Delia Graff: PHI 534

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Delia Graff: PHI 534, Philosophy of Language
Spring 2006 Topic: Propositions, Time and Tense
Princeton University

The leading question of the seminar will be: can a proposition change its truth-value over time? Not many of the readings, however, will address this question directly. My goal was to put together a sampling of interesting, in many cases classic, texts from logic, language and metaphysics that I felt bore on the question directly or indirectly.

Second Homework Assignment (due by 15 April):

Can Lewis (based on what he says in "Index, Context and Content") give a compositional semantics for belief attributions given that the semantic value of an embedded clause in a belief attribution is not on his view a proposition, but rather a more complicated thing? If so, how; if not, why not?
The question is whether Lewis can, on his view, mimic a simple analysis of the semantics for belief ascriptions -- one on which embedded sentences (or "that"-clauses) in belief ascriptions have propositions as semantic values -- according to which "S believes that P" is true just in case the semantic value of S bears the belief relation (the semantic value of "believes") to a certain proposition, the one that is the semantic value of P.
So don't try to do anything fancy with modes of presentation.

First Homework Assignment (due by end of March):

Prove that Richard's two versions of temporalist semantics (from "Tense, Propositions, and Meanings") are equivalent.
- The first version, presented on pp343-344, assigns to each tense and modal operator a function from temporalist propositions to temporalist propositions (where a temporalist proposition is a set of world-time pairs); the second version, presented on p344, assigns to each tense and modal operator a function from temporalist sentence-characters ("meanings") to temporalist sentence-characters, where a temporalist sentence-character is a function from contexts to sets of world-time pairs. Note that Richard simplifies a great deal by ignoring context-dependence on parameters other than time, which is why he identifies a context with the time of that context.
- The proof should proceed by first defining a one-one correspondence between the P-models and the M₁-models. In particular, you should define a one-one function C ("C" is for correspondence) from P-model valuations to M₁-model valuations, so that if (W,T,V^P) is a P-model, then (W,T,C(V^P)) is its corresonding M₁-model. (You must also explain why, or prove that, the correspondence you give is one-one.)
- Then you should show by induction on the complexity of a formula that for every formula A in the formal language, A is true, relative to a context c, at a world-time pair (w,t) in the P-model (W,T,V^P) if and only if it's true relative to c in the corresponding M₁-model (W,T,C(V^P)). I'd like you to use the notation indicated by the following remarks. When V^P is the valuation function from a P-model, it assigns contents to expressions relative to a context c (only because of the presence of the indexical operator 'Now'). This relativity should be expressed by use of a subscript 'c'. When V^M₁ is the valuation function from a M₁-model, it assigns characters to expressions, i.e., functions from contexts to contents. This relativity should be expressed by use of a an argument place. Using the suggested notation, you're to prove, by induction on the complexity of a formula, the following for every formula A:
  V^P(A)_c = C(V^P)(A)(c) The expressions on either side of the identity sign here are sets of world-time pairs, so to prove their identity you need to show that a pair (w,t) is in one if and only if it's in the other.

Course Outline:

10 Feb: Introduction.
17 Feb: Graff at UCSB conference (no class)
24 Feb:
1. David Kaplan: "Demonstratives" (in Themes from Kaplan). Presenter: Graff.
2. Mark Richard: 1981 "Temporalism and Eternalism" (in Philosophical Studies). Presenter: Graff.
3. Mark Richard: 1982 "Tense, Propositions and Meanings" (in Philosophical Studies). Presenter: Graff.
4. Nathan Salmon: 1989 "Tense and Singular Propositions" (in Themes from Kaplan). Presenter: Gilbert Harman.
3 March:
1. A.N. Prior: "Thank Goodness That's Over," Presenter: Graff.
2. John Perry: "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Presenter: Graff.
3. Robert Stalnaker: "Assertion," Presenter: Brian Hedden.
10 Mar:
1. Robert Stalnaker: "Pragmatics," Presenter: Philipp Koralus.
2. David Lewis: "Index Context and Content," Presenter: Graff
17 Mar:
1. Jason Stanley: "Names and Rigid Designation," and/or "Rigidity and Content," Presenter: David Gordon.
2. Jeffrey King: "Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values," Presenter: Graff
24 Mar: SPRING BREAK
31 Mar:
1. David Lewis: "The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics," Presenter: Graff
2. EJ Lowe: "Lewis on perdurance versus endurance"
  EJ Lowe: "The problems of intrinsic change: rejoinder to Lewis"
  David Lewis: "Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe,"
  
  Presenter: ___________.
3. Sally Haslanger: "Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics," Presenter: Graff
4. Mark Hinchliff: "The puzzle of change," Presenter: Ryan Robinson.
5. Dean Zimmerman: "Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism," Presenter: Graff
7 Apr: No class: Graff at UMass
14 Apr:
1. Mark Aronszajn: "A Defense of Temporalism,"
2. G. W. Fitch: "Temporalism Revisited."
3. David Lewis: "Tensing the Copula,"
4. Dean Zimmerman: "Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism, with Postscript (2005)"
21 Apr:
1. Arthur Prior: "Changes in Events and Changes in Things," Presenter: ___________.
2. Gareth Evans:"Does Tense Logic Rest on a Mistake?," Presenter: Elia Zardini.
3. Some other paper(s) by Prior (?) from among:
  1. "Tense Logic and the Logic of Earlier and Later"
  2. "Tensed Propositions as Predicates"
  3. "Quasi-Propositions and Quasi-Individuals"
  4. "Tense Logic for Non-Permanent Existents"
28 Apr:
1. McTaggart: "The Unreality of Time,"
  McTaggart: Excerpt from The Nature of Existence
  Presenter: ___________.
2. Josh Parsons: "A-Theory for B-Theorists," Presenter: ___________.
3. Dean Zimmerman: "The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and `Taking Tense Seriously'," Presenter: Graff
5 May:
1. Hans Kamp: "Formal Properties of `Now'," Presenter: Michael Johnson.
2. Mürvet Enç: "Towards a Referential Analysis of Temporal Expressions," Presenter: Graff
3. Dorit Abusch: "Sequence of Tense, Intensionality and Scope," (?) Presenter: ___________.
12 May (Make-up Class):
1. Graeme Forbes: "The Open Future," Presenter: ___________.
2. John MacFarlane: "Future Contingents and Relative Truth," Presenter: Graff

Requirements: In order to pass the course (or, for philosophy graduate students, to receive a unit in conjunction with the course), one must do all of the following:

Give an in-class presentation;
Write a longish (15--25pp) term paper by the end of reading period.
Do any short homeworks that may be assigned during the semester.

Auditors: Auditors are welcome to attend, and should strongly consider giving an in-class presentation.

Readings will be available in the Marx Hall Philosophy Library (102 Marx); those of you who don't have keys to the library should see Ann Getson in the philosophy department office (1879 Hall, room 212-C) for keys and explanation for how to make photocopies (10 cents per page). For the remainder of the semester, readings will be available at least one seminar session in advance.

Some readings will also be made available online. Because my space on the web server is limited, readings will not be available after the class for which they were supposed to have been read. Please download or print any readings you wish to keep.

Page created and maintained by Delia Graff
http://www.princeton.edu/~graff/phi534/index.html
Last modified: "Monday, 03 Apr 2006, 12:00"