. Articulated to market forces, it is conducive to the mass culture of which the Frankfurt School warned us.

By contrast, the expansive approach to authority --- increased faith in the aesthetic capacity of regular men and women, a willingness to find excellence in many genres --- is an indispensable ingredient in cultural democracy. Associated with a collaborative approach to diversity, it provides the ingredients for cultural animation --- an integration of art and literature into ongoing efforts at community development and change.⁵⁹ Associated with the market version of diversity, it offers a means to overcome the danger of fragmentation: a faith in the active intelligence of consumers and in their willingness and ability to cross boundaries and exercise critical discrimination in many realms.

Table 5: Authority, Diversity, and Democracy

	Authority	
	Nihilistic	Expansive
Diversity	Collaborative Censorship	Cultural animation
	Market Mass culture	Inclusive differentiation

We believe that public sentiments provide a basis to realize some of the promise of cultural democracy --- “a program of culture, drawn out, not for a single class alone, or for the parlors or lecture rooms, but with an eye to practical life... a scope generous enough to include the widest human area...eligible to the uses of the high average of men -- and not restricted to conditions ineligible to the masses,” as Whitman described it at the moment that the United States’ urban elites were actively constructing a hierarchical culture of limited permeability.⁶⁰ To be sure, nihilistic antinomianism, opposed both to high culture and to multiculturalism, retains a constituency, but it would appear to be dwindling. Instead, the sentiments of the typical educated Americans --- the ones with the most to say about cultural policy and educational practice, and the ones whose consumer decision drive the cultural marketplace --- combine a persistent respect for high culture with a curiosity and openness to new forms; a belief in critical standards but a skepticism as to their application; a cosmopolitan openness to the cultural other and a persistent inclination to invest in conventionally defined cultural capital.

Given these sentiments, the commercial marketplace can contribute to the emergence of

cultural democracy, at least so long as low barriers to entry permit many producers to offer a wide range of materials. Indeed, given the persistent respect for high culture evinced by Americans who reject the ideology that privileges high culture and the judgments of critics and curators, it appears that conservative traditionalists have had too little faith in the inherent value and appeal of the objects of their veneration. At the same time, there are many types of culture – and, even more, ways of apprehending cultural objects – that could not persist, or would persist much less widely and effectively, without the existing framework of philanthropically supported nonprofit organizations, and without continued public and philanthropic investment in institutions of collaborative diversity and cultural animation. Moreover, without public policy to ensure that barriers to entry in cultural industries remain low, the liberating potential of the market will not be realized. The key is to find the mix of policies, public and philanthropic, that can guide and manage the new cultural marketplace in ways consistent with the new sensibilities that structure the public’s understanding of culture and its relationship to it.

Endnotes

¹ See, e.g., Richard Bolton, ed., *Culture Wars: Documents from the Recent Controversies in the Arts* (N.Y.: The New Press, 1992); Stephen Dubin, *Arresting Images: Impolitic Art and Uncivil Actions* (N.Y.: Routledge, 1992); Marjorie Heins, *Sex, Sin and Blasphemy: A Guide to America's Censorship Wars* (N.Y.: The New Press, 1993); Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, "From Accord to Discord: Arts Policy During and After the Culture Wars," in *America's Commitment to Culture: Government and the Arts*, edited by Kevin V. Mulcahy and Margaret Jane Wyszomirski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 1-46.

² Influential screeds include Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students* (N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Roger Kimball, *Tenured Radicals: How Politics has Corrupted Our Higher Education*. (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1990); Dinesh D'Souza, *Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus* (N.Y.: Free Press, 1991).

³ See, e.g., Gerald Graff, *Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education*, (N.Y.: Norton, 1992); Robert Hughes, *Culture of Complaint: A Passionate Look into the Ailing Heart of America*, (New York: Warner Books, 1993); James Davison Hunter, *Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America's Culture War* (N.Y.: Free Press, 1994); Lawrence Levine, *The Opening of the American Mind: Canons, Culture and History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996). These authors note that the debate has been characterized by, among other things, distortion of facts, dualistic thinking, and chronic ahistoricity.

⁴ Todd Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars* (New York: Metropolitan, 1995).

⁵ James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1991); Os Guinness, *The American Hour: A Time of Reckoning and the Once and Future Role of Faith* (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1993).

⁶ Rhys H. Williams, ed., *Cultural Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular Myth*, (N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1997); Paul DiMaggio, John Evans and Bethany Bryson, "Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?," *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (1996): 690-755.

⁷ Articles referring to "culture wars" outside the United States (e.g., the Middle East) were not included. Articles that appeared in more than one newspaper (e.g., wire service reports or syndicated columns) were counted only once. For a more detailed description, see Paul DiMaggio, "Social Division in the United States: The Disparity Between Private Opinion and Public Politics," in *Fractious America: Divisions of*

Race, Culture and Politics at the Millenium, edited by Jonathan Rieder and Stephen Steinlight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

⁸ William J. Bennett, *The De-Valuing of America: The Fight for Our Culture and Our Children* (N.Y.: Summit Books, 1992): 25.

⁹ Graff, *op. cit.*; Hughes, *op. cit.*; Levine, *op. cit.*; Ellen Messer-Davidow, "Manufacturing the Attack on Liberalized Higher Education," *Social Text* 36 (1993): 40-80; Gitlin, *op. cit.*: chapt. 6.

¹⁰ Bolton, *op. cit.*; Paul DiMaggio and Becky Pettit, "Public Opinion and Political Vulnerability: Why has the National Endowment for the Arts been Such an Attractive Target?" Working Paper #7, Princeton University Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies, November 1998.

¹¹ Bethany Bryson, *Conflict and Cohesion: Battle Lines and Common Ground in the Struggle over Multiculturalism in English Literature*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University Sociology Department, 1999.

¹² Bettina Huber, "Today's Literature Classroom: Findings from the MLA's 1990 Survey of Upper Division Courses," *ADE Bulletin*, no. 101 (Spring 1992): 36-60; Bettina Huber, "What's Being Read in Survey Courses? Findings from a 1990-91 MLA Survey of English Departments," *ADE Bulletin*, no. 100 (Spring 1995): 40-48. The figure cited is from Table 2 (p. 41) of the latter.

¹³ Susan Herbst, *Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); *Politics at the Margin: Historical Expressions Outside the Mainstream* (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1994); David Zaret, *Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

¹⁴ Herbst, *ibid.* John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Although public-opinion researchers know all this, they still usually describe results as representing that, for example, "35 percent of Americans believe x" rather than writing "35 percent of respondents reported that they agreed with statement x." In effect, the terse form has become a shorthand for more accurate but less graceful constructions. In this chapter we compromise, using the terse form in most cases, but interjecting the long form frequently enough (we hope) to keep the reader on his or her toes.

¹⁵ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols., (N.Y.: Vintage, 1945); Michèle Lamont, *Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and the American Upper-Middle Class* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Thomas L. Haskell, ed., *The Authority of Experts* (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1984); Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy and Public Policy* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1989); Steven Brint, *In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

¹⁶ The most sophisticated chronicler of cultural conflict is Pierre Bourdieu, who has addressed the professional politics of both universities and the arts in a series of trail-blazing works. The primary difference between the U.S. and France is that the boundaries of cultural and educational institutions are for many reasons more permeable in the U.S. than in France, and claims against established institutions are more likely to be placed on behalf of groups defined by racial or ethnic identity in the U.S., and by groups defined on the basis of class or region in France. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, trans. P. Collier, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); *The Field of Cultural Production*. (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993).

¹⁷ Data are from the 1993 NORC General Social Survey, a regular personal-interview sample survey of U.S. households. For details, see James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith, *The NORC General Social Survey: A User's Guide* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992). The 1606 respondents to the 1993 survey were representative of noninstitutionalized Americans aged 18 or older. The items on which this chapter focuses were part of a special "module" of questions germane to the interests of sociologists of culture, described in Peter V. Marsden and Joseph F. Swingle, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Culture in Surveys: Values, Strategies, and Symbols," *Poetics* 22 (1994): 269-90.

¹⁸ National Opinion Research Center, *General Social Surveys, 1972-1998: Cumulative Codebook* (Chicago: NORC, 1999): 465.

¹⁹ Daniel Yankelovich Group for the Ford Foundation, Campus Diversity Initiative Survey, July-August, 1998. Roper Center Public Opinion On-Line, Question ID: USDYG.98CULT,R11B.

²⁰ Question phrasings were intended to maximize variation in response. Because of the novelty of the topic area, however, it was difficult to anticipate the phrasings that would do this most effectively. In the case of this item, a more even break -- perhaps with a plurality in the opposite direction -- might have been achieved by changing "is ignored while other works are promoted because they are" to "receive less attention in order to make room for works." A considerably cruder formulation -- "Adding material about women and minorities to the college curriculum makes it less rigorous" -- elicited the agreement of 33 percent of a 1998

national sample of voters, with 59 percent disagreeing (Daniel Yankelovich Group for the Ford Foundation, Campus Diversity Initiative Survey, July-August, 1998. Roper Center Public Opinion On-Line, Question ID: USDYG.98CULT,R17B).

²¹ National Opinion Research Center, *op. cit.*: 464.

²² The item was taken from Bourdieu and Darbel (1990), which reports results of a survey of French respondents in the late 1960s. One might argue that the wording was more appropriate at a point when modern art was still often popularly identified with abstract expressionism; but agreement was sufficiently high to suggest that negative stereotypes from that era are alive in popular culture even if the styles on which they were based are no longer fashionable.

²³ National Opinion Research Center, *op. cit.*: 465.

²⁴ Ideologies distinguishing sharply between “high culture” and popular forms and privileging the latter rose to prominence in the U.S. in association with the emergence of urban upper classes in the Victorian era, and were quickly embraced by much of the middle class. (On this point see Paul DiMaggio, “Cultural Entrepreneurship in 19th Century Boston,” Parts 1 and 2, *Media Culture and Society* 4 (1982):33-50, 303-21; and Lawrence Levine, *Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988].) Surveys consistently have reported that people from higher socioeconomic status backgrounds participate more actively in audiences for high-culture art forms (they also participate more actively in other kinds of cultural audiences, with the differences are less pronounced), but this is the first study that asked people to evaluate broad genres in this way.

²⁵ These and other figures on respondents without college degrees are calculated from the information in Table 2.

²⁶ Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction: In Education, Society, Culture*, trans. Richard Nice. (London: Sage Publications, 1977); Randall Collins, *The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education* (New York: Academic Press, 1979).

²⁷ Bloom, *op. cit.*; Kimball, *op. cit.*; Bennett, *op. cit.*

²⁸ Hunter, 1994, *op. cit.*: 191.

²⁹ *Ibid.*: 208.

³⁰ The measure of correlation is Kendall’s *tau-b* statistic.

³¹ Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Public," Pp. 206-61 in *Ideology and Discontent*, edited by David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964).

³² One might ask whether we were correct to locate trust in professional educators on the "left" or "progressivist" side of the ideological spectrum in the first place. Doing so is certainly consistent with the assertions of the conservative critics of universities like the National Association of scholars, who tend to view academic professionalism and multiculturalism as wrapped in an unholy alliance. (See, .e.g. Bruce Robbins, "Othering the Academy: Professionalism and Multiculturalism," *Social Research* 58 [1991]: 355-72.) But we were somewhat skeptical, and initially assumed that the unexpectedly positive correlations of the "distrust-of-educators" item with these two liberal views might disguise different patterns of association for liberal and conservative respondents (such that those on the left who distrust the professorate are likely to be especially radical, while those on the right who distrust educators are likely to be more ideologically conservative). But when we analyzed patterns of correlation between distrust of educators and the other items separately for GSS subsamples who characterized themselves, respectively, as liberal and conservative, we found no systematic differences.

³³ We used the SYSTAT/PC Statistics principal-components factor analysis with varimax rotation (replicated with oblique rotation to explore the possibility that the factors were correlated), and retained all factors with eigenvalues of greater than 1.0.

³⁴ Factor loadings on orientation to high culture were .845 for the classics and .620 for modern art; on resistance to multiculturalism they were .802 for expanding the canon and .691 for bilingual education; and on rejection of cultural authority they were .834 for confidence in educators and .631 for the ability to judge art.

³⁵ Race and ethnicity are based on two binary variables identifying respondents who are African-American or who describe themselves as being of Hispanic origin. (Race was assigned by interviewers, except when interviewers were uncertain. Hispanic origin was assigned to respondents who described their national background as Spanish, Latin American [excepting Brazil], or Phillipino.) Income is based on a 21-category scale, coded at the midpoint of each range. Conservative Protestant denominations are coded by GSS from denominational affiliation. (The method is described in Tom Smith, "Classifying Protestant Denominations," GSS Technical Report No. 67 [Chicago: National Opinion Research Council, 1986].) "Political conservatism" is based on self-placement on a 7-point scale ranging from "extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative".

³⁶ The three items involved the right of Euro-Americans to keep African-Americans out of “their” neighborhoods, legal establishments of a homeowner’s right to discriminate by race when selling or renting, and laws against racial intermarriage, each rescaled to range from 0 to 1 with racist views taking the higher value.

³⁷ The categories of persons towards whom tolerance was measured were atheists, communists, gay men, militarists, and racists – a selection intended to ensure that the scale measured tolerance and not simply right- or left-wing political sentiments. Each item was recoded so that 1 represented an intolerant response and 2 represented a tolerant response, and they were summed so that scale values ranged from 15 (less tolerant) to 30 (more tolerant).

³⁸ Items were recoded to range from 1 (less confident) to 3 (more confident), with the scale value ranging from 4 to 12.

³⁹ Items included in this scale are attendance at classical music performance, dance concerts, and art museums (three separate items); attitudes towards classical music and opera, respectively; and the importance of being “cultured” as an attribute of one’s friends. Each item was recoded to make a higher response indicative of a positive orientation to high culture and then rescaled from zero to one, yielding a scale ranging from 0 to 6.

⁴⁰ Howard Schuman puts this problem well: “Attitudes are mental entities or constructs based on verbalizations, and they all swim round in the same heads, with no temporal or other labels to conveniently indicate causal order.” Howard Schuman, “The Perils of Correlation, the Lure of Labels and the Beauty of Negative Results,” pp. 302-23 in *Racialized Politics: the Debate about Racism in America*, edited David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius and Lawrence Bobo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000): 304.

⁴¹ Paul DiMaggio and Francie Ostrower, “Participation in the Arts by Black and White Americans,” *Social Forces* 68 (1990): 753-78; Becky Pettit and Paul DiMaggio, “Public Sentiments Towards the Arts: A Critical Reanalysis of 13 Opinion Surveys,” Princeton University Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies, Working Paper #5 (1998).

⁴² To see if religious conservatives were less supportive of high culture because of messages they received from the pulpit, we undertook the same analyses for actively churchgoing members of conservative denominations only, but the results were unchanged. A more recent study using a wider range of measures

of religious conservatism and a more extensive range of attitude measures has likewise found theologically conservative Protestants to exhibit less favorable attitudes towards the arts: Peter V. Marsden, "Religion, Cultural Participation, and Cultural Attitudes: Survey Data on the United States, 1998," report to the Henry Luce Foundation, Harvard University Department of Sociology, 1999. By the mid-1990s, religious conservatives were also far more likely than any other group except partisan Republicans to favor sharp reductions of federal spending on the arts. Paul DiMaggio and Becky Pettit, *op. cit.*

⁴³ We infer this in by first including only sociodemographic measures in the predictive model, and then investigating a second model to which attitude measures are added (model 3 under each dependent variable in Table 4). We interpret the percentage decline in the size of the coefficients of the sociodemographic measures as reflecting the percentage of their influence that is the result of ("is mediated by") the attitudes. The remaining coefficient represents the portion of the original effect (in the first model) that remains even after differences in attitudes are taken into account: i.e., the difference one would expect to find between people with similar attitudes who differed on the sociodemographic variable in question. The assumption in this procedure is that people's attitudes are shaped by the life experiences of which variables like race, gender, or educational attainment serve as indices, rather than the other way around.

⁴⁴ On omniverousness, see Richard A. Peterson and Roger Kern. 1996. "Changing Highbrow Taste: From Snob to Omnivore." *American Sociological Review* 61: 900-907; on educational effects on racial attitudes, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Licari, "Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53 (1989): 285-308.

⁴⁵ Surprisingly, the views of respondents of Hispanic descent are not significantly different from those of otherwise similar Americans. Higher family income is associated with declining support for multiculturalism, but the relationship is small.

⁴⁶ Ishmael Reed, "America: The Multinational Society," Pp. 155-60 in *Multicultural Literacy: Opening the American Mind*, edited by Rick Simonson and Scott Walker (Saint Paul, Minnesota: Grey Wolf Press, 1988).

⁴⁷ Bethany Bryson, "Anything But Heavy Metal: Symbolic Exclusion and Musical Dislikes," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996):884-99; David Halle, *Inside Culture: Art and Class in the American Home* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): 154; Donald R. Kinder and David O. Sears, "Prejudice and

Politics: Symbolic Racism versus Racial Threats to the Good Life,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40 (1981): 414-31; David O. Sears and Leonie Huddy, “The Symbolic Politics of Opposition to Bilingual Education,” Pp. 145-69 in *Conflict between Peoples and Peoples*, edited by Jeffrey Simpson and Stephen Worchel (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1992).

⁴⁸ Somewhat surprisingly, a related value, political tolerance, is unrelated to attitudes towards multiculturalism. This suggests that political tolerance and social tolerance may be distinct dimensions.

⁴⁹ In order to decide which of these two positions represented a more accurate interpretation of these results we would need additional measures that are not available. For a useful discussion of these contrasting positions, see David O. Sears, John J. Hetts, Jim Sidanius and Lawrence Bobo, “Race in American Politics: Framing the Debates,” pp. 1-43 in *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America*, edited by David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius and Lawrence Bobo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

⁵⁰ These results reflect the inclusion of a multiplicative interaction term (education X political conservatism) in the model predicting attitudes towards multiculturalism (model 3 in table 4). The results is consistent with other research that has noted stronger effects of blatant racism on preferences toward policies related for less educated than for more educated persons, and stronger effects of political ideology on the views of the latter. It is also consistent with the view that educated respondents who reject (or realize that they are not supposed to express) crudely racist views nonetheless harbor anti-minority sentiments (“subtle prejudice”) that may be expressed in the form of conservative or traditionalist views. See Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Thomas F. Pettigrew and Roel W. Meertens, “Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western Europe,” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 25 (1995): 57-75.

⁵¹ On the “culture of critical discourse,” see Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (N.Y.: Seabury Press, 1979)

⁵² Bennett, *op. cit.*

⁵³ In models not presented in this paper, we replaced “age” with dummy variables for the boomer and post-boomer cohorts in the analyses reported in Table 4, and included interaction effects between the cohorts and educational attainment, to test for differences in trends related to extent of formal education.

⁵⁴ Clarence Page, “Where Narrow Minds Stifle Debate,” *Chicago Tribune*, Sunday, September 23, 1990,

“Perspective” section: 3.

⁵⁵ Levine, *op. cit.*; Peterson, *op. cit.*; Paul DiMaggio, “Social Structure, Institutions and Cultural Goods: The Case of the United States,” Pp. 133-55 in *Social Theory for a Changing Society*, edited by Pierre Bourdieu and James S. Coleman (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991); Joan Shelley Rubin, *The Making of Middle Brow Culture* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Paul DiMaggio, “Are Art Museum Visitors Different from Other People? The Relationship between Attendance and Social and Political Attitudes in the United States,” *Poetics* 24 (1996): 161-80.

⁵⁶ Arlene Goldbard, “Better Late than Never, or Confessions of a Premature Cultural-Policy Wonk.” Ukiah, California, 1995, http://www.wgcd.org/issues/cp_wonk.html; Don Adams and Arlene Goldbard, *Crossroads: Reflections on the Politics of Culture* (Talmage, California: DNA Press, 1990).

⁵⁷ Richard A. Peterson, “Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music,” *American Sociological Review* 40 (1975): 158-73; Eszter Hargittai, “Radio's Lessons for the Internet,” *Communications of the ACM* 43 (2000): XX-XXX.

⁵⁸ Joseph Turow, *Breaking Up America: Advertisers and the New Media World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

⁵⁹ Don Adams and Arlene Goldbard, “Animation: What’s in a Name,” Washington, D.C., 1982, <http://www.wgcd.org/action/animation.html>.

⁶⁰ Walt Whitman, *Democratic Vistas* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949 [1871]): 38-39.