Some
articles require access to JStor.
Papers are grouped under the topics of Inefficient
markets, Bargaining, Implementation and Repeated games.
“Bubbles
and crashes”, with Markus K.
Brunnermeier, Econometrica,
2003, 71(1), 173-204.
“Synchronization
Risk and Delayed Arbitrage”, with Markus
K. Brunnermeier; Journal of
Financial Economics, 2002, 66, 341-360.
“Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in
Repeated Games with Contracts”, with
David G. Pearce,
Econometrica 2007.
“A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with
Endogenous Types”, with David G. Pearce. November, 2003.
“Bargaining, Reputation
and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce. September, 2002.
“Evolutionary Stability
in a Reputational Model of Bargaining”, with Rajiv Sethi. January, 2001.
“Bargaining
and Reputation”, with Faruk Gul,
Econometrica,
68(1), January 2000, 85-117.
“Virtual Implementation in
Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete
Information”, with Hitoshi
Matsushima, mimeo, August 1992.
Link to mimeo.
“Exact
Implementation”, with Hitoshi
Matsushima, Journal of
economic theory, 64(1), October 1994, 1-19.
“Virtual
Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies:
Complete Information”, with Hitoshi
Matsushima, Econometrica,
60(5), September 1992, 993-1008.
“A
Response to Glazer and Rosenthal”, with Hitoshi
Matsushima, Econometrica,
60(6), November 1992, 1439-1442 (in Notes and Comments).
“Virtual
Implementation in Nash Equilibrium”, with Arunava
Sen, Econometrica,
59(4), July 1991, 997-1021.
“Subgame
Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition”, with Arunava Sen, Journal of economic theory,
50(2), April 1990, 285-299.
“Bargaining, Reputation
and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce. September, 2000.
“A Perspective on Renegotiation
in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce, in Game
equilibrium models, R. Selten (ed.), Berlin,
Springer Verlag, 1991. Link
to mimeo.
“The
Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition”,
with Prajit
K. Dutta and Lones
Smith, Econometrica,
62(4), July 1994, 939-948 (in Notes and Comments).
“Renegotiation
and Symmetry in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti,
Journal of economic theory,
60(2), August 1993, 217-240.
“Information
and Timing in Repeated Partnerships”, with Paul Milgrom
and David G. Pearce,
Econometrica,
59(6), November 1991, 1713-1733.
“Toward
a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti,
Econometrica,
58(5), September 1990, 1041-1063.
“The
Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata”, with
Ariel Rubinstein, Econometrica,
56(6), November 1988, 1259-1281.
“On
the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting”, Econometrica,
56(2), March 1988, 383-396.
“Extremal
Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames”,
Journal of economic theory,
June 1986.
“Optimal
Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti,
Journal of economic theory,
39(1), 1986.