

**Department of Politics
Graduate Program
Princeton University
Fall 2007**

**POL 542
Charles Cameron**

**Analysis of Political Institutions
Friday 1.30-4.20**

This course is an introduction to the logic, structure, operation, and social importance of political institutions. The primary aim of the course is to introduce students to the conceptual tools (“nuts and bolts”) of modern institutional analysis and illustrate the tools’ use in understanding legislatures, executives, courts, bureaucracies, electoral systems, and political parties. The applications are deliberately wide-ranging – *very* wide-ranging. Although many speak with an American accent, many do not.

A secondary objective of the course is to encourage students to think causally and evaluate evidence skeptically. Consequently, recurring themes are “theory” – what constitutes a valid and worthwhile scientific explanation of a social phenomenon? – and “research design” – how can we employ evidence in a fair and illuminating way?

The course is intended primarily for *first-year doctoral students* in political science, public policy, and political economy. Because of this focus, an effort has been made to keep technical matters to a relative minimum. As such, the course is preparatory to more advanced study requiring more formal and quantitative tools. However, it is impossible to study modern institutional analysis without encountering, and ultimately using, statistical analyses and game theory. Several strategies will be offered to help first-year students cope with this issue.

Class Organization, Student Requirements, & Grading

The class is divided into three parts. Part I, a brief “Introduction,” discusses why political institutions matter. This material justifies a costly intellectual investment in modern institutional analysis, as opposed to lower cost antiquarian, journalistic, or descriptive approaches (as worthwhile as those approaches can often be). We also spend some time on research design and the logic of inquiry.

Part II, “Nuts and Bolts,” the heart of the course, introduces the analytic concepts employed in modern institutional analysis. This part of the course aims simultaneously to introduce ideas and show how they are actually used in applied work. Consequently, these classes employ an unconventional format. In the second portion of each class, the instructor will introduce a concept via a lecture. Then, in the first hour or hour-and-one-half of class *in the following week*, each student will present a brief analysis of a reading or readings that apply the tool/concept. Typically, these readings deal with legislatures, executives, courts, bureaucracies, electoral

systems, or political parties but in many cases go well beyond the “big six.”¹ The reasons for organizing the class this way is to give students a chance to mull over a theoretical concept while grappling with how researchers actually use it to analyze something interesting and important.

Discussion leaders should explicitly elaborate the link between the application and the previous week’s lecture and readings. In addition, she should evaluate the application as theory and evaluate its use of evidence (if it employs any). Before each class, the presenter should email the instructor and classmates an outline of his or her presentation. The discussant’s colleagues are expected to play an active role in the discussion, asking question and making helpful interjections. Unless enrollment prohibits, *each* student will present in *each* class, commencing in week 3.

Part III, “Topics in Contemporary Institutional Analysis,” considers several topics at the contemporary research frontier of institutional analysis. This will vary from year to year, though typically we will consider political history. In addition; this year we consider pandering by politicians.

On **five** occasions during the semester, you should accompany your discussion with a 4-5 page paper making an argument about the reading. By “argument” I do not mean a summary of the reading; in fact, you will be penalized for wasting time on summary. Rather, you should critique the application’s logic or evidence; explore its relationship to other work; suggest new empirical tests; suggest a novel application or extension; or otherwise deploy an analytical sensibility toward the work. . Each student is expected to present every week in seminar, but required to write only five times. I will endeavor to return these papers, with comments, the following week.

Just to be clear, the requirements of the class consist of thoughtful participation, weekly presentations, and five short papers analyzing applications of modern institutional analysis. Class discussion may also indicate the need for occasional problem sets or writing assignments to be graded pass-fail.

Availability of Readings

Everything that can be placed on-line will be available via Blackboard, or links will be given whenever possible.

You may find it helpful to purchase an introductory text in game theory simply for your reference. Since you will eventually want to purchase McCarty and Meirowitz’s *Political Game Theory* you might wish to do so now. You may also wish to purchase Donald Campbell & Julian Stanley *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs and Research* (warning! Do not buy Campbell & Stanley new, only used, due to confiscatory pricing), which we will use in class. You are likely to refer to both many times in the future. Both will be placed on reserve.

¹ I have marked readings that are particularly interesting from the standpoint of research design or methods with a bold “**RD**”; I encourage you to pick one or more of these to present over the semester.

Schedule of Lectures

- 1.1 Why Study Political Institutions? 9/21
- 1.2 Introduction to Research Design 9/28
- 2.1 Collective Action – Theory 9/28
- 2.2 Collective Action – Applications 10/5
- 3.1 Culture – Theory 10/5
- 3.2 Culture – Applications 10/12
- 4.1 Coordination – Theory 10/12
- 4.2 Coordination – Applications 10/19
- 5.1 Commitment – Theory 10/19
- 5.2 Commitment – Applications 10/26
- 6.1 Voting – Theory 10/26
 - Fall Recess – No Class 11/2
- 6.2 Voting – Applications 11/9
- 7.1 Bargaining – Theory 11/9
- 7.2 Bargaining – Applications 11/16
- 8.1 Deliberation – Theory [Meirowitz lecture] 11/16
 - Thanksgiving Recess, No Class 11/23
- 8.2 Deliberation – Applications 11/30
- 9.1 Agency (1): Theory [Ashworth lecture] 11/30
- 9.2 Agency (1): Applications 12/7
- 10.1 Agency (2): Theory 12/7
- 10.2 Agency (2): Applications 12/14
- 11.1 Pandering: Theory [Canes-Wrone lecture] 12/14
- 11.2 Pandering: Application 12/18
- 12.1 Political History: Theory 12/18
- 12.2 Political History: Applications (TBA)

II. Syllabus of Readings

1. Introduction

1.1 Why Study Political Institutions? 9/21

Main themes: Arrow's theorem indicates there cannot be a single "best" set of institutional arrangements. Yet at the same time, economic growth, human rights, and the provision of public goods are associated with specific institutional arrangements. And, political institutions shape policy outcomes in general. In view of these findings, understanding how political institutions work (and fail to work) is a worthwhile intellectual endeavor.

Peruse for substantive overview, but not for technical details:

Richard Biesel, 2007. "States out of Nature: The Legislative Founding of Democracies."
Presented to the Conference on the History of Congress, sponsored by the Center for the

Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton, New Jersey. May 18-19, 2007. Focus on material on Congress.

Tim Besley and Anne Case, "Policy Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," *Journal of Economic Literature*, March 2003, v. 41(1): 7-73. **RD**

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2004. "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth" Chapter in *Handbook of Economic Growth*. **RD**

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Andrei Shleifer, "Judicial Checks and Balances," *Journal of Political Economy*. 2004.

Adam Przeworski. "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition* Volume 39 Issue 4 Page 527 - September 2004

Douglas W. Rae, Eric Schickler, 1997. "Majority Rule." in *Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook*. ed. Dennis C. Mueller. p. 163-180.

Part II. Nuts and Bolts for Modern Institutional Analysis

The class now shifts to the format it takes for the remainder of the semester. In particular, each three hour seminar is divided into two sessions. In part 1, we discuss applications of the theoretical readings from the previous week. In part 2, we move on to new theoretical material, which will be presented via a lecture by the faculty.

1.2 Introduction to Research Design

In the first part of Lecture 2, since we have no application to discuss, we review some basic material on research design.

Campbell and Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs and Research*. Entire. Be prepared to discuss the research designs in the readings from last week.

2. Free-riding, public goods, externalities, and collective action

2.1 Collective Action – Theory

Todd Sandler, 1992. *Collective Action: Theory and Application*. Chapter 1, pg. 1-18.

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter. 2002. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans," *Nature* 415:137-140. **RD**

2.2 Collective Action – Applications

Application: Why Doesn't Congress Collapse?

David R. Mayhew, 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. p. 141-158. Material on free-riding and institutional maintenance in legislatures: does he have an answer? What could be an answer?

Application: Congress and Presidential Unilateral Actions

Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, 1999. "Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 29(4):850-73.

Application: Why Vote? Free-riding in Elections (1)

Roger Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games." *International Journal of Game Theory*. 27(3):375-92. (This is somewhat technical though you may be able to follow the logic if you have had some game theory earlier)

Application: Why Vote? Free-riding in Elections (2)

Ron Schachar and Barry Nalebuff. 1999. "Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation," *American Economic Review* 89(3):525-547. Leaders and parties as an institutional response to free-riding in elections. **RD**

Application: Revolutionary Action

Michael Taylor, 1988. "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action." in *Rationality and Revolution*. ed. Michael Taylor, Chapter 2, p. 63-97. On organizing revolutionary cadres.

Application: Public Good Provision by Predatory States

Mancur Olson. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576. Stationary bandits.

3. Culture

Main themes: Decentralized norms (one aspect of "culture") can solve free-riding, opportunistic behavior, commitment problems and other problems in small, static societies. But decentralized norms tend to break down or fail in large dynamic ones. Institutions then become critical in solving social dilemmas. However, institutions themselves require appropriate sets of norms to work well (or perhaps at all). And, institutions shape norms in turn. Thus, culture and institutions go hand-in-hand. (And, conceivably, co-evolve. We will consider cultural evolution in Lecture 12).

3.1 Culture – Theory

Robert Gibbons, "Lecture Notes 2: Relational Contracts" sections 1-3 [the basic idea of norms as equilibria in a repeated game]

Kaushik Basu, 2000. *Prelude to Political Economy : A Study of the Social and Political Foundation of Economics*. Section 5.1 & 5.2 p 109-124. Norms (culture) can do anything institutions can. Take that institutionalists.

Avinash K. Dixit, *Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance*. Chapter 3, p.59-95. Or, maybe not? Failure of decentralized norms in dynamic societies. Institutions to the rescue.

Jean Ensminger, “Experimenting with Social Norms”: View streaming video lecture on the co-evolution of norms & markets among the Orma

John Shuhe Li, 2003. “Relation-based versus rule-based governance: An explanation of the East Asia Miracle and Asian Crisis,” *Review of International Economics* 11: 651-73.

Optional

Marcel Fafchamps, “Spontaneous Markets, Networks, and Social Capital: Lessons from Africa,” in Tim Besley and Raji Jayaraman (eds) *The Microeconomics of Institutions*

<http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/marcel.fafchamps/homepage/venicexb.pdf>

J. Henrich et al. 2005. “‘Economic Man’ in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-scale Societies,” *Behavioral and Brain Science* 28: 795-855. Also read the rejoinder to critics/commentators, and perhaps any of the critics who sound interesting. **RD**

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/McBBSPublished.pdf>

3.2 Culture – Applications

Application: Law in an stateless society

Bronislaw Malinowski, 1959. *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*. Chapters 1-4, p. 9-27.
(norms/relational contracts at work) **RD**

Application: Private Orderings

A private ordering: a governmental institution outside government, sustaining norms
Lisa Bernstein. 1992. “Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,” *Journal of Legal Studies* 21: 115-157.

Application: The Rule of Law

Barry R. Weingast, 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” *The American Political Science Review* 91(2):245-263.

Application: Culture and Electoral Systems

John A. Ferejohn, 1991. "Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England" in *The Economic Approach to Politics*, Kristen Monroe (ed.), New York: Harper Collins.

4. Coordination

Main theme: Coordination of expectations can create self-fulfilling prophecies, multiple equilibria and path dependence. Which can lead to some very ugly situations; but also some very nice ones.

4.1 Coordination – Theory

H. Peyton Young, 1996. “The Economics of Convention,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10(2):105-122.

4.2 Coordination – Applications

Application: The Politics of Language Choice

David D. Laitin, 1994. “The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game: Political Linguistics in Ghana,” *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 622-634.

Application: Sub-optimal Social & Political Norms: Foot-binding

Gerry Mackie, 1996. “Ending Foot-binding and Infibulation: A Convention Account,” *American Sociological Review* 61(6): 999-1017.

Application: Constitutions

Hardin, Russell. 1989. “Why a Constitution,” *The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism*, Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman (eds) New York: Agathon Press.

Application: Coordination in Elections

Gary Cox, 1999. “Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:145-161.

Application: Quality and Competence of Elected Officials

Francesco Caselli and Massimo Morelli. 2004. “Bad Politicians,” *Journal of Public Economics* 88: 759-82. Parts of this paper are way too hard for first year students but other parts are not; if you are interested in honesty, competence, corruption etc may be worth a look.

5. Commitment and Dynamic Consistency

Main theme: How can I control my own bad behavior in the face of temptation? How can I get you to do good things if you don't believe I can resist temptation? Moral issues ... but quintessentially political as well.

5.1 Commitment – Theory

K. Shepsle, 1991. “Discretion, institutions and the problem of government commitment”, in P. Bordieu y J. Coleman (eds.), *Social Theory for a Changing Society*. Boulder: Westview Press.

5.2 Commitment – Applications

Application: The revival of long-distance trade in Medieval Europe

Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2(March): 1-23.

Application: Slavery, Institutional Design, and the Onset of the U.S. Civil War

Barry R. Weingast, 1998. "Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy," in *Analytic Narratives*, Robert H. Bates, et.al. eds. Chapter 4, p. 148-193. **RD**

Application: Central Banks

Susanne Lohmann "The Non-Politics on Monetary Policy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (eds). Chapter 29, p. 523-544.

Application: Horizontal Stare Decisis in a Judiciary

Rasmusen, Eric. 1994. "Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game," *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*. 10(1):63-83. Why should a judge respect precedent? How norms can solve dynamic consistency problems (over-lapping generations)

Application: Elections and Independent Judiciaries

J. Flanigan manuscript. "Legislative Elections and Judicial Independence" Why doesn't a legislature fire all the opposition judges and pack the judiciary with loyal hacks? Both institutions (competitive elections) and the correct norms to the rescue. (Probably won't be ready in time for class, perhaps used in lecture)

Application: Constitutions

Douglas North and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49:803-832.

Application: An Independent Judiciary

Daniel Klorman and Paul Mahoney. 2007. "The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England," *American Law and Economics Review*. An empirical test of North and Weingast. **RD**

Application: Restraining Autarchs

Hilton L. Root, 1989. "Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy During the Old Regime," *Rationality and Society*. 1(2):240-258.

6. Collective Decision Making: Voting and Preference Aggregation

Main themes: Voting is a distinctively political way to aggregate preferences. Some elementary voting theory including some basic results in social choice theory. The median voter theorem. The Calvert/Wittman alternative. Incentive effects of different electoral systems. (Voting as a way to aggregate information?).

6.1 Voting: Theory

Roger B. Myerson, 1996, "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory." This is definitely hard going and some of it will be over your head unless you have had a semester of game theory. But you have to be at somewhat conversant with this material to be a well-educated social

scientist. You should allow several days reading time (I mean full days) and do the best you can.

McCarty and Meirowitz on median voter theorem (handout).

Handout on Calvert/Wittman games.

Roger B. Myerson. 1999. "Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems," *European Economic Review* 43(4-6):671-697. Comparative politics. Not as hard as the first one but plenty hard too.

6.2 Voting & Electoral Systems – Applications

What are some interesting applications of simple voting theory?

Maybe literature on economic effects of different electoral systems? (Pierson/Tabelini book?)

Application: The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory

Marco Battaglini, Thomas Palfrey, and Rebecca Morton. 2006. "The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory," Princeton/NYU/CalTech working paper. Also not that easy, but focus on the experimental design and data if the theory is too hard. **RD**

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/morton/NonanonSwingvoters_14Dec06.pdf

Application: Voting and "Culture Wars"

James Snyder, Steven Ansolebehere, Jonathan Rodden, "Purple America." An easy paper

http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1266

Application: Apparent Failure of the MVT and Representation Failure in Congress

David Lee, Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler. 2004. "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 119(3):807-860. **RD**

Application: Primaries

Steven Ansolebehere, Mark Hansen, Shigeo Hirano, James Snyder. 2005. "The Decline in Competition in U.S. Primary Elections 1908-2004."

http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1211

Application: Represent Everyone or a Favored Few? The Effect of Electoral Rules

Shigeo Hirano. 2005. "Electoral Institutions, Hometowns and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms," working paper, Columbia University. **RD**

7. Collective Decision Making: Bargaining

Making offers and counter-offers in politics. Take-it-or-leave-it bargaining as a particularly simple and particularly important type of political bargaining.

7.1 Bargaining – Theory

Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo. *Public Choice* 33: 27-43.

McCarty & Meirowitz. The Divide the dollar game (Baron-Ferejohn Game)

7.2 Bargaining – Applications

Application: Vetoes

Cameron, Charles and Nolan McCarty. 2004. “Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 409-435.

Application: Pork Barrel Politics in Legislatures

Diermeier paper on testing Baron-Ferejohn. **RD**

Application: Pivotal Politics

Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics*, Chapters 1 and 2. This will return if we do SOP politics.

Application: Bargaining Over Budgets with Strong Presidents

Lisa Baldez and John M. Carey. 1999. “Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet's Constitution.” *American Journal of Political Science* 43(1): 29-55

Application: Cabinet Formation

Daniel Diermeier; Peter van Roozendaal. “The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies” *British Journal of Political Science* > Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct., 1998), pp. 609-626

8. Collective Decision Making: Deliberation

Main theme: Institutions for sharing and aggregating political information. Juries.

// MEIROWITZ GUEST LECTURE //

Adam – what to read for theory? What to read for applications?

9. Agency: Hierarchy, Delegation, Shirking, Monitoring, Accountability, Representation, Teams

Main theme: Selecting agents, supervising agents, rewarding agents, punishing agents ... central tasks in all political institutions. Moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, screening. .

9.1 Introduction to Agency Theory (1)

Gibbons, Lecture Note 1 “Agency Theory” through section 5.

http://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/LN_1_Agency_Theory.pdf

Avinash Dixit. 2002. [Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review](#). *The Journal of Human Resources*, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 696-727. Focus mostly on the last half of the article.

Jean Tirole. 1994. "Internal Organization of Government," *Oxford Economic Papers* 46:1-29. <http://www.jstor.org/view/00307653/di015406/01p0054m/0>

George Stigler, "Econ Theory of Regulation". One of the most influential papers in the social sciences ... What are the implicit informational assumptions?

9.2 Agency Theory (1 and 2) – Applications

Application: Elections as a Device for Selecting Good Agents

James Madison, *Federalist* 57.

Timothy Besley. 2005. "Political Selection," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(3): 43-60.

Application: Policy Consequences of Representation

Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a India-side Randomized Policy Experiment." *Econometrica* 72(5): 1409-1444. **RD**

Application: Elections as a Device for Disciplining Bad Agents

R. Douglas Arnold, *Logic of Congressional Action*, material on voters and the accountability of congressmen

David Brady, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and John F. Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members Voting." *American Political Science Review* 96:127-140.

Application: Representation Failure in the Current Congress

David Lee, Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler. 2004. "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 119(3):807-860. **RD**

Application: Politicizing the Bureaucracy

David Lewis, 2008. *Politicizing Administration: Policy and Patronage in Presidential Appointments*. Princeton University Press. Chapter TBA

Application: Urban Political Machines & Monopoly Control of Government

Jessica Trounstine, from her book.

Application: Judicial Hierarchies (Teams)

Kornhauser, Lewis. 1995. "Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System." 68 *Southern California Law Review* 1605 (1995).

Application: Judicial Hierarchies (Auditing)

Charles M. Cameron; Jeffrey A. Segal; Donald Songer. Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 94, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), pp. 101-116 (Too hard for most first year students)

Application: Application: Legislative Delegation to Bureaucrats

John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Chapters 1 and 6.

Application: Committees and the Design of Legislatures

(Krehbiel)

Application: Presidential Rhetoric, Voters, and Congressmen

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2005. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Chapters 1 and 2.

Application: Career Incentives in Legislatures

David Mayhew. *America's Congress*.

William Muir. *Legislature*.

Application: Career Concerns and Federalism

Roger Myerson, paper on federalism.

Application: Predatory and Failing States

Avinash Dixit, Predatory and Failing States: An Agency Perspective. Princeton working paper, June 2006.

Application: Clientelism and Particularism

Phil Keefer, "The Political Economy of Development," *Handbook of Comparative Politics*

10. More Agency Theory

10.1. More Theory

Continued discussion of agency theory.

10.2 More Applications

Pick another application from the above.

III. Current Research Topics

Time limits what we can do. But here are two topics from current research frontiers.

11. Pandering and Perverse Incentives from Elections

Main theme: Do politicians just tell people what they want to hear? When can elections create incentives for leadership and making unpopular choices?

11.1 Pandering – Theory

//CANES-WRONE GUEST LECTURE//

Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole. 2004. The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government,” *American Economic Review* 94(4): 1034-1054. First half not too bad, some of the second half too hard for first year students. But see if you can bet the basic idea.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. *Who Leads Whom?* Introduction to part two, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. BEST READING FROM BOOK – B you decide

11.2 Pandering – Applications

Application: Public Utility Regulators

Besley, Timothy and Steven Coate. 2003. “Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1:1176-1206.
<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/154247603770383424?cookieSet=1>
<http://econ.lse.ac.uk/~tbesley/papers/electapp.pdf>

Application: Judges and Retention Elections

Huber, Gregory and Sanford Gordon. 2007. “The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. **RD**

Application: Pandering and Prosecutors

Huber, Gregory and Sanford Gordon. 2004. “Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?” *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2):247-263.

Application: Congressmen, Good Public Policy, and Chains of Traceability

R. Douglas Arnold, *Logic of Congressional Action*, material on chains of traceability

Application: Economic Voting and Political Business Cycles

James Alt and Shanna Rose, “Political Business Cycles,” in *Handbook of Comparative Politics*.
(or, APSR article)

12. History and Political Change

Main theme: Taking history seriously. What is the difference between path dependence and state dependence? How does evolution work and where does it lead? Imitation vs. evolution. Role of contingency. How do institutions form preferences and how do preferences co-evolve with institutional structures?

12.1 History & Change: Theory

Scott Page "A Path Dependence Primer." *QJPS* volume 1.

E.H. Carr. 1961. "Causation in History," pp. 113-143 in *What Is History?* New York: Vintage Books.

Bowles, Samuel. 2003. *Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution*. Chapter Thirteen: The Co-evolution of Institutions and Preferences 437-470. (NEED A READING ON REPLICATOR DYNAMICS)

Robert Boyd and Peter Richardson. 2005. "How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History," pp. 287-309 in Boyd and Richardson *The Origin and Evolution of Cultures* (Oxford UP).

12.2 History & Change: Applications

Application:

Weingast and Katznelson. 2005. *Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism*. Introduction and chapter on 13th century institutional development of parliament. //BEST CHAPTER???

Application: Bureaucratic Power over Time

Carpenter, Daniel P. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*. Princeton University Press.1-36.

Application: Legal Change

Schwerber, Howard. *The Creation of American Common Law, 1850-1880: Technology, Politics, and the Construction of Citizenship*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press (2004).

Application: Effect of Growth in Income on Democratic Stability

Robinson, James. "Economic Development and Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:503-27 (2006)

Application: Emergence of the State as an Institution

Hendrick Spruyt, book or article in *Handbook of Comparative Politics*

Application: History of Contested Primaries

Steven Ansolabehere, Mark Hansen, Shigeo Hirano, James Snyder. 2005. "The Decline in Competition in U.S. Primary Elections 1908-2004."

http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1211

Application: Emergence of Political Parties

Carles Boix. 2007. "Emergence of Parties," *Handbook of Comparative Politics*