Critical Debates

Latin American Independence and the Double Dilemma

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Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. Photographs, table, notes, index, 422 pp.; hardcover $39.95.

John Charles Chasteen and Sara Castro-Klarén, eds., *Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America.* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Notes, index, 280 pp.; hardcover $45, paperback $22.95.

Carlos Forment, *Democracy in Latin America, 1760–1900.* Volume 1, *Civic Selfhood and Public Life in Mexico and Peru.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Illustrations, maps, figures, tables, index, 454 pp.; hardcover $39.

Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810–1910.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Illustrations, maps, bibliography, index, 299 pp.; hardcover $75, paperback $27.99, e-book $75.

Cecilia Méndez, *The Plebeian Republic: The Huanta Rebellion and the Making of the Peruvian State, 1820–1850.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2005. Photographs, illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 360 pp.; hardcover $84.95, paperback $23.95.

Mark Thurner and Andrés Guerrero, eds., *After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. Illustrations, notes, index, 376 pp.; hardcover $84.95, paperback $23.95.

As we approach the official two hundredth anniversary of Latin American independence, a familiar set of issues dominates discussion of and in the region. Leaders and regimes as different as Calderón and Bachelet, Chávez and Morales all pose the same questions (even if they are destined to get different responses): What is the meaning of citizenship? Who deserves it? How can Latin America better develop a stable and inclusive political order? What does it mean to be an Argentine, Peruvian, or Mexican? What is the Latin American national project?

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These were the same questions posed by Bolívar as he looked back on 20 years of fighting for independence, and the quarrels over the answers have overshadowed continental debates ever since. Two hundred years ago, the Latin American republics faced the double dilemma of simultaneously constructing states and nations. They had to define both their internal laws and the territories in which the laws applied. Among myriad conflicting claims, they had to demarcate national membership, along with its corresponding rights and responsibilities. They had to do so, moreover, in an inauspicious environment and with challenging historical legacies.

How did they do it, and to what extent do their solutions still define contemporary Latin American societies? The books considered in this essay all seek to respond to the first question, and no reader can avoid considering the implications for the second. The history analyzed in those pages has particular significance, as Latin America arguably still faces the same double dilemma today.

The books share many common themes and complementary ideas and suggest some basic concurrence as to the historical challenges and legacies. Each book, of course, has its own strengths and weaknesses, and all deserve a careful reading. Following remarks on the individual works, this essay discusses their analyses of the creation of order and citizenship in the postindependence years. Then it includes some considerations regarding the utility of theory, the very notion of a regional path to nationhood, and the possible lessons from these volumes for the fate of the continent in the new century.

Theories of Nationhood

Beyond Imagined Communities is an attempt to test and analyze the applicability of Benedict Anderson's theories of nationmaking to Latin America. The bottom line is that while the concept of an imagined community is quite useful, Anderson erred in his reading of regional history: it is simply not true that a "creole nationalism" existed in Latin America before independence (see Anderson 1983). Neither mechanism cited by Anderson in the creation of this nationalism is supported by the empirical evidence. First, there was no circulation of colonial bureaucrats developing a continental network of political leadership. More important, newspaper and print capitalism in general did not contribute to the creation of an imagined identity before 1810. No print products were widely disseminated and none had continental readership. Despite its apparent unsuitability to Latin American reality, however, Anderson's perspective provides a variety of authors with an opportunity to improve our reading of nationalism in the region, "independent of the validity of its specific conclusions" (p. 33).

The first half of this volume provides a very useful historical overview of the development of the various strains and forms of nationalism. The late François Xavier Guerra denies any correspondence between notions of *patria* and the eventual territorial definitions of Latin American statehood. According to Guerra, "Latin American elites dedicated themselves to creating the discursive infrastructure of nationhood only after independence was won" (32). Tulio Halperin Donghi notes that at least in Argentina, the cause of the nation was identified with a political faction and "thus implicitly excluded all others from the national community" (45). Looking at the creation of national distinctiveness through the prism of gender, Sarah Chambers notes that because of their exclusion from institutionalized political life, women were less interested in abstract identities, and developed networks defined not so much by party or nation as by families and communities. Andrew Kirkendall, in turn, following Angel Rama (1996), describes the creation of a conscious literary elite of *letrados* seeking to construct new identities through national literatures.

Fernando Unzueta agrees with Anderson that history was "emplotted" to serve national ends, but not to the extent it was in Europe. Moreover, this process occurred long after the creation of the official states and expressed much more exclusion of internal others from the sense of nationality. Sara Castro-Klarén also notes the problematic relationship between ethnicity and nation in Latin America and describes the struggle over the definition of a national Peruvian "arch space." Where the "glorious" past was less monumental, as in Uruguay, the best thing was just to ignore it; Gustavo Verdesio suggests that this led to defining that nation by reference to the welfare state. Beatriz González-Stephan finishes the collection with an account of pavilions in the universal expositions of the late nineteenth century and how these reflected elite readings of what constituted "the nation."

Although I liked the book, I wonder about the utility of Anderson, as opposed to Hobsbawm and Ranger's more eclectic approach (1992). The basic concept of creating the imagined community is useful, but there are just too many historical errors. The approach in *The Invention of Tradition* would have given the authors of *Beyond the Imagined Community* wider latitude to explore these questions without so much concern for historical timing. Nevertheless, the book is quite successful at using the culture of nationalism as a lens though which to study the birth of the new states. Overall, I appreciated that while the authors take their cultural turn seriously, they never bog down in the often off-putting, obtuse language of many of their counterparts.

After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas is also explicitly concerned with the appropriateness of a theoretical perspective for Latin America, in this case the "postcolonial" school associated

with South Asian and subaltern studies. Unfortunately, the book is less successful at avoiding the traps of "high theory," and is marred by some excessively self-conscious throat clearing. Moreover, in a book seeking to speak to a south-south condition, it is jarring to note the repeated references to the classic European voices of Barkhin, Heidegger, Hegel, and Nietzsche; what do any of these have to do with postcolonialism? Despite these problems, the individual chapters provide fascinating insights into the cultural construction of both nation and empire during the nineteenth century.

Mauricio Tenoria Trillo notes the central question of a national image, which is critical to notions of nation-state but problematic in Latin America. Mexico was exceptional in creating an apparently unifying identity that, not surprisingly, reflected real conditions of power rather than any real ethnic or cultural homogeneity.

Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra uses travel narratives to define early global gazes on the region. It is particularly interesting that already in the nineteenth century, visitors saw Chile more benignly than they saw the rest of Latin America. The contrast of Chile as "alpine" with Peru as "concupiscent and pagan" might still find some contemporary echoes (95). Similarly, in Mark Thurner's account, travelers and their reactions to Inca ruins serve as clear windows through which to define European perspectives on the region. Thurner also notes the difficulty Peruvian elites faced in attempting to use the grandeur of the Incas without legitimating their descendants too much. Ramón Meza's *Mi tio el empleado* (1887) serves to highlight Javier Morillo-Alicea's discussion of nineteenth-century Spanish imperialism as little more than an archive.

Thomas Abercrombie's contribution may be the clearest explanation of how schemas of race and class rose from the colonial past and still help define modern Latin America. He nicely delineates the postcolonial predicament of having to distinguish oneself from both native and European. Marixa Lasso details how the independence struggle was "creolized" so that Afro-Colombians were written out of the narrative. Peter Guardino echoes much historical work arguing against the assumed passivity of the subaltern in the process of independence, while Andrés Guerrero describes how elites sought to make "natives invisible in the public sphere," and this enabled the perpetuation of the social and racial divisions (293).

EMPIRICAL ARGUMENTS

The difficulties of applying theory seriously and also presenting the empirical evidence at hand are clearest in the case of Carlos Forment's *Democracy in Latin America, 1760–1900*. The first thing that needs to be said about this book is that the quantity and quality of the scholar-

ship are truly astounding. Forment has literally created his own archive of Latin American civil society. The problem is what he does with it.

On the one hand, the introductory chapters are extremely learned, and Forment has clearly spent time thinking about relevant theoretical discussions. He is motivated by the need to explore the development of civil society in Latin America and, armed with this knowledge, to refute some of the claims that have been made regarding the difficulties of democracy on this continent. But no clear argument comes out of all his questioning. We are left with assertions that civil society did develop, but no clear accounts of how it was used or where it came from. While Forment contends that the Latin American independence wars involved a cultural revolution even more than a political one (xx), he never presents adequate evidence to support this assertion.

On the other hand, the empirical chapters are encyclopedic in their descriptive detail. No discussion of Mexican or Peruvian societies in the nineteenth century could afford to ignore them. Forment has gone a long way in demonstrating how much associational life existed in Mexico during the nineteenth century and how this activity developed in response to different political and social events. But again, after absorbing this scholarly tour de force, the reader is left feeling somewhat empty. We know a lot more of the details of daily civil life in the two countries, but I am not sure we understand these societies any better. The contrast between Mexico's "crafting of citizens" and Peru's "republic without citizens" is not adequately analyzed.

Forment, moreover, does not sufficiently interrogate his measures of civil democracy; he assumes that what existed is what he has measured. Obviously, all scholarship is constrained by the materials at hand, but it is always important to remember the various historical filters though which our understanding of the past must penetrate. The empirical chapters could certainly benefit from more self-questioning by Forment of what he is observing in the records he has gathered.

Since this is the first half of a planned two-volume work (the next volume dealing with Cuba and Argentina), it is difficult to make a final judgment on Forment's ambitious project. There is no question of the scholarly and intellectual quality, but one hopes that having finished with the empirical materials, Forment will venture into a more explicit comparative analysis, one that will grapple better with methodological uncertainties.

The Plebeian Republic is partly an attempt to disprove assumptions of peasant and Indian passivity in independence and postnationalist struggles. Cecilia Méndez is concerned that it has been too easy to assume that the subaltern (in this case, the peasant of the Peruvian highlands) was either passive in the face of exploitation or sought recourse in some sort of traditionalism. In her introduction, she persuasively

argues against exoticizing or "orientalizing" Indians so that their political responses and motivations seem otherworldly or mysterious (5). She means to show that the peasants of Huanta did participate in the creation of the Peruvian state, that they negotiated with that state and even sought to redefine it, and that they did so without simple recourse to conventional images. For the Huanta rebels, for example, the monarchism of the 1820s and 1830s was not an atavistic response but an instrument with which to negotiate their social, political, and economic position.

Méndez tells a good story about how and why the rebellion happened. The book is particularly strong when delving into the details of the rebellion and the general geographic and social environment in which it occurred. One of the most interesting conclusions deals with the structure of the rebellion and the manner in which "geographical and ecological factors, distributions and patterns of landowning and settlement created the ideal terrain for strengthening the 'middling' sectors: those muleteer-merchants and small or middle-size landowners who would become the most important *montonero* leaders" (153). Given the chaos of postindependence Peru, it is also fascinating to note how the "state" the rebels created in Uchuraccay successfully both garnered revenues and provided services.

The problem, as with Forment, is that a general argument is often lost in the telling of the story. Méndez has sought to combine the ethnographic detail of an (excellent) anthropologist with a broader historical vision, and the two tasks do not always complement each other. She persuasively suggests the importance of writing a history of liberalism in the *sierra*, but neglects to use this channel as a way to combine her empirical observations and theoretical questions.

Trials of Nation Making is much more successful in this regard, partly because it avoids climbing too far up a pyramid of generalizations and remains rooted in the historical problems at hand. It offers an excellent discussion of the failure to integrate the subaltern, Indian, and black into the political realities of the newly independent Andes.[1] Popular and peasant uprisings fundamentally conditioned the undulating movement of revolution and counterrevolution during the first quarter of the nineteenth century (6). Brooke Larson nicely demonstrates how the resulting responses to these challenges helped define the individual trajectories of the Andean nations. Rare for a synthesizing volume, this one succeeds at providing both a general view of the struggle over race in the Andes and detailed accounts of the story in each of its four cases.

In Colombia, the Indian "problem" remained geographically constrained, "at a safe distance from the main urban centers of power and progress" (101). Ecuador did not follow the regional pattern of attempted "whitening," but instead constructed a Church-led project of reinforcing caste that did not end until the liberal reforms of Eloy Alfaro.

In Peru, the Lima elite simply tried to write the Indians out of the national project, considering them "beyond the bounds of nation and civilization" (201), even when they had been the ultimate defenders of territorial sovereignty. Bolivia saw the "reconstitution of servile Indian subjects . . . as essential to the maintenance of local power relations" (207) and retained this framework well into the twentieth century.

Overall, Larson does a great job of explaining how the Andean states were organized "around rigid concepts of race, culture, and geography" (247). She is less successful, however, at utilizing the different paths to this common end for a comparative analysis. How inevitable was this conclusion? Do the four different experiences she details tell us anything of institutional alternatives? Her brief insertion of the Mexican counterpoint in the conclusions suggests that a more analytically oriented approach to her cases might have provided some suggestive answers. Larson's bibliographic essay also provides an excellent guide to the literature and is alone worth the price of the book.

The most successful of the books considered here is clearly Jeremy Adelman's *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic*. Adelman argues against any school that sees the Latin American states or nations before the revolutions; there simply were no such things. In order to understand both the independence and the nations that arose from it, we have to understand that these are historical products of circumstances and reactions thereto. Adelman argues this while using an enviable and rare command of the history of both Iberian Atlantic empires.

The rise of independent Latin America (or from Adelman's point of view, the collapse of the Spanish and Portuguese empires) was largely a product of conflicts about mercantilism and a response to international wars. Adelman notes that the political economy of empire faced an impossible task: adapting the imperial economy to capitalist transformations along the Atlantic without adjusting feudal privileges in the peninsula. The subjects of the empire sought a balance between competition and imperial rivalry, and they could not find one. Adelman's treatment of the politics of the Cádiz merchants is an excellent demonstration of how these internal conflicts fed the international disputes: "rather than assuage colonial concerns, peninsular events animated them, peninsular officials irritated them, and finally peninsula policies enraged them" (191). His book is most successful at describing how the "reciprocity that supported the old regime—bolstering rents by curbing competition, in return for revenues for the treasury" (238) fell apart.

Constructing an alternative system proved equally difficult. Building a new state was the ultimate goal, but the political authority required to do so was lacking. Essentially, the new republics needed the very thing they were after in order to accomplish their goals; the end and the means required to reach it were the same! Partly because he has dealt with this

issue in other work, Adelman plays less attention to the institutional construction of the new states.[2] In the end, the racial distinctions and class divisions defeated liberal hopes, and these degenerated into the appeal of authoritarian measures and movements such as positivism.

Like almost all the other authors discussed here, Adelman has the common problems of any scholar: an often excessive attachment to the details he has unearthed, as well as a reluctance to make a more explicit argument. At the core of his book is a Skocpolian view of the Latin American revolutions' not necessarily prevailing, but simply outlasting a counterrevolution that failed. A more explicit discussion of this perspective would make the central lessons of the book both clearer and more susceptible to comparative analysis.

The Double Dilemma of Order and Race

Despite their different perspectives, the books considered here share the view that the new states of Latin America arose from the colonial era with practically impossible challenges: they had to resolve castelike divisions while claiming to include all citizens, and they had to construct a state that respected liberty while maintaining order. With few exceptions, they failed to do either. It is this failure to resolve the double dilemma involving what Adelman calls sovereignty and citizenship that helped to define the Latin American nineteenth century and arguably continues to haunt the region.

All these books agree that a major difficulty facing the newly independent nations was the absence of a political order that was both legitimate and efficient. In general, as Larson notes about the Andean countries, the postindependence states had uncommon difficulty negotiating power and legitimacy within a common framework of liberalism or nationalism. Latin American nation-states consolidated only after 1850, with their entry into a global economy. The last point is a crucial one: the creation of nations as a product of international economic forces is one of the characteristics that distinguish Latin America.

How much did the newly independent nations inherit these dilemmas from the empires? There is little question that the colonial condition helped define Latin American modernity. The scholarly disagreements come from articulating the manner in which it did so. There appears to be some debate, for example, as to the strength of the colonial institutional apparatus. For Forment, the colonial state was a mighty behemoth with a well-developed judicial system (40–42). The ability of the colonial state to face the challenge of the Túpac Amaru rebellion of 1781 also indicates that the colonial edifice was not entirely hollow. As Méndez describes it, the figure of the king was a significant source of legitimacy and authority even far beyond the confines of viceregal cap-

itals. Yet in other accounts, a very different picture emerges. In discussing the latter-nineteenth-century version of the Spanish Empire, Javier Morillo-Alicea, for example, writes of an edifice almost literally made of paper and bureaucrats. Adelman details how ineffective were imperial controls over smuggling. Moreover, he notes that the principal threat to the enforcement of contracts (a critical function of any political authority) came from the state itself and its repeated unwillingness to meet its debt obligations (35).

The key to this apparent disagreement is that we need to distinguish between the empire in 1790, still enjoying the benefits of the Bourbon reforms and possessed of a significant navy, and the entity that then had to endure 20 years of almost continuous war against one or the other of the two global powers, Britain and France. Adelman nicely describes how Spain's involvement in this global conflict, first on one side and then on the other, decimated its resources and created a power vacuum of no small proportion. With the collapse of the imperium, colonists had no choice but to improvise a new system (176). The wars of independence actually led to the breakup of authority rather than facilitating the establishment of new authorities (278). The same international situation doomed the new republics to fight and survive in a much less hospitable geopolitical environment than that enjoyed by the 13 colonies to the north (180).

Making the job of the new states much harder was, as Méndez notes, the difficulty of discerning who had really won the wars of independence; it was not obvious (54). Méndez recounts the skepticism of the Peruvian public about the new state. Many just were not sure of the triumph, as the Spaniards were still very much around. The empire also enjoyed significant support even well into the wars: more Peruvians were in the royal army at Ayacucho than on the side of the liberators. An additional problem in all cases was the considerable vagueness about what the territorial composition of the nation was supposed to be. Bolivia may be the most obvious case: should it be linked to La Plata through bureaucratic or legal membership or to Peru through networks of commerce and ethnicity, or should it remain is own autonomous zone? No natural centers of authority developed in the immediate postindependence era, and "as the empire fragmented so did old territorial units of the colonies" (Adelman, 214).

The uncertainty of the outcome regarding the continent's territorial division and the domestic order underlying it led to a perpetual militarization, which lasted much longer than the actual wars. Certainly in the Andes, creole modernizers continued to push their liberal and disciplinary schemes "against debilitating forces of internecine strife, partisan warfare, civil war, foreign invasions, and territorial loss" (Larson, 51). As Adelman notes, it was Brazil's good fortune to avoid both the milita-

rization and the debate about the territoriality of authority that helps explain how its path to nationhood diverged (343).

The war and the victory, moreover, brought huge economic costs and the disarticulation of production and exchange networks. The arrival of the *patria* was an economic and social disaster for many parts of the continent (Méndez, 74). In general, independence did not provoke a decisive economic shift from a crumbling, unviable old order to a robust and uplifting new one; "there was no bourgeois revolution" (Adelman, 355).

If the state was fragile, the underlying sense of collective identity (and thus legitimacy) was even weaker. There was little or no sense of "nation" before 1810, with the possible exception of Chile, New Spain (Mexico), and Buenos Aires. In the case of Peru, Castro-Klarén notes that not until the early twentieth century did the nation appear as a continuous "time-space construct." Larson agrees, claiming that creole political factions could call on no "unifying myth, no accepted rule of law, no deep well of political experience and converging class interest in universalistic ideals that might guide them in their efforts to navigate postcolonial transitions" (38). Guerra makes the point that what sense of nation did exist (at least among creoles) had to do with Spain; and the conflicting claims to that sovereignty turned the independence conflicts into civil wars. This, in turn, further splintered the notion of a single national community.

Halperin Donghi emphasizes that certainly in Argentina and arguably in the rest of the region, the critical political identity (when one existed at all) was the party, not the nation. People thought of themselves as Federalists or Unitarians or Liberals or Conservatives more than as Argentines or Mexicans. In Guardino's view, this led to a failure of pluralism rather than one of democracy (*After Spanish Rule*, 266). Parties and factions came to fear too much the victory of the others and could not accept electoral rules as a consequence; these came to be seen as fraught with danger.

There seems to be broad agreement with John Lynch's judgment that before the 1850s, most Latin American countries had, at best, "an incipient nationalism almost entirely devoid of social content" (1973, 340, quoted by Unzueta, *Beyond Imagined Communities*, 123). The absence of a "nation" was noted by the great generation of liberals, and they sought to create a new sense of nation separate from whatever had been inherited from the colonial era: Mora in Mexico, Alberdi and Echevarría in Argentina, Bello and Lastarria in Chile. Unzueta and González-Stephan document how the literate classes inside and outside the state sought to create a teleological sense of history through romantic novels, national expositions, and the elaboration of a national folklore. For Forment, Latin Americans were the first group of citizens in the

modern world to fail in their attempt to reconcile social equality with cultural differences (xii). Some Latin Americans were able to develop the "social power" of associative life, but this was an organization that appeared to exist purely in the private realm and to occur with the citizens' "backs to the state" (355) and, arguably, to the rest of their supposed national community.

The one area where the state did seem to maintain some bureaucratic coherence also contributed to the ultimate frustration in the creation of a collective identity. In almost all these books, one can find examples of the relatively young state maintaining and enforcing racial divisions. Whether through the racialization of census categories or though social and economic policies, the state insisted on drawing internal boundaries before it even consolidated national frontiers. The origins of the failure to "make nations" may be found in the challenge of race and class.

Thomas Abercrombie notes the postcolonial predicament faced by the new nations and their elites: they needed to distinguish themselves from both natives and Europeans. What made this condition particularly challenging for the Latin American republics was that they had to maintain the ethnic divisions of the colonial order while elaborating new discourses of political modernity. The liberals of the nineteenth century needed to create a language that spoke of universality while maintaining exclusivity (*After Spanish Rule*, 199). This paradox between equality and hierarchy made it impossible to create what Larson calls a "hegemonic language of contention" (13). For Larson, the Andean republics carried "the burden of race . . . into the twentieth century: the stark binary categories defined politics" (16).

The spectre of race and rebellion haunted the creole imagination even before 1810. The Túpac Amaru rebellion of 1781 had demonstrated that elite fears of Indian revolt were not completely unmerited. Before the revolt, there had been a concerted attempt, at least in Peru, to link native and conquering hierarchies. This included the preservation of the Inca aristocracy, along with the elaboration of a national "Incaness" based on Garcilaso de la Vega (Castro-Klarén in *Beyond Imagined Communities*, 175). Similar efforts can be seen in New Spain. But the Andean rebellion led creole elites to see such policies as blunders to be avoided at all cost, and the last years of the empire witnessed a strengthening of racial domination.

The break with any efforts to tie political legality to preconquest structures created a legitimacy vacuum that eroded the authority of the empire and also subsequent republics (Méndez, 99). This creole counterrevolution was complemented by a dramatic increase in the economic importance of slavery and an accompanying rise in the number of Africans living in bondage. Not surprisingly, this led to a further, and

understandable, paranoia, which was only confirmed by the revolt on St. Dominique in 1791. What the double subaltern threat meant was that just as the elites of the colonies were acquiring power and influence in regard to the metropoles, "they faced much more troubling challenges to their authority from below" (Adelman, 91).

These fears and quandaries were exacerbated by the demographic makeup of the various armies fighting after 1810. The books considered here leave no doubt that the respective subalterns were not passive, either in the independence wars or in the efforts to create new national orders. According to Méndez, for example, there was a real popular mobilization in Peru, and independence was not purely a creole gift. The crisis of the monarchy that began in 1808 unleashed a variety of Indian projects and demands in both Mexico and the Andes. Scholarship on the independence wars has already documented the unease with which creole elites observed the participation of blacks or Indians on both sides. As Jorge Basadre nicely puts it, "There was widespread disgust among the old aristocrats toward the turn of events in the republican experiment" (1983, quoted in Méndez frontispiece). Marixa Lasso provides a fascinating view into what this meant in Cartagena. Not only did creole elites view the participation of Afro-Colombians with alarm, but they rewrote their history throughout the nineteenth century to appropriately "whiten" the struggle for independence.

In creating the new republics, the elites appeared to have two options. They could recreate the racial architecture of colonial rule or try to create modern liberal states with an inclusive citizenship. They managed to do neither. At first, there were attempts to dismantle the old ethnic order (Méndez, 187). But when subalterns took liberals at their word and attempted to participate in politics, they were consistently thwarted (Guardino, in *After Spanish Rule*, 265). No better example exists of this double failure than the preservation of Indian tribute throughout the Andes (Larson, 38–50). Due to their fiscal weakness and the ability of the merchant elite to avoid both taxation and loans, the Andean state remained dependent on the head tax. Yet the liberal ideology to which these same states ascribed required the abolition of the special judicial and political status of Indians. Indians faced a sort of postfeminist double burden: all their obligations remained, but their traditional rights were constrained. Worse was to come. As the insertion into a new global economy increased the relative value of the land they occupied, the Indians' tribute tax was replaced by wholesale displacement and new forms of market-defined peonage.

Similar contradictions arose in the effort to create new national identities. Castro-Klarén and Thurner, in their respective volumes, describe the historiographical aerobatics of the Peruvian elite in attempting to claim the Inca heritage of magnificent ruins while divorcing it

from the miserable peasants around them.[3] Typical of this paradox was the reaction of the Lima elite to the possible leadership of Andrés de Santa Cruz; he was too much of an Indian to rule the "land of the Incas" (Méndez 207)! Some commentators, such as José Martí, would claim that "our America" began with the Incas, and many intellectuals sought to symbolically appropriate preconquest identities; but conservative critics like Lucas Alamán correctly pointed out to liberals that they could not successfully claim preconquest heritages while maintaining postconquest privileges.

The result was the double world described in many ways by Forment. A lively civil life took place in some associational spheres, but these remained closed to the masses through explicit racial exclusions (Forment, 285). Using Forment's language, Indians were perpetually judged not rational or adult enough to participate in the new societies. In the end, this led the liberal utopian promise of the first half of the century to transform itself into the positivist eugenics of the last half (Larson, 64–65).

Toward a Latin American Theory

How to make sense of this Latin American path toward nationhood? How to integrate this experience better into broader theoretical discussions? These books share not only some substantive agreements but also a concern with how to apply more general social science theories to the specific cases of Latin America. But how to maintain respect for the specificity of the region under the universal claims of any paradigm?

Guerra comes closest to articulating the contradictions involved in using theory as a guide when he first notes that "virtually every step of [Anderson's] argument is false" (*Beyond Imagined Communities*, 5), but then goes on to acknowledge its utility. Adelman and Forment seem more comfortable with their apparent rejection of overtheorizing. The latter is particularly scathing (and moving) in his assault on many of the assumptions of standard theories and the way they have been misused in the region. And yet, both authors clearly rely on their own theoretical maps. Adelman's use of the Hirschmanian progress from voice to exit in his chapter on Spanish secessions is masterful, while Forment clearly takes his Tocqueville seriously.

The relationship between regional studies of Latin America and broader theoretical discussions has a complex history (see Centeno and López-Alves 2001). I believe, however, that the books considered in this review do offer some potentially rich and generalizable insights that can be used in further comparative study.

One of the most important issues already has an estimable intellectual history with aspects of *dependencia*, particularly the work of Fer-

nando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto and of Peter Evans. The Latin American countries entered into their nationhood through the interaction with the global market; this is practically the opposite causal chain experienced in Europe. The Latin American experience can provide an invaluable basis for studying the interaction between economic globalization and state authority and structures. Certainly the regional experience makes one pessimistic about the viability of states largely designed and oriented toward economic integration with an international market. A more specific question might be how that same integrationalist project frustrated a more "organic" development of political authority in the region.

A second area where the marriage of theory and the Latin American experience might prove fruitful is the construction and defense of a racial hegemony. It is remarkable how a relatively small minority was able to retain power, even after the (temporary) arming of subalterns. The independence wars and the subsequent caudillo states did open up opportunities for those without Spanish blood. Why did control over power and arms not translate into a racial revolution? The relative continuity of racial hierarchy after independence seems to be one of the paradoxes of the nineteenth century.

The reading of these works also calls into question the categories we have constructed for the study of the region. The very notion of Latin America is not very useful when comparing the experiences of the two Iberian empires and their successors. Even in Spanish America, the Andean experience was clearly quite different from that of the Southern Cone, not to mention the exceptionalism of Mexico. Mexico's success in creating a national *mestizaje* as the foundation for a sense of nation certainly deserves more comparative study. The Chilean case and its relative success in addressing these challenges also merits further study. More systemic analyses of the commonalities and differences in the continent would certainly be welcome. At the same time, the concept of Latin America might be useful in comparing the region to other parts of the world. We are still waiting for the work that compares the experience of at least some of these countries with states born in nineteenth-century southeastern Europe. The experience of marrying racial binaries with theoretically democratic values calls for at least some comparisons with the postwar U.S. South. Furthermore, the failure of the liberal project on both sides of the Iberian Atlantic during the nineteenth century could use more attention.

Perhaps what is most theoretically interesting about the Latin American case is the historical continuity between the challenges described by these books and the dilemmas facing modern Latin American societies. All of the books describe a continent forever caught between "the intrusive authority of the European metropolis and the explosive discontent of the native masses" (Larson, 35). Reading accounts of the con-

temporary Andes, one cannot help but wonder if anything has changed. Noting continentwide efforts to satisfy both domestic demands and international pressures, it is hard to believe that we have overcome the dilemmas of sovereignty and citizenship.

NOTES

1. The book is an expansion of work done for a broader project that obviously deserves much more attention than it has received; see Salomon and Schwartz 1999.

2. The reading is much improved with an accompanying look at Adelman's *Republic of Capital* (1999).

3. This is a fascinating reversal on the attempts by the English Romantics to link nineteenth-century Greeks to their Athenian predecessors.

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