Review of Abbott's Kant tranlation*

1.35      G-c.1885-2

  35. Kant's whole philosophy turns upon his logic. He
gives the name of logic to the greater part of his Critic of the
Pure Reason, and it is a result of the great fault of his logical
theory that he does not extend that name to the whole work.
This greatest fault was at the same [time] the greatest merit of
his doctrine: it lay in his sharp discrimination of the intuitive
and the discursive processes of the mind. The distinction itself
is not only familiar to everybody but it had long played a part
in philosophy. Nevertheless, it is on such obvious distinctions
that the greater systems have been founded, and [Kant] saw far
more clearly than any predecessor had done the whole
philosophical import of this distinction. This was what
emancipated him from Leibnizianism, and at the same time turned
him agairnst sensationalism. It was also what enabled him to
see that no general description of existence is possible, which
is perhaps the most valuable proposition that the Critic
contains. But he drew too hard a line between the operations of
observation and of ratiocination. He allows himself to fall into
the habit of thinking that the latter only begins after the
former is complete; and wholly fails to see that even the
simplest syllogistic conclusion can only be drawn by observing
the relations of the terms in the premisses and conclusion. His
doctrine of the schemata can only have been an afterthought,
an addition to his system after it was substantially complete.
For if the schemata had been considered early enough, they
would have overgrown his whole work.

  * 35 is an unpublished, uncompleted review of T. K. Abbott's
translation of Kant's Introduction to Logic, etc. Longmans Green
& Co., 1885.