

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Dilip Abreu

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EDUCATION: Elphinstone College, Bombay University
B.A. Economics/Statistics, 1975

Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University
M.A. Economics/Econometrics, 1978

Balliol College, Oxford University
M. Phil. Economics/Mathematical Economics, 1980

Princeton University
Ph.D. 1983. Thesis: "Repeated Games with Discounting: A General Theory and an Application to Oligopoly"

EMPLOYMENT: Assistant/Associate Professor
Department of Economics, Harvard University
1984-1990

Professor
Department of Economics, Princeton University
1990-1995

Professor
Department of Economics, Yale University
1995-1997

Professor
(Edward E. Matthews, Class of 1953, Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics)
Department of Economics, Princeton University
1997-present

PROFESSIONAL
HONORS:

Sloan Foundation Fellowship, 1988-1990

Fellow of the Econometric Society, elected 1991.

Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, elected 2001.

Council Member of the Econometric Society, 2003-2008

Member of the Council of the Game Theory Society (GTS), 2011-2014.

Economic Theory Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Elected, 2013.

FELLOWSHIPS:

Post-Doctoral Fellow, Institute for Mathematics and its Applications, University of Minnesota, Fall 1983

Post-Doctoral Fellow, Mathematical Sciences Research Institute University of California, Berkeley, Fall 1985

National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1989-1990

Visiting Fellow, Russell Sage Foundation, N.Y., 1994-1995

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Repeated Games with Discounting: A General Theory and an Application to Oligopoly," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1983.

"On the Inconsistency of Certain Axioms on Solution Concepts for Non-Cooperative Games," (with D. Pearce), *Journal of Economic Theory*, October 1984.

"Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames," *Journal of Economic Theory*, June 1986.

"Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring," (with D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti), *Journal of Economic Theory*, June 1986.

"On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," *Econometrica*, March 1988.

"The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," (with A. Rubinstein), *Econometrica*, November 1988.

"Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition," (with A. Sen) *Journal of Economic Theory*, April 1990.

"Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," (with D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti), *Econometrica*, September 1990.

"Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium" (with A. Sen), *Econometrica*, July 1991.

"A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games," (with D. Pearce), in *Game Equilibrium Models*, ed. R. Selten, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1991.

"Information and Timing in Repeated Partnership," (with P. Milgrom and D. Pearce), *Econometrica*, November 1991.

"Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," (with H. Matsushima), *Econometrica*, September 1992.

"A Response to Glazer and Rosenthal," (with Hitoshi Matsushima), *Econometrica*, November 1992.

- "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information," (with H. Matsushima), 1992, mimeo.
- "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," (with D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti), *Journal of Economic Theory*, August 1993.
- "Exact Implementation," (with H. Matsushima), 1994, *Journal of Economic Theory* 64, No. 1.
- "The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games: a NEU Condition," (with P.K. Dutta and Lones Smith), 1994, *Econometrica* 62, No. 4.
- "Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies" in *Economics in a Changing World: Microeconomics* (1997), Vol. 2, Beth Allen (ed.), New York: Saint-Martin's Press, Inc.
- "Bargaining and Reputation" (with F. Gul), *Econometrica* January 2000.
- "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," (with D. Pearce), September 2002.
- "Synchronization Risk and Delayed Arbitrage," (with M. Brunnermeier), *Journal of Financial Economics*, December 2002.
- "Evolutionary Stability in a Reputational Model of Bargaining," (with R. Sethi), *Games and Economic Behavior*, August 2003.
- "Bubbles and Crashes," (with M. Brunnermeier), 2003 *Econometrica*, 71(1).
- "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," (with D. Pearce), November 2003.
- "Self-Enforcing Cooperation with Graduated Punishments" (with Douglas Bernheim and Avinash Dixit) mimeo, July 2005.
- "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts" (with D. Pearce), May 2007 *Econometrica*.
- "Bargaining and Efficiency in Networks" (with M. Manea), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2012
- "Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks" (with M. Manea), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 2012.

“Implementing the Nash Program for Stochastic Games,” (with D. Pearce), ETC WP 2013.

“An Algorithm for Two-Player repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring” (with Y. Sannikov), *Theoretical Economics* Vol.9, Issue 2 (2014)

“A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Threats” (with D. Pearce), *Econometrica* 83 : 4 (2015)

“One Sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining” (with D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti), *Theoretical Economics* Vol.10, Issue 3 (2015)

“Bubbles and Crashes” in *Development in India: Micro and Macro Perspectives*, edited by **S. Mahendra Dev and P.G. Babu**, Springer, 2015

“A ‘Pencil-Sharpening’ Algorithm for Two-Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring” (with B. Brooks and Y. Sannikov), February 2016.