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TO FIND THE RED AND EXPERT:

The Political Implications in the Reinstatement of the 1977 National College Entrance Examination in China

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ABSTRACT

Despite the vast research revolving around the 1977 reinstatement of the national college entrance examination (*gaokao* 高考) in China, little investigation has been done on the dissonance between the promoted slogans for this revision and its actual outcomes. Even though Deng Xiaoping and the Ministry of Education made many references to Mao Zedong's egalitarian education policies during the Cultural Revolution, the reinstatement of the *gaokao* actually concentrated power in the educational elite (especially in urban areas), subjected education to a political and economic agenda, and caused deeper social inequalities. This contradiction can only be explained by examining Deng's motive for implementing the policy: to reassert his power against the Gang of Four after Mao's death. In this paper I will first introduce the context of the time period through the great educational debate during 1977. Then, I will detail the various aspects of the *gaokao* that widened social equality such as localized funding through economic decentralization, development of keypoint universities, emphasis on science and technology, and rapid economic modernization goals. Finally, I will explain why Deng Xiaoping presented this reformation under the façade of Mao Zedong's vision to further the socialist cause, and why this blatant contradiction was so easily received by the Chinese citizens. A better understanding of the history of the *gaokao* will facilitate

discussion on the reform of China's higher education enrollment system in light of its significant connection to power, governmentality and education.

I. INTRODUCTION

In November of 1977, a diverse group of citizens, including young migrant workers, middle-aged rural peasants, veterans, intellectuals, and government employees, altogether 5.8 million, nervously sat in exam venues across the country to take a two-day comprehensive exam called the *gaokao* (高考). Eager for the chance to attend college without a prior educational background, twenty-eight-year-old Wang Jie Dong registered for the *gaokao* with the hopes of earning a secure living for himself and his family in the future.¹ After losing the opportunity to attend high school because of student uprisings during the Cultural Revolution, he worked as a self-taught electrician for several years until hearing the news regarding the reinstatement of the national college entrance examination (*gaokao* 高考). Although unable to attend college after his first *gaokao* due to his father's affiliation with Taiwan, he eventually took the *gaokao* again in 1978, earning the opportunity to study at Shanghai Electrical College. Afterwards, he continued his education at the Concordia University of Canada and finally, became a successful electrical engineer in California.

Many Chinese citizens who partook in this examination had similar success stories, recalling how “it was a time full of dreams and hopes for the future.”^{xiii} After all, following close to ten years of educational stagnation during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) this revision essentially reinstated a merit-based enrollment system in place of one based solely on political affiliation. After months of deliberation with the Ministry of Education, the rising reformist leader, Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), finally proclaimed the news that would spread virally throughout China: “Since everybody requested it, then let’s change it. This year we’ll just reinstate the national college entrance examination!”^{xiii}

But in 1977, Deng’s reinstatement of the national college entrance examination created opportunities to achieve higher education and job stability for only 278,000 citizens. For the remaining 5.5 million candidates who could not conform to the government’s standard of intellect and knowledge, the seemingly monumental policy actually widened the gap between them and the elite, and more generally between the urban and rural. Through the façade of egalitarian appeals, echoing Mao Zedong’s (毛泽东) proclamations for socialism during the Cultural Revolution, the reinstatement of the *gaokao* ironically became the emblem of Deng Xiaoping’s support for the previously criticized elite intellectuals, ultimately moving to raise the level of education (*ti gao* 提高) rather than popularize it (*pu ji* 普及).

The shift towards a regimented education system that focused on the select few rather than the common masses is undeniable. Although Deng Xiaoping reiterated Mao Zedong’s motto to further socialism for the needs of the common people, the reinstatement of the *gaokao*, in practice, created a centralized force made

up of those in urban and top tier universities, for the purpose of spurring rapid economic growth at the price of more social inequality. The contradiction between what was publicized and what resulted from the reinstatement, however, can be explained in part by the chaos of the political scene in 1977: Deng needed to reassert his power against the gang of four (*si ren bang* 四人帮) to take charge of economic reform after Mao.

II. THE GREAT EDUCATIONAL DEBATE

Near the end of the Cultural Revolution, due to the lack of stringent merit-based college enrollment stipulations, the level of education in universities was alarmingly low and elementary. Qinghua University’s (清华大学) president confessed that students’ “cultural qualities were too poor” and that “most of the students were at the level of primary school students”^{xiv}, attesting to the necessity of addressing this domestic issue. In fact, the great debate over education was publicly acknowledged by the acting premier Hua Kuofeng (华国锋) in 1976, during a dinner gala for U.S. President Richard Nixon: “In China, a revolutionary mass debate is going on in such circles as education, science, and technology. It is a continuation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.”^{xv}

Namely, the quality of education did not correlate with Mao Zedong’s promise of social mobility and equality for the disillusioned youth. Although the proletarian class blamed the “right deviationist wind”^{xvi} of the bourgeois class for the tarnishing of the education system, overall, it too was acknowledging that the schooling system had to change. As early as 1975, Deng Xiaoping began to dichotomize the paths of education reform: education for revolution or

development, for the masses or for the elite, for popularizing education or advancing it.^{vii} In other words, the Central Party had to decide between continuing Maoist education policies and reversing them to create the sort of educational environment that would help China in catching up to other modernized countries.

To understand the severity of this domestic debate, we must first understand the conditions of education during the Cultural Revolution. During this time, because Mao believed that conventional education replicated capitalist ideology and “thus produced apolitical intellectuals divorced from the toil and struggle of revolutionary society,”^{viii} leadership roles and education opportunities were only given to politically correct individuals. As a result, he eradicated academic evaluations and examinations, requiring students to be “red” in ideology, but not necessarily “expert” in their studies.^{ix} In any case, this revolutionary model sought to produce cohorts for the socialist cause through mass education. Even intellectuals who were previously teachers were stripped of their status, while uneducated workers, peasants, and soldiers (*gong nong bing* 工农兵) undertook the responsibility of educating students for the Party’s cause. The overarching goal of education, thus, became a political one. For example, in foreign language classes, students learned about “taking the socialist road” rather than basic phrases like “taking a walk.”^x In the end, the failure of the revolutionary education system catalyzed the great educational debate.

Deng Xiaoping’s solution to this conundrum was the reinstatement of the *gaokao* in 1977. As he stated in the 1978 National Education Conference (*Quan guo jiao yu gong zuo hui yi* 全国教育工作会议):

“Exams are an important method to check the situation of learning and efficiency in teaching just like inspecting the quality of products is necessary in guaranteeing the factory’s production level. Obviously, one shouldn’t blindly take tests, but it is the only method to effectively monitor education. We must seriously study, test, and improve examination content and exercises. That is how it will be perfected.”^{xi}

Deng essentially reversed Maoist education policies by restoring this examination, which required true educational knowledge, but did not disregard the importance of candidates’ political affiliations, given that elites were entitled to a superior education. Given the decentralization of the economy and the market-oriented reforms initiated in Deng’s modernization plan, Deng chose to emphasize rapid economic growth through the education of the elite.^{xii} To market his policies, he criticized and blamed the Gang of Four movement, (*fen sui si ren bang* 粉碎四人帮) consisting of Mao Zedong’s last wife Jiang Qing (江青), Zhang Chunqiao (张春桥), Yao Wenyan (姚文元), and Wang Hongwen (王洪文), for the stagnation in education, and for their corrupt “capitalist” ideals in opposition to Mao’s egalitarian policies. In other words, Deng Xiaoping strategically promoted policies in opposition to Maoist education guidelines, ironically by claiming to be continuing Mao Zedong’s egalitarian cause, which was supposedly under attack by the bourgeois Gang of Four. Through the *gaokao*, Deng Xiaoping’s decision to advance education rather than to popularize it became obvious, thus, ending the great educational debate.

III. REGIMENTATION RESULTING FROM THE *GAOKAO*

A year after the reinstatement of the *gaokao*, Deng Xiaoping affirmed that he was still continuing education for the common people. During the Education Conference on April 22, 1978, Deng Xiaoping affirmed that “it is imperative to train a large contingent of working-class intellectuals and greatly to raise the science and cultural level of the *entire* Chinese nation [...] to implement further the fundamental principle set forth by Chairman Mao that ‘education must serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labor.’”^{xiii} However, he subtly hinted at the divide and social inequality the entrance examination would instigate: “Examinations are an important method of checking on studies [...] We encourage everyone to strive for progress, but progress depends, after all, on whether the individual makes the effort. A collective effort is the sum of individual efforts. There will be difference in individual efforts even in communist society.”^{xiv}

In essence, Deng Xiaoping alluded to the resulting social regimentation which would ensue from the very test he claimed to be completely egalitarian in nature. Although opportunities to register for the *gaokao* were given to citizens from all backgrounds, the actual conditions of enrollment in higher education increased social inequality. First of all, while economic decentralization forced local governments, particularly in rural areas, to carry the burden of educational costs, the national government mostly provided funding for keypoint universities (*zhong dian da xue* 重点大学). As a result, most candidates from rural areas could not pass the examination because urban-educated and otherwise privileged candidates had the upper hand. Moreover, since the

gaokao was restored mainly to achieve rapid economic modernization goals, the emphasis on scientific and technological advancement in the actual content of the examination removed the pure academic goals of the *gaokao*, widening the gap between those who studied practical subjects from those who studied the liberal arts.

A. Economic Decentralization

In 1985, the official “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Reform of Educational Structure” reverberated throughout the economic climate of education in the 1970’s.^{xv} Essentially, instead of having the Communist government control every province’s economy, the national government decentralized educational finances. With the dissolution of state ideology and the increase of local autonomy, local governments had the bulk of the responsibility for funding schools, as the national government only compensated them for a third of their expenses. Local governments that needed more funding for school supplies and teachers’ salaries especially depended on sponsorship (*banxue* 办学) from the community.

Specifically, the national government allocated less funding to primary and secondary schools, which provided most of the education of most students taking the college entrance examination. According to Table 1, although primary education received 31% of China’s national education expenditure and secondary education received 39% in 1979, compared to the ratios of other developing countries it was very minimal, especially because there were many more students enrolled in primary and secondary schools. For example, when looking at the recurrent educational expenditures of the Ministry of Education

alone, clearly more money was allocated for primary and secondary education (Table 2). However, when taking into account the number of students and teachers in primary, secondary, and tertiary education, the ratio of the total expenditure to the number of students and teachers was vastly larger for higher education (comparing 13.2 for primary schools, 38.4 for secondary schools, and 1277.3 for higher education). Though more expenditure for higher education is understandable, the severe difference in ratios reflects the national government's minimal financial contribution to local schools. Furthermore, the ratio between the total expenditure and the number of students and teachers does not exhibit how much each student receives individually (since facility management and other factors affect the expenditure). In other words, there was a clear relaxation in funding provided by the national government for primary and secondary education, placing the majority of the burden on local governments.

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Public Recurrent Educational Expenditure, by Level of Education (1979)

	China	Other Developing Countries
Primary Education	31	49
Secondary Education	39	31
Tertiary Education	30	20

Source: Data adapted from The World Bank, *China: Issues and Prospects In Education* (Washington, DC: World Bank Country Studies, 1985), 48.

Table 2: Number of Students, Schools and Teachers and total expenditure by the Ministry of Education for Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Schools (1979, 1982) (in millions)

Primary School

	1979	1982
Students	146.6	139.7
Teachers	0.920	0.881
Total Expenditure	1950	3390
Ratio per student and teacher (in ones)	13.2	24.1

Secondary School:

	1979	1982
Students	59.1	45.3
Teachers	3.211	2.783
Total Expenditure	2390	3490
Ratio per student and teacher (in ones)	38.4	72.6

Higher Education:

	1979	1982
Students	1.0	1.2
Teachers	0.237	0.278
Total Expenditure	1580	2010
Ratio per student and teacher (in ones)	1277.3	1359.9

Source: Data adapted from The World Bank, 59, 66, 68.

As a result of economic decentralization, which included local governments carrying the burden for funding education, the rural-urban divide increased, continuing a trend that started at the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, the per capita income for rural citizens was only 134 yuan per year, while for urban citizens it was 315 yuan.^{xvi}

The state council approved the Ministry of Education's stipulation in "Opinions Regarding the 1977 Higher Education Enrollment" (*Guan yu yi jiu qi qi nian gao deng xue xiao zhao sheng gong zuo de yi jian* 关于一九七七年高等学校招生工作的意见) stipulating: "All workers, farmers, countryside and hometown educated youth, demobilized soldiers, cadres (ages can be relaxed to thirty years old) and graduates only need to suffice certain conditions to register as a candidate [for the *gaokao*]."^{xvii} But because primary and secondary schools varied in quality, the *gaokao* actually increased social inequality. Considering the relatively high dropout rates in both primary and secondary education and the variation in teacher quality^{xviii}, the *gaokao* was an extremely difficult test for the average student.

B. Keypoint Universities

Given that Mao Zedong emphasized equality of education for the common people, he eliminated any trace of elitist education in Chinese society. For example, keypoint colleges were nationally instituted in the 1960's as prestigious universities receiving direct and substantial support from the central government, but were eliminated during the Cultural Revolution. By 1976, however, Deng Xiaoping brought attention to eighty-eight higher education

institutions, once again deemed as national keypoint universities, including Peking University (*Bei jing da xue* 北京大学), Qinghua University (*Qing hua da xue* 清华大学), Fudan University (*Fu dan da xue* 复旦大学) etc., to enumerate the institutions that high scoring *gaokao* candidates could attend.

Deng revived keypoint universities to service as model schools that closely linked education with economic advancement. During his speech "Some Comments on Work in Science and Education" (*Guan yu ke xue he jiao yu gong zuo de ji dian yi jian* 关于科学和教育工作的几点意见) on August 8, 1977, Deng stated: "Institutions of higher learning, particularly the key ones, should serve as an important front-line force in scientific research [...] In this way, our sciences will progress faster [...] Not all our institutions of higher learning can as yet increase their scientific research work, but the key colleges and universities should do so step by step and take on more research assignments from outside."^{xix} Previously labeled as "little treasure pagoda schools" for "intellectual aristocrats" to be "elevated to heaven,"^{xx} keypoint universities suddenly were held up as the highest prizes for *gaokao* candidates. Therefore, entrance to these keypoint universities became the best means of social, political, economical, and geographical mobility.

Keypoint universities, nonetheless, only benefited a few elite students and furthered social inequality by creating a clear distinction between non-keypoint and keypoint universities. On top of this, because of economic decentralization, as discussed earlier, non-keypoint universities were generally where most of the underprivileged, rural youth attended. Although Deng Xiaoping stated that "workers, peasants, and soldiers could enroll in universities" and "keypoint

universities could recruit from this pool of high school graduates,”^{xxi} this statement was an idealistic mirage that concealed the elite nature of keypoint universities. The creation of keypoint universities naturally led to the installment of keypoint primary and secondary schools, which became “conduits through one reaches the pinnacle”^{xxii} of elite education. This sort of elite separation consequently began as early as primary school, rendering the *gaokao* an inefficient means for non-keypoint students to attend high quality universities imbued with resources and qualified staff.

First, since keypoint universities were eliminated during the Maoist period, their reinstatement was evidence for the restoration of elitist education. Second, these universities demonstrated how the central government had even more power to define the ideal in intelligence and education. Even though regimentation between the educated and the uneducated had already existed, keypoint universities allowed for the *gaokao* to further strengthen this divide and to negate mobility.

C. The Emphasis on Science and Technology

Given that the *gaokao* dictated the “perceived needs” of the nation, Deng Xiaoping was able to further his plans for economic modernization plans through the enhancement of science and technology education. In his speech “Respect Knowledge, Respect Talent (*Zun zhong zhi shi, zun zhong ren cai* 尊重知识, 尊重人才), he acknowledged: “We have to achieve modernization, and the key is to develop science and technology. In developing science and technology, to not pay attention to education is unacceptable.”^{xxiii} In various national congressional meetings, the Party Central Committee pushed for science and technology by interlocking rapid economic development

and advancement in education.^{xxiv} As a result, although the *gaokao* tested some humanities subjects such as Chinese literature and political science, the examination emphasized math and science.^{xxv}

It is important to note, however, that an emphasis on science and technology is very common for developing countries as a means to achieve economic stability.^{xxvi} The fact that Deng Xiaoping shifted away from liberal arts should not be criticized. Instead, I will be focusing on the ways he emphasized science and technology through the *gaokao*, which actually restricted the potential for innovation in these fields. Namely, I will be discussing how scientists were compared to production workers and forced to develop under a “socialist agenda” to correlate with the goals of the *gaokao* and the keypoint universities.

Since the *gaokao* further distinguished those more qualified in math and science, most college students entered into related fields, which included engineering, natural sciences, agriculture and forestry, and medicine. Referring to Table 3 for the total enrollment in higher education by specialty, the ratio of those who studied in the fields of science and technology compared to those in the liberal arts field was nearly six to one. Moreover, those who chose to specialize in the fields of science and technology received more resources from teachers and staff. According to Table 4, which charts staff and teachers in higher education by specialty, the ratio of staff members involved with science and technology to those involved with liberal arts was nearly twelve to one, while for the ratio of teachers, it was nearly eleven to one. Not only did the *gaokao* filter in more science and technology based students, but also to some extent, universities (especially keypoint ones)

provided to those studying science and technology the best conditions to flourish. Again, this observation is not to criticize the Ministry of Education's shift in focus to science and technology but rather show to what extent higher education was unbalanced and thus further regimented.

Table 3: Total Enrollment in Institutes of Higher Learning By Specialty (1980)

	1980	1981
Engineering*	382,000	461,265
Agriculture*	71,600	78,837
Forestry*	11,800	13,618
Medicine*	139,600	158,986
Science*	83,700	99,840
Arts	58,700	69,076
Finance/Economics	36,600	47,895
Law and Politics	6,100	9,944
Physical Education	9,400	11,241
Visual Art	5,900	7,326
Total*:	688,700	812,546
Total:	116,700	145,482

* = *fields of science and technology*

Source: Data adapted from Billi L. C. Lo and Tse Mao, *Research Guide to Education in China After Mao 1977-1981* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1983), 20.

Table 4: Staff and Teachers in Institutes of Higher Learning by Specialty (1981)

	Total Staff	Teachers
College of Science and Engineering*	286,063	101,776
College of Agriculture*	58,837	18,247
College of Forestry*	6,646	2,326
College of Medicine*	79,866	30,606
Institutes of Finance/Economics	17,112	6,783
Institutes of Law and Politics	3,322	1,227

Institutes of Physical Education	5,543	2,200
Art Institutes	9,035	3,901
Total*:	431,412	152,955
Total:	35,012	14,111

* = *fields of science and technology*

Source: Data adapted from Lo and Mao, 21.

Beyond the high enrollment rates and the amount of resources given to those specializing in science and technology, it is important to note how Deng likened those studying the sciences to manual laborers. In “Some Comments on Work in Science and Education,” Deng Xiaoping remarked: “Both scientific researchers and educational workers are working people. Don’t we talk about mental labour and manual labour? Scientific research and educational work are mental labour—and doesn’t mental labour count as labour?”^{xxvii} By labeling researchers as laborers, Deng implied that the researchers were also under the agenda of “the revolution” much like how Mao Zedong’s advocated laborers’ dedication to class struggle.

Whereas liberal arts and humanities was more easily monitored and controlled by the Communist Party due to their focus on ideology, science and technology had more autonomy from the central committee given that they dealt more with objective observations and experiments: data could not be manipulated. However, as Deng stated in the opening speech to the National Science Conference (*Quan guo ke xue da hui* 全国科学大会) in 1978, “correctly understanding that science and technology belong to the productive forces and that brain workers who serve socialism are a part of the working people has a close bearing on the rapid development of our scientific undertakings.”^{xxviii} In this manner, the central committee praised scientific and technological research, while in some

ways controlling the research behind the scenes, just as the government had manipulated laborers' ideologies during the Cultural Revolution.

Overall, with the greater emphasis on science and technology, the *gaokao* segregated those who studied these subjects from those who studied liberal arts. Furthermore, these distinguished scientific researchers were subject to the goals of rapid economic modernization within "socialist" cause, further causing regimentation in the education system.

IV. THE MAOIST SOCIALIST FAÇADE

The reinstatement of the *gaokao* created regimentation throughout the education system in many aspects, dividing rural students from urban ones, elite intellectuals from the uneducated, and scientists and engineers from those studying the liberal arts. Yet, Deng Xiaoping still reiterated Mao Zedong's mantra in guiding the May 7 schools.^{xxxix} In forums regarding education reforms leading up to the reinstatement of the *gaokao*, Deng reaffirmed that the qualifications for entering higher education remained extremely political and thereby, more accessible to citizens of higher social ranks. Specifically, candidates would have to continue "to protect the Communist Party, to ardently love socialism, to ardently love labor, to comply with revolutionary discipline, to resolve to learn for the revolution"^{xxxix} just as Mao Zedong required students to "be faithful to the Party's educational task."^{xxxix} Furthermore, in their first session, the People's Congress of the Communist Party followed suit by linking education, modernization, and Mao's ideals of class struggle and anti-capitalism within the school curriculum.^{xxxii}

Like Mao's socialist education policies the *gaokao* continued to test

candidates' political affiliations. As Deng stated in his speech "Doing a Good Job in College Enrollment Is an Aspiration of People Throughout the Country," "a scholastic achievement test is one of the important ways to examine the students' political theory and educational level."^{xxxiii} In other words, candidates still had the burden of carrying the proletarian cause and had to be, according to the Ministry of Education's "Requirements for 1978 College Enrollment," "red and expert."^{xxxiv} The phrase "red and expert" (*you hong you zhuan* 又红又专) originated from Mao, in one of his speeches during the Great Leap Forward when he elaborated the importance of being business oriented and knowledgeable while also being politically and ideologically correct.^{xxxv} Thereby, Deng Xiaoping introduced the *gaokao* as policy that would continue Mao Zedong's method of utilizing education for the proletarian cause.

The key difference, nevertheless, is Deng focused on the "expert" aspect more than the "red." Even though he proclaimed during his speech at the National Conference on Education that "schools should always attach first importance to a firm and correct political orientation,"^{xxxvi} the regimentation in education resulting from the *gaokao* illustrates how this was not the case. In dividing rural citizens from urban ones, for example, the *gaokao* clearly focused less on the "red" ideology than it might have before. But by constantly using the phrase "red and expert" and referring back to the importance of political ideology, Deng and the Ministry of Education were able to maintain their hold on political ideology though the examination did not emphasize political orientation as much as before.

To understand the discord between the actual function of the *gaokao*

and the means that Deng used to present it, we must analyze Deng Xiaoping's motivations for mobilizing the Chinese citizens. All in all, Deng presented the *gaokao* with Maoist rhetoric to maintain power during political opposition from Gang of Four as well as a period of increased social and ideological autonomy resulting from rapid economic modernization.

I. The Smashing of the Gang of Four

On September 9, 1976, an official announcement was released in the New China News Agency (*Xin hua* 新华) mourning the loss of Mao Zedong. However, the announcement was released close to twenty hours after Mao's death, foreshadowing the intensity of the debate that political leaders would initiate regarding China's future. Although the announcement stated that "we must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and persist in taking class struggle as the key link,"^{xxxvii} there was uncertainty regarding the economic, political, and social policies that the government would take due to the vacuum of leadership. The Gang of Four lurched at the opportunity to seize power, as Jiang Qing attempted to succeed Mao Zedong. The politburo members and military, nonetheless, continued to support Premier Hua Kuofeng. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping came out of hiding from Canton (*Guang zhou* 广州) since Mao had removed him from office, accusing him of political mistakes. After Mao's death, Deng began his campaign for rapid economic modernization through a pragmatic approach to development, which the Gang of Four then labeled as capitalistic. By specifically attacking the Gang of Four's corruption on the educational front, however, Deng Xiaoping was able to officially "smash" the Gang of Four on October 9, 1976,

and became the next to lead reforms in the country.

Deng publicized the Gang of Four's destruction of intellectual vibrancy in China, which led to several publications in the local government and the media, tarnishing their reputation. As Deng Xiaoping stated in the National Conference on Education, "ever since we smashed the Gang of Four, especially after revolutionizing higher education enrollment systems and criticizing the 'two estimates,'^{xxxviii} the educational front emerged in many new atmospheres. Achievement should be fully affirmed."^{xxxix} Following "The Great Debate on the Educational Front" (*Jiao yu zhan xian de yi chang da lun zhan* 教育战线的一场大论战)^{xl} the severe assessment of the Gang of Four by a group evaluating the Ministry of Education caused various colleges in cities such as Shanxi, Nanchang, Qinghua, Hanxi, Kansu, Sichuan, and Hopei, to hold official conferences condemning the Gang of Four.^{xli} As such, the public disparagement of the Gang of Four escalated into a massive campaign.

From this perspective, by attacking the Gang of Four on an educational front and repudiating the "two estimates," Deng Xiaoping was able to redefine Mao Zedong's ideals for education to correspond with reforms such as the restoration of the *gaokao*. The Gang of Four concocted the "two estimates" in 1971 to evaluate the educational atmosphere and the intellectuals of the time between 1949 and 1966. According to the Gang of Four, the seventeen-year period did not follow Maoist ideals and most intellectuals were of the bourgeois class, or "class enemies with a bourgeois world outlook."^{xlii} However, the Ministry of Education accused the Gang of Four of scheming to "usurp Party and state power, restore

capitalism and to fundamentally ruin the revolution in education.”^{xliii} The educational stagnation during the Cultural Revolution became the product of the Gang of Four’s misdoings. Mao, on the other hand, was “victimized” by the Gang of Four as his philosophies were utilized for capitalistic aims. In contrast, Deng continued to proclaim Mao’s ideal of restoring education for the masses to avoid being associated with the Gang’s corruption, while in reality implemented an examination for the elite.

In attacking the Gang of Four for their corruption of the education system, the restoration of the *gaokao* became a method to permanently renounce the Gang of Four and their “two estimates.” In a speech regarding college enrollment in 1977, Deng Xiaoping pointed out their faulty means of enforcing enrollment into higher education:

“The ‘gang of four’ completely ignored the tremendous achievements in enrollment since the founding of our country, and negated the leading position of Chairman Mao’s revolution line... They did their utmost to undermine the party’s fine traditions and style of work, thus further worsening an already bad situation in which the practice of ‘going through the back door’ was found in student enrollment. All of this sabotage of student enrollment and higher education was disastrous because it seriously obstructed the selection of outstanding people.”^{xliv}

Thought to be responsible for corrupt enrollment, the Gang of Four and its policies were juxtaposed against the reinstatement of the national college entrance examination. The Gang of Four was blamed for the abolishment of the entrance examination and the emphasis

on citizens’ political affiliations during the Cultural Revolution, although Mao initially proposed these policies.

Overall, the reinstatement of the *gaokao* was a strategic move for radically benefiting elite intellectuals without causing turmoil for repudiating Maoist education policies. Instead, the Gang of Four was blamed for “‘putting intellectual education first’ and thus ‘getting divorced from proletarian politics.’”^{xlv} After all, since there was such strong allegiance to Mao Zedong’s philosophies, Deng Xiaoping could not develop the economy with such a focus on the bifurcated education system. First, he had to reinterpret Mao’s education policies and “smash” the Gang of Four. The *gaokao* became the perfect policy to on the one hand, continue his goal of economic modernization, and on the other, moderate the radicalism of his policies. As a representative of the Higher Education Bureau of the Education Ministry in Beijing confessed in an interview, “this [the Gang of Four] teaches us, therefore, that we should have an entrance examination for this year’s enrollment.”^{xlvi}

II. Governmentality in the New Autonomous Environment

Deng Xiaoping restored the *gaokao* to maintain his power for promoting rapid economic modernization. At the same time, however, the chaotic failure of the Cultural Revolution already began to bring about significant social changes, further dividing the citizens from the government through the decline of state principles. During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese citizens were so ardent in their belief of the Communist party because of their ideological indoctrination and the government’s promise of an egalitarian system. Because the Cultural Revolution brought these disillusioned citizens even more social inequality, there was no legitimized philosophy for the common

people to follow.^{xlvii} Furthermore, with the decollectivization and decentralization agenda, the party had much less control on the public sphere in aspects such as education. Amidst the process of recovering from poverty, many citizens were also preoccupied with market reforms, focusing more on their own businesses rather than the collective goals of the Communist party. As a result, Deng faced the challenge of collectivizing citizens for rapid economic development and modernization while also conserving the socialist establishment.

The restoration of *gaokao* could also be seen as a political tactic initiated by the Party and Deng with respect to the close relationship between power, governmentality^{xlviii}, and education. According to philosopher Michael Foucault, “modern institutions of government are organized to produce governable individuals who are especially susceptible to state control because they are taught to believe they are free.”^{xlix} Similarly, Deng introduced the *gaokao* under the pretense of Maoist socialism, deceiving citizens of the education policy’s actual elitism.

Foucault thus forces us to reanalyze the function of intelligence tests such as the *gaokao* by pointing out that through intelligence tests, “our very conception of intelligence was therefore the capricious product of an essentially arbitrary institutional arrangement. This analysis can be broadened to show how power continues to influence us through the production of knowledge.”¹ After all, the *gaokao*’s focus on science and technology redefined what the purpose of intelligence and education was, which for Deng was fiscal and technological advancement. Deng inquired in his speech about science and education: “how shall we mobilize the energies of workers in science and education?”² His answer was through the national entrance

examination, which provided the only route to a stable education and job in the keypoint universities. Foucault also pointed out that universities were “relatively artificial enclaves where students are expected to absorb socially desirable modes of behaviour and forms of knowledge before being recuperated into society.”³ Given that the documents of the first session of the Fifth National People’s Congress clearly alluded to socialist economic construction as the primary focus, and keypoint universities as the model institutions, to some extent, the *gaokao* played a role in mobilizing talented people for a politicized economic agenda.

Foucault, however, was extremely critical of education as a whole since he believed that knowledge and power were inseparable. Therefore, I am not referring to his philosophies as a means of criticism, but rather a lens to analyze the relevant connections between the *gaokao*, power and governmentality. After all, given the power struggle and the increasingly autonomous political environment of the time, the *gaokao* was an effective means of mobilizing citizens for economic modernization, which could have otherwise weakened state control.

V. CONCLUSION

Clearly, there was discord between the outcome of reinstating the *gaokao* and the phraseology used by Deng and the Ministry of Education in introducing this education reform. On the one hand, restoring the national college entrance examination centralized educational power for urban, high-class citizens in keypoint universities because of existing economic decentralization and modernization goals. Yet, Deng Xiaoping restated Mao Zedong’s aphorism of furthering the socialist cause for class struggle and social equality though his education reforms promoted the opposite.

By analyzing the political conflict between the Gang of Four and Deng Xiaoping, the *gaokao* can be seen as a highly politicized test to mobilize the Chinese citizens against the Gang of Four, since they were attacked for their corrupt enrollment methods and educational policies as a whole. Lastly, in the post-Cultural Revolution environment, marked by the loss of state control over citizenry, Deng needed a method to collectivize citizens under one ideology. By scrutinizing Foucault's discussion of power, governmentality and education, the *gaokao* can be seen less as an academic test, but rather a policy that redefined intelligence to mobilize the citizens for the cause of economic modernization.

Although there was a blatant contradiction revolving around the *gaokao*, the Chinese citizens were so willing to accept the reinstatement of the national college entrance examination as a celebration of educational resurgence because it brought hope to the problem of fixing the politically and economically strained environment. Firstly, the *gaokao* was closely associated with the Imperial Examination system, which was initiated during the Sui dynasty as a centralized and fair examination to select civil service officials.^{liii} The Imperial Examination system lessened the power of aristocratic families and allowed merit and intelligence to decide citizens' ranks. The test, however, was abolished in 1905 because the rich eventually hired tutors, giving themselves them an upper hand, and the rigidity of the content did not assimilate to changing times. Nevertheless, the longevity and the influential focus on meritocracy revolutionized this test as a means to ensure equality in education.

Therefore, when Deng Xiaoping reinstated the *gaokao*, there was an automatically a positive reaction to a test that would once again be based on meritocracy. Especially because of the

chaotic educational system and resulting economic strife from the Cultural Revolution, the citizens were more willing to accept dynamic change. Yet, the citizens were unaware of the tense political environment that the *gaokao* was implemented in.

A reanalysis of the *gaokao* forces us to take a closer look of its actual function in contemporary Chinese history just as Foucault warned. In some aspects, Deng Xiaoping's manipulation of the *gaokao* while deliberately alluding to Mao's diction mobilized Chinese citizens with subtler means than those of Mao during the Cultural Revolution. Whereas Mao Zedong attempted to unite citizens under the Communist cause, Deng tried to unite them under the cause of rapid economic modernization. Whereas Mao led the Chinese citizens against the common enemy of the five black categories, Deng Xiaoping labeled the common enemy as the Gang of Four. Since education had always been seen in a positive light and as an institution of achievement apart from politics, the *gaokao* created the illusion of positive and dynamic change. At the end of the day, however, the *gaokao* clearly focused more on politics than academics though it was a pedagogic examination. Although the *gaokao* integrated more academic work into higher education than in systems during the Cultural Revolution, politics was the ultimate reason that candidates like Wang Jie Dong could not attend college in 1977.

Recently, there have been multiple discussions regarding the negative aspects of the *gaokao*.^{liv} Although the *gaokao* underwent several revisions and has led education enrollment systems towards the road of meritocracy, analyzing the root of this national entrance examination can perhaps shed light on some of its flaws. For example, given that the *gaokao* was highly politicized, and in essence created more social inequality, perhaps the test

should be adjusted to focus more on pedagogy in the modern day. As such, this reinterpretation of the purpose and outcome of the *gaokao* can help initiate more discussion on revising China's higher education enrollment system today.

ⁱ Jie Dong Wang. Personal Interview. Irvine, California, December 17, 2012.

ⁱⁱ Han Ximing, now a Chinese literature professor in Nanjing Audit University, described the time period when the *gaokao* was reinstated in an interview. David Lague, "1977 Exam Opened Escape Route into China's Elite," *The New York Times*, January 6, 2008.

ⁱⁱⁱ “邓小平略一沉吟，一锤定音：“既然大家要求，那就改过来，今年就恢复高考。”余玮，“向邓小平谏言‘恢复高考’内幕，”*文史博览* 6(2007): 38.

^{iv} “现在清华的新生文化素质太差，许多学生只有小学水平，还得补习中学课程。”余玮，37.

^v Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *Chinese Education Since 1949* (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1981), 124.

^{vi} “The Continuation and Deepening of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution – Gratifying to See the Mass Debate on the Education Revolution at Tsinghua University Advancing Against the Waves,” *People's Daily*, February 6, 1976 in *The People's Republic of China 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey*, ed. Harold C. Hinton (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980), 2541.

^{vii} 邓小平 as quoted in 杨学为, *中国高考史述论 1949—1999* (武汉: 湖北人民出版社, 2007), 217.

^{viii} Chen, 121.

^{ix} “Red and Expert” is a famous phrase that originated from Mao Zedong during the Great Leap Forward. To be “red” meant to be politically correct in following communism while to be “expert” meant to be knowledgeable. Mao Zedong, *Red and Expert*, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_04.htm. [Original Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication 1969].

^x Chen, 127.

^{xi} “考试是检查学习情况和教学效果的一种重要方法。如同检验产品质量是保证工厂生产水平的必要制度一样。当然也不能迷信考试，把它当作检查学习效果的唯一方法。要认真研究，试验，改进考试的内容和行使。是他完善起来。”邓小平 as quoted in 杨学为, *难忘1977* (天津: 天津人民出版社, 2007), 12.

^{xii} “Over the next 25 years, we should build before 1980, an independent and comparatively complete industrial system and national economic system. Second, realize modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology, so that our national economy will join the front ranks of the world.” Deng Xiaoping, “On the General Program for All Work of the Whole Party and the Whole Country,” in *Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines* No. 921, (1997).

^{xiii} “Teng's Speech at Education Conference, 22 April 1978,” *New China News Agency*, 25 April 1978 in Hinton, 2755.

^{xiv} “Teng's Speech at Education Conference, 22 April 1978,” in Hinton, 2756.

^{xv} Chen Kai-Ming, “Education—Decentralization and the market,” in *Social Change and Social Policy in Contemporary China*, ed. Linda Wong and Stewart MacPherson (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), 70.

^{xvi} Linda Wong and Ka-ho Mok, “The reform and the changing social context,” in *Social Change*, 1.

^{xvii} “凡是工人，农民，上山下乡和回乡知识青年，复员军人，干部（年龄可放宽到三十周岁）和应届毕业生，只要符合条件都可报考。”高军峰 and 姚润田, *新中国高考史* (福州: 福建人民出版社, 2009), 200.

^{xviii} The World Bank, 36, 57, 58.

^{xix} “Some Comments on Work in Science and Education (August 8, 1977),” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982)* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984) as cited in *Education and Socialist Modernization: A Documentary History of Education in the People's Republic of China, 1977-1986*, ed. and trans. by Shi Ming Hu and Eli Seifman (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1987), 57.

^{xx} Shi Ming Hu and Eli Seifman, ed., *Toward A New World Outlook: A Documentary History of Education in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1976*, (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1976), 160.

^{xxi} “大学要从工农兵中招生，重点学校可以从应届高中毕业生中招”。中共十届三中全会，“关于恢复邓小平同志职务的决议” as cited in 高军峰 and 姚润田, *新中国高考史* (福州: 福建人民出版社, 2009), 189.

^{xxii} Stanly Rosen, “Recentralization, Decentralization, and Rationalization: Deng Xiaoping’s Bifurcated Educational Policy,” *Modern China*, 11.3 (1985): 302.

^{xxiii} “我们要现在现代化，关键是科学技术要能上去。发展科学技术，不抓教育不行。”邓小平，“尊重知识，尊重人才” in 中国教育年鉴编辑部, *中国教育年鉴 1949—1981* (中国大百科全书出版社出版, 1984), 45.

^{xxiv} “Summary of the Report Delivered by Fang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Science, on 27th December at the Seventh Session of the Standing Committee of the Fourth National CPCC Committee,” *New China News Agency*, December 29, 1977 in *Education and Socialist Modernization*, 64. Also stated in 全国人民代表大会, *Documents of the First Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1978) 8-9.

^{xxv} Robert D. Barendsen, ed., *The 1978 national college entrance examination in the People’s Republic of China*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, 1979). Also noted in interview with Jie Dong Wang.

^{xxvi} Keith M Lewin, “Mapping Science Education Policy in Developing Countries,” *The World Bank Secondary Education Series* (2000): 1.

^{xxvii} “无论是从事科研工作的，还是从事教育工作的，都是劳动者。不是讲脑力劳动、体力劳动吗？科研工作、教育工作是脑力劳动，脑力劳动也是劳动嘛。有位科学家反映，现在在农业科学院种庄稼不算劳动，要到农村种庄稼才算劳动。这真是怪事。好多农业院校自己培育品种，自己种田，怎么不是劳动？科学实验也是劳动。一定要用锄头才算劳动？一定要开车床才算劳动？”邓小平，“关于科学和教育工作的几点意见” in 中国教育年鉴, 46. Also roughly translated in “Some Comments on Work in Science and Education” in *Education and Socialist Modernization*, 56.

^{xxviii} “Teng’s Speech at Education Conference, 22 April 1978,” in Hinton, 2745.

^{xxix} The May 7 schools were created in 1968 to follow Mao Zedong’s May 7 Directives, initiated on May 7, 1966. “In this directive, Mao suggested setting up farms, later called cadre schools, where cadres and intellectuals, sent down from the cities, would perform manual labor and undergo ideological reeducation.” These form of schools represented the motto for education during the Cultural Revolution. “Seven May Cadre Schools (1968),” ChinesePosters.Net, last modified December 23, 2012, <http://chinese posters.net/themes/seven-may-cadre-schools.php>.

^{xxx} “拥护中国共产党，热爱社会主义，热爱劳动，遵守革命纪律，决心为革命学习。”杨学为，*难忘1977*, 59.

^{xxxi} “忠诚党的教育失业。”English Language Materials Office of the Peking Second Foreign Language Institute, “Sayings of Chairman Mao,” *Chinese Education*, 9.2 (1976): 7.

^{xxxii} “To speed up socialist modernization in the four fields, we must be steadfast in grasping class struggle as the key link and persist in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. We must always bear in mind Chairman Mao’s teachings and fully recognize that throughout the historical period of socialist society classes, class struggle and the struggle between socialist and capitalist roads all exist and that this struggle is protracted and complicated [...] We must conduct intensive socialist education in order to oppose and prevent revisionism.” *Documents of the First Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China*, 22.

^{xxxiii} “Doing a Good Job in College Enrollment is an Aspiration of People Throughout the Country” *People’s Daily*, October 21, 1977 as cited in *Education and Socialist Modernization*, 62.

^{xxxiv} “Requirements for 1978 College Enrollment,” *New China News Agency*, June 13, 1978 as cited in *Education and Socialist Modernization*, 78. Also referenced as “实现四个现代化，迫切需要培养和造就大批又红又专的建设人才。”国务院批转教育部，“关于1977年高等学校招生工作的意见” in 杨学为，*难忘1977*, 15.

^{xxxv}

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/select-ed-works/volume-8/mswv8_04.htm.

xxxvi “Speech at the National Conference on Education (April 22, 1978),” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982)* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984) as cited in *Education and Socialist Modernization*, 75.

xxxvii “The Announcement of Mao Tse-tung’s Death, September 9, 1976,” *New China News Agency*, 9 September 1976 in Hinton, 2581.

xxxviii The “two estimates” (*liang ge gu ji* 两个估计) was a phrase used by the Gang of Four to describe the corrupt educational front and intellectuals 17 years after the rise of the Communist Party in 1949. Further explanation about the “two estimates” will be discussed later in this paper.

xxxix “粉碎‘四人帮’以来，特别是改革高等学校招生制度和批判‘两个估计’之后，教育战线出现了许多新气氛。成绩应当充分肯定。”邓小平 quoted in 杨学为，*难忘1977*，12。

xl 教育部大批判组，*教育战线的一场大论战：批判‘四人帮’炮制的‘两个估计’*，（北京：人民出版社，1978），1-21。

xli “Shansi Holds Second Meeting on Student Enrollment Work,” Shansi Provincial Services, November 19, 1977; “Reporter Refutes ‘Gang’s’ Opposition to ‘The 17 Years,’” New China News Agency Domestic Service, November 24, 1977; “Nanchang Education Bureau Forum Criticizes ‘Two Assessments,’” Kiangsi Provincial Service, November 21, 1977; “Tsinghua University Leader Criticizes ‘Gang,’” Peking Domestic Services, November 21 1977; “Kansu Holds Forum to Criticize ‘Two Assessments,’” Kansu Provincial Services, November 23, 1977; “Szechwan Education Workers Score ‘Gang’s’ ‘Two Assessments,’” Szechwan Provincial Services, November 23, 1977; “Hopei Meeting Criticizes ‘Gang’s’ Two Evaluations,” Hopei Provincial Services, November 20, 1977 all cited in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, *Translations on People’s Republic of China*, No. 410. (Arlington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1978), 8-25.

xlii “世界观基本上是资产阶级的。”教育部大批判组，1。

xliii *Education and Socialist Movement*, 2.

xliv “Doing a Good Job in College Enrollment is an Aspiration of People Throughout the Country” in *Education and Socialist Modernization*, 61.

xliv “Speech at the National Conference on Education (April 22, 1978)” in *Education and Socialist Modernization*, 74.

xlvi Suzanne Pepper, “An Interview on Changes in Chinese Education after the ‘Gang of Four,’” *The China Quarterly*, 27 (1977): 820.

xlvii Wong and Mok in *Social Changes and Social Policy in Contemporary China*, 8.

xlviii Governmentality is a term created by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. It is: “the organized practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) through which subjects are governed.” Susan Mayhew, “Governmentality,” In *A Dictionary of Geography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

xlvi David Cheshier, “Foucault and Educational Reform,” *The Rostrum*, (1999): 3.

¹ Ansgar Allen, “Using Foucault in Education Research,” *British Educational Research Association* (2012): 2, <http://www.bera.ac.uk/resources/using-foucault-education-research>.

ⁱⁱ “Some Comments on Work and Science and Education (August 8, 1977)” in *Education and Socialist Modernization*, 56.

ⁱⁱⁱ Roger Deacon, “Michel Foucault on education: preliminary theoretical overview,” *South African Journal of Education*, 26.2 (2006): 184.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Yuan Feng, “From the imperial examination to the national college entrance examination: The dynamics of political centralism in China’s educational enterprise,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 4.8 (1995): 5.

^{lv} Edward Wong, “Test That Can Determine the Course of Life in China Gets a Closer Examination,” *The New York Times*, June 30, 2012.

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JAPAN'S FORGOTTEN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:

Kimura Kenkadō and the Case for Biographical History

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ABSTRACT

This essay has two goals. The first is to use Kimura Kenkadō as a case study to evaluate the methodological value of biographical writing. The second is to determine to what extent such writing—based on the numerous secondary and primary sources available on Kenkadō—illuminates two large-scale trends I argue began in the eighteenth century, namely the rise of inter-networked intellectual life and the conceptual revolution regarding the natural world. In comparison with the other methods available, biography does seem preferable given the wealth of evidence Kenkadō's own life provided for both trends.

Like most subjects of biographical writing, Kenkadō was exceptional, in his case due to his vast network of acquaintances, yet even so he seems representative of the highly collaborative eighteenth century as a whole; he was merely unusually gregarious, and less a forerunner than a key participant in the gradual rise of a new conception of the natural world. As such, biography can be a very useful method indeed for shedding light on the historical character of the late eighteenth century, and a critical step towards writing the biography, so to speak, of the eighteenth century itself.

JAPAN'S FORGOTTEN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: KIMURA
KENKADŌ AND THE CASE FOR
BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY

No one pays any attention to the middle of the Tokugawa period. To be fair, all but one of the period's truly exciting, eye-catching events—wars, rebellions, (often successful) assassination attempts—happened in either the first or the last forty years: the rise or the fall of the *pax Tokugawa*. Even more abstract developments like the efflorescence of commoner literary culture and the accompanying explosion in printed materials occurred near the beginning, in the late seventeenth century. In a survey I recently conducted of about a dozen undergraduates near the beginning of a pre-modern Japanese history course, not one student was able to name a single event that occurred during the eighteenth century. I clucked my tongue in lamentation, particularly over their failure to mention the Chūshingura Incident (also known as the Akō Incident or the Vendetta of the Forty-Seven *rōnin*) of 1701-1703. But then it hit me—I, too, could not name more than a handful of events that occurred in that century. Perhaps it was my antiquarian focus on easy-to-remember “events,” History with a capital H, which was to blame.

Nevertheless, I could not shake the conviction that understanding the conditions and developments of the eighteenth century was vital, if only to contextualize the turmoil of the nineteenth century. Since meaty, high-profile political or military events evidently cannot serve as a useful entrée into the character, so to speak, of this period in Japanese history, I was forced to

look elsewhere for inspiration. Imagine my surprise when, having rejected the Great Events method of writing history, I found the methodological solution in the other age-old historical writing trope of the Great Man method. I initially began researching such figures as Kimura Kenkadō (1736-1802, pictured in Fig. 1), a man who as we shall see had a giant and multifaceted presence in the intellectual, artistic, and scientific life of the eighteenth century, only as a narrow side-attempt to gather more evidence for two key historical developments I believe occurred in the eighteenth century. Yet it gradually became clear that, rather than focusing on major trends and selectively referring to individual historical actors as evidence, it might actually be more fruitful to hone in on the individuals themselves and use the accumulation of information on those individuals' lives to illuminate any broader trends that are at work.

In the case study that follows, therefore, I will attempt to show that there were two major socio-intellectual developments that began in the eighteenth century, the network explosion and the natural history revolution, and also that the best way of calling these trends into sharp focus is to use biographical methods to launch an in-depth investigation into the lives of individual participants, especially Kimura Kenkadō.

BIOGRAPHY VERSUS PROSOPOGRAPHY

Since I wish to determine the nature of large-scale developments over a relatively long period of time, perhaps I would be better served in employing a prosopographical method of analysis. In other words, it might be best to carry out a quick survey of a large number of individuals and subsequently conduct quantitative analysis on the results. To be

sure, this method does provide a number of advantages, as seen in the example that is most relevant to us, a book by Anna Beerens bearing the unwieldy title *Friends, Acquaintances, Pupils, and Patrons: Japanese Intellectual Life in the Late Eighteenth Century: A Prosopographical Approach*. In it, Beerens analyzes 173 intellectuals of various vocations and avocations, from various places, all active in late eighteenth century Japan. Her quantitative methods focus on income sources, birth status, cities of residence, and other easily comparable factors, and generate a number of interesting findings. Among them, for example, she found that of the 173 intellectuals she analyzed, 80% were of non-samurai origins.¹

Moreover, Beerens' broad quantitative research into who taught whom and which intellectuals moved in the same social circles helps prevent the overly narrow interpretations of individuals that can occur when researchers focus on a specific activity, for example. It is useful to have a wide-ranging source like Beerens to remind us that, for example, Kenkadō knew not only Sinophiles but also several nativists, including both Ueda Akinari and Motoori Norinaga; it broadens our perspective on his life and activities and keeps us from jumping to the conclusion that he was "just" a student of all things China.

However, Beerens' work, and prosopography in general, also suffers from serious disadvantages. Firstly, Beerens' great breadth and macro-level quantitative analysis comes at the sacrifice of depth; the few sentences written about an individual cannot create anything more than the barest skeletal summary of that person's life. Since our project, at least in part, is to try and recapture a sense of what the experience of larger historical trends might have been like in the moment, it would seem ill-suited

methodologically. Secondly, prosopographical research like Beerens' is necessarily limited in chronological scope. In Beerens' case, she restricts her inquiry essentially to 1775-1800 and analyzes only those intellectuals publicly active during that quarter century. Thus, towering socio-cultural figures like the *sencha* (steeped rather than powdered *matcha* green tea) tea master Baisaō Kō Yūgai ("Old Man Tea-Seller," 1675-1763), around whom formed, as we shall see, a cultural salon of great and lingering significance for its members—especially Kenkadō himself—are excluded simply because they died before the focus period began. Yet the relationships that bound participants in Baisaō's salon together did not simply dissolve instantly upon his death; indeed, many of the friendships and associations Kenkadō formed through Baisaō's salon he cherished for the rest of his life, and his activities even during Beerens' period of study (that is, 1775-1800) were largely motivated by his earlier salon participation. The relatively shallow, largely synchronic methods of prosopography are wholly inadequate to the task of uncovering this sort of vital insight.

Yet merely proving prosopography a poor choice of method does not guarantee that in-depth biography is the best method available. Perhaps an activity-based approach, studying a relatively small group of individuals all involved in the same pursuit—for example, an art historian might choose painting and thus focus on painters—will be most fruitful. This sort of approach does allow the gathering of an exhaustive level of detail about that one activity, so it can be useful, provided the activity one chooses is vital to or highly reflective of the development of larger historical trends.

However, if prosopography led us astray by being limited to a short span of time, activity-based analysis leaves us with the impression that the participants described did nothing but the target activity. Considering the example of *Tea of the Sages*, Patricia Graham's book on *sencha*, Kenkadō often appears in her account, as is to be expected due to his high level of involvement in the Baisaō salon. After the master's death, Kenkadō painstakingly reassembled many of Baisaō's tea implements, as well as several painted portraits of Baisaō for his own collection. Beginning in 1764, he also became involved in a series of publishing projects concerning the propagation of *sencha*ⁱⁱ with Daiten Kenjō, a leading monk of the day and a fellow devotee of Baisaō's.

Yet Kenkadō's activities appear in Graham's account to be limited to this world of tea, and an inattentive reader may well come away thinking that Kenkadō can be categorized as a tea enthusiast, and nothing but a tea enthusiast. Graham largely ignores his incredibly extensive activities in seemingly unrelated areas, like his study of the natural world or his non-tea related collecting or publishing (Kenkadō had become active in publishing in 1761; the first work he published was also by Daiten, but since it did not involve tea it was not mentioned in Graham's accountⁱⁱⁱ), and after all why should she mention such activities? Her book is limited to tea; it never claims to be about "life in the eighteenth century." But as a consequence, in texts such as her's, broader trends larger than the world of tea per se, like the explosion in social networks or the revolution in how to conceive of the natural world, do not come into clear focus because networks not related to *sencha*, to say nothing of networks and individuals interested in

natural history, have no place in the story she tells.

Indeed, methodologies limited to interrogating single activities often end up, unsurprisingly, pigeonholing the individuals with which they deal. Thus, to keep the focus on Kenkadō, Tetsuo Najita, who analyzed the Kaitokudō merchant academy, in relation to which Kenkadō was an outsider and the exception that proved the rule, calls him an “eccentric merchant intellectual.”^{iv} To Melinda Takeuchi, devoted as she is to the study of the *bunjinga* (literati; also known as Nanga (Southern Chinese)) school painter Ike Taiga, Kenkadō was a “wealthy merchant” as well as a “pupil-patron” of Taiga’s, defined and therefore limited by this one relationship with Taiga.^v In one article, Patricia Graham identifies Kenkadō in passing as a “Confucian scholar and Nanga painter” because she is trying to describe a contrast between Mori Sosen, who is associated with the *shaseiga* (representational) artist Maruyama Ōkyo, and those like Kenkadō who had been trained in Nanga, a more traditional and stylized painting style.^{vi} Similarly, one German scholar refers to Kenkadō only as a “Sakebrauer” with the desire to study botany, because her own focus on “sleeve-jewels” (*sode no shugyoku*) renders Kenkadō relevant only as the tangential inheritor of Baisaō’s tea utensils.^{vii}

All of these descriptions are true, but that is the point: they are *all* true, so no single one can serve as an exhaustive description. The Linnaean compulsion to find the true name for something and then assign and classify it apparently still exists today among historians, yet ironically historians’ interests might well be better served by employing a more *honzōgaku*-inflected approach, which would focus more on recording the multitude of names and competing

identities by which anyone—especially a polymath like Kenkadō—was known and attempting to understand the essence of the object of study for its own sake. To get a clear picture of the two socio-intellectual revolutions I believe occurred in the eighteenth century, and to do Kenkadō justice as a complex historical actor, will require a more thorough biographical approach, one not limited to single constellations of activities or relatively brief spans of time.

KIMURA KENKADŌ: NATURAL HISTORIAN, PAINTER, FRIEND

Kimura Kenkadō was an extraordinary man with a bewildering array of identities. He can be variously identified as a commoner, merchant, *literatus*, botanist, natural historian, *sake* brewer, commercial publisher (of Daiten’s works in particular), seal carver, stationery seller, landscape painter, student of Taiga, patron of Taiga, *sencha* enthusiast, *kanshi* (literary Chinese) poet, collector of Japanese, Chinese and Western curiosities, master and founder (in 1769) of a school called the *kenkadō* which centered around his museum of collected objects, exposition organizer, eldest son and therefore family head, neighborhood *toshiyori* (elder) in Osaka but active member of Kyoto intellectual life as well, husband, father (though his daughter died very young), and finally, friend of everyone from nativists (Motoori Norinaga and Ueda Akinari, most famously) and Kyoto artists (Taiga himself and Maruyama Ōkyo as well as Itō Jakuchū) to daimyo (Masuyama Sessai of Nagashima domain).^{viii}

From a very young age, Kenkadō showed great interest in artistic and intellectual pursuits and is known to have studied painting with Ōoka Shunboku beginning at age five or six,^{ix} followed by Kakutei Jōkō, who began teaching him

the Western-influenced Shen Nanpin style when he was twelve^x until 1748 when his parents agreed to send him to Kyoto to study painting with Taiga;^{xi} He continued his studies with *bonzōgaku* (natural history) with Tsushima Tsunenoshin (Nyoran) beginning at age sixteen, *sencha* under Baisaō and alongside Taiga, Daiten Kenjō and Jakuchū, Chinese poetry and philology with Katayama Hokkai (founder in 1764 of the *Kontonshisha* or “Confusing Poems Society,” a select group devoted to unscrambling the philology of ancient poems to which Kenkadō belonged),^{xii} and later in life, botany with Ono Ranzan; indeed, Kenkadō was considered so knowledgeable about plants that he was asked to teach at Ranzan’s school.^{xiii} His huge library and collection of natural history objects, in particular, became so famous nationwide that thousands of fellow *bonzōgaku* and other scholars came from all over Japan to see it and to see him, a steady stream of visitors that he meticulously recorded in his diary.^{xiv} Kenkadō’s list of contacts is surely the longest of any of the nearly two hundred intellectuals Beerens examined.^{xv} In short, Kenkadō knew everyone who was anyone, and everyone knew him.

Given this profusion of identities, it should come as no surprise that he also had a great many names,^{xvi} of which Kenkadō (taken from the name of his school, the *kenkadō*) was perhaps the most widely used from 1769 onwards and the most interesting etymologically. Ueda Akinari, a nativist friend of Kenkadō’s, was even more impressed by his reinterpretation of the classical Japanese term *ashikabi*, which read in the sinitic pronunciation is “kenka”, than by any of his many other accomplishments; the term means “reed” and thus “Kenkadō” could simply be interpreted as “the Reed Hall” (and indeed Kenkadō’s property, which

was relocated to a marshy area of Osaka, was surrounded by reeds and waterways, the latter of which Fig. 2, a surviving sketch of his house, helps illustrate^{xvii}) but during Kenkadō’s lifetime *ashikabi* also came to refer to the systematic collection, observation, and study of things (like natural objects), and thus came Akinari’s appreciation for the clever turn of phrase. In fact, he even wrote a poem in praise of Kenkadō.^{xviii}



Figure 1: Portrait of Kenkadō^{xix}



Figure 2: Sketch of Kenkadō's House^{xx}

Kenkadō’s merchant origins are clear. To borrow terms from David Howell, his formal *occupation*, as determined by his merchant status, was to work as the head of the family *sake*

brewery in Osaka starting at the age of 20^{xxi} when his father died, even if a good portion of his actual *livelihood* eventually came more from his extracurricular activities like publishing and, late in life, selling stationary goods.^{xxii} In fact, Kenkadō also exhibited artwork for sale.^{xxiii} By all accounts, the *sake* operation that the Kimura family managed (as well as the family fortune, considering how many salon activities Kenkadō funded over the course of his life) was quite large, so Kenkadō perfectly fits the profile of the rising “nouveau riche” urban merchant sub-class described by Ikegami. As such, he is precisely the sort of person to whom aesthetic pursuits like his extensive schooling in painting and his enthusiastic embracing of both *sencha* and *bonzōgaku* could potentially offer a way to circumvent the Tokugawa status system.^{xxiv}

Yet Kenkadō’s extensive web of contacts, far from being merely an example of Ikegami’s notion of “aesthetic publics,” also provided him with a very practical political and economic safety net in the event of adversity.^{xxv} Indeed, Kenkadō’s friendship with Masuyama Sessai, the daimyo of Nagashima domain, saved him from total ruin after his family fortune and *sake* brewery were confiscated—and he was banished from Osaka—by the *bakufu* in 1790 for exceeding his *sake* production quota in 1789. During hard times like the late 1780s, right after the Tenmei Famine (1782-1787), use of rice was much more tightly controlled than usual, which probably led to the crackdown. Sessai invited Kenkadō to come to Ise and stay with him until he was at last permitted to return to Osaka two years later, becoming his patron for the duration of his exile.^{xxvi}

Kenkadō also fulfilled the same role as patron; after the Great Tenmei Fire of 1788 which gutted his own house and

atelier along with most of Kyoto, the painter Itō Jakuchū visited Kenkadō twice in the tenth month of 1789 and probably stayed with him for a time, depending on him and other friends in Osaka for economic support.^{xxvii} These sorts of tangible political and economic benefits which the knowledge associated with *bonzōgaku* or other aesthetic fields could and did provide, as well as the extraordinarily far-reaching network of horizontal connections maintained by social giants like Kenkadō, call into question Ikegami’s assertion that such networks are best conceived of as essentially limited to aesthetic matters.^{xxviii}

THE BONZŌGAKU REVOLUTION: SEEING, STUDYING AND COLLECTING THE NATURAL WORLD

In order to grasp how and why the rise of a *bonzōgaku*-inflected outlook on the natural world is connected to painting, we must consider the importance of China. As we have already seen with figures like Taiga and Kenkadō and their devotion to the Nanga (Southern China) school, China loomed large in the cultural imagination of many Japanese intellectuals. Poetry and painting circles emerged in which participants cultivated identities as *bunjin*, or Chinese-style literati. Amateur painter-poets whose aesthetic refinement and skills, not their birth privileges, earned them entry into such circles which were among the few horizontally structured groups available during the Tokugawa period. These groups formed around aesthetic pursuits like poetry or painting in order to circumvent the shogunal prohibition against forming “parties.”^{xxix} The extent to which late eighteenth-century intellectuals were influenced by and interested in China is illustrated in the

extraordinary proportion of such figures that were involved in one or more of *kan-gaku* (“Chinese studies,” meaning the study of classical literature, philology, and so forth), painting (usually Sinophilic in nature), *kanshi* (poetry in literary Chinese), and calligraphy, the four most common activities of intellectuals in this century, even more popular than other pastimes like *waka* (Japanese) poetry and so forth.^{xxx}

In one such aesthetic network, the salon devoted to Baisaō, participants carried their adulation of China to the point of attempting to craft a space that could function as a “China within Japan.”^{xxxi} The salon was highly collaborative in nature; Jakuchū painted the wall panels at the salon’s meeting place, the Daijoin, a sub-building of the Rokuonji temple (better known as Kinkakuji), in such a way as to evoke a distinctly Chinese atmosphere, which was only reinforced by Daiten’s inscription (which was, of course, written in literary Chinese, the lingua franca of the East Asian aesthetic world).^{xxxii} This reverence for China is especially fitting considering the Chinese origins of *sencha* and Baisaō’s proclivity for Chinese-style dress.^{xxxiii}

Since Kenkadō was still very young during the years this salon met, one might be tempted to speculate that his presence in Baisaō’s circle was trivial, an incidental consequence of the inclusion of his painting mentor Ike Taiga. In fact, it was Kenkadō himself who early in the 1750s, during his teens or early twenties, organized and undoubtedly funded this salon, known as the *seijūsha* (referred to by Thomsen as the “Fresh Breeze Society”), which met several times a year.^{xxxiv} Yet even at this young age, while Kenkadō was helping to create a China within Japan, he was also awakening to a new worldview, one that viewed the natural world as worthy of study and representation in its own right, no longer

influenced by the stylized schools of Chinese thought and painting nor limited to the previously dominant utilitarian perspective on natural substances like herbs (in which herbs and such were valuable only if they had medicinal uses). As his study of *bonzōgaku* progressed, he began to sketch, in as naturalistic a manner as possible, all manner of plants, animals, and other objects of the natural world, a body of work that stands alongside the rather conventional landscapes he also produced under Taiga’s tutelage in the Nanga school.^{xxxv}

Kenkadō’s interest in accurate depiction reflects a major trend in the eighteenth century: greatly expanded interest in scientific study and cataloging of the natural world, which found concrete expression in the rise of the *shaseiga* (“pictures sketched/copied from life,” or in other words the representational) school of painting. One key attribute of such representational painting was the influence of Western painting techniques and technologies. Indeed, when Maruyama Ōkyo, the founder and best-known member of the *shaseiga* school of painting who incidentally was known to be an associate of Kenkadō’s, first began to paint, he chose to make *megane-e*, which were pictures designed to be viewed with *nozōki karakuri*, a kind of optical viewing toy invented in Europe and manufactured in China.^{xxxvi}

Among various aesthetic networks, interest in the West increased sharply in the 1730s and onward, a trend spurred on, or at least made possible, by Yoshimune’s decision in 1720 to allow the importation of a greater number of Chinese and Western books, provided they were non-Christian in nature.^{xxxvii} Indeed, Yoshimune became something of an official patron both of *rangaku* (“Dutch” and by extension Western

learning) and of *honzōgaku*, a pursuit that could be translated as “Chinese pharmacology” (the use of plants for medicinal purposes) for earlier periods but by the late eighteenth century grew to have extensive taxonomic features and should by contrast be called “natural history.”

Honzōgaku had existed in Japan since the early seventeenth century when it first rose to prominence thanks to writer-practitioners like Hayashi Razan. However, starting in the 1720s under Yoshimune’s patronage, it became a much more high-profile activity and discipline, as can be seen when the botanist Niwa Seisaku was officially commissioned by Yoshimune in 1721 to travel all over the country and collect medicinal herbs.^{xxxviii} Federico Marcon has argued that the bolstered interest in *honzōgaku* knowledge, which appeared at even the highest levels of society, transformed the practice of *honzōgaku* into a financially viable vocation as opposed to a hobby; the surge in practitioners, in turn, helped provoke a conceptual shift away from thinking of the objects of study as things valuable only for their uses (i.e., as medicines, etc.) but as worthy objects of interest in their own right, as objects of and from the natural world.^{xxxix}

This key conceptual transition from utility to scientific inquiry also had explicit repercussions in the field of pictorial representation. In 1737, Yoshimune is known to have commissioned Kanō Harunobu, a leading Kanō school master of his generation, to make a series of paintings on herbs. Since they were at least partly to aid in classifying and distinguishing various herbs, these paintings, whatever aesthetic properties they had, were representative of a growing nationwide interest both in accurate representation of the natural world and a mounting fascination with

nature itself.^{xl} The new intellectual climate of the eighteenth century opened the door to new possibilities in the world of painting, reducing reliance on standard (usually hallowed Chinese) model works and encouraging the use of actual objects from the natural world in their stead. It also emancipated writers and thinkers from slavish dependence on earlier works and worldviews on the natural world.^{xli}

Holders of one key bureaucratic post in the shogunate, namely the Inspector of Chinese Paintings (*kara-e mekiki*), were from the post’s beginning required to accurately sketch all foreign objects arriving at Nagasaki, from paintings to animals to foreigners themselves; inspectors were often simultaneously court painters to the shogunate or the daimyo, and their own works, despite being part of a system intended to regulate the influx of foreign ideas, ended up contributing to the rise of the heavily Western-influenced Nagasaki school of painting (which was representational and involved Western conceptions of perspective).^{xlii} Evidently, the conceptual revolution towards an understanding of natural history predicated on realistic depiction could not be stopped by any regulatory power the shogunate possessed.

Artists like Ike Taiga and his patron-pupil Kenkadō, normally associated with the more stylized literati/Nanga school of painting, were also affected by the new representational worldview. In fact, Taiga’s interest in the accurate depiction of places was sparked at the beginning of his career, as an early encounter with the painter Nankai shows, and it was partly the pervasive new preoccupation with the natural world and its accurate representation that spurred Taiga and Buson to create their *shinkeizu* (“true view” paintings).^{xliii} Even poetry circles were influenced by the trend

towards realism; in fact, at a certain poetry salon meeting hosted by Kenkadō in Kyoto in 1773, Taiga apparently was unable to come up with any poem, the ostensible goal of the gathering, and chose to paint a true view of the scene instead, thereby implicitly arguing that a painting could fulfill the same function as poetry if properly realistic.^{xliv}

The spirit of scientific inquiry and desire for an at least somewhat realistic depiction in literati painters like Taiga or Kenkadō owed much to Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucian notion of the "extension of knowledge by the investigation of things" (*kakubutsu kyūri*) and, indeed, an aesthetic network devoted to painting and poetry but also to herbalism, cultural geography (the subject of many of his paintings being, after all, landscapes) and mountain climbing, coalesced around Taiga himself.^{xlv} It is thus not possible to argue that the new realism (especially if conceived as having originated, at least in part, due to the influence of Western techniques like perspective) in eighteenth-century painting was in a simple oppositional relationship to the influence of China as typically represented by the Nanga school; it is more helpful to see this matter as a continuum, showing the relative weight placed on representational technique and accuracy in depicting nature. Regarding Taiga's true view paintings, while they were undoubtedly more accurate in topographical detail than most non-true view landscapes of the Nanga school, realism was neither the express goal nor the unambiguous result of such true views, nor can "true" be equated with realism in this context.^{xlvi} As such, Kenkadō's participation in the conceptual revolution, the new way of seeing the natural world, would come more from the study and practice of *honzōgaku* itself than indirectly from his instruction in painting.

The Natural World and the Inter-Network

Kenkadō's interest in natural history is inseparable from his identity as a collector, though of course he collected items not directly related to natural history, such as Baisaō's tea implements. But in a larger sense, even such items acquired new significance for Kenkadō as valuable items in their own right partly because of the new perspective he shared on natural history and on accurate representation of objects in the world; thus, one of his main projects from the 1760s onward was not just the accumulation but the realistic sketching of Baisaō's utensils (the drawings were of great value because after his death, certain objects could not be acquired).^{xlvii}

Speaking of the value of sketches in cases where certain items remained beyond one's reach, Kenkadō produced a curious little book called the *Kibai zūfu* (Illustrated Guide to Rare Shells) in which he sketched and named a variety of shells owned by other collector friends and acquaintances of his. By sketching them, he had also in a sense acquired them, for he now had the key information about each—its shape, color, and name(s)—even if he could not find a physical specimen to add to his extensive personal shell collection. He also made several sketches from a Dutch book on the rare products of the Ambon Islands in Indonesia, which in the eighteenth century was under Dutch colonial administration. The book, entitled *D Amboinsche rariteitkamer*, was written by G.E. Rumphius and published posthumously in 1705. Kenkadō evidently managed to acquire a copy, from which he made a sketch of a rare shellfish native to the Ambon Islands.^{xlviii} Nor is Kenkadō's connection to the Ambon Islands limited to this single interaction; in a letter to Tanaka Mototsugu, he mentioned that a

Dutch ship captain had just given him a drinking cup made from a Nautilus shell (another shell native to the Ambon Islands), something he wished Tanaka to come see.^{xlix}

A letter addressed to Kenkadō by Ono Ranzan (his botany teacher late in life), which was in response to an inquiry Kenkadō had made about the names by which a certain shell he identifies as *monjugai* (the Manjusri Mollusk) is known in other parts of the country, informed him of the shell's various names depending on the province or region.¹ The notion of the accurate representation of objects in the natural world had a corollary in the discipline of cataloging all the multiplicity of names by which the various plants, shells, and so forth were known in various regions, so as to create what Mary Elizabeth Berry would no doubt term a “library of public information” that would be comprehensible throughout Japan.^{li} Thus it is no surprise that we find Kenkadō involved in this sort of investigative project and Ranzan, his teacher, involved with him; their collaboration shows the interconnectivity of late eighteenth-century society in Japan, invigorated by the rise of the new worldview that took interest in the natural world for its own sake.

Kenkadō was also active in organizing exhibitions in which a number of collectors would assemble to show off some of their prized items. He probably participated in the first-ever *honzōkai* (a meeting to discuss and examine natural history products) held in Japan, which occurred in Osaka in 1751.^{lii} Additionally, Kenkadō was involved in the first actual exhibition of natural history objects, called a *bussankai*, ever held. It took place in Kyoto in 1759, and in 1763 Kenkadō also participated in the next such gathering of natural history experts and collectors, also

in Kyoto, at which over 200 natural history objects (including multiple types of the same object, for example different species of bamboo) were displayed.^{liii}

In most cases, if Kenkadō wanted to acquire something, he could do so whether it were Western microscopes or shells from faraway lands because he had both the wealth and the far-flung connections required.^{liv} For example, one of the crown jewels of his shell collection was his Pelican's Foot shell, a rare shellfish native to Northern Europe; this specimen, which is still extant in Kenkadō's collection today (now held by the Osaka Museum of Natural History), is thought to be the first such shell ever to be imported to Japan.^{lv} But though they may be interesting to note, what can his acquisition of such items tell us about Kenkadō himself and about the time in which he lived?

Simply put, Kenkadō, and many others like him, was deeply interconnected in a vast network of friends and contacts that extended beyond Japan's own borders through his relations with Dutch ship captains and others who came to Nagasaki. Aesthetic or natural history activities in Kyoto or Osaka cannot be explained without reference to the larger world channeled through Nagasaki, nor can the activities of any one member of a given salon be understood without grasping the collaborative and inter-network nature of their enterprises. Kenkadō could not have made his *Illustrated Guide to Shells* without the acquiescence of his fellow collectors and the friendly intellectual climate where sharing access and information was the norm, nor would he have been able to acquire a rare shell from Northern Europe without the aid of all those, from the person who first picked up the shell in Europe to the Dutch captain that eventually brought it to Kenkadō's

contacts in Nagasaki, whose very interconnectedness made it possible. I must take issue with Ikegami's suggestion that networks, or aesthetic publics, were largely distinct from one another; on the contrary, it is the inter-networked nature of this period that is striking.^{lvi} In a time before Internet shopping, Kenkadō still managed to acquire quite a large collection of curiosities from all over the world by utilizing this eighteenth-century inter-network.

CONCLUSION: THE BIOGRAPHY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The two goals of this essay were relatively modest. The first was to use Kimura Kenkadō as a case study to evaluate the methodological value of primarily biographical writing. The second was to determine to what extent such writing, based on the individual, often scanty but overall quite numerous secondary and primary sources available on Kenkadō, could illuminate the two large-scale trends hypothesized as having begun in the eighteenth century, namely the rise of inter-networked intellectual life and the conceptual revolution regarding the natural world. In comparison with the other methods available, biography does seem preferable given the wealth of evidence Kenkadō's own life provided for both trends. But my choice of Kenkadō was not random; I knew before beginning that he was deeply involved in studying *bonzōgaku* (while at the same time fully integrated into the community of China-centered artistic and poetic production) and that he possessed a tremendous number of friends and acquaintances. So in other words, like all subjects of biographical writing, he was an exceptional case—can he really be construed as reflective of the times?

The answer, I believe, is yes. After all, Kenkadō's many friends each had their own webs of interconnectivity (Daiten and Jakuchū were close friends, for example, and each had several other contacts, not all of them shared). The eighteenth century was a collaborative time, when no one, not even so-called Eccentrics like Jakuchū, existed in an individualistic vacuum; the gregarious Kenkadō was merely ahead of the curve in this respect. As for the rise of a new conception of the natural world, though it is true that in his collecting and exhibiting Kenkadō was something of a forerunner with organizing the first *bussankai* ever held and so forth, he nevertheless was still more participant than leader of the trend. Consider that he, along with many others, was taught *bonzōgaku*, partaking in a lineage of study, as did his teacher before him; the conceptual shift was gradual, as was the artistic shift toward representation. Furthermore, natural history did not displace earlier notions of *bonzōgaku* products as useful for medicinal reasons, nor did representational painting quickly or totally replace well-respected Chinese models. Kenkadō himself juggled his new identity as a networked natural historian with his identity as a scholar of Chinese studies and painting quite handily.

Kenkadō, then, was reflective of his times, and his life reflects our two trends quite clearly. Biography has proven a very useful method indeed for shedding light on the historical character of the late eighteenth century and, by extension, writing the biography of one such figure is a small step towards writing the biography, so to speak, of the eighteenth century itself.

ⁱ Only 36 out of the 173 individuals for which she collected data were from samurai backgrounds; see Beerens, p. 194.

ⁱⁱ Graham, *Tea of the Sages*, p. 78. One interesting project Daiten and Kenkadō collaborated on, and finished in 1774, was the publication of a key *sencha*-related text (the original of course was written in literary Chinese) in vernacular Japanese, thereby opening the way for the wider popularization of *sencha*. See Graham, p. 79.

ⁱⁱⁱ Beerens, p. 91.

^{iv} Najita, *Visions of Virtue*, p. 4.

^v Takeuchi, *Taiga's True Views*, p. 136.

^{vi} Patricia Graham, "A Heterodox Painting of Shussan Shaka in Late Tokugawa Japan, Part One," *Artibus Asiae*, Vol. 51, No. 3/4 (1991), p. 277.

^{vii} Rose Hempel, "Die Juwelen des Ärmels," *Artibus Asiae*, Vol. 53, No. 3/4 (1993), p. 459. The author also errs on Kenkadō's dates.

^{viii} Beerens, pp. 90-1.

^{ix} See Hickman et al, *The Paintings of Jakuchū*, p. 39. They translate the following written remark by Kenkadō himself: "From the time I was five or six I was fascinated with painting. Ōoka Shunboku was a noted master of the Kanō school in our era, and for this reason I went to study with him...it was as a result of seeing [Shunboku's] work that I first resolved to try and paint in the Chinese manner."

^x Nakamura Shinichirō, *Kimura Kenkadō no saron*, p. 88.

^{xi} See Takeuchi, "Ike Taiga: a Biographical Study," p. 143.

^{xii} Nakamura, *Kimura Kenkadō no saron*, p. 133. The society is usually known in English-language scholarship as the *Kontonsha* (perhaps from of the name of a published work by Katayama) and translated the "Elegant Confusion Society," but the actual name appears to be Kontonshisha or "confusing" (konton) "shi" (poems) "sha" (society).

^{xiii} Takeuchi, *True Views*, p. 117.

^{xiv} See Kimura Kenkadō, *Henpen Kenkadō nikki*, Tōkyō: Geika Shoin, 2009, for the exhaustive list of the thousands that visited him during those periods covered by the extant portions of his diary.

^{xv} See Beerens, p. 90 for the actual list of known contacts. Most intellectuals she examines have roughly 2-5 contacts, whereas Kenkadō has more than 35. By contrast, Jakuchū has five and even Daiten has only ten.

^{xvi} His *na* was Kōkyō (孔恭), his *azana* was Seishuku (世肅), and his *gō* included Kinson (巾巽), Sonsai (遜齋), and Kenkadō (蒹葭堂); see Takigawa, p. 3.

^{xvii} For more information about Kenkadō's house, see Hickman, p. 212, note 7, which also indicates the Chinese origin of the term Kenkadō, a point which seems to have been (perhaps intentionally) lost on, or at least ignored by, Ueda Akinari in his praise for the resuscitation of what to him was a uniquely Japanese term.

^{xviii} Najita, p. 290.

^{xix} Posthumous portrait by Tani Bunchō, circa 1802. Image from *Kimura Kenkadō—Naninwa chi no kyōjin*, p. 10.

^{xx} "Kenkadō's House," manuscript, ink and colors on paper, in a private collection and reproduced from Hans Thomsen, p. 460.

^{xxi} See Hans Thomsen, *The Visual Salon* (dissertation), p. 70.

^{xxii} Howell, *Geographies of Identity*, p. 34. Note that Ikegami, by contrast, focuses on the notion of *yaku*, or "obligation." See Ikegami, p. 148.

^{xxiii} See Graham, "Lifestyles of Scholar-Painters in Edo Japan," p. 272 for more on Kenkadō's sales of art.

^{xxiv} Ikegami, *Bonds of Civility*, p. 149.

^{xxv} *Ibid.*, p. 39.

^{xxvi} Beerens, p. 91.

^{xxvii} *Kenkadō nikki*, p. 236.

^{xxviii} See Ikegami, pp. 380-1, where she seems to dismiss much of the political potential of these horizontal associations because they do not fit the narrow criteria of Habermas' public sphere.

^{xxix} Ikegami, *Bonds of Civility*, p. 39.

^{xxx} See Anna Beerens, *Friends, Acquaintances, Pupils and Patrons*, pp. 233-4 for a chart of the percentages of the 173 figures she studied (all active in the late eighteenth

century) known to have been involved in each of those activities.

xxxii Hans Thomsen, *The Visual Salon* (dissertation), p. 385.

xxxiii For more information on the salon that met at Rokuonji, see Thomsen, especially pp. 51-2.

xxxiiii Baisaō himself wrote that he aspired to live like the Chinese sages of old; see Graham, *Tea of the Sages*, p. 70.

xxxv Thomsen, pp. 50-1.

xxxvi See Graham, “Lifestyles of Scholar-Painters in Edo Japan,” p. 273.

xxxvii See *Ōkyo and the Maruyama-Shijō School of Japanese Painting*, Saint Louis, MO: Saint Louis Art Museum, 1980, p. 27. Ōkyo thus seems to have imbibed Western influence, in the form of perspective, from very early in his career.

xxxviii See Ellen Nakamura, p. 7.

xxxix Ibid., p. 95.

xl Marcon, *The Names of Nature* (dissertation), p. 272.

xli *Ōkyo and the Maruyama-Shijō School of Japanese Painting*, Saint Louis: Saint Louis Art Museum, 1980, p. 27.

xlii Marcon, p. 274.

xliii *Ōkyo and the Maruyama-Shijō School of Japanese Painting*, Saint Louis: Saint Louis Art Museum, 1980, pp. 28-9.

xliiii Melinda Takeuchi, *Taiga's True Views*, p. 22.

xliiii Takeuchi, *Taiga's True Views*, p. 65.

xlv Takeuchi, pp. 115-6.

xlvi Takeuchi, p. 145.

xlvii Graham, *Tea of the Sages*, p. 79. Baisaō had destroyed many of his utensils just before he died, but Kenkadō worked from memory to produce a sketch-book that included most of the tea master's implements. He was also involved in subsequent sketch-book projects depicting the implements.

xlviii See *Kimura Kenkadō—Naniwa chi no keyojin*, p. 91 for a reproduction of the rare shellfish, namely the Geography Cone, from the original Dutch book itself,

and p. 188 for background on the book and Kenkadō's relationship to it.

xlix *Kimura Kenkadō—Naniwa chi no keyojin*, pp. 91, 188.

¹ Ranzan writes that in Tango Province (today the northern half of Kyoto Prefecture) the shell was known as *kagamikai* (Mirror Mollusk) while in Chikuzen (modern-day Fukuoka Pref. in Kyushu) it was called *mirugai* (the Seeing Shell) *Kimura Kenkadō—Naniwa chi no keyojin*, pp. 93, 188. Note that since Kenkadō did not pledge to be Ranzan's student until he was 49 (1785), the letter is very likely to have been written between 1785 and 1802, when Kenkadō died. Kenkadō was evidently quite interested in this particular shell, as it also appears in his *Kibai zūfu*.

² See Mary Elizabeth Berry, *Japan in Print*, p. 15 (and passim!).

³ Endō Shōji, *Honzōgaku to yōgaku—Ono Ranzan gakuiō no kenkyū*, Kyoto: Shimonkaku, 2003, p. 57. Note that the famous meeting to discuss medicines held by Tamura in Edo, the more usual candidate for first ever *honzōgaku* meeting in Japan, did not occur until 1757.

⁴ Thomsen, pp. 74-5.

⁵ Kenkadō is known to have owned a microscope thanks to the existence of a letter from Daiten asking Kenkadō if he could borrow said microscope and show it around; see Thomsen, p. 62.

⁶ *Kimura Kenkadō—Naniwa chi no keyojin*, p. 90. The scientific name for Pelican's Foot is *Aporrhais pespelicani*.

⁷ For the argument on why the aesthetic publics never combined to form a true civil society, see Ikegami, pp. 21-43.

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SILK PRODUCTION IN SONG CHINA (960-1279):

An Investigation of the Treatise on Textiles in the Official Dynastic History of Song

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ABSTRACT

A creation of Chinese civilization, silk has not only been used as material for clothing and decoration in ancient China, but also as means of payment and taxation. Under the Song Dynasty (960-1279) China enjoyed another zenith of its cultural and economic history, achieving unprecedented developments in the sector of silk production. Upon managing and controlling this sector to maximize its revenue, the Song government adopted various innovative economic policies to bolster textile production, including the “Beforehand Buying,” the “Harmonious Beforehand Selling,” and the “Conversion of Silk for Money.” This paper examines the treatise on textiles in the Songshi, the standard official history of the Song Dynasty, to cast an insight into the dynamic of silk production in Song China. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the specific characteristics of silk manufacture in different regions within the Song, this paper further explore the Song policies on silk production, as well as various aspects of the unique contemporary political settings and socio-economic conditions that greatly shaped the silk industry.

1. INTRODUCTION

After the "golden age" of the Tang Dynasty (618-907) and more than one half of a century shaped by political clashes between the warlords, most parts of China were again unified under the Song Dynasty (960-1279), though it essentially

consisted of only the area south of the Great Wall. In geographical comparison with the previous unified dynasties, for instance the Han (202 BC-220 AD) or Tang, the Song possessed a rather limited territory and endured enormous sufferings in military affairs — in wars against nomadic dynasties of the Khitans, the Jurchens, the Tanguts, and the Mongols in the north, the Song mostly suffered defeats. The history of China shows indeed a steady military descent from the high point in the eighth century to the eventual conquest of all China by the Mongols in the 13th century. From a broader view of observation, however, a government of civilian officials under the Song brought the inherent economic problems into focus, whereas at the end of Tang and during the Five Dynasties (907-960), military struggles within the country had tended to blur an economic background of increasing difficulties. Song China admittedly witnessed, with the continued progress of agricultural and industrial technologies, a further cultural and social peak of history, showing a higher development particularly in various economic fields.

The rich and unprecedented developments in virtually all fields of macro- and micro-economics during the Song Dynasty have inspired scholars to delve into its many aspects. Since the beginning of the 20th century, many Chinese and Japanese historians have been devoting themselves to the research of the economic history of Song China

and produced a large body of scholarship written in both Chinese and Japanese about this period, especially in the political and economic fields.ⁱ While these researches involve a great deal of institutional features from a macroscopic view, during the last decades, nevertheless, Western scholars as well have been contributing a growing body of literature, which provides us with a deeper and broader insight into these topics.ⁱⁱ The Song marked a highlight of economic development in China's history. Agriculture as the basis of the national economy of China experienced considerable improvements during the centuries of the Song period. In assessment of silk manufacturing productivity during the Chinese imperial era, it is often overlooked that the raw silk material is actually a farming product; sericulture was closely related to agriculture. Thus, the silk manufactures cannot be purely observed as industrial or handicraft products of technique but depend highly on geographic, demographic, climatic and even biological factors. This reality applies for Song times as well. The textile industry, which served as a key to the political stability and economic prosperity of the dynasty, therefore provides a window onto the relationship between the government and economy in the Song Dynasty, as well as an insight into the varied political ecology at that time.

Scholars on Chinese historiography have long regarded the compilation of Songshi 宋史 (The History of Song, henceforth SS),ⁱⁱⁱ compared with other historic writings composed in the Song Dynasty, like the Song huiyao jigao 宋會要輯稿 (Draft of Documents Pertaining to Matters of State in the Song Dynasty, henceforth SHYJG)^{iv} or the Xu zizhi tongjian changbian 續資治通鑑長編

(Collected Data for a Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government, henceforth XZZTJCB),^v as rather disorganized and stylistically inferior, and have lamented the inadequacies of the texts.^{vi} According to those traditional Chinese historians, the Songshi is believed to have suffered from the Mongol's long delay in beginning work on the Songshi as well as a choppy narrative, which probably resulted from the compilers' unwillingness to digest the voluminous sources available to them. This led inconsistencies and redundancies to abound — historical figures were wrongly identified and statements contradict one another in the same text.^{vii}

To a large extent, these are valid criticisms. But just therein we may also unearth the exceptional historical value of the SS. Because the Mongols subjected the text of Song's guoshi (國史, State History of the Song), which served as basis for the Songshi editing, to a minimum of stylistic editing, the original "passage" that makes up the fabric of the Songshi text became more visible than in other dynastic histories.^{viii} Consequently, the real value of the SS treatise then becomes not what it writes about its de facto subjects, but what its text can, through the characters, tell us about the historical developing outlines and characteristics of different phenomenon. Moreover, its very value lies also in its level of detail, since SS's compilers excerpted memorials and imperial responses in full or in part, making the work to some extent equivalent to a history of legislation.

The bubo (布帛, cloth and silk) treatise in the SS, unlike any other sources on the subject contemporary to the period, organizes the issue of textiles into an intelligible narrative that is unsurpassed in detail. In this way, a comprehensive

understanding of different social and economic fields would be more likely to be achieved by examining and analysing the treatise relative to the subject. Although the treatise mainly consists of numerous official memorials and responding imperial edicts, a rich body of substantial information is also contained within these lines of words, such as names of different regions, figures of diverse silk products and their variations throughout the time. Provided these data, access to a comparative analysis as well as possible factors which have performed deciding functions can be achieved. This examination provides us with a clue to the development and geographical distribution of silk-making activities, and helps us appreciate the political and economic importance of silk to the Song Dynasty.

2. SILK MANUFACTURE IN VARIOUS REGIONS

其織麗之物，則在京有綾錦院，西京、真定、青益梓州場院主織錦綺、鹿胎、透背，江寧府、潤州有織羅務，梓州有綾綺場，亳州市縐紗，大名府織縐縠，青、齊、鄆、濮、淄、濰、沂、密、登、萊、衡、永、全州市平縐。(SS, 175: 4231)

... With regard to the delicate products, there was the manufacture of damask and brocade (lingjin yuan 綾錦院) in the capital [Kaifeng]. The weaving manufactures in the Western Capital, Zhending, Qingzhou, Yizhou and Zizhou mainly wove jing (錦, brocades), qi (綺, damasks), lutai 鹿胎, and toubei 透背.^{ix} In Jiangning and Runzhou, there were zhiluowu 織羅務 (manufactures weaving crossed-warp gauze lenos, and in Zizhou workshops

of thin silk and twill damask (lingqichang 綾綺場). In Bozhou zhou (縐, crepes) and sha (紗, yarn) were traded. In Damingfu fine zhouhu (縐縠, fine crepes) were woven. In places like Qingzhou, Qizhou, Yunzhou, Puzhou, Zizhou, Weizhou, Yizhou, Mizhou, Dengzhou, Laizhou, Hengzhou, Yongzhou and Quanzhou pingshi 平縐 (plain rough silk) was traded.

A series of names of various places all over the country appears in the text. These names of provinces and prefectures spread throughout the treatise in a sort of disorder confusing the reader, and tiring his attention with numerous specific silk terms. However, an attempt to rearrange and analyze these appellations outlines informative features which reveal the general and particular aspects of the silk production in different regions in the Song time. The figures of the government income in form of textiles in the middle of the Northern Song allow for identification of the three leading areas of production: Liangzhe 兩浙 and Jiangnan 江南, Sichuan 四川, Hebei 河北, and Jingdong 京東. Whether the enormous quotas given in various sources were actually fulfilled is debatable, yet the statistics clearly indicate the economic dimensions and its potency.

2.1 LIANGZHE AND ITS VICINITY

A glimpse into the number of occasion that names of this region appear in the treatise might suggest that the places in the reaches of the Yangtze River must have played a significant role in the production of silk and textiles in the Song.^x During the Southern Song, for instance, the most frequently referenced names are Liangzhe 兩浙, Jiangnandong

江南东 and Jiangnanxi 江南西, as well as a number of prefectures and counties like Shaoxing or Yuhang. The fact that these all together occur more than 50 times in the texts can hardly be a result of random sampling, but should represent a relatively high niveau and remarkable significance of the silk manufacture in these locations.

江西和買紬絹歲五十萬匹. (SS, 175: 4235)

[During the reign period of Congning], the annual figures of the “Harmonious Beforehand Selling” (hemai 和買) of silk fabrics and tabby fabrics in Jiangnanxi [Jiangxi] amounted to 500,000 bolts.

兩浙轉運副使王琮言：「本路上供、和買、夏稅及預買稅紬絹，歲為匹一百一十七萬七千八百。」... 紬絹一百六十餘萬匹. (SS, 175: 4237-4238)

[In 1129], Wang Cong, vice fiscal commissioner of Jiangzhe, said: “The annual total amount of silk fabrics as tribute paid by this province to the palace, together with that of the Beforehand Buying and the Summer-Tax, reached 1,177,800 bolts ... [In the 1st year of the reign period Shaoxing (1131)], a decree ordered that among the more than 1.6 million bolts of textiles of the “Summer-Tax” (xiashui 夏稅) and “Beforehand Buying” (yumai 預買) in Liangzhe ...

建炎元年，知越州翟汝文奏：「浙東和預買絹歲九十七萬六千匹。」(SS, 175: 4239)

In the 1st year of the Jianyan reign-period [1127], Zhai Ruwen [1076-1141], magistrate of Yue prefecture, presented a memorial saying: “The

annual amount of the ‘Harmonious Beforehand Selling’ of tabby fabrics in Zhedong is 976.000 bolts, ...”

This impressive productivity of the area around the Yangtze Delta is mostly, apart from other criterion, due to the fact that it had experienced continuous social and economic development since the late Tang, in particular shortly before the founding of the Song.^{xi} After the downfall of the Northern Song in 1127 and North China’s fall into the hands of the Jurchen Jin [1115-1234], a great number of experienced weavers and craftsmen traveled southward with the Song court to modern Hangzhou and enhanced its already well-established weaving industry. With the prosperity that characterized this area under the Song rule, the sector of silk manufacture witnessed a milestone in its history and it has flourished since then until today. This enduring dominance is to be attested for example that even until the end of the Qing [1644-1911], raw silk produced in Zhejiang still made up more than 70 percent of all the Chinese silk exported.^{xii}

2.2 REGION OF SICHUAN

Names for this region such as Chuan 川, Shu 蜀, together with various names of prefectures located in the region like Chengdu 成都, Kui 夔, Zi 梓 and Li 利, occur more than twenty times in the whole treatise, which is just second to the frequency of that of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Historically, the broad area of Sichuan has enjoyed profound fame as the home of delicate silk products, particularly exquisite ones such as brocade, damask, and gauze. The principal city of the region, Chengdu, was even entitled the city of brocade (jinguan cheng 锦官城)^{xiii} because of its fine-

woven and gorgeous silk products. Although no separate figures of the fabrics in this region were given in the treatise, a glimpse into the lines offer certain clues:

四年，遣李元輔變運川峽四路司農物帛。... 五年，戶部上其數凡八百十六萬一千七百八十四匹兩，三百四十六萬二千緡有奇。 (SS, 175: 4234)

In the 4th year [of reign period Yuanfeng (1081)], Li Yuanfu [?] was dispatched to exchange and transport textiles and goods in the four provinces in Chuan and Shaan ... In the fifth year [1082], the Ministry of Revenue announced that the number of this business was 8,161,780 bolts and more than 3,462,000 strings.

時，江、浙、湖北、夔路歲額紬三十九萬匹，江南、川、廣、湖南、兩浙絹二百七十三萬匹，東川、湖南綾羅絕七萬匹，西川、廣西布七十七萬匹，成都綿綺千八百餘匹，皆有奇。 (SS, 175: 4237)

At that time [1132], the annual quota [required by the state] accounted for 390,000 bolts of common silk fabric from the provinces of Jiang, Zhe, Hubei and Kui. [The quota for] the tabby fabric for Jiangnan, Chuan, Guang, Hunan and Liangzhe amounted to 2,730,000 bolts. [That for] damask, gauze lenos and tabbies for Dongchuan and Hunan was 70,000 bolts, 770,000 bolts of cloth for Xichuan and Guangxi and 1,800 bolts of brocade and damask for Chengdu. All [figures mentioned above] were with surplus.

Noteworthy here is the fact that fabrics like brocade and gauze were technically

highly sophisticated and they required much more of an investment of labor and time than common silk weaves. In comparison with the aforementioned figures concerning Liangzhe, these from Sichuan are not especially eye-catching. However, these seemingly smaller numbers depict from another angle the unique characteristic and prominence of the silk industry in Sichuan. Evidence from other sources have shown that an amazing number of exquisite silk products, in general, were manufactured in Sichuan under the Song, and these made up a significant proportion of the total amount of fine weaves in the whole empire. Statistics from the year 1118, for instance, indicate that the silk products of Sichuan had constituted important portions of the national collection, especially as far as damask and tabby fabrics were concerned.^{xiv}

2.3 HEBEI AND JINGDONG

Another area of importance in the production of silk in the Song time was the North China Plain of Hebei and Jingdong, covering the four Song provinces of Hebeixi 河北西, Hebeidong 河北東, Jingdongxi 京東 and Jingdongdong 京東東, which correspond approximately to the large areas of modern Shandong, Hebei, and Henan provinces. Names of these provinces and their subordinated prefectures appear more than twenty times in the treatise, particularly during the period of the Northern Song, primarily because of its geographical meaning for Song's national defense.

Sericulture and silk manufacture in this area traditionally prevailed, and this evident prosperity is confirmed through the fact that this region enjoyed the most popular and advanced weaving technology

in the Tang dynasty.^{xv} This prosperity had survived the long rumors after Tang and continued to develop vigorously in the Song, so the title of “the storage of silk for people all Under Heaven” (yibei tianxia 衣被天下) was bestowed.^{xvi} In the SS treatise, accounts with reference to this region is not rare:

大中祥符三年，河北轉運使李士衡又言：「本路歲給諸軍帛七十萬 ... (SS, 175: 4232)

In the 3rd year of the Dazhongxiangfu reign-period [1010], Li Shiheng, fiscal commissioner in Hebei, memorialized: “This province [Hebei] supplies all military prefectures [in its jurisdiction] with an annual amount of 700,000 bolts of textiles ...”

提點京東刑獄程堂亦言：「京東、河北災民流未復，今轉運司東西路歲額無慮二百萬匹兩 ... (SS, 175: 4235)

Cheng Tang, judicial commissioner of Jingdong, also memorialized: “... Now the amount levied by the Fiscal Commissions in [Hebei]dong and [Hebei]xi is without doubt 2,000,000 units of tael / bolts every year ...”

The fact that considerable amounts of silk produced in this region was delivered directly to Song’s imperial storage in Kaifeng suggests their extraordinary exquisite quality. When the Jurchen extorted the Song court for an amazing amount of 10 million bolts of silk at the end of 1126, historians documented that “silk storage of ten years’ collection which was all from Hebei has been vanished.”^{xvii} If this record is reliable, then the annual delivery of silk products from Hebei to Song’s court can without doubt be calculated at roughly one million bolts.

2.4 OTHER REGIONS AND OTHER MAJOR TEXTILES

Despite its relatively small amount of ruling territory compared to the former unified empires like Han or Tang, the Song still held geography of great variety under its possession. Over 1,000 miles separated the extreme northern and southern or the eastern and western points of the empire, thus it is to be expected that this large territory must be subjected to diverse climatic conditions.^{xviii} This natural differentiation led inevitably to the result that not all regions could engage in sericulture and produce silk, since the growing of mulberry trees and silkworms requires a certain moisture level and temperature. For this reason, in spite of the obvious dominance of silk textiles in Song’s weaving industry, fabrics woven from other indigenous fibres such as hemp or linen also played a role in the textile branch in Song times:

咸平初，廣南西路轉運使陳堯叟言：「準詔課植桑棗，嶺外唯產苧麻，許令折數，仍聽織布赴官場博市，匹為錢百五十至二百。(SS, 175: 4232)

At the beginning of the Xianping reign-period [993], Chen Raosou [961-1017], fiscal commissioner of Guangnanxi, suggested [to the throne]: “Please issue an edict to permit the planting of mulberry trees and jujube trees, [because] in Lingwai [Guangdong and Guangxi] only ramie can be produced. Please allow [local officials there] to convert the tax quotas to be paid [in textiles] and to continue to allow people to weave cloth fabrics to sell to the state owned manufactures. The rate is to be fixed at 150 to 200 cash for each bolt.”

Unlike the *bo* (帛, silk), bast fabrics were generally categorized under the Chinese term of *bu* (布, cloth). Until the introduction of cotton into China by the end of the 13th century, bast fabrics had long been the most essential material for the commoners' clothing than silk. Consequently, as one can imagine, the amount of *bu* fabrics must have been much larger than silk:

西川、廣西布七十七萬匹. (SS, 175: 4237)

[In 1132, the annual quota of] cloth for Xichuan and Guangxi accounted for 770,000 bolts ...

「以國家軍須所急，布帛為先，因勸諭部民廣植麻苧，以錢鹽折變收市之，未及二年，已得三十七萬余匹. (SS, 284: 9585)

“In order to meet the military needs of the state, preference should be given to the cloth fabrics. People should be encouraged to plant ramie trees, and then convert [their values] and buy them with cash and salt. Within merely two years, a total amount of more than 370,000 bolts have already been collected.”

3. SILK PRODUCTION AND INFLUENCING FACTORS

Just as in cases of all other handcraft products, the production of textiles in the Song was determined by various preconditions. Besides specific geographical and climatic factors that affected the planting of mulberry and jujube trees, the outcome of certain weavings must have also been affected by a number of various political and social factors.

3.1 DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

In premodern societies, population figures are a basis for the demographic mechanisms determining the productivity of a society. Unlike in other ancient states, population census in imperial China was an important tool for specific administrative purposes, in most cases gathered by officials in order to allocate tax burdens and manage taxes paid in kind. For this reason, the niveau of the development of Chinese population can, at least indirectly, suggest significant facts about the level of material well-being and the quality of living conditions for all people in a realm. Therefore, a glimpse into the Song contemporary geo-demographic conditions and their historical development would benefit to a great extent the study of silk-manufacturing activities at that time.

The fact that silk production in Song China attained a historical zenith can first be interpreted as a result of the population peak that China reached under the Song. Although exact figures are lacking, historical demographers estimated that the total number of people living under the rule of the Northern Song numbered over 100 million by 1100.^{xix} Even when the territory of the Southern Song shrank to only two-thirds that of its predecessor, the century and a half between the coming of Jurchen and the final fall of the Southern Song under the onslaught of the paramount Mongols was a period of constant and rapid development for Chinese demographic growth. Along with a series of technical achievements and the apparent expansion of economic sectors such as mining, iron and steel, population in the Song realm had also grown immensely and reached up to over 60 million.^{xx} Although accurate estimation is hard to obtain given the lack of materials extant, there is no doubt that the total

population during the Song definitely exceeded that of all its predecessor empires.

As for the distribution of this large population, the three decades between the end of tenth to the end of 12th century was marked by a continuing tide of migrations from north toward the south and eventually resulted to a dramatical increase of population density in the south, especially in the region of Sichuan and the Yangtze delta. Some meteorologists insist that this period was concurrently also the “Third Little Ice Age,” in which the average temperature dropped a considerable amount, so that people tended to move to warmer areas.^{xxi} But the main reason may be well ascribed to the destructive warring affairs and social rumors caused by military conflicts between Song and its nomadic neighbors. As a combined consequence of these factors, this era has accordingly set up a milestone in the demographic and economic history of China, pinpointing a historical surpass of the South over the North in terms of economic outputs and demographic distribution.

In his book on the population between the 10th and 14th century, the Chinese demographer Wu Songdi examines and analyses the situation based on his investigation of a great number of primary and secondary sources.^{xxii} An observation of his study can lead us to the conclusion that Song’s provinces of Jiangnanxi, Jiangnandong, Liangzhe and Sichuan, roughly today’s Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan and Sichuan, belonged to the most densely inhabited regions in the Northern Song, followed by the area of modern Hebei and Shandong. While in the Southern Song, when North China was conquered by the Jurchens, southern provinces aforementioned were then by far the regions with the most population.

Just as discussed above, these regions apparently played a conspicuously significant role in the silk production in the Song time. This result of a demographic analysis precisely coincides with the contemporary positions of their productivity of textiles. The relations between the two factors of demography and economy were recapitulated by the prominent historian Ge Jianxiong: “It is to admit that the areas with dense population are usually also the areas with highly developed culture, economics and high living standard. The areas with sparse population, on the other hand, are often to be noticed as ‘culturally and economically backward.’”^{xxiii}

3.2. MILITARY CONSUMPTION

宋承前代之制，調絹、紬、布、絲、綿以供軍須。(SS, 175: 4231)

The Song continues regulations of the former dynasties [Tang and Five Dynasties] to allocate and transfer tabby fabrics, silk fabrics, cloth, raw silk and soft silk materials for military expenditures.

Starting with this sentence, the significance of textiles for military use is explicitly revealed. Admittedly, Song China had constantly been under enormous military pressure from the neighbouring pastoral nomadic states from the very beginning of its dynastic establishment to its final collapse. In order to arrange a more effective means of national defense, the Song had recruited an amazing number of soldiers, which could probably be one of the largest armies in the human history. Historical records show that in 975, the armed forces numbered 378,000, in 912,000 in 1017, and increased immensely in 1045 to 1,259,000, which ultimately

resulted in the incredible fact that the expenditures for the troops consumed almost 80 percent of the government's annual budget.^{xxiv} Even in the Southern Song, those numbers did not decrease much, and the total bills for soldiers even exceeded those under the Northern Song. It is thus safe to imagine that such large troops must have consumed a considerable amount of materials, including foods, weapons, and, of course, textiles.

明道中，又減兩蜀歲輸錦綺、綾羅、透背、花紗三之二，命改織紬、絹以助軍。(SS, 175: 4232)

During the Mingdao reign-period [1032-1033], an imperial edict again ordered Liangshu [Sichuan] to reduce the annual delivery of brocade, damask, gauze and patterned yarn by two third and change [the quota] to weavings of silk fabrics and tabby fabrics in order to supply the army.

自西邊用兵，軍須紬絹，多出益、梓、利三路，歲增所輸之數... 治平中，歲織十五萬三千五百餘匹... 神宗即位，京師米有餘蓄，命發運司損和糴數五十萬石，市金帛上京，儲之樞貨務，備三路軍須。(SS, 175: 4233)

As the war [against Xi Xia] broke out in the west borders [1041-1044], silk fabrics and tabby fabrics to supply the army were mainly from three provinces of Yizhou, Zizhou and Lizhou ... During the Zhiping reign-period [1064-1067], more than 153,500 bolts of fabrics were woven every year in these three provinces ... When Emperor Shenzong [r. 1067-1085] ascended the throne, there was still additional storage of rice in the capital city. An edict was given to the Supply

Commission to sell 500,000 units of rice to buy gold and fabrics and to store them in the Monopoly Tax Commission in the capital, in order to prepare for the expenditure for the army in the [above-mentioned] three provinces.

紹興元年，初賦鼎州和買折帛錢六萬緡，以贍蔡兵。(SS, 175: 4233)

In the first year of the reign period Shaoxing [1131], for the first time that the “Conversion of Silk for Money” and the “Beforehand Buying” was taxed in Dingzhou at an amount of 60,000 strings in order to support the troops in Caizhou.

Lacking sufficient sources, we probably cannot quantify or analyze the accurate military consumption of textiles during the Song. A glance, however, casted into the treatise reveals the fact that the large scale of Song's military forces played a substantial role in the national production of textiles and their distribution. As demonstrated through the examples presented, textiles gathered and distributed for military expenditures came predominantly from the region of Sichuan. As a matter of fact, a great number of fabrics were indeed collected in Sichuan and transported to the frontiers to the Tanguts in Shaanxi and to the Khitan in Hebei. If the quota was not met, there would be a shortage of fabrics among the soldiers in Shaanxi and Hebei.^{xxv} As during the Southern Song, which had a greatly reduced territory, the importance of textiles produced in Sichuan in order to secure the national defense even surpassed that of the Northern Song.

3.3 INDEMNITIES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Another issue which probably contributed greatly to the settlement of the textile production was the tributes that the Song government were forced to pay to its neighbors in exchange for peace. Silk always played a substantial role in the mainstream of the Song's external diplomatic relations and consequently impacted the domestic economy. As promised in the Treaty of Shanyuan signed between Song and Liao in 1005, the Song agreed to pay the Khitans an annual payment of 100,000 ounces of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk.^{xxvi} Several decades later, the Song were somehow forced to offer a large increase in the annual peace indemnity by 100,000 units of both silver and silk, for the reason that it was under pressure from Xi Xia [1038-1227] incursions in the northwest and vague threats of impending Liao military action in concert with them. The threat from the Tanguts Xi Xia bore heavily on Song policy making, and they consequently received annually from Song 255,000 units of silk, silver and tea.^{xxvii} As for the Jurchen Jin, the tremendous military terror of crushing the Southern Song brought both sides to a treaty in 1142, fixing an annual tribute from the Song comprising of silver and silk amounting to 250,000 ounces and bolts.^{xxviii} These records uncover something of the extent of Song silk manufacture, the amount of these silk textiles used for tributes, and military expenditures.

Apart from the large indemnities paid to the conquest dynasties, a clear development of a vast exchange of goods between the Song and the immediate nomadic states was indicated during the period. Silks, naturally, continued to be much prized abroad and remained one of the best goods, both in quality and quantity. Despite the constant conflicts

on China's northwest frontier and the attendant disruptions on the traditional Silk Roads, the silk exchange persisted through the Khitans since they were ambitious to trade their recently acquired Chinese silks to other people in the west. Given the newly developed technologies of ocean shipping by its craftsmen, the Song was a pioneering period for seafaring and also a heyday for the Maritime Silk Road across the Indian Ocean, which connected China to other countries in South and Southeast Asia. The dominant goods were silk products, consisting mainly of tabby fabrics, with a few exceptions of brocade, twill, yarn and gauze. Important destinations included Japan, Korea, Vietnam, India, Coromandel and the Philippines.^{xxix} Records of Arab and Persian merchant communities dating back to Song times, which organized the trading of delicate silks to the Central Asia and further to Europe, are still found in coastal cities used for international trading during that time, such as Canton, Quanzhou in Fujian, or Mingzhou in Zhejiang.

4. CONCLUSION

It is true that the SS is in some ways a poorly organized compilation with obvious inadequacies, and not infrequently there can be confusions about the coherence or relevance of various pieces of information contained in its vast volumes. However, its value is enhanced to a great degree by the fact that many sources upon which the SS was based have since been lost. The cut-and-paste methods of its compilers should rather be regarded as an asset, because this method preserved a great number of primary sources. In consequence, it is precisely these almost unmodified data that provide us with immense first-hand "raw materials" for unpolished and multi-

dimensional study of the institutional and economic aspects of Song China.

The sparseness of detail and reliable information does not permit us to carry out a more profound analysis of the fiscal operations in the period in question; nevertheless, a circumstantial study of the seemingly randomly organized official memorials and imperial edicts in the treatise on textiles can reveal not only some facts of textile production in different regions in Song times, but more importantly, also provide vivid insights into the unique textile policies adopted by the Song government.

Although a sea of both Chinese and international scholarship has been devoted to the study of the economic history of the Song, in order to reveal or revivify the distinctiveness of medieval China, more comprehensive and in-depth studies are still necessary in the future, particularly as far as archaeological finds and material culture are concerned. For instance, quite a number of specific weaving technologies that occurred in our treatise remain as yet unidentified. Archaeological discoveries in times to come could possibly provide more direct or detailed information. In this sense, the short essay presented here is merely a preliminary approach of future projects to thoroughly examine the textile production and economic policies concerning textiles in medieval China.

ⁱ For profound studies in these fields, see Sogabe Shizuo 曾我部静雄, *Sōdai zaisei shi 雄宋代財政史* (A Financial History of the Song Dynasty) (Tokyo: Taian, 1966); Shiba Yoshinobu 斯波義信, *Sōdai shōgyōshi kenkyū 宋代商業史研究* (Studies on the Commercial History of the Song Dynasty) (Tokyo: Kazama Shobo, 1968); Qi Xia 漆俠, *Songdai jingji shi 宋代經濟史* (Economic History of the Song Dynasty) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1988); Wang Shengduo 汪聖鐸, *Liangsong caizheng shi 兩宋財政史* (Finance History of the Northern and Southern Song) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995).

ⁱⁱ Important publications are among others for instance Deng Gang, *The Premodern Chinese Economy: Structural Equilibrium and Capitalist Sterility* (New York: Routledge, 1999); Richard von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).

ⁱⁱⁱ Tuo Tuo 脱脱 et al. ed., *Songshi 宋史* (History of the Song). Punctuated and collated edition (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977).

^{iv} Xu Song 徐松, *Song huiyao jigao 宋會要輯稿* (Draft of Documents Pertaining to Matters of State in the Song Dynasty). Photoreprint of Beijing Library Copy (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1957).

^v Li Tao 李燾. *Xu Zizhi tongjian changpian 續資治通鑑長篇* (Collected Data for A Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government). Punctuated and collated edition (Beijing: Renmin weisheng chubanshe, 1995).

^{vi} On the historiographical evaluation and criticism on the History of Song, see by Ji Yun 纪昀 and Lu Xixiong 陆锡熊, *Siku quanshu zongmu 四庫全書總目* (General Catalog to the Complete Texts of the Four Repositories). Reprinted edition (Taipei: Yiwen chubanshe, 1964), 993-994.

^{vii} On-cho Ng and Q. Edward Wang, *Mirroring the Past: The Writing and Use of History in Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 181.

^{viii} On the issue, see Jennifer W. Jay, "Memoirs and Official Accounts: The Historiography of the Song Loyalists," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 50, no. 2 (1990): 589-612.

^{ix} There are still intensive debates on the definition of these terms, so a proper translation is hard to be reached. For detailed description of these terms, see Dieter Kuhn, "Das Textilgewerbe in Sichuan in der Song-Dynastie: Redigierte Übersetzung von Dieter Kuhn" (The Manufacture of Textiles in Sichuan in the Song Dynasty, Edited Translation by Dieter Kuhn), in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Song-Zeit* (Contribution to the History of Song-Time), ed. Dieter Kuhn and Ina Asim (Heidelberg: Edition Forum, 2006), 252.

^x Shelagh Vainker, *Chinese Silk: A Cultural History* (London: The British Museum Press, 2004), 112-113.

^{xi} Philip C. Huang, *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 77-78.

^{xiii} For exact figures, see the statistics provided in the chart in Mary Backus Rankin, *Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 64.

^{xiiii} Fei Zhu 費著, *Shujin pu 蜀錦譜* (Spectrum of Shu). Reprinted in Ji Yun 紀昀 and Lu Xixiong 陸錫熊, ed., *Siku quanshu 四庫全書* (Complete Texts of the Four Repositories). Photo reprint of the Wenyuange Copy. Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1976. In the book there is also a detailed description of all kinds of specific silk products manufactured in Sichuan.

^{xv} See the charts offered in Kuhn, "Das Textilgewerbe in Sichuan", 253-254.

^{xvi} See Vainker, *Chinese Silk*, 126.

^{xvii} SS, 179: 4362.

^{xviii} Xu Mengxin 徐夢莘, *Sanchao beimeng huibian 三朝北盟匯編* (Compilation of Documents on the Treaties with the North during Three Reigns). Photo reprint of the Wenyuange Copy (Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1976), 72: 9a.

^{xix} Michael Loewe, *Imperial China: The Historical Background to the Modern Age* (Taipei: Rainbow-Bridge Book Co., 1973), 35.

^{xx} John K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 89.

^{xxi} Dieter Kuhn, *The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 75. While Ping-ti Ho estimated that the figure must have been over 70 million, see Ping-ti Ho, "An Estimate of the Total Population of Sung-Chin China," in *Études Song*, series 1, no. 1 (1970): 33-53.

^{xxii} Dieter Kuhn, *The Age of Confucian Rule*, 71-72.

^{xxiii} See Wu Songdi 吳松弟, *Zhongguo renkou shi, di san juan: Song, Liao, Jin, Yuan 中國人口史, 第三卷: 宋遼金元* (A Demographic History of China, vol. 3: Song-Liao-Jin-Yuan) (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2001), 122-137, 141-144, 394.

^{xxiiii} Quoted and translated from Ge Jianxiong 葛劍雄, *Zhongguo renkou fazhan shi 中國人口發展史* (A History of the Development of Chinese Population) (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1991), 406.

^{xxv} See Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*, 84.

^{xxvi} SHYJG, 156: 6111.

^{xxvii} On the Shanyuan Treaty, see David Curtis Wright, *From War to Diplomatic Parity in Eleventh-Century China: Song's Foreign Relations with Khitan Liao* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 71. The fullest study of the treaty in a Western language is by Christian Schwarz-Schilling, *Der Friede von Shan-yüan (1005 n. Chr.): Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der chinesischen Diplomatie* (The Peace of Shanyuan 1005: A Contribution to the History of Chinese Diplomacy) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1959).

^{xxviii} The accurate figures of silk among the total might be 135,000 bolts of silk, see Jacques Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 355. On the Song payment to the Xi Xia, see also Frederick W. Mote, *Imperial China: 900-1800* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 117.

^{xxix} Herbert Franke, "The Chin Dynasty," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 6: *Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368*, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 234.

^{xxx} Vadime Elisseeff, *The Silk Roads: Highways of Culture and Commerce* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 295.

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PUBLIC OPINION AND BUREAUCRATIC STONEWALLING:

The Legalization of the Birth Control Pill in Japan

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ABSTRACT

Until 1999, Japan was the only developed nation in the world not to have legalized oral contraceptives, and circumstances during the 1990s indicated that Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare intended to prolong the ban indefinitely. But the unprecedentedly speedy legalization of Viagra in January 1999 unleashed a firestorm of public criticism that essentially forced the Ministry to approve the pill with all due haste; oral contraceptives were legalized in June, and on the market in Japan by September 1999. In this paper, I argue that, as a result of the hemophiliac HIV debacle that mired the Ministry of Health and Welfare in scandal only a few years previously, the Ministry was acutely sensitive to broad-based public criticism. In order to appease its critics and avoid further scandal, therefore, the MHW quickly retracted its previous objections to the pill, and legalized oral contraceptives a mere six months after the introduction of Viagra.

INTRODUCTION

Until 1999, Japan was the only country in the developed world – indeed, the only country in the United Nations – not to have legalized hormonal oral contraceptives, commonly known as “the pill.” Once the issue of possible legalization was examined and dismissed by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW)ⁱ in the 1960s, a de facto ban on pill use for contraceptive purposes

characterized Japanese birth control policy. But in March 1999, the Central Pharmaceutical Advisory Council (CPAC), the committee within the MHW responsible for reviewing and approving new drugs, announced that it was finalizing prescription guidelines for the approval of low-dose oral contraceptives. On June 16, 1999, ten different types of oral contraceptive, marketed by nine pharmaceutical companies, were legalized for sale, overturning the ban that had been in place for more than thirty years. The pill finally became available in Japan by prescription on Sept. 2.ⁱⁱ

In July 1998, the Japan branch of the international pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc. applied to the MHW for approval of its anti-impotency drug Viagra. In December, the MHW deemed the drug safe and effective based solely on clinical trial data from the United States.ⁱⁱⁱ The new drug was “fast-tracked” to approval; on Jan. 25, 1999, a mere six months after the application was first filed, the MHW announced that Viagra was approved for sale. It became available by prescription in March 1999 – the same month that the Ministry announced that guidelines for pill approval were being finalized.^{iv}

Although the timing is suggestive, there could be several explanations for the sudden reversal of the long-standing pill ban. New evidence of the pill's safety or benefits may have come to light; alternatively, the MHW may have been made aware of the risks facing the estimated 200,000 Japanese women using

the older, high-dose version of the pill off-label for contraception.^v Perhaps Japan's mid-1990s electoral reform encouraged Diet members, hoping to impress women voters, to pressure the MHW into legalizing the pill. Pro-pill pressure groups may have finally found the right words to convince MHW bureaucrats that the pill was beneficial to society.

None of these explanations adequately account for the facts. In 1995, the Ministry's own CPAC released a report concluding that low-dose oral contraceptives were safe and effective, but failed to approve them at every deliberation meeting until 1999, after Viagra was approved.^{vi} Petitions to the MHW in the early 1990s pointed out the increased risk of side effects for Japanese women who were using the high-dose pill (which was available by prescription for the treatment of menstrual disorders but often used off-label for contraception), so MHW bureaucrats were aware of this danger to Japanese citizens.^{vii} Diet members were clearly uninterested in pill approval – the pill was mentioned in Diet sessions one time each in 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997, and 1998; from February to March 1999, after Viagra was approved, the pill was brought up in four separate Diet sessions.^{viii} Pro-pill activist groups, including family planning organizations and doctors' associations, lobbied for the pill consistently from 1990, regularly submitting petitions to the government and speaking to the media about the need for the pill. Their redoubled efforts following the approval of Viagra may have influenced the MHW's decision to approve the pill, especially insofar as they increased media coverage of the controversy. However, the degree and amount of these groups' lobbying efforts in early 1999 were not significantly different from those of previous years.^{ix}

The only difference in the political situation surrounding the pill debate between March 1998, when the MHW announced for the second time in eight years that deliberations on pill approval would be postponed indefinitely, and March 1999, when it announced that it was researching guidelines for the pill's imminent legalization, was the fast-tracked approval of Viagra and the widespread, well-publicized criticism of ministerial hypocrisy that accompanied it. An examination of the process of pill approval in Japan from 1961 to 1999 will make clear that public outrage over the Ministry's evident double standards resulted in the MHW's ultimate approval of the pill.

THE FIRST PUSH FOR THE PILL: 1961-66

Japan initially seemed set on a course to approve the pill along with other developed nations, nearly all of which legalized the pill by 1968. Clinical trials of the pill had been conducted in Japan in the 1950s, and in 1961 three Japanese pharmaceutical companies applied to the MHW to market the newly developed drug as a contraceptive.^x The pill would likely have been approved within a few years had it not been for a series of domestic and international drug scandals (relating to sleeping pills and thalidomide) in 1961 that resulted in "activist groups ... severely criticiz[ing] the government's Drug Authorization Law for being too lax."^{xi} At the same time, Socialist Diet member and birth control activist Kato Shizue voiced her disapproval of the pill in a Diet committee session, questioning its safety and efficacy as well as its effects on public morals.^{xii} There were reports that the pill was not approved because the prime minister's wife "was worried that the pill's use might lead to sexual immorality."^{xiii} By 1964,

doctors' groups (the Japan Association of Maternal Welfare, the Japan Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the Japan Medical Association), family planning groups (the Family Planning Federation of Japan and the Japan Family Planning Association), and the Japan Midwives Association had all stated their opposition to the approval of the pill. These groups were motivated by both financial interests (selling condoms and providing abortions) and concern about adverse effects on women's health:

Although opposition to the pill among these groups was largely motivated by a desire to protect professional interests, there was also genuine concern about the possible health risks posed by this new type of drug, which was to be taken not by sick people to cure illness but by healthy women to prevent pregnancy.^{xiv}

The authority of these groups on matters relating to women's health was undeniable, and naturally their unified opposition negatively affected views of the pill among the public.

As has been amply demonstrated, the motives behind the initial ban on the pill in the 1960s are fairly clear. Fear of sexual immorality and possible side effects, but most importantly opposition to the pill from influential activist groups, caused the MHW to avoid approving the pill. The Oral Contraception Committee, which was formed when the application for pill approval was first submitted by Japanese pharmaceutical companies in 1961, was dissolved in 1966, and an official verdict on the pill was never announced.

Until the mid-1980s, very few prominent groups advocated for the legalization of the pill; one prominent pro-pill feminist group in the 1970s, Chūpiren, employed such aggressive and anti-social

protest tactics that the group, and by association the pill, was condemned by both the mainstream media and other feminist organizations.^{xv}

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE LOW-DOSE PILL: 1987-92

In the 1980s, feminist groups, doctors, and family planning activists who had previously opposed the pill (including Kato Shizue, now the president of the Family Planning Federation of Japan), reversed course and began to lobby in favor of it. For women's and family planning groups, this shift was caused largely by the overwhelming evidence from other countries that continued use of the drug had few ill effects; the development of a safer, low-dose pill eased the minds of many women worried about side effects. For abortion providing doctors, some have speculated that the reversal was caused by declining demand for abortions; since doctors in Japan sell prescription medication to patients directly, the introduction of the pill was likely seen as a means of increasing flagging physician incomes.^{xvi}

In 1990, nine Japanese pharmaceutical companies submitted an application for the approval of the new low-dose contraceptive pill, based on data from Japanese clinical trials of 5000 women conducted from 1987-1990, to the Ministry of Health and Welfare.^{xvii} There were indications from within the Ministry that the pill would be approved by 1992, and Japanese and international media outlets, academics, and activists speculated freely on the possible effects of the anticipated approval; Carl Djerassi, one of the scientists involved in the creation of the pill in the 1950s, predicted that "six million Japanese women may be using oral contraceptives by the turn of the century."^{xviii}

In March 1992, the MHW announced that the application for oral contraceptives would be shelved indefinitely.^{xxix} Initially no explanation for the decision was forthcoming; pressed by the media, the ministry later cited concern that the pill would “discourage condom use and facilitate spread of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection.”^{xxx} Some Japanese activists and observers questioned the ministry’s true intent: “Many believe that the AIDS issue merely provided a convenient excuse, and that the real reason MHW bureaucrats refused to lift the pill ban was the fear that pill use would further lower Japan’s already low birth rate.”^{xxxi}

From 1992 onward, the nine pharmaceutical companies that had applied to market oral contraceptives, as well as the activists and doctors lobbying for them, were left in limbo. The MHW vacillated between approval and postponement, always concluding “not yet.” The Japan Association of Maternal Welfare, the Japan Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Family Planning Federation of Japan, and the Japan Family Planning Association jointly submitted a petition to the MHW in 1993 demanding that deliberations on the pill be reopened, noting that there were no studies linking pill use to the spread of AIDS. In explaining the motives behind the petition, the president of the Japan Association of Maternal Welfare criticized the Ministry’s decision in no uncertain terms: “The view that if [the pill] is legalized AIDS infections will increase is unscientific, and insulting to women.”^{xxxii}

THE DEBATE DRAGS ON: 1995-98

In 1995, deliberations on the pill were officially reopened. The CPAC issued a report concluding that the relation between pill use and the spread of

AIDS was weak, and indicated that the pill would be approved in early 1996.^{xxxiii} The promised date came and went; in July of that year, then-Minister of Health and Welfare Kan Naoto stated publicly that he thought the Central Pharmaceutical Advisory Council would approve the pill “around next year.”^{xxxiv} And indeed, in February 1997, the Council released a report suggesting that the low-dose pill was both safe and effective – but that due to concerns about AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases, the Council would refrain from a decision until the next deliberation session, and ask for input from the public.^{xxxv} In June 1997, the Public Health Council ambiguously stated that increased public education about the risks of STDs must accompany the legalization of the pill, but did not issue any recommendation for or against pill approval. In August, CPAC announced that an investigation into trends of sexually transmitted diseases was necessary before a decision could be made, effectively delaying approval another year.^{xxxvi} That the Ministry was deliberately dragging its feet on the issue of pill approval was increasingly obvious, prompting the *Mainichi Shinbun* to remark, “There really isn’t any more reason to delay approval of a drug that has been proven safe and effective, is there?”^{xxxvii}

As it happened, there was. In December 1997, a small environmental group submitted a petition asking the MHW to exercise caution with regard to the pill because of “the possibility that pill users’ urine, when released into the environment, might cause hormonal imbalances in animals and humans.”^{xxxviii} Despite the fact that the original reports of hormonal imbalance in human and animal populations near some industrial plants in Europe and America concluded that industrial chemicals, not the pill, were to blame, in March 1998 the MHW again declared an indefinite postponement of

pill approval pending further research on “low-dose OCs and cervical cancer, potential environmental pollution due to residues of the hormonal drug in urine, and possible teratogenic risks of OCs.”^{xxxix}

Pro-pill family planning activists and gynecologists were taken aback by the speed with which the MHW heeded the suggestions of a network of small local environmental groups, especially considering their own eight years of petitions and lobbying for the pill. Activists publicly criticized the ministry’s delay, pointing out its inconsistencies. Kitamura Kunio, a Japanese gynecologist and director of the Japan Family Planning Association’s Tokyo Family Planning Clinic, characterized the delay as unreasonable: “The claim that the pill could disrupt the hormonal system of other people or wild animals does not make sense. The estrogen level in the excrement of pill takers is not much beyond that of non-takers, and anyway it is only one or two thousandths of the level in pregnant women.”^{xxx}

These groups continued to lobby strenuously for the pill throughout 1998. Kato Shizue, the President of the Family Planning Federation of Japan, submitted a new petition to the MHW calling for the immediate approval of the pill soon after the March announcement. The Professional Women’s Coalition for Sexuality and Health, led by gynecologist Horiguchi Masako, promoted awareness of the pill through press releases and media interviews, and sent information packets directly to politicians and MHW bureaucrats.^{xxxi} In contrast to the early 1990s, when media sources reflected the widespread belief that the pill would soon be legalized, media coverage of the pill in 1998 was much more cautious, pointing out the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s many delays and running articles featuring both pro and con opinions of the pill.^{xxxii} In December 1998, the *Asahi Shinbun* ran

an article highly critical of the MHW’s continued postponement of pill approval entitled “Unique in the world ‘pill isolation:’ Japan’s irresponsibility,” featuring statements from Kitamura Kunio and other health care professionals about the pill’s proven safety and effectiveness, its long history of use in other countries, and its lack of connection with the spread of AIDS.^{xxxiii} Despite this increase in criticism from activists, the Ministry made no move to approve the pill until the eruption of the Viagra controversy.

VIAGRA VS. THE PILL, 1999

As noted above, Viagra was approved by the Central Pharmaceutical Advisory Council in January 1999, six months after its application was filed. The unprecedented speed with which a drug designed to improve male sexual ability was approved, compared to the indefinite delays faced by a drug associated with female sexual independence, was immediately judged a sexist double standard by Japanese and international observers. News outlets jumped on the story, comparing the record six-month approval period of Viagra to the nine years of deliberations on the pill.^{xxxiv} Female politicians vocally condemned the Ministry’s double standard. Diet member Nōno Chieko commented, “The situation epitomizes the sexism of our society. The Health and Welfare Ministry gives [Viagra for] sexual gratification. But are those men going to use it with their wives, who are not allowed reliable birth control?”^{xxxv} Upper House member Domoto Akiko questioned the MHW’s commitment to health care: “If they were really concerned about women’s reproductive health, it wouldn’t take such a long time to approve the pill.”^{xxxvi} Japanese newspapers quoted scathing reports from American and

British news sources about Japan's swift approval of Viagra, emphasizing the mounting international criticism facing the MHW and the government.^{xxxvii} In response to the Ministry's official justification for the swift approval, that black market sales and unsupervised use of Viagra among Japanese men posed an urgent health risk, activist gynecologists such as Kitamura Kunio and Horiguchi Masako pointed out the dangers of unwanted pregnancy, leading to Japan's high abortion rate, as well as the side effects faced by the approximately 200,000 Japanese women using the high-dose pill off-label for contraceptive purposes.^{xxxviii}

The MHW reacted to this criticism with uncharacteristic speed. In February, officials announced that the pill would be approved later in the year; in March the CPAC announced it was finalizing prescription guidelines, and the pill was officially approved in June. It is obvious that the legalization of Viagra and the public anger it incited played a role in the MHW's decision. However, the Ministry was no stranger to criticism; indeed, it had brushed off the protests of family planning activists and other groups on this issue for years. Why should its response be any different this time?

CRITICISM AND PUBLIC OUTRAGE

A broader view of the MHW's circumstances in the 1990s reveals that the Ministry had ample reason to be very sensitive to public criticism. In the 1990s, a tragic scandal dealt a serious blow to the MHW's reputation. It came to light that many high-level officials within the Ministry had been aware that untreated blood products already in use were likely contaminated with HIV and neglected to inform the public. In 1984, tests found that 23 of 48 blood samples from Japanese hemophiliacs were HIV-positive.


The physician heading the Japanese AIDS Study Group reported these findings to the MHW, but neither he nor the Ministry informed the public, and further decided not to tell the patients themselves that they were HIV-positive, "reportedly because they believed that since curative therapy for AIDS was lacking, there was no need to inform individuals about their HIV status."^{xxxix} The lawsuits against the Ministry and the physicians involved began in 1989; more than 1,800 Japanese hemophiliacs had been infected with HIV due to untreated blood products, 500 of whom died as a result.^{xl} In 1996, the new Minister of Health and Welfare Kan Naoto ordered an internal investigation which turned up evidence that the Ministry had been aware of the problem and done nothing for years – evidence which former Ministry officials had denied existed.^{xli}

This case understandably resulted in a torrent of public outrage directed against the MHW. Hemophiliac groups organized a sit-in at the MHW in February 1996 that captured the attention of the media and the public, and their petitions garnered hundreds of thousands of signatures. Official apologies from executives of the pharmaceutical companies that had sold the tainted blood as well as MHW officials were demanded and received. The first arrest of an official involved in the case, blood policy advisor Dr. Abe Takeshi, took place in August 1996. The MHW was forced to undertake institutional reform, including opening advisory committee meetings to the public.^{xlii}

It is likely that this experience made MHW bureaucrats especially averse to criticism from the public. Before Viagra was legalized, criticism of the MHW's repeated delay of pill approval came almost entirely from interest groups, most notably the pharmaceutical lobby and the two doctors' (the Japan Association of

Maternal Welfare and the Japan Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists) and two family planning groups (the Family Planning Federation of Japan, and the Japan Family Planning Association) that submitted a joint petition to the MHW urging swift approval in 1993. Gynecologists associated with these and other family planning groups were especially outspoken.^{xliii} However, these groups and individuals represented only a small subset of the Japanese population. In fact, surveys indicated that most Japanese women were indifferent to the pill and did not plan to take it if legalized (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Do you want to use low-dosage oral contraceptives if they are approved for use?^{xliv}



Source: Mainichi Shinbunsha Jinkō Mondai Chōsakai 2005

The Ministry was well aware of this public apathy toward the pill, and used it to rebuff critical activists: when representatives of the four family planning and doctors' groups presented their petition to the Minister of Health and Welfare in 1993, "he told them that, while

he personally agreed that lifting the pill ban and preventing AIDS were two separate issues, the public was fearful of AIDS, women were fearful of the pill, and not all women's groups agreed that the pill should be approved."^{xlv}

After the hasty approval of Viagra, however, criticism of the Ministry spread from activist groups to the public in general. This can be seen in the sudden increase in discussion of the pill in Diet sessions, as demonstrated above, as well as in the tone of newspaper articles mentioning the pill before and after the approval of Viagra. Comparing pill-related headlines of the *Asahi Shinbun* pre- and post-Viagra reveals a distinct shift in coverage: pre-Viagra articles presented both pro-pill-approval and anti-approval opinion pieces ("Lifting the pill ban and AIDS prevention – Inoue Sakae,"^{xlvi} "The

choice of the pill is a woman's right – Kato Shizue,"^{xlvii}) and news articles examined both the pros and cons of approval ("Anticipation and anxiety for 'pill approval' – Women's group panel discussion next month,"^{xlviii}

"Towards strengthening AIDS countermeasures' – The pill approval problem at the Public Health

Council"^{xlix}). But in the wake of Viagra's legalization, articles and opinion pieces mentioning the pill became highly critical of the MHW: "The pill and Viagra – differences in approval speed;"^{li} "A safe contraceptive, quickly – Viagra approved in 6 months, pill deliberations for 9 years;"^{lii} "The double standard lurking in Viagra approval."^{liii} A similar trend can be found in the archives of the *Yomiuri Shinbun*: "Large-scale postponement of pill approval/Pharmaceutical Advisory

Council” (March 3, 1998)^{liii} versus “Viagra’s speed approval – Why is the pill no good?” (Feb. 9, 1999).

As these headlines reveal, the approval of Viagra shifted the context of the pill debate from an issue of public safety to an issue of bureaucratic hypocrisy. The official reasons for the two indefinite postponements of deliberations on the pill, the spread of AIDS in 1992 and environmental degradation in 1998, suddenly seemed preposterous: at the time that Viagra was approved in Japan, 242 deaths internationally were linked with the drug, including one Japanese man whose heart stopped two hours after taking a Viagra tablet.^{liv} In the Ministry’s own words, the man’s death had the effect of ensuring swift approval: “Following the death in July [1998] of a man in his 60s after taking [Viagra], it was considered necessary to regulate use of the drug as soon as possible to prevent inappropriate use, one of the ministry’s leading officials said.”^{lv}

As a matter of health and safety, the public was indifferent to the plight of the pill, but when it became instead evidence of bureaucratic stonewalling and even sexism, the public was outraged. Given its newfound allergy to widespread criticism, the Ministry’s near-instantaneous capitulation is indeed unsurprising.

CONCLUSION

In the 1990s, the Ministry of Health and Welfare seemed determined to keep the pill out of Japan. Some have speculated that this behavior was motivated by concern that a reliable female-controlled contraceptive would further lower Japan’s plummeting birthrate.^{lvi} Whatever the MHW’s true motivations, it acted consistently to block pill approval from 1992 to 1998. The Ministry was opposed in this by doctors,

family planning activists, and the pharmaceutical lobby, but the issue did not arouse public interest.

The record six-month approval of Viagra brought the nine years of bureaucratic stonewalling with regard to the pill to the public’s attention. Where previously public discourse had framed the pill in the context of health and safety, the Viagra controversy pushed sexism to the forefront of the debate, and brought with it media scrutiny and public outrage. The MHW, which had been at the center of a rancorous scandal inviting widespread condemnation by the public only a few years previously, sought to stem the inevitable tide of acrimonious criticism and save what little face it could by swiftly approving the pill. It was the desire to avoid another scandal, rather than the efforts of lobbyists, electoral reform, or a genuine change of heart, that motivated the MHW to speedily reverse its long-standing no-pill policy.

While this analysis of the pill approval process in Japan presents an extremely unflattering picture of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, it is notable that this Ministry, at least, is responsive to public opinion and demands. Given enough negative public attention, it seems, bureaucratic progress can eventually be achieved.

ⁱ In 2001, the Ministry of Health and Welfare was combined with the Ministry of Labor to form the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare. It will be referred to as the Ministry of Health and Welfare or MHW throughout this paper.

ⁱⁱ Aya Goto, Michael R. Reich, and Iain Aitken. "Oral Contraceptives and Women's Health in Japan." *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)* 282, no. 22 (1999): 2173-2177.

ⁱⁱⁱ Viagra was the first drug to be approved in Japan based solely on foreign clinical trial data, as a consequence of a new law passed in August 1998, based on the recommendations of the International

Conference on Harmonization, designed to “prevent duplicate studies and to improve efficiency of drug approvals” (Hollander 2006, 687).

^{iv} Ilyssa Hollander. "Viagra's rise above women's health issues: An analysis of the social and political influences on drug approvals in the United States and Japan." *Social Science & Medicine* 62 (2006): 683–693.

^v Hollander 2006.

^{vi} *Mainichi Shinbun*. "Piru, rainen 3getsu ni mo kaikin Hininyou no teiyouyou - - Chuuouyakuujishinchousakai [Lifting the pill ban next March Low dosage for contraception – Central Pharmaceutical Affairs Investigation Council]." Sept. 18, 1995.

^{vii} Tiana Norgren. *Abortion before Birth Control: The Politics of Reproduction in Postwar Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

^{viii} Kokkai Gijiroku, a searchable online database of the records of Japanese Diet proceedings, reveals that the birth control pill was brought up in Diet discussions four times in the two-month period from February to March 1999, compared to five times total during the previous ten year period. (The search terms “pill” [ピル] and “contraception” [避妊] were used.) “Viagra” was also mentioned in two of the February meetings. Available online at <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

^{ix} Yuriko Ashino, "Long wait for birth control pills," *Japan Quarterly* 46, no. 4 (1999): 86-91; Kunio Kitamura, "The Pill in Japan: Will Approval Ever Come?" *Family Planning Perspectives* 31, no. 1 (1999): 44-45; Norgren 2001.

^x Lara V. Marks. *Sexual Chemistry: A History of the Contraceptive Pill*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.

^{xi} Samuel Coleman. *Family Planning in Japanese Society: Traditional Birth Control in a Modern Urban Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

^{xii} Norgren 2001.

^{xiii} Masaya Yamauchi. "Japan to lift ban on oral contraception." *British Medical Journal* 303 (1991): 1157.

^{xiv} Norgren 2001, 111.

^{xv} Ashino 1999.

^{xvi} Goto, Reich, and Aitken 1999.

^{xvii} Aya Furuta. "Latest attack on the pill comes from environmental groups; Doctors, Activists Bemoan Setback In Birth-Control Battle." *The Nikkei Weekly*, July 13, 1998.

^{xviii} Carl Djerassi, "The Politics of Contraception: The View from Tokyo," *Technology in Society* 9 (1987): 157; Takehiro Fukuda, "Drug houses readying for legalized 'Pill,'" *The Japan Economic Journal*, October 13, 1990; Yamauchi 1991, 1157; Yuzo Saeiki, "Japan appears ready to end ban on pill for contraceptive; Reservations Remain As Threat Of AIDS Grows Globally," *The Nikkei Weekly*, March 7, 1992.

^{xix} Mariko Jitsukawa and Carl Djerassi. "Birth Control in Japan: Realities and Prognosis." *Science* 265 (1994): 1048-1051.

^{xx} Goto, Reich, and Aitken 1999, 2174.

^{xxi} Norgren 2001, 123.

^{xxii} *Mainichi Shinbun*. "Piru souki 'kaikin' o Koushou ni kyou youbousho – Sankafujinkagakkai nado 4dantai [Petition today for an early lift of the 'pill ban' – 4 organizations, the Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists etc.]." May 12, 1993.

^{xxiii} *Mainichi Shinbun*, Sept. 18, 1995.

^{xxiv} Miyuki Nakamura. "Japan still finds the pill hard to swallow; Kan's Remark Reignites Debate Over Legalizing Low-Dose Contraceptive." *The Nikkei Weekly*, Oct. 21, 1996.

^{xxv} *Mainichi Shinbun*. "Piru kaikin, 5gatsu ikou ni Seikansenshou kenenshi jikai ni mochikoshi – Yakujishingikai [Lifting the pill ban, not until May at least Concern about sexually transmitted diseases, to be carried over to the next time – Pharmaceutical Advisory Council]." Feb. 26, 1997.

^{xxvi} *Mainichi Shinbun*. "Piru kaikin, 98nen ni zurekomika Fukuyougo no doukou o chousa e - - Yakujishingikai [Lifting the pill ban, delayed until 1998? Toward an investigation of the aftereffects of the medication - - Pharmaceutical Advisory Council]." Aug. 13, 1997.

^{xxvii} *Mainichi Shinbun*. "Konmeisuru piru kaikin Anzen, yuuyousei wa kakunin zumi [Lifting the pill ban in turmoil – Safety, effectiveness already confirmed]." July 2, 1997.

^{xxviii} Norgren 2001, 129.

^{xxix} Goto, Reich, and Aitken 1999, 2174.

xxx Furuta 1998.

xxxi *Yomiuri Shinbun*. "Sanfujinkai Horiguchi Masako san Piru 'kaikin' no tame ni [Ob-gyn Horiguchi Masako For the sake of lifting the 'pill ban']. " October 26, 1998. Norgren 2001.

xxxii Furuta 1998; *Asabi Shinbun*, "Piru kaikin to eizu no yobou Inoue Sakae [Lifting the pill ban and AIDS prevention – Inoue Sakae]," September 21, 1998; *Asabi Shinbun*, "Piru no sentaku wa josei no kenri Kato Shizue [The choice of the pill is a woman's right – Kato Shizue]," Oct. 7, 1998.

xxxiii *Asabi Shinbun*. "Sekai yuütsu 'piru sakoku' Nippon no musekinin [Unique in the world 'pill isolation?' Japan's irresponsibility]." Dec. 21, 1998.

xxxiv *Asabi Shinbun*, "Anzen na hininyaku, hayaku Baiagura wa 6kagetsu de shounin, piru 9nenkan shingichuu [A safe contraceptive, quickly – Viagra approved in 6 months, pill deliberations for 9 years]," January 30, 1999; Kay Itoi. "The Great Viagra Emergency," *Newsweek (Pacific Edition)*, February 8, 1999.

xxxv Itoi 1999.

xxxvi Mina Hasegawa. "Japan ends holdout on birth-control pill; Women Applaud Move But Fears Remain." *The Nikkei Weekly*, June 7, 1999.

xxxvii *Yomiuri Shinbun*. "Baiagura' supiido shounin Naze 'piru' wa dame na no ka [Viagra's speed approval – Why is the pill no good?]." Feb. 9, 1999.

xxxviii *Asabi Shinbun*, "Piru to baiagura Ninka supiido no chigai [The pill and Viagra – differences in approval speed]," January 16, 1999; Itoi 1999; Kitamura 1999.

xxxix Peter D. Weinberg, et al. "Legal, Financial, and Public Health Consequences of HIV Contamination of Blood and Blood Products in the 1980s and 1990s." *Annals of Internal Medicine* 136, no. 4 (2002): 313.

xl Weinberg, et al. 2002.

xli Andrew Pollack. "Japan Arrests Doctor in Case Of Bad Blood." *The New York Times*, Aug. 30, 1996.

xlii Eric A. Feldman. "Blood Justice: Courts, Conflict, and Compensation in Japan, France, and the United States." *Law & Society Review* 34, no. 3 (2000): 651-701.

xliii Kitamura 1999.

xliv Percentage of women responding "Yes," "No," "Not sure," and no answer out of total. In 1986 and 1992, only married respondents were asked this question.

xlv Norgren 2001, 126.

xlvi *Asabi Shinbun*, Sept. 21, 1999.

xlvii *Asabi Shinbun*, Oct. 7, 1999.

xlviii *Asabi Shinbun*. "Piru shounin'ni kitai to fuan Josei dantai ga raigetsu touronkai [Anticipation and anxiety for 'pill approval' – Women's group panel discussion next month]." June 28, 1997.

xlix *Asabi Shinbun*. "Eizu taisaku kyouka o' Piru kaikin mondai de koushuueiseishinbukai ['Towards strengthening AIDS countermeasures' – The pill approval problem at the Public Health Council]." June 17, 1997.

¹ *Asabi Shinbun*, Jan. 16, 1999.

^{li} *Asabi Shinbun*, Jan. 30, 1999.

^{lii} *Asabi Shinbun*. "Baiagura shounin ni hisomu niujukijun [The double standard lurking in Viagra approval]." Feb. 1, 1999.

^{liii} *Yomiuri Shinbun*. "Piru kaikin, oohaba sakiokuri / Yakujishingikai [Large-scale postponement of pill approval/Pharmaceutical Advisory Council]." March 3, 1998.

^{liv} Sheryl Wudunn. "Japan's Tale of Two Pills: Viagra and Birth Control." *The New York Times*, April 27, 1999.

^{lv} *The Daily Yomiuri*. "Ministry says two died after taking Viagra." August 31, 1998.

^{lvi} Goto, Reich, and Aitken 1999; Hollander 2006; Evy F. McElmeel, "Legalization of the Birth Control Pill in Japan Will Reduce Reliance on Abortion as the Primary Method of Birth Control," *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal* 8, no. 3 (1999); Norgren 2001.

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POLITICS OF IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT:

Case Study of Post-Transition China and North Korea

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ABSTRACT

Why did North Korea and China follow different paths of political development, as indicated by their ideological development in the 1950s? North Korea, with its Juche ideology, followed a path of independence from the Soviet Union and China, whereas China, with its “lean to one side” policy, followed a path of integration with the communist bloc. This is not coherent with our expectations: we would expect North Korea to integrate with the communist bloc, against the threat of the foreign imperialists, i.e. the United States and China, to follow an independent trajectory as a relatively large power with control over its population. This paper examines the politics of ideological development in the two countries to explain the different outcomes. The analysis shows that North Korea’s lack of control over domestic power and high leverage of foreign powers in its internal affairs contributed to its isolation. In short, North Korea’s isolation was an attempt to assert control over domestic politics and exert its sovereignty. China, with a popular base in the peasants and control over foreign relations, could instead follow a path of integration to reap the benefits from alliance.

I. INTRODUCTION

PUZZLE

North Korea and China became communist countries at similar periods in history. North Korea was established as a communist country in 1948 at the time of its birth, and China transitioned to communism in 1949 after a lengthy civil war. Both countries were nominally based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism at the time, and went through the process of ideological development or “localization.” Curiously, North Korea adopted a path that led to its independence and isolation in the international community, including the communist bloc, by developing a “uniquely Korean” interpretation of Marxism-Leninism called Juche, whereas China adopted a path that led to an integration of the country into the communist bloc, by leaning toward the Soviet model of development. This paper explores the curious fate of North Korea’s political development. Why did North Korea, a newly built nation, choose a path of ideology that led to isolation whereas China chose a path that led to integration into the international community?

To explain these diverging trajectories of ideological development, I focus on the independent variables of isolation or integration into the international system, and two dependent variables. The first is the power base of the regime, which I divide into peasants, the proletariat, and party elites. The regime’s relationship with its power base indicates the leadership’s control over major sources of support. The second dependent variable is the country’s foreign relations and its relative power position

among regional powers. The greater the difference in the country's position of power relative to regional powers, the more likely it is to follow an independent path of development.

I hypothesize that the North Korean trajectory of ideological development is due to the lack of a power base in the domestic sphere and relative weakness among regional powers. China's trajectory, on the other hand, is based on the shift in the power base from peasants to workers in the domestic sphere, and on the country's need to establish alliances with the Soviet Union in the wake of the Cold War.

I take a comparative case study approach, which has four parts, in examining North Korea and China. First, I examine the historical context of the transition to communism. Second, I examine different factions within the regime and the reason for the victory of the winning faction in each country. This section illustrates how the domestic power base influences ideological development. Third, I examine foreign relations and power positions of the countries in relations to the other major powers, namely the Soviet Union and the United States. After examining these two cases, I analyze their similarities and differences and extract a common mechanism for ideological localization.

This study of ideological development in North Korea and China would contribute to the study of political development by showing the different structural mechanisms at work in the countries' ideological development, an understudied area in comparative politics and international relations. On the other hand, there are alternative explanations to explaining the trajectory of the localization of ideology. For instance, the Realist explanation would focus on the change in balance of power that leads to the promotion of a certain political

ideology. However, such an explanation would not explain why the ideology is adopted and indigenized. Political psychologists' explanations would instead focus on the role of the leader and his perception, but this would portray the ideology as the result of one leader's opinions. Instead, I try to explore the question from a structural perspective by taking into account the domestic political structure as well as the international political system.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of international influence on domestic politics has primarily interested the international relations scholar, such as Peter Gourevitch in "The Second Image Reversed."^[i] Gourevitch shows that the international political environment and domestic politics are related by discussing the mechanisms through which the former influences the latter. Other recent scholars who discuss the relationship between international politics and domestic politics and structure include Owen, Cooley and Spruyt.^[ii] However, the literature has predominantly dealt with the supply side of this relationship, i.e. a systematic understanding of how the international influence works, and has largely ignored the influence of domestic interests in accepting international structure or politics. Comparativists such as William Easterly, Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way have dealt with the issue from a regime transition perspective. Easterly discusses how foreign influence from either a democratic or an authoritarian power affects the level of democracy in a country.^[iii] Levitsky and Way show how Western linkage facilitates, as opposed to leveraging, a regime's transition to democracy.^[iv] However, there has not yet been a systematic study of how domestic agents perceive external influence and

how internal politics affect the way they react to international structure and politics. While such literature exists in the field of history, historical analyses of international influence on domestic politics lack external validity and are largely descriptive than explanatory. This paper, therefore, contributes to both the literature on international relations as well as comparative politics through its analysis of the demand side of international influence.

II. FINDINGS

CASE STUDY 1: CHINA HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Marxism-Leninism in China has historical roots from the early 1900s with a widespread interest in anarchism. Chinese students in Paris and Tokyo were drawn to the theories of Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin that denounced all authority ranging from governments to family. These students put forward ideas of egalitarianism and emancipation of women from the family bonds and peasantry from exploitation.[v] In 1920s, when the Bolshevik Revolution had brought Leninism to China, radical study groups formed by intellectuals proliferated. One of these intellectuals was Li Dazhao, who was then a professor at Peking University and later became one of the two founders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Li had organized a Marxist study group in 1920.[vi]

In addition to the preexisting basis for Marxism-Leninism, there was also the supply of the ideology from Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks, having recently won the Civil War, attempted to apply their experience and perspectives to China.[vii] Because Lenin wanted to work through an existing “bourgeois” revolutionary organization, as opposed to setting up a Soviet-based independent movement, the

natural candidate was Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang (KMT), then a fairly disorganized revolutionary group found on the ideology of Three People’s Principles—Nationalism, People’s Rights or Democracy, and People’s Livelihood.[viii] As it became clear that the main vehicle through which Soviet Union would influence China was the KMT, the Chinese Communists began to join KMT instead of the Chinese Communist Party, which had already been established in 1921. The Sun-Joffe agreement was signed in 1923, and the Chinese Communists were “well on the road to forming a Bolshevik faction” within KMT.[ix] It was during this decade of KMT-CCP collaboration and split that the different factions in CCP emerged.

FRACTIONS WITHIN CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Examination of the different factions in CCP that existed before Mao’s stance on communism became mainstream is important in answering a number of questions: what were other approaches to communism in China? Why did they not fare? These questions were considered to be essential for Risse-Kappen in answering Gorbachev’s shift in foreign policy line to answer the question of why a particular track of reform was chosen when there were two other options.[x] Therefore, such questions would in turn answer the question of why Maoism, not other interpretations, became mainstream and determined the path of Chinese revolution.

There seem to have been four identifiable factions in CCP during the period: Chen Duxiu’s “Right Wing” faction, Chü Chiu-pai’s “leftist” faction, Li Li-san’s faction, and Mao’s faction. These four factions advocated different relations with the KMT and had different views on who should lead the revolution. I argue

that Maoism prevailed in the end because Mao was able to identify the power base of the country: the peasants. Despite the fact that the Soviet line of ideology emphasized the proletariat, Mao was more pragmatically oriented and appealed to those who constituted the majority of the population, in order to gain support and loyalty for Mao's ascendance to power.

The first faction was Chen Duxiu and the "Right Wing" faction. Chen was one of the two founders of CCP, alongside Li Dazhao. Chen's ideological stance can be inferred from his writings: firstly, he was critical of the imperialistic and militaristic aspects of KMT. He believed that national revolution should be "to overthrow imperialism and militarism by the masses of all classes and the liberation of our people—particularly the workers and peasants."^[xi] Secondly, his writings show distaste for the peasants. Chen argued that the peasants' culture level was low, their forces were scattered, and that they inclined toward conservatism. However, at the same time Chen did recognize that the peasantry could serve as a revolutionary supporting force: "The peasantry constitutes the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people...if the Chinese revolution does not enlist the peasants, it will be most difficult for it to succeed as a great national revolution."^[xii] Chen Duxiu's line was what Mao somewhat takes after, although as will be explained later, Mao takes a more radical view on the role of the peasants than Chen.

The second strand of communism in China is the Chü Chiu-pai faction, or the "leftist" wing, which emerged with the rise of Chü Chiu-pai to the leadership of CCP in the August Seventh Emergency Conference. This Emergency Conference was held to reconsider the leadership of Chen Duxiu, and confirmed CCP's alignment with the Comintern line of working within the frame of KMT. The

idea of Chü Chiu-pai leadership was that KMT was still the vehicle to achieve the revolution, yet CCP needed to win hegemony within the KMT to win the hegemony over the Chinese proletariat itself and to organize the KMT into a genuine organization of the working class of town and country. The fall of Chü's leadership came after the failure of Canton Commune in December 1927, which was a Comintern-instigated urban uprising under "the most unfavorable conditions imaginable."^[xiii] Stalin sent two of his personal emissaries to Canton to organize the uprising, because Stalin and the Comintern postulated a rising wave in China and thought that insufficient attention was paid to the urban centers. Despite the fact that Chü leadership was not primarily responsible for the uprising, the responsibility of the failure was placed on entirely on the central organs.^[xiv] The failure of the uprising alongside the disintegration within the party due to Chü's political ineptness all added to his loss in power as the leader, allowing Li Li-san faction to be seated in power. Further, the failure showed the faultiness of the claim of the "rising wave" of revolution in China.

The third strand of communism was the Li Li-san faction. This faction was an outcome of a shift in line in Comintern's strategies that took into account the particular local conditions and the differences between advanced capitalist countries and backward agrarian countries, although still under the worldwide Communist propaganda.^[xv] This is because Comintern was no longer able to continue the previous line after the failures of Canton Commune. Comintern was thus more inclined to accept the "peasantist" minority within the CCP.^[xvi] The Li Li-san faction was thus mandated to complete the "agrarian" revolution, but only under "proletarian hegemony."^[xvii] This faction believed that CCP needed to

recapture its basis among the proletariat, because “only a proletarian mentality can lead to correct revolutionary road.”[xviii] Despite the shift in line, the Li Li-san faction still faced the indifference of the Chinese urban proletariat, and faced the same fate as the Chü Chiu-pai faction. The fall of the Li Li-san faction came with a failure of another “leftist adventure”: Red Army’s attack on Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, in 1930. The main aim of this attack was to place proletariat at the hegemony of the movement. This meant that the Red Army, which consisted of peasants, was to take over a large city to place power in the hands of the proletariat. In addition to creating an inherent tension or contradiction, this failed to arouse any working-class uprising.[xix] Li Li-san, at the end, was convicted of putschism and disgraced. The Central Committee afterwards was to be controlled by a group called “twenty-eight Bolsheviks,” i.e. loyalists to the Soviet Union and Comintern.

The three factions within CCP are characteristic in that each emphasized the leadership or the hegemony of the proletariat. Although each differed in the specific strategies of achieving the revolution—for example, within the framework of the KMT or the framework of agrarian revolution—in essence the proletariat was to lead. This line in thought was mostly due to the influence of the Soviet Union and Comintern, which points to China’s lack of dominance over its own revolution. Although each of the three factions occupied the leadership positions, the fall from power of the leader meant the end of his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, for there was no mass support for each of the three interpretations.

MAO’S LINE OF THOUGHT

In these three broad currents of factions within CCP, Mao Tse-tung was merely a side current. His interpretation of Marxism-Leninism can be seen in the 1927 Hunan report, a seminal piece in the Chinese communist revolution, although it cannot be taken as a complete expression of Mao’s political thought since it deals with specific events and a very limited subject.[xx] What is highlighted in the Hunan Report is a revolutionary approach to Marxism-Leninism: placing the poor peasantry as the “revolutionary vanguard,” Mao highlights the revolutionary potential of the peasants. Based on the realities of China—rural and peasant-based—Mao argues, “without socialization of agriculture, there will be no complete and consolidated socialism.”[xxi] This is a radical departure from the previous factions in CCP that placed utmost emphasis on the hegemony of the proletariat in leading the revolution, and this shift can be interpreted as an attempt at localizing Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions—peasant-based agrarian country. While Mao had these thoughts in 1926 and 1927, CCP was in a united front with KMT, and Mao’s peasant-based ideas could not be tolerated. It was only when Mao became head during the Jiangxi-Soviet Republic period from 1931 that his ideas could be implemented.[xxii]

The two events that led to Mao’s victory in the civil war show that Mao identified the power base correctly. First there was the Long March of 1934-1935, a period during which CCP tried to avoid the pursuit of KMT at the same time as trying to find new territorial base outside the periphery of the power of KMT. The Long March, despite the losses in lives of CCP and Red Army, was crucial in helping Mao emerge as the new leader of CCP and to spread CCP ideas in the rural areas. The routes CCP and the Red Army

took during the Long March was on the periphery of China, reaching areas like Ruijin, Guilin, Kunming and Chengdu,[xxiii] and allowed CCP to gain support from the peasants in the rural peripheral areas.

The second crucial event was the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The war brought KMT and CCP to halt the fight to form a second united front against the Japanese invading forces. The CCP tactic of guerilla warfare was particularly successful in firstly, avoiding deaths of the members of CCP and the Red Army and secondly, indirectly weakening KMT stationed in the cities where the major fights took place.[xxiv] The war against Japan was also useful for CCP in representing itself as the nationalist party,[xxv] with rhetoric such as: “Exterminate the Traitor Peace Preservation Committees! Comrades! Japan has invaded our Shansi... Rise up and join a guerilla self-defense unit! Overthrow Japanese imperialism!”[xxvi] As Skocpol explains, the ability of the Communists to take advantage of the same wartime conditions that debilitated the KMT depended upon their eventual success in combining nationalist appeals to potential educated recruits with concrete responses to the interests of the peasantry.[xxvii]

CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS AND POSITION OF POWER

There is a second phase of ideological development, which begins after Mao’s ascendance to the chairman of the party in 1945. This phase can be characterized as a reversion to the original tenants of Marxism-Leninism. The major features of the second phase of ideological development are first, an increased incorporation of Marxism-Leninism in the party ideology; second, an increased emphasis on the relations with the Soviet

Union; and lastly, the shift of emphasis from the “peasants” to the “masses.” I argue that this second phase of ideological development is motivated primarily by China’s need as a newly emerging communist nation to establish alliances and to integrate into the communist bloc.

To illustrate, the first evidence of the reversion to the original tenants of Marxism-Leninism is in the 1945 Constitution of CCP: “The CCP takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism and...the ideas of Mao Zedong as the guiding principles of all its work.”[xxviii] This introduction to the Constitution suggests that Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought exist on equal plains, whereas previously, only Mao Zedong Thought had been highlighted. Also, in Mao’s speech in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the CCP in 1949, Mao makes the argument that China “must unite in common struggle with the Soviet Union, and to ally with the proletariat and the broad masses in the people in other countries, to form an international united front.”[xxix] This clearly indicates a shift in Mao’s discourse that previously emphasized China as a unique nation to China as a communist nation.

Another main feature of the second phase in ideological development is the shift in emphasis from the “peasants” to “masses.” Before the revised version of the Constitution of 1945, the 1938 version still highlighted the peasant class as a distinct class from the workers: “the tasks are to link the workers and peasants ... by Communist propaganda and agitation ... to discuss their demands from the viewpoint of the revolutionary class struggle” (Article 18). There is a dichotomy of workers and the peasants. In the revised version, it writes: “to unite the masses closely with the Party to carry on propaganda and organizational work among the masses with a view to

carrying out the Party programs and the decisions of higher Party organs” (Article 52). There is a shift from the dichotomy between the peasants and the workers to the dichotomy between workers and the Party. What this seems to indicate is a relative downplay on the unique role of peasants in China’s communist discourse and bringing Party to the center.

Lastly, during Mao’s commemoration speech, he highlighted that the revolutionary struggle “needs the leadership of the working class” because they are the “most far-sighted, just and unselfish and endowed with revolutionary thoroughness.”^[xxx] This is a striking shift from the 1927 Hunan Report during which Mao named the peasants as the “vanguard of the revolution.” At least according to the documents, the peasants seem to have lost the priority in Mao’s discourse.

The second phase of ideological development seems to be a logical response to China’s perception of threats and interests. The threat to China’s power and sovereignty came from the United States and Japan, and the interests came from the Soviet Union. First, the United States had become an important factor in Chinese politics towards the end of the Second World War. The US wanted KMT to move into the East Asian power vacuum that would be created by the fall of Japan. In the fall of 1945, soon after the war with Japan has ended, the Communist forces moved across North China to compel the Japanese to surrender to them; the KMT reacted by ordering the Japanese to fight off the Communists and recover any territory they had gained. In effect, the KMT made use of Japan, the ex-imperialist aggressors, to fight off the social revolution. The United States, following the example of KMT, moved 53,000 US Marines into North China to hold Beijing and Tianjin against a possible Soviet incursion, while

transporting Nationalist armies to Manchurian cities and other parts of North China.^[xxxii] This intervention by the US on the anti-communist side was a major threat in the eyes of CCP.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union re-equipped the CCP after the civil war with heavy weaponry in increasingly conventional and large-scale offensive operations. According to Soviet sources, the Russians supplied more than 1,800 pieces of artillery and 700 tanks.^[xxxiii] This was a clear incentive for CCP, which was a new power in the country. Therefore, the logical trajectory was to lean towards the Soviet side at the cost of independence in order to ensure regime survival.

CASE STUDY 2: NORTH KOREA^[xxxiiii] HISTORICAL CONTEXT

North Korea is a product of Japanese decolonization and the occupation of the Korean Peninsula by the two Cold War axes — the US in the South and the Soviet Union in the North. The formal establishment of North Korea began in 1948 with its own election, and the North Korean Workers’ Party emerged in 1949. With the power vacuum formed after Japanese decolonization, socialists and nationalists within North Korea formed provincial people’s committees, before they were centralized into a single party — the Korean Worker’s Party, headed by Kim Il Sung, who was previously involved in communist guerrilla activities under the umbrella of the Chinese Communist Party.

FRACTIONS WITHIN THE KOREAN WORKERS PARTY

The factions within the KWP were, in essence, proxies for foreign

communist powers. There were four factions in the party during the period of 1945-1956. First, the Soviet-Korean faction, consisting of ethnic Koreans who had lived and studied in the Soviet Union and were sent to serve in administrative positions in northern Korea after 1945. Second, the Yen-an faction, made up of those Koreans who lived in China during Japan's colonial rule over Korea. Third, the South Korean domestic faction which consisted of those who had survived Japanese repression in Korea and Japan and who were split into North and South factions at that time. Lastly, the Kapsan faction, made up of former anti-Japanese guerilla fighters.[xxxiv] Even by the numbers, one is able to see that the Kapsan faction, to which Kim Il Sung belonged, was not very significant; in the Standing Committee of KWP, it held 2 out of 13 seats; in the Central Committee in general, 4 out of 43 seats.[xxxv] Nevertheless, it was through the Soviet Union that Kim Il Sung of the Kapsan faction was installed as North Korea's premier and chairman of the KWP.

Although there is a lack of evidence in regards to the specific debates amongst the factions, there is a general sense of the contents of the dispute. In general, the Soviet-Korean faction and the Yen-an faction had a propensity to try to "replicate developments in the Soviet and Chinese parties," respectively, and a willingness to "violate the principle of democratic centralism to ensure that these foreign experiences be imitated." [xxxvi] As for the development models, Kim Il Sung's Kapsan faction advocated for the "Stalin-inspired heavy industry at the expense of light industry and consumer goods," whereas the Soviet-Korean faction and the Yen-an faction encouraged the development of light industry and consumer durables and supported North Korea's further integration into the international division of labor through

COMECON.[xxxvii] Essentially, the Kapsan faction is in search of self-sufficiency and sovereign power, whereas the Soviet-Korean and Yen-an factions are willing to become integrated into the international economy regardless of self-sufficiency.

What seems to be characteristic of the factions in KWP is that there were confrontations between Kim and the leaders of each faction, but the debate was primarily strategies to govern the party as opposed to their different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism and the policy implications. For example, in Kim's confrontation with Hŏ Ka-I, the highest-ranking Soviet-Korean, the issue was over how to reorganize the tattered party and how to handle party members who were not completely loyal. Kim argued that the war had distinguished the loyal from disloyal, and that appropriate steps should be taken to punish the disloyal regardless of their position in the party. The party, Kim argued, should be magnanimous to the lower ranking members and avoid indiscriminate purges, and Hŏ was to carry out these orders. Hŏ, however, did exactly the opposite of what Kim had told him to do: he conducted indiscriminate purges of lower ranking members and punished 450,000 of the 600,000 members of the party. Another example of the dispute between the Soviet-Korean faction and Kim Il Sung regards the organization of the party, on whether to build an elite Communist party in the style of the Soviet Union or a mass party, as the Soviet authorities had taught Kim to do. Kim said later that Hŏ had argued for an elite party of fewer than 60,000 members; Kim argued that Korea must build a mass party in order to suit the unique characteristics of North Korea. The result of a series of confrontations between Hŏ and Kim was the expulsion of Hŏ from the party.[xxxviii]

JUCHE IDEOLOGY

Kim Il Sung's own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism — Juche ideology — was able to emerge after the elimination of factions within the KWP in August 1956. With the emergence of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, there was a burgeoning critical sentiment amongst the domestic factions against Kim Il Sung's increasingly personalistic rule over the party. According to Lankov, Choe Chang Ik, who led the Yen-an faction, and Pak Chang Ok of the Soviet-Korean faction “conspired to challenge Kim and his authoritarian rule in favor of a collective leadership and easing of the tightly controlled party machine.”[xxxix] This was the first serious challenge to Kim's leadership. As a result, the Soviet-Koreans and the Yen-an-Koreans were expelled from the party as “reactionary and anti-party elements.”[xl] By 1961, Kim Il Sung and his Kapsan faction had successfully eliminated all domestically bred Communists from North and South and all the foreign-trained Communists from Russia and China. Historians like Sungbo Kim argue that the purging of Yen-an and Soviet factions within the party is an expression of North Korea's determination to exclude foreign influence in its domestic affairs and to walk the independent trajectory of development.

The substantive expression of North Korea's determination to walk an independent trajectory is shown in Kim Il Sung's Juche ideology. Juche ideology officially appears in the North Korean Workers' Party in 1955 in Kim's speech to party propagandists and agitators entitled “On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche in ideological work.”[xli] The major characteristics of Juche ideology are first, economic self-reliance. North Korea consciously withdrew from the capitalist

world system and seriously attempted to construct an independent, self-contained economy. Bruce Cumings argues North Korea to be “the most autarkic industrial economy in the world.” Evidence to support his claim is that North Korea never joined COMECON, the socialist would-be common market. The second characteristic of Juche ideology is sovereignty and anti-imperialism. Kim declared Juche to be an “indigenous expression of Korean sovereignty and autonomy.”[xlii] Kim was strongly critical of imitation of foreign ways: “we are not engaged in any other country's revolution, but solely in the Korean revolution.” These criticisms and assertion of an indigenous identity of Korean communism as primarily directed against the political influence of the SU and China, which is furthermore evident in his attempts to purge his political rivals, especially those in the Soviet and Chinese factions of the party. The last characteristic of Juche ideology is corporatism. The society is viewed as one big family, led by a benevolent father to whom unconditional respect and gratitude are owed. The leader is revered like a parent by the whole society—an idea that is likely to be rhetorically reminiscent of Korea's Neo-Confucian tradition.[xliii] Juche is not a class-based ideology but communitarian, and this is symbolically evident in the symbol of the Worker's Party of Korea: hammer, sickle, and calligraphy brush, which represent the working intellectual.

NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS AND POSITION OF POWER

Historians argue that Juche ideology was a reaction to the foreign pressure from the Soviet Union and China to exert influence on North Korea. North Korea, threatened by foreign interference,

decided to follow a path of independent development in all aspects of politics, economy and foreign relations. Taking this a step further, I wish to examine in this section the details of foreign pressure on North Korea to the extent that North Korea decided to follow an independent path.

First, North Korea's foreign relations with the Soviet Union are a crucial element. Based on a deep-rooted relationship from before the construction of the country, the Soviet Union exerted influence over North Korea. The Soviet Union interfered in the construction of the people's committees in the regions, arguing that there should be an equal representation of socialists and nationalists, in the fear that nationalism would threaten their presence in North Korea. Further, when the Chosun Independence Alliance, an anti-Japanese military alliance, came back to Korea with a volunteer army, the Soviet Union argued that there cannot be a military when there is no nation and forcefully demilitarized them. Even after the creation of the North Korean nation, the Soviet Union interfered in the domestic affairs of the state. In 1955, when the North Korean economy went down a slope, the Soviet Union decided to actively engage in North Korea. Conflicting with the support from China, the Soviet Union pressured North Korea to change its economic policies fundamentally. Also, China increased its leverage in North Korea after the Korean War. There were over 100,000 Chinese troops in North Korea even after the Korean War, exerting a physical presence in the country.

Although China also went through a period of Soviet influence in its domestic affairs, such as a Soviet provision of armed forces for the improvement of Chinese army in the aftermath of the second Sino-Japanese War, the fundamental difference between

China and North Korea is that the Soviet Union had deeply penetrated into North Korea physically and substantively, with the presence of the Soviet faction in the center of the government and with the presence of Soviet forces in North Hamgyeong Province.

Second, North Korea's status as a postcolonial nation is another important point in its decision to follow the trajectory of independent development. Socialism with a nationalistic character that appealed to African nations such as Tanzania after their decolonization from the Western powers. The prospect of a centralized regime after a power vacuum in addition to the emphasis on the noninterference of foreign powers with the nationalist element must have appealed to North Korea and the African nations equally. This logic is based fundamentally on the element of perception of threat. With a stark power balance between a newly built nation of North Korea relative to its regional powers, especially the Soviet Union and China, North Korea naturally felt threatened by both countries' attempts to exert influence on the country. In addition, the Sino-Soviet split that began in the 1950s and 1960s exacerbated the dichotomy of the influence; unable to choose either one of the powers, North Korea naturally chose to follow a nationalistic path.

III. LESSONS FROM THE TWO CASES AND CONCLUSION

The examination of the two cases of the politics of ideological development in China and North Korea show that the two variables, control over domestic power base and the country's foreign relations, are proxies to examine the extent to which the leadership had control over the domestic politics and foreign relations of the country. As for

domestic control, Mao was able to locate the power base of the nation, the peasants, and strategically appeal to them for support. North Korea, on the other hand, had a diffused power base, for it was only a newly built nation without a prominent class to which it could appeal. All politics had been managed within the central committees, and factionalism within the central committees of the party led to a major threat to North Korean leadership. The second variable is the country's foreign relations. As Easterly et al. show, the foreign interference in the nation is shown to have adverse affects, regardless of whether the foreign power is an ally or an adversary.[xliv] The crucial difference between China and North Korea was the balance of power in East Asia. North Korea was a newly built nation with a need to exert national sovereignty on the international scale as well as legitimacy on domestic scale, whereas the CCP had come to power through a civil war, defeating the KMT, so it had a power base within the country.

This research does not stay in the realm of history and has important policy implications. In analyzing the way ideology developed with the change in international situation, policymakers need to take into account that the strains on autocratic countries such as North Korea are highly likely to have detrimental effects. Particularly in the case of North Korea, the strains imposed on the regime through international sanctions, for example, are not likely to achieve the effects that the policymakers want, i.e. North Korean concession on issues like human rights or the nuclear program, but are likely to consolidate North Korea's rhetoric on self-dependence and anti-imperialism. Therefore, this study would function as a warning against hostile policies towards rogue regimes.

[i] Peter Gourevitch. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32 (4) (1978): 884-912.

[ii] John M. Owen, *Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States and Regime Change 1510-2010* (Princeton University Press, 2012); Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt. *Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009)

[iii] William Easterly, Satyaniah Shanker, and Daniel Berger, "Superpower Interventions and their Consequences for Democracy: An Empirical Inquiry" Working Paper, New York University (2008)

[iv] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkage and Democratization." *Journal of Democracy*. 16 (3) (2005): 20-34

[v] John Fairbank, *China: A New History*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 275

[vi] *Ibid*, 276

[vii] Richard Thorton, *China: A Political History, 1917-1980*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1973), 4

[viii] *Ibid*, 281

[ix] *Ibid*, 7

[x] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war," *International Organization*. 48 (2) (1994): 185-214, 210

[xi] Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese communism and the rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 57

[xii] *Ibid*, 65

[xiii] Lucien Bianco, *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 69

[xiv] Schwartz, *Chinese Communism*, 108

[xv] *Ibid*, 109

[xvi] Bianco, *Origins*, 70

[xvii] Schwartz, *Chinese Communism*, 127

[xviii] *Ibid*, 137

[xix] Bianco, *Origins*, 70

[xx] Brant, 77

[xxi][xxi] Mao, quoted in Conrad Brandt, *A Documentary History of Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 80

[xxii] Fairbank, China, 304

[xxiii] Refer to map, *Ibid.*, 307

[xxiv] *Ibid.*, 312-316

[xxv] Small n, for Nationalist party represented the KMT

[xxvi] Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 4

[xxvii] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 256

[xxviii] CCP 1945, quoted in Brandt, *A Documentary*, 422

[xxix] Mao 1949, quoted in *Ibid.*, 449

[xxx] *Ibid.*, 458

[xxxi] Fairbank, China, 328-337

[xxxii] Thorton, China, 219-220

[xxxiii] The sources on North Korea are by no means comprehensive. Even the books written by the most prominent scholars in the field of North Korea need to be taken with a grain of salt; for example, An's book takes a highly critical attitude towards the regime and when the time of its composition is taken into account—1981, during the Cold War—such an attitude is comprehensible, and one can say that An could have been subject to the Cold War paradigm. Although these political attitudes of the scholars may not hinder directly their account on the localization of the communist ideology in North Korea, they may affect how the localization. Therefore, I try to examine as many sources available, and work with the primary documents published by the North Korean government on Kim Il Sung's sayings to decipher the validity of the scholars' examinations.

[xxxiv] James F. Person, "New Evidence on North Korea in 1956." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue 16, 447

[xxxv] Andrei Lankov *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 82

[xxxvi] James F. Person, "We Need Help from Outside: The North Korean Opposition Movement of 1956," *CWIHP Working Paper* 52, August 2006, 14

[xxxvii] *Ibid.*, 448

[xxxviii] Tai Sung An, *North Korea in Transition: From Dictatorship to Dynasty* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), 123-126

[xxxix] Suh, Dae-sook. *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 150

[xl] An, North Korea, 19

[xli] Kim, Il Sung, *Kim Il Sung, Selected Works* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), 582

[xlii] Eun Hee Shin, "The Sociopolitical Organism: The Religious Dimensions of Juche Philosophy." In Buswell, Robert ed. *In Religions of Korea in Practice* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 217

[xliii] Bruce Cumings' argument in his book is that North Korea's Juche ideology is primarily based on Neo-Confucianism. Cumings, Bruce. *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997)

[xliv] Easterly, "Superpower," 30

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A TEMPORARY RELEASE FROM REGULATION:

Geographical and Social Movement During Japan's Tokugawa Period

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ABSTRACT

The Tokugawa period (1600-1868) brought significant social, legislative, and institutional change to Japan, including peace and stability that pervaded much of early modern society. Life in these new social conditions was experienced under the authoritative and ideological influence of the shogunal regime, which sought to order society in a way reflective of administrative ideals. However, this article will offer a more nuanced picture of Tokugawa religious life than is often presented in scholarship, one in which portions of society may have fluidly maneuvered within the boundaries of the hegemonic structure. While control over Tokugawa inhabitants existed to a certain degree, there also appears to have been instances of geographical and social release from such control through engagement in religious pilgrimage and ritual. Practices such as these allowed some citizens to move around and through the modes of confinement established by authorities. This movement is indicated below through a consideration of customs particular to each practice, while the inclusion of contemporary ritual theory helps to illuminate such a release from regulation. It is hoped that social and religious complexities such as these come to be further studied in a future approaches to Tokugawa religious history.

I. INTRODUCTION

It is commonly understood that a new social order in Japan, which began its formation during the outset of the 17th century, was maintained by society's ideological adherence to stability, security, and a collective obligation to political authority. In stark distinction to the atmosphere of provincial warfare and instability that plagued Japan in prior centuries, this new social order meant many things for the Japanese citizens living in dense urban areas such as Edo and Ōsaka. Most notably, social change during this era meant a new relationship shared between the governing body and its people, one that can be represented as a system of exchange involving the prospect of national progress and normalcy delivered by the shogunate on the one hand, and the recognition of its absolute sovereignty by society on the other. In this way, Japanese society and its shogunal leader became bound together by promise and power, and the terms of this exchange manifested as ideological, material, and geo-political shifts meant to unify the country.

Ideological shifts took place insofar as citizens, under the rule of the new shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu, were made to adjust to new economic pressures that were exerted at the threshold of early modernity. Japan was no longer a country pulled in opposing directions by clan disputes or contending claims to lineal authority. Instead, it was unified through

the political legitimacy of a single military government that sought to homogenize its people in an effort to establish a definitive identity as a leading country and economic force. This becomes clear when we consider the rapid development of extensive maritime routes that began to commercially network important areas of Europe and East and Southeast Asia. As surrounding countries began to rise to the forefront in trade and exportation, Japan also felt an obligation to lead the way toward economic ideals newly redefined by the early modern era. In order to maneuver through these pressures as a single entity, the country first had to be brought together by an ideology founded on the political legitimacy of its ruling shogun, and it was necessary that this authority be conferred as something wholly righteous and fundamentally different from previous regimes. The Tokugawa represented a force that differed greatly from the military might exhibited by past bastions of power, and indeed held far more potential for conditioned social change. With regard to this transfiguration of power, Herman Ooms suggests that “a discourse was spun, a conceptual cocoon in whose dark center power could hide from view. Thus power came to be accepted almost unknowingly, because it had found a way to maintain itself behind a new symbolic language that gave it legitimacy.”ⁱ This symbolic language, which manifested as an underlying ideology of social formation, group identity, and religious homogeneity that pervaded social consciousness, will be shown to have held the most potent influence for the Tokugawa shogunate. Furthermore, the social misrecognition of this appeal to an ideological expression of power, toward which Herman Ooms gestures, is precisely what enabled the legitimization of such stifling assertions of authority by the *bakufu*.

The early modern period was not the first instance in Japan’s history wherein ideology and religion became bound to one another. As Michael Como has shown, in the seventh and eighth centuries Buddhist lineal authority and immigrant kinship conferred by court literati helped influential figures such as Prince Shōtoku emerge as figureheads of Buddhism, able to establish and contribute early on to its place within Japanese culture and identity.ⁱⁱ Ancestry and lineage thereafter not only became a permanent feature within the religious imagination in Japan, but also became the source of authoritative political power for the Buddhist adherents stationed in government. In this way, as a religious tradition recognized as having a necessary role in cultural, social, and political change, Tokugawa era Buddhism had already held within it the considerable power of ties to political legitimacy. In that sense, the changes wrought by the Tokugawa administration were more evolutionary than revolutionary, but they were significant nonetheless.

The material and geo-political unification of the country became a necessary byproduct of the new this Tokugawa ideology that pervaded society. After all, the stratification of society and the restrictions placed on its movement were made possible only after such ideological power had gained a foothold in the mind of the public. These changes tangibly reinforced concepts of stability, security, and order to such a degree that the difficulty of physical movement within society became a notable characteristic of Tokugawa social order. For instance, the establishment of permanent castle towns as central urban hubs meant an influx of people of all sorts, which gave rise to a degree of commerce and mercantilism never before seen in Japan. Shogunal favor toward this economic productivity,

as well as the establishment of guilds, religious confraternities, and other social groups, placed greater importance on the four-tier class system that further stratified society. This was realized most vividly in Edo, where merchant, entertainment, and warrior “districts” became clearly delineated. More drastic efforts at restriction involved the establishment of the *danka* system, which gave rise to obligatory religious affiliation with a Buddhist temple, and allowed for a degree of religious surveillance by temple monks newly endowed with the administrative responsibility of conducting censuses and certifying temple-householder relationships.ⁱⁱⁱ While these social and religious delineations may appear to have separated rather than unified the Japanese people, it was actually the greater emphasis on contributive social roles, group identity, and the importance of proximity in obligatory temple registration that spatially tied together the religious patron, temple, and the economic urban center. Thus, the Tokugawa period is often assumed to be a time of suppressive stability. On the one hand, the *bakufu* was able to wield stifling institutional power in maintaining social order. On the other hand, while the Japanese population enjoyed this new atmosphere of security and relative peace, it did so with neither the ease of physical mobility throughout the country nor the possibility of social mobility within a hierarchical, hegemonic social structure.

However, while the period is often described as a time of rigid confinement, which indeed may have existed under the veil of order and stability, the situation was much more complex and begs further considerations of the varying types and degrees of movement that occurred in Tokugawa society. Just as Japanese citizens may have endured degrees of physical and social confinement, there also appears to have been some degree of

fluidity. What we will see is that the forms and functions of movement during this era were more varied than is often assumed. That is, there are parameters of social and ritual logic and praxis, with their attendant dynamics of hierarchy and equality, individuality and collectivity, and the loss and accrual of capital in all realms of human activity: emotional, social, economic, material, and so forth. A deeper consideration of these components brings into relief the complexities that existed within the relationship between the Tokugawa *bakufu* and its subjects, some of which may be contrary to assumption. In comparing the somatic movement through a confining physical space on the one hand with movement through a conceptual, social space on the other, we are presented with important issues concerning identity, coercion, confrontation, and the power of economic and ideological concerns. These two types of movement and their surrounding issues beg to be addressed with the hope of revealing a more complex layer of Tokugawa social and religious history.

II. THE TOKUGAWA TRAVEL EXPERIENCE

The physical movement that occurred during the Tokugawa period serves to illustrate a unique type of passage through the restrictive measures put into place by the *bakufu*. Physical movement may be considered more of a striking representation of hegemonic transcendence than social movement, as the efforts called for bodily exertion and physical risk. As we will see, the stakes in this type of movement involved real physical demands, necessitated a willingness to temporarily abandon the comforts of sedentary life, and confronted the individual with visceral realities of early modern travel. Furthermore, much

can be said generally about acts of physical movement during this period in that they allowed for a temporary redefinition of spatial realities and a reconstruction of identity for a sedentary citizen on the move; the assertion of the body through highly regulated space was as much a physical endeavor as it was a transformative experience for the traveler. The trend of movement that is most revealing with regard to such reconstructions and redefinitions, and that which allowed for passageways through an otherwise obstructed route of travel, was the religious pilgrimage.

The development of the five-highway system (*gokaidō*) during the 17th century effectively networked the main urban hubs of early modern Japan, and created “arms and legs” for the realm in that it expanded power asserted over certain domains, controlled foreign policy, allowed the *bakufu* to more easily oversee *daimyo* disputes, and enabled alternate attendance.^{iv} After construction of the system began in 1601, movement for the Tokugawa administration became much easier. Whether it involved movements of martial forces or officials, or the conveyance of communications, the five-highway system enabled the *bakufu* to control the realm with better efficiency and greater breadth. Conversely, the development of such extensive road systems did not carry the same opportunity for ease of movement for the average Tokugawa citizen. For example, all potential travelers in the Tokugawa era were required to apply for a travel permit, something that necessitated both time and money. In rural areas, an intendant issued the travel permit, in *bakufu* cities the City Magistrate, and in Edo the Keeper of Edo Castle, the only individuals allowed to administer the proper permits for movement away from a major city. The process was quite involved, especially for

women and peasants. Peasants were required to find a guarantor to sign a permit request form, which was then taken to the village head or elder who would act as a second guarantor. The form was then presented to the Senior Village Headman who would need to endorse the form before forwarding it to the proper magistrate, depending on the village location. In a similarly cumbersome procedure, women were required to report to certain issuers for a more scrutinizing approval process, which involved the collection of highly detailed information for the permit itself. Unlike permits issued to males, those issued to females were required to provide such details as rank, marital status, hair length, age, mental health, and visible wounds or other markings.^v

Once a citizen was able to acquire the necessary permits for travel along this new road system, other issues continued to make movement difficult and unpredictable. Particularly, the experiences that awaited the traveler at post stations (*sekisbo*) along the roads were notably distressing. Here, all travelers with the intention of passing through these stations were required to submit to an inspection of their belongings and a confirmation of identity. Constantine Vaporis illustrates the intimidation and fear that surrounded these post stations, a symbolic reminder of the reach of the shogunate outside of Edo. Travelers “ordinarily would be flanked by two foot soldiers carrying staves. Walking past them, he would see an edict board to his right listing the regulations for passing through the *sekisbo* ... [then] the traveler would see a number of weapons displayed to impress with the authority of the institution those who were about to face the officials at the *sekisbo*.”^{vi} An interview to confirm one's identity and the authenticity of travel permits awaited in the Inspector's Office, as well as a

physical examination for women. With everything in order, and with the compliance of the traveler, passage was allowed, and the process repeated at each of the 17 main post stations along the busiest routes of the five-highway system. Additionally, these posts were only open during certain hours, with exceptions made only for official shogunate travelers, and thus provided the *bakufu* with the illusion of controlling not only space but also time outside of Edo.^{vii} Perhaps an unsurprising reflection of the bureaucratic process that so often functions in highly regulated societies, the steps involved in acquiring a travel permit and setting out on the roads became time-consuming, expensive, stressful, and sometimes frightening for the Tokugawa citizen. Furthermore, aside from some of the overt appeals to fear by the *bakufu* in keeping travel well-ordered and regulated, it is also worth noting that movement was at times outright discouraged. As already mentioned, the early modern period brought new pressures of economic production from which naturally arose an emphasis on social contribution, especially from farmers and skilled laborers. If an individual or groups of individuals were to leave for an extended period of time, production would see a decline in that village or region, which meant less taxable product for the *bakufu*.

The discouragement of pilgrimage, which is outlined by Carmen Blacker in her work on travel in the Tokugawa period, illustrates a real contention shared between society and its ruling body. From the perspective of citizens, many thought it necessary to commit to pilgrimage as a religious practitioner despite the regulatory atmosphere surrounding movement away from large urban areas. From the perspective of the *bakufu*, while citizens may have appeared as traveling practitioners bound institutionally to a Buddhist temple by this time,

administrative concerns over economic production overrode those of the religious individual. Accordingly, from the perspective of some Tokugawa authorities, “those desirous of becoming pilgrims were threatening the stable order of human society. By abandoning their proper tasks they were failing in their duty as human beings, flouting the moral way which it was part of their humanity to follow.”^{viii} Despite the administrative discouragement of travel over economic concerns, the pace at which the bureaucratic process operated in issuing expensive travel permits, and the atmosphere of intimidation at post stations during travel itself, we will see that religious pilgrimage nonetheless allowed for individuals and groups to physically move beyond these confines.^{ix}

III. INSTANCES OF GEOGRAPHICAL MOVEMENT

According to Laura Nenzi, *nukemairi* (抜け参り) is the phenomenon of “stealing away on pilgrimage,” wherein the pilgrim practically dropped their farming tools or walked out of their shop in order to embark on a spur of the moment religious journey.^x Her simple explanation of this activity is particularly interesting in light of the new Tokugawa social order for two reasons. First, the spontaneity that surrounded the *nukemairi* speaks directly to a seemingly urgent need to embark on a religious journey, as if the individual was somehow lead outward on this sacred pilgrimage. Considering the burden of the bureaucratic process required before travel, as well as the difficulties inherent to travel itself, this spontaneity reveals a physical effort unbound by propriety and protocol. Secondly, the fact that these individuals may very well have simply stopped what they were doing in order to embark on

nukemairi illustrates a voluntary distancing from their normal social duties and obligations. Like spontaneity, this distance between the individual and their contributive social role represents a temporary abandonment of the confinements of obligation, and is exemplary of those very concerns over economic production shared by the *bakufu*. In fact, the characteristics of *nukemairi* reveal an opportunity for one's identity to be redefined in ways other than occupationally or economically. By committing to an act of spontaneity and occupational distancing in the name of religious pilgrimage, the individual was able to reassert certain dimensions of their identity that may have been dissolved in the name of social homogeneity. Through this bodily movement, individuals were able to redefine themselves as religious observers and travelers, not merely as workers contributing to the larger economic or productive cause. In this way, the temporary abandonment of a collective cause also reveals a reappraisal of interests, in that spiritual pursuits held more importance for the individual than the economic concerns of society at large. Moreover, they were able to resituate themselves in parts of Japan's landscape that existed outside of sprawling castle towns, undoubtedly a reminder of rural lifestyles experienced by many before this period. Thus, spontaneous journeys were as much reclamation of the autonomous power of the body as they were a reimagining of what constitutes an individual in a hegemonic society.

While the majority of *nukemairi* were endeavored by individuals or very small groups, there were instances of mass pilgrimages undertaken by large groups, most of which ventured to Ise shrine. These larger pilgrimages, or *okagemairi* (お陰参り), often involved many individuals from the same village who traveled

together to their destination, receiving alms at stops along the way. Interestingly, the cyclical nature of *okagemairi*, its relationship to village custom, as well as the highly numbered groups that embarked on the pilgrimages may have all contributed to its success in helping Tokugawa citizens to move beyond some of the physical barriers put in place by the *bakufu*. For instance, in certain local areas, such as Aizu in Fukushima province, village custom decreed that boys and girls make a 13th-year pilgrimage with a parental escort as a rite of passage into adulthood, signifying the start of the child's ability to contribute to their village.^{xi} Strikingly, it was during these rites of passage, which often accompanied larger groups on an *okagemairi* pilgrimage, that *bakufu* administrators turned a blind eye to those without permits as they passed the *sekisbo* along the roads. This may have occurred for a combination of reasons, but two stand out as being directly linked to the nature of *okagemairi* as a particular form of pilgrimage. First, there was the practical difficulty of checking the sheer amount of permits that may or may not have been carried by those embarked on a pilgrimage. Constantine Vaporis cites one instance in 1705 at a *sekisbo* in Hakone through which 33,000 people passed on the last day of the first month alone, noting that some had permits while others did not.^{xii} The importance of large numbers during *okagemairi*, whether a conscious effort on behalf of the travelers or simply a natural occurrence of the cyclical pattern of the pilgrimage, most certainly enabled a degree of movement beyond the physical fixtures and symbolic representations of control and authority that dotted the main routes of the five-highway system. The second reason that travelers were largely permitted passage during *okagemairi* may also have been due to the pilgrimage's link to regional custom. It appears that some

domains were more reluctant to prohibit their citizens from embarking on *okagemairi* for fear of rising discontent among the populace, or “losing the hearts of the people,” a likely occurrence should a customary rite of entrance into adulthood be challenged.^{xiii} Similarly, though perhaps less of an influence was the fact that the 13th-year pilgrimage also meant the start of a child’s ability to properly contribute to society as a young adult; any impediment to necessary rites of custom also meant an impediment to the propriety of filling future social roles. In this way, *okagemairi*, whether undertaken as an adult paying thanks to popular deities at sites such as Ise, or as a young adult experiencing a local rite of passage into adulthood, enabled citizens to bypass the cumbersome and distressing experiences at the *sekisho* as they left their urban center.

More notably, however, *okagemairi* and *nukemairi* serve to show not only a physical movement beyond the barriers that characterized Tokugawa travel, but they also illustrate a redefinition of identity for the sedentary citizen on the move. In the case of *okagemairi*, its feature of involving mass amounts of people headed to the same location with a similar purpose illustrates the inherent contention between a citizen’s spiritual aspirations and the shogunate’s inability to practically deal with the difficulties of regulating movement; the passage of tens of thousands of people on that single day in Hakone shows that no matter how streamlined a regulatory system may have appeared, the sheer number of individuals on a pilgrimage allowed the system to break down. While the allowance of passage without a travel permit may appear as a trivial triumph for the Tokugawa citizen, it is more broadly representational of a practical gap in a system that had been inadvertently exposed by the effort of amassed religious

travelers. Moreover, *okagemairi*’s ties to regional custom also allowed individuals to circumvent these barriers, as the importance of rites of passage into adulthood trumped those of preserving administrative protocol. Those who freely undertook *okagemairi* in the name of the 13th-year pilgrimage were able to do so because keeping the “hearts of the people,” especially those who would commit to contributive social roles after returning from the pilgrimage, became a primary concern for many domain administrators.

Since *nukemairi* appears as a more transgressive form of pilgrimage, in that it meant an unplanned departure from home and station without the permission of political authorities, this phenomenon more clearly captures a concerted effort to circumvent the confines of Tokugawa social order. As mentioned earlier, the spontaneous nature of the pilgrimage, as well as the distancing between the individual and their social role appear as two of the most telling characteristics of this form pilgrimage as a mode of movement. For this reason, while individuals willing to endeavor these spontaneous pilgrimages effected a more drastic redefinition of their own identity in comparison to those of the *okagemairi*, they were also redefined by certain social groups and often marginalized for their seemingly selfish behavior. For instance, Nenzi points out that unauthorized pilgrimages were sometimes seen as “a way for the underlings of society to enjoy a temporary respite from their toil,” and those who committed to *nukemairi* were labeled as “escapists” or “non-conformists.”^{xiv} However, these pilgrims also redefined themselves autonomously. They committed to the act of temporarily abandoning their social role, undoing the conceptual bonds that stratified and ordered Tokugawa society; economic implications aside, an individual who

abandoned their productive duties may have been seen as a challenge to authority and a danger to the stability of early modern society in the eyes of the administration. Nevertheless, whether *nukemairi* meant following a spontaneous urge, simply finding “respite from their toil,” or was a conscious dismissal of authority, it became a definitive reclamation of selfhood for an individual. Similarly, whether *okagemairi* meant the fulfillment of a regional custom or individual spiritual desire, its particular characteristics allowed pilgrims a degree of fluidity in an otherwise confining physical space.

In both of these types of pilgrimage we find religious desire to be at their core. As Victor and Edith Turner indicate, in religious pilgrimage there occurs a movement “from a mundane center to a sacred periphery which suddenly, transiently, becomes central for the individual, an *axis mundi* of his [or her] faith.”^{xv} This spiritual impulse within the individual, which leads them from the center to the fringe, allows us to better understand the type of redefinitions that may have been effected for those who embarked on *nukemairi* and *okagemairi*. Though temporary, there occurred a degree of transformation of social identity and a reconstruction of spatial realities; with religious desire at its core, pilgrims were able to experience a release from the physical confines of Tokugawa regulation.

IV. INSTANCES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Along with instances of physical mobility established amidst the regulatory atmosphere of travel in Tokugawa Japan, it is also interesting to consider the degree to which a more conceptual movement occurred within the confines of an ordered, hegemonic society. In Gerald Groemer’s historical accounts of the

gannin, or religious street performers, we find a group of people who were able to reside within the delineated social structure of Tokugawa Japan as religious devotees, entertainers, and ritualists, but who were also able to gain a degree of social movement within that framework. Though this instance of movement does not appear as an obvious effort to circumvent the confines of the *bakufu* as was seen in *nukemairi* or *okagemairi*, it nonetheless provides another perspective from which to view social fluidity, and may reveal further insight into conceptions of group identity and social roles.

The ritual theory of Catherine Bell is particularly helpful in illuminating some of the complexities of social movement that we find in the case of the *gannin*, and serves to illustrate the way in which religious ritual may have helped this social group to transcend the boundaries of hegemonic society. In her work *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, she outlines her concept of “redemptive hegemony,” a theoretical model that can help to illustrate the relationship shared between the *gannin* and the Tokugawa *bakufu*. In her model, individuals in a society may ascend the hierarchy if able to strategically transmit the meaning and purpose of ritual, embody a “cultural sense of ritual,” and uphold the disposition necessary for ritual socialization. At the same time, this “redemptive” quality of an imposed social structure, which allows for some degree of movement by the individual or group, also grants its hegemonic source the ability to define, constrain, or empower the movement of those within the ritual system.^{xvi} In Bell’s work, we are presented with a model that outlines the delicate exchange of power shared between social groups and their ruling body, one that is based on ritual embodiment and propriety but also on the interests of those at the top of the hegemonic structure. Thus,

while the *gannin* will be shown to have transcended the confines of hegemonic social delineations, the inherent misrecognition of the passage of power which Bell addresses in her theory, and which Ooms indicated was a “conceptual cocoon in whose dark center power” lay hidden, existed as yet another vehicle for social order.

As we turn toward the *gannin*, it is first worth noting that they were perceived as marginal members of society. Like other mendicant or ascetic groups, they made a livelihood by begging for alms, though also offered religious services, entertainment, and sometimes sold amulets or talismans. What was particular about the *gannin* in Tokugawa society was their appearance and behavior. Many wore the most minimal of attire, sometimes nothing but a headband and straw rope around their waist, while others donned illegal facial coverings, outlandishly tall, stilt-like clogs, or wooden buckets balanced as hats on their heads. While some regularly wore this eccentric clothing, others still wore Buddhist garments, Shintō costumes, and other religious garb, oftentimes interchanging them all. Behaviorally, the *gannin* stood out in a crowd. They chanted loudly and obnoxiously, paraded through town with portable shrines, and danced provocatively. With such conspicuous appearance and behavior, the *gannin* were sometimes considered a nuisance, especially by those hoping to preserve the welcoming atmosphere of storefronts and the tranquility of homes, though they were enjoyed by children.^{xvii} In order to illustrate the degree of social movement made by the *gannin*, it is important to understand their place in society from the start: they were perceived as eccentric, religious entertainers that stood out against the backdrop of the burgeoning mercantilism and productivity that

pervaded Tokugawa society, able only to avoid arrest or the status of *binin* (literally “non-human”) by their loose affiliation with religious temples or shrines.

However, the *gannin* did contribute to society by providing a variety of religious services for Tokugawa citizens. They offered Shintō services such as hearth exorcisms, the sale of talismans, and proxy water ablutions, but also offered Buddhist services such as the recitation of Japanese Buddhist hymns, the street-side chanting of litanies, prayers or invocations, and the burning of incense.^{xviii} Through the variety of services offered, others of which were secular in nature and aimed at entertainment, the *gannin* indeed held a place in society as figures that could potentially address the spectrum of religious needs expressed by almost all people. However, perhaps the most beneficial service rendered by the *gannin* was the proxy pilgrimage; sponsors were able to avoid the hardships associated with travel, but reap the spiritual rewards of paying thanks at sacred temples and shrines that populated areas outside of Edo and Ōsaka. This service began like any other, as the *gannin* walked the streets shaking a bell to attract the attention of potential clients, though sometimes they brandished a sacred object with the intent of bringing it with them in the name of sponsors. Those who were interested handed over a fee, and in return the *gannin* traveled in their stead to popular sacred sites such as the temple-shrine compound of Ōyama or Bishamonten, paid thanks and prayed for the coming year.^{xix}

This service, which became especially popular among citizens in Edo, is striking to consider in light of the general concern over pilgrimages expressed by the Tokugawa shogunate. As discussed, the discouragement of pilgrimages arose out of a greater concern

for economic and productive decline suffered after the departure of contributing members of society from urban hubs. To a degree, the proxy pilgrimages offered by the *gannin* remedied this concern insofar as productive social roles were kept intact at those locations. Additionally, the religious needs of productive citizens, still an important cultural fixture in keeping the “hearts of the people,” remained addressed. In this way, the *gannin* appear to have benefitted three groups of people with their offerings of proxy pilgrimages. The first two groups were those directly involved in the exchange of service, as the *gannin* themselves were able to carry out a livelihood as purveyors of a religious service while the Tokugawa citizen received the spiritual benefits of the act. However, the third beneficiary in this exchange of service was the Tokugawa shogunate itself.

With the religious needs of its subjects addressed by a group of people offering a wide spectrum of services, one of which also kept productive, contributing citizens in place rather than on the roads, the Tokugawa shogunate may have begun to look upon the *gannin* with different eyes. While this particular inadvertent contribution to social order may have gone unnoticed as such by the *bakufu* itself, the *gannin* did gain notoriety that held a similar contributive function in regulating society. According to Gerald Groemer, the *gannin* and the *bakufu* “frequently stood at cross-purposes, [but] by the later decades of the seventeenth century the cornerstones of a hierarchical system designed to allow the Kuruma temple to oversee the *gannin* throughout the land had been set in place.”^{xx} Accordingly, in a final recognition of affiliation with this temple, “chief” *gannin* were organized into two groups, *Taijō-in* and *Enkō-in*, made up much of the

Kuruma administration, and were granted rights and powers by the shogunate in return for keeping order among the *gannin* underlings. Not only did this new organization endow the *gannin* with the power and safety of Kuruma temple, but it also spelled considerable advantage for a group previously at odds with the new social climate of early modern productivity. Furthermore, in an even more explicit example of notoriety gained by the *gannin*, some were hired as shogunate spies, charged with keeping track of suspicious or mischievous individuals entering or leaving the city of Edo and were compensated as such.^{xxi} In this way, we see a social group previously marginalized for their unorthodox appearance and behavior, yet useful to society for their wide array of religious services offered. Similarly, we find in the same social group, and for the very same reasons, people upheld by the *bakufu* to be worthy of their own organizational temple, and even occupations within the shogunal administration itself.

Returning to Catherine Bell’s model of “redemptive hegemony,” it becomes clear how the *gannin* were able to transcend the confines of Tokugawa social order. This social group strongly exhibited a “cultural sense of ritual,” as they understood the importance of pilgrimage as a religious act while taking into consideration the new practicalities of travel, offering proxy pilgrimages for those who were willing to pay. They offered a wide array of religious services including Shintō and Buddhist, thereby strategically transmitting the meaning and purpose of ritual as each recipient saw fit. In demonstrating this ritual mastery as a practical endeavor that spoke to the inherent needs of a religious society, the *gannin* also showed that they could exhibit the “disposition necessary for ritual socialization.” According to Bell, ritual

may be seen as “dramatizing collective representations and endowing them with a mystical ethos that in the course of the communal experience did not merely promote acceptance of those representations but also inculcated deep-seated affective responses to them.”^{xxiii}

This is most clearly illustrated by the *gannin* as marginalized figures in society; despite their social marginality, the ability of this group to uphold ritual propriety closed the conceptual gap between society and the *gannin*, the citizen and the other. Their unorthodox behavior and appearance, and their existence on the fringes of society lent a degree of mystery and exoticism to their religious services, further dramatizing a ritual act found elsewhere in society to be more orthodox. Thus, as individuals adept at appeasing society’s needs for religious service, the *gannin* were able to expend such social capital and dissolve their marginal boundaries. The allowance of Kuruma temple as administrative headquarters, status as an officially sanctioned religious confraternity, and the instances of hire as shogunal spies each represent the tangible “redemption” for the *gannin* in this hierarchical structure. Indeed, in practical, social, and cultural displays of ritual mastery, the *gannin* were able to fluidly maneuver more than most throughout Tokugawa society.

However, Bell’s model of “redemptive hegemony” must be qualified as an inevitable system of coercion, where even the most fluid of social movement nevertheless serves a hegemonic source. As a result, while the *gannin* were afforded a degree of power on behalf of the *bakufu*, they failed to recognize its effects. While Kuruma temple became a place of safety and power for the *gannin*, it was only granted under the condition that the administrative *Taijō-in* and *Enkō-in* kept order within the lower ranks of its

population. Similarly, the hiring of *gannin* as spies only advanced the aims of the shogunate for a safe, secure, and stable early modern capital city. Both of these acts of misrecognition, which Bell refers to as a reality “experienced as a natural weave of constraint and possibility,” was the true operative force in the relationship between the *gannin* and the Tokugawa shogunate. While there indeed occurred a movement by this group of people, one that transcended social delineations and administrative hierarchies, it was a movement that lent to the very social order it cut across. This is not to imply a lack of redefinition in the identity of the *gannin*. While the result of their movement from marginalized ritualists to bearers of administrative power may have led to a greater degree of social order and control for Tokugawa authorities, the movement itself represents a certain transformation by the *gannin*. Through their varied application of ritual as a marginalized social group, and the eventual exchange of power that occurred in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the *gannin* were able to occupy a social station not originally their own. As they made a lateral movement inward from the fringes of society and a vertical movement upward to the heights of the Tokugawa administration, they became definitive symbols of the changes wrought by early modernity. In other words, the new concerns of the *bakufu* did not simply restrict the movements of the *gannin*, but rather allowed for the shift and flow of their social identity within the regulated structure.

V. CONCLUSION

While the Tokugawa era was indeed a time of rigid geographical and social confinement, these instances of movement demand consideration as part of this historical period. It seems too

convenient to cast the early modern period, especially its initial years, as a time of absolute regulation. The phenomenon of *okagemairi* reveals a regulatory system with gaps to be practically exploited, but also illustrates that, while Tokugawa hegemony may have sought to control many aspects of life for the citizen, the power of custom remained an important consideration. As a contrastingly transgressive example, those who chose to embark on *nukemairi* were able to exhibit a reassertion of their identity as a citizen unbound by obligatory social roles. Finally, in a conceptual illustration of movement during this same period, we find in the *gannin* an example of social fluidity that served both the individual and the hegemonic structure within which they existed. While the redeeming factors of ritual mastery in a religious society may have propelled the *gannin* through social barriers that were so characteristic of the Tokugawa era, this potential was unable to exist apart from social constraint.

Although these examples reveal a temporary release from the varieties of Tokugawa control, they do not fully address the possibility of religious release as such. That is, a behavioral examination of pilgrimage and the application of the theoretical models of Bell may not exhaustively account for the religious lives of the inhabitants of Tokugawa society. While it is impossible to determine whether or not such geographical or social release was understood as part of a larger religious experience for the individuals that engaged in various movements internally and externally, one may wonder if the movement beyond the socially defined modes of confinement came to hold a spiritual significance beyond measure. In his preface to a collection of essays on the relationship between early modern religion and travel, Hatakama Kazuhiro recognizes the difficulty in capturing such a sacred element in the

experience of mobility through discursive examination alone, and yet acknowledges a deep connection between travel and religious meaning. In the case of pilgrimage, religious belief and individual identity work complementarily as a singular expression of the pilgrim. They both arise together and are proclaimed in the course of spiritual travel.^{xxiii} Turner's references to the "sacred periphery" and the importance of unorthodoxy for the *gannin* seem to indicate that perhaps there may be other, unquantifiable aspects of religious awareness that cannot be determined through discursive theories of behavioral or ritual study. This concept may be better discerned through methods of approach not immediately obvious, and may be worth exploring in future research.

Regardless, these examples do provide a glimpse into trends of movement overlooked all too often in considerations of Tokugawa communal life. They each may have allowed for a temporary release from the regulatory atmosphere and, perhaps even more importantly, a redefinition of identity for an early modern citizen on the move.

i Herman Ooms, *Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570-1680*, 21.

ii Michael Como, *Shōtoku: Ethnicity, Ritual, and Violence in the Japanese Buddhist Tradition*, 2008.

iii Nam Lin-Hur, *Death and Social Order in Tokugawa Japan: Buddhism, Anti-Christianity, and the Danka System*, Part 1, Section 3.

iv Constantine Nomikos Vaporis, *Breaking Barriers*, 12, 17. Alternate attendance, which became institutionalized in 1635, demanded that *daimyo* make annual trips from their respective domains to Edo in order to help with shogunal administrative matters. The movement inward from their less regulated domains to an atmosphere of detail and scrutiny also became a symbolic gesture of loyalty and trust, in that the *daimyo* spent a period of the year "exposed" to their leader, far away from the comforts of their own domain.

- v Constantine Nomikos Vaporis, *Breaking Barriers*, 137-159.
- vi Ibid., 160.
- vii Laura Nenzi, *Excursions in Identity: Travel and the Intersection of Place, Gender, and Status in Edo Japan*, 19.
- viii Carmen Blacker, "The Religious Traveler in the Edo Period," 605.
- ix While it is not discussed here, scholars have addressed the important component of leisure within religious travel. For an example of leisure within Tokugawa Japanese pilgrimage, see Nenzi *Excursions in Identity*, 5-8. For a broader discussion of travel in its secular and religious forms, see Erik Cohen, "Phenomenology of Tourist Experiences," *Defining Travel: Diverse Visions*, Ed. Susan L. Robertson, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001.
- x Laura Nenzi, "To Ise at All Costs: Religious Implications of the Early Modern *Nukemairi*," 76.
- xi Shinno Toshikazu and Laura Nenzi, "Journeys, Pilgrimages, and Excursions: Religious Travels in the Early Modern Period," 456-458.
- xii Constantine Nomikos Vaporis, *Breaking Barriers*, 205.
- xiii Ibid., 207.
- xiv Laura Nenzi, "To Ise at All Costs: Religious Implications of the Early Modern *Nukemairi*," 78.
- xv Victor and Edith Turner, *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture: Anthropological Perspectives*, 34.
- xvi Catherine Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 221.
- xvii Gerald Groemer, "The Arts of the Gannin," 279-283.
- xviii Ibid., 278.
- xix Ibid., 284.
- xx Gerald Groemer, "A Short History of the *Gannin*: Popular Religious Performers in Tokugawa Japan," 47.
- xxi Ibid., 56.
- xxii Catherine Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, 171.

- xxiii Hatakama Kazuhiro 幡鎌一弘, "Ryokō kara miru kinsei shūkyō" 旅行からみる近世宗教, *Kinsei minshū shūkyō to tabi* 近世民衆宗教と旅, 4-5.

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CLOTHING AND UNCLOTHING, SEEN AND UNSEEN:

A Study of Pan Jinlian in Jin Ping Mei

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the relationship between materials and sexual politics in *Jin Ping Mei* 金瓶梅 (The Plum in the Golden Vase). The women in this novel, whether clothed or unclothed, seen or unseen, are represented as objects from which Ximen Qing can gain endless sexual and visual pleasure. Among all the women in the novel, clothing and unclothing functions most effectively in the female protagonist Pan Jinlian, as it elevates her beauty and femininity and maintains her as an appealing object to Ximen Qing. However, Pan Jinlian is not content with being Ximen Qing's sexual object. Rather, she tries to transgress her inferior position and become the female counterpart of Ximen Qing through her control of clothing and unclothing, as well as through "stolen love." Clothing and unclothing to her are weapons to initiate sexual intercourse, and to compete against Ximen Qing's other women. Pan Jinlian's invisible human desires, her ambitions for sex and status, are brought to the front in her usage of these materials. Her lust is not satisfied in the end, and she never succeeds in winning anything more than the physical function of a concubine.

Key Words: *Jin Ping Mei*, clothing, unclothing, visibility, stolen love.

INTRODUCTION

Although *Jin Ping Mei* has consistently been regarded as a

pornographic work, its literary and artistic achievement has scarcely been affected by the controversy about its pornography. In fact, it has won national and international acclaim, as two *Jin Ping Mei* scholars Ning Zongyi and Luo Derong point out: "Whether one examines the novel by placing it among the Chinese novels of manners or explores it by placing it with the novels of similar subject matter in the worldwide context, it will not lose its status as a brilliant masterpiece."¹ The worldwide recognition of this brilliance tells of the novel's lasting appeal as a work of art. The most striking characteristic of this work is the author's highly sophisticated skill with erotic narratives.

This novel may be easily read as an explicit portrayal of eroticism. However, such a reading sees *Jin Ping Mei* as no different from other erotic narratives such as *Rouputuan* (肉蒲團), *Huanxi Yuanjia* (歡喜冤家) and *Yipian Qing* (一片情). Its special appeal, I argue, lies in the paradoxical nature of its sexual politics. Human desires for sex, wealth, and power in this novel are usually represented in material objects such as money, clothes, and food. Previous scholarship on this issue has differed. Some studies focus on the symbolic meanings of the body and materials in the novel and their association with sexual economy.² Some others focus on the act of making or giving materials in the novel. For example, in his "Brocade of Human Desires," Ming Dong Gu sees the novel as a "woven fabric of human desires couched in linguistic signifiers," and he

compares the principle of composition to the act of weaving (zhi 織).ⁱⁱⁱ Nevertheless, his emphasis is not on the symbolic meanings of the materials, but rather on the novel's art of composition. Sophie Volpp examines the consumption and circulation of materials in Jin Ping Mei. The circulation of the objects, she argues, symbolizes the transfer of power from the world of officialdom to the mercantile realm.^{iv} Although all these studies touch on the materials in Jin Ping Mei, none of the scholars have done an extensive study of the materials and sexual politics in the novel.

In this paper, I hope to fill this gap by examining the novel's exposure of human desires in relation to the notion of "visibility," with an emphasis on clothing and unclothing. I argue that the women in the household, whether clothed or unclothed, seen or not seen, are represented as objects from which Ximen Qing can gain endless sexual and visual pleasure. Pan Jinlian, the female protagonist in this novel, embodies an ambitious desire for sex and power. Although she is objectified as a sexual object along with the other women in the household, she tries her best to control the objectification. This paper will focus on how clothing and unclothing, as well as "stolen love" represent Pan Jinlian as the female counterpart of Ximen Qing, vis-à-vis her desire for sex and power.

This paper attempts to explore Pan Jinlian's invisible human desires, her ambitions for sex and power. I will explore how her clothing represents female sexuality, how she uses clothing and unclothing as means of sexual attraction, how she competes with Ximen Qing's other wives and struggles for dominance in the big household, and how, in her attempts to become the female counterpart of Ximen Qing, she ultimately

fails. Several other women will be discussed for the purpose of comparison.

CLOTHING

Clothing is a means of shaping one's identity and sphere of influence or power. As a mode of cultural expression and mediation, clothing is a medium through which characters respond to social structure. The clothing of different characters not only gives us a visual picture of their personalities but also implies their status and relationships. For instance, in a scene in Chapter 56 in which Ximen Qing is relaxing with his wives in the Hidden Spring Grotto in his garden:

Ximen Qing, being at home with nothing to do, was enjoying himself in the flower garden with Wu Yueniang, Meng Yulou, Pan Jinlian, and Li Ping'er, five of them in all. On his head, Ximen Qing wore a "loyal and tranquil hat." On his body he wore a long gown of willow-green moiré, and white-soled boots. Yueniang was wearing a willow-green jacket of Hangzhou chiffon that opened down the middle, over a light blue skirt of water-patterned pongee, and gold-red phoenix-toed, high-heeled shoes. Meng Yulou was wearing a raven-black satin jacket, over a skirt of gosling-yellow pongee, and peach-red high-heeled shoes of plain silk with purpled gold-spangled edging. Pan Jinlian was wearing a pink crepe blouse that opened down the middle with a white chiffon lining, and a vest of gold-red material with a bright green border, over a skirt of white Hangzhou chiffon with a decorated border, and high-heeled shoes of pink patterned silk. Only Li Ping'er was wearing a wide-lapelled jacket of plain blue

Hangzhou chiffon, a skirt of finished pale blue moon-colored chiffon, and light blue plain silk high-heeled shoes. The four of them:

Seductively and bewitchingly,
kept Ximen Qing company while
he enjoyed himself
Scanning the flowers and
inspecting the willows.^v

西門慶無事在家，只是和吳月娘、孟玉樓、潘金蓮、李瓶兒五個在花園裡頑耍。只見西門慶頭戴着忠靖冠，身穿柳綠緯羅直身，粉頭靴兒。月娘上穿柳綠杭絹對衿襖兒，淺藍水紬裙子，金紅鳳頭高底鞋兒。孟玉樓上穿鴉青緞子襖兒，鵝黃紬裙子，桃紅素羅羊皮金滾口高底鞋兒。潘金蓮上穿着銀紅縐紗白絹裡對衿衫子，豆綠沿邊金紅心比甲兒，白杭絹畫拖裙子，粉紅花羅高底鞋兒。只有李瓶兒上穿素青杭絹大衿襖兒，月白熟絹裙子，淺藍玄羅高底鞋兒。四個妖妖嬈嬈，伴着西門慶尋花問柳，好不快活。

At this point in the narrative, the list of the ladies' luxurious clothes can hardly be terribly striking to the readers, as readers would have become accustomed to the copious descriptions of clothing throughout the novel. Jin Ping Mei frequently indulges in lists of the ladies' colorful clothes, the various materials of the clothing, and the different hairstyles of the ladies. The lists, however, are seldom depicted with sentiment as shown in this passage. Such lists speak to the way in which clothing functions in the novel. In the paragraph above, the four ladies are

dressed up “seductively and bewitchingly” to keep Ximen Qing's company. The women's beautiful dressing inscribes an anxiety about seducing their man, and also their struggle for sexual dominance. The main purpose of the ladies' dressing up is to please their man Ximen Qing by creating visual appeal. Therefore, the beauty of the nicely dressed in the novel is mainly observed from the “male gaze.”^{vi}

Although born and reared a slave, Pan Jinlian has a fine taste for clothes, and takes good advantage of luxurious clothing to create visual appeal for Ximen Qing. She is not satisfied with being a passive, objectified female figure, but actively controls her own objectification.

In Chapter 19, we see the delicate but evocative description of Jinlian through Ximen Qing's eyes:

(T)he woman was wearing a blouse of aloeswood-colored moiré with variegated crepe edging, which opened down the middle, over a drawnwork skirt of white glazed damask. Shoes of scarlet iridescent silk, with white shoes, satin high heels, and gold-spangled toes were visible beneath her skirt. On her head she wore a chignon, enclosed in a fret of silver filigree, in front of which there was a tiara of jade, encased with gold, representing the scene “plucking the cassia in the moon palace.” Her hair was further adorned with plum-blossom shaped ornaments with kingfisher feather inlays, and a host of trinkets were stuck about the temples, which had the effect of further enhancing:

The fragrant redness of her ruby lips, and
The glossy whiteness of her powdered face.^{vii}

因看見婦人上穿沉香色水緯羅對衿衫兒，玉色縐紗眉子。下著白碾光絹挑綫裙子，裙邊大紅光素緞子白綾高底羊皮金雲頭鞋兒。頭上銀絲鬚髻，金鑲玉蟾宮折桂分心，翠梅鈿兒，雲鬢簪着許多花翠，越顯得紅馥馥朱唇，白膩膩粉臉。

Jinlian appears as an alluring and wealthy lady in a big family. The ostentatious materials and colors of her clothing are chosen to display her own beauty and power. Her costume, impeccably matched, is meticulously designed. These expensive items of clothing symbolize her shift of social status from a lower to a higher social class. These luxurious pieces suggest her departure from the simplicity and purity with which she first appears in the novel: her hair is held by a “comb of aromatic wood,”(頭上戴着黑油油頭髮鬚髻) and she wears a “pale blue homespun blouse, with wide sleeves and jacket to match,”(毛青布大袖衫兒褶兒又短) complemented by the “embossed silk of her beige skirt.”(襯湘裙碾絹綾紗) She has a figured handkerchief dangling from the mouth of her sleeves, and a sachet of pomander hanging low at her waist (通花汗巾兒袖中兒邊搭刺).^{viii} Compared with her clothing in the above scene, this adornment of Jinlian at an earlier stage shows her inborn beauty without disguising it. Even without much deliberate adornment, she appears so beautiful that “the mere sight of her makes one’s ethereal and material souls take flight” (人見了魂飛魄散). This reflects her youth and natural seductiveness, before she is abused by the first man she encounters. The affluent life in the family she marries into enables her to enjoy the luxury of dress, but deprives her of the uncontaminated grace of her

earlier years. Her adorned beauty, however, is not enough to secure her position in the household. Ximen Qing’s family is an extraordinary household in a number of ways, and these changes show herald of her adaptation to the household.

In order to compete with other wives in the household and, more ambitiously, to strive for upward mobility, Pan Jinlian not only imitates what the higher-class ladies wear, but also distinguishes herself from the others by making something different. In Chapter 27, the descriptions of Pan Jinlian and Ling Ping’er’s clothes are parallel to each other. They both dress “in their everyday garb of wine silver-striped silk blouses and long trailing skirts of honey yellow silk brocade with a drawnwork motif of ‘phoenixes traversing the flowers’” (家常都是白銀條紗衫兒，蜜合色紗挑綫穿花鳳縷金拖泥裙子。).^{ix} The materials, designs, and colors of their blouses and skirts show their similar status in the family. This luxurious clothing matches the wealth and status of Li Ping’er, but not Jinlian’s original status. Without marrying Ximen Qing, Jinlian would never have had such access to luxury and wealth as Li Ping’er does. Besides, she is anxious to make herself appear outstanding by dressing up. Jinlian’s special luxurious hairstyle reveals her eagerness to be unique: instead of wearing a headdress as Ping’er, she has done her hair up in the Hangzhou style, fastened with a “cloud-shaped ornament with kingfisher feather inlays” (一窩絲杭州攢). She optimizes every piece of clothing to enhance her beauty.

Nothing is spared in Jinlian’s effort to create freshness and uniqueness in her appearance. In Chapter 40, we find a detailed description of her dressing up like a maidservant:

...she approached the mirror stand, took off the fret enclosing

her chignon, and did up her hair in two curled knots on either side of her head. She then made up her face until it was snow white, painted her lips bright red, put on a pair of gold lantern earrings, applied three beauty patches, adorned herself with a purple gold lamé headband, and donned an outfit consisting of a jacket of scarlet brocade over a blue satin skirt. The idea was to present herself in the guise of a maidservant in order to have some fun with Yueniang and the others.^x

(走到鏡臺前，把鬚髻摘了，打了個盤頭揸髻，把臉搽的雪白，抹的嘴唇兒鮮紅；戴着兩個金燈籠墜子，貼着三個面花兒，帶着紫銷金箍兒；尋了一套大紅織金襖兒，下著翠藍緞子裙：要裝丫頭哄月娘眾人耍子。)

Jinlian entertains the other wives by dressing as a maidservant; more importantly, she brings fresh visual pleasure to Ximen Qing, who is “carried away by lecherous desires” (不覺淫心蕩漾)^{xi} as a result. Given a knowing wink from Ximen Qing, Pan Jinlian changes her hairstyle, retouches her face and rerouges her lips. Her cloud-shaped chignon delights Ximen Qing, and she offers him another cup of wine, insisting this one represents her personal undertaking unlike the one she offers within the crowd. This offering, together with her special make-up, shows her ambition to possess her man.

Jinlian’s intense possessiveness is also demonstrated by her desire for nice clothes. The scene discussed above is immediately followed by Jinlian’s request for more high quality clothing. She

complains about not having “appropriate clothes” as the First Lady while the other wives do, and suggests that Ximen Qing make newly purchased fabric into clothes for the wives to wear. Without hesitation Ximen Qing promises to ask Tailor Zhao to make clothes for all his wives. What he makes, however, shows the unequal status of the wives. Yueniang is given two scarlet full-sleeved brocade robes, and four outfits of figured material. Only two outfits but not a robe are made for Sun Xue’er. The other wives are given the same robes and outfits.^{xii}

From a woman’s standpoint, to be given nice clothes is to recognize Ximen Qing’s favor with her. Wearing luxurious clothes, as the other wives do, makes Jinlian’s status in the household visible, which helps her gain a sense of security. Therefore, Jinlian frequently asks for nice clothes, especially when she sees beautiful clothes on other women. For example, in Chapter 52, when Ximen Qing indulges in sexual intercourse with Jinlian and plans to buy a set of patterned silk clothing for her, she immediately requests a drawnwork silk skirt of glossy gosling-yellow with silver stripes, just like the one Guijie has. Without hesitation, Ximen Qing promises to buy her one.^{xiii} Jinlian hopes that, through dressing herself in luxurious clothes worn by the ladies of higher class, she will be able to transcend her low-class origins.

For this reason Jinlian strongly desires the clothing of others. She keeps an eye on Li Ping’er’s clothes. After Li Ping’er has died, Jinlian tries to get her nice fur coat, which is worth sixty taels of silver. It is the only time in the novel that Ximen Qing hesitates to give her a clothing item. For Jinlian, if she is given the fur coat, she is acknowledged as being a good wife. But Ximen Qing says wearing the coat will only make her ostentatious. To get rid of her disadvantaged position of this quarrel,

Jinlian tries hard to bring about Ximen's orgasm with her mouth. This immediately makes Ximen Qing walk over to Li Ping'er's quarters to get the beautiful fur coat for Jinlian.

Jinlian's request for Li Ping'er's clothes demonstrates her desire for power and property in the household. She becomes a more and more dangerous figure as the story progresses. Yueniang senses the danger of Pan Jinlian in her dream, which she describes to Ximen Qing. Yueniang dreamed that when Ximen Qing had taken a robe of crimson velvet out of Li Ping'er's trunk and given it to Yueniang to wear, Pan Jinlian the Sixth grabbed it away from her and put it on herself. Jinlian even tore a large hole in the robe.^{xiv} Through the primary wife Yueniang's dream, we see Jinlian's excessive desire at this point is rising to an extent that is hardly controllable.

It is interesting to observe the circulation of the clothes within the household, in which Ximen Qing acts as a negotiator. In this circulation, Jinlian is more active and demanding while some other wives are more compliant. In Chapter 35, when Ximen Qing's family is invited to Wu's "third-day party" to celebrate her son's marriage, Jinlian initially refuses to go with the excuse that she does not have a good complimentary gift. When Ximen Qing asks her to take a bolt of red silk as her gift, she rejects, claiming that the "diaphanous silk stuff" would be a tease. Ximen Qing then picks out two bolts of jet silk in Li Ping'er's belvedere, and asks Li Ping'er to come up with a blouse of cloud-patterned damask for Jinlian to give as a complimentary gift. Ping'er generously agrees to give away an outfit lying around made of brocaded cloud-patterned damask, and lets Jinlian pick what she wants. Jinlian, however, is reluctant to present a complimentary gift with her.^{xv} Without Ximen Qing's

negotiation, they would not have come up with this harmonious agreement.

Ximen Qing is not just a negotiator, but more importantly, the master in the circulation of clothes within the household. From the discussion above, we notice that the giving of clothes plays an essential role in this novel. As a silk dealer, Ximen Qing usually gives his wives and concubines silk or clothing as gifts. His possession of the materials for making clothes suggests his dominant power in the family. Every time after Ximen Qing makes love with Pan Jinlian, he always promises to give her the clothes she requests. Giving clothes to the women is not just to please them, but also to satisfy his own lust. In this novel, the direct result of Ximen Qing seeing his nicely dressed women is visual pleasure being gained or sexual desire being aroused. The ladies' clothing, therefore, becomes a means of inflaming his sexual desire.

Pan Jinlian's effort to reveal her female sexuality and to restore her role as Ximen Qing's privileged sexual partner has been dramatized by her unceasing effort to beautify herself by dressing up and asking for nice clothes. Both gestures aim to make her beauty and sexuality visible to her lover and other wives. It does not help, however, in subverting her inferior status as the fifth wife within the household. Undoubtedly she is appealing and enticing, being able to satisfy her man's needs and get what she wants. Nevertheless, she is an objectified sexual figure to Ximen Qing.

In order to secure her position as Ximen Qing's primary sexual partner, Pan Jinlian not only strives for dominant ownership of nice clothes, but also uses clothes to compete against other wives. In particular, red clothes become a useful weapon for her. First, they symbolize her lust for sex and power. In Jin Ping Mei, no other wife except for the primary wife

Yueniang is often given red clothes on special occasions, which symbolize her status as a ritual leader among the wives. Jinlian is particularly fascinated with red. She frequently wears red clothes and shoes such as a bodice of red chiffon, a coverlet of red silk and red embroidered shoes. Her fondness for red proves her eagerness to transgress her position in the household. In this way, the color red is used by her to subvert the order of the wives in the household. This fire-like color embodies her fierce sexual desire. It is a color that easily makes her seductive and attractive. Time and again Ximen Qing is attracted to the body under her red clothes.^{xvi}

Related to this, her killing of Ping'er's son is an incident that assuredly strikes horror into every reader. When Li Ping'er gains much favor after having a son, Jinlian contrives a way to kill the son. By this act she becomes a monster with whom readers can hardly sympathize.

Knowing that Li Ping'er's son likes cats, Jinlian deliberately keeps a fat cat and cultivates its strange habitual diet. Instead of eating calves' liver or dried fish, this cat eats much raw meat, and is trained to eat meat wrapped in red silk. One day, seeing Ping'er's son Guan'ge dressed in a red shirt, the cat pounces onto his body and tears at him with its claws. When interrogated by Yueniang, Jinlian pretends to be innocent, "(m)y cat is happily asleep in my room, isn't it. You're talking nonsense. How could it have frightened the child? You'd better not try to blame it on me." (「俺猫在屋裡好好兒的卧着不是? 你們亂道怎的! 把孩子唬了, 沒的賴人起來。」)^{xvii} The readers' note following this scary scene gives us insight into Jinlian's sinful plot, which is to kill her rival Li Ping'er's son in order to regain Ximen Qing's favor. By this unforgivable act Jinlian turns into a monster, a figure undeserving of pity, as C.T. Hsia rightly

argues.^{xviii} In this context, "red," which is often associated with auspiciousness and happiness in Chinese tradition, reverts to its original, vulgar meaning, "blood," by Jinlian's immoral act.

From the above, we know "red" is used by Jinlian to attract and seduce Ximen Qing and the cat. If we read it rhetorically, both Ximen Qing and the cat are trained by Jinlian to get attracted and seduced. Similarly, Jinlian's body underneath the red clothes is no better than the fresh meat wrapped in the red cloth. The death of Li Ping'er's son indicates the similar disaster that will soon happen to Jinlian. Red is a signal or emblem of desire for sex and power that forms part of the sequence of Jinlian's tragic fate in the end.

CLOTHING AND UNCLOTHING

Jin Ping Mei not only calls our attention to clothing, but also to the bodies underneath. Instead of directly displaying the naked bodies in the erotic scenes, the novel often gives ample space to the description of clothing and unclothing. Clothing and unclothing in this novel translate into two contradictory impulses: the former implies covering up, while the latter is meant to reveal. While clothing signifies one's cultural identity, undressing in these scenes suggests exposing the human desires beneath the clothes. It is the juxtaposition and coexistence of the two that make the novel successful in the genre of erotic narratives.

Through examining the undressing of the characters we are able to see their erotic emotions. In the following scenes, we can find that Jinlian always actively undresses herself while Ximeng Qing's other sexual partners allow themselves to be undressed passively by him. This comparison shows her as a shameless lady overwhelmed by her sexual

desire. Undressing herself and exposing her body to her lover implies her internal struggle for dominance in love and power in the big household. It is her ambition and excessive desires that lead to her tragedy in the end.

Dress to Jinlian not only represents advancement in social status, but also becomes an important means of seduction. In Chapter 19, Jinlian's appearance dressed in her beautiful adornments apparently titillates Ximen Qing and arouses his lecherous desires. The description of Jinlian's clothing is followed by foreplay between the couple, "(t)aking her two hands in his, he embraced her and gave her a kiss" (攬着他兩隻手兒，摟抱在一處親嘴。). They then "sucked each other's tongues" (啣舌). Jinlian seduces him by hitching up her skirt and sitting in his lap. The hitched skirt allows her body to touch Ximen Qing.^{xix} She continues the seduction by transferring a sip of wine from her mouth to Ximen Qing "like a bird feeding its young."^{xxx} She also feeds walnut kernels to Ximen Qing with her mouth. When Ximen Qing shows a strong inclination to play with her breasts, she unhesitatingly "unfastened the gold chatelaine with its three pendant charms that she wore at her collar and held it between her teeth while she pulled open her silk blouse" (一面摘下擦領子的金三事兒來，用口咬着，攤開羅衫). This effectively reveals her beautiful body: "Her fragrant and creamy bosom" (香馥馥的酥胸) and "tight and squeazy breasts" (緊就就的香乳). Jinlian's undressing further provokes her lover's desire. He "fondled and caressed" (揣揣摸摸良久) her breast, while "sucking at the teats like a young calf" (用口犢之). Strangely, instead of proceeding into a description of their intercourse, this scene ends with the laughter of the couple, followed by a statement that

frequently appears: "enjoyed to the full the pleasures of connubial bliss" (曲盡于飛).^{xxi} The narrative contains no cue about the real sexual act. In fact, this omission of the actual sexual encounter brings the readers' attention to the foreplay, where clothing and unclothing play an important role. Jinlian succeeds in seducing Ximen Qing through the skillful act of feeding and undressing. Exposing her body to bring her lover's visual pleasure is just like feeding him to satisfy his hunger.

Despite her beauty and skillful seductive techniques, Jinlian cannot secure a privileged position in her sexual relationship with Ximen Qing. In Jin Ping Mei, Ximen Qing is described as a sexually greedy man. Not only his wives, but the servants as well, become sexual objects for him.

One of the greatest threats to Jinlian's privileged position is the simple-minded Huilian. The description of the love affair between Huilian and Ximen Qing is more succinct and direct than the one between Jinlian and Ximen Qing. The scene begins with Huilian's deliberately unlatching the door. This simple gesture directs readers to the sexual scene. Ximen Qing is sitting there with candle in hand. Huilian is instantly assailed by the cold wind once she enters. Then she gently "unrolled the bedding on the bench and then laid a sable robe, cut like a Chan monk's cassock, on top of it" (在床上先伸下鋪，上面還蓋着一件貂鼠禪衣。).^{xxii} There is little description of any clothing besides the sable robe on the bed. Silently, they close tight the double-leaved door, and go to bed. Here Huilian is identified as a much purer and shyer woman than Jinlian. She neither dresses up as a wealthy lady, nor does she undress piece by piece to seduce Ximen Qing. However, her purity and simplicity is attractive enough to win Ximen's favor. After taking off his own garments, Ximen

Qing removes her trousers. This quick undressing is immediately followed by his brutal sexual act, “he took her onto his lap with her two legs splayed to either side and abruptly inserted his organ into her vagina” (兩隻腳蹠在兩邊，那話突入牝中。).^{xxiii} Their excitement is suddenly raised by the rapid erotic action without any foreplay. In this scene Ximen Qing’s sexual pleasure comes from his ability to dominate the whole act. Here we see the passivity of Huilian, as if she were nothing but an unmediated sexual object. Ximen Qing’s resolute undressing of both himself and his sexual partner exemplifies his dominance in the sexual act.

Ximen Qing’s love affair with Huilian makes Jinlian extremely anxious. She tries her best to overhear what they say in private. The brief mention of Jinlian’s luxurious clothing, such as “wave-tripping” stockings or skirts, shows Huilian’s low status in the household and lack of assets. Ironically, after making love with Ximen Qing, Huilian asks for shoe uppers, as if they would compensate for what she lacks to match her beautiful feet. She says, “The only thing is I don’t have any shoe uppers. Couldn’t you contrive to buy me a pair somehow?” (「沒雙鞋面兒。那個買與我雙鞋面兒也怎的？」). Her request for nice shoe covers suggests her ambition to raise her own status.^{xxiv} She becomes confident when she finds that her feet are smaller, hence prettier than Jinlian’s. When Ximen Qing expresses his surprise at seeing her feet smaller than Jinlian’s, she replies proudly: “There’s no comparison,” she says, “The other day I tried on one of her shoes and found that I could wear it over my own. But it’s not size that matters so much as the stylishness of the shoe” (老婆道：「拿什麼比他！昨日我拿他的鞋略試了試，還套着我的鞋穿。倒也不在乎大小，只是鞋樣子周正纔好。」).^{xxv} She

attempts to win her master’s favor by competing against Jinlian in beauty. She further questions Jinlian’s status by pointing out that she was not a pure virgin at the point she married Ximen Qing. Hearing these words, Jinlian mutters angrily, calling Huilian “slave of a whore” twice. Jinlian and Huilian are in fierce competition in winning Ximen Qing’s attention. However, Huilian is defeated in this battle and finally commits suicide (Chapter 26).

An even greater threat to Jinlian’s sexual relationship with Ximen Qing is Li Ping’er, a lovable, rich lady. In Chapter 27 there is an erotic scene between Ximen Qing and Li Ping’er. Ximen Qing’s sexual desire is aroused when he sees her “jade bones and icy flesh” (玉骨冰肌) exposed under the translucent scarlet silk under-drawers. Unable to resist the temptation, Ximen Qing bends Ping’er over a bench and undresses her rudely. He turns up her beige skirt and takes down her red drawers. This undressing is followed by their habitual pose of erotic exchange, “poking up the fire on the other side of the mountain”(倒擻着隔山取火). All through this scene Li Ping’er does not present a slight sense of enthusiasm and excitement. She is only a passive sexual object being manipulated by Ximen Qing at his own will. After having sex, she tells Ximen that she is pregnant. The fact that she says that only after their anal intercourse suggests that she bears the pain to satisfy her lover. She is not just passive, as Huilian, but masochistic in addition. Her pregnant condition is later jeered at by Jinlian in front of Ximen. In fact, there are few sexual scenes between Ximen Qing and Li Ping’er. The only two direct descriptions are found in Chapter 27 and Chapter 50, both occurring when Ping’er is not well.

Jealous of Li Ping’er, Jinlian attempts to retrieve Ximen Qing’s favor.

Overhearing Ximen Qing's praise for Ping'er's white bottom, Jinlian whitens her own body to lure Ximen in Chapter 29. It is important now to note the sexual scene between Ximen Qing and Jinlian right after the one between him and Li Ping'er in Chapter 27. After amusing themselves with sexually suggestive games,^{xxvi} they voluntarily undress themselves. After Ximen takes off his jade-colored silk tunic and returns to the room, Jinlian has already stripped herself and exposed her naked body. She positions herself on the mat, with scarlet shoes on her feet and silk fan in her hand. As usual, she succeeds in stimulating Ximen's lecherous desires. Taking off his underclothes, he titillates her clitoris until her vaginal fluids flow. He then takes off the woman's red shoes and suspends her feet from the grape arbor with her foot bindings, making her look like "A Golden Dragon Extending Its Claws" (金龍探爪). Here a lot of erotic imagery like "Red Hook" (紅鈎), "Chicken Tongue" (雞舌), and "jade chowrie handle" (麈柄) are employed. With elaborate description of sexual play and the imaginative term "inserting the Arrow Upside Down" (倒入翎花),^{xxvii} the author creates a vivid picture of the erotic scene that can be easily visualized by the readers. Therefore the imagery on the pages could satisfy male elite readers. Their sound and the woman's unceasing moans further emphasize the excitement of the couple. Comparatively, Jinlian is more interactive and performative than other ladies in sexual play with Ximen Qing.

Jinlian's unclothed body gives her seduction a cutting-edge sophistication. Her naked body becomes a gesture to call for sexual activities. In Chapter 29, she again exposes her "jade body," with nothing on her body but a bodice of red chiffon. Whenever Ximen Qing sees her naked body, his lecherous desires are

aroused. In just a quick moment, he undresses himself and inserts his sexual organ into her vagina. After he manages to thrust and retract several tens of times, she says naughtily, "You crazy ruffian! When did you sneak in here without anyone's knowing it?" (「怪強盜，三不知多咱進來？」)^{xxviii} Pretending to be ignorant of what Ximen Qing has done to her, Jinlian acts in a pettishly charming manner like a spoiled child. Her sophisticated skills in seducing, acting, and lovemaking never fail to satisfy Ximen Qing.

It is easy to find a similar pattern in the sexual play between Jinlian and Ximen Qing: the depiction of Jinlian's clothing, Jinlian's seduction by feeding or undressing, and then the sexual act. Jinlian's body is represented exhaustively as iconic of an unconstrained female figure longing for love and sex. Clothed or unclothed, her body remains sexually appealing to Ximen Qing.

Compared with Huilian and Ping'er, Jinlian shows initiative in seducing Ximen Qing, while the other two remain in a passive state in the sexual scenes examined above. She finds victory in the sexual realm by deeply engaging herself in sexual play, thereby providing him with sexual comforts. Dressing and undressing becomes Jinlian's weapon to win her husband's favor. Jinlian is an objectified sexual object for Ximen Qing, but she wants to subvert her objectified status by actively controlling her sexual intercourse with him.

It is significant how Jinlian, an indisputable beauty, finishes her life in the end. Her life culminates in the scene when Wu Song tears her clothes off and kills her violently (Chapter 87). To Wu Song, her unclothed body is not an attractive sexual object, but a contaminated, disgusting object. To avenge his brother's murder, Wu Song inserts the knife into Jinlian's

heart, and her blood splatters. However, this ignominious ending does not necessarily strike surprise into readers, for it is a natural retribution against such an evil figure.^{xxx} She falls victim to nothing but her own excessive desires.

SEEN AND UNSEEN

The above discussion of clothing and unclothing illustrates Pan Jinlian's lust for sex and power. Ximen Qing's gaze becomes the focus of this sexual game. To win his attention and satisfy his sexual desire is the purpose of the women in this game within the household. Ximen Qing not only attains pleasure from seeing his beautiful ladies, but also from seeing himself. In the scene where he burns incense on Ruyi's body after doing so to Lin Taitai's, he entertains himself by watching himself in the mirror when they make love. Likewise, when Ximen Qing makes love with one of his paramours, Wang Liu'er, he lifts her haunches in order to observe the sight of his sexual organ in and out of her body. Through self-observation he witnesses his own masculinity, which reminds him of his domination in the household.^{xxx}

Invisibility is as important as visibility in this novel. As the saying goes, "A wife isn't as good as a concubine, a concubine isn't as good as a maid, a maid isn't as good as a prostitute, a prostitute isn't as good as stealing!"^{xxxii} "Stolen love" (touqing 偷情) is uniquely enjoyable to Ximen Qing, and the most formidable opponent in this regard is Pan Jinlian, for she is the only wife who dares to have "stolen love." Their mutually matched infidelity in love leads them to their deaths in the end.

From the beginning, we see their similar desire for sex. However, Ximen Qing can easily get access to every woman he likes, while she has a much more

difficult path to satisfy her desire. In fact, most of Ximen Qing's "stolen love" is legitimized in the novel, and many of his secret lovers are naturally brought into his household after his sexual intercourse with them. Pan Jinlian, however, needs to hide her secret love affair and is criticized for "stealing man" (touhan 偷漢) most of the time. There is no "invisible" love affair for Ximen Qing per se, but secret love affairs happen to Pan Jinlian. This comparison is shown in the secret love affairs between Pan Jinlian and Chen Jingji, Ximen Qing and Wang Liu'er.

Pan Jinlian is brave enough to touhan (having adulterous affairs), through which she transgresses the boundaries of being an obedient concubine in an inner chamber. It is an attempt to convert her objectified position in the household to that of a sexual subject. In the secret love affair between Pan Jinlian and Chen Jingji, both of them express affection and enthusiasm. This is apparent in their sexual intercourse in Chapter 53:

Chen Jingji kept on uttering the word "darling" with his mouth, while beneath the single thickness of his gown, his organ, like a bar of red-hot iron, surged forward beneath the fabric. Jinlian, for her part, couldn't help thrusting her body forward to meet the overheated organ beneath his gown. Unable to restrain herself, Jinlian lifted Chen Jingji's gown aside with her hand and firmly gripped his male organ. Chen Jingji was so flustered that in trying to pull down Jinlian's waistband, he only succeeded, with a rending sound, in ripping out one of the pleats in her skirt.

^{xxxii}

經濟口裡只顧叫親親，下面單

裙子內却似火燒的一條硬鐵，隔了衣服只顧挺將進來。那金蓮也不由人把身子一聳，那話兒都隔了衣服熱烘烘對着了。金蓮正忍不過，用手掀開經濟裙子，用力捏着陽物。經濟慌不迭的替金蓮扯下褲腰來，劃的一聲，却扯下一個裙襖兒。

In this scene Jinlian clearly takes control of their lovemaking, from thrusting her body towards his organ to undressing the man. She does not show the slightest sense of guilt or shyness when she makes love with her secret lover. On the opposite, Chen Jingji is not as sophisticated in this play and rips out a pleat in her shirt. Jinlian calls him “lousy slave,” and complains, “How clumsy can you get? You’re still so unused to snitching your food, and so timorous in going about it” (「蠢賊奴！還不曾偷慣食的，恁小着膽！」). Jinlian laughs at Jingji because he is not used to “stolen love,” which sounds ridiculous to readers. At the same time, this reminds us of her experience in fornication, from which her relationship with Ximen Qing starts. She is so experienced that she keeps ordering Chen Jingji about during their lovemaking. However, their enjoyment is disrupted by the dogs’ barking. Hearing Ximen Qing arrive, they are thrown into consternation and separate immediately.^{xxxiii} Afterwards Ximen Qing finds her private parts sopping wet and jokes that she has been hankering after a man. This joke unintentionally hits upon her “stolen love” with Chen Jingji, so she flushes and tries to cover up as best she can.^{xxxiv} It is clear in Pan Jinlian’s mind that she cannot afford to leave Ximen Qing and lose all the luxury she is enjoying. Therefore Pan Jinlian feels apprehension at her “stolen love” being discovered. This apprehension stays even after Ximen Qing

dies. At one time the servant Chunmei sees them making love; in order to keep her silent, Jinlian allows her to sleep with Jingji and gives her lovely clothes and jewelries. Pan Jinlian and Chen Jingji’s love affair remains invisible and never legitimized until the end.

The “stolen love” between Ximen Qing and Wang Liu’er is described in much greater detail. Calling Ximen Qing “Dada,”^{xxxv} Wang Liu’er lets him to do whatever he wants and shows her special patience. In Chapter 38, Ximen Qing unwraps her foot binding and suspends her leg from the latticework partition of the bed. This gesture makes her uncomfortable but she does not complain at all. Her obedience and compatibility in the intercourse increases Ximen Qing’s enjoyment. In this play, Wang Liu’er is objectifying herself into Ximen Qing’s plaything. Readers might assume this is “hidden love.” Later in the Chapter, we find that Wang Liu’er’s husband knows about it. The couple sees Liu’er’s sexual intercourse with Ximen Qing as a business rather than personal relationship. “Now that we’ve already got this fifty taels of silver in hand,” the woman says, “in the future he’s sure to add a few taels in addition and find a decent house for us. It’s all owing to my willingness to surrender my body to him. We might as well take advantage of the opportunity to get what we can out of him and improve our life-style” (婦人道：「這不是有了五十兩銀子？到他明日，一定與咱多添幾兩銀子，看所好房兒。也是我輸了身一場，且落他些好供給、穿戴！」).^{xxxvi} Surprisingly, Liu’er’s husband Han Daoguo pretends to know nothing and encourages his wife to cater to Ximen Qing. Liu’er’s body then is just a commodity to earn money for their family. Calling herself the whore, the woman permits Ximen to do at his will, “the body of this whore of yours is yours

to command”(左右淫婦的身子屬了你). To please the woman, Ximen promises to send her husband silver and appoint him as a purchasing agent. Wang Liu'er is so happy with this arrangement that she swears to commit herself completely to Ximen Qing.^{xxxvii} Her “stolen love” with Ximen Qing is deliberately “not seen” by Han Daoguo for the sake of financial return. In this way the secret love between Ximen Qing and Wang Liu'er can be sustained as long as he can directly feed their family.

Ximen Qing's illicit love affairs are hardly disrupted by the observers. For example, in a scene when Ximen Qing and Li Guijie make love, Ying Bojue happens to see them and he jokes, “Quickly, fetch some water to splash on them. The two rutting creatures have gotten themselves stuck together” (「快取水來，潑潑兩個攬心的，攆到一答裡了。」). Keith McMahon takes Ying Bojue as an example of a detractor,^{xxxviii} someone who satirizes those caught in a lovers' solipsism. However, his attempt to intervene in their sexual discourse turns into failure. He finally gives up disrupting their “stolen love.” Given a kiss by Li Guijie, he puts the latch on the door and leaves the couple alone.^{xxxix} In addition, sometimes Ximen Qing's hidden love affairs are overheard by his wives and servants, but none of them can prevent him from constantly indulging in “stolen love.” Instead, all the observers pretend that they have seen nothing. Therefore, his “stolen love” becomes visible to others, but normally remains “invisible.” His power and status brings him pleasure and invisibility at the same time.

Although Jinlian shares the same drive to have “stolen love” as Ximen Qing, she does not have the same capacity for legitimizing her secret love affairs as Ximen Qing does. Her hidden love with Chen Jingji, once seen by others, would

get her into trouble. Ximen Qing, however, is able to enjoy illicit love constantly. This contrast further proves Jinlian's failure to compete with Ximen Qing in this game.

CONCLUSION

Coming from a family of low status and means, Pan Jinlian shows keen eagerness to rise above her origins. She makes every effort to struggle for dominance in the sexual relationship with Ximen Qing, to compete against his other wives for his favor with her beauty and skills in seduction, and to conceive every means to humiliate her rivals. She hopes, through these attempts, that she can get a sense of security and satisfy her own desires. Her body becomes a site where femininity is defined and demonstrated. Sex is not merely a natural phenomenon for Jinlian and in this great novel of manners. Clothed or unclothed, she is established as a charming and seductive woman in the big household. She becomes an attractive sexual being and takes control of her lover in sexual intercourse. In addition, she tries to transgress her inferior position and become the female counterpart of Ximen Qing through “stolen love.” But her journey to enter the domain of power in this household is hardly successful. She is fixed in her determination, but at what cost? Pan Jinlian is anxiously avid for secure status, but all her efforts never succeed in winning anything more than the function of concubine.^{xl}

ⁱ Luo Derong 羅德榮 and Ning Zongyi 寧宗一. Jin Ping Mei dui xiaoshuo meixue de gongxian 金瓶梅對小說美學的貢獻 (Tianjin: Tianjin Shehui Kexueyuan chubanshe), 1.

ⁱⁱ Please see Ding, Naifei. *Obscene Things: Sexual Politics in Jin Ping Mei*. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2002, and Satyendra, Indira.

“Metaphors of the Body: The Sexual Economy of the Chin P’ing Mei Tz’u-hua.” *Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews (CLEAR)* 15 (December 1993): 85–97.

iii Gu, Ming Dong. “Brocade of Human Desires: The Poetics of Weaving in the Jin Ping Mei and Traditional Commentaries.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 63.2 (May 2004): 333–356.

iv See Volpp, Sophie. “The Gift of a Python Robe: The Circulation of Objects in Jin Ping Mei.” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 65.1 (June 2005): 133–158.

v Jin Ping Mei Cihua, 860-861; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol 3, 376-377. Wade-Giles transcriptions have been converted to Hanyu pinyin.

vi “The gaze” is a psychoanalytical term brought into modern usage by Jacques Lacan. Based on this notion, Laura Mulvey introduced the term “male gaze” into feminist theory and media studies. She argues that male gaze takes precedence over female gaze in films, and women are objectified through the gaze of the heterosexual man.

vii JPMCH, 257; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol.1, 383.

viii JPMCH, 29; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol.1, 51.

ix JPMCH, 384; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 132.

x JPMCH, 597; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 444.

xi JPMCH, 600; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 449.

xii JPMCH, 602; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 451-452.

xiii JPMCH, 780; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 3, 257.

xiv JPMCH, 1227-1228; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 4, 421.

xv JPMCH, 506-507; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 314-315.

xvi In Chapter 29, for instance, Ximen Qing’s lecherous desires are aroused at the sight of her wearing nothing but a bodice of red chiffon, under a coverlet of red silk. *Jin Ping Mei Cihua*, 418; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 188.

xvii JPMCH, 922-923; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 3, 468-469.

xviii C.T.Hsia makes this argument based on Jinlian’s murder of her first husband, and in her treatment of her stepdaughter, Ying’er. For detail see Hsia, Chih-tsing, “Chin P’ing Mei.” in *The Classic Chinese Novel: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 165-202.

xix JPMCH, 257; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 1, 383.

xx This image is added in the translation.

xxi JPMCH, 257; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 1, 384.

xxii JPMCH, 325; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 52.

xxiii JPMCH, 325; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 52.

xxiv For a discussion of shoe uppers, see Ko, Dorothy, and Bata Shoe Museum Foundation. *Every Step a Lotus: Shoes for Bound Feet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 105.

xxv JPMCH, 326; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 53.

xxvi Such games include “Crossing the Bridge,” “Inserting the Arrow Upside Down,” “A Pair of Wild Geese in Flight,” “Passing the Examinations and Qualifying for Office,” etc. See JPMCH, 391; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 143.

xxvii JPMCH, 391; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 143.

xxviii JPMCH, 419; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 188.

xxix For a discussion of retribution in *Jin Ping Mei*, see Paul Varo, Martinson. “Pao, Order, and Redemption: Perspectives on Chinese Religion and Society Based on a Study of the *Chin P’ing Mei*.” PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1973, 59.

xxx For a discussion of this point please see McMahon, Keith. *Causality and Containment in Seventeenth-century Chinese Fiction* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 83.

xxxi The Chinese original is “妻不如妾，妾不如婢，婢不如妓，妓不如偷。”

xxxii JPMCH, 806; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 3, 297.

xxxiii JPMCH, 806; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 3, 298.

xxxiv JPMCH, 807; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 3, 300.

xxxv Originally coming from Mongolian, Dada is usually used by women in the most exciting moments of sexual intercourse. See Yao Ling 姚靈 *Pingwai zhiyan 瓶外卮言* (Tianjin: Tianjin shuju, 1940), 158-159.

xxxvi JPMCH, 561; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 2, 392.

xxxvii JPMCH, 952-953; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 4, 9-10.

^{xxxviii} Keith McMahon argues that there are three types of observers: the detracting observer, the deprived observer, and the participating observer. For detail see McMahon, Keith. *Causality and Containment in Seventeenth-century Chinese Fiction* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 98-99.

^{xxxix} JPMCH, p. 792; Roy, trans., *Chin Ping Mei*, vol. 3, 276.

^{xl} There is an interesting discussion of “containment” in *Causality and Containment in Seventeenth-century Chinese Fiction*. See Chapter One, 1-25.

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THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ROLE IN THE TAIWAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

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ABSTRACT

An elaboration of five potential policy options that the U.S. could pursue in Taiwan-China relations show that the peacefulness of cross-Strait relations clearly rests in the hands of leaders in Beijing and Taipei, though the U.S. should try to help ensure that this contract happens harmoniously. The U.S. should avoid getting too involved in Taiwan-China affairs, whether that is by actively playing a mediator role or by choosing sides, but it should also avoid complacency, for it still has international commitments to uphold with China, Taiwan, and other allies in the Asia Pacific region. While the U.S. works on its overall commitment to improving U.S.-China relations, such as increasing economic interdependence, the U.S. should maintain an ambiguous but supportive role of Taiwan. Not only could this improve U.S. relationships in the Asia Pacific, it could also stabilize the region as a whole. There is a lot to be gained from a peaceful resolution between Taiwan and China, but it is up to the two parties to decide how that resolution might be reached.

INTRODUCTION

The nature of Sino-U.S. relations is heavily influenced by policy surrounding Taiwan. The United States believes that improved relations in the Asia Pacific could lead to open markets with opportunities for investment, trade, and technology. Improved U.S. relations

with China, in particular, has the potential to sustain worldwide economic growth and the management of pressing global problems, including climate change and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, worsening relations with a huge military establishment like China could lead to a colossally destructive war that might have repercussions for decades, even if following conventional methods. A sensitive topic, the U.S. needs to figure out how to navigate its China relationship while maintaining relations with Taiwan. This is important for the maintenance of regional peace and perhaps even more so for international credibility. There is reason to believe that Taiwan is going to be an important contemporary issue in the context of improving U.S.-China relations, though the issue is one that America has been tiptoeing around for decades. Though there are multiple policies the U.S. could pursue, the most pragmatic seems to be a push towards dialogue—not as a mediator, but as an encouraging sideliners.

Taiwan is of significant importance to the United States for the reasons of maintaining regional peace and America's international credibility. The United States can use Taiwan to provide leverage in expressing American dissatisfaction with China over arms proliferation, trade, intellectual property rights, and human rights. The physical position of the island provides certain geographic leverage, but it is argued that U.S. military support is unnecessary for

the immediate defense of Taiwan, and the island in turn is unnecessary for the security of the United States and its regional interests. By itself, Taiwan's military remains one of the twenty largest armed forces in the world, with close to 270,000 active-duty troops and a defense budget of some \$10 billion.ⁱ However, investment in Taiwan's geographic location does reassure U.S. allies—particularly Japan, whose sea lanes of supply and communication pass close to Taiwanⁱⁱ—of safety with the United States' international credibility.

While U.S. investment and physical presence in Taiwan does not guarantee the security of allies in Asia like Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, its support of Taiwan has a lot to do with upholding historical commitments and maintaining international credibility. The ending of an alliance with Taiwan would be more significant than is generally appreciated, for it would not only signal abandonment of the containment of China but also threaten the concept of collective security.ⁱⁱⁱ Granted, America has often held an ambiguous position regarding Taiwan, interpreting and citing different agreements based on current self-interest. However, in keeping with commitment, future policy options should remain compliant with the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of 1979 while simultaneously acknowledging policies such as the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and Reagan's Six Assurances of 1982.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

President Obama inherited a foreign policy relationship with China that was based on general separateness and as little interaction as possible. The previous term with President Bush showed signs of

mounting friction between Washington and Beijing, friction that the Obama administration hoped to alleviate with a “reset” of U.S.-China relations. Once it became apparent that “reset” wasn't working and the U.S. needed to adopt a new strategy in approaching China, the Obama administration then shifted to a “pivot towards Asia.”

The rhetoric of Obama's first term called for “visionary leadership” to “lead the world, by deed and by example.”^{iv} Outlined by goals to maintain “sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy—the kind that the Bush administration ha[d] been unable and unwilling to use,”^v the new foreign policy strategy was termed the “reset” policy. Obama's first grand strategy, as explained in various speeches and administration initiatives in his first year, was “to make lemons out of lemonade.”^{vi} But the administration quickly found out that an improved standing for the U.S. did not actually give the U.S. greater policy leverage. China, Russia, and other aspiring powers did not view themselves as partners of the United States. The administration's strategy was perceived as promoting narrow U.S. interests rather than global public goods.

In response, the administration reset its policies after its first 18 months in office, pivoting toward a second, more assertive strategy. The U.S. also tightened economic and security relationships with China's neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, forcing Beijing to rethink its strategy by demonstrating a willingness to balance against rising threats. In doing so, the U.S. hopes to reassure its allies that it will not be retreating into isolationism anytime soon. Though key allies in the Pacific Rim may be reassured, Obama has yet to clearly outline his foreign policies to the American people, who grow resentful over troubling domestic affairs, an issue that will be discussed in the policy options of the next section.

Moving into the new term, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has noted that one of the most important tasks for America in the next decade is to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region. The Strategic Economic Dialogue, a forum for bilateral talks, seems dedicated to improving U.S.-China economic interdependence. Clinton has expressed a commitment in using action to back up economic and strategic commitments, for “peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is crucial to global progress.”^{vii} She also expresses a need to “guarantee that defense capabilities and communications infrastructure of alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors,” a diplomatic way of expressing that the U.S. plans to be ready to take action if anything occurs that challenges the status quo. While much of Clinton’s speech addresses the benefits of economic interdependence between the U.S. and China, Clinton’s rhetoric also emphasizes a support of human rights and democracy. This is said to be the heart of their foreign policy, including in the turn to the Asia-Pacific region. The Obama administration claims to be committed to the pivot towards the Asia-Pacific as one of the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.

POLICY OPTIONS WITH TAIWAN

Washington has several policy options regarding U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. The implications of each will be outlined in the following section. However, whatever policy Washington decides to pursue, it will still need to decide whether to make its intentions clear or remain ambiguous over its likely response to fighting in the Strait.

The U.S. can pursue the following policy options:

- a. Stay out and do nothing
- b. Actively mediate between Taiwan and China
- c. Aggressively support Beijing and “One China”
- d. Support Taiwan, openly defying Beijing
- e. Encourage dialogue

Doing Nothing:

Although America is engaged in the international world, the American public generally believes that domestic issues should take priority. Likewise, factions in the Beijing leadership have argued that the U.S. is too preoccupied with its own affairs to intervene in a dangerous situation on Taiwan’s behalf.^{viii} The U.S. has officially stated support of China’s “One China” policy with documents like President Nixon’s Shanghai Communiqué of ’72, aimed towards the normalization of US-China relations, and President Carter’s Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, a formal announcement establishing official relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite this, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 states that the U.S. would view violence in the Strait with grave concern, and commits Washington to arming Taiwan to allow it to defend itself if attacked. It does not, however, require the U.S. to protect the island directly. The U.S. could officially choose to do nothing if armed conflict arose between Taiwan and China.

However, economic interests must be kept in mind. Even if China does not directly apply military force, the scare of a blockade or missiles fired at offshore islands could intimidate Taiwan’s trade partners away from investment. During the 1996 crisis, when Beijing test-fired nuclear-capable M-9 missiles to land close

to Taiwan's two major ports, China's actions caused Taiwan's stock market to fall, significantly reducing foreign-exchange reserves and generally destabilizing the economy.^{ix} Washington has historically been instrumental in the island's democratic development, has invested heavily in its economy and has been the key to maintaining its defensive capabilities. In 2010, two-way trade between Taiwan and America reached \$59 billion and Taiwan ranked as America's ninth-largest trading partner.^x In 2012, U.S.-Taiwan relations included the possibility of a controversial sale of F-16 C/D fighter jets that Taiwan has been requesting since 2006.^{xi} It is clear that America has made a significant investment in Taiwan, making it unclear as to why the U.S. would choose to pursue a policy that does nothing. There is too much at stake for the U.S. to do nothing about Taiwan.

As stated before, America has no formal responsibility to use military force to prevent Chinese action on Taiwan. However, history and current politics suggest the U.S. would find it difficult to watch the subjugation of Taiwan's democratic government by the Communist Chinese. Not only would this threaten U.S. economic interests, but U.S. credibility in Asia might also be damaged if it failed to react to a Chinese attack. Even without formal obligations, the Obama administration has demonstrated a commitment to proving American reliability, to make it clear that the U.S. remains an Asia-Pacific power. The do-nothing policy does not seem to follow the kind of reputation the U.S. wants to display.

Active Mediation:

The U.S. has previously been a mediator in China-Taiwan relations. In 1945, President Harry Truman dispatched General George C. Marshall in a failed

effort to prevent a resurgence of civil war by reconciling the Nationalists and Communists. The effort failed, in part due to a lack of willingness from both sides to compromise, but also because Marshall's mediation was biased in favor of the democratic Nationalists. Washington has been, and probably should be, hesitant to intercede so directly again.

Stepping in as a mediator could put the U.S. in an uncomfortable position for several reasons. Since the U.S. seems to have more vested interests in maintaining Sino-U.S. ties and it is assumed that U.S. mediation would yield an outcome pleasing to China, Beijing is more in favor of this policy than Taipei. Therefore, if talks produced results unexpectedly favorable to Taiwan, U.S. relations with China could deteriorate quite rapidly. Washington's mediating role could also incur obligations unwelcome to Congress and the American public, such as the responsibility of imposing compromises and monitoring outcomes. A look at the general American response to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and most recently, Libyan intervention, illustrate public dissatisfaction in the perceived unnecessary involvement in foreign affairs. If the U.S. does not need to intervene between China and Taiwan, it should not try.

Taking a mediator position would force the U.S. to distinctly outline its policies, as opposed to maintaining a historically ambiguous stance. In 1972, when the U.S. and China reached their first compromise over Taiwan with the Chinese 'One-China' position, Washington acknowledged the Chinese position but did not accept it. Though members of the China-policy community now blur the distinction, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be allowed to take a nuanced position if acting in the mediator role.

This policy does not seem to be in line with American interest.

Aggressive Support for Beijing in the “One-China” Policy:

The U.S. has particular interest in improving U.S.-China relations. China’s main priority regarding Taiwan is to prevent independence and all policies that promote it. Before pursuing this policy, the U.S. will need to decide how heavy the benefits from relinquishing the notion of an independent Taiwan, either by encouraging Taiwan to reunite with China or by allowing for forced reunification, will actually weigh in on the improvement of U.S.-China relations.

Chinese administrative officials claim that Taiwan’s interests and improved U.S. relations with Beijing are mutually exclusive, persuading U.S. officials that compliance with Beijing’s policies could lead to a stronger Sino-U.S. relationship benefitting all parties involved. Realists offer an alternative explanation to China’s push for reunification. Rising powers are often drawn to challenge territorial boundaries and international institutional arrangements that were in place when they were relatively weak. China, with an expanding economy and growing military capabilities, is identified by most realists as a rising power and will be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon.^{xii} Some think that the changes China’s leaders seek are relatively limited: the reintegration of Taiwan with the mainland, rectification of some disputed borders, and the acceptance by the international community of its claims to portions of the South China Sea. Appeased with these conditions, China will perhaps calm down on its harsh territorial expansionist policies.

However, accommodating China on these terms would lead to serious discontent in the Asia Pacific region, not

to mention discontent from Taiwan. Official U.S. policy is to acknowledge the One-China policy. But changes in the nature of the government, as well as growing national sentiment in Taiwan, is changing the amount of influence the U.S. has in exerting pressure for reunification. Current president-elect Ma Ying Jeou advocates policy aimed at improving cross-strait relations, but Taiwan’s people are showing trends of a desire to reclaim some of the attributes of nationhood, particularly an international voice. This is particularly true of the growing number of young people in Taiwan who do not identify culturally with the mainland, but see themselves as distinctly Taiwanese. The growth of the Democratic Political Party (DPP), whose main party platform supports Taiwanese independence, illustrates this trend.^{xiii} Taiwanese nationalism is not only an impeding factor in China’s pursuit of reunification, but also increasingly in Taiwan’s resistance to reunification. The option of pressured reunification is likely to mull over poorly with the citizens of Taiwan.

Furthermore, the history of U.S. relations with Taiwan provides considerable precedent for those who argue that the U.S. should and would intervene if China tried to forcibly bring Taiwan under its control. In 1954 and 1958, the U.S. deployed significant naval power in the Strait to intercept armed conflict between the PRC and the ROC. In both instances, though more in the first than the second, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration won public and Congressional support as it successfully deescalated heightened tension between China and Taiwan. In 1996, President Bill Clinton also dispatched two aircraft-carrier battle groups to defend the Taiwan area as Chinese missiles fell into the waters just off Taiwan’s coast.

The fact remains that the U.S. is an ideological country whose foreign policy is influenced by its ideals of protecting democracy and freedom. Though the forced reunification of Taiwan may benefit the U.S.-China relationship in the short term, others argue that China might see it as a sign of American weakness and that the credibility of American reliability could be seriously damaged. This option would put the U.S. in a position that not only directly contradicts its ideals of democracy and freedom, but also risks ruining Washington's standing in world politics.

Supporting Taiwanese Independence:

Under the TRA's provisions, the U.S. has no obligation to send forces to protect Taiwan. It does, however, outline a responsibility to sell Taipei weapons to allow it to defend itself and to give it the courage to try. China protests against these sales as an unacceptable violation of Chinese sovereignty. In 1982, China extracted a communiqué out of President Reagan that pledged that U.S. arms sales would "not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years" and that the U.S. would "reduce gradually" the levels of its sales.^{xiv} But these stipulations have not completely deterred the U.S. from continuing to sell arms to Taiwan, as evidenced by a \$5.85 billion weaponry package to meet Taiwan's defense needs.^{xv}

The U.S., as Taiwan's third largest foreign investor,^{xvi} supports Taiwan with economic investments and arms sales, but the triangular relationship fashioned during the normalization era of Sino-U.S. relations limits U.S. mobility in developing a bilateral relationship with Taiwan. Under the terms of its recognition communiqué with Beijing and the TRA, Washington can have only informal relations with Taiwan. The U.S. needs to uphold its historical commitments to Taiwan and

allies in the Asia Pacific just as it needs to uphold its agreements with China. The consequences of upsetting China on this issue could potentially extend consequences beyond the economy and further into armed conflict. Given that the rules circumscribing U.S. military presence in Taiwan are relatively strict, there are no coordination procedures in place for joint U.S.-Taiwan action in an emergency, which threatens to impair operations and endanger lives should circumstances require cooperation.

The American public is unlikely to want to support this policy. As outlined in reasons why the U.S. should not take an active mediator role, the long economic downturn has jaded Americans on engaging with the rest of the world, making any activist foreign policy a tough sell. Recent Libyan intervention underscores this attitude. Said Obama of his actions, "wherever people long to be free, they will find a friend in the United States."^{xvii} But because Libya is not a core national interest, this has left Obama in an awkward position of trying to explain his foreign policy priorities, something he should be hesitant of doing again in taking a position to support Taiwanese independence. Even when taking America's obligation to preserve democracy and freedom into account, the potential deterioration of U.S.-China relations makes this position seem too risky for the U.S.

Encouraging Dialogue, but Not Much More Than That:

Current U.S. policy advocates dialogue between China and Taiwan to resolve differences and maintain regional peace. This is a comparatively disinterested posture in contrast to mediation, where the U.S. would assume responsibility for outcomes and implementation. To pursue this policy option, Washington has to continue to be

careful not to set goals or to suggest a path for China and Taiwan to follow on this basis of cross-Strait dialogue. A look at the failed talks between Chinese Communists and Chinese Nationalists in 1945 show that the U.S. must remain unbiased if they choose to join in the conversation. By signaling that Washington is respecting China's territorial integrity, this policy could lead to force reductions by China, as well as an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. A resolution reached between Taiwan and China itself could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia.^{xviii} The U.S. objective may be only to prevent forceful reunification.

Encouraging dialogue seems to be the best policy that encompasses the protection of U.S. interests while avoiding unnecessary conflict. Whatever policy the U.S. decides to pursue regarding the China-Taiwan debate, it will also need to decide whether to clarify its intentions or leave them ambiguous. In the past, ambiguity has worked towards the U.S.'s advantage. Today, critics argue more strongly than before that ambiguity jeopardizes rather than protects regional peace. According to this view, ambiguity invites rash action; firm principles would make a more compelling deterrent.^{xix}

However, if the U.S. clarified its policy, saying that it would not defend Taiwan, leaders in Beijing might be encouraged to take rash action. On the other hand, a firm U.S. declaration that it would protect Taiwan may prompt Taiwanese radicals to hasten a crisis by leading them to believe themselves invulnerable in the event of a Chinese attack. Ambiguity regarding the U.S. position during a cross-Strait dispute seems to provide the U.S. with the largest buffer for action. Furthermore, the U.S. government cannot be certain how it

would react, and what demands Congress and the American public would place upon it, should fighting break out in the Taiwan Strait. The cause of conflict would be crucial to U.S. decision-making but it would not be easy to judge initial provocation. Thus, it is best for the U.S. to maintain ambiguity while encouraging peaceful dialogue between China and Taiwan.

THE PLAN TO MAINTAIN PEACE

An elaboration of five potential policy options that the U.S. could pursue in Taiwan-China relations shows that the peacefulness of cross-Strait relations clearly rests in the hands of leaders in Beijing and Taipei, though the U.S. should try to help ensure that this contract happens peacefully. While the U.S. works on its overall commitment to improving U.S.-China relations, such as increasing economic interdependence, the U.S. should maintain an ambiguous but supportive role of Taiwan. There is no doubt that the economic downturn has made the American people tired of risk, war, and foreigners with problems, but they also believe in democracy and freedom. The U.S. should avoid getting too involved in Taiwan-China affairs, whether that is by actively playing a mediator role or by choosing sides, but it should also avoid complacency for it still has international commitments to uphold with China, Taiwan, and other allies in the Asia Pacific region.

That being said, the Obama administration should fulfill the responsibilities outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act and continue with arms sales. China will never believe that there is a good time for the U.S. to sell weapons to Taiwan, but in the past two years, the United States has sold almost \$13 billion in weapons to Taiwan, and cross-Strait relations are in the best shape in decades.^{xx}

Without military security, Taipei might feel too insecure and Taiwan's leaders too politically vulnerable to negotiate with China. Arms sales facilitate cross-Strait compromise by giving Taiwan confidence. An abandoned and isolated Taiwan might, in desperation, declare independence or even revive efforts to produce nuclear weapons. A Taipei that feels vulnerable would not necessarily pursue unification as Beijing assumes. Because of this, it would seem that U.S. support is helpful, not harmful to China's interests. The continuation of arms sales does come with a caveat though. If Washington continues to support Taiwan, it must simultaneously find ways to convince Beijing that the United States does not seek to prevent an accommodation between Taiwan and China. America should try to sustain peaceful conditions in which Taiwan and China can reach a solution by themselves. Not only could this improve U.S. relationships in the Asia Pacific, it could also stabilize the region as a whole. There is a lot to be gained from a peaceful resolution between Taiwan and China, but it is up to the two parties to decide how that might be reached.

ⁱ Andrew Scobell and Andrew J. Nathan. "China's Overstretched Military." *The Washington Quarterly* 35.4 (2012): 140.

ⁱⁱ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser. "Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?" *The Washington Quarterly* 34.4 (2011): 32.

ⁱⁱⁱ Earl C. Ravenal "Approaching China, Defending Taiwan." *Foreign Affairs* 50 (1972): 44.

^{iv} Barack Obama. "Renewing American Leadership." *Foreign Affairs* 86.4 (2007): 4.

^v *Ibid*: 9.

^{vi} Daniel W. Drezner "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?" *Foreign Affairs* 90.4 (2011): 64.

^{vii} Hillary Clinton. "America's Pacific Century." *Foreign Policy* 1 Nov. 2011. Print.

^{viii} Nancy Bernkopf Tucker "China-Taiwan: US Debates and Policy Choices." *Survival* 40.4 (1998): 152.

^{ix} *Ibid*: 153.

^x "US comfortable with improved cross-Taiwan Strait ties," *The China Post*, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-affairs/2011/03/09/293936/US-comfortable.htm>. More information at "Top U.S. Trade Partners," International Trade Administration, http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf as cited in Nancy Bernkopf and Bonnie Glaser. "Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?" *The Washington Quarterly* 34.4 (2011): 32.

^{xi} "Arms sales to Taiwan: Fighter-fleet response", *The Economist*, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/05/arms-sales-taiwan>

^{xii} Aaron L. Friedberg. "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" *International Security* 30.2 (2005): 19.

^{xiii} As indicated in "2012 ELECTIONS: Wary of China, many Taiwanese hope for DPP win", *Taipei Times*, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/01/10/2003522881> as well from personal communication and insight from family in Taiwan

^{xiv} Nancy Bernkopf Tucker. "China-Taiwan: US Debates and Policy Choices." *Survival* 40.4 (1998): 154.

^{xv} "Arms sales to Taiwan: Fighter-fleet response, *The Economist*, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/05/arms-sales-taiwan>

^{xvi} Nancy Bernkopf and Bonnie Glaser. "Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?" *The Washington Quarterly* 34.4 (2011): 32.

^{xvii} Daniel W. Drezner. "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?" *Foreign Affairs* 90.4 (2011): 66.

^{xviii} Bruce Gilley. "Not So Dire Straits." *Foreign Affairs* 89.1 (2010): 45.

^{xix} Nancy Bernkopf Tucker "China-Taiwan: US Debates and Policy Choices." *Survival* 40.4 (1998): 162.

^{xx} Nancy Bernkopf and Bonnie Glaser. "Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?" *The Washington Quarterly* 34.4 (2011): 34.

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GOT MILK?

China's Dairy Industry and its Impact on a Globalized Children's Culture

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ABSTRACT

The introduction of China's One Child Policy in 1978 drastically shifted the dynamic within Chinese homes. Chinese families were stuck trying to grapple with the shifting numbers of younger generations and the increasing importance forced upon the Only Child to carry on the family name. Thus, the "Little Emperor" phenomenon arose as a result of this shifting dynamic. Following the Opening and Reform Policy, China's newly globalized world was absorbing new products and influences from all over the world. Thus, milk made its way into Chinese stomachs.

In 2008, China was introduced into the global sphere as a force to be reckoned with. Finally, in 2012, Chinese advertising in London became crucial to upholding the good name that had been established in 2008. As such, milk advertisements took over by storm. Advertising companies played on relevant themes that are central to Chinese culture: family and nation. The themes touched upon in these advertisements are indicative of a larger trend of transformation in Chinese society.

INTRODUCTION

Ice cream, chocolate, cheese, milk. Dairy in its various forms has constituted a significant element of the Western diet for centuries. In the United States, it is hard to live a day without consuming

some form of milk. As infants, we drink our mothers' milk, or milk-based formula, and it continues to dominate our diet throughout all stages of early development. Milk exists as a taken-for-granted part of our daily lives—a substance that has been hard-wired into our nutritional thinking as an essential dietary product for growing youth. In China, this is not the case; milk consumption, as we know it, is a recent and growing phenomenon that has significantly altered food culture and food consumption patterns. This phenomenon has been particularly striking among the eating habits of China's youngest generation.¹ The increased prominence of milk has prompted alarm among older generations regarding the future health of their children. My research explores the changing eating habits of China's youngest generation through the lens of milk: its history in the world, its introduction into the Chinese sphere, and its impact on children's culture in China.

During my first visit to China in the summer of 2008, I was warned that the Chinese palate was quite different, and that I would most likely get sick at some point because of it. I paid close attention to everything I ate, and my Western upbringing led me to notice the lack of dairy products in my everyday life. Towards the end of the summer, I found myself at a Pizza Hut, craving the taste of a familiar and comforting Western food. Following that meal, I finally experienced the food-induced discomfort that I had been warned about since orientation

week. What puzzled me, however, was that the source of this illness was a food that I had eaten for eighteen years: cheese.

When I returned to China in September 2011, I became fascinated with the country's dairy industry. Historically, milk has always played a minor role in China's culinary narrative. Only recently has milk been re-introduced into the Chinese middle class as a consumer product. With the globalization of China's economy, the Chinese have become more open to foreign food products and industries, such as fast food chains and dairy. As milk consumption declines in the U.S., it is growing steadily in China. Thanks to its introduction and popularization through Western influences, milk is starting to play an important role in the cultural and culinary experience of China's youth.

The introduction of milk into the Chinese diet raises many anthropological questions regarding a changing social landscape of Chinese culture. Food is a defining measure of self and of one's place in society; it is associated with home, familiarity, tradition, and most importantly, group identification (Anderson 2005:124-8). In the past two decades, milk has not only successfully infiltrated Chinese markets, but it has been absorbed into culinary culture and daily life.

CHAPTER 1: THE EMERGING CHILDREN'S CULTURE IN CHINA

After the Opening and Reform Policyⁱ of 1978, two major changes have influenced the nature of Chinese society. The first was China's adoption of market socialism: the One Child generation had to engage with the excess of products and advertising caused by the new global economy. The economic restructuring led to new affluence, innovative retailing practices, the commercialization of all

types of products, and made children themselves significant consumers (Davis 2000:57). The effects of this commercial environment can be observed in the way in which milk, a novel industry in China, made its way into the Chinese marketplace, and how it requires children to make decisions as consumers.

The second major transformation was the implementation of China's One Child Policy in 1979. With families being restricted to raising only one child, the policy engendered a new familial structure that has resulted in a move away from traditional values. Now, they have had to adjust to having only one child to be nurtured, and to succeed them, where previously, parents and grandparents could diffuse their attention and doting among several children. Starting in 1979, the Only Child has become the center of the family structure, thus leading to the emergence of the "4-2-1" problem: a numeric representation of four grandparents, two parents, and one child. "4-2-1" has implications and concerns expressed in two key terms: *pei yang* (fostering a child's growth, 培养) and *shan yang* (caring for the elderly, 赡养).ⁱⁱⁱ These have become synonyms of an intense change in the Chinese demographic, transforming the relationship between child and caretaker.

The effects of the One Child Policy can be seen in the context of food consumption in the household. Traditionally, children in China have been the "passive recipients of consumer goods," eating whatever was handed to them (Watson 2000:200); household decisions did not include any input from the youngest generation. As these familial structures have been transforming and the economy has become more market-based, children have acquired increasing consumer power (Watson 2000:201). Rising social pressures affect both the

parents and the child: parents feel the need to acquiesce to their child's requests in order to put them ahead.

This demographic change is leading to what scholars refer to as a "Little Emperors" phenomenon, or the breeding of children who are selfish and spoiled compared to previous generations. Because there is only one child to carry on the legacy of the family name, parents may adopt new child rearing styles to produce a highly influential and successful child. For many, parenting has developed with an intense competitive spirit. Parents are willing to provide their child with every advantage and edge to ensure future quality of life. Young children are interested in being included in this transforming globalized world, and their parents are interested in providing them this opportunity. The child becomes the center of attention for his six elders, as they collectively raise him/her, providing the child with the resources to become a competent caretaker in the future. In a sense, the elders are investing their efforts in the child as a means of social welfare—ensuring an excellent quality of life as their child assumes the caretaker role and repays them by caring for them in their old age.

Chinese parents are overwhelmingly concerned with the wellbeing of their offspring. With only one child to fill their shoes, they feel compelled to provide their child with all of the requisite tools for success. Chinese parents assess their self worth through the success and happiness of their children (Chee 2000:60). Parents who grew up during the Cultural Revolution suffer from what James McNeal^{iv} calls "compensation syndrome," the determination to provide their child with the material wealth they lacked as children; thus, they are often "materially generous" when fulfilling their child's requests (Chee 2000:60,65). Parents feel

an increasing pressure to distinguish their child by "yield[ing] to their child's tastes" (Chee 2000:58). Food is used as a concrete means of doting on children and thus connotes a superior financial situation while demonstrating parental love (Chee 2000:57).

Parents have thus slowly been adapting to changing social norms in order for their children to keep up with the times. Children now have "have higher decision-making power," and are able to control their own diets both by manipulating their parents and also by being granted increased control of their own food money (Watson 2000:201,209). Only children are able to successfully manipulate their parents by bombarding them with requests; parents are more eager to comply because of the "parents' hope that their children's lives will be better than their own" (Yan 2006:66). This change in the dynamic of child-rearing leads only children not only to become primary decision makers, but also to experience a higher quality of life.

According to James L. Watson's work in 2000, a very salient shift can be observed in "decision-making power within the Chinese family [which]—at least in respect to food—[was] shifting from senior to junior generations" (Watson 2000:202). This shift in the decision-making power illustrates the changing relationship between parent and child. While this transfer of power is, in part, parent-driven, it is also largely due to child-driven efforts and persistence. This persistence is demonstrated at the dinner table as children become more confident and feel more comfortable asserting what they want to eat, rather than passively receiving what is put on their plates. The rising voice of the only child is causing a shift in the consumption culture of China, a culture once centered around the providing parent, now focused upon the demanding only child (Jing 2000:5). The

shift in control from the parent to the child is especially noticeable in Chinese culture, in which children have traditionally been seen rather than heard. This newfound sense of independence and control cultivated in the youngest generation is a clear projection of China's adoption of Western ideals in the hope of empowering its only children.

Children, too, face severe pressures at home thanks to the Confucian principle of filial piety, which pertains specifically to the notion of shan yang (caring for the elderly, 赡养). Thus, the reverse "4-2-1" problem ("1-2-4" problem) arises, carrying significant implications for the Only Child. As the youngest member of a family of six, the Only Child is responsible for the care not only of his/her parents, but also of his/her grandparents. The child is responsible for dealing with any and all health issues that may arise in their old age, and is, thus, under tremendous pressure to stay afloat in their stressful social environment, particularly at school. In "Eating Snacks and Biting Pressure: Only Children in Beijing," Chee provides a thorough analysis of the pressure felt by children in the late 1990's to conform to a globalized and modern society. "Compensation Syndrome" causes the child to suffer from many demanding pressures to perform well in school from parents that had neither the same educational opportunities nor the same "opportunity for social mobility [since they were raised] during the chaotic cultural revolution" (Chee 2000:65; Yan 2006:66). Thus, the parents are attempting to fulfill their personal need to live vicariously through their child, which, in turn, pressures the child to live a lifestyle that their parents have already determined for him/her.

While parents attempt to make their way through the maze of modernity,

observing the youngest generation is the best method for understanding what exactly is occurring. Children, in effect, "act as guides and instructors for older consumers who are less sure of themselves in this new terrain" (Watson 2000:202). The parents of the Only Child generation grew up in a culture devoid of Western contact; therefore, they must turn to their younger family members in order to make sense of the world in flux around them. By entrusting their children with the task of such decision-making, they are able to navigate the world of uncertainty with more confidence.

While the decision-making power is shifting to the youngest generation, it is important to note that consumer decision-making is, ultimately, a collaborative act. Children are influencing their parents' decisions in the supermarkets, but it is ultimately the parent who physically buys the product. Milk advertising undoubtedly appeals to the desires of the youngest generation, but the parents are also directly affected by the perceived promise of a better future that is embedded in a glass of milk.

These shifts in familial structures reflect an overarching agenda on the national level. Because the government is concerned with improving the population quality (renkou suzhi, 人口素质), the internal shift of power within a family structure calls for a restructuring of societal ideals. By appealing to these idealistic, modern (and synonymously Western) ideals, the only children of China are able to make strides towards modernizing and empowering their generation, ultimately leading to the overarching goal of improving the nation. By making (metaphorical) strides in the Western ("forward") direction, China's emerging Only Child generation is, for the first time, able to engage in the globalization narrative.

Milk companies and their advertising campaigns are taking advantage of the ability of China's youngest generation to access the media as a result of this modernity-driven social change. By using advertisements to appeal to China's youth and to Chinese parents, milk companies are transforming the cultural norms associated with milk drinking by getting parents to provide milk to their children, and using this generation to set a precedent in order to mold the future consumers of China.

As Jun Jing eloquently stated, "New eating habits forge new identities" (Jing 2000:4). The younger generations are forging new eating habits that differ both historically and ideologically from previous generations. These new trends are part of a new Chinese identity based on observations of success in the West. These changing attitudes towards the milk industry have allowed it to flourish in China and will allow it to continue integrating itself into the cultural and historical narrative of Chinese food culture.

CHAPTER 2: THE RISE OF MILK IN CHINA

Milk has never been a typical part of the Chinese diet. In fact, most Chinese people have lived their lives consuming little to no dairy. Recent studies, however, illuminate the changing trajectory of milk in China as an increasingly prominent consumer product (See studies described in Wiley 2007; 2011). While there are many theories regarding this upward trend in popularity, this analysis focuses on milk as a symbol of Western ideals, and the use of milk, in turn, as a Chinese nationalist symbol in order to encourage demand and production. Examining the trajectory taken by the governmental institutions and advertising companies in

the United States helps us understand the model that China used to shape its own industry.

In the United States, the National Dairy Council (NDC) played an integral role in the rise of milk consumption. Founded in 1915, its goals were to support research on the healthfulness of dairy products, conduct educational campaigns, and promote milk consumption. The NDC was critical in establishing and promoting the idea that children's health depended on milk (Wiley 2011:52). Public health campaigns focusing on nutrients and children's growth arose at the beginning of the twentieth century. The explicit focus of these campaigns is evident in the advertising from the time. Andrea Wiley's book, *Re-Imagining Milk*, outlines some examples of early slogans that promoted and emphasized the healthfulness of milk: "Start them early in the way they should go; ensure health and happiness for your children by establishing and maintaining the right food habits;" "Tomorrow's image is being cast today" (Wiley 2011:54-5). These advertisements used scientific findings to project positive future implications, fueling a middle-class narrative that emphasized dietary habits and children's physical growth (Levenstein 1988; Wiley 2011:55).

The association of milk with intense symbolic and cultural values in the United States supported monumental growth in milk consumption; milk soon became a symbol of health and therefore a necessity. Milk drinking, then, is needed to build what constitutes a "normal" and "healthy" body (Wiley 2011:3-4). This image of milk became engrained in the minds of America and, over time, daily milk drinking became a normative aspect of American culture; regardless of milk's actual presence in their lives, most Americans know that milk is something

they should drink daily (Wiley 2011:1). The origin of these claims is unclear; studies completed over the last 30 years show no clear causal link between increased milk consumption and growth in height (Wiley 2005; 2007). Andrea Wiley posits that it may have been an "intuitive recognition" that since infants consume their mother's milk to support their growth, milk's life-sustaining benefits should be suitable and necessary for post-weaning-age children (Wiley 2011:48). Therefore, cows' milk was seen as a food "naturally" needed by children, and hence as inherently good (Wiley 2011:48).

Despite the lack of scientific grounding, milk has risen in China as a symbol of growth for the human body. Height is often used as an indicator of population health (See Komlos 1994). A blatant height discrepancy between the average height of U.S. and Chinese populations has caused speculation regarding a cause. Because milk is notorious for its growth-enhancing quality (albeit false), a link is drawn between the visible height of the United States' citizens and high levels of milk consumption. The Chinese look upon this height phenomenon as a plausible relationship, and were therefore eager to adopt milk drinking in order to resolve the nation's "growth deficits" (Wiley 2007:675). These "growth deficits" are not limited to the physical size of the Chinese population; an enhanced physical stature further implies positive economic and social development. Milk, therefore, has become an essential "mark of new money" in China (Wiley 2011:84).

Following the Opening and Reform Policy, China was exposed to globalization first-hand as ideas and products flowed into China from all over the world. The economy that came about as a result of this influx of ideas flourished into a globalized culture. Manfred Steger

provides a comprehensive definition of globalization as a means of flourishing through the exchange of ideas and also points out the deepening connection "between the local and the distant" (Steger 2003:13). The Chinese viewed the West as an exemplar of modern society, and globalization served as a catalyst for their assimilation of Western practices. Milk was an obvious stepping-stone as China worked towards becoming a modern nation.

There are three issues that have challenged milk's absorption into Chinese culture. Firstly, food and commensality^v has long been a means of group identification, pride, and security, especially in China (Anderson 2005:128). Incorporating unfamiliar or foreign foods into a cultural tradition that has been in place for millennia is not an easy undertaking. While the West is viewed as an example of modernity, Chinese people remain steadfast in their traditions and have had major difficulties adopting foreign products in their culture, especially foodstuffs. The Chinese have always had a strong sense of "bio-ethnocentrism,"^{vi} firmly believing that their consumption habits and patterns are superior to those of others and any patterns that deviate from that norm are, in effect, abnormal (Wiley 2011:4).

Secondly, there is an inherent problem with the biological makeup of milk, as the human body is not equipped with the proper enzymes to digest it. Worldwide, approximately 70% of the population is in some way lactose intolerant; the prevalence of this lactase enzyme deficiency in Asia, however, is almost 100% (Wiley 2011:29). This presents a physical barrier to the act of consuming and digesting milk.

Thirdly, milk was never a significant part of Chinese history. Historically, nomadic peoples in the

North and West were the only producers and consumers. Outside of these populations, the consumer bases of milk were mainly the Chinese upper classes (Wiley 2007: 670). Milk, therefore, became heavily associated with these nomadic tribes—particularly the Mongols. With the fall of the Yuan dynasty, the Ming rulers developed a new agenda geared towards belittling foods associated with the foreign and “barbarian” Mongols (See Anderson 1988). Because of the negative association with the Mongols, milk was seen as a product that would stifle, rather than uplift, the culture of their dynasty. This association contributed to the emergence of a deeply rooted stigma that, in turn, influenced the willingness of the Chinese people to accept into their diet and culture a food that has long been associated with a “barbaric” people.

These major cultural setbacks led the milk industry to primarily focus on demographic groups that were not yet convinced of the cultural stigma of milk. These target demographics include the younger generations, whose rising incomes, increased purchasing power, and changing food preferences are “seen as key to the boom in the dairy market” (Wiley 2011:87). Economic factors play a major role in milk popularization and consumption: milk consumption is about thirteen times greater in urban areas compared to rural ones. While the increase in milk consumption is tangible across all income levels, it is most common among higher income groups (See Fuller et al.:2006).

In a quantitative survey of dairy purchases done by Fuller et al. in 2004, the upward trend of dairy consumption in the urban Chinese diet was confirmed in China’s three major cities: Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou. Over 90% of those surveyed reported purchasing fluid

milk and view dairy in a positive light. The purchasers consider dairy healthy and nutritious and see milk as a product that should be incorporated as a staple into their daily diets (See Fuller et al.:2004). This study is indicative of the deeply engrained cultural label (borrowed from the West) that connects milk to the idea of health. As in the United States, milk is increasingly viewed as a product that should be consumed daily. Interestingly, this study also mirrors the economic imbalance of milk consumption that was present in the time of the Ming Dynasty, when only the wealthier class had access to dairy products.

Dairy consumption in China more than tripled between 1990 and 2009, and it increased six-fold from 2000-2009 (Wiley 2011:86-7). China’s efforts in promoting milk provide valuable insights into the local meanings of milk, as well as governmental institutions’ interpretation of milk. Advertising companies and government efforts are heeding a national need to improve the generation of the future. The Chinese government is set on educating the public on the positive effects of milk in order to improve the population quality (renkou suzhi, 人口素质) (Jing 2000:12). The health of the nation has become a primary concern of the government in initiating school milk programs and promoting milk positive advertising. Milk has been transformed to fit local ideologies both on the individual and the national level. The marketing of dairy in China exploits the idea of milk as source of physical enhancement and a necessary product for national strength; these “links between milk, size, and national success in global competitions are unmistakable” (Wiley 2007:673). These associations are all positive ones, and they have heavily informed Chinese advertising campaigns.

In response to this visible trend, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations initiated “World School Milk Day” in 2000 which emphasized milk programs in developing countries, attempting to make a push for the provision of milk in schools (Wiley 2011:87-88). The Chinese government also responded to the upward trend by establishing government subsidized milk programs in 1999; these programs were a key strategy for increasing milk consumption by introducing it to the youngest generation of Chinese citizens as early as possible. China’s Ministry of Agriculture also responded to the overwhelming demand for milk with agricultural reforms such as the “Advantageous Cow Milk Area Development Program, 2003-2007” to increase the efficiency of milk production and the consumption of milk products (Wiley 2007:670). Because these programs are included as direct governmental dietary advice, the inclusion of milk is further legitimized, increasing desirability and therefore consumption (Wiley 2011:92).

Milk has become the “quintessential modern Western drink” and is thus associated with its economic and athletic successes; it offers a tangible way to make up for past “growth deficits” and allows China to envision itself as comparably strong and modern as the West (Wiley 2007:675). While in the United States the milk industry’s primary agenda is an economic one, China’s main preoccupation is using milk as a unifying and nation-strengthening product, allowing the country to promote and strengthen its status in this globalized economy. As Andrea Wiley states so eloquently: “Milk thus offers a kind of message of hope in a bottle (or carton) for China’s future as a robust, strong, healthy population and society” (Wiley 2011:95).

Various Chinese officials have stated that by drinking more milk, the Chinese are able to “catch up” in size to Western populations (Chen 2003). In 2006, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao was quoted saying, “I have a dream to provide every Chinese, especially children, sufficient milk each day” (“China Drinks Its Milk” 2007). Milk advertising has adopted a twofold agenda: to improve health through milk consumption, thereby helping to build a better nation-state.

Milk companies like Shanghai Bright Dairy and Food Company are developing their future consumers by targeting urban Chinese and their children (Chen 2003). Children, in fact, have become the primary targets for the majority of milk advertising and commercials. The use of internationally known athletes to market milk products, as demonstrated in the next chapter, is a particularly effective tactic for targeting children. Milk companies have the child in mind as they enhance milk products with different flavors and use cartoons to decorate milk packaging (Chen 2003). These marketing tools reflect the emergence of the child as a consumer and, therefore, the primary target of most marketing efforts. Given that children have not yet established their consumer habits, they are the ideal target for these marketing efforts assuming that they, in turn, adopt these culinary habits and then pass them on to their progeny.

Milk consumption has grown exponentially over the past two decades. This rapid growth exemplifies a sense of urgency for milk to be accepted and promulgated in Chinese culture. By 2020, China is predicted to hold the title of the largest dairy market in the world (Hornby 2012). This upward trend of milk consumption surprisingly occurred despite numerous ideological barriers that fundamentally prevent the acceptance of

milk into the Chinese diet. The powerful establishment of the dairy industry in China promotes a sense that milk is a necessary element of the Chinese diet. Thus, the idea of milk (and its consumers) illustrates a larger discourse on China's transforming cultural structures.

CHAPTER 3: MARKETING CULTURAL CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF MILK ADVERTISING

Advertising was the primary force for popularizing milk in the United States. At the end of the twentieth century, the milk industry in the U.S. was suffering from the rising competition of other beverages such as soda and juice. By 1990, Jeff Manning, the Executive Director of the California Milk Processor Board, determined that milk was in need of a "resurrection." In response to this concern, he spearheaded a campaign that would soon become one of the most successful advertising campaigns in the United States: "Got Milk?" (Manning 1996:6). The milk moustache became an iconic image, and the faces who wore it flooded magazines in the 1990s. The milk moustache became symbolic of milk, its growth enhancing benefits, and the community it represented—America.

The "milk moustache" became a symbol that even the Chinese began to understand. In 2001, Yao Ming^{vii} was featured wearing a milk moustache as the 2001 "Got Milk? Rookie of the Month" (Wiley 2011:95). The selection of a Chinese athlete and his association with everything that milk symbolizes made the Chinese more willing to accept an advertising campaign similar to that of "Got Milk?" Chinese milk companies looked to the success of the campaign to inspire a campaign of their own, geared towards a larger demographic.

Chinese milk companies drew inspiration from the "Got Milk?" campaign to highlight important values and themes in China. Milk was seen as a symbol of the modern, more forward West, "the drink of America;" by drawing upon those associations, China used milk to highlight the absence of such a drink and the need for China to have its own "drink." Milk, as a modern foodstuff, would allow China to enhance its role in a globalized arena. Therefore, milk companies chose to highlight specific themes important to Chinese people: family, country, health, modernity, and sacrifice. Since milk's inception into China, companies have highlighted these themes in various ways.

In 1998, five years after the launch of "Got Milk?", China released its first influential milk advertisement. Sanyuan Milk Company teamed up with an American advertising agency, Ogilvy & Mather, and Jiang Wen, an acclaimed Chinese director, to produce a short film entitled "Sanyuan Milk Commercial"^{viii} (Sanyuan gushi, 三元故事). "Sanyuan Milk Commercial" sought to depict the historical tale of Sanyuan and how it deeply affected a young boy's life while setting up a narrative that parallels that of a moral fable. The commercial follows a man as he recalls his childhood and the pleasure he got from imbibing milk. His older sister used to unselfishly give him her milk in order to help him as he grew. She plays the role of the caretaker, closely monitoring her brother and providing him with an essential tool for success—milk. Years later, the boy still enjoys drinking milk because it reminds him of his childhood and his sister's selfless nurturing.

The commercial inspired a dialogue with the "Got Milk?" campaign. Throughout the commercial, each of the characters is branded one-by-one with the

milk moustache (see appendix A.1; Figure 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3). Sanyuan uses the imagery of the milk moustache to impose a Western icon onto a sentimental Chinese scene, asking the viewer to imagine this story as a part of their own history. Sanyuan's use of the moral fable narrative not only calls upon the influence of Western images to inform their own culture, but also attempts to retroactively write milk into China's history.

Jiang Wen's style appeals to the nostalgic parent of the Only Child generation and their memory of the recent Cultural Revolution. Jiang Wen weaves clips of soldiers into the commercial, tugging on the heartstrings of the children of the revolution and calling upon their memory of hard times and sacrifice during what was a time of scarce resources, particularly for the working class. The commercial alternates between the imagery of past struggles and the present world, where milk abounds. In this commercial, milk embodies a new epoch of abundance and promise for both a better present and a better future. Jiang Wen removes milk from the distant, almost threatening, Western pedestal and makes it more approachable to the reluctant Chinese viewer. As a value laden, "high-context culture,"^{ix} Chinese society is steadfast in its cultural beliefs, and new ideas and changes are slow to be accepted. In the commercial, Jiang Wen literally places milk into the hands of the children of the Cultural Revolution, writing milk into China's history as a product that provides a message of hope for the future.

Finally, Jiang Wen appeals to the unbreakable bond of Chinese families and the nostalgia of the Chinese adult of the Cultural Revolution by recalling a time (not too long ago) when children had the companionship and guidance of their siblings. In the commercial, milk is understood as a nourishing bond between

siblings. The older sister diligently provides the protagonist with his daily portion of milk, even giving him her own, insisting that she does not like the taste. Years later, the protagonist realizes that she actually does like the taste of milk, and that his sister was sacrificing her own portion so that her brother could absorb double the nutrients. The commercial highlights milk as an essential representation of the bond between older sister and younger brother. The One Child Policy abandons the possibility of this necessary relationship, and points to the new anxiety of the parent who must fill the role of the now absent older sibling.

Ultimately this commercial has one aim: to portray milk as a unifying force. Milk plays an essential role in the household as it brings together caretaker and child and allows for a sense of shared understanding through milk drinking. Furthermore, this shared family identity can be translated to the idea of milk as a unifying force of the nation. Sanyuan established milk as a "family drink," hoping to one day become the "family drink," and, furthermore, transforming it into a larger identifying product of China that eventually will become a part the national canon as "China's drink."

"Sanyuan Milk Commercial" explores many of the important concepts associated with milk. Advertising has played a tremendous role in the acceptance of milk into the minds of the Chinese people; in fact, it was reported as one of the primary modicums through which information about milk reached the Chinese consumer (see Fuller et al.:2004). Jiang Wen established a precedent for all future milk commercials and established the themes of family, country, and sacrifice in the Chinese memory, making them popular tenets in future commercials.

In 2008, the dairy industry suffered a great blow by the Milk Scandal.^x With its tainted reputation still lingering in the minds of many Chinese, the milk industry suffered quite a few setbacks. Chinese dairy companies had to find a way in which they could turn their reputations around. Four years later, the milk industry looked to the Olympic games as a means of recovering from its tainted name. The Olympic games presented a convenient platform and source of nationalism upon which the milk industry could feed while also adding the element of pride and success associated with Chinese athletes. The surge in the milk industry during the past year reflects the influence of the Olympic games on these campaigns. The same themes of family, country, healthy, modernity, and sacrifice presented in Jiang Wen's commercial were picked up by other milk companies, who focused their efforts on the shifting dynamic of the familial structure. These advertisements were targeted specifically at the Only Child generation and the anxieties they developed in response to their new responsibilities.

In 2008, ten years after "Sanyuan Milk Commercial," Ogilvy & Mather conducted a consumer study about the impact of the Olympic games on the Chinese consumer mentality. The study highlights a crucial concept surrounding the Beijing Olympic games: that they carried a greater meaning than previous ones because they symbolized the "arrival of China" and the start of a new chapter within the modern globalized world (Ogilvy & Mather 2008). With eyes all over the world scrutinizing China's every move and the remaining stigma of the milk scandal, 2008 would have been an inopportune time to attempt new marketing agendas. By 2012, criticisms had faded, and the image of the London Olympics revived memories of China's

gold medal domination and iconic Bird's Nest from 2008. With the momentum already established in 2008, the 2012 games were the perfect time for a big marketing push. As such, milk companies took advantage of the Olympic-inspired nationalism to further their own agenda for promoting milk as "China's drink."

Since 2008, Yili has thrown its efforts into Olympic sponsorship opportunities. Yili was a main sponsor in the 2008 Beijing games and a national team sponsor in the 2012 London games. The brand's involvement with the Olympic games was most apparent in the various video and print advertisements that they released. According to a marketing analysis done by Labbrand in August of 2012, there are numerous advantages of using the Olympic games as a marketing platform. Yili promoted the association between the brand and "Olympic value" in order to "improve brand esteem" as well as to "establish positive brand image." Yili also improved its relevance in the Chinese viewfinder by fostering a "shared vision" for the brand using the Olympics as a starting platform ("Branding Through the Olympics for Chinese and Global Brands"). Following their campaign theme, "Let's Olympic Together," Yili used the spirit of the Olympic games as a lens through which to describe their product. To fortify the connection between the Olympic games and the Yili brand, Yili ensured that every advertisement, commercial, and product was branded with the Olympic rings. This partnership allowed the brand to legitimize itself in relation to the Olympic name and, as such, allowed for an almost infallible campaign initiative. Milk was used in these athlete-focused advertisements because it addressed a prominent concern about the size difference between Chinese and Western athletes; it was therefore marketed as a contributing factor to the apparent larger

size and musculature of Western athletes (Brownell 2005: 254).

In the midst of the 2012 Olympics, Yili Milk Company used Liu Xiang and Chen Yibing, two important Chinese Olympians, as spokesmen for milk as a drink of athletes and China. The commercial “Liu Xiang-Run Together”^{xi} plays upon the concepts of cooperation and teamwork that are necessary in any sporting event. It shows a diverse crowd running with Liu Xiang in a field and ends with everyone jumping over a hurdle together. The commercial fosters a sense of companionship between the viewer and the athlete, urging the viewer to believe in his/her own ability to participate in the commercial, thanks to the beneficial nutrients in milk. The sense of companionship among the viewer, Liu Xiang, and the ordinary people in the commercial forges a sense of group identification that attempts to embed milk into the existing nationalist sentiment.

The “Chen Yibing Milk Commercial”^{xii} also highlights the superior nutrients in milk and leverages the Olympics to further incorporate milk in the existing nationalism agenda. The commercial links milk drinking to the successes of the Chinese gymnastics team. Milk’s nutrients, they claim, are so superior that they “meet the strict criteria of the Chinese gymnastics team.” Because Yili claims milk to be a necessary part of Chinese athletes’ diets and, furthermore, an essential part of their success, Yili is then able to convincingly claim milk as a suitable, nutritious, and even essential product for their homes.^{xiii} Because milk contributes to the success of China’s athletes, the more milk the nation drinks, the more successes will be awarded to the Chinese name. Milk is in a position to foster a stronger sense of communal pride within China by drawing upon the success of its citizens as well as the praise of outsiders. As a four-time Olympic

medalist for China, Chen Yibing serves as an Olympic role model, the epitome of physical fitness, and a physical manifestation of Chinese pride. This commercial promotes this sense of community as, in figure 2.2, the athletes come together because of milk to boost their team morale. Yili, Chen Yibing proclaims, “contributes to the pride of China and allows the world to see the power of China.” The link to milk is implicit: it can enhance the strength of citizens and the bond between them, just as it did for the Olympic team.

The use of Olympic athletes in these advertisements directly appeals to younger Chinese people—those who look up to these athletes as role models. From a marketing perspective, this is an ideal target audience because their consumer habits have not yet been set. Due to the nature of family consumer dynamics, it is difficult to direct an advertisement effectively at Chinese youth because, ultimately, they do not actually purchase the product. This commercial, therefore, has another implicit audience: the parents. These advertisements draw upon parental impulses to nurture a child as successfully as possible, perhaps even to be gold medalist.^{xiv} This commercial instills the younger generations with the desire to drink milk in order to become as successful as Chen Yibing and provides parents with an easy tactic to avoid the failure and backwardness that could result without such advantages.

While the “Liu Xiang-Run Together” and the “Chen Yibing Milk Commercial” figuratively invited viewers to identify with milk as a component of national pride, Yili did this literally in their large campaign for the 2012 Olympic games in London. In conjunction with their campaign theme of “Let’s Olympic Together,” they invited “ordinary” people (pingfan ren, 平凡人) to share their

stories with an audience of “ordinary” Chinese people. Five inspiring videos were produced with the collaboration of Yili and Ogilvy & Mather Beijing.^{xv} According to China Smack Advertising’s website, “Happy Backpackers” was viewed more than ten million times in the first week and “Run Lao Li” was viewed over two million times in the first two days of its release. While the main goal for these advertisements is obviously to promote the Yili brand and milk in general, the approach taken in these two commercials is completely distinct from that of the advertisements featuring Olympic athletes. With the tagline of “Ordinary People Doing Extraordinary Things,” these advertisements target the Chinese population on a personal and accessible level.

“Happy Backpackers”^{xvi} tells the tale of two grandparents, Zhang Guangzhu and his wife Wang Zhongjin, and their adventures backpacking together. Each year they walk farther and farther and are inspired by the fact that the more they move, the more they are able to move. The mountains, they say, “Don’t care about how old you are or how much money you have. They only care about whether or not you’re healthy enough to make it to them.” This beautifully sums up the message of the commercial: what matters most in life, particularly in old age, is one’s health. “These two have been backpacking since the last Olympic games in 2008, having traveled through 46 countries in all seven continents.” The commercial ends with the slogans of this campaign: “There are new sceneries in a healthy life” (jiankang de shen ming, cai you bie yang de feng jing, 健康的生命, 才有别样的风景) and “Let’s Olympic Together” (Yili he ni yiqi ao lin pi ke, 伊利和你一起奥林匹克). The message here is clear: with old age, it is necessary to move, and by moving,

you will prolong your life and be able to continue moving. Drinking Yili milk will allow you to live a healthier life, literally opening up new experiences to you. This commercial provides a message of hope for the elderly who fear they can achieve nothing in their old age and allows them to imagine a longer and healthier life by letting milk inspire them to achieve their Olympics.

This Yili campaign can be considered very non-traditional in its superficial target audience. Firstly, elderly people are less likely to watch television and therefore may not actually see this commercial. Secondly, consumer habits are usually set by age thirty; therefore, senior citizens (i.e. sixty plus years) are unlikely to be affected by these commercials. Their children and grandchildren, however, are likely to be watching these commercials together as they follow the Olympic games.

These younger generations are ultimately the target of commercials like these because they will be the ones purchasing milk in the future. As a result of the One Child Policy, the proportion of elderly people in China is increasing at an exponential rate, and the cohorts of young people are thinning. This poses a problem rooted in sheer numbers—fewer young people are available to care for the elderly; China’s population as a whole is becoming more elderly and decrepit, posing a demographic shift that could have detrimental implications for China’s future as the number of young people continues to decline. Concern for the elderly lies not only in the number of senior citizens but also, more importantly, in the quality of their numbers. According to World Health Organization (WHO) China’s life expectancy is 71 years, compared to the United States’ 77 years, indicating that there are factors contributing to a better overall quality of life in the United States. Lin Diansheng,

Vice Director of the Ministry of Agriculture, stated that milk drinking is important for the future of the Chinese people because there is overwhelming evidence that the Chinese lifespan tends to be shorter not because of illness but rather because Chinese people are not educated about what constitutes a healthy diet (Chen 2003).

These commercials provide us with valuable insight into the prominent concerns of China's younger generations. Based on the ever-present Confucian principle of filial piety, the youngest generation is responsible for the care of all living generations before them. Thus, with only one child, there is increasing anxiety related to caring for the elderly (shan yang, 赡养). Milk allows for a solution to "nurse" the population of elderly back to health and provides a solution to this overwhelming responsibility.^{xvii} Yili appeals to the pressures and responsibilities facing the Only Child generations of China, who must eventually assume the role of caretaker, by providing milk as a preventative substance against even more sickly elderly people.

These commercials present two consequences of milk consumption. First, by consuming milk, one can become a healthier, stronger member of a modern and globalized society. Second, this individual growth will lead to the betterment of the population in the future. Milk provides a way to improve the population quality (renkou suzhi, 人口素质), bearing undeniable implications of a stronger nation as a whole. Milk offers a solution to both the external concern regarding the image of China, as well as the internal concerns of China's youth. Milk consumption in China provides a link to the West by an association that is accessible to most Chinese citizens. Feeding on America's "signature drink"

allows China to assert itself as a prominent member of today's globalized world.

CONCLUSION

"[It] would not be accurate to say that Chinese political and intellectual culture is nothing more than an outpost of mindlessly replicated Western thought. However Western these "Chinese" ideas may be in their origins, it is undeniable that their mere utterance in a non-Western context inevitably creates a modification of their form and content." ("Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China," Chen 2002:2)

The milk industry and its advertisements have provoked a discussion regarding the significant shifts occurring in Chinese demographics. Family structures have shifted so that elderly people form a majority, and the Only Child is left to navigate an unprecedented demographic arena. As the number of elderly people in China increases and the number of children decreases, Chinese Only Children have become the primary focus of the family demographic. Both grandparents and parents subsequently invest all of their efforts on the Only Child; suffering from "compensation syndrome," parents are driven by the anxiety and hope to provide the child with every opportunity they lacked during the Cultural Revolution. This shift in focus to the Only Child allows for two significant phenomena to occur. The first, the "Little Emperor" phenomenon, has led to a generation of spoiled children. The second, a shift in consumerism from the parent to child, creates a new child-driven consumerism that greatly affects marketing tactics. These changes in Chinese demographics

call for a restructuring of cultural understanding and lead to significant socio-cultural changes.

In the United States, milk has always been a natural and normative part of the diet. China, on the other hand, has never considered milk a significant part of its dietary tradition. In fact, milk encounters significant cultural barriers in being absorbed into Chinese culture. It is definitely not the first ingredient that comes to mind when one thinks about China—in fact, upon hearing “milk in China,” many of my peers immediately associated China with the Milk Scandal of 2008. Historically, China had a severe case of “bio-ethnocentrism”^{xviii} and were unwilling, almost unable, to adopt foreign food items. Despite this significant barrier, milk has still been able to establish itself as a significant beverage in China, and the dairy industry has created a growing consumer base in “bio-ethnocentric” context of China. It is exceptional that China was even able to have a milk scandal; twenty years ago, even the idea of such a scandal would be unimaginable, even laughable. The Milk Scandal demonstrates the extent to which milk has been able to entrench itself in a developing Chinese discourse surrounding milk.

Milk and advertising companies played a major role in the adaptation of a developing milk discourse. Advertisements denaturalized Western attitudes and built them back up using culturally significant values in order to create a new milk identity that was suited to China’s cultural context. In addition to promoting milk as a consumer product, Chinese milk companies were attempting to build upon a larger, more significant discourse. These commercials portray milk’s attempt to associate itself with the conversation surrounding the family dinner table. Food is an integral part of family life and culture, linking together

families for the greater purpose of serving a nation. By integrating milk into this discourse, milk companies are trying to form a collective community of drinkers. Milk promotes a strong body, strong family, and, by extension, a strong collection of families: a nation.

Milk advertisements in China point to an overarching purpose that motivates their stories: nationalism. Each advertisement, in some capacity, points to the idea of milk as a nationalist symbol for China. While the “Got Milk?” campaign in the United States was not pointing towards a nationalist aim, Chinese milk advertisements were created with the intension of establishing a nationalist discourse surrounding milk. As a drink associated with healthfulness and nutrition, milk provides a way to improve each individual citizen and, by extension, China as a nation. Through these advertisements, milk companies are hoping to create a cohesive nation that is united through milk.

As my research has hopefully brought to light, milk drinking in China is undoubtedly a practice modeled after the West. This method of borrowing and restructuring is indicative of a more overarching theme within the discourse of Chinese cultural development. Following political and cultural trends in the West, China has long considered the West an authoritative model that represents that which is modern and forward. Due to numerous instances of physical size difference between China and the West, China looks to the West as an authority on what is “healthy” and “nutritious” for the body.

This speaks to the significance of “Occidentalism”^{xix} in China’s present-day discourse. China looks to Western practices in order to adopt relevant and applicable discourses for the purpose of modifying and improving its own culture. This act of adaptation should not be

looked at as a mere imitation, but rather as a conscious act of assimilating ideas and absorbing concepts. According to Xiaomei Chen, this process is more than a suggested appropriation of discourse, as defined by Edward Said. This discourse, rather, seeks to actively mediate between the two cultures in order to find a suitable *entrée* into existing relationships, concepts, and cultural structures. Chen argues that this discourse can effectively have a politically and ideologically liberating effect in non-Western culture (See Chen 2002). Chen uses a model of literary and cultural studies in order to argue the point that these discourses are adapted and transformed in the process of assimilation.

My research speaks directly to this proposed model of cultural assimilation. Milk is not simply absorbed as a symbol of Western ideals and values. It mirrors the West, carefully plucks the discourse from the United States, and molds it into a suitable model for China. Jiang Wen illustrates this point very clearly. He provides the viewer with the positive qualities associated with milk: it is good for the body, and its conception can be molded to fit the pre-existing Chinese cultural discourse. He uses themes such as family, country, revolution, and nostalgia to mobilize all of these existing cultural forces and link them to this new, foreign item: milk. He, in effect, creates a support system for milk in order to assimilate milk drinking as if it were a pre-existing cultural practice.

Food has long been an indicator of socio-cultural norms and practices; it allows a member of society to form identities on an individual and national level. In Chinese culture especially, it is deeply tied to historical traditions and practices, and the ritual of commensality has longstanding implications indicating deeply engrained socio-cultural norms.

Milk, therefore, is a significant indicator of these changing socio-cultural norms.

Andrea Wiley explores the associations surrounding cow's milk in the United States. She points to the American tendency to blindly adopt a nutritional understanding of milk as a substance that is necessary and essential to daily life because of its ability to "help us grow," and she explores the growing trend of milk carrying a universal message, which is prevalent both in countries with well-established dairy industries and in countries with expanding dairy industries, such as China. Milk has even made its way into China's food guide pagoda^{xx} (See Chinese Nutrition Society website).

Since its initiation into China, milk has drawn upon the Western model in order to draw associations between Chinese milk and its American ideological counterpart. China feels an urgent need to decrease the "growth deficit" that has been incurred due to their long-lasting lack of milk consumption; by incorporating milk into Chinese culture, citizens will be able to participate in this global conversation.

While Wiley's model is highly relevant in the United States, its applicability is limited to that very scope, and by no means indicates a universal trend. The idea of milk as an essential part of daily nutrition is still a new phenomenon in China. Milk is slowly integrating itself into China as a new representation of Chinese ideologies. Wiley was right in her claim that food allows us to embody and express our cultural identity (Wiley 2011: 7). For the Chinese, imbibing milk means literally drinking up Western cultural ideological values, though Chinese milk drinkers are not trying to express themselves as embodying Western ideals *per se*. Rather, Chinese milk drinkers face the misconception that Chen discusses in her work on "Occidentalism": while milk

drinking is undeniably linked to Western ideologies, in China it embodies cultural identity in that it has been adapted to the particulars of Chinese culture and society.

Within Chinese society, milk remains in a paradoxical figurative limbo caused by the struggle to assuage discontent between deeply engrained cultural norms surrounding food and the pressure to globalize China. Food is a special commodity, as it ties an individual's biological identity with family identity and, furthermore, with a national identity. As a symbol of modernity, milk consumption appeals to the Chinese desire to become a more prominent and cohesive national identity in today's world. The assimilation of milk as an ideology in China indicates a profound cultural transformation of society. While milk's absorption into Chinese culture is still connected to cultural biases, milk is slowly making its way into the stomachs of China's youth, and will continue to do so as the cultural landscape transforms to adapt to the emerging "globalized childhood" in China.

APPENDIX A: VIDEO AND PRINT ADVERTISEMENTS

VIDEO ADVERTISEMENTS

- "Sanyuan Milk Commercial" A.1
- "Yili-Liuxiang-Run together" A.2
- "Chen Yibing Yili Milk Commercial" A.3
- "Happy Backpackers" A.4
- "Mengniu Children Milk: Happy Family" A.5

A.1 "Sanyuan Milk Commercial (1996)."



Figure 1.1



Figure 1.2



Figure 1.3

从小，我就清楚地记得，姐姐不喜欢喝牛奶。尽管我本来就爱喝奶，可是奶喝多了，精力就过剩。精力过剩了，就...哎！每当这时就只能喝凉水了。

喝着牛奶，好象姐姐并没有走。多年以后，我惊喜地发现姐姐的女儿比自己还象她小的时候。更让我惊喜的是，姐姐居然非常喜欢喝牛奶。原来谎言，也可以如此美丽。“三元牛奶，深爱滋味。细心品味”

From a very young age I remember that my sister did not like to drink milk. Even though I always liked drinking milk, a lot of milk made me filled with too much energy. If I am filled with too much energy ... (sigh). Every time all I could do was drink cold water. Drinking milk is as if my sister never left. Years later, I was surprised to find that my sister's daughter looks even more like my sister when she was young than my sister does. What makes me even more surprised is the fact that my sister absolutely loves drinking milk. Even lies can be beautiful.

(Transcription and still images from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t7IYgXgElqw&feature=youtube_gdata_player)

A.2 “Yili-Liuxiang-Run together”



Figure 3.1

一起来感受冠军品质，天然健康，让你表现更出色，自然健康更出色。伊利纯牛奶。

Let's experience together the quality of a champion, natural and healthy, which makes our performance more exceptional, naturally and healthily more exceptional. Yili pure milk.

(Transcription and still images from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCe7XWP0DmQ&feature=youtube_gdata_player)

A.3 “Chen Yibing Yili Milk Commercial.”



Figure 3.1



Figure 3.2

代表中国的力量，我们只用金牌说话。继续中国男子体操的王者风范。比赛与训练，力量与营养，我们必须面面俱到。伊利，符合中国体育代表团严格营养标准，连续八年提供专业营养支持，为中国骄傲贡献力量，让世界看看中国的力量。伊利，中国队唯一乳制品。

To represent the power of China, we only need to let our gold medals do the talking. Continuing kingly Chinese gymnastics--games and training, strength and nutrition--we need to pay attention to everything. Yili meets the strict nutritional criteria of the Chinese gymnastics team, it has provided professional nutrition support for eight years straight, contributing to the pride of China, allowing the world to see the power of China. Yili, the only dairy product of the Chinese team.

(Transcription and still images from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anKARjt1KgE>)

A.4 “Happy Backpackers.” 第1部 花甲背包客



Figure 4.1

我叫张广柱，她是我的老伴儿叫王钟津，我们既是老两口，也是一对驴友，在各种路上我们已经走了几十年，这几年我们越走越远，就像趁着身体还行，看看这个世界究竟有些什么不一样的东西。其实那些山啊，那些风景根本就不在乎你年龄有多大，你口袋里有多少钱，它们在乎的是你是不是足够的健康，能不能走到它们的面

前。对我们来说，旅行最大的收获是爱情。有了爱的人，哪怕没有一帆风顺的路，却有永远走下去的路。这个世界真是太美了，现在我只有一个心愿，那就是健健康康的，和她一起再走三十年。

Zhang Guangzhu:

My name is Zhang Guangzhu, this is my wife and travel companion, Wang Zhongjin. Even though we're a pair of oldsters, we've been going on all kinds of journeys for decades now. In the past few years, we've been walking farther and farther. We just want to visit more places while we're still healthy and see what other interesting things the world has to offer. Honestly, these mountains, those scenic views, don't care about how old you are or how much money you have. They only care about whether or not you're healthy enough to make it to them. For us, the biggest reward from traveling is love. With love, even if the path isn't always smooth, there will always be a road ahead. This world is so beautiful, and now I just have one wish. I want to travel with her for 30 more years.

On-screen text:

Zhang Guangzhu, age 64; Wang Zhongjin, age 61

Started backpacking since the 2008 Olympic Games

They've traveled through 46 countries in seven continents

There is new scenery with a healthy life.

Let the Yili Group join you at the 2012 Olympics.

(Transcription and still images from http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzgxMzE0NTI4.html)

A.5 “Mengniu Children Milk: Happy Family (2009)”



Figure 5.1

在我们眼中孩子未来充满无限可能。未来星，以专业助力儿童成长，特选有机奶，专为儿童设计成长配方。好牛奶，成就未来之星，未来星，儿童牛奶。

In our eyes, there are unlimited possibilities in the future of our children. Weilaixing (brand name, literally “future star”) contributes professionally to children's growth, we choose organic milk, designed especially for children. Good milk, will make children be future starts, future stars, milk for children.

(Transcription and still images from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EA5sVROCAFI&feature=youtube_gdata_player)

PRINT ADVERTISEMENTS A.6

“更多蒙牛牛奶更多健康动力” Figure 6.1

“奶人多多蒙牛牛奶广告” Figure 6.2

A.6 “更多蒙牛牛奶更多健康动力”



Figure 6.1.

更多蒙牛牛奶更多健康动力。

The more you drink milk, the more health and power you have. (Image from <http://www.tuluo.com/psd%E7%B4%A0%E6%9D%90/%E5%A5%B6%E4%B A%E5%A4%9A%E5%A4%9A%E 8%92%99%E7%89%9B%E7%89%9B% E5%A5%B6%E5%B9%BF%E5%91%8 A>)

“奶人多多蒙牛牛奶广告”



Figure 6.2.

“奶人多多蒙牛牛奶广告”
伊利纯牛奶天然纯正专家信赖

'natural pure milk that the whole family can trust.'

(Image from <http://www.ekoooo.com/html/zhuantisucai/yinpinguangao/201006/13-1885733.html>)

ⁱ For the purpose of my discussion, the “youngest generation” refers to China’s first generation of only children since the One-Child Policy was implemented in 1979.

ⁱⁱ The Opening and Reform Policy was a series of economic reforms implemented in 1978 and led by Deng Xiaoping, which held a goal of Four Modernizations: agriculture, science and technology, military, and industry. The end goal for these series of modernizations was to help China become a modern, industrial nation, and to allow for a new era of interaction with the Outside World. This policy initiated the dialogue between China and the West and encouraged the exchange of ideas between the two.

ⁱⁱⁱ These terms will be explained in further detail later on in this chapter.

^{iv} A professor of marketing at Texas A&M University.

^v The sharing of food as a social, human interaction.

^{vi} Andrea Wiley coins the term “bio-ethnocentrism,” a term referring to the “interpretation of other people’s bodies and behavior only in relation to those of one’s own body and culture, generally with the view that one’s own is ‘better’ than the other, or that one’s own is ‘normal’ and others are deviant of somehow abnormal or pathological” (Wiley 2011:4).

^{vii} One of the best internationally known Chinese athletes.

^{viii} Please refer to appendix A.1 for a full transcription and translation of the commercial.

^{ix} “High-context” versus “low-context” cultures were two contrasting terms that Edward T. Hall defined in his book, *Beyond Culture*. The term refers to the cultural tendency to use “high context” messages in routine communication, and caters to in-groups, having shared similar experiences and expectations (See Hall 1976).

^x The Chinese Milk Scandal of 2008 was a food safety crisis involving milk and infant formula that was tainted with melamine. With over 300,000 victims, this crisis raised major concerns about food safety in China and greatly affected food exports.

^{xi} Please refer to appendix A.2 for a full transcription and translation of the advertisement.

^{xii} Please refer to appendix A.3 for a full transcription and translation of the advertisement.

^{xiii} For another example, please refer to appendix A.6, figure 6.1.

^{xiv} For another example, please refer to appendix A.5.

^{xv} Ogilvy & Mather was also involved in the production of the “Sanyuan Milk Commercial.”

^{xvi} Please refer to appendix A.4 for a full transcription and translation of the advertisement.

^{xvii} For another example, please refer to appendix 6, figure 6.2.

^{xviii} See footnote 6 for definition

^{xix} The inversion of Edward Said’s “Orientalism,” “Occidentalism” refers to images of the West. These images often refer to stereotyped views of the Western world or ideologies or visions of the West developed in either the West or non-West. In this case, the term refers to Xiaomei Chen’s interpretation that the construction of “Occidentalism” as an appropriation of discourse as a defining facet of imperialism. Rather, she argues a more nuanced point, that the appropriation of this Western discourse can actually propagate an ideologically liberating effect on non-Western culture.

^{xx} The Chinese version of the United States’ food pyramid.

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