chappell@princeton.edu

Blogging

• philosophyetc.net
• PEA Soup
• Philosophers' Carnival
• Open Access Philosophy

Favourite Philosophers

• Helen Yetter Chappell
• Jack Spencer
• Michael Smith
• Peter Singer
• Philip Pettit
• Derek Parfit
• David Chalmers

Education

In progress: Ph.D., Princeton University
2006: BA (hons.) first class, Australian National University
2003-5: BA, University of Canterbury

>> full CV [pdf]

Online Papers

>> listed here

Dissertation

According to the Fitting Attitudes analysis of value, we can understand value in terms of desirability or what it is fitting to desire. But we can also raise normative questions about the fittingness of (e.g.) beliefs, emotions, and choices. My dissertation will explore the broader significance of such 'fittingness' evaluations from a consequentialist standpoint. This project has both a normative and a metaethical component. The normative component is to develop and assess the Consequentialist's conception of a morally fitting (or virtuous) agent, thereby responding to several traditional character-based objections to the view. Critics have alleged, for example, that a consequentialist agent would see people as mere value receptacles, be cold and calculating, have 'one thought too many', and be incapable of genuine friendship or other commitments. I aim to rebut these charges. The metaethical component of my project explores how attention to the possible objects of 'fittingness' evaluations can help us to define the scope and limits of normative theorizing, with important implications for how we should formulate consequentialism. In particular, I'll argue that even if we think that what's right is determined by the value facts, we should not go so far as to think that rightness is ontologically reducible to goodness.

>> Dissertation summary (pdf)

Other Research Interests

Beyond my dissertation, I'm interested in consequentialism and moral philosophy more broadly -- especially such questions as what is the good and whether a rational agent must always prefer an impartially better state of affairs. I'm also interested in exploring the prospects for non-naturalist moral realism, especially in light of epistemological objections.

I have secondary interests in bioethics, democratic theory, 'zombies' and consciousness, the metaphysics of modality and time, and personal identity, amongst other things -- some mentioned on my blog.

I think that the connections between metaethics and philosophy of mind warrant further exploration, and find myself sympathetic towards the anti-reductionist arguments found in both areas. (Though eliminativism about normativity seems a more serious alternative than is eliminativism about consciousness!)