

## GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY

### CONCEPTS OF EFFICIENCY

Partial equilibrium (single industry) analysis:

- Other goods are implicit behind demand and cost curves

- Concept of cost is opportunity cost

- Efficiency = maximization of total surplus

- Equilibrium of perfectly competitive market is efficient

General equilibrium analysis:

- Looks at all markets simultaneously, so opportunity costs become explicit

- Tool of analysis: indifference and transformation curves, MRS etc

- Concept of efficiency: Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality

- No one can be made better off without making someone else worse off

General equilibrium analysis adds detail and logical rigor to our understanding of markets

- Clarifies conditions for economic efficiency (equality of MRS etc), and

- conditions under which markets yield efficient outcomes (no externalities etc)

- Also limitations of “efficiency” concept itself - says nothing about ethics of distribution

- This also clarifies conditions under which governments can improve upon markets

- (But further political-economic analysis needed to understand limits of governments)

For ease of exposition only, we [1] treat case with 2 consumers, 2 goods, 2 inputs to production,  
[2] separate analysis of exchange and production

## EXCHANGE – EDGEWORTH BOX DIAGRAM


Two goods X, Y, and two consumers R, B

Analyze exchange when total amounts of 2 goods are fixed


Rectangular box, lengths of sides X, Y equal to the fixed quantities of the two goods

R's quantities read from origin  $O_R$  ; B's from origin  $O_B$  in the reverse direction

Each point P in the box shows an allocation of X and Y between R and B (4 quantities)



Move from one point E to another point T is a reallocation or exchange or trade



## MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND EFFICIENT TRADES

Initial allocation E (endowment or ownership)

Move to F is mutually beneficial -


lies above the indifference curve

through E for both R and B

(Remember B's quantities are measured from  $O_B$  in reverse direction, so B's utility increases toward the south-west and B's indifference curves are rotated 180°)

Trade from E to any point in the shaded area is also mutually beneficial

Move to F still leaves open the possibility of further mutually beneficial trades in the similar smaller double-shaded area



Now consider G as shown. If a further trade from F to G (or a direct trade from E to G) is made, then there remains no possibility for further mutual benefit

Any further reallocation that increases R's utility must decrease B's utility and vice versa

This is just the definition of Pareto efficiency, so G is Pareto efficient

How can we characterize a Pareto efficient allocation in the exchange Edgeworth box?

When the shaded area of beneficial trades starting at this point vanishes

Or when indifference curves for R and B through that point are mutually tangential

That is, MRS between X and Y for R = MRS between X and Y for B

More generally, take any two goods; MRS between them should be same for all consumers

The “contract curve” consists of ALL Pareto efficient allocations in the exchange Edgeworth box ignoring initial ownership / endowment , as if the government can seize and redistribute goods among people  
 Contract curve extends from  $O_R$  to  $O_B$

If initial ownership E must be respected,  
 see where indifference curves of R, B through E intersect the contract curve  
 The figure shows this at H, K, respectively  
 Then only the portion HK becomes relevant  
 This is called the “core” of the exchange:  
 trades that are voluntary and efficient


In the core, there must be at least one point C such that the line of R and B’s common MRS between X and Y at C passes through E

This gives a way of achieving the allocation C as a competitive market equilibrium  
 Set the relative price of X in terms of Y equal to the slope of this line.

Also the line passes through the point E showing the endowments of both people  
 Therefore it becomes the common budget line for the two

The optimal choice of each is at the point of tangency with his/her indifference curve, namely C  
 Therefore both want to trade from E to C; that is the price-taking (perfect compet’n) equilibrium

$E$  = initial endowment,  $O_R H C K O_B$  = contract curve  
 $HK$  = core,  $C$  = equilibrium



Can show general equilibrium analogs of supply/demand curves to construct equilibrium

Consider just one consumer

Take budget lines of different slopes

all through endowment point E

Connect up all their tangencies

with indifference curves

This is the “price-consumption curve”

or “offer curve” : locus of all trades

the consumer optimally chooses

when facing different relative prices

Normal case: steeper budget line  
(higher relative price of X) causes  
the consumer to keep less X out  
of endowment; trade away more  
This is substitution effect


But offer curve can “bend back”

due to income effects:

when  $P_X/P_Y$  very high,

consumer can get a lot of Y by


giving up very little X, and so consume more of both X and Y than at a lower price



Now put the two consumers' offer curves together in the exchange Edgeworth box  
 Where they intersect is equilibrium  
 Must be on contract curve, because the two consumers' indifference curves are tangent to the same budget line

Mathematically, such an equilibrium exists  
 But should we expect it to arise in reality?  
 If literally just two consumers, then they can try to exercise market power or to bargain;  
 R wants outcome close to K and  
 B wants outcome close to H

If actually there are many consumers, and each of R, B stands for many of that type, then each must compete with others of the same type, therefore has less market power. In the limit, only C can be sustained  
 This is the rigorous formulation of connection between large numbers and perfect competition



Limitations of perfect competition:

- [1] Says nothing about distribution – some may do much better than others depending on initial endowments and on whether the endowment is valued highly in the market
  - [2] Efficiency requires numerous traders / freedom of entry so no one has market power
  - [3] Efficiency requires symmetric information (absence of moral hazard or adverse selection)
  - [4] Efficiency requires everything to be tradeable in the market
- If there are external economies or diseconomies or public goods/ bads,  
 some benefits or costs are not priced in markets, so individuals lack correct incentives

Subject to these limitations, general equilibrium framework has wide application. Examples:

### 1: INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Replace consumers in above analysis by countries

A country that has relatively large endowment of a good will export it  
in exchange for others of which it has less

Competitive free trade equilibrium will be Pareto efficient for the world as a whole

Each country will gain from trade. But within each country, there can be winners and losers,  
raising question of whether / how to compensate losers

Countries don't usually have given endowments of goods

Will relate production & pattern of trade soon

### 2: INSURANCE

Interpret the goods as wealth contingent on random events,

e.g.  $X$  = my wealth if I have good luck,  $Y$  = my wealth if I have bad luck

Then my endowment has a lot of  $X$  and very little  $Y$

Others' endowments of  $X$  and  $Y$  are nearly equal if their luck is uncorrelated with mine

In equilibrium I will give up some  $X$  in exchange for some  $Y$

Others will take up some of my risk for a suitable relative price

Even better if my luck is negatively correlated with others' luck

(Recall the example of the landowners on San Serife in Problem Set 4)

### 3: BORROWING AND LENDING

Interpret  $X$  as this year's income and  $Y$  as next year's income

Relative price of  $X$  equals 1 plus the one-year interest rate

## DISTRIBUTION

Along contract curve, R has lowest utility at  $O_R$  and highest utility at  $O_B$  ; B is other way round  
“Utility Possibility Frontier (UPF)” in figure

shows the levels of utilities of the two  
Cannot always have concave frontier  
because utilities are ordinal

A social welfare function (SWF) is a  
normative or ethical valuation of  
the two utilities:  $W(U_R, U_B)$


The figure shows iso-welfare curves

Social optimum at tangency with UPF

Who chooses SWF? Implicitly, the

society's political process does

Philosophers debate the merits



Special problems if

[1] Optimum leaves someone worse off than at endowment

Requires some coercion or expropriation to implement such a policy

[2] Available policies for redistribution are inefficient (create some dead-weight loss),  
so need efficiency-equity tradeoff in judging whether a policy is socially desirable

In the example shown in figure, the efficient competitive equilibrium at C  
is worse in SWF evaluation than the inefficient point P



## PRODUCTION

Two inputs, fixed total quantities  $L$ ,  $K$  to be allocated for production of two outputs,  $X$  and  $Y$

Production Edgworth box:

Lengths of sides = total qties of  $L$ ,  $K$   
Isoquants of  $X$  from origin  $O_X$ ,  
of  $Y$  from  $O_Y$  in reverse direction

Allocation is technically efficient if  
cannot increase output of one good  
without decreasing that of the other

Efficiency if an isoquant of  $X$  is  
tangential to an isoquant of  $Y$


$MRTS$  between  $L$  and  $K$  in  $X$  production =  $MRTS$  between  $L$  and  $K$  in  $Y$  production

More generally, for two specified inputs,  $MRTS$  should be same in production of all goods

Common  $MRTS$  (slope of each isoquant) will equal input price ratio  $w/r$

Efficient allocation can be achieved using perfectly competitive factor markets

$MRTS$  bet.  $L$  &  $K$ ,  $w/r$



Note in figure the curve of efficient input allocations is below diagonal of box

Efficient to use lower ratio of  $K/L$  in  $X$  production than in  $Y$  production -

$X$  is relatively less  $K$ -intensive (relatively more  $L$ -intensive) than  $Y$

In international trade, a country that has a lower  $K/L$  ratio will have

comparative advantage in the production of  $X$ ; the other will have comp. adv. in  $Y$


From production Edgeworth box, can construct production possibility frontier (PPF)  
exactly as utility possibility frontier came from exchange Edgeworth box  
But quantities of goods are cardinally meaningful; so curvature of PPF is also meaningful  
PPF is concave if

- [1] there are diminishing returns in the production of each good, or
- [2] there are constant returns to scale in the production of each good and  
the two goods use the two factors with different intensities as above

At each point on the PPF, slope =  
MRT between outputs =  $P_X / P_Y$

To complete general equilibrium of  
production and exchange together,  
inscribe exchange box in the  
rectangle of outputs in PPF figure

Full equilibrium when  
MRT in production = MRS in exchange



Can get even more general, and instead of taking input quantities as fixed,  
allow consumers to choose L (income-leisure tradeoff), and  
allow savers and investors to increase K over time, or allow it to decay over time

## OVERVIEW

### CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

1. Efficient exchange:

For each pair of goods, MRS should be same for all consumers

2. Efficient use of inputs in production:

For each pair of inputs, MRTS should be same in all goods

3. Efficiency in output market:

For any pair of goods, MRT along PPF should equal MRS for all consumers

These conditions are satisfied if markets are complete and perfectly competitive

### NORMATIVE EVALUATION

Equity or ethical desirability of outcome even of perfect markets

must be judged in each situation; there is no general presumption

Policy must often strike a balance between efficiency and equity

### REASONS FOR MARKET FAILURE

1. Market power – prices are kept higher than marginal costs; quantity inefficiently low

2. Incomplete information – inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection, moral hazard

3. Externalities – some goods are not traded in markets, and one consumers' or one firm's actions can create unpriced spillover costs or benefits on others

4. Public goods – non-payers cannot be excluded from enjoying benefits

or public bads – individuals suffer from aggregate quantities but are not compensated