

## Calm and Storm in the Pacific:

### International Aid and Trans-Pacific Relations 1900-1931

KIRIHARA Kenshin<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. A birth of the Globe

The United States of America reach from ocean to ocean, and our Territory of Oregon and State of California lie directly opposite to the dominions of your Imperial Majesty. Our steamships can go from California to Japan in eighteen days.

Our great state of California produces about sixty millions of dollars in gold every year, beside silver, quicksilver, precious stones, and many other valuable articles. Japan is also a rich and fertile country, and produces many very valuable articles. Your Imperial Majesty's subjects are skilled in many of the arts. I am desirous that our two countries are should trade with each other, for the benefit both of Japan and the United States.

President of The United States M. Fillmore, 1852.<sup>2</sup>

Japanese people remember that Commander-in-chief of the United States

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<sup>1</sup> Tōhoku University

<sup>2</sup> Millaed Fillmore, 'President of the United States of America, to his Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan.' *Dainihon Komonjo: Bakumatsu Gaikoku Kankē Monjo (The Collection of Historical Documents of Great Japan: The Historical Documents of Foreign Relation in the in the last days of the Tokugawa shogunate)*. 50 vols. (continuing) Ed. The Historiographical Institute the University of Tokyo. vol.1. (the appendix) p.2

Naval Forces in the East India, China, and Japan seas<sup>1</sup> Matthew Calbraith Perry, who commanded the four Kurofune (steamships) which visited Japan in 1853, as a man of merit who contributed to Japan's opening to the world. At that time, most Japanese people save the intelligentsia were surprised at steamships "smoking". What surprised the intelligentsia was that the distance between Japan and California could be covered in only eighteen days.

Needless to say, Naval Forces in *the East India Sea* Admiral Perry's visit to Japan was not across the Pacific but via the Cape of Good Hope. But many Japanese intellectuals who believed that he had gone across the Pacific ceased to think of it as the boundless ocean. At the same time, for AIZAWA Sēshisai (1782 – 1863; the great scholar of the Mito School) who had been proud of "Far East" Japan as the country of Gentleman (Tōhō-Kunshi-koku), the appearance of *a further eastern* rising country meant that his worldview reached an impasse<sup>2</sup>. In this way, the Pacific became a

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<sup>1</sup> The phrase "China, and Japan seas" was added by Perry in a self-serving manner.

<sup>2</sup> The earth lies amid the heavenly firmament, is round in shape, and has no edges. All things exist as nature dictates. Thus, our Divine Realm is at the top of the world. Though not a very large country, it reigns over the Four Quarters because its Imperial Line has never known dynastic change. The Western barbarians represent the thighs, legs, and feet of the universe. This is why they sail hither and yon, indifferent to the distances involved. Moreover, the country they call America is located at the rear end of the world, so its inhabitants are stupid and incompetent. All of this is as nature dictates. (AIZAWA Sēshisai, *Shinron (the New theses)*. Trans. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi. *Anti-foreignism and Western learning in early-modern Japan: the New theses of 1825*. Cambridge, Mass. : Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986

AIZAWA believed that the east was defined as the throne on the earth by important Confucian text "*the I-Ching (The Book of Changes)*". Though he knew America was

junction between East and West. It was literally *a birth of the Globe*.

In 1858 when the first United States Consul General Townsend Harris (1804 - 1878) succeeded in concluding *the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the United States*, Karl Marx (1818 - 1883) foretold the following:

The proper task of bourgeois society is the creation of the world market, at least in outline, and of the production based on that market. Since the world is round, the colonisation '*sic*' of California and Australia and the opening up of China and Japan would seem to have completed this process.<sup>1</sup>

The Pacific as a junction of two progressive powers of *colonization* and *opening up* is thus sometimes called “a puddle<sup>2</sup>”, due to close contact between its two sides. But it has not been a “puddle” at all times. The waters of the Pacific, which provide an important junction for world trade, are sometimes *stormy*, sometimes *calm*, and sometimes *a battle field*. This paper is a study of Trans-Pacific Non-governmental Diplomacy via the history of international humanitarian aid rendered to the earthquake victims of San Francisco and Tōkyō.

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to the east, he thought the fact that it was uncivilized proved it to be not “Far East” but “Far West”.

<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, Letter to Friedrich Engels in Manchester. October 8, 1858. Karl Marx & Frederick Engels. *Collected works*. vols.50. Trans. Richard Dixon...et al. Moscow: Progress, 1975-. Vol.40. p.347  
*MEW* 29-360,DIETZ VERLAG,1963.

<sup>2</sup> The word “the Pacific is a puddle.” is a favorite phrase of UCHIDA Zenichirō (1922 - 2006). He was widely known as the “father of postwar immigration from Japan to the United States”. (‘Nanpū-roku’ Editorial. *Minami-Nippon Shinbun*. April 6, 2006. <http://373news.com/2000syasetu/2006/sya060406.htm>)

## 2. The Great San Francisco earthquake of 1906.

The Great San Francisco earthquake occurred in the gray of morning on April 18, 1906. The earthquake and subsequent fire razed 28,000 buildings and killed at least 452 people. It had two great influences on Japanese society and philosophy.

Firstly, this earthquake led to a qualitative change in Japanese socialism. A prominent socialist called KŌTOKU Shūsui who witnessed the solidarity and autonomous ability of workers in a state of anarchy after the earthquake, opposed parliament democracy as “an extremely childish and naive idea”, and chose instead “direct action” and “anarchism”.

My views of the methods and policy, to be adopted by the socialist movement started to change a little from the time that I went into prison a couple of years ago. Then during my travels [in the United States] last year, they changed dramatically. If I recall how I was a few years back, I get the feeling that I am now almost like a different person.... “A real social revolution cannot possibly be achieved by means of universal suffrage and a parliamentary policy. There is no way to reach our goal of socialism other than by the direct action of the workers, united as one.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> KŌTOKU Shūsui, 1907. *Yo ga Shisō no Henka (The Change in My Thought)*,

It is common knowledge that the anarcho-syndicalism argued by Shusui however came to a tragic end in the Taigyaku Jiken (the incident of high treason) of 1910.

Also this earthquake provided a first instance of *Kokumin-gaikō* (people-to-people diplomacy) as advanced by SHIBUSAWA Ei'ich (1840 - 1931).

“People-to-people diplomacy” is in other words non-government diplomacy. KANEKO Kentarō (1853-1942) who promoted people-to-people diplomacy alongside Shibusawa said:

While the old diplomacy was the relationship between Emperor and Emperor or Foreign Minister and Foreign Minister, the prime mover of diplomacy in the twentieth century is the person-to-person relationship so any ambitious politician has nothing to do.<sup>1</sup>

Kaneko, who had made efforts to conclude the peace treaty with Imperial Russia in 1905, had firsthand experience of a peace conference effectively controlled by American public opinion. Hence he was aware of the need to pay careful attention to the trends of foreign public opinion. He thought that an increase in foreign sympathy

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Compiled by Wm. Theodore de Bary ... [et al.] *Sources of Japanese tradition. 2nd ed.* vols.2. New York : Columbia University Press, 2005 vol.1.

<sup>1</sup> KANEKO Kentarō, 1908. [Mēji] 45-nen Nihon Dai-hakuran-kai (The Address for Japan Exposition in Mēji 45.), *Chuō Ginkō-kai Tsūshin-roku (The Central Banker's Magazine)* No.62. June, 1908.

for Japan was connected directly with Japanese national interests. Kaneko endeavored to establish friendly relations between the United States and Japan alongside his sworn friend Shibusawa.

The Japanese Red Cross made plans to send humanitarian aid to the victims of the Great San Francisco Earthquake, but the dispatch of a hospital ship and other aid was held up because the President Theodore Roosevelt, declined foreign aid. The President's attitude was probably based on the Monroe Doctrine. Finally, the all foreign aid was declined. Although Japanese people withdrew the hospital ship<sup>1</sup>, they never gave up on sending contributions. Of course, one of the reasons for this was humanitarian sympathy<sup>2</sup>, but a more significant reason was to get rid of anti-Japanese sentiment arising from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

When Shibusawa raised contributions for San Francisco, the difficulty that he encountered was lack of understanding. It is said, for example that YASUDA Zenzaburō (1870 – 1930; the head clerk of the Yasuda Combine) said “It is very unusual that the commercial entrepreneur invests money in social work.” Shibusawa criticized such comments harshly and said “It is only natural that entrepreneurs should invest money appropriately in such significant things as public works.” He thought of

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<sup>1</sup> The reason for this cancellation was not only Roosevelt's refusal but also the amount of time needed to rig out and transfer the hospital ships.

<sup>2</sup> One of the reasons was the requital of American people's aid to famine in the Tohoku region (northeast Japan).

the earthquake contribution as an “opportunity to change the minds of American people”<sup>1</sup>. For that purpose, it was necessary to invite generous contribution and have to send it to San Francisco.

While many countries whose contributions had been declined by the Federal Government shifted their aid to immigrants from own country, Japan stuck to contribution toward the American general public. Finally Japan found a way to send aid not to the Federal Government but to the Red Cross of United States and the State of California. This extraordinary method was possible because of the way in which the U.S. States have autonomy. Other countries then sent contributions taking advantage of Japan’s successful method. But the contribution from Japan which Shibusawa and others had endeavored to collect was larger than the total from all the other countries.

(See fig.1)

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<sup>1</sup> TSURUOKA Isaku, 1937. “*San Francisco Dai-Shinsai Kyūsai (The Aid of the Greate Earthquake of San Francisco)*” op. cit. *Denki Shiryō*. Vol.25. p.739-740.




Fig.1. the Foreign Aid Contributions after the San Francisco Earthquake<sup>1</sup>

But the autonomy of individual States which had helped Japan in her aid effort, contributed to her distress arising from exclusion of Japanese students from the San Francisco regular schools.

Half a year after the earthquake, the San Francisco Board of Education ordered that Japanese and Chinese children be excluded from the regular schools and sent to segregated classes to “relieve overcrowding”. However, this explanation is not at all persuasive, because there were less than a hundred Oriental students in the whole school system<sup>2</sup>.

News of the San Francisco action gave rise to an anti-America movement in

<sup>1</sup> Souse: The table of KAGAWA Mari, “*San Francisco ni okeru Nihon-jin Gakudo Kakuri Mondai (The Exclusion of Japanese Students from the San Francisco Public Schools in 1906)*” Ronso-sha, p. 99

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.* Kagawa, p.123



Japan. Japanese newspapers took a critical tone and denounced the Americans as “ungrateful people”. However there was no significant movement for the boycott of American goods, because Japanese business circles thought that labor problems and misunderstandings of Japanese culture were the causes of the anti-Japanese movement. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that there was a deep-rooted racial prejudice — against the “Yellow Peril”, as Wilhelm II had put it — in the background of anti-Japanese sentiment<sup>1</sup>.

The Japanese government demanded a retraction of this racial discrimination policy of the Federal Government. However the State's autonomy which had helped Japan before obstructed her, since the educational policy of the State was a factor of its autonomy. Therefore there were the grounds to criticize the demand of the Japanese government as interference in U.S. domestic affairs. Finally, the Japanese and United States governments bartered a gentlemen's agreement which actively prohibited Japanese immigrants being segregated. Japanese people who realized the limitations of government diplomacy believed firmly in the necessity of people-to-people diplomacy.

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<sup>1</sup> It is not necessary to explain the concept of Yellow Peril in detail. One of the best studies of this issue is thing of HASHIKAWA Bunzō, 1978. *Kōka Monogatari (The Story of the Yellow peril)*. Of course this vague and abstract concept was only one cause of the anti-Japanese movement in San Francisco. If anything, it was merely a plausible *excuse* for anti-Japanese sentiment. KAGAWA Mari points it out that Irish immigrant, who wanted to seize the initiative in the new immigrant society that was San Francisco, cast Japanese immigrants as scapegoats; this having formerly been the role mainly of Chinese immigrants.

### 3 The *remedy* for the “Yellow Peril”

In 1903, famous Japanese novelist and doctor MORI Ōgai delivered a lecture entitled “KŌKARON KŌGAI (A summary of the Concept of the Yellow Peril)” at Waseda University<sup>1</sup>. Political scientist HASHIKAWA Bunzō (1922 - 1983) introduced an interpretation of Ōgai’s lecture on novelist YASUOKA Shōtarō (1920 - ), and then summarized it as follows.

When the issue of the “Yellow Peril” arose, which was based not on reason but on the emotional complex regarding race relations that the white race had shaped over a long time, there was no way to respond except either with a similarly emotionally-charged argument or with silence. However Ōgai chose neither, and therefore his lecture was to do neither harm nor good in the end.<sup>2</sup>

At this point Hashikawa argued that the sole reason why Ōgai’s lecture ended in an anticlimax was his indecisive attitude toward the emotive “Yellow Peril” thought. Moreover, he summarized Yasukawa’s interpretation of Ōgai’s lecture:

Ōgai, who knew that there was a grotesque nonsense which made a person

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<sup>1</sup> The text that he used was Samson Himmelstjerna’s *Die Gelbe Gefahr als Moralproblem (The Yellow Peril as Moral Problem)*, 1902. In the same year, he had another lecture about yellow peril on Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau’s *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines*, 1853. ; MORI Rintaro, 1951 - 1956. *Ogai Zenshu (The complete works of Ogai)* vol.25. IWANAMI Shoten

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. HASHIKAWA Bunzō, 2001. *HASHIKAWA Bunzō Chosakushū (The Selected Works of HASHIKAWA Bunzō)* Chikuma Shobō, pp. 35.

nervous in the “Yellow Peril” thought , was made more nervous by the fact that no-one could negate this thought in any way.<sup>1</sup>

Admittedly, Doctor Ōgai’s *remedy* for the “Yellow Peril” is suitable for a *Man of Resignation*<sup>2</sup>, but it was too hasty a diagnosis. A stronger and more unreasonable storm of “Yellow Peril” thought raged after the Russo-Japanese War. However, SHIBUSAWA Ei’ichi did not choose any *remedy* for this problem, from the 3 options available: ignoring it, resignation to its existence and effects and responding with emotionally-charged argument.

Because he believed firmly that the cause of anti-Japanese sentiment was *misunderstanding*<sup>3</sup> of Japan and Japanese people, he wanted to solve it through mutual understanding which he believed could be brought about by economical and cultural people-to-people diplomacy. Then he realized the mutual visits of the Honorary Commercial Commissioners of Japan and The United States in 1908 and 1909. That was one of his remedies for the “Yellow Peril”. This remedy was related to that fact

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
<sup>1</sup> Ibid. pp. 35 - 36.

<sup>2</sup> MORI Ōgai, 1909. Resignation no Setsu (An essay on Resignation), *MORI Ōgai Zenshu (The complete works of Ōgai)* Chikuma Shobo, 1971.

<sup>3</sup> *Misunderstandings* were common not only in the United States, but also in Japan. SHIBUSAWA himself had *misunderstandings* before his first visit to the United States. I had previously thought that American people are rough and aim to be the greatest in the world in all things, while Japanese people are clever with their fingers. However, I was surprised by the precision machinery industry in this [automobile] factory. This is precisely what Japanese people should study most intently. (SHIBUSAWA Motoji, 1932. “Kyodo wo ai-suru Seen-sense (Mr Seen, who loved his hometown)”, *Denki Shiryō*. Vol.25. p.412)


that he was an entrepreneur, not a demagogic politician or an armchair critic, who managed or had managed<sup>1</sup> businesses and actively contributed to the Japanese economy.

Shibusawa had a confidence in himself which Ōgai could never achieve. It was based on his conviction that the economies of Japan and the United States were in close contact with one another. Fig.2 and fig.3 show total amounts and relative proportions of import and export between Japan and the United States<sup>2</sup>.



<sup>1</sup> After 1909 when he retired from business management, he devoted himself to people-to-people diplomacy and social work.

<sup>2</sup> See the table in KIMURA Masato, 1989. *Non-government Economy Diplomacy of Japan and United States; 1905-1911*. Keio Tsushin. p.134



While there was at times talk of Japanese-American war on both sides of the Pacific, mutual economic dependence was increasing. Especially noteworthy is the export dependence on the United States, which averaged 30% of total Japanese exports. The United States, however, had a serious trade deficit with Japan and this was one cause of anti-Japanese sentiment.

When he met an American businessman who requested that Japan make sincere efforts to see that she does not show a large export surplus in her trade with the United States, he explained the following.

Regarding exports in 1908, there were values of...

1. from Japan to the United States; 130million yen
2. from the United States to Japan; 80million yen

Our most important export good is raw silk. It is also produced in France, China and Italy, and it is low-priced. However, you want us to supply it. Furthermore, although raw silk is processed somewhat, it is nonetheless a raw material. You produce more expensive goods from it, do you not? Therefore I say “We do not get you to buy our goods, but help you to buy them” [a sellers’ market]

Moreover goods are very expensive in the United States, because of high domestic demand. Hence you are idler than other countries in opening up new oversea markets. This is a reason why your goods are high-priced. English or especially German merchants study Eastern languages to help themselves open up new markets, and accordingly their goods are inexpensive. Nevertheless, we continue to buy your goods. So I say “You do not sell your goods, so much as we buy to help you to sell them (a buyers’ market)” I hope you will inquire into my explanation with regard to establishing what was worth listening to.<sup>1</sup>

This was Shibusawa’s lecture delivered in Tokyo Commercial College (the

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<sup>1</sup> SHIBUSAWA Ei’ichi, “Tobe Syokan (My impressions of the United States)” January, 22. 1910, SHIBUSAWA Sēen Kinen Zaidan Ryūmon-sha. *SHIBUSAWA Ei’ichi Denki Shiryō* (*The biographical sources of SHIBUSAWA Ei’ichi*). vol.32. SHIBUSAWA Ei’ichi Denki Shiryō Kankokai. 1955-1971. p.429 - 430 (for short *Denki Shiryō*)

present Hitotsubashi University). According to Shibusawa, exports from Japan were not consumer products but semi-finished goods or raw materials. The finished goods made from these materials brought wealth to the United States.

There was some truth in what he said. But it was a clear problem that the U.S. trade balance was 50 million yen to the detriment of the United States. Because of this very fact, Shibusawa established and joined many Japan-U.S. friendship societies; Nichibē Dōshi-kai (1913; The Comradeship Society of Japan and The United States), Nichibē Kankē-iin-kai (1916; The Commission for Japan-U.S. Relations), Nichbē Yūshi Kyōgi-kai (1920; The Voluntary Conference of Japan and The United States), and so on.

His endeavors for friendly relations between Japan and The United States came to fruition in the aftermath of another great earthquake.

#### 4. The Great Kantō Earthquake Disaster of 1923

Conflagra[t]ion '*sic*' subsequent to severe earthquake at Yokohama at noon today. Whole city practically a blaze with numerous casualties. All traffic stopped.

(The first wireless telegram of the Earthquake<sup>1</sup>)

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<sup>1</sup> From Iwaki wireless station, Fukushima Prefecture, at 11 p.m. of the same day. KDD

The Great Kantō Earthquake Disaster occurred at midday on September 1, 1923. This earthquake and subsequent fire razed 702,000 buildings and killed at least 142,000 people (the number of missing: 43,000 people). Nearly two-thirds of Tōkyō was wiped out in this great conflagration. The people in Karuizawa of Nagano Prefecture, 130 km away from Tōkyō, saw the whole sky aglow all night with fire<sup>1</sup>. Tokyo was burning.

Immediately after the earthquake a lot of countries provided aid. The largest contribution came from the United States, which accounted for above two thirds of the whole (see fig.4). Many American people donated as requital. They remembered the aid rendered to San Francisco by Japan.

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Research Institute. 1995, Nihon no Kokusai Muesn Tsushin Koto-hajime (The Beginning of International Wireless Telegraphy in Japan). “*R & A*” September 1995. p.9. [http://www.kddi-ri.jp/ja/r\\_a/pdf/KDDI-RA-199509.pdf](http://www.kddi-ri.jp/ja/r_a/pdf/KDDI-RA-199509.pdf)

<sup>1</sup> Arthur Morgan Young, 1928. *Japan under Taisho Tenno, 1912-1926*. London: Allen & Unwin. p. 296.






Fig.4. Foreign Contributions following the Great Kantō Earthquake Disaster<sup>1</sup>

The contribution of The United States, which was not merely a huge sum but was also provided swiftly, was praised by many Japanese people. For example, General UGAKI Kazushige (1868 - 1956), who had criticized as hypocrisy the United States' upholding both the "open-door principle" and the Monroe Doctrine, also recorded in his diary:

I heard that the government of the United States sent a telegram of heartfelt sympathy for the natural disaster of September 1st after only 2 days, and in the same time managed to dispatch first-aid teams of the Red Cross, to contribute foods, and detail warships, and that its advance party will arrive at Yokohama on September 7 or 8. The swiftness and sturdiness of that

<sup>1</sup> From the table of Shakai-kyoku, 1926. *Taishō Shinsai-shi (the History of Earthquake Disaster in the Taisho era)*. Naimu-sho Vol.2. p.96-68

government deserves admiration, and I don't know how to express my thanks for its sympathy.<sup>1</sup>

The contribution of the United States made a favorable impression on many Japanese people similar to the sentiment expressed by Ugaki. This was a product of people-to-people diplomacy.

A phrase used by many in the face of the miserable disaster was: “Turn a misfortune into a blessing!” That sentiment was shared by advocates of people-to-people diplomacy. KANEKO Kentarō said that this earthquake was not only a divine punishment for Japanese people, who “pushed their luck” after the great victories of the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars, but also an opportunity to do “Dai-ni no Ishin (the Second Restoration)”<sup>2</sup>. And furthermore, he wanted to encourage a stronger, closer relationship between Japan and The United States. His letter to SHIBUSAWA Ei'ichi said the following about his plans;

- Plans for the restoration of the Capital should be based on the sympathy of American government and people.
- We should import Steel, wood and machines which were need in construction from the United States, as well as excavators and pavement

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<sup>1</sup> UGAKI Kazushige *Nikki (The Diary of UGAKI Kazushige)*. September 6, 1922. vol.1. Misuzu-shobo, 1968-1971. p.446.

<sup>2</sup> Kaneko to SHIBUSAWA Ei'ichi; September 22, 1923. *Denki Shiryō*, vol.40 p.139

machines

(.....)

- Availing ourselves of expression of American sympathy for Japan, we should start a joint enterprise of Japan and The United States.
- Seizing this opportunity, we should improve and strengthen the ties of friendship between Japan and The United States.

It is clear that Kaneko was at great pains to foster a friendly relationship between Japan and The United States. He did not object to providing the American economy with opportunities to benefit from the Tōkyō restoration Project. Approving of Kaneko's plan, Shibusawa actively invited American entrepreneurs to contribute to and invest in Japan. Friendship with The United States was, to Shibusawa, *a blessing*.

Similar perspectives on this disaster existed not only among Japanese but among in Americans. In a letter addressed to Shibusawa, Frank Arthur Vanderlip (1864-1937; Former President of National City Bank, New York) wrote to say:

The loss, it seems to me, is by no means without compensation. It is hard to think that it needed such a disaster as this to arouse a better spirit of fellowship and understanding, but undoubtedly that has been the fact. The contribution which have been made here are of course, small indeed, compared to the needs of the situation, but they carry with them a great deal of

sympathy and an increase in friendly international spirit.

Despite this “friendly international spirit” the fruits of the efforts of individuals such as Shibusawa and Vanderlip were trampled underfoot again. In the very next year, 1924, the Congress of The United States passed *the Immigration Exclusion Act*, completely forbidding all immigration from Japan.

## 5. The Japanese Immigration Exclusion Act

Many Japanese people were very angry with this plainly anti-Japanese legislation. “The trans-pacific bridge”<sup>1</sup> NITOBÉ Inazō (1862-1933; the author of *Bushidō*) provided no exception to anti-America sentiments. He declared that he would never again visit the United States again until the abolition of this Act, and was still angry about it 7 years later:

The repercussion of this legislative act on Japan was profound.... All talk of peace and goodwill is vain, so long as one nation sows in the heart of another the seeds of suspicion and resentment.... In the meantime, Japan’s preparations are for peace and the maintenance of peaceful relations with the rest of the world.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nitobe said that he wanted to be a “The trans-Pacific bridge” at a *viva voce* examination at Tokyo University.

<sup>2</sup> NITOBÉ Inazō Japan. 1931, Ed. *NITOBÉ Inazō Zenshū (The complete works of NITOBÉ Inazō)*. vols.24. 1969-1987. Kyōbun-kan, vol. 14. p. 170-171.

At one time, F. A. Vanderlip said half as a joke at a conference of the Nichibē Yūshi Kyōgi-kai;

There is another Yellow Peril [other than that suggested by German Kaiser] in our country: Yellow Papers. A certain variety of these newspapers ignores the truth, and reports with prejudice, slanders and political ambition. We are ashamed that such newspapers exist in our country.<sup>1</sup>

But those present should have taken careful heed of Vanderlip's joke, because the masses who read the Yellow Papers by preference would be in favor of the Immigration Exclusion Act at a later date. Of course, because the year in which Ortega (Spanish Philosopher; 1883 - 1955) criticized mass society was 1930<sup>2</sup>, it is not reasonable to denounce the members of the Nichibē Yūshi Kyōgi-kai as insensitive to social change.

Resisting the storm of anti-Japanese sentiment, USHIJIMA Kinji (1864-1926; the first president of the Japan Association of America) called on Shibusawa again and again to visit The United States and to appeal to the American society. But Shibusawa could only reply "I can imagine the difficult situation of our compatriots. But as I have no idea how to resolve it, it is difficult to visit the United States" Although he was at a

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<sup>1</sup> As expressed by Vanderlip in Nichibē Yūshi Kyōgi-kai, April 26 - May 1, 1920. *Denki Shiryō*. vol.35. p.369

<sup>2</sup> José Ortega y Gasset, *La rebelión de las masas*. 1930.

loss for ways to improve the lot of his compatriots, he did not resign himself to the situation like Ōgai, or build up anger like Nitobe. He searched for what he could do, and did it. This represents was a cooling off the excitable public sentiment in Japan.

I think that the votes of Congress at this time did not reflect the voice of many American people. I believe it from the bottom of my heart. I want to believe it....therefore it is fruitless to criticize their votes. It might be a pleasure to discuss the matter casually, but only a pleasure. I think that it is somewhat vain to babble drunkenly on the subject....Anyhow, after this it is necessary to rack our brains over people-to-people diplomacy, in order to calm the antagonistic sentiments of both sides.<sup>1</sup>

This is a Shibusawa's speech as carried in "*Jūdai-naru Kekka (Grave Consequences)*" which collected speeches from the Speech Conference on the American Problem held by the Kokumin Shinbun-sha. "Grave Consequences" was a phrase in the letter which the Japanese ambassador to The United States UEHARA Masanao sent to the Secretary of State C. E. Hughes in which he made a strong protest against the Japanese immigration exclusion bill. This phrase was widely interpreted as a "veiled threat" in Congress<sup>2</sup>, and thence also became a slogan in Japan.

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<sup>1</sup> SHIBUSAWA Ei'ichi, Kokumin Gaiko no Toki kitaru (The opportunity of people-to-people diplomacy had come). Minyu-sha, *Jūdai-naru Kekka (Grave Consequences)*. 1924.

<sup>2</sup> MINOHARA Toshihiro, *Hainichi-imin-ho to Nichibe Kanke (The Anti-Japanese*

The writers of these articles were anti-America hawks who were crying out “Grave Consequences” with the exception of Shibusawa and KANEKO Kentarō, who continued to argue for the friendship of Japan and the United States. The existence of these two was the salvation of this collection of these chauvinistic articles.

There was no relation between the thought of that German Emperor who railed against a “Yellow Peril” and the workers who supported anti-Japanese sentiment. But when the discourse of “Yellow Peril” was expounded excitingly, this led to a storm of unreason regarding Japanese immigration rising above the historical context. This is why L. Althusser (1918 - 90) said “The ideology...does not have history *with it*.”<sup>1</sup>

Against this storm of unreasonable, Shibusawa protested reasonably. He was inaugurated as the President of the Institute of Pacific Relations (1925), and then built the monument to T. Harris in Shimoda, Shizuoka Prefecture and orchestrated the exchange of Doll Ambassadors (1927). He held many welcome and farewell parties for exchange professors, and so on. He put all his energies into the encouragement of friendship between Japan and the United States for the rest of his life.

However after the end of his life in 1931, those who had been called “Yellow Peril” decided to become the “Yellow Peril” of not merely the white race but also the

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*Immigration Exclusion Act and the Relation between Japan and the United States*) 2002.

<sup>1</sup> Louis Althusser ‘Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’Etat’ (1970) *POSITIONS*. Edition Sociales 1976. p. 100.

yellow race. The Pacific and surrounding area became a *battlefield*.

## 6. Concluding remarks

*“The U.S.-Japan partnership stands as one of the most accomplished bilateral relationships in history”*, the heads of these countries have agreed<sup>1</sup>. However (or therefore) when we examine other bilateral relationships, we can find less good relations than those enjoyed by Japan and the United States.; for example *East Asia, the Middle East, or South America* etc. It is undeniable that one of the reasons for poor relationships is simple mutual misunderstanding. International or cultural misunderstanding is difficult to dispel by governmental diplomacy. We should once again accept the necessity of the people-to-people diplomacy regarding issue of culture and economy that Shibusawa endeavored to establish.

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<sup>1</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting: The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century* (June 29, 2006).