Fallibilism, Continuity, Evolution

1.141-175           G.c.1897-5


  141. All positive reasoning is of the nature of judging the
proportion of something in a whole collection by the proportion
found in a sample. Accordingly, there are three things to
which we can never hope to attain by reasoning, namely,
absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, absolute universality. We
cannot be absolutely certain that our conclusions are even
approximately true; for the sample may be utterly unlike the
unsampled part of the collection. We cannot pretend to be
even probably exact; because the sample consists of but a finite
number of instances and only admits special values of the
proportion sought. Finally, even if we could ascertain with
absolute certainty and exactness that the ratio of sinful men to all
men was as 1 to 1; still among the infinite generations of men
there would be room for any finite number of sinless men without

  * From unpaginated, untitled ms. (or mss.) which to judge from 159 was
intended as part of a lecture. c. 1897.
|p59

violating the proportion. The case is the same with a
seven legged calf.
  142. Now if exactitude, certitude, and universality are not
to be attained by reasoning, there is certainly no other means
by which they can be reached.
  143. Somebody will suggest revelation. There are scientists
and people influenced by science who laugh at revelation; and
certainly science has taught us to look at testimony in such a
light that the whole theological doctrine of the "Evidences"
seems pretty weak. However, I do not think it is philosophical
to reject the possibility of a revelation. Still, granting that, I
declare as a logician that revealed truths -- that is, truths
which have nothing in their favor but revelations made to a
few individuals -- constitute by far the most uncertain class of
truths there are. There is here no question of universality; for
revelation is itself sporadic and miraculous. There is no
question of mathematical exactitude; for no revelation makes any
pretension to that character. But it does pretend to be certain;
and against that there are three conclusive objections. First,
we never can be absolutely certain that any given deliverance
really is inspired; for that can only be established by reasoning.
We cannot even prove it with any very high degree of
probability. Second, even if it is inspired, we cannot be sure, or
nearly sure, that the statement is true. We know that one of
the commandments was in one of the Bibles printed with[out] a
not in it.* All inspired matter has been subject to human
distortion or coloring. Besides we cannot penetrate the counsels
of the most High, or lay down anything as a principle that
would govern his conduct. We do not know his inscrutable
purposes, nor can we comprehend his plans. We cannot tell
but he might see fit to inspire his servants with errors. In the
third place, a truth which rests on the authority of inspiration
only is of a somewhat incomprehensible nature; and we never
can be sure that we rightly comprehend it. As there is no way
of evading these difficulties, I say that revelation, far from
affording us any certainty, gives results less certain than other
sources of information. This would be so even if revelation
were much plainer than it is.
  144. But, it will be said, you forget the laws which are

 * The "Wicked Bible" of 1631 omitted "not" from the Seventh Commandment.
|p60

known to us a priori, the axioms of geometry, the principles of
logic, the maxims of causality, and the like. Those are
absolutely certain, without exception and exact. To this I reply
that it seems to me there is the most positive historic proof that
innate truths are particularly uncertain and mixed up with
error, and therefore a fortiori not without exception. This
historical proof is, of course, not infallible; but it is very strong.
Therefore, I ask how do you know that a priori truth is certain,
exceptionless, and exact? You cannot know it by reasoning.
For that would be subject to uncertainty and inexactitude.
Then, it must amount to this that you know it a priori; that is,
you take a priori judgments at their own valuation, without
criticism or credentials. That is barring the gate of inquiry.
  145. Ah! but it will be said, you forget direct experience.
Direct experience is neither certain nor uncertain, because it
affirms nothing -- it just is. There are delusions,
hallucinations, dreams. But there is no mistake that such things really
do appear, and direct experience means simply the appearance.
It involves no error, because it testifies to nothing but its own
appearance. For the same reason, it affords no certainty. It
is not exact, because it leaves much vague; though it is not
inexact either; that is, it has no false exactitude.
  146. All this is true of direct experience at its first
presentation. But when it comes up to be criticized it is past, itself,
and is represented by memory. Now the deceptions and
inexactitude of memory are proverbial.
  147.... On the whole, then, we cannot in any way reach
perfect certitude nor exactitude. We never can be absolutely sure
of anything, nor can we with any probability ascertain the
exact value of any measure or general ratio.
  This is my condusion, after many years study of the logic
of science; and it is the conclusion which others, of very
different cast of mind, have come to, likewise. I believe I may say
there is no tenable opinion regarding human knowledge which
does not legitimately lead to this corollary. Certainly there is
nothing new in it; and many of the greatest minds of all time
have held it for true.
  148. Indeed, most everybody will admit it until he begins
to see what is involved in the admission -- and then most
people will draw back. It will not be admitted by persons
|p61

utterly incapable of philosophical reflection. It will not be
fully admitted by masterful minds developed exclusively in
the direction of action and accustomed to claim practical
infallibility in matters of business. These men will admit the
incurable fallibility of all opinions readily enough; only, they will
always make exception of their own. The doctrine of fallibilism
will also be denied by those who fear its consequences for
science, for religion, and for morality. But I will take leave to
say to these highly conservative gentlemen that however
competent they may be to direct the affairs of a church or other
corporation, they had better not try to manage science in that
way. Conservatism -- in the sense of a dread of consequences
 -- is altogether out of place in science -- which has on the
contrary always been forwarded by radicals and radicalism, in the
sense of the eagemess to carry consequences to their extremes.
Not the radicalism that is cocksure, however, but the radicalism
that tries experiments. Indeed, it is precisely among men
animated by the spirit of science that the doctrine of fallibilism
will find supporters.
  149. Still, even such a man as that may well ask whether
I propose to say that it is not quite certain that twice two are
four -- and that it is even not probably quite exact! But it
would be quite misunderstanding the doctrine of fallibilism to
suppose that it means that twice two is probably not exactly
four. As I have already remarked, it is not my purpose to
doubt that people can usually count with accuracy. Nor does
fallibilism say that men cannot attain a sure knowledge of the
creations of their own minds. It neither afl;rms nor denies
that. It only says that people cannot attain absolute certainty
concerning questions of fact. Numbers are merely a system of
names devised by men for the purpose of counting.* It is a
matter of real fact to say that in a certain room there are two
persons. It is a matter of fact to say that each person has two
eyes. It is a matter of fact to say that there are four eyes in
the room. But to say that if there are two persons and each
person has two eyes there will be four eyes is not a statement
of fact, but a statement about the system of numbers which is
our own creation.
  150. Still, if the matter is pressed, let me ask whether any

 * See 4.155ff.
 |p62

individual here present thinks there is no room for possible
doubt that twice two is four?
  What do you think? You have heard of hypnotism. You
know how common it is. You know that about one man in
twenty is capable of being put into a condition in which he holds
the most ridiculous nonsense for unquestionable truth. How
does any individual here know but that I am a hypnotist and
that when he comes out of my influence he may see that twice
two is four is merely his distorted idea; that in fact everybody
knows it isn't so? Suppose the individual I am addressing to
be enormously wealthy. Then I ask: " Would you, in view of
this possibility -- or with the possibility that you are seized
with a temporary insanity, risk your entire fortune this minute
against one cent, on the truth of twice two being four?" You
certainly ought not to do so; for you could not go on making
very many millions of such bets before you would losel Why,
according to my estimate of probabilities there is not a single
truth of science upon which we ought to bet more than about a
million of millions to one -- and that truth will be a general
one and not a special fact. People say " Such a thing is as
certain as that the sun will rise tomorrow!" I like that phrase for
its great moderation because it is infinitely far from certain
that the sun will rise tomorrow.
  151. To return to our friends the Conservatives; these
ladies and gentlemen will tell me this doctrine of fallibilism
can never be admitted because the consequences from it would
undermine Religion. I can only say I am very sorry. The
doctrine is true; -- without claiming absolute certainty for it,
it is substantially unassailable. And if its consequences are
antagonistic to religion, so much the worse for religion. At the
same time, I do not believe they are so antagonistic. The
dogmas of a church may be infallible -- infallible in the sense
in which it is infallibly true that it is wrong to murder and
steal -- practically and substantially infallible. But what use
a church could make of a mathematical infallibility, I fail to
see. Messieurs et mesdames les conservateurs have generally
taken the lead in determining what the church should say to
the novelties of science; and I don't think they have managed
the business with very distinguished success so far. They have
begun by recoiling with horror from the alleged heresies -- 

|p63

about the rotundity of the earth, about its rotation, about
geology, about Egyptian history, and so forth -- and they have
ended by declaring that the church never breathed a single
word against any of these truths of science. Perhaps, it be just
so with fallibility. For the present those knowing in divine
things insist that infallibility is the prerogative of the church,
but maybe bye and bye we shall be told that this infallibility
had always been taken in an ecclesiastical sense. And that will
be true, too. I should not wonder if the churches were to be
quite agile in reformed teachings during the coming thirty
years. Even one that mainly gathers in the very ignorant and
the very rich may feel young blood in its veins.
  152. But doubtless many of you will say, as many most
intelligent people have said, Oh, we grant your fallibilism
to the extent you insist upon it. It is nothing new. Franklin
said a century ago that nothing was certain. We will grant it
would be foolish to bet ten years' expenditure of the United
States Govemment against one cent upon any fact whatever.
But practically speaking many things are substantially certain.
So, after all, of what importance is your fallibilism?
  We come then to this question: of what importance is it?
Let us see.
  153. How can such a little thing be of importance, you will
ask? I answer: after all there is a difference between something
and nothing. If a metaphysical theory has come into general
vogue, which can rest on nothing in the world but the
assumption that absolute exactitude and certitude are to be attained,
and if that metaphysics leaves us unprovided with
pigeonholes in which to file important facts so that they have to be
thrown in the fire -- or to resume our previous figure if that
metaphysical theory seriously blocks the road of inquiry -- 
then it is comprehensible that the little difference between a
degree of evidence extremely high and absolute certainty
should after all be of great importance as removing a mote
from our eye.
  154. Let us look then at two or three of the grandest
results of science and see whether they appear any different from
a fallibilist standpoint from what they would to an infallibilist.
  Three of the leading conceptions of science may be glanced
at -- I mean the ideas of force, of continuity, and of evolution.
|p64

  155.... The fourth law of motion was developed about
forty years ago * by Helmholtz and others. It is called the law
of the conservation of energy; but in my opinion that is a very
misleading name, implying a peculiar aspect of the law under
which the real fact at the bottom of it is not clearly brought
out. It is therefore not suitable for an abstract and general
statement, although it is a point of view which is very
serviceable for many practical applications. But the law generally
stated is that the changes in the velocities of particles depend
exclusively on their relative positions.
  It is not necessary now to examine these laws with technical
accuracy. It is sufficient to notice that they leave the poor
little partide no option at all. Under given circumstances his
motion is precisely laid out for him.
  We can from the nature of things have no evidence at all
tending to show that these laws are absolutely exact. But in
some single cases we can see that the approximation to
exactitude is quite wonderful.
  These laws have had a very wonderful effect upon physical
sciences, because they have shown the very high degree of
exactitude with which nature acts -- at least, in simple
configurations. But, as I said before, the logic of the case affords
us not one scintilla of reason to think that this exactitude is
perfect.
  156. The illustrious Phoenix [G. H. Derby], you remember,
wrote a series of lectures on astronomy to be delivered at the
Lowell Institute in Boston. ** But owing to the unexpected
circumstance of his not being invited to give any lectures at that
Institution, they were ultimately published in The San Diego
Herald. In those lectures in treating of the sun he mentions
how it once stood still at the command of Joshua. But, says
he, I never could help thinking that it might have wiggled a
very little when Joshua was not looking directly at it. The
question is whether particles may not spontaneously swerve
by a very little -- less than we can perceive -- from the exact

  * To judge from this, the ms. should be dated ten years earlier. But the
absence of the terms and the handwnting in earlier mss., and their presence m
mss. dated 1897-8 seem to indicate that the editorial dating is correct.
  ** Phoenixiana. "Lectures on Astronomy."

|p65

requirements of the laws of mechanics. We cannot possibly
have a right to deny this. For such a denial would be a claim
to absolute exactitude of knowledge. On the other hand, we
never can have any right to suppose that any observed
phenomenon is simply a sporadic spontaneous irregularity. For
the only justification we can have for supposing anything we
don't see is that it would explain how an observed fact could
result from the ordinary course of things. Now to suppose a
thing sporadic, spontaneous, irregular, is to suppose it departs
from the ordinary course of things. That is blocking the road
of inquiry; it is supposing the thing inexplicable, when a
supposition can only be justified by its affording an explanation.
  157. But we may find a general class of phenomena,
forming a part of the general course of things, which are explicable
not as an irregularity, but as the resultant effect of a whole
class of irregularities.
  Physicists often resort to this kind of explanation to account
for phenomena which appear to violate the law of the
conservation of energy. The general properties of gases are explained
by supposing the molecules are moving about in every direction
in the most diverse possible ways. Here, it is true, it is
supposed that there is only so much irregularity as the laws of
mechanics permit -- but the principle is there of expiaining a
general phenomenon by the statistical regularities that exist
among irregularities.
  158. As there is nothing to show that there is not a certain
amount of absolute spontaneity in nature, despite all laws, our
metaphysical pigeon-holes should not be so limited as to
exclude this hypothesis, provided any general phenomena should
appear which might be explained by such spontaneity.
  159. Now in my opinion there are several such general
phenomena. Of these I will at this moment instance but one.
  It is the most obtrusive character of nature. It is so obvious,
that you will hardly know at first what it is I mean. It is
curious how certain facts escape us because they are so
pervading and ubiquitous; just as the ancients imagined the music of
the spheres was not heard because it was heard all the time.
But will not somebody kindly tell the rest of the audience what
is the most marked and obtrusive character of nature? Of
course, I mean the variety of nature.
|p66

  160. Now I don't know that it is logically accurate to say
that this marvellous and infinite diversity and manifoldness of
things is a sign of spontaneity. I am a logical analyst by long
training, you know, and to say this is a manifestation of
spontaneity seems to me faulty analysis. I would rather say it is
spontaneity. I don't know what you can make out of the
meaning of spontaneity but newness, freshness, and diversity.
  161. Let me ask you a little question? Can the operation
of law create diversity where there was no diversity before?
Obviously not; under given circumstances mechanical law
prescribes one determinate result.
  I could easily prove this by the principles of analytical
mechanics. But that is needless. You can see for yourselves that
law prescribes like results under like circumstances. That is
what the word law implies. So then, all this exuberant
diversity of nature cannot be the result of law. Now what is
spontaneity? It is the character of not resulting by law from
something antecedent.
  162. Thus, the universe is not a mere mechanical result of
the operation of blind law. * The most obvious of all its
characters cannot be so explained. It is the multitudinous facts of all
experience that show us this; but that which has opened our
eyes to these facts is the principle of fallibilism. Those who
fail to appreciate the importance of fallibilism reason: we see
these laws of mechanics; we see how extremely closely they
have been verified in some cases. We suppose that what we
haven't examined is like what we have examined, and that
these laws are absolute, and the whole universe is a boundless
machine working by the blind laws of mechanics. This is a
philosophy which leaves no room for a God! No, indeed! It
leaves even human consciousness, which cannot well be denied
to exist, as a perfectly idle and functionless flaneur in the world,
with no possible influence upon anything -- not even upon
itself. Now will you tell me that this fallibilism amounts to
nothing?
  163. But in order really to see all there is in the doctrine of
fallibilism, it is necessary to introduce the idea of continuity,
or unbrokenness. This is the leading idea of the differential
calculus and of all the useful branches of mathematics; it plays

 * See vol. 6, bk. I.

|p67

a great part in all scientific thought, and the greater the more
scientific that thought is; and it is the master key which adepts
tell us unlocks the arcana of philosophy.
  164. We all have some idea of continuity. Continuity is
fluidity, the merging of part into part. But to achieve a really
distinct and adequate conception of it is a difficult task, which
with all the aids possible must for the most acute and most
logically trained intellect require days of severe thought. If I
were to attempt to give you any logical conception of it, I
should only make you dizzy to no purpose. I may say this,
however. I draw a line. Now the points on that line form a
continuous series. If I take any two points on that line,
however close together, other points there are lying between them.
If that were not so,the series of points would not be continuous.
It might be so, even if the series of points were not
continuous. . .
  165. You will readily see that the idea of continuity
involves the idea of infinity. Now, the nominalists tell us that
we cannot reason about infinity, or that we cannot reason about
it mathematically. Nothing can be more false. Nominalists
cannot reason about infinity, because they do not reason logically
about anything. Their reasoning consists of performing
certain processes which they have found worked well -- without
having any insight into the conditions of their working well.
This is not logical reasoning. It naturally fails when infinity is
involved; because they reason about infinity as if it were finite.
But to a logical reasoner, reasoning about infinity is decidedly
simpler than reasoning about finite quantity.
  166. There is one property of a continuous expanse that I
must mention, though I cannot venture to trouble you with
the demonstration of it. It is that in a continuous expanse, say
a continuous line, there are continuous lines infinitely short.
In fact, the whole line is made up of such infinitesimal parts.
The property of these infinitely small spaces is -- I regret the
abstruseness of what I am going to say, but I cannot help it -- 
the property which distinguishes these infinitesimal distances
is that a certain mode of reasoning which holds good of all
finite quantities and of some that are not finite does not hold
good of them. Namely, mark any point on the line A.
Suppose that point to have any character; suppose, for instance,
|p68

it is blue. Now suppose we lay down the rule that every point
within an inch of a blue point shall be painted blue. Obviously,
the consequence will be that the whole line will have to be
blue. But this reasoning does not hold good of infinitesimal
distances. After the point A has been painted blue, the rule
that every point infinitesimally near to a blue point shall be
painted blue will not necessarily result in making the whole
blue. Continuity involves infinity in the strictest sense, and
infinity even in a less strict sense goes beyond the possibility
of direct experience.
  167. Can we, then, ever be sure that anything in the real
world is continuous? Of course, I am not asking for an
absolute certainty; but can we ever say that it is so with any
ordinary degree of security? This is a vitally important question.
I think that we have one positive direct evidence of continuity
and on the first line but one. It is this. We are immediately
aware only of our present feelings -- not of the future, nor of
the past. The past is known to us by present memory, the
future by present suggestion. But before we can interpret the
memory or the suggestion, they are past; before we can
interpret the present feeling which means memory, or the present
feeling that means suggestion, since that interpretation takes
time, that feeling has ceased to be present and is now past. So
we can reach no conclusion from the present but only from the
past.
  168. How do we know then on the whole that the past ever
existed, that the future ever will exist? How do we know there
ever was or ever will be anything but the present instant? Or
stop: I must not say we. How do I know that anybody but
myself ever existed or even I myself exist except for one single
instant, the present, and that all this business is not an
illusion from top to bottom? Answer: I don't know. But I am
trying the hypothesis that it is real, which seems to work
excellently so far. Now if this is real, the past is really known to
the present. How can it be known? Not by inference; because
as we have just seen we can make no inference from the
present, since it will be past before the inference gets drawn.
  169. Then we must have an immediate consciousness of the
past. But if we have an immediate consciousness of a state of
consciousness past by one unit of time and if that past state
|p69

involved an immediate consciousness of a state then past by
one unit, we now have an immediate consciousness of a state
past by two units; and as this is equally true of all states, we
have an immediate consciousness of a state past by four units,
by eight units, by sixteen units, etc.; in short we must have
an immediate consciousness of every state of mind that is past
by any finite number of units of time. But we certainly have
not an immediate consciousness of our state of mind a year
ago. So a year is more than any finite number of units of time
in this system of measurement; or, in other words, there is a
measure of time infinitely less than a year. Now, this is only
true if the series be continuous. Here, then, it seems to me,
we have positive and tremendously strong reason for believing
that time really is continuous.
  170. Equally conclusive and direct reason for thinking
that space and degrees of quality and other things are
continuous is to be found as for believing time to be so. Yet, the
reality of continuity once admitted, reasons are there, divers
reasons, some positive, others only formal, yet not
contemptible, for admitting the continuity of all things. I am making a
bore of myself and won't bother you with any full statement of
these reasons, but will just indicate the nature of a few of them.
Among formal reasons, there are such as these, that it is easier
to reason about continuity than about discontinuity, so that
it is a convenient assumption. Also, in case of ignorance it is
best to adopt the hypothesis which leaves open the greatest
field of possibility; now a continuum is merely a discontinuous
series with additional possibilities. Among positive reasons,
we have that apparent analogy between time and space,
between time and degree, and so on. There are various other
positive reasons, but the weightiest consideration appears to
me to be this: How can one mind act upon another mind?
How can one particle of matter act upon another at a distance
from it? The nominalists tell us this is an ultimate fact -- it
cannot be explained. Now, if this were meant in [a] merely
practical sense, if it were only meant that we know that one
thing does act on another but that how it takes place we
cannot very well tell, up to date, I should have nothing to say,
except to applaud the moderation and good logic of the
statement. But this is not what is meant; what is meant is that we
|p70

come up, bump against actions absolutely unintelligible and
inexplicable, where human inquiries have to stop. Now that
is a mere theory, and nothing can justify a theory except its
explaining observed facts. It is a poor kind of theory which in
place of performing this, the sole legitimate function of a
theory, merely supposes the facts to be inexplicable. It is one
of the peculiarities of nominalism that it is continually
supposing things to be absolutely inexplicable. That blocks the road
of inquiry. But if we adopt the theory of continuity we escape
this illogical situation. We may then say that one portion of
mind acts upon another, because it is in a measure immediately
present to that other; just as we suppose that the
infinitesimally past is in a measure present. And in like manner we
may suppose that one portion of matter acts upon another
because it is in a measure in the same place.
  171. If I were to attempt to describe to you in full all the
scientific beauty and truth that I find in the principle of
continuity, I might say in the simple language of Matilda the
Engaged, " the tomb would close over me e'er the entrancing
topic were exhausted " -- but not before my audience was
exhausted. So I will just drop it here. Only, in doing so, let me
call your attention to the natural affinity of this principle to
the doctrine of fallibilism. The principle of continuity is the
idea of fallibilism objectified. For fallibilism is the doctrine
that our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it
were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy.
Now the doctrine of continuity is that all things so swim in
continua.
  172. The doctrine of continuity rests upon observed fact
as we have seen. But what opens our eyes to the significance
of that fact is fallibilism. The ordinary scientific infallibilist -- 
of which sect Buchner in his Kraft und Stoff affords a fine
example -- cannot accept synechism, or the doctrine that all
that exists is continuous -- because he is committed to
discontinuity in regard to all those things which he fancies he has
exactly ascertained, and especially in regard to that part of his
knowledge which he fancies he has exactly ascertained to be
certain. For where there is continuity, the exact
ascertainment of real quantities is too obviously impossible. No sane
man can dream that the ratio of the circumference to the
|p71

diameter could be exactly ascertained by measurement. As to
the quantities he has not yet exactly ascertained, the
Buchnerite is naturally led to separate them into two distinct
classes, those which may be ascertained hereafter (and there,
as before, continuity must be excluded), and those absolutely
unascertainable -- and these in their utter and everlasting
severance from the other dass present a new breach of
continuity. Thus scientific infallibilism draws down a veil before the eyes
which prevents the evidences of continuity from being discerned.
  But as soon as a man is fully impressed with the fact that
absolute exactitude never can be known, he naturally asks
whether there are any facts to show that hard discrete
exactitude really exists. That suggestion lifts the edge of that
curtain and he begins to see the clear daylight shining in from
behind it.
  173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like
its true significancy until evolution has been considered. This
is what the world has been most thinking of for the last forty
years -- though old enough is the general idea itself. Aristotle's
philosophy, that dominated the world for so many ages and
still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of butchers
and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
evolutionism.
  174. Evolution means nothing but growth in the widest
sense of that word. Reproduction, of course, is merely one of
the incidents of growth. And what is growth? Not mere
increase. Spencer says it is the passage from the
homogeneous to the heterogeneous -- or, if we prefer English to
Spencerese -- diversification. That is certainly an important
factor of it. Spencer further says that it is a passage from the
unorganized to the organized; but that part of the definition is
so obscure that I will leave it aside for the present. But think
what an astonishing idea this of diversification is! Is there such
thing in nature as increase of variety? Were things simpler, was
variety less in the original nebula from which the solar system
is supposed to have grown than it is now when the land and
sea swarms with animal and vegetable forms with their
intricate anatomies and still more wonderful economies? It
would seem as if there were an increase in variety, would it
not? And yet mechanical law, which the scientific infallibilist
|p72

tells us is the only agency of nature, mechanical law can never
produce diversification. That is a mathematical truth -- a
proposition of analytical mechanics; and anybody can see
without any algebraical apparatus that mechanical law out of
like antecedents car nly produce like consequents. It is the
very idea of law. So if observed facts point to real growth,
they point to another agency, to spontaneity for which
infallibilism provides no pigeon-hole. And what is meant by this
passage from the less organized to the more organized? Does
it mean a passage from the less bound together to the more
bound together, the less connected to the more connected, the
less regular to the more regular? How can the regularity of the
world increase, if it has been absolutely perfect all the time?
  175. ... Once you have embraced the principle of
continuity no kind of explanation of things will satisfy you except
that they grew. The infallibilist naturally thinks that
everything always was substantially as it is now. Laws at any rate
being absolute could not grow. They either always were, or
they sprang instantaneously into being by a sudden fiat like the
drill of a company of soldiers. This makes the laws of nature
absolutely blind and inexplicable. Their why and wherefore
can't be asked. This absolutely blocks the road of inquiry.
The fallibilist won't do this. He asks may these forces of nature
not be somehow amenable to reason? May they not have
naturally grown up? After all, there is no reason to think they
are absolute. If all things are continuous, the universe must be
undergoing a continuous growth from non-existence to
existence. There is no difficulty in conceiving existence as a matter
of degree. The reality of things consists in their persistent
forcing themselves upon our recognition. If a thing has no
such persistence, it is a mere dream. Reality, then, is
persistence, is regularity. In the original chaos, where there was
no regularity, there was no existence. It was all a confused
dream. This we may suppose was in the infinitely distant past.
But as things are getting more regular, more persistent, they
are getting less dreamy and more real.
  Fallibilism will at least provide a big pigeon-hole for facts
bearing on that theory.