Some
articles require access to JStor. Papers
are grouped under the topics of Inefficient markets, Bargaining, Implementation
and Repeated games.
Ř
“Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in
Repeated Games with Contracts”, with
David G. Pearce,
December, 2006.
Earlier
title: “Reputational
Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures”
“Bubbles
and crashes”, with Markus K.
Brunnermeier, Econometrica,
2003, 71(1), 173-204.
“Synchronization
Risk and Delayed Arbitrage”, with Markus
K. Brunnermeier; Journal of
Financial Economics, 2002, 66, 341-360.
“Reputational
Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures”, with David G. Pearce.
October, 2005.
“A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with
Endogenous Types”, with David G. Pearce.
November, 2003.
“Bargaining, Reputation
and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce.
September, 2002.
“Evolutionary Stability
in a Reputational Model of Bargaining”, with Rajiv Sethi. January, 2001.
“Bargaining
and Reputation”, with Faruk Gul,
Econometrica,
68(1), January 2000, 85-117.
“Virtual
Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information”,
with Hitoshi
Matsushima, mimeo, August 1992. Link to mimeo.
“Exact
Implementation”, with Hitoshi
Matsushima, Journal of
economic theory, 64(1), October 1994, 1-19.
“Virtual
Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information”,
with Hitoshi
Matsushima, Econometrica,
60(5), September 1992, 993-1008.
“A
Response to Glazer and Rosenthal”, with Hitoshi
Matsushima, Econometrica,
60(6), November 1992, 1439-1442 (in Notes and Comments).
“Virtual
Implementation in Nash Equilibrium”, with Arunava Sen, Econometrica,
59(4), July 1991, 997-1021.
“Subgame
Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition”, with
Arunava Sen, Journal of economic
theory, 50(2), April 1990, 285-299.
“Bargaining, Reputation
and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce.
September, 2000.
“A
Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce, in Game
equilibrium models, R. Selten (ed.), Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1991. Link
to mimeo.
“The
Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition”, with Prajit K. Dutta and Lones Smith, Econometrica,
62(4), July 1994, 939-948 (in Notes and Comments).
“Renegotiation
and Symmetry in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, Journal of economic theory,
60(2), August 1993, 217-240.
“Information
and Timing in Repeated Partnerships”, with Paul Milgrom and David G. Pearce, Econometrica,
59(6), November 1991, 1713-1733.
“Toward
a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, Econometrica,
58(5), September 1990, 1041-1063.
“The
Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata”, with
Ariel Rubinstein, Econometrica,
56(6), November 1988, 1259-1281.
“On
the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting”, Econometrica,
56(2), March 1988, 383-396.
“Extremal
Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames”, Journal of economic theory,
June 1986.
“Optimal
Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, Journal of economic theory,
39(1), 1986.