

THE PRINCETON JOURNAL
OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

VOLUME I

FALL 2011

PRINCETON JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

Yunsuk Chung '12 Natalie Kim '12

COPY EDITORS

Charles Fortin '15 Heidi Yi '15

LAYOUT EDITOR

Jiweon Kim '15

FINANCE MANAGER

Eric Wang '12

IT TEAM

IT MANAGER

Eeh Pyoung Rhee '13

STAFF

Thomas Truongchau '14

PUBLICITY TEAM

PUBLICITY MANAGER

Alex Kim '12

OPERATIONS MANAGERS

Tanny Kang '14

Jenna Song '14

CHINA EDITORIAL TEAM

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Eddie Skolnick '12

EDITORS

Gavin Cook '15

Charles Fortin '15

Adrienne Fung '14

Rebecca Haynes '15

Tzu-Yung Huang '15

JAPAN EDITORIAL TEAM

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Rafael Abrahams '13

EDITORS

Tzu-Yung Huang '15

Shiro Kuriwaki '14

Ryohei Ozaki '14

KOREA EDITORIAL TEAM

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Anji Shin '13

EDITORS

Jennifer Cho '15

Jisoo Han '14

Lydia Lim '15

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. THE RIVER SUSPENDED IN TIME AND SPACE: THE PRESENCE OF THE MILKY WAY IN LI BAI'S POETIC CONSCIOUSNESS BECKY KEUNG YOON BAE	1
2. ADVANCING "VIRTUAL CIVIL SOCIETY" IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS EDDIE SKOLNICK	7
3. THE "RISK-AVERSE" JAPANESE-JAPANESE ENTREPRENEURSHIP PRINCETON KWONG	19
4. NORTH KOREA'S GROWING ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON CHINA HYUN SUN SUH	37
5. MAPPING SOUTH KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES JULIE HAN	52
6. SON PREFERENCE YESTERDAY AND TODAY: THE CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS OF SON PREFERENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH KOREA KRISTEN KIM	62

THE RIVER SUSPENDED IN TIME AND SPACE:

The Presence of the Milky Way in Li Bai's Poetic Consciousness

Becky Keung Yoon Bae '11

七夕詩歌 Seventh Night Song

From ‘古詩十九首’

Tr. Becky Keung Yoon Bae

迢迢牽牛星， The distant Cowherd Star

皎皎河漢女。 The glistening Milky Way Girl (i.e. the seamstress star)

纖纖擢素手， Such delicate, delicate little hands

札札弄機杼。 Pushing the loom to clatter and chatter

終日不成章， But all day long she cannot complete one pattern

泣涕零如雨。 And teardrops sprinkle down like rain

河漢清且淺， The Milky Way is clear and shallow

相去復幾許？ But how wide is it across, the distance between (the lovers)?

盈盈一水間， Separated by a full stretch of water

脈脈不得語。 For ages they cannot exchange a word.

望廬山瀑布 Gazing Upon The Lu Mountain Falls

李 白

Tr. Becky Keung Yoon Bae

日照香爐生紫烟， In the rising sun, purple mist arises from the Xiang Lu (‘Incense Burner’)

Peak

遙看瀑布掛長川。 Beholding from afar the waterfall; a long river hanging

飛流直下三千尺， The flying current drops down three thousand feet

疑是銀河落九天。 It could be the Milky Way, fallen from the heavens

月下獨酌 Drinking Alone Under the Moonlight

李 白

Tr. Ezra Pound

花間一壺酒 Amongst the flowers is a pot of wine

獨酌無相親 I pour alone but with no friend at hand

舉杯邀明月 So I lift the cup to invite the shining moon,

對影成三人。 Along with my shadow we become party of three

月既不解飲 Though the moon understands none of drinking, and

影徒隨我身。 The shadow just follows my body vainly

暫伴月將影 Still I make the moon and the shadow my company

行樂須及春。 To enjoy the springtime before too late

我歌月裴回 The moon lingers while I am singing

我舞影零亂。 The shadow scatters while I am dancing

醒時同交歡 We cheer in delight when being awake

醉後各分散。 We separate apart after getting drunk

永結無情遊 Forever will we keep this unfettered friendship

相期邈雲漢。 Till we meet again far in the Milky Way

Princeton Kwong¹

EAS 331 Chinese Poetry

¹ Princeton Kwong is a senior majoring in the East Asian Studies Department.

The legend of the lovers in the Milky Way (牽牛織女) is a significant one in Asian cultural consciousness, a story perhaps akin to 'Romeo and Juliet' in the West in that it tells of two star struck young lovers separated by forces beyond their power. In the story, the Heavenly Emperor marries his talented seamstress daughter to a young, handsome cowherd, but when the young couple begin to neglect their duties in favor of spending time with each other, the Emperor grows angry and decides to separate them for all eternity. He places them at the opposite ends of the sky, with the Milky Way between them, and the lovers can only meet once a year on the seventh day of the seventh month (七夕) when the heavens are forded by a bridge of blackbirds and magpies. The tale is one of sadness, eternal love, and yearning, the Milky Way becoming a symbol of an impossible distance, like a wide river, between the cowherd and the seamstress.

Only the first of the three poems that I have selected deals directly with this mythological love story, and shows how the perception of the Milky Way in Chinese poetry has been influenced by it. In the other two poems, both of which are composed by the great poet Li Bai, there is only a brief mention of the Milky Way toward the final lines: '疑是银河落九天' It could be the Milky Way, fallen from the heavens' (Gazing Upon the Lu Mountain Falls) and '相期邈雲漢' Till we meet again far in the Milky Way' (Drinking Alone Under the Moonlight). In reading the two celebrated poems, however, I felt that the tale still lurked below the surface, on the other side of his consciousness, in the way that the concept was utilized, and that the poems themselves could be seen in a new light with the legend, and the Milky Way as defined by this legend, in mind.

Therefore, over the course of this paper, I will attempt to engage these two poems in a discourse with the folktale and with the first poem.

The first poem, which is a much older one from the Han Dynasty collection '古詩十九首' (Nineteen Ancient Poems), does well to introduce certain ideas or sensibilities that are attached to the traditional tale. The first characters '迢迢' immediately establish the central problem, which is 'distance'; from the distant, faraway Cowherd Star, the poem's focus pulls back to center upon the seamstress, who finds herself melancholy, listless and unable to weave at her loom. The poem appears to be told more from the point of view of the '河漢女,' directly meaning 'The Milky Way Girl' and referring to the seamstress princess.

Both the seamstress' name and her distress introduce another integral part of the Milky Way metaphor: water. The Milky Way has long been characterized as a long, wide river that stretches across the sky, as can be seen in its various names: '河漢,' (Milky Way River) '銀河水,' (Silver River) etc. The water imagery is further reinforced by the princess's 'teardrops [sprinkling] down like rain,' and also the observation that 'the Milky Way is clear and shallow' – a clear, definitive description of the Milky Way as a form of *water*. There is a very fluid, rhythmic quality to the entire poem that is brought about not only through this imagery, but also by the constant repetitive rhyme scheme of repeating two syllables at the beginning of each line ('迢迢牽牛星/皎皎河漢女'), and also the imagery of the clattering, chattering loom moving under the seamstress's hands.

Interestingly, despite its 'uncrossability,' the Milky Way never

appears to pose a direct threat; that is, it is not characterized as a *dangerous* space. ‘The Milky Way is clear and shallow,’ describes the poet, before emphasizing that it is really the distance and width of the river that presents itself as a the real obstacle separating the two lovers. ‘脈脈不得語 (For ages they cannot exchange a word),’ says the poet, a line that highlights both the suffering of the two lovers in their division and also the impossible distance between them, not only in space but also in time. For all its fluidity, the Milky Way River does not flow from one lover to another, but parallel to both their shores. Thus, the Milky Way is defined as an immutable, ineffable, eternal river flowing suspended in the heavens.

This characterization, then, leads us quite conveniently to the next poem, which is Li Bai’s ‘望庐山瀑布 (Gazing Upon the Lu Mountain Falls),’ where it is obvious that the idea of the Milky Way as a river was also very much ingrained in Li’s sensibilities of it, even though the poem itself does not reference the folktale in any direct way. In this poem, Li Bai presents his impression of the wondrous landscape of both the Xiang Lu peak and the Lu Mountain cascade, in a juxtaposition of two very different movements: rising up, and falling down. The first, quite masterful line, Li Bai deftly uses the mountain peak’s name 香炉 (‘Incense Burner’) to create an upward-moving image; the sun rising slowly above the peak, signifying light and flame, creates an ethereal tableau as the morning mist ascends like incense smoke.

This slow, upward motion is sharply in contrast with the rest of the poem, which turns its eye toward the mountain’s torrential waterfall descending down below. Here, also, there is a curious coexistence of descent and suspension, where the phrase ‘挂長川’ presents us with a ‘long river *hanging*.’ This

contradictory, yet completely understandable, description is supported by the following phrase ‘飞流直下 (The flying current drops down),’ a line that perfectly captures the momentary suspension of time and motion as the water current falls over the precipice, both flying yet descending.

It is no wonder, then, that the utter beauty and grandeur of the spectacle leaves Li Bai pondering – suspecting (‘疑’) – that the waterfall is not of any human realm, but rather the Milky Way descended from the heavens. It certainly befits the qualities defined in ‘七夕,’ of width and immutability and suspension, and the connection of the river to the heavens is further reinforced by Li Bai’s rhyming of ‘川’ (which *descends*) at the end of the second line with ‘天’ (which *ascends*) at the end of the fourth. The juxtaposition of the two contrasting motions within the poem, one up toward the sky and one down from the sky, both appear to reflect an unconscious desire on the part of the poet to grow closer to the heavens himself, perhaps in a never-ending effort to attain a level of immortality or eternity – as all artists, it seems, strive to do. The smoke rising above like incense, the torrential river descending mightily from up high – both seem to signify a kind of inadvertent yearning and reaching out that is reflected in the movement of what Li Bai sees. If one superimposes the Cowherd and the Seamstress’s tale on this dynamic, it is not difficult to see Li Bai and the Heavens separated by the Lu Mountain cascade.

This desire appears to come to a full head in the last poem, ‘月下獨酌 Drinking Alone Under the Moonlight.’ I have used Ezra Pound’s translation here, rather than my own, as I feel that he struck just the right balance between poetic artistry and accurate translation,

thereby elegantly conveying the whimsical, amusing, but at the same time bittersweet and somewhat desolate experience of drinking alone. Pondering, it seems, understands best the gently ironic, sarcastic tone that Li Bai adopts here. Outwardly, Li appears to be having a light-hearted, fanciful conversation with his drinking companions the moon and his shadow, dancing and conversing with them, but constantly lurking in each line is a complete consciousness of how absurd these companions are, and in truth how very alone he is in this experience.

The first line ‘獨酌無相親 (I pour alone but with no friend at hand)’ quite decisively defines Li Bai’s situation, and serves as a backdrop as to why he is acting the way he is in the poem. The fifth and sixth lines are most indicative of his amused, and somewhat self-pitying, mode of thought: ‘月既不解飲/影徒隨我身 (Though the moon understands none of drinking, and/The shadow just follows my body vainly).’ Li is drinking and dancing with companions who know nothing of either drinking or dancing, but at this moment when there are ‘no friends at hand’ the moon and the shadow must suffice – and, it seems, with enough liquor, Li can fool himself at least for the moment into thinking that he is not so alone.

This fleeting quality of this self-illusion is also acknowledged in the lines ‘醒時同交歡/醉後各分散 (We cheer in delight when being awake/We separate apart after getting drunk).’ The poet enjoys himself as much as he can with his new-found friends in the waking moments of his drinking, and when he has drunk enough, when he is sufficiently tipsy, he departs, no longer needing those drinking companions. This attitude is underlined in the corresponding rhyme of ‘歡 (welcoming, delight)’ and ‘散 (separation, dissemination).’ There is a simple, almost

cold utilitarian nature in the way he defines his friendship in the poem, referring to it in the second-to-last line as ‘無情’: unfettered. There is no sentimentality, no desperate emotions or clinging here, only the enjoyment of oneself in shallow, straightforward companionship and drunkenness.

It is ironic, then, that Li simultaneously makes such a grand declaration in the final line of the poem: ‘相期邈雲漢 (Till we meet again far in the Milky Way).’ Knowing all too well from ‘Lu Mountain Cascade’ that the Milky Way as an eternal, celestial river is ingrained deeply in Li Bai’s mind, it is curious to see that he casts his new ‘friendship’ with the moon and the shadow to the sky, to a place immutable and endless. Indeed, Li’s relationship with his drinking companions can be seen as the absolute antithesis of the sentiments and ideas expressed in ‘望廬山瀑布’ and ‘七夕詩歌’; there is nothing eternal, mystical, or emotionally resonant in Li’s frolicking with his friends, only a sad, ironic, bittersweet whimsicality that attempts to mask Li’s loneliness. In promising to meet his companions in this ‘unfettered’ friendship in a mythological space that is defined by eternity, yearning, and sentimentality, Li Bai, in a final, crowning gesture of irony, is acknowledging the futility of his efforts to attain immortality. By invoking something so great, so profoundly high above, so unfathomable, at the end of a poem that has mostly dealt with a sense of individual amusement and whimsicality, Li Bai appears to be admitting and also poking fun at the relative smallness of his own existence in the context of the world, of ‘雲漢’.

What Li Bai is referring to in ‘月下獨酌,’ then, is not only a sense of the Milky Way as an eternal river, but the very

attainment of immortality, the state of mythologization. The age-old legend of the Cowherd and the Seamstress and the immovable, everlasting constellations in the sky are both facets of the eternal heavenly river, facets that Li Bai understands so well but – in his opinion – cannot reach himself. In a kind of cruel, poetic irony, the very river that stands as a symbol of the immortality he so yearns can also be imposed upon the circumstances as the metaphorical barrier that separates him from his desire, much as the Milky Way separated the Cowherd and the Seamstress. Moreover, though Li Bai himself may not know, the very poem where he lamented the futility of aspiring toward eternity also granted it to him, in that ‘月下獨酌’ is one of his most-loved, celebrated, and translated poems today.

Like this, the Milky Way as defined by the folktale of the Cowherd and the Seamstress claims a distinct presence in cultural consciousness. It encapsulates perfectly several contradictory, conflicting qualities: movement (change) and eternity, love and separation, breathtaking beauty and extended suffering. Yet the one sentiment it seems to signify the most is the sense of wistful yearning, not only of two lovers toward each other as we saw in ‘七夕詩歌’, but also that of an artist, and his never-ending struggle toward an ideal. The Milky Way in Chinese poetry is both the struggle *and* the ideal, the heavenly paradise that poets reach toward and also the immutable space that stands between them and their goal.

ADVANCING “VIRTUAL CIVIL SOCIETY” IN CHINA:

Problems and Prospects

Eddie Skolnick '12

ABSTRACT

This policy paper provides a preliminary field study regarding the advancement of civil society in China via the internet. The paper begins by evaluating how and to what extent the internet has become a forum for “virtual civil society” in China, and then goes on to hypothesize how the internet might also develop as a force for advancing civil society in China more generally. Particular attention is given to the rise of “microblogging” in China, and the direct impacts of this phenomenon on Chinese society, as well as the implications for the future of China’s governance.

The first section of the paper is a preliminary description of the current state of the internet in China. It attempts to paint a picture of to what extent civil society is flourishing on the Internet, and what the developments have been in this regard in recent years from a domestic Chinese perspective. The primary question here is why certain online movements, such as the 2005 petitioning campaign, have been successful, while others have not. The central case study for this paper is that of the “Child Beggar Campaign” of 2010, in which websites post photographs of missing children in an attempt to help parents reconnect with them. Through this and other examples, this analysis uncovers what have been the challenges, successes, failures, and frustrations of civil society groups operating on the internet in China. There is also a discussion of the official backlash against the Child Beggar Campaign in

early 2011 and of how more debilitating crackdowns on virtual civil society can be avoided. Next, the paper identifies where there is need for improvement in the development of China’s virtual civil society, and suggests what the realistic prospects are for further advancing civil society online.

The final section deals with the question of outside advocacy and how outside entities, either governmental or civil society-based, can best approach China in a constructive way in order to facilitate the domestic advancement of civil society. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations for the ways in which United States actors should push for both an ideal and a pragmatic agenda vis-à-vis these problems in China.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2008, a Chinese store-owner Peng Gaofeng (彭高峰) experienced the greatest horror imaginable for any parent – his only son, Wenle (文乐), who at the time was three years old, was abducted by a man right outside of his house in the southern metropolis of Shenzhen.¹ For the next several months, Peng traveled back-and-forth across China, desperately searching for his lost son. Despite suggestions by the police that Wenle would not be found, he relentlessly persisted in his search, even going so far as to join in a protest at the Olympic Green in Beijing. He questioned how the Chinese government was able to host the 2008 Olympics, yet the authorities were still unable to find his son.

After nearly three years of searching for Wenle to no avail, a promising potential lead as to Wenle's whereabouts finally arose on a Chinese microblogging website.² Deng Fei (邓飞), a journalist from Phoenix Weekly, had been helping Peng for some time in his search for his son by posting Wenle's picture on his weibo account, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter.³ With over 100,000 followers, Deng hoped that his microblog could function as a sort of "virtual milk carton," and that someone would be able to recognize Wenle by his distinctive facial features. In February 2011, during the beginning of the Chinese New Year holiday, when many urban Chinese return to their hometowns to celebrate with their families, one user recognized Wenle in Pizhou, a city in northern Jiangsu province, over one thousand miles north of Shenzhen. The user contacted Peng, who immediately traveled to Pizhou along with the local police from Shenzhen. The now six-year-old Wenle recognized his father at first glance, and after DNA tests confirmed the boy's identity, the father and son were finally reunited.

The highly emotional and tearful reunion was broadcast live via the internet, and Peng asserted that he unequivocally believed this miracle was due to the power of the internet: "If there was no Internet, I would never have found my son."⁴ The story of Peng and Wenle received wide media attention both in China and abroad, and has since sparked a full-fledged movement, consisting of various microblogging accounts all aimed at reuniting lost and abducted children with their families. The sensational popularity of such websites, which have already accumulated hundreds of thousands of followers throughout China, has been cited as the onset of a new era for citizen activism online and a revolution of China's "digital

conscience."⁵ The microblogs are designed so that any "netizens" (slang for internet users) can upload photographs that they have taken of children begging on the streets in blog posts that also include the date and location. Parents of abducted children can then go onto these websites and attempt to identify their lost children. The success of the so-called "Child Beggar Campaign" has resonated throughout China, with dozens of success stories inspiring constantly increasing participation and innovation in microblogs.⁶

From the point of view of an outsider looking in, the story of Peng Gaofeng and the ensuing Child Beggar Campaign provide a case in point for the development of civil society in China today. The implications of this and other such movements for the future of China's governance are complex and manifold, and it is becoming increasingly clear that the internet and microblogs in particular are central to the future of China's burgeoning civil society. Today's China is undergoing nothing short of a tectonic shift in terms of the treatment of human rights, such as freedom of speech, by the Communist regime, so the question of how China's leaders are responding to these developments is as relevant as it is timely. Bearing this in mind, this paper seeks to assess the problems and prospects of advancing "virtual civil society" in China today.

MICROBLOGGING AS A TOOL FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Since the vast majority of media outlets in China are state-run or state-controlled, there is very limited opportunity for the free flow of information, and there are sharp restrictions placed on individuals seeking to voice their opinions.⁷ The impressive feat of monitoring and repressing the

opinions expressed online by hundreds of millions of internet users is made possible by China's highly advanced mechanism of internet supervision, which has been described by many internet experts as the "most sophisticated censorship system in the world."⁸ In light of the government's unrelenting suppression of conventional internet content, many Chinese internet users have increasingly resorted to using a different online mechanism for the promulgation of news and the expression of different perspectives and points-of-view: microblogs.

Referred to in Chinese as weibo (微波), these microblogging websites are different from most other sites in that the content posted by users is usually of a relatively small file size, and thus allows for the exchange of small amounts of information, such as a few short sentences, an image, or a link to a video.⁹ Often compared in format to the American website Twitter, these weibo have recently become immensely popular in China, with at least twelve major microblogging sites servicing over 120 million users who produce upwards of a million posts an hour.¹⁰ Furthermore, this recent explosion of microblogs seems to be outpacing the capabilities of China's infamously capable censors, providing an alternative avenue for free speech and expression under China's repressive information regime.¹¹

In an atmosphere in which the government has blocked several other popular forms of social media, such as Facebook and YouTube, the immense appeal of microblogs for Chinese citizens is clear. The rising popularity of microblogs in China has also been fueled by the government's continued blocking of foreign news sources, such as CNN and BBC, and by the recent monitoring and censorship of text messages sent via cell phone that contain sensitive words

such as "jasmine" and "revolution."¹² These are both examples of how microblogs are providing an alternative means of information exchange. Furthermore, since weibo are one of the only media sources that are not entirely sponsored by the Communist Party, they are also of particular appeal to those citizens who seek to read about news and engage in the public debate in a way that is fundamentally independent of the Party.¹³

Indeed, many microbloggers on China's weibo websites are engaging in a debate over some of the most sensitive and controversial political topics in China today, such as the recent wave of demonstrations and protest in the Middle East and North Africa, discussions of political reform among China's leaders, including Premier Wen Jiabao's recent call for greater openness, and even the presumably "off-limits" discussion of Tibet and the Dalai Lama.¹⁴ In this sense, weibo are home to a form of political discussion and debate the likes of which can scarcely be found elsewhere in China, albeit, in a virtual world that is made possible only through the power of the internet.

However, there is a definite limit on the range of topics that are tolerated by the Chinese authorities. Despite the apparent allowance of discussion of the above-mentioned politically-sensitive subjects on China's weibo websites, content related to Liu Xiaobo, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning human rights activist and political dissident, and Falun Gong, the outlawed spiritual movement, is nevertheless subject to restrictions and monitoring by the government's internet police.¹⁵ Posts on microblogs pertaining to such "ultra-sensitive" issues are liable to be blocked from re-posting on other blogs or simply to be deleted outright.

Despite this limited censorship, however, the surging popularity of

microblogging in China is beginning to exhibit some of the classic features of civil society, albeit in a virtual world. Weibo have essentially come to provide a virtual public forum in which Chinese people can engage in discussions and debates about matters of public concern, which otherwise would be too taboo or dangerous to discuss openly.¹⁶ Weibo are also increasingly providing an outlet for Chinese citizens to formulate their own opinions and furthermore to express them in a public way.¹⁷ In this sense, microblogs in China can be seen as filling the void left by the lack of a public forum in Chinese society, and creating the foundations for what could be regarded as a “virtual civil society.”

The sky-rocketing popularity of such microblogging sites in China can thus be explained, at least in part, by the fact that unlike in democratic countries where there are a wealth of avenues for people to exercise their freedom of speech, Chinese people are limited to a few options, chief among them being microblogging, where free expression of opinions is a luxury not to be taken for granted.¹⁸ Since China does not have a free media, an established rule of law, general elections for political office, or a well-functioning system for petitioning the government for reform or to redress grievances, microblogs have quickly become one of the most prominent channels for civil society to operate in China.¹⁹

CASE STUDY: THE CHILD BEGGAR CAMPAIGN

Since Twitter was blocked in China in March 2009, along with several other social networking and social media sites, several “knockoffs” of the popular American microblog were subsequently created by Chinese companies in order to take advantage of the Chinese people’s

appetite for microblogging. It was not until 2010, however, that microblogs in China really began to take off, spawning several independent websites, such as the microblog described in the introduction. The heart-wrenching story of Peng Gaofeng being reunited with his son in February 2011, nearly three years after his abduction, provided a vivid illustration of the power of microblogging. But this anecdote can be viewed more broadly as evidence of the promise of the internet as a potential tool for civil society in China.

Peng’s story further inspired multiple individuals and groups throughout China to explore using microblogs to help track down more children, including Peking University sociology professor Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), who founded a microblog with the express purpose of “taking snapshots to rescue child beggars” (随手拍照解救乞讨儿童 *suishou paizhao jiejiu qitao ertong*).²¹ In less than one month’s time, Yu’s account had accrued over 200,000 followers, and the broader implications of the movement were beginning to become clear. Despite the immense popularity of Yu’s and other similar sites, public responses to the Child Beggar Campaign were mixed, with its critics insisting that this mechanism is flawed in that it might incite retaliation by human traffickers toward the children whose pictures are posted on the microblogs.²² Concerns were also raised about the possibility for the campaign to create stigmas around child beggars, who are already an extremely vulnerable segment of the population.²³

The official response to the Child Beggar Campaign by the Chinese government has also been mixed. Initially, the websites seemed to be embraced by the authorities, who expressed a commitment to confirm and pursue all viable leads that were found through the

sites.²⁴ However, this initial receptiveness to the microblogs by police was supplanted in late February 2011 by official government backlash against the websites.²⁵ Although falling short of an all-out crackdown on the microblogs, the press releases by the official government-sponsored news agencies sought to undermine the credibility of the microblogging sites, and to label the movement as antithetical to the party line.²⁶

At first it may seem perplexing that the government would openly criticize a movement that was providing such an undeniable social good; however, when taken in light of the unique context of the Chinese state, this type of reaction is revealed to be an inevitability. Given China's authoritarian regime, where any type of alternative association among citizens is perceived as a threat to China's "harmonious society," it is clear why microblogs as popular as these might make the government nervous.²⁷ With followers in the hundreds of thousands, these weibo sites have seemingly sprung up in the blink of an eye to provide another avenue for connecting people and actualizing social justice, completely independent of the Communist Party. Furthermore, the Child Beggar Campaign sites in particular are serving to complement law enforcement by providing leads and operational support for the police. At the same time, these weibo can be embarrassing for the authorities to some degree, since they also serve as a reminder of the Communist Party's inability to sufficiently address the social problem of child abductions in China.

Were such an initiative to take hold in the United States, it is likely that it would be met with the response that the authorities are clearly trying very hard to combat child abductions, and that they have the confidence of the citizenry in this

regard.²⁸ It would probably still be seen as beneficial to have ordinary citizens helping out the police through microblogs. In China, however, the reaction is opposite. Any sort of independent initiatives with regard to law enforcement are regarded as a threat to the Communist regime; albeit, not enough of a threat to warrant a full-scale crack down, such as that of Falun Gong. Nevertheless, any phenomenon such as the Child Beggar Campaign is not going to receive the same kind of praise by the Chinese government that such a social movement would most likely receive in the US. The Communist leadership cannot simply shut down these weibo, under the assertion that they have the child beggar problem "under control," because the Chinese people are already observing a noticeable difference in the efficacy of the authorities and civil society organizations in combating this societal problem. As these weibo become more and more popular, China's blogosphere is beginning to take on attributes that resemble a civil society, the most threatening of which is an avenue for alternative association that goes beyond government control.

Since the beginning of the Child Beggar Campaign last year, microblogs have quickly expanded to perform other functions that are highly characteristic of civil society. Some have served to buttress law enforcement by helping the police to solve cases, while others have even exposed corruption among local party officials. Other weibo sites have even succeeded in raising money for philanthropic endeavors to benefit the poor all across China.²⁹ While many of these microblogs are still in their early stages of development, the potential of such websites to contribute to the advancement of a virtual civil society in China is undeniable.

The Implications of Virtual Civil Society

The striking ability of microblogs to fill this niche in the development of China's civil society has been recognized by many among China's elite, who have observed first-hand the empowering nature of weibo for China's masses. The capacity to mobilize phenomenally large numbers of people across geographical regions is encapsulated in the growth of microblogs that boast followers in the millions, such as that of prominent businessman Xu Xiaoping (徐小平).³⁰ Xu emphasizes that weibo in China are developing in a way unlike any other institution in China today, and he succinctly asserts: "Weibo give people power."³¹

The apparent power of weibo manifests itself in a number of forms, most notably in terms of influencing China's tightly controlled public opinion and as a mechanism for the organization of social movements online. The blogosphere in China is increasingly being understood as more than just a forum for the free expression of ideas, but as a place where people can come together in an organized way to advance a common cause – an idea which resonates with Westerners as the most recognizable aim of civil society.³²

In addition to this more abstract conceptualization of virtual civil society in China, the entrenchment of weibo within Chinese society has also begun to be quantified, as is shown by a recent study by Xie Gengyun (谢耕耘), a professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University (上海交通大学 Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue). Xie's report shows that for Chinese citizens, weibo are now regarded as the most reliable and trustworthy sources for information and news, surpassing in popularity more conventional media like newspapers, and even other internet-based sources, such as online forums and blogs.³³ Xie interprets these findings as

evidence that microblogs are effectively transforming the way that public opinion is formulated in China, since weibo are becoming increasingly critical to determining the content and format of public discourse. In this sense, microblogs are essentially usurping a key power that has historically been monopolized by the elite and the state-run media—the power to decide “hot topics” and to promulgate an agenda for public discourse.³⁴ Rather than a China in which the masses concerned themselves precisely with whatever they were told to, weibo are introducing a new structure where the people themselves define the origins of public opinion.

However, when evaluating the accomplishments of microblogging in terms of advancing civil society in China, it is important not to mistake this trend as evidence of growing leniency among government authorities regarding free speech or free expression on the internet.³⁵ Rather, the failure of censors to “keep up” and maintain their rigid content restrictions on weibo sites is more likely a result of a combination of other factors, including the booming numbers of microbloggers, the high speed at which short microblog posts are made, and the unfamiliarity of the new technology.³⁶ Microblogging in China occurs at such a fast pace and at such a high volume, that government censors are left with no choice but to adjust their standards for what content is acceptable and what is not.³⁷ This inevitably leads to certain politically sensitive topics getting through, while only the most divisive and polarizing posts end up being blocked.

The explosion of microblogging in China has forced government leaders to look for new and innovative ways to combat the rise of civil society via the internet. One such method is to have lower level party officials create weibo accounts of their own. This practice has

spread among local Communist Party bosses, into the ranks of propaganda department, municipal police departments, and even the provincial party chief in Xinjiang province.³⁸ This strategy has been encouraged by individuals such as Chen Tong (陈彤), the executive vice president and editor in chief of Sina.com, which is the largest website in China and also host to the country's most popular weibo. Thanks to his advocating for party officials to embrace this trend, he reportedly convinced one hundred members of China's parliament to launch their own weibo accounts during their most recent annual meeting in March, indicating that this strategy is gradually making its way into higher levels of the Communist Party.³⁹ Despite these increased efforts by the Party to infiltrate the weibo, government officials' prominence in the so-called "blogosphere" pales in comparison to that of other public figures, such as athletes, singers, and other entertainers.⁴⁰ These highly popular accounts have been known to accumulate as many as ten million followers each.⁴¹ However, whether or not such immensely popular blogs can serve as a boon for civil society is much more uncertain.

China's Communist leaders seem to be well aware of the rise of virtual civil society in China, and of the potential threat that this might pose to their regime. Their understanding of the internet and its rising influence in China was exemplified in a speech on February 19, 2011 by Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), in which he instructed a provincial-level Party cadre that the Communist Party as a whole must do a better job controlling the growth of the internet and the xuni shehui (虚拟社会), or "virtual society," that it is creating.⁴² In the same vein, he went on to say that China's leaders must work to

strengthen their mechanisms for "guiding" public opinion.

This speech by President Hu is particularly noteworthy because it took place so soon after the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned as leader and relinquished power under pressure from weeks-long protests in Cairo's Tahrir Square and elsewhere throughout Egypt. This event in turn also prompted an emergency meeting of the Chinese Politburo to address the surging wave of similar uprisings throughout the Middle East, and to discuss what ramifications this might hold for China.⁴³ Coming from the absolute highest level of the Chinese Communist hierarchy, Hu's speech demonstrated a profound understanding of the potentially revolutionary power of the Chinese internet, and expressed a surprisingly frank admittance that the internet was well on its way to developing an alternative avenue for Chinese people to associate with each other besides the Communist-sanctioned channels.

OUTSIDE ADVOCACY

Since 2010, microblogging has exploded on the Chinese internet as one of the most popular forms of alternative association among Chinese people, naturally making the Chinese government extremely nervous and increasingly aware of the threat posed by the growth of a virtual civil society in China. The rise of microblogging does not comport with the story of triumphant Chinese nationalism under the Communist Party, and has revealed a number of underlying social problems that are indicative of the void left by the absence of a full-fledged civil society in China. The internet as a whole, and microblogs in particular, provides the best means for spreading awareness of these kinds of social issues, since it is the

effectively the only form of social media in China that is not fully censored.

Furthermore, there has been an increased frequency and rate of success among independent initiatives by Chinese citizens to strengthen civil society online, often drawing on the models of other websites. This is evidence of the fact that such initiatives are not isolated cases, but rather are indicative of a larger phenomenon. The success of certain websites in addressing important social issues, such as child abductions and human trafficking, have been shown to be able to complement law enforcement, but this is also potentially very embarrassing for the authorities. The sky-rocking popularity of microblogs has also made it much clearer where the government censors draw the line in terms of what is and is not acceptable as “free speech” on the internet.

The challenge posed by the internet to the authority of the ruling Chinese Communist Party has been increasingly magnified in recent months in light of the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the crucial role that websites such as Facebook and Twitter have played in these movements.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the recent crackdown by the Chinese government on political dissidents has elevated the importance of virtual civil society and highlighted the vulnerability of online movements to government restrictions.

The ideal goal for Chinese civil society organizations should be to insulate themselves and websites associated with them from government criticism and backlash in order to prevent a more severe crackdown by the government on such websites. In doing so, they will allow virtual civil society to continue to grow in China. Internet-based NGOs can adopt tactics to help protect themselves from government criticism, as a step towards

instituting more systemic protections in the future, ideally leading to complete internet freedom.

As of today, weibo such as those contributing to the Child Beggar Campaign are being criticized by the Communist Party, but that is not necessarily reason to worry just yet. In recent years, other internet groups have been shut down entirely by government censors, and yet these microblogs continue to grow and thrive.⁴⁵ This gives such groups all the more reason to adopt strategies to preempt a government crackdown, by evading ultra-sensitive political issues, and instead focusing all of their energies and efforts on accomplishing their social missions. In this vein, the question for internet-based NGOs in China becomes not so much about quelling government criticism, but rather about what should be done to prevent a crackdown in this area.

There is also some promise in that the rise of virtual civil society has further exposed the fact that the Chinese government is not a monolith, particularly with regard to issues pertaining to the internet. For outside actors, it is important to recognize that China’s internet is in many ways further along than many other parts of the world in terms of developing civil society online, and this should be thoughtfully acknowledged in discourses with Chinese counterparts. It would not be very prudent for the United States to sing the praises of China’s weibo as running counter to the aims of the Communist Party, but rather, the US should commend such websites on their successes in combating social ills as a distinctively “Chinese solution” to a universal problem.

Additionally, although it might seem natural for the US government to want to provide funding to these internet-based NGOs, either through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

(DRL) or the US Agency for International Development (USAID), such efforts to provide financial support for China's virtual civil society may actually end up backfiring, since they would then run the risk of being associated with unsolicited American involvement in domestic Chinese affairs. Finally, the US government should shy away from direct tactical advice to the Chinese leaders themselves. Rather, China's leaders must come to realize on their own the potential benefits of a vibrant virtual civil society for China's future.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

What follows is a short list of general policy recommendations for both US civil society organizations and the US government for how to best support the advancement of virtual civil society in China:

1. Learn from Chinese successes

American-based civil society organizations should make efforts to learn from the successes of Chinese-based groups in using the internet to further their causes. China's internet is far beyond that of most other countries in terms of the political relevance of online discourse and the widespread nature of internet phenomena. American non-governmental organizations can seek ways to emulate their Chinese counterparts in terms of how they make use of the internet, and various models that have proven to be widely effective and popular in China can be adapted for use in the United States.

2. Pursue "track II" diplomacy

Actors within the United States should put emphasis on "track II" dialogue with their Chinese counterparts in order to buttress the growth of virtual civil society in China. Non-threatening and mutually-beneficial avenues of

exchange, such as holding a conference on microblogging and the implications it has for governance, would be an ideal way for both countries to share and learn from each other, while also strengthening the legitimacy of such websites. If such endeavors are organized through academia, they are much less likely to be perceived as threatening by the Chinese government. These track II exchanges are also beneficial in that they emphasize the fact that the question of using the internet to address social problems is not at all unique to China, but is also highly relevant to the United States.

3. Avoid compromising what has already been achieved

The United States government should do its best to prevent undermining what has already begun to take shape as China's virtual civil society. For those websites that are not yet under attack, we should aim to safeguard them as best as possible, by not bringing excessive international attention to them or providing direct funding, which might cause them to be labeled as "American tools." This will allow more space for civil society to develop on its own in China. The United States should also shy away from direct, tactical advice to the Chinese leadership itself regarding how to address the development of civil society on the internet. Given enough time to grow, this online movement has the potential to propose profound systemic reforms in China, but only if we do not compromise the progress that has already been made.

CONCLUSION

The political impact of connectivity made possible by weibo is undeniable. These online tools serve to strengthen the Chinese people's sense of selves, sense of community, and sense of the political process.⁴⁶ The blogosphere is unlike any

other form of association in China today in that it decisively cuts across geographic lines and class lines. The internet takes people out of the physical confines of their natural communities, and places them in a broader, de-territorialized space. It is thanks to this dynamism that the internet holds such vast potential in terms of creating a virtual civil society in China. Judging from the developments over the past year, microblogs hold great promise as an invaluable tool for civil society organizations. However, despite the fact that many of these websites are not yet under attack from the Communist regime, there are signs that China's leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the threat posed by this phenomenon. It is in this context and with a full appreciation of the nuances of Chinese society that outsiders must approach the internet in China. Only then can we hope to be able to safeguard China's nascent virtual society, and perhaps give it more room to grow.

¹ “小文乐昨回家 父亲彭高峰变身志愿者 (Little Wenle returned home yesterday, father turns self into volunteer),” 现在新闻 (Xianzai News), <http://news.cnxianzai.com/2011/02/314665.html>.

¹ “Weibo reunites father with kidnapped son after three long years,” shanghaiist, <http://shanghaiist.com/2011/02/09/weibo-reunites-father-kidnapped-son.php>.

¹ Link to Deng Fei's microblog account: <http://t.qq.com/dengfei/>.

¹ Louisa Lim, “In China, Dad Uses Social Media To Find Missing Boy,” NPR, <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/10/133644822/Chinas-Social-Media-Help-To-Rescue-Abducted-Boy>.

¹ C. Custer, “Child Beggars and a Revolution of Digital Conscience,” ChinaGeeks, <http://chinageeks.org/2011/02/child-beggars-and-a-revolution-of-digital-conscience/>.

¹ 蔡胜龙 (Cai Shenglong) 和 何剑辉 (He Jianhui), “解救乞讨儿童行动引关注 网友上传 900 多幅照片 (Child beggar campaign attracts attention, netizens post over 900 pictures),” 腾讯新闻 (Tencent News), <http://news.qq.com/a/20110207/000095.htm>.

¹ Yongnian Zheng and Joseph Fewsmith, *China's Opening Society: The Non-State Sector and Governance*, (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 88.

¹ Interview with Rebecca MacKinnon, New America Foundation. See also Ziyue Tai, *The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 3-24.

¹ Guobin Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 126-8.

¹ Keith B. Richburg, “In China, microblogging sites become free-speech platform,” *The Washington Post*, [livepage.apple.comhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-china-microblogging-sites-become-free-speech-platform/2011/03/22/AFcsxlkB_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-china-microblogging-sites-become-free-speech-platform/2011/03/22/AFcsxlkB_story.html).

¹ Interview with Cathy Yan, *The Wall Street Journal*. See also Xiaoling Zhang and Yongnian Zheng, *China's Information and Communications Technology Revolution: Social changes and state responses*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 4-7.

¹ Michael Kan, “China blocks microblogs for Jasmine Revolution,” IDG, <http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=A1B048E7-1A64-6A71-CE3AF5E4803C886E>.

¹ Richard McGregor, *The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2010) pp. 46-51.

¹ Jon Russell, “Microblogging in China: Politics, censorship & 120 million users,” *asiancorrespondent.com*, [livepage.apple.comhttp://asiancorrespondent.com/51332/microblogging-in-china-politics-censorship-120-million-users/](http://asiancorrespondent.com/51332/microblogging-in-china-politics-censorship-120-million-users/).

¹ Austin Ramzy, “China's Crackdown on Dissidents Continues,” *Time*, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1963609,00.html>.

¹ Interview with Hu Yong, Associate Professor of Journalism at Peking University. See also Qiusa Ma, *Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China: Paving the Way to Civil Society?* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 15.

¹ Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Hsu, *China in an Era of Transition: Understanding Contemporary State and Society Actors*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 19-29.

¹ “News Media Tool Floods China,” *The Asia Business*, <http://eng.ajnews.co.kr/view.jsp?newsId=20110329000181>.

¹ Interview with Jing Chen, Princeton University. See also Neil J. Diamant, Stanley B. Lubman, and Kevin J. O'Brien, *Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) pp. 114-121 and Jonathan Schwartz and Shawn Shieh, *State and Society Responses to Social Welfare Needs in China: Serving the People*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 28.

¹ Stan Schroeder, “China Blocks Twitter (And Almost Everything Else),” *Mashable*, <http://mashable.com/2009/06/02/china-blocks-twitter-and-almost-everything-else/>.

¹ Stan Schroeder, “China Blocks Twitter (And Almost Everything Else),” *Mashable*, <http://mashable.com/2009/06/02/china-blocks-twitter-and-almost-everything-else/>.

¹ Link to Yu Jianrong's Sina Weibo account: <http://t.sina.com.cn/jiejiquier>.

¹ Qiu Ming, “Stop Running and Think For A Moment,” *XXZB*, <http://www.zonaeuropa.com/201102a.brief.htm#016>.

¹ He Caitou, “Who Is Being Abducted And Sold Off?” <http://www.zonaeuropa.com/201102a.brief.htm#015>.

¹ “Family holiday strengthens campaign to rescue stolen

children,” Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-02/07/c_13721776.htm.

¹ Evan Kornbluh, “Official Backlash Against the Child Beggar Campaign,” West of Middle, <http://westofmiddle.wordpress.com/2011/02/22/official-backlash-against-the-child-beggar-campaign/>.

¹ “Downsides unseen of child-abduction blug, online rogues,” Global Times, <http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2011-02/622091.html>.

¹ Ma, pp. 45-6.

¹ Thank you to Martin Flaherty for this observation.

¹ Some microblogs have even been taken on more entrepreneurial forms, as exemplified by a campaign initiated by bloggers in the days leading up to Valentine’s Day, who in reference to Yu’s inspirational model named their weibo: “taking snapshots to rescue singles” (随手拍照解救单

身, Suishou paizhao jiejiu danshen) <http://t.gzstv.com/index.php?m=ta&name=随手拍照解救单身>.

¹ Link to Xu’s Sina Weibo account: <http://blog.sina.com.cn/xuxiaoping>.

¹ Yang Yang, “Information flow draws more people to weibo,” China Daily Europe, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-04/22/content_12376555.htm.

¹ Baogang He, *The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), p. 13-18.

¹ Pang Qi, “Microblogging increasing rapidly in China,” Global Times, <http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2011-04/606969.html>.

¹ “微波成为中国民众发言平台 (Microblogs have become a platform for free-speech for China’s masses),” 大纪元 (The Epoch Times), <http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/11/4/6/n3219992p.htm>.

¹ Thank you to Elizabeth Wickeri for this important observation.

¹ Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin, *Online Chinese Nationalism and China’s Bilateral Relations*, (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), p. 75.

¹ David Barboza, “Despite Restrictions, Microblogs Catch on in China,” The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/16/business/global/16blogs.html>.

¹ Zheng jinran, “Xinjiang Party chief opens micro blog,” China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011npc/2011-03/03/content_12110976.htm.

¹ “China’s leaders embrace social media,” China Media Project, <http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/03/02/10346/>.

¹ Xiang Zhou, “The political blogosphere in China: A content analysis of the blogs regarding the dismissal of Shanghai leader Chen Liangyu,” *New Media & Society*, Shanghai University, <http://nms.sagepub.com/content/11/6/1003.full.pdf>.

¹ “Chinese microblogs growing faster than Twitter,” *Want China Times*, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20110520000007&cid=1503>.

¹ Xuni shehui can also be translated as “imaginary society” or “fictitious society.” <http://news.qq.com/a/20110220/000168.htm>

¹ Ju Li-chyun, “Politburo Plans Ahead to Stile Discussion of Unrest,” *Want China Times*, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass->

[cnt.aspx?id=20110220000067&cid=1101](http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20110220000067&cid=1101).

¹ Perry Link, “How China Fears the Middle East Revolutions,” *The New York Review of Books*, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/mar/24/how-china-fears-middle-east-revolutions/>.

¹ Michael Sainsbury, “China hits Gmail in censorship crackdown,” *The Australian*, [livepage.apple.comhttp://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/china-hits-gmail-in-censorship-crackdown/story-e6frg6so-1226025648501](http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/china-hits-gmail-in-censorship-crackdown/story-e6frg6so-1226025648501).

¹ Thank you to Evan Osnos for this important point.

REFERENCES

Balme, Stephanie, and Michael W Dowdle. *Building Constitutionalism in China*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Brook, Timothy, and B. Michael Frolic. *Civil Society in China*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997.

Cai, Yongshun. *State and Laid-Off Workers in Reform China: The Silence and Collective Action of the Retrenched*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Chan, Chris King-Chi. *The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes and the Changing Labour Regime in Global Factories*. London: Routledge, 2010.

Daniere, Amrita, and Mike Douglass. *The Politics of Civic Space in Asia: Building urban communities*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Davis, Deborah, and Feng Wang. *Creating Wealth and Poverty in Postsocialist China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Deng, Zhenglai 邓正来. *Country and Society: China Civil Society Research, 国家与社会: 中国市民社会研究* (Guojia yu shehui: Zhongguo shimin shehui yanjiu). Chengdu 成都市: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1997.

Diamant, Neil J, Stanley B Lubman, and Kevin J O'Brien. *Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

Dittmer, Lowell, and Guoli Liu. *China's Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition*. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006.

Friedmann, John. *China's Urban Transition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

Hao, Yufan, and Lin Su. *China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force And Chinese American Policy*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005.

- Hasmath, Reza, and Jennifer Hsu. *China in an Era of Transition: Understanding Contemporary State and Society Actors*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- He, Baogang. *The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997.
- Kluver, Randy, and John H. Powers. *Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and Chinese Communities*. Stamford: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1999.
- Lu, Yiyi. *Non-Governmental Organizations in China: The Rise of Dependent Autonomy*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Lubman, Stanley B. *Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Lubman, Stanley B, ed. *China's Legal Reforms*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Ma, Qiusha. *Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China: Paving the Way to Civil Society?* New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Madsen, Richard. *China's Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- McGregor, Richard. *The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2010.
- Ngok, Ma. *Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007.
- Schwartz, Jonathan, and Shawn Shieh. *State and Society Responses to Social Welfare Needs in China: Serving the People*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Shen, Simon, and Shaun Breslin. *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations*. New York: Lexington Books, 2010.
- Tai, Zixue. *The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Unger, Jonathan, ed. *Associations and the Chinese State: Contested Spaces*. Stamford: M. E. Sharpe, 2008.
- Wakeman, Frederic E. *Telling Chinese History: A Selection of Essays*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
- White, Gordon, Jude Howell, and Xiaoyuan Shang. *In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Whyte, Martin King. *Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive Injustice in Contemporary China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- Wu, Xiaoqun 吴效群. *The Historical Changes of Beijing's Civil Society 北京民间社会的历史变迁* (Beijing minjian shehui de lishi bianqian). 2006.
- Yang, Guobin. *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
- Yu, Keping 俞可平. *Democracy Is A Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009.
- Zhang, Xiaoling, and Yongnian Zheng. *China's Information and Communications Technology Revolution: Social changes and state responses*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Zheng, Yongnian, and Joseph Fewsmith. *China's Opening Society: The Non-State Sector and Governance*. New York: Routledge, 2008.

THE “RISK-AVERSE” JAPANESE-JAPANESE ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Princeton Kwong '12

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, Japan has been relatively stagnant in its entrepreneurial activities. As opposed to American corporations, where avant-garde innovation is a key criterion to modern success, a bulk of Japanese business wealth today is accumulated through “dynasty” corporations; that is, companies that have been in the industry for several decades. These already-established companies utilize their veteran status in their respective industries to take pre-existing concepts that have been developed elsewhere and improve upon them. When one thinks of the major, money-earning industries in Japan, the first thoughts that come to mind are automobiles and electronic technology: Japanese world corporations. One may view a 3-D television set from Sony as “innovative” technology, however, this is not an entrepreneurial idea nor is it a start-up to a new enterprise. The product is still merely a TV with improved modifications. Additionally, the new car models released every few years from Japanese automotive industries such as Toyota and Honda may be seen as “innovative” with their refurbished designs, GPS systems, and plethora of modern, integrated technology. Nevertheless, these are again simply improvements made from the original entrepreneurial corporate designs that were established in Japan following the advent of the automobile in the early 1900s. It is important to note that the automobiles and electronics industries

that fuel Japan’s economy were all originally the ideas of American entrepreneurs. The first general, all-purpose computer, ENIAC, was conceived in 1946 in the U.S. Ford revolutionized automobile production in 1908 in the U.S. Although Japan prides and maintains itself as one of the world’s foremost retailers in the automobile and technology industries, these coveted productions alone have not been enough to raise Japan out of its recession.

History clearly shows that “that the business likely to drive economies 25 years from now will NOT come from today’s large established companies, but from the efforts of entrepreneurs starting companies yesterday, today, or tomorrow.” Noriyuki Takahashi, a professor of economics from Musashi University in Tokyo, Japan states, “Unless new firms are created, the Japanese economy won't easily be revitalized, but that recognition has yet to emerge.”ⁱⁱⁱ Statistics from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) have clearly shown that the rate of new firm emergence in Japan remains shockingly low compared to that of its neighbors’.

According to the Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) consisting of the top 65 countries, data from GEM shows that Japan has consistently oscillated from last place to 64th place, next to Puerto Rico, within the last decade.ⁱⁱⁱ Note that the TEA percentage is obtained by measuring each country’s entrepreneurial activity as a percentage of that country’s GDP. Seeing that Japan’s GDP is second only to the United States,

one would assume that similarly to the U.S., Japan's entrepreneurial activity would rank high as well. Puerto Rico has one of the lowest GDPs in the world at a -5.80% growth rate^{iv}, which signifies that Japan's entrepreneurial activity stands appallingly low, on par with underdeveloped countries despite having the status of an economically superior country. I found it quite disturbing to discover that Japan is so behind this stratum. Thus, I decided to research the reasons behind the stagnant properties of Japanese entrepreneurship.

Why has Japan lagged in its movement away from entrepreneurship and novel platforms for its companies? Popular preconceptions and stereotypes of Japanese would offer the convenient answer: "The Japanese are opportunists and are afraid to take risks." The world has looked upon Japan's new Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, as a risk-averse opportunist.^v "Rather than a crusading visionary, Kan looks more like a stereotypical Japanese salary man: a bland, opportunistic, risk-averse leader who prefers to go with the flow." Throughout his term, contrary to the insistence of his cabinet members, Kan opted to not challenge any of Japan's status quos. However, despite these publicized words, it would be baseless and fallacious to use Japanese clichés and stigmatic images as the sole explanation for the lack of entrepreneurial activity in Japan. In order to find more substantive and concrete evidence to answer this question, I decided to investigate deeper not only Japanese societal influences but the Japanese business structure as well.

Through my research, I have found that there are several factors that contribute to the dormant nature of the entrepreneurial drive. In this paper, I want to show that the lack of entrepreneurial activity is something inherently Japanese. Initially, I will use a

sociology theoretical approach to provide general frameworks to better understand the prosperity of entrepreneurship in America and the adversity to it in Japan. I will then differentiate my research into three subcategories. Firstly, I will analyze the business structures in Japanese companies and their internal hierarchal properties. Next, I will evaluate cultural and societal backings specific to Japan in order to ascertain a pattern between Japanese cultural tendencies and the fear of entrepreneurship. And thirdly, I will utilize the Geert Hofstede framework, which provides a comprehensive study of how values in the workplace are influenced by culture, and I will use those findings to link back to my prior two research results on Japanese business and cultural explanations. Finally, after laying down the overall structure of the shortcomings that are inhibiting entrepreneurship in Japan, I will conclude with a generally positive direction for Japanese entrepreneurship in the future.

KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF A SUCCESSFUL ENTREPRENEUR

Before we delve into the analysis, however, it is important to first define the key characteristics of a successful entrepreneur in order to understand the areas in which Japan is lacking. Successful entrepreneurship can be summed up overall into five categories: risk, drive, experience, organization, and leadership.^{vi}

The ability to take on risks is arguably the most crucial element in starting a company. Risk plays an increasingly large role in entrepreneurship as public needs becomes more difficult to predict and interpret. Thus, a good entrepreneur must know and understand the risks at hand and must be brave and daring enough to take on both the expected and unforeseen challenges. Even amidst product failure, successful

entrepreneur has the ability to rebound and try again; unfazed by past failures.

Drive refers to recognition of opportunity, vision, and persistence. In order to succeed, goals must be focused upon to ensure that demands are met and that a solid directive is maintained. Vision allows for novelty, innovation, and administration of the current and future movement of the company. Passion and persistence are needed, as the entrepreneur must be completely committed to building his company even in rough times, which undoubtedly accompany any startup.

Experience is what allows an entrepreneur to draw upon previous technical knowledge and background in order to manage the technical aspects of the company. A lack of experience leads to the inadequacy of handling future unforeseen problems.

Organization is key to maintaining the firm as a singular unit. Communication must be fluid amongst the members of the company, as the initial count is sparse. All must be devoted to the goal of the company, and priorities must be properly delegated to ensure maximum efficiency amongst the fledgling company.

Finally, leadership is a necessity for any aspiring entrepreneur. Looking at this past decade's thriving American startups such as Google and Facebook, it is evident that Lawrence Page, Sergey Brin, and Mark Zuckerberg, the respective CEOs of these two companies, all share these commanding qualities. When looking at Japanese startups, experience, organization, and leadership may be visible, but it appears that there is a severe lack of risk taking and opportunity exploitation.

JAPANESE VS. U.S. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS

Having established what is needed for a generally successful entrepreneur, let us now interpret the general layouts among business styles, which is critical for understanding what creates or bridles this generation's entrepreneurial drive. In sociological organizational theory, there are three main systems that model the developmental paths of companies. These three organizational perspectives, or systems, are Rational Systems, Natural Systems, and Open Systems. For this paper, I will focus on the initial two: Rational and Natural Systems.

Rational Systems can be thought of as formalized bureaucracy. This system closely models pre-established and relatively large firms. Overall, the most important characteristic of an organization in this system is accomplishing specific, solid goals and adhering to the formal, written roles that help lead to the overall goal of the organization. Boundaries within the company are highly formalized and activities in the company are defined by roles and role relationships. There is a clear hierarchy of authority, almost bureaucratic in form. Since the division of labor is so extreme, there is a high degree of de-skilling of the worker and dehumanization of the workplace. Managers direct their workers through strict administration, and in turn, worker moral and productivity is optimized through material incentives. The system runs on task relationships, rules, and rewards. This models the very traditional form of Japanese "dynasty" companies. Recently, however, entrepreneurs of the world have been shifting away from this particular organizational perspective and have begun a movement toward a more conducive system of starting new companies.

Natural Systems is a framework of an organization that holds a different mindset toward goals, boundaries, and activities and is widely connected with

entrepreneurial companies and smaller firms. This system generally relies heavily upon the human resource and relation sectors of the company. The goals are not purely instrumental to the company, but rather are a conglomerate of the aspirations of the employees of the company. Behavior of the participants is not guided strictly by formal and written rules set by the organization. However, the organization does function as a sort of social system for its participants. Here the participants feel as though perpetuation of the company as a whole is an essential part of pursuing their own desires and goals. The employees work for the company not for monetary incentives but because of their love for their work and their drive to prolong the company. Natural System closely fits U.S. smaller companies in their fledgling state, where cooperation and unified drive is critical in launching a productive company. These two systems provide the basic frameworks that I will use to classify and delineate general Japanese company operations from that of U.S. company operations.

The new wave of U.S. industries has closely adopted the Natural System setup for companies. The highlights of Google for example, using the Natural Systems approach, are quite clear. Google portrays itself to the public as a hub and a generator of unique and brilliant ideas, mainly stemming from the spontaneous minds of its employees. It prides itself on being “not a conventional company” and on the fact that it “does not intend to become one.”^{vii} Management takes on a very organic nature in the sense that communication remains fluid and free-flowing between manager and employee, and that the manager is integrated with the teamwork. In other words, Google is consciously trying to stray from the path of bureaucracy. The workers are passionate about their work and self-goals as much as they are about the company

itself. Employees are encouraged to enjoy their freedom to pursue their desires. This mentality has been preserved throughout Google’s startup process, and the straying from strict hierarchal boundaries has been an essential trademark of most up-and-coming entrepreneurial firms. The freedom and united direction within these companies has allowed for an unhindered mind in pushing into novel boundaries and markets. Natural System-style organizations model the ideal conception of an entrepreneurial company.

Japanese large firms, on the other hand, are represented by a Rational System-like company structure; one of bureaucratic nature. Thus far, I have gained an understanding of Japanese company mindset and attitudes and have examined how the many aspects of strict bureaucracy in Japanese companies have led to a lack of entrepreneurial growth. My research has revealed that business structures and social construction and organization provide explanations for Japan’s lack of entrepreneurial growth.

I. JAPANESE COMPANY STRUCTURE: INTERNAL HIERARCHY AND ATTITUDES

As noted above, the Japanese economy is maintained heavily by “dynasty” companies. In order to attain a better notion of this term “dynasty,” it is important to understand where Japanese companies initially attained their power. Today’s well known companies such as Mitsubishi and Nissan are remnants of the zaibatsu, early 1900s vertical-chain-of-command firms. These companies were ruled by family name and employed their immense financial and monopoly power. Everything from manufacturing and retailing to banking shared the name of the company. After World War II, the zaibatsu dissolved and reformed into the

keiretsu, companies with horizontal integration and interlocking business relationships.^{viii} Although pure monopolies no longer exist, many argue that remnants of zaibatsu mentality still exist amongst the keiretsu.^{ix} Taking note of Japan's automobile industry, for example, it would be nearly impossible for a new automobile company to be founded since current organizations such as Toyota and Honda maintain such a substantial amount of power. Toyota is widely viewed as one of the obvious zaibatsu vertically-integrated companies still existing today under the publically accepted keiretsu façade.^x There would be no point in investing money in a company that could not compete in a keiretsu-linked monopoly. Although this mentality is perfectly reasonable with respect to entering an automobile industry, it appears as if this notion and opposition to entering markets has cascaded into basic entrepreneurial disposition. A look into the hierarchy of Japanese bureaucracy reveals why Japan is perpetually stuck in the Rational System organizational perspective and sees little movement toward the entrepreneur-friendly Natural System.

THE JAPANESE BUSINESS SYSTEM

As a corporation grows, it is logical to say that more bureaucracy is needed to maintain order and direction amidst thousands of employees. This is a characteristic of large companies in general. Japan's interlinking of large firms through the keiretsu system thus explains the necessary implementation of hierarchal structure, a key component of bureaucracy. Two major aspects common among Japanese firms that I have focused on are management's controlling of employee opportunism and the contrasting role of Japanese venture capitalist firms compared to American

firms. I draw from these observations to reveal their subsequent detrimental effects on stimulating entrepreneurship.

i. The Controlling of Employee Opportunism

As noted in the key criteria for an entrepreneur, a drive for seeking opportunism is an important characteristic shared amongst successful entrepreneurs. However, in Japan it appears that the idea of opportunism in a worker is discouraged through strict bureaucracy. Dr. Aoki Masahiko, the current President and Chief Research Officer (CRO) of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (REITI) in Japan, provides insight into the managerial logic behind Japanese executives. Masahiko postulates that the 'autonomy' of workshop groups regarding work duties "gives rise to opportunistic behavior on the part of the workers."^{xi} The underlying theory that Japanese managers share is that the onset of the "individual within the group" further weakens the strong relationship between the group and the company.^{xii} The working force of the company abides by the authority of the managerial staff with very little room for individual input. Hierarchy in Japanese companies instills a somewhat aimless nature in the Japanese workman. I use the term "aimless" not in the sense of "no direction" but more towards the meaning of "no need for direction." Because working for a large company in Japan ensures job stability and some form of social status, there is a great feeling of normality, attendance, and complacency. In Japan, the job wage is based on a "seniority-based wage system." That is, elder status and term of work with the company directly correlate to how much one is paid in Japan. With hierarchy set in place, Japanese workers thus seek to stay in one company for as long as possible in order to increase their

earnings. There simply is no encouragement to start a new company, not only due to the risk and low pay, but also because should a start-up fail, time would reset on the seniority counter, assuming the entrepreneur returned to a new firm to work. One may counter with the argument, "Have workers ever voiced their discontent with their treatment within the company?" The answer to this is surely yes, yet the means by which Japanese firms have controlled this have ratified the attitude of the Japanese employees, who go with the flow of bureaucracy rather than going against it.

CONTROLLED WORKER ASSESSMENT AND INDIVIDUALITY DETERRENTS

In Japan, the workplace is like a controlled environment that strives to ensure no form of individualism. Whatever chance of autonomy a worker may have is lost amidst the strict moderation by Japanese higher-up managers. There does exist a rigid concept of worker assessment where employees are systematically gauged based on their work performance and are subsequently rewarded or demoted. This appears to lend a sort of freedom to the hierarchal structure of the Japanese company as the employee is given power over his positioning through these assessments. In reality, however, the Japanese worker assessment system achieves nothing and works against the notion of an autonomous worker. "Interviews are conducted, but employees are not notified of their assessment results,"^{xiii} nor do they have the right to access their appraisals. There have been past cases where employees who had been working for a long period of time in a company were not given proper treatment or deserved promotions. These various claims of employee discrimination were

consequently brought before the Japanese courts, a rare sign of the rise of the worker's voice against the company.

Although these cases were brought before a judge, company hierarchy interestingly remained prevalent even in the court room, under Japanese law. In court, "judges rarely order companies to present assessment results as evidence to substantiate their claims. They usually permit companies to arrange the testimony of many bosses, and employees to make the counterargument."^{xiv} It is not uncommon for cases regarding assessment discrimination in Japan to take more than ten years to resolve. "Moreover the costs for going to trial are exorbitant."^{xv} Seeing this as an ongoing trend with employees who have tried to speak up against their company, and faced unfair court procedure, long and drawn out case times, and expensive court fees, it would seem unwise for an employee to engage in opportunistic behavior, as the opportunity costs of the resulting aftermath all point to sunk costs. Thus, once situated within the Rational System of Japanese corporations, "herd mentality" sets in, and employees serve to follow the direction that the company has administered for them. As a result, there are very few cases today where workers stand up for themselves because the Japanese court system has been proven to be disadvantageous for employees.

It is precisely because companies apply their domineering hand over their employees that opportunism is not rampant among Japanese workers. The idea of working outside of a large company in Japan is almost unthinkable as the large corporations maintain their zaibatsu behavior toward their employees; that is, a monopoly over the direction of one's work. Harnessing of opportunities is the stimulator of the growth of entrepreneurship. Even if the vision

exists, however, the startup will never start if the opportunity is not taken. Many Japanese are well aware of this notion as it has been brought up on Japanese internet web blogs. As translated from one Japanese blog, one person writes, "If you have all the ideas but you don't take action, then you cannot be called a real entrepreneur."^{xvi} In addition to this sort of engineered complacency of employees within Japanese companies, there is yet another factor that has proven to be quite unfavorable for entrepreneurial development in Japan. Let us say that an individual does indeed have the innovative idea as well as the bravery to individually push for an opportunity to start a new company. Without sufficient funds, the idea will not be carried through. Regardless of the type of startup company, money is always the limiting factor that is needed to see a new firm into succession. In business, there are companies that specialize in granting private risk capital to entrepreneurs. These are called venture capital firms. We now come across the second problem for Japanese entrepreneurs: the attitude of the Japanese venture capital firms toward entrepreneurial companies.

ii. Japanese Venture Capital Risk Aversion

Although it is dangerous and boundless to label the entire Japanese population with the stereotype of being risk-adverse, through a comparison between American and Japanese venture capital firms, it is evident that through the years of investment patterns, risk aversion may very well be a decisive impetus for the lacking of entrepreneurial activity in Japan. Data from the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy have given conclusive results on the differences between American and Japanese private

risk capital investments.

For American venture capital companies, financing can be split into roughly six different categories: seed, start-up, other early-stage, expansion, leveraged buyout, and acquisition.^{xvii} The first three are often categorized as start-up funds and typically account for more than 40% of all venture capital investment expenditure in America. The latter three represent 60% of capital dedicated to later state company investments.^{xviii} Based on this data, it is evident that there is a significant amount of "risky" investment that is put into fledgling companies. These funds are what allow the greatly-needed start to more quickly stimulate the company toward actuality. Generous American venture capital organizations are largely responsible for the ranking of entrepreneurial growth in comparison with the rest of the world on the world classification scale.^{xix} Looking at these same numerical data values for Japan, however, we see that the venture capital firms in Japan are taking a strikingly opposite and more conservative pattern with their private risk capital investments.

In Japan, statistics show that venture capital companies remain relatively unwilling to provide significant investments to early-stage entrepreneur companies. According to the studies conducted by Masaaki Kawagoe, an economics graduate from Tokyo University and currently an economics researcher at Oxford University, results show that, indeed, "the fundamental problem is that private risk capital in Japan is risk-adverse."^{xx} Figures taken in the late 1990s on venture capital behavior show that about 20% of new venture capital investment went to companies that were between ten and 19 years old, and nearly 40% went to those that were 20 years or older. Investment in companies aged five years or less, by contrast, had negligible investments.^{xxi} Clearly, there is

risk when investing capital in start-ups, whose success in the market is not noticeable in the early stages. Judging by the behavior of Japanese venture capitalists, these companies are dodging the risks and are not willing to invest in early-stage firms. Veteran companies that have been established for over a decade and that have already produced viable products are the ones who receive a bulk of the investment funds.

It is evident that business structure, behavior, and attitude are key elements that delineate American entrepreneurial activity from Japanese entrepreneurial activity. In America, employees are not as corralled and restricted, and individual ideas are encouraged by the company, as seen with organizations such as Google. In Japan, however, individualism in an employee is seen as a stigma and is rejected. Workers have very little voice of their own and very limited rights within the company. Thus there is very little incentive and opportunism in Japan for the pursuit of entrepreneurship. Moreover, in America, initial funding to start new companies is more available than it is in Japan. Japanese venture capitalists remain apathetic toward substantial investments in start-up companies. Thus far, I have analyzed the Japanese business structures and attitudes and their relationship with the dormancy of entrepreneurship in Japan. To properly address the stereotype of “Japanese risk-aversion,” my research does not stop at the scrutiny of Japanese businesses but expands into the evaluation of cultural and societal backings specific to Japan. The goal is to ascertain a pattern between Japanese cultural and social tendencies and the lack of entrepreneurship.

II. CULTURAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN RELATION TO RISK-AVERSION

In addition to the business structures in Japan, there are several factors of Japanese culture and society that provide possible explanations for limited entrepreneurship. Culturally, failure is very closely linked to dishonor, and Japanese history has created a discouraging mindset toward the resultant ramifications should one fail at a venture. Additionally, incentives too colloquial in Japan, social conditions dictate more of a convergence toward staying with large, prominent companies. Recent Japanese age demographics and aspects that govern social worth have proven to be obstacles to establishing new entrepreneurs.

i. Failure and Dishonor Stigmas

A common process with any entrepreneurship is the possibility or contingency of failure. However, particularly with Japanese culture, failure has been linked with serious negative repercussions and thus disparages start-ups. Stemming all the way back to the 12th century, we see the early signs of reactions to failure in the bushido, the Japanese code of conduct and a way of samurai life. Under the bushido ideal, if a samurai failed to maintain and uphold his honor, the only way he could regain it was to perform a ritual suicide known as seppuku.^{xxiii} Although this may seem like a much exaggerated effect, in modern day Japanese society, this idea of suicide from failure has been for some unfortunate businessmen whose ventures were unable to launch. Because of the heavy stigma that accompanies failure, founders of failed businesses become social outcasts as no one is willing to re-hire them or fund them again. Japanese banks set extremely tough conditions for loans, forcing borrowers to use relatives and friends as guarantors who become liable for the defaulted loans, producing extreme guilt and despair in the borrower.^{xxiiii} Vaguely similar to the seppuku mentality, in many

cases, the only feasible way to regain “honor” without putting the burden on the guarantors is by “taking responsibility for their unpaid loans and outstanding debts through life insurance payouts;”^{xxiv} in other words, suicide.

One such case occurred in the summer of 2003 when three Osaka residents, a husband, a wife, and her brother, leapt in front of an oncoming train on the Japan Railway Kansai Line. According to the reports and suicide letter found, the husband of the family “had borrowed 20,000 yen from various sources; the amount to be repaid now totaled 150,000 yen.”^{xxv} Debt collectors pressed for returns, but when the couple could not come up with the sum of money, the wife concluded, “We have decided to apologize with our lives.”^{xxvi} Looking at the couple’s debt, it was roughly \$1,500 U.S. dollars, yet suicide was the unfortunate route they chose.

Cases such as this are quite frequent in Japan. With such a negative and rather depressing connotation related to failure involving money loss, and because entrepreneurship involves a high rate of risk and deficiency, it is not surprising that many are hesitant to proceed with entering a start-up.

In contrast to Japanese culture, failure carries no stigma in the Silicon Valley, America’s hub for new high-tech entrepreneurs. From my personal experiences, tech entrepreneurs from places such as Palo Alto or Berkeley typically begin a conversation by talking about their current startup. Then the conversation transitions, and they soon start to boast about all their previous failed start-up ventures. As seen here, failure at entrepreneurship does not demonstrate inadequacy within the individual, but rather, shows that to have failed means to have gained experience and to have learned. And as previously stated, since venture capitalist firms in

America are exponentially more generous with their investments, failure at a start-up in America often is not accompanied with the massive financial debts as seen in Japan.

ii. Social Factors

Contrary to popular belief, according to the global entrepreneurship monitor, there is a negative correlation between start-up rate and the share of a young population. One would think that more entrepreneurs would be of youthful ages, where energy and daringness prescribe the ability to take on the demands of a start-up company. However, “the oldest age group (ages fifty-five to sixty-four) experienced the largest increase in entrepreneurial activity from 2007 to 2008 (0.31 percent to 0.36 percent), making it the age group with the highest entrepreneurial activity rate.”^{xxvii} Thus it turns out that over the past decade or so, the highest rate of entrepreneurial activity has belonged to the 55 – 64 age group. The 20 – 34 age bracket, meanwhile, which one would usually identify with the “swashbuckling and risk taking youth” of Facebook and Google, has the lowest rate.^{xxviii} However, judging by the age demographics of Japan, statistics further conflict with this general age group trend of entrepreneurs.

Statistically speaking, the aging of Japan outweighs all other nations; it has the highest proportion of elderly citizens, with 21% over the age of 60.^{xxix} It is roughly estimated that if the age trend continues, the percentage is expected to increase to 40% by 2055. Japan holds the highest concentration of elderly in the world for several reasons.

Firstly, the World Health Organization in 2000 reported that “Japan provides one of the best healthcare systems in the world among 191 member countries.”^{xxx} Premiums on healthcare are affordable because they are based on income and ability to pay. “The poorest

can be supported by the national health insurance program offered by the government.^{xxxix} Another reason for the longevity is the Japanese diet. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations in 2001, Japan had one of the lowest consumption rates of saturated fat among developed countries. Additionally, since the late 1970s, the average number of children born to a woman over her lifetime has been estimated to be fewer than two due to legal abortions, birth control, and late marriage, which results from an increase in participation of women in the working force.^{xxxii} For these reasons, Japan holds a higher concentration of older people. Thus a valid question arises. If Japan has the highest concentration of elderly individuals who are at an optimal age for entrepreneurs, why is it then that Japan is an anomaly with regards to entrepreneur aging patterns? This can be explained in two reasons that revolve around defining one's social worth in society.

SENIORITY-BASED WAGE SYSTEM

In Japan, there exists a system called the seniority-wage system, or *nenko joretsu*. In this particular form of Japanese employment system, workers are promoted with higher salary in relation to their proximity to retirement. Employees begin with a standard, basic wage and receive an increase in pay for each year of service. "The seniority-based wage system keeps workers from changing jobs since after a few years of employment they enjoy a wage level that could not be matched if they moved to another company."^{xxxiii} There is very little incentive for a worker to retire early from a company thus contributing to the idea of lifetime employment. A typical young man will enter a company at age 22 already anticipating his retirement in the same company at age 65. This gives an

explanation as to why very few workers are available to invest their time into starting a new company. With most workers achieving their highest status in the company in their later years of service, this system works directly against the trend of older individuals being more likely to start a business.

THE IMPORTANCE OF A BUSINESS CARD

In Japanese society, one's social worth is often dictated during first-time introductions with others. Generally, in meetings, one is greeted by the initial contact upon arrival and is taken to a meeting room. Here teams meet and there is a polite exchanging of business cards. "One of the reasons why Japanese so ritually proffer and accept business cards at meetings is the sense of pride in belonging to the company of a Japanese salary man."^{xxxiv} To a great extent, a Japanese man and his family are "socially ranked by the reputation of the company he works for and the position and prospects he has there."^{xxxv} Because the low rate of entrepreneurial activity in Japan, being an entrepreneur holds the stigma of being slightly eccentric or a misfit in society. A business card that is not affiliated with a *kabushiki kaisha*, or large, well-known Japanese corporation, does not initially promote the social status of the holder. This being said, it is understandable that in addition to the older generation aiming to increase their status within the company, the younger generation aims to enter a company that would grant an immediate incipient status as opposed to the unknown prestige of an entrepreneur.

Thus far I have analyzed the business hierarchy aspects of Japanese companies and the social stigmas and effects relating to entrepreneurship in Japan. To sum up my findings and conclusions, I will utilize the Geert



Hofstede framework, which provides a comprehensive study of how values in the workplace are influenced by culture, and use those findings to link back to my prior two research results on Japanese business and cultural explanations.

III. GEERT HOFSTEDE FRAMEWORK

“Dr. Geert Hofstede conducted perhaps the most comprehensive study of how values in the workplace are influenced by culture. From 1967 to 1973, while working at IBM as a psychologist, he collected and analyzed data from over 100,000 individuals from forty countries. From those results, and later additions, Hofstede developed a model that identifies five primary dimensions to differentiate cultures.”^{xxxvi}

The first of five elements is the Power Distance Index (PDI), which measures the equality or inequality between people in the society of the country. The second dimension is Individualism (IDV), which monitors individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships. Next is Masculinity (MAS), which is the degree in which society reinforces traditional masculine work role, achievement, and power; gender differentiation. The fourth element is the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), which focuses on the level of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity within the society; risk aversion. And the final dimension of the Geert Hofstede model is Long Term Orientation (LTO), which primarily concentrates on the degree that society embraces, or does not embrace, long-term devotion to traditional values or contemporary, forward-thinking values. These five aspects of a country are ranked through various collected data source inputs and are used to classify countries and show relativity patterns across the dimensions.

According to the statistics gathered on Japan by Hofstede, Japan holds a PDI of 50, an IDV of 41, an MAS of 90, a UAI of 90, and an LTO of 78. On the contrary, the U.S. holds a PDI of 38, an IDV of 89, an MAS of 60, a UAI of 41, and a LTO of 25. The following graphs give a more tangible visual representation of the contrasting dimensions between Japan and the United States.



These results confirm my reasoning about Japan’s low entrepreneurship activity. One of the obvious differences between Japan and the U.S. is the ranking of the Individualism index. The United States holds the highest level of individualism amongst all of the countries classified using the Geert Hofstede framework.

Australia and the United Kingdom rank second and third, respectively, in terms of IDV levels.^{xxxvii} Japan, on the other hand, falls below the world average IDV level. The fact that high IDV levels in the U.S. come coupled with high entrepreneurship rates and that low IDV levels in Japan are coupled with low entrepreneurship rates is not just a coincidence. My initial reasoning and arguments in the previous sections serve to confirm this overall encompassing framework. Additionally, MAS and UAI levels in Japan tower over those of the U.S. The higher level of masculinity amongst the Japanese population relates to the importance of the salary man and the relevance of job position to power. This reverts back to the notion of entering and staying with a kabushiki kaisha rather than pursuing a startup in order to achieve company and social status with more guarantees. The high UAI levels suggest and coincide with stereotypes of Japan that Japanese are risk-averse. And finally, the U.S.'s LTO dimension is dwarfed by Japan's strong preservation and devotion to tradition. This does not serve well for Japan on the field of entrepreneurship, as business traditions and social cultures have proven detrimental to entrepreneurial activity in Japan.

I do not use the Geert Hofstede framework as my source of factual representation and proof of Japan's defunct entrepreneurial activity. I utilize it as an interesting study that neatly compliments and affirms the results and findings from my analysis of the business structures, cultural rationale, and societal norms in Japan.

CONCLUSION

The stereotype that Japan is "risk averse" is baseless without proper deduction. In Japan, there remains a

strong adherence to company bureaucracy and strict hierarchy. This organizational perspective of the Rational System does not allow for much freedom or individuality of the company employee, but rather, it institutes a herd mentality within corporations, which inhibits the entrepreneurial drive. Furthermore, the lack of venture capitalists' willingness to invest in seed-stage, fledgling companies extinguishes the incentives to form a startup since failure without venture capital backing would likely mean debt. And in a society rampant with debt-related suicides, it is highly discouraging to be an entrepreneur. Although world entrepreneur activity shows a higher density of older individuals pursuing entrepreneurship, Japan, the country with the most elderly, remains averse to startups due to the seniority-based wage system and job security within the kabushiki kaisha. Risk aversion points to staying with the corporation. The Geert Hofstede framework reaffirms my findings about the reasons behind Japanese entrepreneur dormancy with its pattern classifications of Japan being anti-individualistic, highly risk averse, and resistant to change.

Although Japanese entrepreneurship is lacking, there are paths that Japanese firms can take that may be able to jumpstart activity. Most importantly, an increase in private risk capital for entry-level companies will subsequently decrease risk aversion, at least for the entrepreneur. As for the venture capitalist firm, if an increased frequency of investments in early-stage companies can yield at least one profitable company such as the American firms Google or Facebook, then overall, the venture capital firm will profit from its more risky investment behavior. Judging from the Geert Hofstede comparison between Japan and the U.S., another underlying factor that can be changed is

the high level of Long Term Orientation in Japan. Entrepreneurship is in itself an aspect not entirely aligned with the conservative, risk averse nature of Japanese corporations, yet if a solid community of entrepreneurs can at least be established in Japan, then the traditional herd mentality of Japanese may eventually lead to the advocacy of entrepreneurship.

Success stories do exist in Japan. Kentaro Lemeto founded his own company, Clara Online, in 1997 with just US\$9,000. Today Clara is now one of the leading server hosting companies in Japan and Korea, listed on the Singapore stock exchange with a market capitalization of US\$3 million.^{xxxviii} Another successful entrepreneur is Noriko Teremoto, “who broke through Japan’s notoriously thick glass ceiling and became a successful female entrepreneur after she was barred from returning to work by her company when she took leave to have a child.”^{xxxix} Her company, Digimom Inc., a webpage design firm, has acquired much successful reputation from not only being a profitable company but also consisting of mainly female employees. While admirable, Digimoms’ success also serves as an indicator of how Japanese often need to be persuaded that entrepreneurship is another possible path to success, and not just a path that entails risk and shame.^{xl} Success is possible, and there are still avenues of opportunity for Japan to rid itself of its stereotypical stigma of risk aversion.

Total Entrepreneurial Activity

Ranked by Country

World Average = 10.6% - Africa Only (15.6%) - Asia Only (11.2%) - Europe Only (6.4%) -
North America Only (13.4%) - South America Only (19.2%) - Mid Eastern Only (11.8%)
U.S. State by State

Note: TEA by Country Measures Entrepreneurial Activity as a Percent of GDP.

Country	AVERAGE	2009 TE A	2008 TE A	2007 TE A	2006 TEA	2005 TEA	2004 TEA	2003 TEA	2002 TE A	2001 TEA
Peru	30.6%	20.9%	25.6%	25.9%	40.20%		40.30%			
Uganda	31.5%	33.6%					31.60%	29.30%		
Bolivia	29.8%		29.8%							
Venezuela	22.8%	18.7%		20.2%		25.00%		27.30%		
Angola	22.7%		22.7%							
Philippines	20.4%				20.40%					
Thailand	20.1%			26.9%	15.20%	20.70%		18.90%	18.9%	
Colombia	20.4%	22.4%	13.8%	22.7%	22.50%					
Indonesia	19.3%				19.30%					
Dominican Rep.	18.2%	17.5%	20.4%	16.8%						
Jordan	14.3%	10.2%					18.30%			
Ecuador	17.2%	15.8%	8.7%				27.20%			
Jamaica	18.9%	22.7%	15.6%		20.30%	17.00%				
New Zealand	15.7%					17.60%	14.70%	13.80%	14.0%	18.2%
Macedonia	14.5%		14.5%							
China	14.9%	18.8%		16.4%	16.20%	13.70%		12.00%	12.3%	
South Korea	12.2%	7.0	10.0%					14.50%	14.5%	14.8%
Chile	13.5%	14.9%	14.1%	13.4%	9.20%	11.10%		16.30%	15.7%	
Argentina	13.3%	14.7%	16.5%	14.4%	10.20%	9.50%	12.80%	17.00%	14.2%	10.5%
Brazil	13.0%	15.3%	12.0%	12.7%	11.70%	11.30%	13.50%	13.20%	13.5%	14.2%
Uruguay	12.2%	12.2%	11.9%	12.2%	12.60%					
India	12.1%		6.9%	8.5%	10.40%			17.90%	17.9%	11.2%
Australia	11.9%				12.00%	10.90%	13.40%	9.90%	8.7%	16.2%
Iceland	11.5%	11.4%	10.1%		11.30%		13.60%	11.30%	11.3%	
Mexico	11.3%		13.1%		5.30%	5.90%		12.40%	12.4%	18.7%
Malaysia	7.75%	4.4%			11.10%					
United States	10.6%	8.0%	10.8%	9.6%	10.00%	12.40%	11.30%	11.30%	10.5%	11.6%
Kazakhstan	9.4%			9.4%						

Canada	8.9%				7.10%	9.30%	8.90%	8.50%	8.8%	10.9%
Ireland	8.7%		7.6%	8.2%	7.40%		7.70%	8.60%	9.1%	12.1%
Norway	8.3%	8.5%	8.7%	6.5%	9.10%	9.20%	7.00%	8.10%	8.7%	8.7%
Serbia	7.0%	4.9%	7.6%	8.6%						
Czech Republic	7.9%				7.90%					
Egypt	7.9%		7.9%							
Greece	7.6%	8.8%	9.9%		7.90%	6.50%	5.80%	6.80%		
Poland	6.9%						8.80%	4.40%	4.4%	9.9%
Switzerland	6.9%	7.7%		6.3%		6.10%		7.30%	7.1%	
Portugal	6.6%			8.8%			4.00%			7.0%
South Africa	6.4%	5.9%	7.8%		5.30%	5.10%	5.40%	5.70%	6.5%	9.3%
Spain	6.3%	5.1%	7.0%	7.6%	7.30%	5.70%	5.20%	6.30%	4.6%	7.7%
Israel	6.3%	6.1%	6.4%	5.4%			6.60%	7.10%	7.1%	5.9%
Bosnia & Herz.	5.4%	4.4%	6.4%							
Hungary	6.6%	9.1%	6.6%	6.9%	6.00%	1.90%	4.30%	6.60%	6.6%	11.4%
United Kingdom	6.0%	5.7%	5.9%	5.5%	5.80%	6.20%	6.30%	6.00%	5.4%	7.6%
Latvia	7.0%	10.5%	6.5%	4.5%	6.60%	6.60%				
UAE	8.5%	13.3%		8.4%	3.70%					
Finland	5.9%	5.2%	7.3%	6.9%	5.00%	5.00%	4.40%	5.70%	4.6%	9.3%
Iran	9.0%	12.0%	5.9%							
Turkey	5.9%		6.0%	5.6%	6.10%					
Denmark	5.5%	3.6%	4.4%	5.4%	5.30%	4.80%	5.30%	6.20%	6.5%	8.0%
Croatia	5.7%	5.6%	7.6%	7.3%	8.60%	6.10%	3.70%	3.10%	3.6%	
Singapore	5.72				4.90%	7.20%	5.70%	5.40%	5.9%	5.1%
Italy	5.4%	3.7%	4.6%	5.0%	3.50%		4.30%	4.60%	5.9%	10.1%
Germany	4.9%	4.1%	3.8%		4.20%	5.40%	4.50%	5.20%	5.2%	7.0%
Netherlands	5.3%	7.2%	5.2%	5.2%	5.40%	4.40%	5.10%	4.10%	4.6%	6.3%
Hong Kong	4.7%	3.6%		10.0%			3.00%	3.30%	3.4%	
France	4.6%	4.3%	5.6%	3.2%	4.40%	5.40%	6.00%	2.40%	3.2%	7.2%
Slovenia	4.6%	5.4%	6.4%	4.8%	4.60%	4.40%	2.60%	4.30%	4.6%	
Sweden	4.3%			4.2%	3.50%	4.00%	3.70%	4.10%	4.0%	6.6%
Taiwan	4.3%							4.30%	4.3%	
Romania	4.3%	5.0%	4.0%	4.0%						
Austria	3.9%			2.4%		5.30%				
Russia	3.8%	3.9%	3.5%	2.7%	4.90%			2.50%	2.5%	6.9%
Belgium	3.4%	3.5	2.9%	3.2%	2.70%	3.90%	3.50%	3.40%	3.0%	4.5%
Japan	3.20%	3.3	5.40%	4.30%	2.90%	2.20%	1.50%	2.20%	1.80%	5.0%
Puerto Rico	3.1%			3.1%						
World Average	10.6%	10.7%	9.7%	9.1%	9.5%	8.4%	9.4%	9.0%	8.0%	9.7%

Data Source: [Global Entrepreneurship Monitor](#)

ⁱ Reynolds, P., N. Carter, W. Gartner, P. Greene, and L. Cox. *The Entrepreneur next Door: Characteristics of Individuals Starting Companies in America : an Executive Summary of The Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics*. Kansas City, MO: Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2002. Print.

ⁱⁱ Kubota, Yoko. "ANALYSIS - In Risk-averse Japan, Odds Stack up against Startups | Reuters." *Business News - Indian Stock Market, Stock Market News, Business & Finance, Market Statistics | Reuters India*. 19 Apr. 2010. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. <<http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/04/19/idINIndia-47801520100419?pageNumber=1>>.

"Total Entrepreneurial Activity." *International Entrepreneurship - Entrepreneur International - Entrepreneur - Entrepreneurship*. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. <http://www.internationalentrepreneurship.com/total_entrepreneur_activity.asp>.

ⁱⁱⁱ

"CIA - The World Factbook -- Country Comparison :: National Product Real Growth Rate." *Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency*. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2003rank.html>>.

^{iv}

Naoto Kan Is Just Another Salaryman - *Newsweek*. "Newsweek - National News, World News, Business, Health, Technology, Entertainment, and More - Newsweek". Web. 04 Apr. 2011. <<http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/18/japan-s-salaryman-in-chief.html>>.

^v

Ogura, Masao, and David Noble. *Delivering the Goods: Entrepreneurship and Innovation in a Japanese Corporation*. Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2004. Print.

^{vi}

"The Google Culture Â· Corporate Information Â· About." *Google*. Web. 22 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.google.com/corporate/culture.html>>.

^{vii}

Morck, Randall. *A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005. Print.

^{viii}

Fujimoto, Takahiro. *Seisan Shisutemu No Shinkaron: Toyota Jidōsha Ni Miru Soshiki Nōryoku to Sōhatsu Purosesu*. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print

^{ix}

"The Toyota Group, the One and Only Horizontal-Vertical Keiretsu." *San José State University - Powering Silicon Valley*. Web. 23 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/toyota.htm>>.

^x

Nomura, Masami, and Yoshihiko Kamii, eds. *Japanese Companies - Theories and Realities*. Trans. Brad Williams. Melbourne: Trans Pacific, 2004. Print. p. 124

^{xi}

Ibid., p. 124

^{xii}

Nomura, Masami, and Yoshihiko Kamii, eds. *Japanese Companies - Theories and Realities*. Trans. Brad Williams. Melbourne: Trans Pacific, 2004. Print. p.15

^{xiii}

Ibid., p. 17

^{xiv}

Nagayoshi, Hiromi. *Jinji Koka Ni Taisuru Hoteki Kinsei No Nichi Bei Hikaku*. Vol. 107. Chuo University, 2000-2001. Print. p. 6

^{xv}

Chikura. <http://chikura.fprog.com/index.php?UID=1212030122>. 2004. Web.

^{xvi}

Rausch, Lawrence M. "Venture Capital Investment Trends in the United States and Europe." *Nsf.gov - National Science Foundation - US National Science Foundation (NSF)*. 16 Oct. 1998. Web. 21 Apr. 2011. <<http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/issuebrf/sib99303.htm>>.

^{xvii}

Rausch, Lawrence M. "Venture Capital Investment Trends in the United States and Europe." *Nsf.gov - National Science Foundation - US National Science Foundation (NSF)*. 16 Oct. 1998. Web. 21 Apr. 2011. <<http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/issuebrf/sib99303.htm>>.

^{xviii}

"Total Entrepreneurial Activity." *International Entrepreneurship - Entrepreneur International - Entrepreneur - Entrepreneurship*. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. <http://www.internationalentrepreneurship.com/total_entrepreneur_activity.asp>.

^{xx} Imai, Y., and M. Kawagoe. *Business Start-ups in Japan: Problems in Japan*. 2nd ed. Vol. 16. Oxford UP, 2000. Print. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. p. 5

^{xxi} *Ibid.* p. 5

^{xxii} Turnbull, Stephen R., and Angus McBride. *Samurai: The World of the Warrior*. Oxford: Osprey, 2006. Print.

^{xxiii} "Loans to tackle suicide". *Geelong Advertiser (Australia) 1 - Main Edition*. 30 December 2009.

^{xxiv} "Japan: Ending the Culture of the 'honourable' Suicide | Andrew Chambers | Comment Is Free | Guardian.co.uk." *Latest News, Comment and Reviews from the Guardian | Guardian.co.uk*. 23 Apr. 2011.

^{xxv} West, Mark. *Dying to Get out of Debt: Consumer Insolvency Law and Suicide in Japan*. Diss. University of Michigan, 2003. *Berkeley Electronic*, 2003. Print.

^{xxvi} Munen no Tegami [A Regretful Letter], *Mainichi Shinbun*, June 15, 2003, at 13.

^{xxvii} Fairlie, Robert M. *Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity*. Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2009. p. 2

^{xxviii} Fairlie, Robert M. *Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity*. Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2009. p. 2

^{xxix} "World Briefing - Asia - Japan - Most Elderly Nation - NYTimes.com." *The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia*. 01 July 2006. Web. 02 May 2011. <<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EEDC1530F932A35754C0A9609C8B63>>.

^{xxx} Hatasu, Yukiko Abe., Kazumi Hatasu, and Seiichi Makino. *Nakama 2: Intermediate Japanese : Communication, Culture, Context*. Boston: Heinle, 2011. p. 46

^{xxxi} Ibid.

^{xxxii} "World Briefing - Asia - Japan - Most Elderly Nation - NYTimes.com." *The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia*. 01 July 2006. Web. 02 May 2011.

^{xxxiii} Fujimoto, Takahiro. *Seisan Shisutemu No Shinkaron: Toyota Jidōsha Ni Miru Soshiki Nōryoku to Sōhatsu Purosesu*. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print

^{xxxiv} "Japanese Business Culture and the Company." *Doing Business in Japan How to Start Doing Business* in Japan. Web. 02 May 2011. <<http://www.venturejapan.com/japan-business-culture-company.htm>>

^{xxxv} Ibid.

^{xxxvi} McSweeney, Dr. Brendan. "Hofstede's 'Model of National Cultural Differences and Consequences: A Triumph of Faith - A Failure of Analysis, Human Relations'." *Culture's Consequences*(2002): 89-118. Print.

^{xxxvii} McSweeney, Dr. Brendan. "Hofstede's 'Model of National Cultural Differences and Consequences: A Triumph of Faith - A Failure of Analysis, Human Relations'." *Culture's Consequences*(2002): 89-118. Print.

^{xxxviii} Eberhart, Robert. "Japanese Venture Capital: An Analysis of Start-up Investment Patterns vs. Silicon Valle." *Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship (STAJE)* (2009). Print.

^{xxxix} Ibid

^{xl} Ibid.

REFERENCES

Chikura. [Http://chikura.fprog.com/index.php?p?UID=1212030122](http://chikura.fprog.com/index.php?p?UID=1212030122). 2004. Web.

"CIA - The World Factbook -- Country Comparison :: National Product Real Growth Rate." *Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency*. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2003rank.html>>.

Eberhart, Robert. "Japanese Venture Capital: An Analysis of Start-up Investment Patterns vs. Silicon Valle." *Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship (STAJE)* (2009). Print.

Fairlie, Robert M. *Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity*. Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2009. Print.

Fujimoto, Takahiro. *Seisan Shisutemu No Shinkaron: Toyota Jidōsha Ni Miru Soshiki Nōryoku to Sōhatsu Purosesu*. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.

Hosler, Akiko S. *Japanese Immigrant Entrepreneurs in New York City: a Wave of Ethnic Business*. New York: Garland Pub., 1998. Print.

Imai, Y., and M. Kawagoe. *Business Start-ups in Japan: Problems in Japan*. 2nd ed. Vol. 16. Oxford UP, 2000. Print. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*.

"Japanese Business Culture and the Company." *Doing Business in Japan How to Start Doing Business in Japan*. Web. 02 May 2011. <<http://www.venturejapan.com/japan-business-culture-company.htm>>

"Japan: Ending the Culture of the 'honourable' Suicide | Andrew Chambers | Comment Is Free | Guardian.co.uk." *Latest News, Comment and Reviews from the Guardian | Guardian.co.uk*. 23 Apr. 2011.

Johnstone, Bob. *Matsushita-ryū Okoshi 企业家 Seishin - Wa, Nippon No Mono-zukuri Wa Kōshite Yomigaeru*. Trans. Shizu Ura. Toyo Keizai, 2006. Print.

"Key Characteristics of Entrepreneurs: Common Traits of Successful Entrepreneurs | Growththink." *Business Plans, Strategy Consulting, Investment Banking | Growththink*. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.growththink.com/businessplan/help-center/critical-entrepreneurial-skills>>.

Koike, Kazuko. *Nihon Kigyō No Jinzai Keisei: Fukakujitsusei Ni Taishosuru Tame No Nouhau*. Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1997. Print.

Kubota, Yoko. "ANALYSIS - In Risk-averse Japan, Odds Stack up against Startups | Reuters." *Business News - Indian Stock Market, Stock Market News, Business & Finance, Market Statistics | Reuters India*. 19 Apr. 2010. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. <<http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/04/19/idINIndia-47801520100419?>>.

"Loans to tackle suicide". *Geelong Advertiser (Australia)* 1 - Main Edition. 30 December 2009.

Ogura, Masao, and David Noble. *Delivering the Goods: Entrepreneurship and Innovation in a Japanese Corporation*. Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2004. Print.

McSweeney, Dr. Brendan. "Hofstede's 'Model of National Cultural Differences and Consequences: A Triumph of Faith - A Failure of Analysis, Human Relations'." *Culture's Consequences*(2002): 89-118. Print.

Morck, Randall. *A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005. Print.

Munen no Tegami [A Regretful Letter], *Mainichi Shinbun*, June 15, 2003, at 13.

Nagayoshi, Hiromi. *Jinji Koka Ni Taisuru Hoteki Kinsei No Nichi Bei Hikaku*. Vol. 107. Chuo University, 2000-2001. Print.

Nakamura, Yoshiaki, Yoshiaki Nakamura, and Minoru Shibuya. *The Hollowing out Phenomenon in the Japanese Industry*. Tokyo: Research Institute of International Trade and Industry, 1995. Print.

Nomura, Masami, and Yoshihiko Kamii, eds. *Japanese Companies - Theories and Realities*. Trans. Brad Williams. Melbourne: Trans Pacific, 2004. Print.

Rausch, Lawrence M. "Venture Capital Investment Trends in the United States and Europe." *Nsf.gov - National Science Foundation - US National Science Foundation (NSF)*. 16 Oct. 1998. Web. 21 Apr. 2011.

<<http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/issuebrf/sib99303.htm>>.

Reynolds, P., N. Carter, W. Gartner, P. Greene, and L. Cox. *The Entrepreneur next Door: Characteristics of Individuals Starting Companies in America : an Executive Summary of The Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics*. Kansas City, MO: Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2002. Print.

Taplin, Ruth. *Valuing Intellectual Property in Japan, Britain, and the United States*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. Print.

"The Google Culture Â· Corporate Information Â· About." Google. Web. 22 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.google.com/corporate/culture.html>>.

"Total Entrepreneurial Activity." *International Entrepreneurship - Entrepreneur International - Entrepreneur - Entrepreneurship*. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. <http://www.internationalentrepreneurship.com/total_entrepreneur_activity.asp>.

Turnbull, Stephen R., and Angus McBride. *Samurai: the World of the Warrior*. Oxford: Osprey, 2006. Print.

West, Mark. *Dying to Get out of Debt: Consumer Insolvency Law and Suicide in Japan*. Diss. University of Michigan, 2003. Berkeley Electronic, 2003. Print.

NORTH KOREA'S GROWING ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON CHINA

Hyun Sun Suh '12

INTRODUCTION

China is undeniably the most important ally of North Korea. As North Korea's biggest trading partner and main source of food, arms, and fuel, China has helped sustain Kim Jong-Il's regime. In the hope of avoiding potential instability in the region and an uncontrolled influx of refugees across its border, Beijing wants to keep the authoritarian regime afloat. The relationship between the two countries has taken a different path beyond the traditional military-centered alliance since the dissolution of Soviet Union and Beijing's transition to a quasi-capitalist economy. China's successful integration into the global capitalist economy has made Sino-North Korean relations all the more unequal, for Pyongyang cannot afford to offer China anything in return, with its outmoded and failed economy.

North Korea's growing economic dependence on China is important in solving the Korean peninsula's two major security problems concerning reunification and denuclearization. As one of North Korea's few allies, Beijing continues to have more leverage over Pyongyang than any other nation. The economic leverage in particular has only grown as a result of North Korea's declining relations with South Korea and the international community. After the recent confrontations between the two Koreas, the subsequent withdrawal of aid from the South have left North Korea all the more dependent on China economically. China has become more

deeply involved in Kim's regime survival, by remaining its main source of life support. China's policy towards North Korea has been characterized by its strategic passiveness, but now with the more economic and political leverage, China can voice a stronger opinion on pushing North Korea on the issues of interest.

This paper will analyze the degree of economic dependence of North Korea and China's growing leverage over Pyongyang. First, I will briefly go over the history of Sino-North Korea relations, specifically, two major turning points that led to the isolation of North Korea in the post-Cold War era: the collapse of Soviet Union and China's successful integration into the global capitalist economy. This isolation, coupled with the failure of North Korean communist economy, has motivated North Korea's brinkmanship policy of nuclear development. As a result, North Korea's violent behavior created a negative feedback that further isolated itself. Second, I will mention the major goals and priorities of North Korea and China's foreign policies that explain the seemingly imbalanced relationship between the two countries. Third, I will argue that North Korea's declining relations with the international community goes hand in hand with its growing dependence on China. Next, I will look at statistical figures that confirm this trend of North Korea's growing economic reliance on china. Lastly, I will discuss the implications of this asymmetric relationship as a form of economic leverage. With the recent shift in Sino-

North Korean relations, China will exert greater influence over North Korea's economy, as inter-Korean relations are spiraling downward. China's recent acquisition of mining rights in North Korea provides such evidence. While South Korea has its back turned against the North, China will continue to pursue its interests in North Korea's natural resources, developing deeper ties and ultimately expanding its influence over North Korea.

I. The History of Sino-North Korean Relations

The acceptance of communism brought together the PRC and the DPRK in the same socialist camp in the twentieth century, pursuing the common missions of defeating imperialism and capitalism. Leaders of both countries shared the sense of belonging to a single family of the socialist world, including the Soviet Union and other satellite states. The relationship of the two communist countries solidified during the Korean Warⁱ, when China supported North Korea by sending millions of Chinese soldiers across its border to fight for their comrades. However, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries brought about a big change in Sino-North Korean relations.ⁱⁱ

During the post-Cold War era, accommodation and conciliation became the driving forces in pushing the international order ahead, and they were widely accepted as the primary norms of international affairs. However, North Korea regarded this new world order with strong suspicion as well as antagonism. As the former socialist camp reached out to the rest of the world, North Korea became isolated from the international community. In 1990, the Soviet Union became the vanguard that adopted dual

recognition of both north and South Korea. China also took initiatives to widen its circle of relations, pursuing conciliatory foreign policy. After Beijing and Seoul normalized diplomatic ties in 1992, China's increasing collaboration with South Korea has further isolated the Kim Jong-il's regime.ⁱⁱⁱ North Korea found both Russia and China's integration threatening, for the fear of being deserted by its previous allies and being encircled by enemies, which bred suspicion and mistrust towards the outside world.

North Korea felt that the shift in the international environment would have an extremely detrimental effect on Pyongyang's survival.^{iv} Kim Jong-Il was concerned about the possibility of being "sold out" by China's conciliatory policy toward the United States. This fear based on isolation ultimately contributed to Pyongyang's brinkmanship policy. North Korea's nuclear development can be explained as a manifestation of such fear. Pyongyang would pursue the status of a nuclear power at any cost to secure regime survival. Thus, it is extremely difficult and frustrating to persuade North Korea to give up its last resort. As Pyongyang refused to observe international norms, even China became frustrated at its neighbor's defiance.^v North Korea's uncooperative attitude at six-party talks led to international sanctions against North Korea. The rearrangement of the world order coupled with the brinkmanship policy further isolated the hermit kingdom.

The dissolution of Soviet Union and Pyongyang's subsequent isolation from the international community had a devastating effect on North Korea's economy as well, since the starving nation could no longer receive abundant aid or support from its formal allies. North Korea was hardly self-sufficient, which meant that it had to be more dependent on its few remaining allies, one of which

being China. China, on the other hand, had been growing remarkably after the successful economic reform in 1978 launched by Deng Xiaoping. Since then, North Korea's growing dependence on China became more evident. The asymmetric give-and-take relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang fueled China's frustrations with the Kim Jong-Il's regime, due to Pyongyang's deteriorating economic situations and its continued brinkmanship aimed at receiving more aid.^{vi}

Nevertheless, China seemed unlikely to halt or withdraw its support completely, given that it had too much at stake in North Korea.^{vii} "The idea that the Chinese would turn their backs on the North Koreans is clearly wrong," says Adam Segal, CFR senior fellow for China studies. China was persevering in its relations with North Korea, protecting Kim's regime from falling apart. Hence, it becomes appropriate to discuss the motivations behind China's continued support despite its seemingly unequal relationship with North Korea.

II. The Dynamics of Sino-North Korea Relations

Following the major turning points in the post Cold War era, Sino-North Korean relations took a different path beyond their traditional military-based alliance. Therefore, it would be a grave mistake to assume that the PRC and the DPRK still have the kind of relations formerly dubbed as "lips and teeth." In fact, Pyongyang and Beijing have a noticeably asymmetric relationship characterized by the growing economic dependence of North Korea on China. This uneven relationship calls for an explanation of what has been driving the asymmetric interdependence. In this light, the following section attempts to explore

the main goals and priorities behind the foreign policies of Pyongyang and Beijing.

A. Pyongyang's Gains

Understanding the motives of any country is difficult, but it is even more so for North Korea, which many people view as an extreme case of a closed and totalitarian polity. North Korea's foreign policy decision-making has been especially unapproachable as a result of its strong ideological commitments, lack of transparency, and the overwhelming dominance of its dear leader. Over the course of history, North Korea has been unpredictable and inconsistent when interacting with the rest of the world, yet it seems clear that it has one unchanging goal: the perpetuation of Kim's regime. In recent years, China has established itself as an undeniable regional power while North Korea has further isolated itself, as discussed in the previous section. In that context, Pyongyang's policy towards Beijing can be best understood as the desperate search for protection from outside pressures.

Furthermore, Pyongyang's survival is fundamentally dependent on China, which provides most of its food and energy supplies. Nicholas Eberstadt, a consultant at the World Bank, says that since the early 1990s, China has served as North Korea's chief food supplier and has accounted for nearly 90 percent of its energy imports.^{viii} By some estimates, China provides 80 percent of North Korea's consumer goods and 45 percent of its food. North Korea's economic dependence on China is rapidly increasing, as indicated by a significant trade imbalance.^{ix} Some experts see North Korea's significant trade deficit as an indirect Chinese subsidy, given that North Korea cannot finance its trade deficit through borrowing.^x On top of that indirect subsidy, China also provides aid

directly to Pyongyang. At first glance, it seems obvious from the figures that China has been continuously giving to its neighbor without taking back anything substantial in return. This brings us to our next point: what does China gain from this relentless support?

B. China's Priorities

China's support for Pyongyang ensures a friendly nation on its northeastern border, and provides a buffer zone between China and democratic South Korea, which is home to around twenty-nine thousand U.S. troops and marines. This allows China to reduce its military deployment in its northeast and "focus more directly on the issue of Taiwanese independence," Shen Dingli of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai writes in *China Security*.^{xi} North Korea's allegiance is important to Beijing as a bulwark against U.S. military dominance of the region as well as against the rise of Japan's military.

Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Stanford's Asia-Pacific Research Center, confirms that regional stability is the top priority for the Chinese.^{xii} In that sense, North Korea is a time bomb for China, because Pyongyang could trigger a war on its own. If North Korea does provoke a war with South Korea, the United States and China would have to get involved, sharing the burden of yet another costly war on the Korean peninsula. Thus, China is hesitant about withdrawing support, for the fear of North Korea's unpredictable aggressions developing into a full-scale war. The collapse of Kim's regime can also lead to chaos on the border. The flow of refugees into China has already been a chronic problem, and it is becoming worse due to the poor performance of North Korean economy. Beijing began its construction

of a barbed wire fence along this border in 2006 for that reason.^{xiii}

To an extent, North Korea and China share a common goal: their foreign policies have been geared towards the mutually beneficial end of keeping Kim's regime afloat. China has been providing North Korea with food, arms and fuel. Yet, their relationship has not been invulnerable to external shocks. One of the major changes was declining inter-Korean relations following the South's new administration and two recent military confrontations.

III. Deteriorating Inter-Korean Relations

In 2008, the inauguration of a conservative government led by Lee Myung-bak brought about a fundamental change in South Korea's policy toward North Korea. Upon entering office, Lee was determined to implement a brand new policy based on a tough stance towards Pyongyang. President Lee's hard line marked a great departure from the Sunshine Policy that had been adopted by the former administrations. The Lee government established the principle of reciprocity in its assistance policy, in which the amount of aid is directly linked to North Korea's cooperation, most importantly progress on denuclearization.^{xiv} Lee believed that, in exchange for providing humanitarian aid, the South should demand more from the North. In fact, one of the plans President Lee suggested—Vision 3000 proposal^{xv}—requires Pyongyang to completely abandon its nuclear quest before South Korea can raise North Korean per capita income up to \$3000 per year in a decade.

Lee pledged to work more closely with the United States in taking a tougher stance towards Pyongyang. South Korea's pursuit of stronger alliance with the United States along with the

discontinuation of aid aggravated North Korea's antagonism. The North's torpedoing of the naval vessel, *Cheonan*,^{xvi} in March and the shelling of the South Korean island, *Yeonpyeong*,^{xvii} can be, to an extent, explained as a manifestation of the North's dissatisfaction with the South's current government. As a result, relations between the two Koreas plunged to their lowest point after the two confrontations.^{xviii} Seoul said it would slash all trade with Pyongyang. In response, North Korea declared it was cutting all ties with the South until President Lee Myung-bak leaves office in early 2013.^{xix}

Amid worsened political relations between the two Koreas, North Korea's trade with South Korea fell to about half of its trade with China in 2010. The two Koreas exchanged US\$1.91 billion worth of goods last year, up 14 percent from 2009, according to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA).^{xx} However, trade between the North and China jumped 32 percent on-year to slightly over \$3.46 billion, indicating Pyongyang's growing economic dependence on its communist ally. The proportion of inter-Korean trade to North Korea-China trade reached its peak of 91 percent in 2007 when South Korean President Roh^{xxi} held a historic summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il,

the second summit between the Koreans. The rate dropped to 65 percent in 2008, 64 percent in 2009 and 55 percent last year, KITA said.^{xxii} The gap between the amount of South-North trade and that of North-China trade will further widen unless the tension between the South and North is resolved, according a KITA official in charge of inter-Korean trade.^{xxiii}

IV. Sino-North Korea Trade Statistics

In this section, we will examine Beijing-Pyongyang economic relations in terms of trade. These figures of Sino-North Korean trade show the extent of North Korea's autarky and economic decline in the past decade.

Table 1 China's Merchandise Trade with DPRK, 1995-2009 (\$ in millions)

Year	China's Imports	China's Exports	Total Trade	China's Balance
1995	63.609	486.037	549.646	422.428
1996	68.638	497.014	565.652	428.376
1997	121.610	534.411	656.021	412.801
1998	51.089	356.661	407.750	305.572
1999	41.722	328.634	370.356	286.912
2000	37.214	450.839	488.053	413.625
<u>2001</u>	166.797	570.660	<u>737.457</u>	403.863
2002	270.863	467.309	738.172	196.446

2003	395.546	627.995	1,023.541	232.449
2004	582.193	794.525	1,376.718	212.332
<u>2005</u>	496.511	1,084.723	1,581.234	<u>588.212</u>
2006	467.718	1,231.886	1,699.604	764.168
2007	581.521	1,392.453	1,973.974	810.932
2008	754.045	2,033.233	2,787.278	1,279.188
2009	793.026	1,887.741	2,680.767	1,094.715


^{xxiv} Source: China, Ministry of Commerce (excludes Hong Kong and Macau).

As shown in Table 1, Sino-DPRK trade has been rising steadily. While that amount is dwarfed by China's trade with countries such as South Korea (total bilateral trade of \$156 billion in 2009)^{xxv}, both imports from and exports to the DPRK have increased significantly over the past decade. One notable aspect of Sino-DPRK economic relations is the trade characterized by chronic and substantial balance-of-trade deficits for North Korea. The cumulative sum of the trade balance deficits for North Korea amounted to \$7.85 billion during the period 1995-2009, with total import amount from China at \$12.74 billion and total export to China only \$4.89 billion. While China remained North Korea's largest trading partner in the 1990s in terms of total value, Beijing has allowed Pyongyang to run average annual deficits of approximately \$377 million since 1995.^{xxvi} In 2009, despite the global financial crisis, DPRK exports to China increased to \$793 million, although Chinese exports to the DPRK slowed slightly to \$1.9 billion. The bilateral trade is highly imbalanced with China's surplus exceeding \$1 billion in 2009. China's role in North Korea's trade would be even larger if barter transactions and aid were factored into these figures. North Korea's

trade deficit is not likely to improve for a long time, because North Korea does not possess the technology to produce high-value exportable products and its primary commodities are losing competitiveness in the Chinese market.

In addition to its bilateral trade with North Korea, China has also been playing a major role in North Korea's economic relations with the outside world. China especially has been exerting a huge influence on the implementation of international economic sanctions on the DPRK. For example, Beijing only agreed to UN Resolution 1718^{xxvii} after revisions removed requirements for tough economic sanctions beyond those targeting luxury goods^{xxviii}, and China's trade with North Korea has continued to increase since then. Bilateral trade between China and North Korea reached \$2.79 billion in 2008, up 63.5 percent compared to 2006. In 2009, China provided about half of all North Korean imports and received a quarter of its exports.^{xxix}

Chart 1 North Korea's Total Foreign Trade 1990-2008 (\$ in billions)




Source: Korea Development Institute, Analysis of North Korean Trade Statistics 1990~2008 (한국개발연구원, 1990~2008년 북한 무역 통계의 분석과 재구성)

The China percentage of total North Korean foreign trade has fluctuated greatly over the years: 1) 25-60 percent (but the absolute value was around U.S. \$100 million) in the 1950s; 2) about 30 percent in the 1960s until 1967 after which the ratio declined to around 10 percent in the wake of the Cultural Revolution; 3) increased to about 20 percent since 1973 (to the level of U.S. \$300-600 million); and 4) declined to the 10-20 percent range in the 1980s, although its total value had risen to U.S. \$3-4 billion.^{xxx} From the post-Cold War decade of 90's to the recent years, the ratio has been increasing, reaching its peak in 2005. This year, when China experienced the largest trade surplus, coincides with the time period when the United States was escalating its sanctions^{xxxi} against North Korea. Despite the general trend of growing China's

percentage share, we observe a noticeable drop in China's percentage share around the year 2000. Yet, when we look at the total value (see Table 1), Sino-DPRK trade registered a 51.13 percent increase in 2001 (\$250 million). Despite the dramatic increase in total value, the China's share stayed in the range of 20 percent, because North Korea also experienced a big jump in total foreign trade as it was renewing its economic ties with the South after their monumental joint declaration on June 15th.

Chart 2 China Percentage of Total North Korean Foreign Trade 1995-2008




Source: Combined the figures from Table 1 and Chart

V. China's Aid to North Korea Statistics

In the late 90's, nearly one million North Koreans starved to death.^{xxxii} Major portions of the North Korean population survived primarily through transfers of food and other economic assistance from abroad.^{xxxiii} In that decade, the inefficiencies of North Korea's centrally planned economy, especially its promotion of state-owned heavy industries, along with high military spending—about 15-25% of GDP—joined with drought and floods to push the economy into crisis. The food crisis has since passed, but shortages still exist. The country basically depends on staples from China, and, (before economic sanctions) from the U.N. World Food Program, as well as fertilizer from South Korea (when it was being delivered before Lee administration cut off its aid to the

North). In addition, the collapse of the Soviet bloc meant the loss of Russian aid, export markets, and cheap oil. Trade with the former Soviet Union dropped from as much as \$3.58 billion in 1999 and to \$111 million in 2008.^{xxxiv} This has aggravated the disastrous domestic economic conditions in North Korea.




Source: Interfais, May 20, 2009.

Since the Soviet Union withdrew its patronage of North Korea in the early 1990s, China is widely believed to have emerged as the single largest provider of food to North Korea, though the precise amount is difficult to estimate due to lax controls on the North Korea-China border and the overall unreliability of official Chinese statistics. Additionally, food from China is known to enter the North on commercial, concessional, and barter terms, making it difficult to distinguish aid from trade.^{xxxv} During the North Korean nuclear crisis of the early 1990s, China cut its food shipments to the DPRK dramatically, only to restore them with the onset of famine, which threatened the possibility of a North Korean collapse.¹⁹ What is known is that after declining in the early 1990s, Chinese food shipments to the DPRK increased

with the onset of North Korea's famine, as China became concerned that the food situation could lead to the collapse of the Pyongyang regime and/or to increased numbers of North Koreans crossing the border into northeastern China.

VI. Chinese Investments in North Korea

Detailing the full extent of Chinese investment in North Korea is difficult, as the North Korean government provides little information on the subject. The communist party does publish data regarding Chinese outward-bound foreign direct investment (FDI), yet it is unclear whether the official data provide a complete picture of the level of PRC investment in North Korea.



^{xxxvi} Source: People's Republic of China (PRC), Ministry of Commerce "2009 年度中国对外直接投资统计公报"

Investments made by Chinese companies in North Korea have increased dramatically over the past decade. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, investments by Chinese companies have reached its peak in 2008, \$41.23 million (USD), compared to only \$1.2 million in 2003 (see figures above).^{xxxvii} A substantial amount of this Chinese investment is taking place in the mining and mineral resource sectors of North Korea as well as in port facilities and other infrastructure sectors.

Among the 45 major commercial minerals identified by the U.S. Geological Survey, nineteen of them are faced with limited supply in China.^{xxxviii} China's demand for minerals exceeds domestic supply, and thus, imports are estimated to account for more than 30 percent of domestic consumption in 2008.^{xxxix} In order to satisfy this enormous demand for natural resources, China has turned to North Korea as an additional source of raw materials, importing ores, mineral fuels (coal), iron and steel.^{xl} While this aspect of the minerals trade has existed for some time, the nature of the relationship has changed in recent years, as Chinese companies started investing in infrastructure projects and joint ventures in North Korea's mining industry.^{xli}

China has been eyeing North Korea's massive mineral wealth for a long time.^{xlii} Beijing has been expanding its mining rights in North Korea to cover as many as 20 sites, while South Korea has secured only three sites. As North Korea's closest ally and major benefactor, China has had better access to its mines than any other country. In exchange for mining rights, China has helped sustain the North, providing oil, equipment and food. As the South has virtually no mineral wealth of its own, South Korea has also been eager to acquire mining rights in North Korea, until its strained relations with Pyongyang severed all economic ties.

In fact, North Korea agreed in May 2007 to a long-term joint mining deal with the South Korean government^{xliii} and zinc exports from the North to the South doubled in 2007.^{xliv}

With one fewer competitor in its pursuit of mining rights, China can acquire North Korea's natural resources more easily than before, as it enjoys bigger leverage over the communist state. North Korea made significant economic concessions when it agreed to allow Chinese companies to invest in its potentially vast mineral wealth, as the poverty-stricken nation has few other options left to keep the cash coming. Officials of the two countries signed a deal to jointly develop the North's mineral deposits in Beijing on February 15th.^{xlv} This joint investment has considerable political implications beyond the simple business partnership.

VII. Implications of China's Economic Leverage

China gains a lot economically from its asymmetric relationship with North Korea. Reportedly, growing numbers of Chinese firms are investing in North Korea and are gaining concessions like preferable trading terms and port operations.^{xlvi} These economic development plans also supposedly further China's national interests in developing its own chronically poor northeastern provinces by securing mineral and energy resources across the border.^{xlvii} But most importantly, Chinese investment inside the borders of North Korea means that Beijing can exercise bigger political leverage on the important issues of North Korea.

Back in 2008, military authorities in North Korea were still unenthusiastic about the idea of foreign investment in minerals^{xlviii}, even though their trade volume of minerals was growing. The

North did not want to open up its mineral resources to foreign countries, because allowing big investments inside its border was equivalent to permitting that much foreign influence. However, recently, Kim Jong-Il has changed his mind. The abrupt change following North Korea's declining relations with the South after the recent confrontations seems to suggest that North Korea has become more willing to lease its mines realistically as a tool for winning favor of China. With the overall decrease in aid as a result of its hostile relationship with the South, the cash infusion the North could receive from such large-scale industrial mining investments must have been a viable option for Kim. Therefore, it is likely that North Korea decided to sell off its underground resources at a cheap price, in exchange for Chinese protection from outside pressures. Furthermore, if that is the case, North Korea will be compelled to make more economic concessions in the future, if it does not somehow break the deepening economic reliance.

China's recent acquisition of mining rights is politically significant because investments, unlike trade, imply a deeper involvement in a country's economy. As opposed to just buying the minerals from North Korea, China will actually invest its capital with partial ownership to the mines. As North Korea's single most important ally, China has the capacity to monopolize investment opportunities in North Korea, earning not only financial gains but also strategic benefits. The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry voiced practical concerns that South Korea was falling behind while China was locking up rights to North Korea's minerals. Pyongyang's growing economic reliance on Beijing also confirms the fear that Seoul may lose its leverage in case of political turmoil in the North.

CONCLUSION

Before I conclude this paper, I want to mention that the incomplete nature of statistical data from both the PRC and the DPRK can potentially undermine the conclusiveness of this paper's analysis. Nevertheless, I have found, from the available statistical and anecdotal evidence, a dramatic increase in China's investments in North Korea along with Pyongyang's growing economic dependence on Beijing over the past decade.^{xlix} However, this increase can be attributed to China's general trend of promoting foreign expansion and economic growth rather than representing a calculative plan specific to North Korea based on its geopolitical importance. Data on China's total outward foreign direct investment bolster this argument, as China's amount of FDI into North Korea increased drastically within the same time frame as China's period of foreign expansion. However, the growth of investments is significant if we look at it as percentage of North Korea's total investments. China's investment in North Korea not only increased in total value but also in its ratio. This suggests that even though Beijing's promotion of investment abroad through its policy may have been a contributing factor, North Korea and China's unique, imbalanced relationship is a more convincing explanation for this drastic increase of one-sided investments represented as percentage of North Korea's total foreign investment.

Since the post-Cold War era, Sino-North Korea relations have taken a different path. China's integration into the capitalist economy stands in stark contrast to North Korea's isolation. Furthermore, North Korea's declining relations with the international community goes hand in hand with its growing dependence on China. After inter-Korean relations spiraled downward, North Korea lost one

of its major lifelines, and consequently, ended up turning to China for financial reasons. As a result, Pyongyang's asymmetric relationship with Beijing gave both means and motives for Beijing to take advantage of their uneven power structure. China's exploitation of the situation has become evident through its rising investments in North Korea, especially the recent agreement on joint ventures in North Korea's mining industry.¹ While the distance between the two Koreas keeps growing, China will continue to pursue its interests in North Korea's natural resources.

Declining inter-Korean relations, a result of President Lee's tougher policy and the recent military conflicts between the two Koreas, have also created a general sense of anxiety in South Koreans that China will enjoy greater control and leverage over North Korea. "The North Korean economy is being rapidly incorporated into the Chinese economic sphere. That's why there are people who say North Korea is becoming another China's province," Seoul's largest newspaper, *Chosun Ilbo*, voiced its concerns in an editorial.ⁱⁱ

This whole discussion of China's increasing control over North Korea ultimately brings into light a fundamental question regarding the future of the

Korean peninsula: What will China do with its leverage about the major security concerns of denuclearization and reunification? As long as the two countries, despite its unequal standings in the international community, can still find a balanced interdependence, North Korea and China will cooperate to achieve the same goal of keeping the Kim Jong-Il regime afloat. Then, the question becomes, will China support transformations at the expense of regional stability? Is peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula now a distant dream? I believe having that "China factor" is not necessarily an obstacle in pursuing both denuclearization and reunification. It can actually mean that Beijing may use that leverage *for* South Korea, except in that case China will have to lead these transformations under its control. In this light, South Koreans' fear is trivial because it is not a contest of who has more control over that situation; rather the control should be given to the party that ensures efficiency. In any case, neither South Korea nor China is likely to absorb North Korea unilaterally, and we will inevitably need international cooperation to solve the problems of either denuclearization or reunification.

ⁱ The North and South have technically remained at war since the 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice rather than a peace treaty.

ⁱⁱ Gloria Koo, "China and North Korea: A Changing Relationship," Stanford Journal of International Relations (San Francisco, CA: Department of International Relations, Stanford University, 2006).

ⁱⁱⁱ China has surpassed the United States as South Korea's largest trading partner in 2003.

^{iv} Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, *North Korea's foreign policy under Kim Jong Il: new perspectives*, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009

^v Ariana Eunjung Cha and Glenn Kessler, "Anger May Help Bring New U.N. Sanctions", *Washington Post*, May 28, 2009.

^{vi} Hu Jintao reportedly insisted on long-overdue market reforms.

Aidan Foster-Carter, "Harsh realities for North Korea's unseen heir", *Financial Times*

^{vii} Jayshree Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship", *Council on Foreign Relations*

^{viii} Jayshree Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship", *Council on Foreign Relations*

^{ix} See section IV for trade statistics.

^x Scott Snyder, "China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing's Patience", *Comparative Connections* (A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations), July 2009.

- ^{xi} Shen Dingli, North Korea's Strategic Significance to China, *China Security Autumn 2006*
- ^{xii} Jayshree Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship", *Council on Foreign Relations*
- ^{xiii} "Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao answers reporters' questions at regular news conference on October 12, 2006." Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated in FBIS, CPP20061012038001, October 12, 2006.
- ^{xiv} Jong-moo Lee, "The History of South Korean Aid to DPRK," Paper Presented at the 2009 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul, November 24-26, 2009.
- ^{xv} Norimitsu Onishi, "South Korean President Pledges Pragmatism", *The New York Times*
- ^{xvi} The Cheonan sinking occurred on 26 March 2010, when the Cheonan, a South Korean Navy ship carrying 104 personnel, sank off the country's west coast near Baengnyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 seamen. A South Korean-led official investigation carried out by a team of international experts from South Korea, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Sweden presented a summary of its investigation on 20 May 2010, concluding that the warship had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo fired by a midget submarine.
- ^{xvii} The bombardment of Yeonpyeong was an artillery engagement between the North Korean military and South Korean forces stationed on Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010. The incident -- in which two South Korean marines and two civilians died -- is "the first direct artillery attack on South Korean territory since the Korean War ended in an armistice" in 1953
- ^{xviii} The former UN ambassador Bill Richardson said tensions had escalated to become "the most serious crisis on the Korean peninsula since the 1953 armistice which ended the Korean War."
- ^{xix} Associated Press, "Chafing at South Korea's punishment for ship sinking, North Korea severs all ties, raises war rhetoric", May 25, 2010.
- ^{xx} Yonhap News, "Inter-Korean trade falls to half of North-China trade in 2010," March 23 2011.
- ^{xxi} Former President Roh was a strong proponent of the Sunshine Policy.
- ^{xxii} Yonhap News, "Inter-Korean trade falls to half of North-China trade in 2010," March 23 2011.
- ^{xxiii} *Ibid.*,
- ^{xxiv} China has stopped publicly issuing trade data about North Korea, veiling the potentially sensitive numbers about its wary neighbour under another category while the two countries seek improved ties.
- ^{xxv} Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, *North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis*, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010
- ^{xxvi} In contrast, South Korea's trade with China in 2000 generated a huge surplus of \$5.7 billion, while North Korea's trade with China generated a trade deficit of \$414 million.
- ^{xxvii} United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 was adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council on October 14, 2006. The resolution imposes a series of economic and commercial sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the aftermath of that nation's claimed nuclear test of October 9, 2006.
- ^{xxviii} Jayshree Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship", *Council on Foreign Relations*
- ^{xxix} This trade essentially consists of shipments of raw materials and components from South Korea to an industrial zone in North Korea and the return of finished products from the zone to South Korea. For details, see CRS Report RL34093, *The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex*, by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin.
- ^{xxx} Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, *Chinese-North Korean Relations: Managing Asymmetrical Interdependence*, North Korea and Northeast Asia
- ^{xxxi} On June 28, 2005, President George W. Bush expanded the authority granted his office to address the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—authority first exercised by President George H.W. Bush in 1990—to freeze assets and property of those engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- ^{xxxii} Bill Powell, "The Next Great North Korean Famine", *Time*, May. 06, 2008
- ^{xxxiii} Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, *North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis*, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010
- ^{xxxiv} Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, *North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis*, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010
- ^{xxxv} Mark E. Manyin, *Foreign Assistance to North Korea*, Congressional Research Service, May 26, 2005
- ^{xxxvi} Retrieved from *Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments in North Korea* by Daniel Gearin, Research Fellow, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Background October 20, 2010
- ^{xxxvii} Statistical Bulletin on China's Outward Direct Investment, 2009. <http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201009/1284339524515.pdf>.
- ^{xxxviii} Pui-Kwan Tse, 2008 Minerals Yearbook - China (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, October 2009), p. 9.2. <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2008/myb3-2008-ch.pdf>
- ^{xxxix} *Ibid.*
- ^{xl} *Ibid.*
- ^{xli} Washington Post, "Value of N. Korea Sanctions Disputed," June 12, 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061102323.html>.

^{sliv} North Korea's mineral wealth is valued at US\$6.3 trillion according to the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry. There are large deposits of iron ore, zinc and uranium, as well as coal. The North also has the world's largest known deposit of magnesite, an essential part of lightweight metal used in cars, airplanes and electronic equipment.

^{slviii} Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Korea milking mineral deposits", *The Washington Post*, Feb 24, 2008.

^{slv} Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, "N. Korea Cashes In on Mineral Riches: Financial Need Trumps Longtime Aversion to Foreign Trade," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2008.

^{slvi} AFP, "China to explore N. Korean minerals", Feb 6, 2011.

^{slvii} Jayshree Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship", *Council on Foreign Relations*

^{slviii} John S. Park, "On the Issues: North Korea's Leadership Succession: The China Factor", United States Institute of Peace, September 2010

"China's brisk investment in North Korea seems part of efforts to develop its poor northeastern provinces," said Chung Uijun, a researcher at the KDB institute. Under a so-called Northeast Development Project endorsed by the Communist Party, China has pushed to develop its three northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, bordering North Korea, Russia and Mongolia, he said.

^{slvix} Christian Oliver, "China eyes N Korea's mineral wealth," *Financial Times*, October 6 2009.

^{slx} China has reportedly invested a total of \$264 million USD in North Korea. Much of this investment has come since 2003 with a 44 percent increase in investment taking place between 2007 and 2008 alone (from \$18.4 million to \$41.23 million, respectively.)

¹ Washington Post, "Value of N. Korea Sanctions Disputed," June 12, 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061102323.html>.

^{li} Christian Oliver, "China eyes N Korea's mineral wealth," *Financial Times*, October 6 2009.

REFERENCES

Gloria Koo, "China and North Korea: A Changing Relationship," *Stanford Journal of International Relations* (San Francisco, CA: Department of International Relations, Stanford University, 2006).

Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, *North Korea's foreign policy under Kim Jong Il: new perspectives*, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009

Ariana Eunjung Cha and Glenn Kessler, "Anger May Help Bring New U.N. Sanctions", *Washington Post*, May 28, 2009.

Aidan Foster-Carter, "Harsh realities for North Korea's unseen heir", *Financial Times*

Jayshree Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship", *Council on Foreign Relations*

Scott Snyder, "China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing's Patience", *Comparative Connections* (A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations), July 2009.

Shen Dingli, North Korea's Strategic Significance to China, *China Security* Autumn 2006

"Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao answers reporters' questions at regular news conference on October 12, 2006." Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated in FBIS, CPP20061012038001, October 12, 2006.

Jong-moo Lee, "The History of South Korean Aid to DPRK," Paper Presented at the 2009 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul, November 24-26, 2009.

Norimitsu Onishi, "South Korean President Pledges Pragmatism", *The New York Times*

Associated Press, "Chafing at South Korea's punishment for ship sinking, North Korea severs all ties, raises war rhetoric", May 25, 2010.

Yonhap News, "Inter-Korean trade falls to half of North-China trade in 2010," March 23 2011.

Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, *North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy*

Analysis, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010

Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, *Chinese-North Korean Relations: Managing Asymmetrical Interdependence*, North Korea and Northeast Asia

Bill Powell, "The Next Great North Korean Famine", *Time*, May. 06, 2008

Mark E. Manyin, *Foreign Assistance to North Korea*, Congressional Research Service, May 26, 2005

Retrieved from *Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments in North Korea* by Daniel Gearin, Research Fellow, U.S.-China Economic and Security

Review Commission Staff Background October 20, 2010

Statistical Bulletin on China's Outward Direct Investment, 2009. <http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201009/1284339524515.pdf>.

Pui-Kwan Tse, 2008 Minerals Yearbook - China (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, October 2009), p. 9.2. <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2008/myb3-2008-ch.pdf>

Washington Post, "Value of N. Korea Sanctions Disputed," June 12, 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061102323.html>.

Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Korea milking mineral deposits", *The Washington Post*, Feb 24, 2008.

Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, "N. Korea Cashes In on Mineral Riches: Financial Need Trumps Longtime Aversion to Foreign Trade," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2008.

AFP, "China to explore N. Korean minerals", Feb 6, 2011.

John S. Park, "On the Issues: North Korea's Leadership Succession: The China Factor", United States Institute of Peace, September 2010

Christian Oliver, "China eyes N Korea's mineral wealth," *Financial Times*, October 6 2009.

Washington Post, "Value of N. Korea Sanctions Disputed," June 12, 2009.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061102323.html>.

MAPPING SOUTH KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

Julie Han '12

ABSTRACT

North Korean refugees who resettle in South Korea face a myriad of obstacles to assimilation. In addition to difficulties of adjusting to the radically different political, economic, and social structures of South Korea, refugees are subject to discrimination from South Koreans throughout, and after, the adjustment process. The currently proposed model illustrates three processes that would facilitate positive South Korean attitudes towards North Korean refugees. It also provides descriptions of social, historical, and psychological barriers to these processes and how they prevent positive attitudes towards refugees. Discriminatory attitudes of South Koreans towards refugees not only heighten stress of assimilation but may also decrease South Koreans' future support for generous refugee policy and for reunification with the North.

Recognition of the vast political, economic, and sociocultural differences that separate North and South Korea is necessary to understand the difficulties North Korean refugees face after resettling in South Korea. While safe passage out of North Korea may appear to be the toughest challenge for refugees, adjusting to life after defection is comparable in terms of obstacles and stress. Sudden escalation in the number of resettled refugeesⁱ following devastating flooding and famineⁱⁱ in the North in the 1990s revealed many of these refugee problems to the South Korean public.

Some of the most recognized issues today include language and cultural barriers, poverty, unemployment, and mental health (Kim, 2010).

For newly resettled refugees, social support and interaction are necessary for adequate mental and emotional adjustment (Ahearn, 1999). The friendly, hostile, or indifferent attitudes of host nation citizens can greatly impact the likelihood of successful adjustment. Interviews of North Korean refugees who resettled in South Korea revealed many instances of discrimination because individuals were from the North. An important step in helping North Korean refugees overcome other obstacles to assimilation is identifying how to promote positive South Korean attitudes towards refugees. This report proposes a model to illustrate the various factors that influence attitudes of South Koreans (Figure 1). Leading into the outcome of positive South Korean attitudes towards North Koreans are three main processes or channels: perception of a shared identity with North Koreans, successful assimilation of North Korean refugees into South Korean society, and South Koreans' acceptance of perceived costs of refugee resettlement. As the model shows, each process can be obstructed or facilitated by a number of items. Also shown in the model is the bidirectional relationship between North Korean refugees' attitudes and South Koreans' attitudes. As it is a fairly simplified model, it does not provide a comprehensive view of all factors that influence South Korean attitudes. It does, however, allow one to

gain an understanding of not only where discriminatory attitudes come from, but also how they may affect the experiences of current and future refugees. The importance of this research lies in the identification of ways to alleviate or prevent assimilation difficulties for the increasing numbers of North Korean refugees.

PERCEPTION OF A SHARED IDENTITY WITH NORTH KOREANS

The phrase *Hanminjok*, or “one people,” is used by South Koreans to refer to the ethnic bond that unites Koreans on both sides of the 38th parallel (Kim & Jang, 2007).ⁱⁱⁱ In the years following the division, a symbolic brotherhood characterized the majority of South Koreans’ attitudes towards North Koreans, despite growing mistrust and opposition towards the North Korean government (Hilpert, 2010). In many instances, the kinship was not merely symbolic but real; amidst chaos and confusion of the war, many families were separated by the North-South border without warning (Lee, 2010).

Over the course of six decades since the division of the Korean Peninsula, many events have weakened the emotional, ideological, and material bond that once existed between the two states (Hilpert, 2010; Lee, 2010). Growing differences between the North and the South have contributed to the conceptualization of one another as “other,” or “*nam*” as one would say in Korean. Today, North and South are separated not only by a physical boundary but also by divergences in cultural values, experiences, and ideology. The resulting cognitive and emotional detachment felt by South Koreans towards North Korea and its citizens as a whole may contribute to South Koreans’ discriminatory attitudes towards refugees. Ironically, the

individuals who choose to defect from the country of “other” and who obtain South Korean citizenship upon resettlement are still seen as outsiders by the people that once considered them brothers.

Specifically, the barriers to South Koreans’ perception of a shared identity with North Koreans are the changes that have caused this distancing: the diverging of North and South national identities, strained relations between the two countries, and the emergence of younger generations that are further removed from the war and a united Korean identity. The economic victory of South Korea in the 1970s, when it surpassed the economic performance of its Northern neighbor, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of North Koreans due to famine likely contributed to South Korean views that the North’s socialist system was not only incompetent but also dangerous (Lee, 2010). Refugees who managed to enter South Korea before the 1980s were enthusiastically welcomed by South Koreans delighted at the small “victories” for capitalism (Park, 2003). More recently, stories of torture and persecution by refugees have revealed a horrific side to North Korea that alienated it even more from its neighbor state (Lee, 2010).

Military provocations and hostility from the North also reinforced the image of North Korea as an enemy rather than a brother nation. For example, nuclear testing by the North in 2006 triggered great outrage in the South (Lee, 2010). South Korean administrations under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) had maintained a policy of continued contact and unconditional economic assistance, and South Korean citizens felt betrayed by North Korea’s decision to develop its nuclear weapons program without any regard for their agreement (Lee, 2010). The policy, which was known as the “Sunshine Policy,” was criticized for providing unconditional

economic aid and perhaps even enabling the North to develop a nuclear weapons program (Lee, 2010).^{iv}

A poll taken in 2009 revealed that 41.6 percent of South Koreans considered North Korea as an enemy whereas 47.3 percent considered them a partner (Lee, 2010). More recently, altercations between North and South military forces have sparked increases in hostility towards the North. The sinking of a South Korean navy vessel, the *Cheonan*, by a North Korean torpedo in November 2010 resulted in the deaths of 46 South Korean sailors (NY Times, 2010). The nations also exchanged artillery fire following a shelling of the South Korean Yeonpyeong Island by North Korean forces, which killed two soldiers and two civilians and injured another twelve. In 2010, following these events, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak declared the North as the South's "principal enemy," formally reestablishing a hostile relationship that had been avoided in the past. While these are just recent examples, similar trends have characterized the North-South relationship for many years.

Lastly, the appearance of new generations that did not experience the devastation of war also acts as a barrier to identification with North Koreans. As the direct family ties across the 38th parallel disappear or are forgotten, members of younger generations have little reason to consider North Koreans their actual brothers and sisters. Surveys report low support for and skepticism towards reunification in the younger generation^v, who also seem to hold pragmatic concerns (e.g. cost of reunification to South Korean economy) over ideological desires for a united Korea (Lee, 2010). These individuals are also growing up in a period when South Korea is forging its own identity separate from North Korea and is becoming more global, multi-cultural, and multi-ethnic (Lee, 2010). The

tradition of ethnic homogeneity is changing, lessening the importance of a shared ethnic identity with North Koreans.

In 2003, a national poll reported that 58 percent of South Korean respondents agreed to the statement, "I feel compatriotism for *saetomin*" ("new settlers", another term for North Korean refugees) and 21.7 percent reported that they "do not have any particular emotion" regarding *saetomin*. However, in the same poll conducted two years later in 2005, 46.8 percent reported "no particular emotion" and 36 percent reported having either "somewhat friendly" or "very friendly" feelings towards *saetomin* (Korea Institute for National Unification, as cited in Kim & Jang 2007). It is worrisome that even as the numbers of refugees entering Korea are increasing every year, concern for refugee and refugee problems seems to be declining. Through a combination of all the factors discussed above, the sense of brotherhood that used to surround North Korea is being replaced by a negative one of nuclear threat, human rights violations, and duplicity.

Even in a nation such as South Korea where ethnicity and nationality have been closely tied, it is difficult for South Koreans to think of refugees as fellow citizens because of the great difference in experiences. Social psychological research on the experiences of immigrants may shed light on the difficult situation of North Korean refugees in South Korea. Deaux (2008) writes that we find it difficult to recognize that an individual may have multiple identities (e.g. different ethnic and national identities). For example, immigrants or hyphenated Americans illustrate how two identity categories can be present in one body. However, we do not easily accept this notion because of our tendencies to engage in a type of zero-sum thinking that a person who is of one

category cannot simultaneously be of another. For South Koreans, this may mean that their ideas of what constitute a North Korean identity will hinder their ability to recognize North Korean refugees' new status as South Korean citizens. The reason behind this relates back to the failure of South Koreans to identify with North Korean citizens. The view that the two categories (i.e. a North Korean past and a South Korean citizenship) are incompatible will perpetuate the idea that refugees can never become fully accepted members of South Korean society.

In a recent change, the Ministry of Unification encouraged use of the title *saetomin* (new settler) instead of the older term *talbukcha* (North Korean refugee). Perhaps they hoped that removing the connection with North Korea from the title would decrease associations with the country that could lead to discrimination. Though it is a small change, it may help to promote the idea that refugees are new members of South Korean society rather than foreigners from the North.

ASSIMILATION OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

A second channel feeding into South Korean attitudes towards North Korean refugees is the success of refugee assimilation into South Korean society. This channel focuses on the specific characteristics and circumstances surrounding resettled refugees that are observable to the rest of society. It is distinct from the first channel in that it encompasses personal situations rather than general attitudes towards North Koreans. The two are related, however, since failure of refugees to adequately assimilate into South Korean society reinforces the conceptualization of them as outsiders incapable of disposing of their North Korean identity.

Three barriers to successful assimilation include low socioeconomic status, poor academic performance, and mental health problems. A facilitator, on the other hand, is resettlement programs run by the Ministry of Unification specifically to aid the adjustment North Korean refugees. Currently, refugees spend their first two months in South Korea at *Hanawon*, a facility created to teach refugees about South Korean society (Kim, 2010). During their time there, refugees receive intensive adaptation education and vocational training. They also receive help looking for employment and education opportunities and are assigned to residential areas (Kim, 2010). For the first five years, refugees receive help with social adaptation, economic concerns, employment, and other needs. Various other ministries provide means for employment and vocational training outside of *Hanawon*, opportunities for education, social welfare services, and housing arrangements. Private organizations, such as the Society to Support NK Refugees, may assist with public relations matters and hold social and educational gatherings for refugees (Kim, 2010).

North Korean refugees who enter South Korea hold high expectations for their new lives, especially in terms of economic well-being and employment (Stein, 1986). However, many face tough economic situations due to high rates of unemployment and low rates of promotion, which are especially disappointing (Kim & Jang, 2007). Income comparison studies revealed that refugees received incomes below the societal average (Korea National Statistical Office, as cited in Kim & Jang, 2007), and a separate study by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (DCNKHR) revealed that many refugees also experience feelings of relative

deprivation. Most of those surveyed (57.3 percent) classified themselves as “lower class” and the next greatest percentage (27.5 percent) considered themselves to be living in “abject poverty.”

One explanation for high unemployment in refugee populations relates North Koreans’ lack of professional and technical knowledge^{vi} to few opportunities for employment outside of temporary and daily work in South Korean society (Kim & Jang, 2007). However, studies revealed that even college graduates and professionals trained in North Korea are not being hired in their fields^{vii} and forced to find temporary or unskilled positions. Another explanation of low employment rates blames the unwillingness of refugees to find work that may lower their status, especially low-paying and low-skill jobs that may represent underemployment (Stein, 1986). It seems fairly likely that a combination of inadequate training and discrimination are at play. A more contemptuous view of refugee unemployment claims they are simply content to live off of government funds^{viii} (Kim & Jang, 2007). Factors outside of hiring, such as negative interactions with coworkers, may also discourage steady and long-term employment.^{ix}

Language has also been cited as a major contributor to the failure of refugees to find employment. Though North and South Koreans technically speak the same language, such thorough isolation of the North and increased globalization and modernization of the South have rendered the two versions very different. In addition to differences in words, the North Korean version is spoken with a strong accent that is also heard in ethnic communities of Koreans in China. A survey conducted by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) revealed that it took the majority of refugees close to three years to feel

comfortable with the South Korean language (Kim & Jang, 2007). For newly arrived refugees and those still learning, however, the language barrier strongly hinders employment prospects and everyday interactions. According to South Korean employers, language is the primary reason refugees are not being hired (Kim & Jang, 2007). Inability to effectively communicate can definitely contribute to the idea that North Korean refugees cannot assimilate to South Korean society. Hearing North Korean dialect is also a sure give-away to South Koreans, and simply recognizing its origins may activate negative stereotypes towards the speaker.

For younger refugees who enter South Korea, adjusting to school life is yet another obstacle to overcome. Parents of these refugees invest much hope into the South Korean education system and see good education as a requirement to succeed in the new society (Kim & Jang, 2007). However, studies by the Ministry of Education show worrisome school performance and adjustment in refugee youth: elevated drop-out rates (13.7 percent, ten times higher than the South Korean national average) and similarly dismal attendance rates (58.4 percent for middle school students and 10.4 percent for high school students).

Many reasons have also been proposed to explain poor academic performance by refugees. Poor education systems in North Korea could have left the children significantly behind their South Korean peers, and disruption in children’s education due to poverty, family death, or defection could have contributed as well (Kim & Jang, 2007). North Korean refugee children are placed into South Korean school systems based solely on how many years of schooling they received in the North. While this may help to lessen the gaps in knowledge between refugee youth and their South Korean

classmates, it usually places refugees into classrooms of much younger students.^x Difficulties forging friendships with other students and differences in educational content and pedagogy have also been proposed as explanations for low achievement. Amongst all these explanations, perhaps the most likely is a combination of all these factors added to the stress of assimilating to a new society.

Mental health problems of refugees are yet another barrier to adjustment to life in South Korea. Importantly, mental illness has a direct influence on refugees' ability to successfully settle in their new environment (Blair, 2000, as cited in Jeon et al., 2005). Traumatic experiences while living in North Korea, such as witnessing public executions, watching family members die of starvation, or serving a sentence in a labor camp, may lead to anxiety or mood disorders (Jeon et al., 2009). Fearful and anxiety-causing situations during defection, such as living in hiding in China^{xi}, may also contribute to stress-disorders. Disaster research has shown that affected populations may show major mental health problems such as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosomatic syndromes, suicide attempts, and violence (Jeon et al., 2009). In addition to previous instances of traumatic stress, refugees also bear the burden of significant mental stress from adjusting to life in a different society.

In a study of refugees who had lived in Korea for at least one year following defection, over 30 percent of both men and women reported symptoms of depression^{xii} and even more showed signs of severe distress^{xiii} (Jeon et al., 2009). In a separate study (Jeon et al., 2005), 29.5 percent of refugees surveyed were diagnosed with PTSD^{xiv}. Mental illness disorders and behaviors may lead South Koreans to view the refugees as dangerous, helpless, or unpredictable

(Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2005). South Koreans' negative attitudes can play a role in the vicious cycle of impaired mental health of refugees and the stress of their new environments (e.g. Kivling-Boden & Sundbon, 2002, as cited in Jeon et al., 2005).

The factors discussed in this channel illustrate how failure of refugees to assimilate (for reasons that may be related to life experiences in North Korea, discrimination from South Korean employers and coworkers, or stress of assimilation) can hinder positive attitudes of South Koreans towards refugees. Observers may attribute poor employment or academic record to mere laziness or lack of motivation. Stigmas of mental illness may discourage South Koreans from befriending refugees, for fear that they will be violent or unstable. Most of all, they may stimulate views that North Korean refugees are too different or damaged to be functional members of society.

PERCEIVED COST TO SOUTH KOREANS FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

According to Professor Yun In-jin of Korea University, Koreans agree with government refugee aid programs in theory, but oppose them when they must bear the costs and burdens of making them possible (Kim & Jang, 2007). For example, refugee placement into subsidized housing is a program that can affect neighboring South Koreans: areas with high numbers of resettled refugees tend to turn into slums with decreased property value (Kim, 2010). Kangseo, a district of Seoul, is one area where a significant number of refugees are placed. A survey was conducted by the Kangseo District Office to gauge South Korean sentiment regarding this trend. Residents of the area were asked whether they

supported or opposed a proposal to continue placing refugees in Kangseo. Results revealed that twice as many residents opposed the proposal (46 percent) as those who supported it (23 percent) (Kim & Ko, as cited in Kim & Jang, 2007).

The third and final channel process that could potentially lead to positive attitudes of South Koreans is the recognition and acceptance of personal costs of refugee resettlement. Taking the example mentioned above, the residents of Kangseo were reluctant to see more refugees placed in the district since it would decrease the property value of their homes. If these individuals, on the other hand, considered refugee resettlement a cause worth the decrease in value of their property, they might have supported the proposal instead of opposing it. In this way, encouraging South Koreans to accept the perceived cost of refugee resettlement could promote positive attitudes towards North Korean refugees.

However, social psychological theory on intergroup relations provides at least two reasons why this is not easy. Firstly, realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 1961) predicts that competition for scarce resources will increase conflict between groups and possibly lead to discrimination and stereotyping. In the case of the Kangseo residents, the threat of losing money via loss in property value created potential conflict between them and hypothetical refugees that posed this threat. The conflict, though imagined in this case, might have led to negative attitudes towards the hypothetical refugees. Importantly, even the knowledge that refugees resettlement is correlated with decreased property value might contribute to generalized negative attitudes towards refugees.

Another example shows the importance of South Koreans' perception of loss as a result of refugee resettlement

policy. In 1997, South Korea experienced an economic crisis that required intervention by the International Monetary Fund, an event that is now commonly referred as the "IMF Crisis" (Park, 2003). Powerful corporations declared bankruptcy and many lost their jobs as a result. The government, however, increased aid to refugees during the crisis after realizing that the refugees were the most vulnerable during times of economic hardship (Park, 2003). Not long after, in 1999, the administration created the Office for North Korean Refugee Settlement Assistance (*Hanawon*) and expanded it in 2002 (Yonhap News, 2002, as cited in Park, 2003).

Owing to government intervention, North Korean refugees were not directly harmed from the IMF Crisis. However, realistic conflict theory predicts that South Koreans' negative attitudes towards refugees increased as a result of the government decision. One would predict that citizens resented the extra help given to refugees and the extra funds that went to building a resettlement center, especially right after one of the worst economic disasters in South Korea. The frustration of South Koreans in the midst of the IMF crisis, perhaps compounded by the opinions of some that refugees are lazy or unmotivated, could have increased discriminatory tendencies.

A second social psychological theory that identifies a barrier to South Koreans' acceptance of perceived cost comes from Tajfel's minimal group paradigm (1971). According to Tajfel, the mere recognition of one's belonging to a group, even a group compiled through chance, is enough to produce ingroup favoritism and intergroup discrimination. This presents a barrier to the third and final channel because of the already present idea of the North Korean refugee as an outsider to South Korean society.

Because of the tendency to think of refugees in this way, South Koreans are less likely to accept costs for their benefit. Even though this channel has fewer barriers relative to the other two, it might be the most difficult to address. As the barriers are psychological factors of South Koreans, interventions must focus on changing South Koreans' perceptions of the value of refugee resettlement to their society (as outweighing potential personal costs).

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES' MISTRUST OF SOUTH KOREANS

"South Koreans are very calculating, cautious, and circumambulatory. Meanwhile, North Koreans, frankly speaking, are straightforward and stupid, although they are actually just simple and naïve," (Kim, 2010 p. 102). This refugee's account of adjusting to South Korean life expressed great surprise and fear at the cultural differences separating the two Koreas. It reveals the importance of refugee's impressions of South Koreans to both successful adjustment. The following section details how refugees' negative impressions of South Koreans may also contribute to their own discrimination.

Surveys report that many refugees have difficulty trusting and understanding the motivations of South Koreans (Kim & Lee, 2009) and that many feel discriminated against because of their North Korean past. They resented others' tendencies to automatically and completely reject all political, ideological, and cultural aspects of North Korea. This was especially true for refugees who resettled fairly recently and were still trying to reconcile two conflicting images of South Korea: one based on their personal experiences and the other based on North Korean propaganda and socialist ideology. Though they decided to

leave North Korea in order to escape the political and economic conditions, some refugees still held mixed feelings about their new lives in South Korea.^{xv}

Perceptions of discrimination also contribute greatly to negative impressions of South Koreans. Refugees felt that discrimination by South Koreans, particularly employers, presented a major disadvantage in finding employment and advancing in the workplace (Kim & Jang, 2007). Refugees have also become a targeted population for perpetrators of fraud; 21.5 percent of North Korean refugees reported having been victims of fraud by South Koreans, an astounding 43 times higher than the national average (Oh & Whan, as cited in Kim & Jang, 2007). Moreover, refugees reported feeling socially isolated by and emotionally distant from South Koreans (Kim & Jang, 2007). These accounts suggest a relationship between refugees and South Koreans that is splintered with distrust, hostility, and disappointment.

CONCLUSION

Social support has been shown to be an important factor in the recovery of many different populations (Ahearn, 1999). North Korean refugees who received instrumental (e.g. money, time) or emotional support from South Koreans reported improvements in mood (Kim & Lee, 2009) whereas those that experienced discrimination from South Koreans reported increased difficulty adjusting (Kim, 2010). The model and explanation presented here gives just one of many ways to understand the many factors that influence South Korean attitudes towards North Korean refugees. The complicated nature of the issue at hand precludes the possibility of simple solutions, or even simple explanations. A complex system, however, does present opportunities for intervention via many different pathways.

Considering the rapid development of South Korea and deterioration of North-South relations recently, it may be easier to focus on helping refugees assimilate into South Korean culture than trying to promote a shared identity to South Koreans in general. Interventions aimed at facilitating easier adjustment for refugees could implement continued vocational training programs and education services after refugees leave *Hanawon*. Specialized employment counseling that takes both prior training and future employment goals into consideration could definitely help refugees find and keep the jobs they need. Perhaps even the option of being accompanied by a translator to interviews would help refugees to understand the duties that specific positions entail and reduce room for miscommunication. For students, a more thorough evaluation of refugees' academic readiness upon entering South Korea (instead of one based solely on years of education received) may improve poor performance caused by gaps in knowledge. Perhaps even alternative educational programs should be considered, as they may provide a much-needed transition phrase before students are enrolled into normal schools. Lastly, and maybe most importantly, greater attention to mental health care should be given from the moment refugees enter South Korea. The utilization of resources such as therapists or group therapy meetings should be encouraged and publicized throughout the refugee community. Better publicity of all refugee resources, such as optional job training, could help already established programs to be better utilized. These suggestions all use the facilitator identified in the assimilation channel (refugee resettlement programs) to bypass the barriers blocking successful refugee assimilation.

Decreases in discriminatory attitudes of South Koreans towards refugees have great implications for future reunification and refugee resettlement policy. Interventions that could reliably promote positive attitudes of South Koreans would stabilize support for generous refugee resettlement policies regardless of outside factors, such as North-South relations and economic climate. This seems especially important at a time when the number of refugees is continuing to increase, and concern for the well-being of refugees seems to be declining.

ⁱ Numbers of refugees that entered South Korea increased nearly every year from 1989 to 2006 (Kim & Jang, 2007). Records show that while 9 refugees entered in 1990, a staggering 2,019 refugees entered in 2006 (Ministry of Unification, 2005, as cited in Kim & Jang, 2007).

ⁱⁱ Famine ravaged the DPRK in the mid 1990s, killing between an estimated 600,000 to 1 million people (Lee, 2006).

ⁱⁱⁱ The 38th parallel was where US and USSR troops initially divided the Korean Peninsula. Though they planned on reunifying the North and South under an independent Korean government, increasing mistrust between the US and the USSR prevented reconciliation of competing Korean governments and precluded joint elections (Hilpert, 2010). The line that divides the DPRK and the ROK is also known as the DMZ, or Demilitarized Zone.

^{iv} The Sunshine Policy was continued throughout the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008) but was discontinued by President Lee Myung-bak, who took a stronger stance against providing North Korea with aid.

^v A 2009 survey of 20-29 year olds revealed that 30.2 percent of them had a negative view of reunification. This percentage was higher than the average across all age groups (18.8 percent). These individuals disapproved of efforts to reintegrate the two states and believed that South Korea had more to lose than to gain by reunification (Lee, 2010).

^{vi} Of approximately 8,400 refugees surveyed in May 2006, 44 percent of them were unemployed in NK. Of the remaining who held jobs, 77 percent of them performed manual labor (Ministry of Unification, as cited in Kim & Jang, 2007).

^{vii} Between 2000 and August 2004, 128 "professional" refugees (doctors, teachers, translators, etc.) defected to Korea. Of those, only two found employment in their professions (Kim, 2005, as cited in Kim & Jang, 2007).

^{viii} Many refugees leave North Korea with the help of border guides and brokers, whom they need to compensate once settled in South Korea. Much of

refugees' start-up money from the *Hanawon* program is used to pay back fees or even to arrange the escape of other family members (Park, 2003).

^{ix} In a 2001 survey by the Association for Support to North Korean defectors, 22.4 percent of refugee respondents answered that "unfair treatment and prejudice of South Koreans" to be the toughest challenge faced at work (Kim & Jang, 2007).

^x A 2005 survey by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights revealed that being older than the rest of one's classmates was a commonly given reason for dropping out of school (13.5 percent). Unfriendly relations with other students (16.7 percent) and poor academic records (16.7 percent) were other commonly cited reasons (Kim & Jang, 2007).

^{xi} North Korean defectors are considered economic migrants, rather than political refugees, by Chinese officials. If discovered, they will be returned to North Korea and imprisoned or even executed (Ko, Chung, & Oh, 2004).

^{xii} 30.5 percent of men and 34.7 percent of women, the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D).

^{xiii} 33.1 percent of men and 36.1 percent of women, assessed with The Psychosocial Well-Being Index.

^{xiv} Higher PTSD rates (56 percent) were found in a study of refugees who settled in China (Lee et al., 2001). This may be due to the stress of living in hiding.

^{xv} Kim and Oh (2009) reported that while both South Koreans and North Korean refugees showed more favorable attitudes towards South Korea than North Korea on explicit measures, North Korean refugees showed more favorable evaluations of North Korea than South Korea on implicit measures. North Koreans also showed neutral national identification on explicit measures but identified more strongly with a North Korean national identity on implicit measures.

REFERENCES

Ahearn, F.L. (1999). Psychosocial wellness: methodological approaches to the study of refugees. In *The psychosocial wellness of refugees*. (pp. 3-23) New York, NY: Berghahn Books.

Angermeyer, M.C., & Dietrich, S. (2006). Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people with mental illness: A review of population studies. *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica*, 113(3), 163-179. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.2005.00699.x

Deaux, K. (2008). To be an american: Immigration, hyphenation, and incorporation. *Journal of Social Issues*, 64(4), 925-943. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00596.x

Hilpert, H.G. (2010). A comparison of german and korean division: Analogies and differences. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, 19(1), 126-156.

Jeon, W. et al. (2005). Correlation between traumatic events and ptsd among north korean defectors in south korea. *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, 18(2), 147-154.

Jeon, W. et al. (2009). Prevalence and correlates of depressive symptoms among north korean

defectors living in south korea for more than one year. *Psychiatry Invest*, 6, 122-130.

Kim, S. (2010). Tackling the social exclusion of north korean refugees in south korea. *Korea Observer*, 41(1), 93-129.

Kim, J. & Jang, D. (2007). Aliens among brothers? The status and perception of north korean refugees in south korea. *Asian Perspective*, 31(2), 5-22.

Kim, H. & Lee, O. (2009). Phenomenological study on the experiences of north korean refugees. *Nursing Science Quarterly*, 22(1), 85-88.

Kim, D. & Oh, H. (2001). Psychosocial aspects of korean reunification: Explicit and implicit national attitudes and identity of south Koreans and north korean defectors. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 7(3), 265-288.

Ko, S., Chung, K., & Oh, Y. (2004). North korean defectors: Their life and well-being after defection. *Asian Perspective*, 28(2), 65-99.

Lec, S. (2010). The south korean view on korean unification. In *No Confidence in Korea: A Regional Problem in a Global Context* (pp. 88-93). Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Policy.

Park, H. (2003). South korea's policy response to sudden increases in north korean refugees. *Korea Observer*, 34(4), 731-755.

Stein, B. N. (1986). The experience of being a refugee: Insights from the research literature. In *Refugee mental health in resettlement countries*. (pp. 5-23) Washington, DC, US: Hemisphere Publishing Corp.

Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1(2), 149-178. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420010202

SON PREFERENCE YESTERDAY AND TODAY:

The Causes and Implications of Son Preference in Contemporary South Korea

Kristen Kim '13

INTRODUCTION

“If you have a daughter, you cry twice.” This Korean proverb refers to the notion that parents cry once when their daughter is born and a second time when she gets married and leaves home. This image of parents crying out of disappointment at the birth of a daughter effectively captures the prevalence of son preference in South Korea (hereafter, Korea). Although son preference, also known as boy preference, is often marked as traditional and outdated, it continues to pervade contemporary Korean society. In fact, just two decades ago, Korea’s secondary sex ratio, or the ratio of males to females in a population at the time of birth, was the highest in the world (Figure 1). The statistically normal sex ratio is estimated to range between 103 and 106 boys per 100 girls. In 1990, Korea’s sex ratio was 117 – a value unattainable without human intervention.ⁱ Although the government has since managed to normalize the ratio (around 105 in the last couple of years), I argue that this artificially deflated value is no longer representative of the degree of son preference in Korea. Son preference may be less detectable and perhaps slightly weaker today, but it is still rampant and functions as a barrier to achieving gender equality in realms of society outside reproduction. As it exists today, son preference is a manifestation of the deeply embedded essentialist belief in the innate superiority of males. As long as people are socialized to accept such a power structure as natural, the subordination of

women will continue to be enacted in everyday activities, which will in turn further propel son preference.

CAUSES OF SON PREFERENCE: Historical and Cultural Roots of Son Preference

Korea is not alone in its history of male-based sex ratios. In 1994, representatives from China, India, and several other Asian nations gathered in Seoul for a conference called the International Symposium on Issues Related to Sex Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing Demographic Dynamics in Asia.ⁱⁱ The purpose of this conference was to discuss the “missing girl phenomenon,” or the dearth of girls among these nations exhibiting strong son preference. One thing that became clear through the symposium was that the “missing girl phenomenon” was not the same in each country represented; thus treating all of East Asia as a son-preferring monolithic entity is unproductive for this dilemma. Instead, because the social, economic, political, and cultural context of each population is distinct, the causes of son preference, the ways in which it is being practiced and the sorts of consequences it has also varies among nations. For example, the dearth of girls in China is most commonly attributed to the state’s stringent fertility regulation through the one-child policy.ⁱⁱⁱ This coercive policy has led to the underreporting of female births and cases of infanticide.^{iv} In India, son preference and the skewed sex ratio are consequences of the expensive

dowries that parents have to pay at the time of their daughters' marriage.^v Economic concerns specific to Indian marriage customs are what characterize their sex preference.

Cross-country comparisons serve to elucidate the particulars of Korea's "missing girl phenomenon." Although the Korean government has intervened in bringing down the sex ratio, the means that it used, which will be more fully described in later sections, were nowhere near as restrictive as the one-child policy. Also, there is little to no evidence indicating that unreported female births and/or infanticide significantly influence sex ratios as they have in China. Moreover, contrary to what one might expect, sons in Korea have limited economic utility; the net expenses of a son's marriage are actually three or four times higher than that of a daughter's. Clearly concerns about paying dowries are not central to Korea's situation. Considering the rapid urbanization that Korea has undergone since the Korean War, the advantage of having males for labor force participation, which is a consideration in more rural countries, is not a major factor either and will continue to decrease in its relevance.

Instead the most commonly cited causes of son preference in Korea include women's lack of autonomy and the patriarchal family system.^{vi} In a 1991 survey, most women agreed that cultural factors, namely the need to continue family lineage and prestige (42.2% and 34.2% respectively), were the most relevant reasons for desiring sons over daughters.^{vii} Only 6.8% of women agreed that receiving financial support in old age was the most important reason, further clarifying that economic reasons for son preference are less significant.^{viii} These responses are not surprising when one considers the family structure of Premodern Korea.

In eighteenth century Korea, during the reign of the Choson dynasty (1392-1910), the existing bilateral family system was replaced with a patriarchal family system.^{ix} Under the earlier bilateral family system, both male and female members had enjoyed equal rights and privileges, including those of lineage and inheritance. According to Martina Deuchler, a professor of Korean studies at the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, "because of this bilateral strategy, the [descent] group was equally interested in retaining its male and female members."^x Such a kinship system did not promote a predilection towards having sons. However, the newly instated patriarchal system changed kinship relations to be both patrilineal and patrilocal. Patrilineal means that the passage of productive assets was limited to the males in the family, while patrilocal means that couples were required to reside at the man's home with the man's family after marriage.^{xi} This shift intensified the responsibility of women to bear a male heir for her husband's family. This functioned to reduce the value of women to their reproductive capabilities.

Furthermore the pressure to bear sons resulted because sons have the responsibility of taking care of his ancestors in the afterlife by conducting ancestor worship. According to supernatural belief, through ancestor worship, sons could appease their hungry ancestors and thereby ensure peace and harmony in their families.^{xii} More specifically, this duty is delegated to the eldest son, which is particular to Korean culture. In parts of India and in China, sons are considered pretty much equal and inherit property equally so the option of having one's brother's sons take care of one in old age and in the after life is available.^{xiii} However, in Korea, the son of the eldest brother is expected to continue the family line and take care of his family

during and after life. Accordingly, the eldest brother inherits the largest proportion of the property and holds the responsibility of performing ancestor worship.^{xiv} Thus it is common for the wife of an eldest son to face especially significant pressure from her in-laws to have a son.

Though it would be naïve to wholly blame Confucian ideology for gender inequality in contemporary Korea, because of its undeniable influence on Korean thought, it is important to examine what aspects may have contributed to the development of son preference. The Confucian tenet dictates that it is natural for women to be inferior to men; women are to follow the orders of her father, husband, and son.^{xv} Therefore, women socialized by the ethics of Confucianism may not think to question this gender hierarchy. Another relevant Confucian value is that of filial piety, which a son could only completely fulfill by ensuring the continuation of his family's lineage. These values alongside the establishment of a patriarchal family system ushered in a son-preferring nation.

The pressures from one's family and society to bear sons became so strong that the practice of taking in concubines for this sole purpose became acceptable. This mindset surprisingly persisted into modern times. According to results from a 1981 survey, about 90% of female respondents said that it was either important or very important to have a boy in the family. Furthermore, over half the women said they would assume ignorance if her husband were to have an affair with another woman to have a male heir born to him.^{xvi} These numbers suggest that even into the eighties, affairs and second wives were permissible as long as it was to help men fulfill their filial duties and lift pressure from their wives.

FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISTORTED LEVELS OF THE SEX RATIO

As Korea started modernizing in the sixties, the ideal family size and consequently the population's fertility rate declined. In the past, it was assumed that strong son preference would prevent or at least slow down fertility decline because people would continue to have children until they achieved their desired number of sons.^{xvii} However, the opposite seems to have been the case in Korea. Fertility rates continued to drop precipitously to below replacement level in 1991.^{xviii} As fertility rates dropped, the sex ratio became more skewed. This is because as the ideal family size dropped, son preference remained the same. Between 1959 and 1991, as the ideal number of children fell from 5 to 2, the ideal number of sons fell from 3 to 1.2. Although the desired proportion of sons did not change, the number of daughters that could be accommodated in the described family composition decreased from 2 to .08.^{xix} In other words, there was less room for daughters and greater pressure to have sons. Instead of preventing fertility decline as people had predicted, son preference changed how families valued daughters.

The accommodation of both a lower desired family size and son preference was made possible by different contraceptive use as well as the introduction of sex-detection technology in 1985. Based on the sex of their existing children, parents could manipulate reproductive patterns and contraceptive use to achieve the desired sex composition for their families.^{xx} For example, a couple with one daughter would be more likely to continue reproducing than one with a son. More importantly, the mass production of ultrasound technology, the most common

mode of prenatal sex-detection, gave couples more control over the gender composition of their family. Ultrasound scans, which were both convenient and relatively affordable, influenced couples' decision whether to go through with the pregnancy or to abort.

One trend that became clear through the use of sex-detection technology is that sex ratios grow as birth order progresses (Figure 2). This trend was especially noticeable as the nation's sex ratio peaked in 1990. Logically speaking, son-preferring couples with only daughters would be more likely than those with sons to resort to prenatal sex screening and sex selective abortion for later births. This is especially the case if the number of children they already have is close to or above the desired family size.^{xxi} Thus the sex ratio becomes more and more distorted for second and later births.

The population's reliance on sex-selective technology is also made obvious in the geographical differences in sex ratio. The sex ratio rose earlier in larger cities, such as Taegu and Pusan, than in towns or rural areas, which can be explained by a greater availability of sex-selective technology in cities.^{xxii}

Another noteworthy trend in the sex ratio is that it significantly increased in the years of the Horse. In a study analyzing data from Horse years between 1970 and 2003, Jungmin Lee and Myungho Paik found that the sex ratio at birth significantly increased while fertility decreased in these years.^{xxiii} According to Zodiac astrology, which is widespread in Korea, one's zodiac sign determines one's personality traits, and the year of the Horse is one that symbolizes an energetic, optimistic, and high-spirited personality. Such qualities are considered masculine and unfit for wives, and accordingly, couples seem to avoid having daughters in the year of the Horse. Since 1990, the year

of the unusually high sex ratio of 117, was the year of the Horse, parents may have been misreporting their daughter's birth dates, timing their childbearing by changing coital behavior or contraception usage and/or undergoing sex-selective abortion.

Although the Korean government outlawed prenatal sex detection practices and sex-selective abortion in 1987, the unnaturally high sex ratios that persisted long after indicate that selective abortions continued to be performed clandestinely among the masses. Chai Bin Park and Nam-hoon Cho in their study "Consequences of Son Preference," looks at the deviance of observed sex ratios from a "normal" value of 106 to estimate the number of female births that have been averted through selective abortion. Their results indicate that between 1986 and 1990, about 80,000 female births, or 5% of actual female births, were averted.^{xxiv}

The persistence of sex-selective abortion is also evidenced in the fact that in 1990, Korea's ministry of health and social affairs suspended the medical licenses of eight physicians who had performed sex determination tests.^{xxv} The ministry then revised their regulations so that performing sex-determination procedures could result in the revocation of medical licenses to make it a much more risky practice for medical practitioners.^{xxvi} Still in 2004, South Korea had the highest level of sex-selective abortion, due to the accessibility to such technology.^{xxvii} In sum, as the fertility rate went down and sex-detection technology was introduced, we saw son preference reflected more and more clearly in the distorted sex ratio.

THE POLITICS OF SON PREFERENCE

Since the patriarchal family system was first introduced in the Choson Dynasty, it has been both reinforced and undermined by the Korean government. Under the presidency of Syngman Rhee, the state codified the patriarchal family system in the Family Law of 1958, which stipulated that family headship belongs to the males in the line of the eldest sons, inheritance should be passed through the male line, women should be transferred to their husband's family register after marriage, and children belong to their father's lineage after divorce.^{xxxviii} In 1961, President Park Chung Hee led a military coup and came into office. His militaristic regime continued to emphasize the patriarchal family system by stressing the importance of individual families in maintaining the social welfare of the people.^{xxxix} The government also repressed citizen's demands for democracy and women's organizations' calls for greater gender equality.^{xxx}

It was not until 1989 that the Family Law of 1958 underwent major reform; however, even then it continued to support the traditional family roles that tended to marginalize women and their role in the family.^{xxxxi} This reform included allowing women the to have custody of children after divorce, encouraging equal inheritance of sons and daughters, and allowing the eldest son to relinquish family headship.^{xxxiii} Nevertheless, it maintained that family headship had to be held by males. As women's groups continued to question the constitutionality of the Family Law, the government continued to make amendments.^{xxxiii} In 1997, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled that the prohibition of marriage within the lineage was unconstitutional and amended the law.^{xxxiv} In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that women could remain members of their natal household after marriage and that women and men have equal rights and responsibilities to

care for their ancestors.^{xxxv} Also in 2005, the government abolished male headship and allowed parents who wished to register their children under the mother's family name beginning in 2008.^{xxxvi} Through these amendments, we see a gradual deterioration of the legalization of the patriarchal family structure.

Given the historical and political landscape in which son preference first appeared and continues to exist, it is clear that son preference is not a natural but a socially constructed phenomenon. Is contemporary son preference simply a tradition that has withstood the test of modernization? Has it continued linearly from Premodern Korea into modernity? Is it merely a refection of the remnants of the Choson Dynasty's patriarchal kinship system? It is unquestionable that with rapid economic development as well as the democratization movement in the late eighties, Korea on a whole has come to place greater emphasis on meritocracy and equal opportunities for men and women.^{xxxvii} With such advances, cultural factors like lineage become less relevant in determining one's success. As the traditional patriarchal family breaks down and gender equality increases, it should follow that son preference also diminishes. Conversely, in the rapid advancement of the eighties, the sex ratio in Korea continued to rise.^{xxxviii} It seems that economic and social advancement does not necessarily lessen son preference, complicating the characterization of son preference as a traditional value dependent on the traditional context in which it first appeared. Instead, it is a dynamic concept that is constantly changing even today.

GENDER ESSENTIALISM

So what is driving son preference in Korea today? Although the government managed to reduce the levels of the sex

ratio, this artificially deflated value is not an indication that son preference has disappeared. In fact, it persists today, though not as conspicuously, because of prevalent essentialist beliefs regarding gender. Gender essentialism is the view that men and women are different not because they are socialized to be different, but because they are biologically different.^{xxxix} It assumes that boys possess certain innate properties, such as being strong and aggressive, and girls other, such as being meek and passive, that are not dependent on context.

Prior to the introduction of a patriarchal kinship system in the Choson dynasty, Korea had a bilateral kinship system, which treated men and women as equals. Thus the subordination and marginalization of women that came alongside the installment of a patriarchal family system was very much socially constructed. However, it seems that people in Korea have lost sight of that. Although the patriarchal family system has been deteriorating with the rise of women's rights through feminist movements and legislative measures, son preference lives on because of essentialist beliefs regarding gender. Because the notion of men being superior over women is so salient in a patriarchal family structure, it seems that people have also accepted the belief that natural law dictates that boys are in "essence better than girls." People assume that sons are intrinsically more valuable than daughters, and such rigid thinking is what makes it so difficult for Korea to embrace daughters as they do sons.

Essentialist beliefs are problematic because they serve to perpetuate traditional gender roles. The essentialist blurs the line between sex, which is often used to describe male-female biological differences, and gender, or the characteristics that a society delineates as masculine or feminine. When the

distinction between the two become unclear, gender roles come to be seen as inevitable consequences of one's sex. Thus gender roles remain stringent and gender transgression is forbidden. Gender essentialism groups all women into the same category regardless of class, education level, individual personality, family background, etc. It assumes that because male female biological differences, for instance in chromosomes and sex organs, are for the most part black-and-white, male female personality differences are as well. It ascribes what are "masculine" qualities to men, and "feminine" ones to women. It does not take into account that girls can be aggressive and boys can be passive.

Though there has not been research conducted specifically to Korea's situation, a study in India has shown that son-preferring communities are more likely to essentialize gender. It also found that privileged group members, in this case, men, are more likely to endorse essentialist beliefs about gender.^{xl} In this way essentialist beliefs can and are being used to perpetuate the belief in men's superiority. Even though girls may have increased opportunities for education and work today, public thought is that boys still have an advantage because of certain intrinsic traits. For example, some may argue that boys are innately better suited for today's competitive capitalistic society because they are aggressive, independent and disciplined. As long as people continue to be socialized to think that boys are intrinsically superior to girls, gender equality will be difficult to achieve.

IMPLICATIONS OF SON PREFERENCE:

Consequences of Son Preference

One of the most commonly noted consequences of a population's sex imbalance is the "marriage squeeze," or

the surplus of unmarried men, especially in rural districts and among the lower class.^{xli} This concern has been criticized because it is often one-dimensional and focuses only on the plight of men, and not that of women.^{xlii} While the difficulty of men in finding spouses is understandable, there is no doubt that the “marriage squeeze” is equally if not more problematic for women. For one, in addressing this problem, Korean men have turned to foreign brides from other parts of Asia. In fact, this was so common that in 2008, 11% of marriages were “mixed,” most often between Korean men and foreign women.^{xliii} Though the influx of foreigners is not problematic in and of itself, these foreign women face discrimination and have difficulty assimilating into a mostly homogeneous society. Although Korea is not necessarily ethnically homogeneous, it is culturally homogeneous, making it difficult for outsiders to fit in. These women are often comprised of lower class members who come to Korea in hope of economic prosperity. For this reason, these women are discriminated against not only based on their race but also based on their class and social status. The children of these mixed marriages also face much discrimination.

However, the marriage squeeze does not only affect foreign women but also Korean women and Korean society at large. Although some scholars argue that the scarcity of women increases the value of women and helps women’s rights, it seems that scarcity has little effect on women’s social status.^{xliii} In fact, it has been observed in both China and India that the surplus of single men has increased the crime rate, with sex-related crimes of bride abduction, human trafficking, rape, and prostitution.^{xliii} One possible explanation for increased violence in light of the gender essentialism view is that males in high competition for

partners may have a greater tendency to essentialize and value men as being macho, and women as being chaste.^{xliii} Although a notable increase in the official crime rate fortunately has not occurred in Korea, it is possible that the surplus of single men has created a more hostile environment and attitude towards women. There is no evidence that the scarcity of women has increased their social value. The mere fact that people have called upon the economic theory of scarcity in predicting the future value of women suggests that the dearth of women may actually lead to further commodification of women.

Additionally, son preference and a masculine sex ratio could lead to the negative consequences for women’s physical and mental health. Before the advent of prenatal sex detection technology, women faced the pressure of continuously having children until they had a son. After the advent of prenatal sex detection technology, women faced the pressure of undergoing abortion until they bore a son. Although abortion is not as dangerous as childbirth, it still has its hazards, especially when performed repeatedly. In any case, before and after the advent of sex-detection technology, the need for a son in the family is often prioritized higher than the physical health of women.

Furthermore, son preference can affect the mental health of women. Korean women have suffered from rejection and mistreatment by her husband and her husband’s family if they failed to produce a son. This is captured in an interview with a Korean woman doctor conducted in 2002: “Every woman in Korea wants to have a son. Even though a lot of people are aware that the sex of the child is [biologically] determined by the father, women still feel that if their husband had married some other woman, he might have had a son. A

woman's domestic life is often badly affected if she does not have a son."^{xlvi} Women living with such irrational guilt and fear of mistreatment can develop psychological problems, such as depression. Additionally, daughters raised in families exhibiting strong son preference may feel neglected and develop low self-esteem and a sense of inferiority.

Furthermore, it is possible that the combination of intense male-male competition and a paucity of women leads to a more severe social control of and violence towards women. This abuse in turn could lead to negative psychological effects on women.^{xlviii} A study conducted on areas of South and Southeast Asia found that communities with male-based sex ratios have higher female suicide rates.^{xlix} With this in mind, it would not be too great of a stretch to suggest a correlation between strong son preference and the high female suicide rate in Korea. China also has one of the highest female suicide rates in the world and some have attributed this to the fact that women have difficulty dealing with the guilt that they aborted or killed their daughters.¹ Although the exact cause of suicide may not be identical in Korea, the relationship between the "missing girls" phenomenon and women's mental health deserves further attention.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S AUTONOMY

The performance of sex-selective abortions begs the question of how such practice shapes women's bodily agency. Is this an expression of women's control over their reproductive rights and autonomy? At first glance, it may be assumed that such technology to control their reproduction allows women to protect their bodies and their reproductive health. After all, induced abortion is considered safer than childbirth, so

perhaps abortions are a way in which women can protect their bodily health.^{li} However, when one realizes that the magnitude of societal pressures to produce male heirs, one finds that any reproductive decisions made by women will likely be a response to this pressure and not an expression of their reproductive autonomy.

By cracking down on sex-selective abortion, the government was able to successfully bring down the sex ratio in a matter of a couple decades. The only way that it was able to do so quickly and without much resistance is the cooperation of its people. Because government intervention gave women a justifiable reason to relinquish the control over the sex of their children, it also removed a certain level of guilt and pressure on them to bear sons and also to exhibit son preference. It is likely that government efforts were so effective because they were in line with women's wishes. Although the legitimacy of government intervention in personal matters of reproduction is debatable, it seems that the government may have actually furthered the wellbeing of women in this particular situation.

CONCLUSION

Between 1985 and 2003, the percentage of women who answered a survey saying, "they must have a son" fell from 48% to 17%.^{lii} While these results are somewhat encouraging, it is important to make the distinction between needing to have a son and wanting to have a son. Though the former may be a less prevalent notion today, the latter remains embedded in the Korean mentality and is still important to address. Because the sex ratio has been stabilized and son preference is less conspicuous, people have stopped paying attention to the consequences of it. However, son

preference remains a formidable barrier to achieving complete gender equality and deserves further attention.

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Sex Ratio at Birth
Park and Cho, “Consequences of Son Preference”; Korean National Statistics Office




Figure 2: Sex Ratio by Birth Order
Korea National Statistical Office

ⁱ “Gendecide: The Worldwide War on Baby Girls,” *Economist*, March 4, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/15636231>.

ⁱⁱ Judith Banister, “Son Preference in Asia” (report, International Symposium on Issues Related to Sex Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing Demographic Dynamics in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, November 1994).

ⁱⁱⁱ Monica Das Gupta, et al. *Why is Son Preference so Persistent in East and South Asia?* (Washington DC: The World Bank Development Group Public Services and Rural Development, 2002), 1.

^{iv} *Ibid.*

^v *Ibid.*

^{vi} *Ibid.*

^{vii} Moon Sik Hong, “Boy Preference and Imbalance in Sex Ratio in Korea” (presentation, International Symposium on Issues Related to Sex Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing

Demographic Dynamics in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, November 1994).

^{viii} *Ibid.*

^{ix} Deuchler, Martina, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1995), 45.

^x *Ibid.*, 39.

^{xi} Das Gupta, et al., *Why is Son Preference Persistent*, 7.

^{xii} Hong, “Boy Preference and Imbalance.”

^{xiii} Das Gupta, et al., *Why is Son Preference Persistent*, 13.

^{xiv} *Ibid.*

^{xv} Hung-tak Lee, *Causes of Son Preference in Korea* (research report to W.H.O., 1982), 11.

^{xvi} Lee, *Causes of Son Preference*, 158-159.

^{xvii} Banister, “Son Preference in Asia.”

^{xviii} Chai Bin Park and Nam-Hoon Cho, “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-Fertility Society: Imbalance of the Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea.”

Population and Development Review 21, no. 1 (1995): 64.

^{xix} Das Gupta, et al., Why Son Preference Persistent, 5.

^{xx} Park and Cho, "Consequences of Son Preference," 65.

^{xxi} Doo-sub Kim, "Missing Girls in South Korea: Trends, Levels, and Regional Variations," Population 56, no. 6 (2004): 869.

^{xxii} Park and Cho, "Consequences of Son Preference," 62.

^{xxiii} Jungmin Lee and Myungho Paik, "Sex Preferences and Fertility in South Korea During the Year of the Horse," Demography 43, no. 2 (2006).

^{xxiv} Ibid., 74.

^{xxv} Ibid., 80.

^{xxvi} Ibid.

^{xxvii} Das Gupta, et al., Why is Son Preference Persistent, 3.

^{xxviii} Woojin Chung and Monica Das Gupta, "Decline of Son Preference in South Korea: The Roles of Development and Public Policy," Population and Development Review 33, no. 4 (2007): 762.

^{xxix} Ibid.

^{xxx} Ibid.

^{xxxi} Ibid.

^{xxxii} Das Gupta, et al., Why Son Preference Persistent, 27.

^{xxxiii} Chung and Das Gupta, "Decline of Son Preference," 763.

^{xxxiv} Ibid.

^{xxxv} Ibid.

^{xxxvi} Ibid., 764.

^{xxxvii} Chung and Das Gupta, "Decline of Son Preference," 764.

^{xxxviii} Korean National Statistics Office, Last modified May 4, 2011, <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/index.action>.

^{xxxix} Clancy Ratliff, "Essentialism: Draft of 3W Encyclopedia Entry," Culture Cat (blog), August 7, 2004 (4:13 p.m.), <http://culturecat.net/node/486>.

^{xl} Mahalingam, Ramaswami, Jana Haritatos, and Benita Jackson, "Essentialism and the Cultural Psychology of Gender in Extreme Son Preference Communities in India," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 77, no. 4 (2007): 598-609.

^{xli} "Gendercide."

^{xlii} Banister, "Son Preference in Asia."

^{xliii} "Gendercide."

^{xliv} Monica Das Gupta and Li Shuzhuo, "Gender Bias in China, South Korea, and India 1920-1990: Effects of War, Famine and Fertility Decline." Development and Change 30, no.3 (1999): 644.

^{xlv} "Gendercide."

^{xlvi} Mahalingam, Haritatos, and Jackson, "Essentialism," 599.

^{xlvii} Ibid., 21.

^{xlviii} Mahalingam, Haritatos, and Jackson, "Essentialism," 599.

^{xlix} Ibid.

^l Ibid.

^{li} Park and Cho, "Consequences of Son Preference," 77.

^{lii} Ibid.

REFERENCES

Banister, Judith. "Son Preference in Asia." Report, International Symposium on Issues Related to Sex Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing Demographic Dynamics in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, November 1994.

Chung, Woojin and Monica Das Gupta. "Decline of Son Preference in South Korea: The Roles of Development and Public Policy." Population and Development Review 33, no. 4 (2007): 757-783.

Das Gupta, Monica, Jiang Zhenghua, Li Bohua, Xie Zhenming, Woojin Chung, and Bae Hwa-Ok. Why is Son Preference so Persistent in East and South Asia? Washington DC: The World Bank Development Group Public Services and Rural Development, 2002.

Das Gupta, Monica and Li Shuzhuo, "Gender Bias in China, South Korea, and India 1920-1990: Effects of War, Famine and Fertility Decline." Development and Change 30, no.3 (1999): 619-652.

Deuchler, Martina, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1995.

"Gendercide: The Worldwide War on Baby Girls." Economist, March 4, 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/15636231>.

Hong, Moon Sik. "Boy Preference and Imbalance in Sex Ratio in Korea." Presentation at the International Symposium on Issues Related to Sex Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing Demographic Dynamics in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, November 1994.

Kim, Doo-sub. "Missing Girls in South Korea: Trends, Levels, and Regional Variations." Population 56, no. 6 (2004): 865-878.

Korean National Statistics Office. Last modified May 4, 2011. <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/index.action>.

Lee, Hung-tak. Causes of Son Preference in Korea. Research Report to W.H.O., 1982.

Lee, Jungmin and Myungho Paik, "Sex Preferences and Fertility in South Korea During the Year of the Horse." Demography 43, no. 2 (2006).

My Name is Kim Sam-soon. Directed by Yoon Chul Kim. 2005. Seoul: MBC. DVD.

Park, Chai-Bin and Nam-Hoon Cho, "Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-Fertility Society: Imbalance of the Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea." Population and Development Review 21, no. 1 (1995): 59-84.

Ramaswami, Mahalingam, Jana Haritatos, and Benita Jackson, "Essentialism and the Cultural Psychology of Gender in Extreme Son Preference Communities in India." American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 77, no. 4 (2007): 598-609.

Son and Daughter Storyline 1992 (1/2)
[Video]. (2002). Retrieved May 6, 2011, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBK8NXOUk3Q>

Son and Daughter Storyline 1992 (2/2)
[Video]. (2002). Retrieved May 6, 2011, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zFFaNhojPzk&NR=1>.