Law of Nature - Hume

1.133-134      G-1901-2a


  133. Every science has a mathematical part, a branch of
work that the mathematician is called in to do. We say,
"Here, mathematician, suppose such and such to be the case.
Never you mind whether it is really so or not; but tell us,
supposing it to be so, what will be the consequence. " Thus arise
mathematical psychology, mathematical stylometry,
mathematical economics, mathematical physics, mathematical
chemistry, mathematical meteorology, mathematical biology,
mathematical geology, mathematical astronomy, etc., etc., etc. But
there is none of these mathematical offices which constitutes
quite so large a proportion of the whole science to which it is
annexed as mathematical philosophy, for the obvious reason
that the observational part of philosophy is a simple business,
compared, for example, with that of anatomy or biography, or
any other special science.
  134. To assume, however, that the observational part of
philosophy, because it is not particularly laborious, is therefore

  * De Rerum Natura, bk. II, 1. 216ff.
  ** From "The Idea of a Law of Nature among the Contemporaries of David
Hume and among Advanced Thinkers of the Present Day," c. 1894.
|p55

easy, is a dreadful mistake, into which the student is very apt
to fall, and which gives the death-blow to any possibility of his
success in this study. It is, on the contrary, extremely difficult
to bring our attention to elements of experience which are
continually present. For we have nothing in experience with which
to contrast them; and without contrast, they cannot excite our
attention. We can only contrast them with imaginary states of
things; but even what we imagine is but a crazy-quilt of bits
snipped off from actual experiences. The result is that
roundabout devices have to be resorted to, in order to enable us to
perceive what stares us in the face with a glare that, once
noticed, becomes almost oppressive with its insistency. This
circumstance alone would be sufficient to render philosophical
observation difficult -- much more difficult, for example, than
the kind of observation which the painter has to exercise. Yet
this is the least of the difficulties of philosophy. Of the various
hindrances more serious still, I may mention once more the
notion that it is an extremely easy thing to perceive what is
before us every day and hour. But quite the worst is, that
every man becomes more or less imbued with philosophical
opinions, without being dearly aware of it. Some of these, it
is true, may be right opinions; if he is a quite uneducated man,
they doubtless will be so. But even if they are right, or nearly
right, they prevent true observation as much as a pair of blue
spectacles will prevent a man from observing the blue of the
sky. The man will hold the right opinion, but not knowing
that it might be founded upon direct observation, he will dass
it among artides of faith of a pretty dubious character. The
more a man is educated in other branches, but not trained in
philosophy, the more certain it is that two-thirds of his stodk
of half-conscious philosophical opinions will be utterly wrong,
and will completely blind him to the truth, which he will
gradually become unable so much as to conceive. I remember a
really eminent French savant, who had sojourned for very many
months in America, but who must have imbibed in his
childhood the notion, then common in France, that Englishmen
and Americans interject into every second sentence a certain
word which the French imagine to be English. He belonged to
one of the most observant of races; he was naturally a keen
observer; and he was trained in an observational science, and
|p56

yet, in order to assimilate himself as much as possible to
American ways, he used to think it necessary to greet one every
morning with a "How do you do, goddam?" and to keep it
up all day. He actually believed that he had observed that
such was the American style. The educated man who is a
beginner in philosophy is just like that man, who (be it
remembered) had been moving about in America for years; -- and by
a beginner in philosophy I wish to be understood as meaning,
in the case of an educated man, one who has not been seriously,
earnestly, and single-mindedly devoted to the study of it for
more than six or eight years. For there is no other science for
which the preparatory training requires to be nearly so severe
and so long, no matter how great the natural genius of the
student may be. For a plain man or a boy who should be early
taken in hand by an instructor capable of making him
comprehend both sides of every question, the time, without doubt,
can be greatly reduced, with untiring industry and energy on
the pupil's part.