The end of the cold war is arguably the most momentous event in international politics since the end of World War II and the dawn of the atomic age. Paraphrasing John F. Kennedy on the advent of nuclear weapons, one scholar sees the end of the cold war as changing "all the answers and all the questions."1 Another scholar, however, denies that there have been any "fundamental changes in the nature of international politics since World War II" and asserts that states will have to worry as much about military security as they did during the cold war (Mearsheimer, in Allison and Treverton, 214, 235). Most of the fifty or so authors whose work appears in the books reviewed here take the more moderate position that the end of the cold war changes some of the questions and some of the answers, but they disagree over which questions and answers are at issue.

* The author would like to thank the following scholars for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this review article: Richard Betts, Robert O. Keohane, Edward A. Kolodziej, Robert Jervis, Edward Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, Jack Snyder, and Oran Young.

Despite the disparity of views among the authors, three themes emerge. First, military power has declined in importance in international politics. For some this means that military threats are less prevalent, while for others it means that military force is less useful as a tool of statecraft. Second, there is a need to reexamine the way we think about international relations and national security. For some this need stems from the changed circumstances of the post-cold war world; for others it grows out of the collective failure of scholars to anticipate either the timing or the nature of the end of the cold war. And third, there is a need for a broader view of national security (see especially the essays by Schelling and Peterson, in Allison and Treverton). For some this means including domestic problems on the national security agenda; for others it means treating nonmilitary external threats to national well-being as security issues.

Each of these books raises fundamental questions about the theories, concepts, and assumptions used to analyze security during the cold war and about those that should be used now, in its aftermath. This review in turn seeks to lay the intellectual groundwork for a reexamination of security studies as a subfield of international relations.

The discussion is presented in three parts. The first surveys the emergence and evolution of security studies as a subfield of international relations. It suggests that scholars who wrote on national security at the beginning of the cold war had a broader and more useful approach to the topic than those writing at its end. The second part assesses the relevance of security studies to the new world order. It argues that the field's treatments of the goal of security, the means for pursuing it, and the domestic dimensions of security raise serious questions about its ability to cope with the post-cold war world. And the third part reviews proposals for the future study of security; these range from holding to the status quo to abolishing the subfield and reintegrating it with the study of international politics and foreign policy. It suggests that a strong case can be made for reintegration.

See especially the contributions by Ernest R. May, Raymond L. Garthoff, and Robert Jervis in Hogan; the essays by Peter G. Peterson, Gregory F. Treverton, and Barbara A. Bicksler in Allison and Treverton; and Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War*.

See especially the contributions by Ronald Steel and Robert Jervis in Hogan; Gaddis; and most of the essays in Allison and Treverton.

In order to make the subject manageable, this review article focuses on security studies in the United States. This should not be interpreted as implying that important work was not done in other parts of the world.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY STUDIES

It has become a commonplace to associate the origins of security studies with the twin stimuli of nuclear weaponry and the cold war. This approach, however, can easily give the misleading impression that security studies was created ex nihilo sometime between 1945 and 1955. Before one can understand the impact of the cold war on thinking about national security, one must first examine the pre–cold war scholarship on the subject. Was there simply a void to be filled because no one had been studying national security or war? Were existing approaches to the study of foreign policy and international politics too narrow and rigid to accommodate students of the cold war? It will be argued that each of these questions should be answered in the negative. Indeed, in many ways the study of national security grew more narrow and rigid during the cold war than it had been before.

THE INTERWAR PERIOD

If security studies is defined as the study of the nature, causes, effects, and prevention of war, the period between the First and Second World Wars was not the intellectual vacuum it is often thought to be. During this period international relations scholars believed that democracy, international understanding, arbitration, national self-determination, disarmament, and collective security were the most important ways to promote international peace and security. They therefore tended to emphasize international law and organization rather than military force. Quincy Wright’s *Study of War*, published in 1942, was far more than a single book by a single author. It was the culmination of a major research project dating from 1926, a project that spawned numerous studies by such scholars as William T. R. Fox, Bernard Brodie, Harold Lasswell, Eugene Staley, Jacob Viner, Vernon Van Dyke, and many others. In an appendix entitled “Co-operative Research on War,” Wright describes numerous scholarly research projects on aspects of

---


war conducted by various groups during the interwar period. Fifty years later *A Study of War* still stands as the most thorough and comprehensive treatise on war in any language. It inspires awe in its coverage of the legal, moral, economic, political, biological, psychological, historical, sociological, anthropological, technological, and philosophical aspects of war.

For Wright, war was primarily a problem to be solved, a disease to be cured, rather than an instrument of statecraft. The book was, according to Fox, “as notable for its inattention to problems of national strategy and national security as for its dispassionate portrayal of war as a malfunction of the international system.” Except for a few scholars, such as Frederick Sherwood Dunn, Nicholas J. Spykman, Arnold Wolfers, Edward Mead Earle, and Harold and Margaret Sprout, the study of military force as an instrument of statecraft for promoting national security tended to be neglected. This was the crucial difference between security studies before and after 1940.

All of this changed rapidly with the onset of World War II, when “national security became a central concern of international relationists of widely different persuasions. For all of them, moreover, it called for explicit consideration of force as it related to policy in conflicts among first-ranking nation-states.” By 1941 a course on war and national policy, designed by Grayson Kirk, John Herz, Bernard Brodie, Felix Gilbert, Alfred Vagts, and others was being taught at Columbia University; and similar courses were developed during the war at Princeton, the University of North Carolina, Northwestern, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale. A book of readings developed for such courses was nearly eight hundred pages long.

---

9 Ibid., 237–38.
THE FIRST POSTWAR DECADE

Later chroniclers of the history of security studies have suggested that there was little academic interest in security studies until the mid-1950s, when it was sparked by concern about the doctrine of massive retaliation.\(^{12}\) Although it is true that national security was treated within the broader framework of international relations and foreign policy, it is not true that questions of the security of the nation were ignored. By 1954 a rich literature on national security affairs was available to anyone wishing to design courses or do research.\(^{13}\) It was, as Fox observed, "to be expected that fifteen years of world war and postwar tension, with national security problems continually at the center of public and governmental interest, would shape the research activities of social scientists generally."\(^{14}\)

It is difficult to make the case that the first decade after World War II was a period in which civilian intellectuals evinced little interest in national security. To the contrary, it is more accurately described as the most creative and exciting period in the entire history of security studies. Numerous courses on international politics and foreign policy were added to college curricula during this period.\(^{15}\) Two major graduate schools devoted entirely to international affairs were founded—the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins and the School of International Affairs at Columbia University. Also founded during this period were *International Organization* (1947) and *World Politics* (1948), two major professional journals, both of which published articles on national security. In addition, there were at least three strong research centers focusing on national security: the Yale Institute of International Studies had emphasized national security policy since the 1930s and continued to do so after it moved to Princeton and became the Center of International Studies in 1951. At Columbia, Grayson Kirk encouraged the study of military force and national policy, and the Institute of War and Peace Studies was established in 1951. And at the University of Chicago the strong foundations laid by Quincy Wright were strengthened when Hans Morgenthau joined the faculty in 1943. The Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy

\(^{12}\) E.g., Smoke (fn. 5), 275–87; Lyons and Morton (fn. 5); and Marc Trachtenberg, "Strategic Thought in America, 1952–1966," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Summer 1989).

\(^{13}\) For a sampling of this literature, see William T. R. Fox, "Civil-Military Relations Research: The SSRC Committee and Its Research Survey," *World Politics* 6 (January 1954).

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 279.

was established under his direction in 1950. And in 1952 the Social Science Research Council established a committee on National Security Research, chaired by Fox.\(^\text{16}\)

During the period 1945–55 scholars were well aware of military instruments of statecraft, but security studies was not yet as preoccupied with nuclear weaponry and deterrence as it would become later on. Although no single research question dominated the field, four themes recurred. First, security was viewed not as the primary goal of all states at all times but rather as one among several values, the relative importance of which varied from one state to another and from one historical context to another. Brodie described security as “a derivative value, being meaningful only in so far as it promotes and maintains other values which have been or are being realized and are thought worth securing, though in proportion to the magnitude of the threat it may displace all others in primacy.”\(^\text{17}\) This view focused attention on the trade-offs between military security and other values, such as economic welfare, economic stability, and individual freedom. Second, national security was viewed as a goal to be pursued by both nonmilitary and military techniques of statecraft. Warnings against overreliance on armaments were common. Third, awareness of the security dilemma often led to emphasis on caution and prudence with respect to military policy. And fourth, much attention was devoted to the relationship between national security and domestic affairs, such as the economy, civil liberties, and democratic political processes.\(^\text{18}\)

The question then is not why there was so little interest in security studies in the decade after World War II but rather why later descriptions of the evolution of the field have been so blind to the work of scholars prior to 1955. It is as if the field came to be so narrowly defined in later years that the questions addressed during these early years were no longer considered to belong to the field of security studies.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{16}\) For details on the teaching and research programs at Yale, Princeton, Columbia, and Chicago during this period, see Lyons and Morton (fn. 5), 127–44; and William T. R. Fox, “Frederick Sherwood Dunn and the American Study of International Relations,” *World Politics* 15 (October 1962). The SSRC Committee was originally called the Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research, but this was later changed to the Committee on National Security Policy Research.


\(^{19}\) Two recent reviews of the evolution of security studies ignore or make only passing reference to the contributions of such major figures as Wright, Wolfers, Fox, the Sprouts, Dunn, Lasswell, Earle, and Spykman. Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quar-
Since many of the authors of the books under review subscribe to a broader view, this is unfortunate. Many current problems are related to those addressed in the period 1945–55, for example, the trade-offs among foreign policy objectives, the trade-offs between foreign affairs and domestic affairs, and the trade-offs between nonmilitary and military policy instruments.

THE "GOLDEN AGE"

The second decade after World War II, 1955–65, has been described as the "golden age" of security studies. Unlike the previous decade, the "golden age" was dominated by nuclear weaponry and related concerns, such as arms control and limited war. The central question, according to one reviewer, "was straightforward: how could states use weapons of mass destruction as instruments of policy, given the risk of any nuclear exchange?" This question, it should be noted, represented a shift in focus from the previous decade. Whereas earlier research questions considered what security is, how important it is relative to other goals, and the means by which it should be pursued, the new focus was on how to use a particular set of weapons. Contributors to this literature included Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, William W. Kaufmann, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger, and others.

Although deterrence theory, one of the most impressive intellectual achievements in the history of the study of international relations, was a product of the "golden age," the period also had its many blind spots. Even scholars who define security studies in terms of military force have noted the tendency during that period to overemphasize the military aspects of national security at the expense of historical, psychological, cultural, organizational, and political contexts. Edward A. Kolodziej evidently has this period in mind when he observes that "a
focus on threat manipulation and force projections became the central, almost exclusive, concern of security studies.” This agenda, he notes, “was certainly urgent and ample, but the questions raised were inevitably circumscribed, technical, and managerial.”

THE DECLINE

If the cold war stimulated and nourished security studies before 1965, the decreased salience of the cold war during the next fifteen years contributed to a period of decline. As Americans turned their interest from the cold war with the Soviet Union to the hot war in Vietnam, their interest in security studies waned. Although some might view this as an irrational reaction on the part of those who thought they could stop war by not studying it, this would be an oversimplification. In the first place, security studies had been so preoccupied with U.S.-Soviet relations, NATO, and nuclear strategy that it offered little help to those seeking to understand the Vietnam War. As Colin Gray put it, the leading strategists knew “next to nothing” about “peasant nationalism in Southeast Asia or about the mechanics of a counterrevolutionary war.” Second, security studies had become so preoccupied with war as an instrument of national policy that it had slighted the legal, moral, and other aspects of war emphasized in Wright’s *A Study of War*. Third, the desire to be “policy relevant” had led some scholars into such close relationships with policymakers that they ceased to be perceived as autonomous intellectuals and came to be considered instead as part of the policy-making establishment. And fourth, the decline of interest in traditional security studies was partially offset by increased interest in peace studies and peace research during the 1960s and 1970s, thus indicating that declining interest in security studies was not tantamount to a lack of intellectual interest in war.

Interest in security studies did not revive immediately after the Vietnam War; rather the lessened cold war tensions associated with détente allowed other issues, such as economic interdependence, Third World poverty, and environmental issues, to increase in salience. And the Arab oil embargo served as a sharp reminder that threats to the American way of life emanated from nonmilitary sources, as well as from military ones.

---


25 Walt (fn. 19), 215; Smoke (fn. 5), 303–4; Nye and Lynn-Jones (fn. 5), 9; and Trachtenberg (fn. 12), 332.

26 Gray (fn. 20), 90. See also Smoke (fn. 5), 304–5.

THE 1980S

The breakdown of détente and the renewal of cold war tensions in the late 1970s and 1980s once again stimulated interest in security studies. Student interest was rekindled, foundation money poured in, and research burgeoned, as the old national security studies was replaced by the new international security studies.

The new international security studies, however, looked much like the version of national security studies that had evolved after 1955. One writer, who had written a comprehensive survey of the field in 1975, noted the renaming of the field and observed that "the substance of the problems addressed did not change markedly from what national security specialists had been working on earlier." 28 Another writer proclaimed the rejuvenation of security studies in the 1980s as the "renaissance" of the field. Defining the field as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force," he portrayed the renaissance as bringing history, psychology, and organization theory to bear on such familiar topics as deterrence theory and nuclear weapons policy and consideration of such topics as the conventional military balance, the danger of surprise attack, alternative force postures, and the role of the U.S. Navy. 29 Although there were undoubtedly new insights during the 1980s, such topics continued to reflect the preoccupation that had characterized the field since 1955—the use of military means to meet military threats. It is small wonder that a European security specialist, noting the military focus of strategic studies, recently observed that "in the United States the field of international security studies has often been equated with strategic studies." 30 The cold war not only militarized American security policy, it also militarized the study of security. 31

In sum, a case can be made that the origins of security studies predate the cold war, nuclear weaponry, and the so-called golden age. The

29 Walt (fn. 19). Walt also portrays the "renaissance" as characterized by a commitment to more rigorous scholarly standards. Although he notes that much work on security topics fails to meet basic scholarly standards and "should be viewed as propaganda rather than serious scholarship," he concentrates his review of the field on works that do "meet the standards of logic and evidence in the social sciences" (p. 213). He concludes, not surprisingly, that the field is doing quite well by social science standards. For a cogent critique of Walt's view of security studies, see Edward A. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" International Studies Quarterly 36 (December 1992).
30 Haftendorn (fn. 19).
31 On the militarization of American security policy, see the essays by Allison and Treverton, Peterson, and Treverton and Bicksler, in Allison and Treverton; the essay by May in Hogan; and Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8 (Summer 1983).
The purpose of such an exercise is not just to set the record straight; it is also a way of placing the study of security during the cold war in perspective. The cold war permeated thinking about security for so long that it will be very difficult to break free from old habits of thought.

The cold war affected both the level of activity and the substantive focus of research on security. It focused attention on nuclear weaponry and strategies, on East-West relations, and on the security problems of the United States and Western Europe. At the beginning of the cold war, scholars operating within the broader framework of foreign policy studies and international politics considered national security as one of several important foreign policy goals, with important domestic dimensions and implications, to be pursued by nonmilitary as well as military means. During the cold war the primacy of national security, defined largely in military terms, came to be viewed more as a premise than as a topic for debate. Similarly, military instruments of statecraft became the central, if not the exclusive, concern of security specialists.

The question now is whether security studies so conceived is adequate for coping with post–cold war security problems.

II. Security Studies and the New World Order

During the cold war military threats to national security dominated all others in the eyes of most security specialists. With the end of the cold war have come numerous suggestions that resources once devoted to coping with military threats now be used to deal with such nonmilitary threats as domestic poverty, educational crises, industrial competitiveness, drug trafficking, crime, international migration, environmental hazards, resource shortages, global poverty, and so on. The challenge, according to the Final Report of the Seventy-ninth American Assembly, is to “rethink the concept of national security” (Allison and Treverton, 446–47). Is the field of security studies capable of meeting this challenge? A tentative answer is suggested by examining the field with respect to three critical issues: the goal of national security, the means for pursuing it, and the relation between domestic affairs and national security.

Security as a Goal

The end of the cold war, like its beginning, raises the question of how important military security is in comparison with other goals of public

policy. Although security specialists have become accustomed to thinking in terms of trade-offs within the military sphere, such as that between missiles and submarines, they have been reluctant to extend that logic to trade-offs between military security and nonmilitary policy goals. Instead, they have tended to assert the primacy of military security over other goals. The following three passages are examples of this tendency.

In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power.  

The axiom of the primacy of national security among the responsibilities of government cannot be escaped. . . . Governments, as a matter of empirical fact, almost invariably commit as many resources and sacrifice as many other desiderata as they feel necessary to preserve their national security.

States are surely concerned about prosperity, and thus economic calculations are not trivial for them. However, states operate in both an international political environment and an international economic environment, and the former dominates the latter in cases where the two come into conflict. The reason is straightforward: the international political system is anarchic, which means that each state must always be concerned to ensure its own survival. A state can have no higher goal than survival, since profits matter little when the enemy is occupying your country and slaughtering your citizens. (Mearsheimer, in Allison and Treverton, 222)

Each of these passages can be interpreted in (at least) two ways. On the one hand, since neither national security nor survival can ever be completely assured, there can be no limit on resources allocated to this purpose; and thus no trade-offs with other goals are ever admissible. On the other hand, the passages may be interpreted as implying that such trade-offs are admissible only after a minimum threshold of assurance of survival and/or national security has been attained. The latter, somewhat generous interpretation is surely the more defensible.

The trouble with the second interpretation is that it fails to distinguish between the goal of national security (or survival) and other important goals. For example, the economist could assert the primacy of economic welfare, since states are likely to worry little about external military threats if their citizens have no food, clothing, or shelter, that is, no economic welfare. Likewise, the environmentalist could assert the primacy of environmental concerns, since minimum amounts of

34 Smoke (fn. 5), 248; emphasis in original.
35 This is not to suggest that the authors of these passages actually advocate unlimited defense spending. The relevant question is whether the logic of such passages provides any justification for a limit.
breathable air and drinkable water are more important than security from external attack. In order to survive, states need minimum amounts not only of security from external attack but also of breathable air, drinkable water, economic welfare, and so forth. A state without armed forces to protect it from external attack may not survive, but a state without breathable air or drinkable water will surely not survive.

Of course, as King Midas learned, the value of anything—security, economic welfare, clean air—is determined not only by one's preferences but also by how much of it one has. The law of diminishing marginal utility is as applicable to national security affairs as it is to other spheres of social life. Although it is true that military security is an important goal of states, it is not true that conflicts with other goals of public policy will always—or should always—be resolved in favor of security. In a world of scarce resources, the goal of military security is always in conflict with other goals, such as economic welfare, environmental protection, and social welfare. This is just another way of saying that the pursuit of security involves opportunity costs—as does any other human action. A rational policymaker will allocate resources to security only as long as the marginal return from a dollar spent on an additional increment of security is greater than that for a dollar spent on other goals.

In order to justify shifting resources from guns to butter, one need not argue that butter is inherently superior to guns or that butter provides more total utility to society than guns. It is only necessary to argue that the marginal utility of an expenditure on butter exceeds that of the marginal utility of that same expenditure on guns. A rational policymaker cannot escape the necessity of comparing the value of an increment of security with an increment of other goals at the margin. The law of diminishing marginal utility suggests that the more abundant security is, the less valuable it is likely to be at the margin. Those, including many of the writers reviewed here, who believe that the end of the cold war has made military security more abundant are therefore likely to suggest that the time has come to shift resources from security to other goals of public policy.

If *Rethinking American Security* is an accurate indicator, public policy

---

36 Even conceiving of security as a matter of degree seems to be difficult for some security specialists. See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991). Buzan asserts that the “word itself implies an absolute condition . . . and does not lend itself to the idea of a graded spectrum like that which fills the space between hot and cold” (p. 18). And Klaus Knorr notes that his treatment of security threats as matters of degree “causes a lot of conceptual uneasiness” for other scholars. Knorr, “Economic Interdependence and National Security,” in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., *Economic Issues and National Security* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 18n.
debates in the post–cold war world are likely to be increasingly concerned with trade-offs between military security and other public policy goals. An earlier generation of scholars, writing within the framework of foreign policy and international politics during the first decade after World War II, viewed the goal of military security as one of many public policy goals competing for scarce resources and subject to the law of diminishing marginal utility.\(^{37}\) Many of their writings are more relevant to the post–cold war world than are those of more recent writers who assert the primacy of the goal of national security. To the extent that today’s security specialists cling to the idea that security dominates all other public policy goals, they are unlikely to make helpful contributions to the post–cold war debate on public policy.

MEANS TO SECURITY

Security studies has traditionally devoted less attention to the goal of security than to the means by which it is pursued. More accurately, one should say that the field has tended to focus on one set of means by which security may be pursued, that is, military statecraft. One recent review of the field, for example, ignores security as a goal and defines the field entirely in terms of means, that is, “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.”\(^{38}\) Likewise, Shultz, Godson, and Greenwood focus their volume on “the traditional and historical essence of the subject: the threat, use and management of military force” (p. 2).\(^{39}\)

The reasons for the emphasis on means rather than ends are not self-evident. A partial explanation for the emphasis on military force may be found in the common practice of equating security interests with “vital interests.” Since the latter are typically defined as those interests for which a country is willing to use force, some confusion between means and ends is almost inevitable.\(^{40}\) Another possible explanation is

\(^{37}\) E.g., Dunn (fn. 18); Wolfers (fn. 18); Lasswell (fn. 18); and Brodie (fn. 17, 18). Defense economists, of course, have usually shared this view. Their voices, however, were more salient in security studies during the “golden age” than during the 1980s. See Charles J. Hitch, “National Security Policy as a Field for Economics Research,” World Politics 12 (April 1960); Charles J. Hitch and Roland Mckean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and James R. Schlesinger, The Political Economy of National Security (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960). Walt’s (fn. 19) recent review, for example, pays scant attention to the views of defense economists.

\(^{38}\) Walt (fn. 19), 212; emphasis in original. Walt’s definition of the field is puzzling, since he had criticized the tendency to define security solely in military terms in an earlier publication. Stephen M. Walt, “The Search for a Science of Strategy,” International Security 12 (Summer 1987), 159–64.

\(^{39}\) For other reviews of the field that emphasize military force as a means rather than security as an end, see Klaus Knorr, “National Security Studies: Scope and Structure of the Field,” in Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., National Security and American Society: Theory, Process, and Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973); and Nye and Lynn-Jones (fn. 5).

\(^{40}\) See Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), chap. 8.
the tendency of security scholars to treat national security goals as “given.” One writer describes the situation as follows:

In the field of... foreign policy studies it is possible—in fact mandatory—to ask: “What goals do we want a foreign policy to accomplish?” But in national security there is no parallel question. It is “given” that the goal is to enhance security. An entire dimension of potential theorizing—everything that concerns problems of multiple possible purposes—is therefore nonexistent from its very root, in national security affairs.41

There is something peculiarly un-Clausewitzian about studying military force without devoting equal attention to the purposes for which it is used. Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war should be viewed as policy by other means was meant to imply that military force should be understood in the context of the purposes it serves.42

From the standpoint of the military threats to security that tended to dominate the cold war era, the emphasis of security studies on military statecraft was understandable, though not necessarily justifiable. In the post–cold war era, however, many have suggested that nonmilitary threats be included under the rubric of national security (see especially Allison and Treverton). Many of these problems—for example, environmental protection, promoting human rights and democracy, promoting economic growth—are not amenable to solution by military means. To the extent that this is true, traditional security studies has little relevance.

The generation of scholars writing on security at the beginning of the cold war not only defined national security in broader terms but also had a more comprehensive view of the policy instruments by which it could be pursued. Wolfers observed in 1952 that security “covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security” and concluded that although armaments were often relevant, some situations called for “greater reliance on means other than coercive power.”43 Lasswell, writing in 1950, cautioned against “confounding defense policy with armament” and argued that “our greatest security lies in the best balance of all instruments of foreign policy, and hence in the coordinated handling of arms, diplomacy, information, and economics.”44 This broad view of the policy instruments relevant to the pursuit of national security is likely to be more

41 Smoke (fn. 28), 330. See also Smoke (fn. 5), 259.
43 Wolfers (fn. 18), 484, 502.
44 Lasswell (fn. 18), 75. Recent interest in “grand strategy” among security specialists has expanded the term to include diplomacy as well as military means, but economic statecraft and information remain neglected. On this point, see Walt (fn. 19); and Kolodziej (fn. 29), 434.
useful in the post-cold war world than one that confines itself to military statecraft.

**DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND SECURITY**

Although several of the authors reviewed here mention domestic concerns, Peter G. Peterson argues in his essay “The Primacy of the Domestic Agenda” (in Allison and Treverton) that American security is now threatened more by domestic problems than by external military threats. Noting the legislative mandate of the National Security Council, created in 1947, to establish a forum for integrating “domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security,” Peterson contends that the domestic dimension of national security tended to be neglected during the cold war years. Recalling the National Security Council’s early working definition of national security as preservation of “the United States as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact,” he argues that American security is now less endangered by military threats than by the crisis in education, an exploding underclass, and underinvestment in productive capacity and infrastructure. He calls upon those traditionally concerned with national security to broaden their focus to include concern for such domestic threats.

Peterson’s view of national security poses a severe challenge to a field that has traditionally neglected domestic aspects of security. Indeed, to the extent that domestic affairs have been considered at all, they have been treated as sources of international conflict, as constraints on security policy, or as partial determinants of security policy. They have not, however, been treated as sources of threats to security.

The close relationship between traditional security studies and the realist paradigm makes the possibility of incorporating domestic affairs especially difficult. Realists have tended to emphasize the anarchic international system rather than domestic affairs in their treatment of security issues. Similarly, the recent tendency to label the field *international security* rather than *national security* is likely to make it even harder to focus attention on the domestic aspects of security. The alleged benefit of international security is that it focuses attention on international interdependence and the security dilemma in thinking about security issues.

Once again, the writings of scholars at the beginning of the cold war are more in tune with Peterson’s view of national security than are those by today’s security specialists. Writing in 1949, Dunn spoke of a “grow-

45 Nye and Lynn-Jones (fn. 5), 24; and Walt (fn. 19), 215, 224.
ing realization” that a sharp distinction between domestic and international affairs serves as a “serious obstacle to clear thinking” and pointed to a “general tendency to reduce the line between ‘international’ and ‘domestic.’”46 Brodie in 1950 defended the idea of contracyclical manipulation of defense spending for the purpose of stabilizing the domestic economy.47 And Lasswell, writing in the same year, sounds very much like Peterson in warning against “conceiving of national security policy in terms of foreign divorced from domestic policy” and in his call for “balancing the costs and benefits of all policies in the foreign and domestic fields.”48

In sum, the field of security studies seems poorly equipped to deal with the post–cold war world, having emerged from the cold war with a narrow military conception of national security and a tendency to assert its primacy over other public policy goals. Its preoccupation with military statecraft limits its ability to address the many foreign and domestic problems that are not amenable to military solutions. In response, many of the authors reviewed here have called for the development of new ways to think about international relations and national security.

For some authors, this impetus for reform of security studies stems from the differences between the cold war era and its successor.49 For others, the failure to anticipate the nature or timing of the end of the cold war revealed the deep-seated inadequacies not only of security studies but also of thinking about international relations and foreign policy more generally.50 One might argue that it is unfair to single out security studies as bearing special responsibility in this regard, since no scholarly approach or field of interest proved more prescient than any other with respect to the surprise ending of the cold war. For security studies, however, precisely the claim of special expertise with respect to the cold war makes its failure to anticipate the end so embarrassing. The cold war was not just another event to be analyzed; rather, it was the progenitor of the field and its central focus from 1955 on.

46 Dunn (fn. 18), 83.
47 Brodie (fn. 18).
48 Lasswell (fn. 18), 55, 75.
49 See the essays by Allison and Treverton, Peterson, May, Michael Borrus and John Zysman, and Schelling, in Allison and Treverton; see Shultz, Godson, and Greenwood; and see the essay by Jervis, in Hogan.
50 See Gaddis; and the essays by Gaddis and Ronald Steel, in Hogan. See also John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17 (Winter 1992–93); and Koledziej (fn. 29).
III. PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

“Security studies as an academic field is in need of clarification,” according to Haftendorn. “What is to be studied, how is it to be studied, and how is security studies to be distinguished from various subfields on the one hand and international relations on the other?” Proposals for the future study of security may be divided into three groups according to the degree of reform they advocate.

DO NOTHING

Not everyone agrees that reform is needed. For Mearsheimer, the essential defining characteristic of international politics has been and remains a zero-sum competition for military security. Whereas others may see a diminution of military threats to security, he maintains that the end of the cold war does not “mean that states will have to worry less about security than during the Cold War” (Mearsheimer, in Allison and Treverton, 235).

For Walt, the end of the cold war expands the agenda of security studies to include post-cold war security arrangements and makes the study of “grand strategy” more important; but it does not necessitate redefining the scope of the field. The end of the cold war, he contends, “will keep security issues on the front burner for some time to come.”

MODEST REFORM

Security Studies for the 1990s is based on the premise that reform of security studies would have been in order even if the cold war had not ended. According to this view, the latter event simply makes the case for such reforms more compelling. Although some of the contributors, especially Charles Kegley, Oran Young, and Edward Kolodziej, argue for radical reforms, most concentrate on minor reforms consistent with the editors’ conventional definition of the subject as “the threat, use and management of military force, and closely related topics” (p. 2).

The editors identify weaknesses in the “first-generation curriculum” (1950–90) of security studies, including overemphasis on nuclear deterrence, the United States, Europe, and the former Soviet Union and neglect of the Third World, Asia, and nonmilitary instruments of policy. They then present model syllabi for eleven courses, which are dis-

51 Haftendorn (fn. 19), 15.
52 Walt (fn. 19), 225–27.
cussed by various commentators. The three syllabi emphasizing economic, environmental, and regional aspects of security are the only ones that depart from the traditional security studies orientation. The inclusion of the regional security syllabus by Kolodziej is somewhat anomalous, since he clearly rejects the narrow traditional definition of security in favor of one broad enough to include domestic affairs, economic issues, human rights, and more. The inclusion of courses on economic and environmental aspects of security is in itself an innovation, of course; but the proposed syllabi do not depart significantly from conventional views of security. The syllabus on “environment and security,” for example, emphasizes such topics as environmental tools of warfare (herbicides, for example), environmental side effects of warfare, and environmental disputes as causes of war.

Overall, *Security Studies for the 1990s* presents a view of the field not much different from the cold war version. What is needed, it suggests, is not fundamental reorganization of the field but rather modest reform.

**Radical Reform**

Radical proposals for reforming security studies include those that call for broadening the focus of the field and those that advocate reintegration of security studies with the study of foreign policy and international politics.

Proposals for expanding the focus of security studies have been advanced by numerous scholars, including Ullman, Buzan, Haftendorn, Kolodziej, and Kegley. Recognizing that threats to national survival or well-being are not confined to the military realm, these proposals expand the notion of security threats to include such matters as human rights, the environment, economics, epidemics, crime, and social injustice.

These proposals are not necessarily tied to post-cold war developments. Indeed, any serious attempt to explicate the concept of security is likely to lead to a broader view—which may explain why traditional security specialists have usually avoided such exercises. Reflections on

---

53 Ullman (fn. 31); Buzan (fn. 36); Haftendorn (fn. 19); Kolodziej (fn. 29); and Kegley, “Discussion,” in Shultz, Godson, and Greenwood, 73–76.

54 On this point, see Buzan (fn. 36), 3–12. Recent reviews of the field by Nye and Lynn-Jones (fn. 5) and Walt (fn. 19), for example, do not attempt to define the concept of security. Although many of the contributors to *Security Studies in the 1990s* allude to the debate about alternative conceptualizations of the field, none of the eleven course syllabi includes the famous article by Wolfers (fn. 18) on the concept of national security.
the post–cold war world, however, have increased the number of proposals for a broader conception of security.

For those seeking an enhanced understanding of the multiple vulnerabilities that beset humankind,\textsuperscript{55} expanding the focus of security studies is clearly a step in the right direction. But from the standpoint of academic disciplines—admittedly a matter of minor importance to nonacademics—the advantages are less obvious. For to expand the scope of security studies is to blur even further the barely distinguishable line between the subfield of security studies and the main field of international relations and foreign policy studies. As Klaus Knorr recognized two decades ago, “If we wanted to study with equal emphasis all phenomena suggested by the term ‘national security,’ we would have passed on to the study of foreign policy or international relations as a whole.”\textsuperscript{56}

Perhaps the time has come to abolish the subfield of security studies and “pass on” or, more accurately, return to the study of foreign policy and international relations. In commenting on one of the syllabi in \textit{Security Studies for the 1990s}, Oran Young observes that “there is a strong case for integrating international security studies into the broader curriculum on international relations” (p. 351).\textsuperscript{57}

The following are the principal arguments on behalf of such a case.

1. \textit{It overlaps too much with the fields of international politics and foreign policy}. Although expanding the focus of security studies makes the problem more obvious, there has never been a clear line between security studies and international politics and foreign policy studies. War has always been a central concern of international relations scholars; and national security policy, including war as an instrument of statecraft, has been part of that concern since 1940. Various scholars have noted the overlap, and none has been able to draw a clear line between academic security studies and its parent fields of foreign policy and international politics.\textsuperscript{58} The intimate connection between military force

\textsuperscript{55} Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, \textit{Multiple Vulnerabilities: The Context of Environmental Repair and Resources}, Research Monograph no. 40 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1974).

\textsuperscript{56} Knorr (fn. 39), 6.

\textsuperscript{57} Kolodziej (fn. 29) warns against consigning security studies to “a ghetto within the academy” and suggests that such studies be integrated into “as inclusive a spectrum of disciplinary units as possible” (pp. 436–37). On “reintegrating” strategic thought “into the mainstream of the theory of international politics,” see also Laurence Martin, “The Future of Strategic Studies,” \textit{Journal of Strategic Studies} 3 (December 1980), 91–99.

\textsuperscript{58} E.g., Lyons and Morton (fn. 5); Bock and Berkowitz (fn. 5); Smoke (fn. 5); Knorr (fn. 39); and Haftendorn (fn. 19).
and foreign policy was clearly recognized before the “golden age” of security studies began:

On the important matter of the necessary relation between armed force and policy, nothing in the profession of a soldier—not his training, his tactics, his weapons, his code of war—and nothing in military policy of any American command, from the battalion to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is without reference to policy. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a purely military matter.\(^{59}\)

The basic concepts of security studies (for example, power, balance of power, the security dilemma, limited war, and various concepts from deterrence theory) are covered in standard courses on international politics. And it would be difficult to imagine a course on foreign policy that did not include military policy (which cannot be said for foreign economic policy). In American universities at least, the dominance of the realist paradigm ensures that standard security studies topics will be covered.\(^{60}\)

There is a certain irony in the fact that it is precisely the hard-core realist security scholars who are in the weakest position to make the case for security studies as a separate subfield. If one believes that military competition among sovereign states is “the distinguishing feature of international politics” (Mearsheimer, in Allison and Treverton, 214; emphasis added), then one must assume that a well-designed course in international politics will focus on many of the same topics as will a course in traditional security studies. “Since Thucydides in Greece and Kautilya in India,” asserts Kenneth Waltz, “the use of force and the possibility of controlling it have been the preoccupations of international-political studies.”\(^{61}\) It is hard to make a case for the study of military force as a subsidiary endeavor if one believes that this topic should be the central focus of the principal field. Subfields, by definition, deal with subtopics.

There is also a certain irony in the fact that the overlap is a natural pedagogical consequence of the teachings of two intellectual heroes of conventional security studies—Clausewitz and Schelling. The pedagogical implication of Clausewitz’s famous dictum is that war should

---

\(^{59}\) William Yandell Elliott et al., *United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 159. This view of foreign policy would be broad enough to include even tank tactics, which are specifically excluded from the purview of security studies by Nye and Lynn-Jones (fn. 5), 7; and Smoke (fn. 5), 251.


\(^{61}\) Waltz (fn. 33), 186.
not be studied separately from broader issues of foreign policy and international relations. When our thinking about war is divorced from our thinking about political life, he argued, "we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense." And Schelling taught us to think about war and military strategy in the context of international bargaining processes in which conflict and cooperation are inseparable. The teachings of Clausewitz and Schelling provide powerful arguments for integrating the study of security with the study of foreign policy and international politics.

2. It impedes policy relevance. Despite the commitment of most security studies scholars to policy relevance, the field is severely handicapped with respect to its ability to contribute to the broad debates on public policy likely to characterize the post-cold war world. These handicaps arise from its treatment of both means and ends. That relating to means is the more fundamental because it is inherent in the definition of the field in terms of the threat, use, and control of military force. Although some security problems may be adequately addressed by comparing the pros and cons of various types of military statecraft, most important problems involve consideration of nonmilitary techniques of statecraft as well. Policymakers rarely define a security problem as, We have these weapons; now what can we do with them? Rather, they ask, We have this problem; what means are available for coping with it? Policymakers need help in evaluating the utility of all the instruments available to them, including diplomacy, information, economic statecraft, and military statecraft.

Consider the following question, which many security specialists would view as central to the field: "Under what conditions should states employ military force and for what purposes?" The obvious answer is that states should employ military force when its prospective utility exceeds that of alternative techniques of statecraft. The problem is that this can be determined only by comparing the costs and benefits of alternative techniques of statecraft with those of military force. Those who confine themselves to the study of one type of statecraft are logically incapable of judging the utility of that type of statecraft for any problem with respect to which other types of statecraft are potentially relevant.

62 Clausewitz (fn. 42), 605.
63 Schelling (fn. 23); and idem, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
64 Walt (fn. 19), 226.
Hedley Bull recognized this problem in his famous defense of strategic studies:

No doubt strategists are inclined to think too readily in terms of military solutions to the problems of foreign policy and to lose sight of the other instruments that are available. But this is the occupational disease of any specialist, and the remedy for it lies in entering into debate with the specialist and correcting his perspective. 66

Bull’s proposed “remedy,” however, depends on the willingness and capability of others to correct the military bias of the security specialist. 67

In today’s context this passage would seem to suggest that subfields other than security studies bear the responsibility for correcting the military bias in security studies. There are, however, no other subfields defined in terms of techniques of statecraft: the subfield of foreign policy studies is not defined in terms of diplomacy, and international political economy is not defined in terms of economic statecraft. What is needed is a field of specialization that subsumes the study of all types of statecraft, for example, traditional foreign policy studies.

With respect to ends, the handicaps of conventional security studies are real but not inherent. The tendency to assert the primacy of national security and the consequent resistance to thinking in terms of trade-offs between security and other goals impedes policy-relevant debate, but this is a correctable defect. All that is required is a return to the view that marginal utility analysis is relevant to judging the importance of security relative to other goals.

Another significant but remediable handicap is the tendency to treat goals as given and to accept the framework of assumptions within which policymakers define security problems. 68 In the post-cold war world it is precisely this framework of assumptions that needs to be re-assessed. There is no inherent reason why those who study military force must accept the outlook of those who use it. Witness the example of the peace researchers.

Reintegrating the study of the threat, use, and control of military force with traditional foreign policy analysis would facilitate both the

---


67 In fairness to Bull, it should be noted that he was opposed to separating strategic studies from the wider study of international relations.

68 On this point, see Walt (fn. 19); Kolodziej (fn. 29); and Samuel P. Huntington, “Recent Writings in Military Politics: Foci and Corpora,” in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962), 240. As early as 1949, Dunn (fn. 18) noted this tendency and expressed concern about allowing “the consumers of research, and especially the governmental decision-makers, to determine the questions on which academic researchers shall work” (p. 84).
assessment of the utility of military statecraft and the comparison of security with other policy goals. Policy relevance would thereby increase.

3. It is mislabeled. Unless one is willing to argue that military threats to national well-being are the only ones that matter, it is difficult to justify labeling the study of the threat, use, and control of military force as “security studies.” This cannot be dismissed as merely a semantic problem. Connotations have consequences, and for the last forty years the consequence of designating something as a security issue has been synonymous with asserting its relative importance. High politics implies low politics; vital interests imply nonvital interests; and important issues imply unimportant issues. “National security” is therefore not just another label; it is a powerful political symbol. This has been well understood for a long time. In 1952 Wolfers pointed out that “any reference to the pursuit of security is likely to ring a sympathetic chord.”

And in 1993 Shultz, Godson, and Greenwood noted that “everyone agrees that ‘security issues’ are important and deserving of national prominence and financial support” (p. 1).

It is precisely because “everyone agrees” that security issues are important that they should not be consigned to a separate subfield. Although some subfields are more important than others, no other academic discipline contains a subfield designated, in effect, “the study of important issues.”

4. Security is too broad. As a theoretical concept, “security” is too broad to define a subfield. Broad analytical concepts, such as power, interdependence, welfare, cooperation, conflict, public interest, and security, are relevant to all subfields of international relations and should be the special province of none. Buzan rightly points out that the concept of security is broad enough to integrate the fields of international relations theory, international political economy, area studies, peace studies, human rights, development studies, international history, and so forth. It is precisely for this reason, however, that it should not be used to delineate a single subfield. Lasswell understood the broad applicability of the concept, which prompted his observation that “there are no

69 Wolfers (fn. 18), 481.
70 For other studies referring to national security as a symbol of importance, see Buzan (fn. 36), 19, 370; and Brodie (fn. 40).
71 Although it could be argued that American scholars were simply following standard governmental terminology, even this justification may disappear. President Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: White House, July 1994) emphasizes economic prosperity, population growth, environmental degradation, mass migration of refugees, narcotics trafficking, and promoting democracy, as well as traditional military concerns.
72 Buzan (fn. 36), 372.
experts on national security. There are only experts on aspects of the problem.73

The third and fourth arguments outlined above, concerning the mislabeling of the field and the breadth of the concept of security, are based on the assumption that both the label and the concept are important to security studies scholars. To the extent that such scholars are willing to give up both the label and the claim of special expertise with respect to the security problematique, those arguments would be nullified. Renaming the field as “military studies,” “war studies,” or something similar, however, would not affect the first or second arguments discussed above.

If reintegration of security studies into the broader curriculum of foreign policy and international politics is desirable, why not apply similar logic to other subfields, such as international political economy (IPE)? The answer to this question is instructive. If the rationale for subfields is to ensure that important subtopics are not neglected, the emergence of IPE as an identifiable subfield during the 1970s was justified by—and a reaction to—the widespread neglect of the topic by international relations scholars during the 1950s and 1960s.74 To the extent that the larger field focuses on the politico-economic aspects of international relations, the rationale for a subfield of IPE is weakened. In principle, then, one can well imagine a situation in which the arguments for reintegration of security studies would apply, mutatis mutandis, to IPE. If the dominant paradigm for the study of international relations were Marxist-Leninist, for example, one might well argue that a subfield of IPE was unnecessary on the grounds that it overlapped too much with the main field of study. Under such circumstances, one might argue that a subfield of security studies is needed in order to ensure that politico-military aspects of the subject are not neglected. The case for the traditional subfield of security studies is strongest when realism is not the dominant paradigm. It is paradoxical that traditional security studies flourished during the cold war, when realism was at its apogee and the rationale for the subfield would seem to have been weakest.

It is sometimes argued that the existence of security studies as a subfield is justified by the continuing importance of war and military strategy in human affairs. The question here, however, is how, not whether, to study war and military strategy. The reintegration of such topics into the study of international politics and foreign policy would not put aca-

73 Lasswell (fn. 18), 55–56.
demic security specialists out of work. It would, however, set their work in a broader context that would increase its relevance to the post–cold war world.

**IV. Conclusion**

The emergence of security studies as an identifiable subfield of international relations was closely related to the cold war. Interest in the field tended to rise and fall with cold war tensions, and the substantive focus of the field tended to be dominated by cold war issues. Is there a role for security studies now that the cold war is over? The answer to that question depends partly on one's view of the state of the subfield and partly on one's vision of the post–cold war world.

The vision of the post–cold war world presented by many of the contributors to the books under review is one in which nonmilitary foreign and domestic threats to American security have increased in importance, even as external military threats have decreased in importance. As a means of pursuing national security, military force is viewed as less useful than it used to be, though certainly not irrelevant. Some call explicitly, others implicitly, for a fundamental reexamination of the theories, concepts, and assumptions used to study national security during the cold war.

The purpose of this review has been to lay the groundwork for such a reexamination by contrasting the study of national security at the beginning of the cold war with security studies at its end, by evaluating the relevance of contemporary security studies to the new world order, and by laying out a wide range of proposals for reforming security studies. The world of the 1990s is not the world of 1945–55, but some of the modes of thought, policy concerns, concepts of security, and discussions of statecraft developed during that period appear more relevant to the post–cold war era than those bequeathed to us by the cold war. Scholars searching for ways to think about security problems in the 1990s may find it useful to consult the writings of this older generation of scholars. The answers to today's problems are not to be found there, but some of the right questions are.