Delia Graff Fara:
"Circularity is No Problem for the Being-Called Condition on Names" (Section 10 of my in-progress manuscript "Names Are Predicates".)
Predicativists about proper names typically think that the "being-called condition" gives the extension of a name: 'N' applies to a thing just in case that thing is called N.
See sections 4 and 5 of my in-progress manuscript "Names Are Predicates" for introduction (section 4) and elaboration (section 5) of the being-called condition.
Some referentialists about names accept a form of descriptivism according to which a kind of being-called condition gives the sense of a name: the sense of "N" is "the thing called N"
Saul Kripke later chided Kneale for holding a circular view of the meaning of names.
See the last few pages of "Lecture I" of Naming and Necessity (pages 68-70 of the 1980 edition) for Kripke's circularity condition and his criticism of Kneale.
I defend Kneale against Kripke, and thereby indirectly defend being-called predicativism.
See section 10 of my manuscript "Names Are Predicates" for this defense of Kneale. My MITings talk is based on this section.
I recently published an Analysis paper, that gives a snappy snapshot of my view: