TRADE POLICIES TO COUNTER DOMESTIC DISTORTIONS

GENERAL PRINCIPLES


[2] Each market failure is best countered by the policy that is
directly targeted to the margin where it creates a distortion.

[3] Other policies can have a beneficial effect on this margin
but will create another distortion elsewhere.
They are a less good (second-best or worse) response to the problem.

[4] If the targeted (first-best) policy instrument is unavailable,
a small dose of a second-best policy is better than no policy at all.


Will examine the role of trade policies in this context.
Production of good X creates a spillover benefit elsewhere.
Examples: workers acquire skills that raise their productivity,
entrepreneurs get ideas they use for developing new products ...
Social marginal cost (SMC) = Private marginal cost to firms (PMC)
- External marginal benefit (EMB)

At a price P, private profit-max producers will supply \( X_m \),
socially optimal to supply \( X_s \)

(PMC is market supply curve, SMC is optimal supply curve.)

Will consider and compare policies to achieve optimal production,
or at least increase it above \( X_m \), toward \( X_s \)
FIRST-BEST OPTIMAL SUBSIDY

Offer a specific (per unit quantity) subsidy to producers

\[ s = \text{vertical difference between PMC and SMC at } X_s \]

PMC shifts down vertically parallel by \( s \). At price \( P \), \( X_s \) is supplied

Social gain = shaded area 1

(between \( P \) & SMC from \( X_m \) to \( X_s \) )

Alternative perspective showing division of gains, losses

Producer surplus gain = area 3

Externality benefit = area 4

= areas 1 + 2

Subsidy cost = areas 2 + 3

Net gain = areas 1 + 2 + 3 - (2+3) = area 1
SECOND-BEST IMPORT TARIFF

Suppose this is a small country facing given world price $P$, importing good $X$ (to avoid mixing in separate consideration of optimal tariff).

Levy an import tariff $t$ so that production rises to optimal $X_s$.

Consumption falls from $X_f$ to $X_t$. Resulting gains and losses:

- Producer surplus gain = area 3
- Externality gain = area 4 = areas 1 + 2
- Consumer surplus loss = areas 3+2+5+6+7
- Tariff revenue gain = areas 5 + 6

Net gain = area 1 - area 7

Area 7 is the extra by-product distortion caused by the tariff.
A SMALL TARIFF YIELDS A (SMALL) NET BENEFIT

A small import tariff \( t \) increases domestic production and decreases consumption, both by small amounts.

The gain from higher production is \( t \) times the initial gap between \( P \) and SMC; therefore proportional to \( t \).

The consumption dead-weight loss is triangle: height \( t \), width prop. to \( t \), Area prop. to \( t^2 \).

Therefore for small \( t \), gain exceeds loss: small tariff is improvement over no policy at all.
TARIFF SHOULD STOP SHORT OF FULLY CORRECTING PRODUCTION DISTORTION

If $s$ is the optimal subsidy, the last increment of an import tariff $t$ will yield

Marginal gain on production-side is second order of smallness (darker triangle)
By-product marginal loss on consumption side is of first-order (darker vertical bar)
Therefore net loss

Second-best optimal tariff will balance gain and loss at the margin
VALUATION OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE

The above analysis valued government's gain or loss of revenue dollar-for-dollar equivalently to the gains or losses of consumer / producer surpluses. Background assumption: revenue needed for subsidy is raised, and revenue gained from taxes disbursed, without any distortion (lump-sum transfers).

What if this is not possible? The “shadow price” of government revenue is > 1. Does this strengthen the case for a tariff because it raises revenue, while a production subsidy would lose revenue?

An import tariff is exactly equivalent to an equal-rate combination of a production subsidy and a consumption tax. So correcting a production distortion using an import tariff is equivalent to correcting it with a production subsidy and raising (in fact over-raising) the revenue to finance the subsidy by taxing consumption of the same good. Consider the more general possibility of levying the consumption tax at a different rate, or even levying it on a different good. This makes it a more general problem in public finance: What is the optimal base and rate for commodity taxation?
Will briefly explain the general idea of this analysis for case of constant marginal cost (horizontal supply curve) to focus on consumption DWL.

Contrast cases of low and high demand elasticities:
Tax reduces quantity consumed from $X_0$ to $X_1$.

For a given tax rate $t$
Higher demand elasticity:
greater quantity reduction
greater tax revenue loss
greater dead-weight loss

Suppose $X = X_0 - k t$
Tax revenue $R = t (X_0 - k t)$
Dead-weight loss $DWL = \frac{1}{2} k t^2$
Marginal tax revenue $= X_0 - 2 k t$
Marginal dead-weight loss $= k t$
Optimal tax structure will equate marginal $DWL / marginal R$ across commodities.
Need to do this more generally. For good $i$, let demand $X_i = D_i(P_i) = D_i(MG_i+t_i)$

When $t_i$ rises by $\Delta t_i$, $X_i$ changes by $\Delta X_i = D_i \ ' (P_i) \Delta t_i < 0$. Therefore

- marginal DWL$_i$ = $- t_i \Delta X_i$, and marginal R$_i$ = $t_i \Delta X_i + X_i \Delta t_i$

Let common ratio of marginal DWL$_i$/marginal R$_i$ = $c$ for all $i$

Simplifying, $(1+c) t_i \Delta X_i = c \ X_i \Delta t_i$ for all $i$, or

$$\frac{t_i}{P_i} = \frac{c X_i}{1+c P_i D_i'(P_i)} = \frac{c}{1+c e_i}$$

where $e_i$ denotes the price elasticity of demand for good $i$.

Corrections needed with more rigorous analysis:

[1] the elasticities should be substitution elasticities, excluding income effects,
[2] need to include effects arising from cross-elasticities among goods.

But the general intuition remains valid.

Taxing imports: If domestic consumption = 100, production = 80,
demand elasticity = 0.5, supply elasticity = 1, then a 1% increase in price
changes demand to 99.5, supply to 80.8, so imports reduce from 20 to 18.7,
which is a 6.5% decrease. So elasticity = 6.5, which is quite large.
Imports are not good candidates for taxation to raise revenue.
SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF POLICY TARGETING

[1] Infant industries in LDCs should be nurtured using subsidies or investment coordination and provision of credit if capital market failures

[2] Macroeconomic unemployment should be tackled by fiscal and monetary policies. If cause is micro (labor market failure), use employment subsidy

[3] Secure supplies of food, defense materials etc. should be achieved using subsidy. Energy independence using strategic reserve

POSSIBLE LIMITATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF TARGETING

If the private sector consists of large strategic players, they may game against the government's policy. For example, if the labor market failure consists of a high wage set by unions, the unions will only further exploit a subsidy. But they can likewise exploit a policy offering trade barriers.
OPTIMAL TARIFF AS A “DISTORTION” CORRECTING POLICY

When a country faces an upward-sloping supply curve of its import good from ROW, each marginal unit imported increases the price paid by all infra-marginal units. The importer of the marginal unit does not take this into account. From the country's perspective, the marginal cost of imports > price of marginal unit. The ROW’s supply curve of home’s imports is like the home's average cost (AC) curve. Then home's SMC of imports is the corresponding marginal.

The optimal level of imports $X_s$ (from home country's point of view, is where the SMC cuts the home's demand curve. The optimum tariff raises the private cost of importing so the AC + t meets the home demand curve at the optimum.

Here trade is the margin of distortion, that is why a trade policy is first-best.

Of course this is not optimal from a worldwide perspective.