Eight Lectures delivered at Harvard from March 26 to May I7, I903, the first
seven under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy and the eighth
under the auspices of the Department of Mathematics. Two of the notebooks
included here are probably but not certainly part of the Harvard Lecture
series.

301. Lecture I
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
Published in entirety: 5.14-40.

302. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.

A liberal education in a hundred lessons: fifty lessons devoted to the teaching
of some small branch of knowledge. of the remaining fifty lessons, thirty-six
were to be devoted to logic. Lectures begin with a discussion of the different
kinds of mathematics. Dichotonic and trichotonic mathematics. Logic of rela
tives. Incident involving Sylvester, who claimed that mathematical work
shown him by CSP, who, in turn, suspected that his work reduced to Cayley's
Theory of Matrices, was really nothing more than Sylvester's umbral notation.
Later CSP discovers, with some satisfaction, that what Sylvester called "my
umbral notation" had originally been published in 1693 by Leibniz. CSP's
bitterness revealed in his remark that he can find a more comfortable way of
ending his days, if nobody is interested in his efforts to gather together the
scattered outcroppings of his work in logic for the purpose of a more
systematic presentation of it.

303. Lecture II

A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.

A note appended to notebook reads: "Rejected. No time for this and it
would need two if not three lectures." The history and nature of
mathematics. Role of diagrams in mathematics. Algebra of logic as an attempt to
analyze mathematical reasoning into its logical steps. An aside on opium's
"dormitive virtue": a sound doctrine but hardly an explanation. The nature
of abstraction, especially mathematical abstraction. Role played by conception
of collection in mathematics. Whether pure mathematics is a branch of
logic. "I am satisfied that all necessary reasoning is of the nature of
mathematical reasoning." Boolean algebra.

304. Lecture II. On Phenomenology

A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.

CSP notes "First draught,, and "To be rewritten and compressed." Published:
1.322-323 (pp. 10-12). Omitted from publication is CSP's discussion of the
goal of phenomenology, which is to describe what is before the mind and to
show that the description is correct. Presentness (Hegel's view and CSP's
contrasted). The "immediate" defined. Quality distinguished from feeling;
quality as an element of feeling. Neither abstract nor complex quality is the First
Category. Law of nature, with the being of law considered to be a sort of
esse in futuro. An objection to this view of law noted and refuted. Reaction
(or struggle) as the chief characteristic of experience. Content of the percept.
No criticism of perceptual fact possible. Reaction is no more to be
comprehended than blue or the perfume of a tea rose. Perception and imagination.
Genuine and degenerate varieties of the Second Category. The Third
Category (called "Mediation,') and signs. First degenerate form of the Third
Category.

305. Lecture II

A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.

CSP notes: "Second Draught" and "This won't do, it will have to be rewritten."
Published: 5.41-56 (pp. 7-10, 13-32). Pages 1-6 and 10-13 not published.
Classification of the various sciences and the place of philosophy among them.
The three principal divisions of philosophy-metaphysics, normative science,
and phenomenology-and the relation of dependence among them.

306. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.

Published: 5.59-65 (pp. 1-14). Only the first paragraph was omitted.

307. Lecture III
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.

This lecture is subtitled: "The Categories Continued." Published: 5.71n
(p. 9); 5.82-87 (pp. 16-34). Omitted: the three categories and their degenerate
forms, if any. Genuine form of the representamen is the symbol. First and
second degenerate forms are the index and icon respectively. Symbol, index,
and icon analyzed with regard to degenerate forms. Given the three catego
ries, all possible systems of metaphysics are divided into seven classes, e.g.,
into systems which admit only one of the three categories (three systems
possible), systems which admit only two of the three categories (three systems
possible), and that system which admits all three categories. The history of
philosophy is examined for examples of each system. Schroeder's argument
against admitting the Second Category into logic deemed naive, but not
Kempe's argument against the Third Category. Kempe's system of graphs.

308. Lecture III
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.

This lecture is subtitled: "The Categories Defended." Published: 5.66-81,
except 5.71n1 and 5.77n1 (pp. 1-12); 5.88-92 (pp. 48-53). Omitted: whether the
three categories must be admitted as irreducible constituents of thought.
Objection raised against Schroeder's and Sigwart's denial of the Second
Category. Discussion of Sigwart's reduction of the notion of logicality to a quality
of feeling (Logical Gefahl). Objection raised against Kempe's denial of the
irreducibility of the Third Category. Brief comparison of existential graphs
with Kempe's system of graphs. Whether the categories are real, i.e., "have
their place among the realities of nature and constitute all there is in nature,"
is a question which remains to be answered.

309 Lecture IV. The Seven Systems of Metaphysics
A. MS., two notebooks, G-1903-1.

Notebook I (pp. 1-37, of which pp. 1-4 and 12-37, with exception of 25-34,
were published as 5.77n and 5.93-111 respectively). Unpublished: a discussion
of the possible systems of metaphysics based on CSP's categories and their
combinations. In CSP's opinion, the following philosophers were on the right
track: Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus, Reid, and Kant. Rejection of the
idea attributed to the Hegelians that Aristotle belongs to their school of
thought. Aristotle and the notion of esse in futuro. The Aristotelian
distinction between existence and entelechy. Ockhamists and the rise of nominalism.
Analysis of infinity (pp. 24-30). The reality of Firstness (pp. 31-35). Notebook
II (pp. 38-62, of which pp. 38-45, 45-49, 49-51, 52-57, and 59-62, were pub
fished separately as 5.114-118, 1.314-316, 5.119, 5.111-113, 5.57-58 respectively).
Omitted is a discussion of the reality of Secondness and a consideration of the
position that feelings and laws (Firstness and Thirdness) are alone real (that
to say that one thing acts upon another is merely to say that there is a certain
law of succession of feelings). Experience is our great teacher; invariably it
teaches by means of surprises.

310. Lecture V

A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903, pp. 1-14,

A knowledge of logic is requisite for understanding metaphysics. The three
categories are not original with CSP; they permeate human thought for all
time. Statement of his own early intellectual behavior. The year 1856 is given
as the year of his first serious study of philosophy. Beginning with esthetics
(Schiller,s Hesthetische Briefe) he proceeded to logic and the analytic part of
the Critic of Pure Reason. Mentions his subsequent neglect of esthetics and
his incompetence in this area. Reflections on esthetics. Is there such a quality
as beauty? Is beauty the name we give to whatever we enjoy contemplating
regardless of the reasons for liking it? Esthetic quality related to the three
categories: It is Firstness that belongs to a Thirdness in its achievement of
Secondness. Reflections on ethics.

311. Lecture V

A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903, pp. 1-16.

The branches of philosophy. The normative sciences: the relationships among
the normative sciences; the relationship between the normative sciences and
the special sciences, especially psychology; the dependence of the normative
sciences upon phenomenology and pure mathematics. Description of the
laborious "method of discussing with myself a philosophical question."

312. Lecture V

A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1, pp. 1-50.

Published: 5.120-150 (pp. 11-50). Not published is Part I., "How I go to work
in studying philosophy" (pp. silo), and the contents of pp. 43-47, which
constitute a first draft (the published second draft is the versos of these pages) and
which concern the obscurity of the relation between the three kinds of
inferences and the three categories as well as CSP's attempt to achieve clarity here.

313. Lecture VI

A. MS., n.p., 1903, pp. 1-31

Perceptual judgments as involving generality and as being beyond the power
of logic to criticize, as referring to singular objects, and as relating to
continuous change (time, continuity, infinity). The nature of logical goodness
and the end of argumentation. Logic and metaphysics. Pragmatism: the
genealogy of a born pragmatist; pragmatism and realism; the ultimate meaning
of a symbol. CSP,s acceptance of the term "meaning" as a technical term of
logic (as referring to the total intended interpretant of a symbol). The mean.
ing of an argument and of a proposition (rhema); the meanings of such
difficult abstractions as Pure Being, Quality, Relation. Definitions, it is stated,
should be "in terms of the conceptions of everyday life." CSP raises one
possible objection to his formulation of the maxim of pragmatism, and ends this
draft with some disparaging remarks about the state of logical studies at
Harvard. The objection raised is this: If meaning consists in doing (or the
intention to do), is there not a conflict with the view (to which CSP
subscribes) that the meaning of an argument is its conclusion, since a conclusion
is an intellectual phenomenon different from doing and presumably without
relation to it?

314. Lecture VI

A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1, pp. 1-43.

This manuscript is presumably the second draft of Lecture VI. Published in
entirety (5.15X-179) as "Three types of Reasoning.,' Note on the cover reads
"first 35 pages as delivered." See MS. 316 for the continuation of Lecture VI.

315. Lecture VII
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1, pp. 1-48.

Published: 5.180-212 (pp. 1-21). The omitted pages concern the three
essentially different modes of reasoning (deduction, induction, and abduction),
with the pragmatic maxim identified with the logic of abduction.

316. [Lectures on Pragmatism]

A. MS., notebook, n.p., [1903], pp. 44-60.

MS. 316 continues MS. 314' and was in fact delivered as part of Lecture VI.
What is the end of a term? Distinction between term and rhema. The common
noun, its late development and restriction to a peculiar family of
languages. Term and index. Three truths necessar,v for the comprehension
of the merits of pragmatism: that all our ideas are given to us in perceptual
judgments; that perceptual judgments contain elements of generality (so that
Thirdness is directly perceived); that the abductive faculty is a shading off
of that which at its peak is called "perception." Pragmatism and the logic
of abduction.

*316a. Multitude and Continuity
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.
CSP notes that this is a "lecture to be delivered . . . in Harvard University,
1903 May 15." This lecture was delivered. See G-1903-1 and sup(l) G-1902-1.