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JUCHE: NORTH KOREA'S STATE RELIGION

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ABSTRACT

North Korean Juche is commonly viewed as a purely political ideology. However, many of the practices and implementations of Juche model that of a religious organization, making Juche an unofficial state religion.

INTRODUCTION

The Korean word Juche, meaning “self-reliance,” is the political ideology that has shaped North Korean domestic and foreign policy for the past 50 years. Far from affecting only the government leaders, Juche has influenced people of all social classes in North Korea through its implementation as a state religion. While not officially classified as such, Juche has all of the defining elements of a religion and thus plays a structuring role in the citizens’ lives that a traditional religion plays in the lives of people outside the state.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUCHE

The word “juche” (주체) has not always been tied to a North Korean political ideology. This system of thought has undergone a transformative process from an undeveloped ideal to a fine tuned worldview that has shaped how North Korea functions as a nation and interacts with the rest of the world. This evolutionary process has five distinct steps, which mirror the country’s political situation and its contemporary global position.¹

The first of these steps is anti-Japanism. Kim Il Sung was a prominent guerilla fighter who helped lead Korea’s independence movement against Japanese imperialism. While Korea’s independence was not recognized until Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, Kim’s use of Juche allegedly dates back to this period, while he was advocating for Korea’s independence. At this point, however, Juche was more of a slogan than an existing belief system.

Juche further developed into an anti-hegemonic ideology in the 1950s when North Korea found a new enemy, the United States. North Korea’s animosity toward the United States is understandable when considering its nearly despotic control over South Korea during the early years, after a long fight for independence from Japan. North Korea saw its values of independence and autonomy, of Juche, being challenged by the US, with its manipulation and control over South Korean political leaders, destruction it caused during the Korean War, and its continued military presence in South Korea.

The third step was the first time Juche was intentionally crafted to be the nation’s political ideology. By the end of the 1960s, Kim’s concentration on heavy industry had given North Korea a relative economic edge; this was when Juche was implemented to show ideological superiority to the South. North Korea’s advocacy for Juche had three objectives, which could be (and should have been) implemented in both state and individual levels: political sovereignty, economic subsistence, and military self-defense.

Indeed, Kim Il Sung himself said, “Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-reliance in the economy and self-defense in national defense- this is the stand our Party has consistently adhered to.”ⁱⁱⁱ North Korea was to be politically independent and not reliant on countries for trade, building its economy from the inside and focusing resources on domestic goods, as well as a strong military to protect its interests. While this strategy did not help the country continue to grow, it established a Juche economy and solidified the national ideology, giving the people a concrete system with which to identify.

The next time Juche was tied to the regime was particular to Kim Il Sung’s role as the charismatic paternal leader and the establishment of a practice of hereditary succession. In seeing the succession problems of other socialist states, North Korea needed an alternative to a leader elected by the majority, especially since this practice was unheard of in a monarch-dominated Korean history. Kim’s natural ascension to power gave him regal status among the people. Thus the new goal of the regime was to extend this status not just to Kim Il Sung but to his family. This led to myths and stories about his birth, his childhood, and his “supernatural powers.” Similar stories were told about his son, Kim Jong Il, in preparation for ascension as leader of the country. It is such deification of the political leaders in which Juche turns from merely being a political ideology to embodying religious qualities.

Finally, Juche became a *Weltanschauung*, a way of viewing the world that affects everything in the country. The government uses socialization and political education to instill Juche principles in all of its citizens. Music and media are used to further promote the Great Leader and his family. State-run programs and mandatory

practices remarkably resemble common religious practices found in Christianity and other religions across the world. It is at this point where Juche is clearly more than a political ideology; it is a religion that colors how North Korea and its citizens interact with the rest of the world.

DEFINING RELIGION ACCORDING TO MANNER AND MATTER

In defining religion, both manner and matter of belief must equally be considered. First is the way in which the belief is believed and second is the content of the belief itself. In reference to the manner of belief, Professor Frederick Ferré defined religion as “one’s way of valuing most intensively and comprehensively.”ⁱⁱⁱ Ferré holds that in order for a belief to be considered a religion, it must be of significant importance to the believer to justify intense devotion. This is often manifested in personal sacrifice or ritualistic observance. However, this intensity of value alone is not enough. The believer must also hold that the object of valuing is extremely important and relevant to the universe in order for it to be considered a religion. For example, a person can be obsessed with playing video games to the point where one might say that he “plays video games religiously.” However, as long as the gamer does not assert that his game has relevance to the universe, his obsession would not be considered as a religion. The combination of intensity and comprehensiveness in Juche makes this qualification to be classified as a religion. This will be described in detail in the next section.^{iv}

The matter or content of belief is also important in defining a religion. Dr. Edward Westermarck defines religion as “a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being, on whom man feels himself dependent and to whom he makes an

appeal in his worship.”^v According to this definition, there are three key notions that must hold true within a belief system for it to be considered a religion. First, there must be a supernatural being. Second, the believer must feel dependent or indebted to this being. And third, there must be a form of worship or appealing to this being. This worship can take many forms, such as prayer, veneration, pilgrimage, commemoration of events, and the use of sacred texts. Juche ideology satisfies this definition of religion, as I will explain in a following section.

DEFINING JUCHE WITHIN THE PARADIGM OF RELIGION

INTENSITY OF WORSHIP

Intense personal valuing of a belief is shown in common forms of worship. In mainstream Christianity, believers show this by attending church services on Sunday and partaking in communion. Muslims make pilgrimages to Mecca and pray at regular intervals throughout the day. Juche followers are required to attend various indoctrination classes every week. The atmosphere there was described as, “very solemn” and likened to a “divine religious shrine.”^{vi} Followers venerate pictures and statues of Kim Il Sung. They show devotion by answering questions well in class, working hard in the workplace, and singing songs of praise to the Great Leader.^{vii} Every household must have portraits of the Kim family in their household, hanging on their best walls. They are instructed to clean these portraits daily.^{viii} Juche is different from Christianity or Islam in that much of Juche’s worship practices are compulsory. Indeed, North Korean defectors have said that, “It is totally impossible not to follow Juche.”^{ix} This begs the question, how much of this worship signifies true devotion? Philosopher Terry Eagleton

notes that the problem with studying ideology is that “the puzzle of how ideological beliefs can be said to be both ‘lived’ and false.”^x It is possible to fully practice an ideology on the outside and ‘live’ it, but not believe in it. If the people do not truly believe and are simply pretending to do so, much of the intensity of valuing shown is false. However, one North Korean defector’s statement of his personal beliefs is truly telling. After talking about the different study halls he attended and the portrait veneration in which he participated, he said,

“I never thought that Juche or Kimilsungism was a closed or oppressive ideology, but I simply believed it as truth. I thought it was right to say that human beings should make the decisions on all things. I also thought Kim Il Sung is the greatest man who created such a great ideology. I believed that Kim Il Sung provides for all of our needs. Therefore, I could not even imagine being disloyal to Kim Il Sung. When he died, I was sad as much as when my father died. Maybe, most of the North Korean escapees in South Korea were also like me. During all my life, I was brainwashed, believing that Kim Il Sung was the only reason I was happy. I learned to say ‘Thank you father Kim Il Sung’ even when I was a baby. Therefore it is impossible to think of anything else but Kimilsungism.” (34)^{xi}

It is interesting that he calls his own indoctrination “brainwashing.” The word has such a negative connotation in Western society, as we view it as depriving another of a clear, rational thinking process. However when talking about his beliefs, the interviewee was clearly

devoted to Kim Il Sung and had a strong conviction and faithfulness to him. He was participating in worship rituals because he wanted to show respect for Kim Il Sung. There were also accounts of people attending meetings and participating in clean ups when they were not required.^{xiii} In this sense, Juche worship is both compulsory and voluntary. The state forces everyone to participate through mandatory meetings, but the people are so thoroughly indoctrinated that they go above and beyond what is required of them in order to better serve the Great Leader.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

According to Juche theorists, North Koreans have a sacred mission to spread Juche to the rest of the world. North Korea is the only genuinely socialist system left in the world, and as such, is the world's only hope for overcoming the evils of capitalism, consumerism, and materialism. They will face opposition because the world is afraid of being engulfed by such a perfect ideology.^{xiii} This universal application of Juche makes it a prime example of comprehensiveness. The belief must be spread to others, or everything will be lost. The followers support Juche in the short term to spread the ideology in the long term.

DIETY AND DEPENDENCE

In order to demand loyalty from its citizens, the regime has depicted a familial metaphor of the state. Kim Il Sung is the father, the state or the Party is the mother, and the citizens are the children. This becomes very effective since the Confucian concept of filial piety is strong in Korea. Duty to one's parents is important to Koreans, and North Korea "has been unique in East Asia in

literalising the filial piety of nationalism in the family of the leader himself, in effect making Kim Il Sung the universal patriarch."^{xiv}

Another metaphor is drawn in the human body. The leader is the head, or the brain, and the people are the body parts. The Party is considered the backbone. The brain sends directions to the rest of the body directly and through the backbone.^{xv,xvi}

To extend this devotion to the rest of the Kim family, Kim's deification began. Myths of his childhood and early revolutionary years were taught in primary schools. Stories of his family being revolutionary heroes were well known. Soon came stories of sailors singing praise to Kim Il Sung to calm stormy seas. Kim Jong Il was allegedly born atop Mount Paektu under a double rainbow, a magical sign often associated with Shamanism.^{xvii} All of these show the regime's attempt to idealize the Kim family.

Once Kim Il Sung died in 1994, it became widespread that though his physical body had died, his political body lived on in the spirit of Juche. Kim Il Sung became immortal because of his perfect alignment with Juche ideology, and this immortality became the goal for all citizens to achieve. A giant obelisk was constructed and on it engraved, "The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung Lives Forever in our Hearts." Kim Il Sung was appointed the eternal State President of DPRK.^{xviii} This immortalization further deified him, and the veneration practices described earlier show that North Koreans worship him as a god. One defector said, "Kim Il Sung is a god in North Korea,"^{xix} while another, "The pictures indicate that Kim Il Sung is god, and we hang the pictures for the purpose of reminding ourselves that we depend on him."^{xx}

Dependence on Kim Il Sung is another evidence of his deification. North

Koreans are taught at a young age the phrase “Thank you, Father Kim Il Sung.” The previously quoted interviewee also said that he “believed that Kim Il Sung provides for all our needs.”^{xxxi} This shows that Juche teaches that Kim Il Sung is the provider for all and that North Koreans should be grateful to him, as all are dependent on and indebted to him.

IMPLICATIONS OF JUCHE AS A STATE RELIGION

North Korea has made official statements to the United Nations guaranteeing freedom of religion, among other human rights, to its citizens.^{xxii} According to its constitution, citizens are guaranteed “religious liberty and the freedom of anti-religious propaganda.” However, in practice, the state’s attitude seems more in line with this quote from Kim Il-Sung:

“Whether one believes in Christ or Buddha, [religion] is essentially all superstition. Religion has historically been [used] in the service of the ruling class in deceiving, exploiting, and oppressing the people; in recent times it has been used as an ideological tool of imperialists for aggression against backwards peoples.”^{xxiii}

Ironically enough, this could be viewed as the manner in which North Korea has used Juche to “deceive, exploit, and oppress” its people. North Korean defectors agree with this, saying that North Korea views religion as “an opium” and that, “If you have a religion, you will be persecuted, even executed. Juche is the only religion North Korean people can have.”^{xxiv} It is clear that the state does not approve of any thought that is not directly in line with the Juche ideology. When

reports were made of religious movements within the North Korean military, it was a policy that the religion must be “eradicated without delay since it comes from [their] enemies from around the world.”^{xxv} This “eradication” takes the form of public executions or the disappearance of people, presumably taken as political prisoners.^{xxvi}

State-run churches do exist, but there is much speculation about them. Many believe that they are there simply for show to foreign visitors. While worship services are held, one cannot be sure as to whether those in the congregation are true believers, or sent there by the state. This is impossible to tell without interviewing people in the congregation; but scholars and North Korean defectors both believe that these churches are set up and run by the state.^{xxvii}

Thus, it seems that freedom of religion and belief are not so free in North Korea. North Korea’s state ideology is the only religion that is allowed. The government is strictly opposed to any other beliefs that are not in direct correlation with its ideology. In order to keep political power, Juche developed from a purely political ideology into a political religion, in which the Great Leader and the Kim family are deified and venerated in order to retain political legitimacy. Any other religious belief would be in opposition to Kim’s power and is not allowed. North Koreans are free to believe whatever they want- as long as it is Juche.

ⁱ Han S. Park, *North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 20 – 29.

ⁱⁱ Kim Il Sung, *Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea*, (New York, NY: International Publishers, CO., Inc., 1971), 88, URL.

ⁱⁱⁱ Frederick Ferré, “The Definition of Religion,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 38, no. 1 (March 1970): 11, URL.

iv Beginning on page 5.
 v Thomas A. Idinopulos, "What is Religion?" *Cross Currents* 48, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 370.
 vi David Hawk, *Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea*, Nov. 2005, 33, URL.
 vii Ibid., 35.
 viii Ibid., 37.
 ix Ibid.
 x Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction*, (London, United Kingdom: Verso, 2007), 24, URL.
 xi Hawk, *Thank You Father Kim Il Sung*, 34.
 xii Ibid., 36.
 xiii Park, *North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom*, 47.
 xiv Armstrong, "Familism, Socialism and Political Religion in North Korea," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 3 (Dec. 2005): 389.
 xv Thomas Stock, "Dissecting Juche: A Fresh Look at North Korea's 'Total Quest'" (MA thesis, Indiana University, 2012).
 xvi Hawk, *Thank You Father Kim Il Sung*, 79.
 xvii Ibid., 76.
 xviii Armstrong, "Familism, Socialism and Political Religion in North Korea," 384.
 xix Hawk, *Thank You Father Kim Il Sung*, 26.
 xx Ibid., 36.
 xxi Ibid., 34.
 xxii Ibid., 19.
 xxiii Anne Himmelfarb, "Christianity in North Korea: Politics by Other Means," *America* 166, no. 16 (May 9, 1992): 411.
 xxiv Hawk, *Thank You Father Kim Il Sung*, 27.
 xxv "Religion 'spreading like cancer' in North Korea," *National Catholic Reporter*, 43, no. 39 (Sept. 28, 2007): 4.
 xxvi Hawk, *Thank You Father Kim Il Sung*, 29-32.
 xxvii Ibid., 50.

(May 9, 1992): 411-13. ProQuest (AAT: 01084039).
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JAPAN AND THE WORLD'S FAIRS

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ABSTRACT

This essay attempts to highlight the Japanese commission's use of international expositions as opportunities to advance the Japanese national image from 1867 to 1939. A comparison of Asian and Western countries and modes of self-exoticism shows that the commission's efforts were largely successful in instilling a profound admiration for the Japanese people in Euro-American audiences, especially during an age when most Asian countries were colonized.

The Japanese people are the deliberate self-conscious creation of certain individual artists...In fact the whole of Japan is a pure invention. There is no such country, there are no such people...the Japanese people are, as I have said, simply a mode of style, an exquisite fancy of art.ⁱ

-Oscar Wilde, "The Decay of Lying"
(1891)

In 1915 the Panama-Pacific Exposition in San Francisco, California, featured over forty different countries, eight exhibit palaces, and ninety 'living exhibits', making it the most expensive world exposition in history to date.ⁱⁱ Eugen Neuhaus, a member of the international jury of awards in the department of fine arts at the exposition, wrote the following statement in his review after visiting one of the smaller galleries in the Japanese pavilion used to display paintings done in

the "western-style:" "I think the sooner these wayward [artists] are brought back into the fold of their truly Oriental colleagues, the better it will be for the national art of Japan, the most profound art the world has ever seen."ⁱⁱⁱ Neuhaus' evident admiration for traditional Japanese art, however, did not transfer to his feelings towards Chinese art, or the Chinese culture, for that matter. He instead described their art as representative of the country's declining image before comparing it to the brilliance of Japanese art:

There is so much religious and other sentiment woven into [Chinese] art that to the casual observer much of the pleasure of looking at the varied examples of applied art is spoiled by the necessity of having to read all of the long-winded stories attached to many of them. The freshness of youth, the spirit of progress, which enliven the Japanese section, are entirely missing in this display...^{iv}

But what compelled Neuhaus to specifically compare these two countries to each other? Did viewers such as he enter the exposition naturally predisposed to drawing parallels between Japan and China, or were they encouraged to do so after being given the thought by an outside hand? Indeed, this essay seeks to examine the extent to which the Japanese authorities used comparisons between Japan and other countries during world fairs in order to advance their national image, thereby advancing the Japanese

mission to enter the ranks of the great Western Powers.^v As the overwhelming majority of fairgoers were ‘white’ Europeans and North Americans who belonged to Western empires and/or superpowers, the commission understood that demographic as their target audience. By using a set of tools aimed at drawing Euro-American crowds to characteristically Japanese aesthetics and customs, the committee successfully marketed an image of their culture as one of advanced merit. This essay will argue that the Japanese committee’s strategy drew upon self-exotification, a process by which Japan formed its national identity, and comparisons to both European and Asian countries.^{vi}

More specifically, as China had been seen as the source of Eastern enlightenment for a long time before Japan’s string of military successes and rapid modernization, the commission sought to emphasize the differences between itself and China, ultimately designating themselves as the sole guardians of Chinese art and, by extension, all things sacred to East Asian culture. In effect, Japan wanted to be seen as the ‘new’ China, and its efforts were a success among its target demographic. As Euro-American audiences became increasingly receptive to this formulated Japanese image, demand for certain styles and imported items increased. Ultimately, these trends reflected the shifting tastes of Western audiences regarding the ‘Oriental’ appeals they contained, as evidenced by the shift of popular favor from chinoiserie to japonaiserie. Scholars such as Carol Ann Christ and David Beevers make the compelling argument that chinoiserie and japonaiserie never died out as trends, but have instead merely re-surfaced again and again from that point on—alternating but never co-existing in popularity and remaining dependant on their political standings with the West for their survival

at all times. This paper will thus focus more specifically on the lasting comparisons that Euro-American fairgoers drew between Japan and China—as opposed to Japan and any of its other Asian neighbors—as a large consequence of the commission’s intention to bring about precisely this effect. Not only were Euro-Americans the commission’s target audience, but their opinions were also responsible for the creation and sustenance of chinoiserie and japonaiserie. Two world expositions in particular were representative of the time frame 1867-1939: the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904 and the Japanese-British Exhibition of 1910.

THE RISE OF JAPAN

From the years following the 1868 Meiji Restoration (when Japan officially opened up to trade as a country) until around the end of World War I, the Japanese government-appointed commission for world expositions was entrusted with the important task of presenting Japan to the world. Politically and economically, these expositions provided the opportunity to sell products, increase trade, and demonstrate the progress that had thereby been achieved, advancing Japan’s favor with Western audiences that the authorities sought in order to be recognized as a fellow empire. Thus, these expositions were seen as a way of setting up an official narrative of the country, which the Meiji authorities preferred audiences to ‘read’ in a certain, unquestionable way. In a world where countries were usually either the colonizer or the colonized, this organization understood the importance of exhibiting Japan’s ability to modernize, colonize, and emulate the characteristics that classified that of the Western Powers. For their part, Japanese observers noticed the importance of events like the World’s Fair

very early on. The diaries of Japanese statesmen sent on missions to the West during the early years of the Meiji era were full of comments on the various institutions of spectatorship—expositions, museums, galleries, etc.—which were scattered among the major cities of Europe and the United States. In 1869, ‘exposition’ was officially translated as *bakurankai* (博覧会) and listed in an encyclopedia of characteristically “western things” by the man known as the theorist of ‘Japanese enlightenment,’ Fukuzawa Yukichi. By the late 1870’s, expositions were an eagerly endorsed, heavily subsidized tool of the new Meiji government’s promotion of enlightenment through modernization (which was intrinsically linked to Westernization). However, it was also primarily interested in highlighting the differences between Japan and its ‘inferior’ Asian neighbours in order to show a social Darwinism-obsessed world that the Japanese race and culture were different but just as ‘superior’ as that of the Western Powers. In short, the committee needed to present Japan’s resemblance to its fellow colonizers without compromising its treasured uniqueness. One method of achieving this delicate balance was by framing itself against its East Asian neighbours, like Korea and China—both Japanese colonies and legendary giants that were torn apart by internal strife, respectively. Another method was by comparing itself to countries such as Britain and the United States, Western countries of great political and economic influence. These two strategies were simultaneously applied to the committee’s structural plan regarding the creation of the Japanese image.

JAPAN AND THE COUNTRIES NEXT DOOR

In order to examine Japan’s comparison to its East Asian neighbours, one must first understand the historical context in which certain attitudes were fostered. After China was defeated in the first Opium/Anglo-Chinese War (1839-1842), and continued to fare badly in the second one, it was led to the negotiating table with Britain, France, Russia, and the United States to form the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858. This treaty in effect opened up China by force as it exacted certain demands: All Western countries involved were given the right to station legations in Beijing (a closed city at the time), eleven more ports were to be opened up for trade, and foreign vessels (including warships) would be allowed to navigate the Yangtze river freely.^{vii} France and Britain especially began to assert their authority in certain key cities and ports from then on. The French concession in Shanghai became more than double the size of any other international concession and the number of French expatriates by 1915 swelled to over 60,000.^{viii} Britain controlled the mouth of the Yangtze and Pearl rivers as well as all international ports.^{ix} In 1911 the Qing dynasty was forced to dismantle, ending China’s line of royalty.^x In short, China’s desire to retain its autonomy was crippled under the foreign powers it strove to compete with.

Japan was similarly pressured to ‘open’ its doors when Commodore Matthew Perry forced the Tokugawa shogunate to sign the Kanagawa Treaty in 1854. However, it seems that Japan learned from China’s experiences with foreign nations as China had prolonged dealings with the West even before the Treaty of 1858. As Sugita Teiichi, a prominent Meiji intellectual who championed the vision of a unified East Asia, stated,

Westerners have come to East
Asia, fighting for their interests,

each wanting to assert hegemony [over East Asian countries]. My friends and I [i.e., the Japanese] lie within the contested sphere, and we are wondering if we should be their main course or if we should move forward and join the guests at the table. It is certainly better to sit at the table than to be served as the entrée like China.^{xi}

Japan also demonstrated its military might with its victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1905-1905), the latter of which secured its control of Korea as a colony. However, Japan's great victory over Russia was not without dire costs. Western leaders such as President Roosevelt understood that the only reason why Japan did not demand more land or rights from Russia was because "She was bled white" from famine, financial exhaustion, and a staggering loss of men.^{xii} Yet Japan's success still drew unexpected admiration from those who had underestimated the abilities of a newly introduced, racially 'inferior' country.

By 1904 at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, Japan had already begun to expand upon such nascent admiration for its capacity to supersede its neighbours. It also had no qualms in displaying its newly acquired colony of Formosa; many Meiji statesmen such as Andō Fujio, viewed China as a "sick old man" (病める老翁) and Japan as a "lively youth" (潑刺足る少年).^{xiii} While Andō acknowledged that Sino-Japanese interests were bonded together in many ways, he maintained that Japan was now the centre of "Eastern enlightenment," and that "the stalwart, heroic youth of the nation of cherry blossoms has arisen and taken over for the old man, while the old man...leans on the shoulder of the beautiful youth full of hope and love."^{xiv} At this point, Korea

was not yet a colony, but Formosa was. In the official catalogue of the Japanese pavilion, it was described as "of course, a possession of Japan in every sense of the word," and was thus a model, historical illustration of Japan's achievement as a world power. A photo series displayed the progress that Japan had implanted in native Formosans from an initial state of savagery and headhunting to the current lifestyle of tea leaf-picking in orderly rows (Fig.1, Fig.2).^{xv} In Figure 1, a reconstruction of pre-colonial Formosa shows Formosan dolls dressed in loose swathes of cloth and clunky metal jewellery to illustrate their humble beginnings. On the left, a woman sits on the ground next to her baskets of collected plants and, presumably, her child, who plays with a twig. Next to them, on higher ground, stands a heavily accessorized, grimacing man, who points at them in a fully authoritative posture (legs set wide apart, finger in the air, rigid back, elevated position). His feathered headdress and layers of jewellery imply that he is an important figure who could easily be construed as a tyrannical, savage ruler far from the likes of the democratic bureaucrats of civilization. To the right of him stand two spear-wielding lookouts in similarly ornate attire. Surrounding the dolls are palm trees, shrubs, and rocks, set against a mountainside backdrop devoid of any habitats—perhaps implying that the people depicted live a primitive hunter-gatherer, nomadic lifestyle. This is in stark contrast to the scene constructed in Figure 2, where Formosan women seem to have found their purpose in life by putting themselves to work harvesting tea leaves—free at last from the male savages who formerly dictated their lives. The women are dressed in Qing dynasty attire and wear flowers in their neatly groomed up-dos. Behind them stands a prominently dressed Japanese supervisor in a Western-style outfit of crisp white

clothes, a tie, a cane, and a straw hat. His attire and position evoke the image of the American plantation and slave-owning 'Massa;' his attractive female workers further emphasize this evocation as one recalls the sexualization of the feminized 'other' inherent in the colonial discourse. Thus, the Japanese man represents the new institution of authority: one governed by orderliness, democracy, and technological advancement. By feminizing the Formosans (one of the key characteristics of the Orientalist gaze, as defined by Edward Said), the Japanese organizers constructed here a visual narrative of masculine domination and enlightenment established by, and therefore able to be read by, members of the Western public.^{xvi} Such an assertion of visual language exemplifies the colonial modes that were heavily integrated into the exhibits on Japanese colonies. Accompanying the Formosan doll exhibits was a narrative linking Japan's status as an empire to that of its Western 'allies:'

The representation of the island of Formosa...shows the aptitude of our allies for colonisation...[Under] the firm and steady administration of the Japanese...the whole island is rapidly becoming civilized. A life-like and full-sized model of an aboriginal village conveys to visitors an excellent idea of the original, and the present condition of the island is shown by a collection of agricultural products.^{xvii}

As well-planned as this exhibit was, however, at the same exposition Japan was faced with an unpleasant surprise. Frederick Starr, an anthropologist from the University of Chicago, had brought in several Ainu tribesmen and women as 'living exhibitions' (Fig.3); they were then

placed in the same sector as Japan, which was allocated to countries of the Orient.^{xviii} The acknowledgement of the Ainu people's existence posed a problem for the Japanese commission as attempts to 'Japanize' them by the colonial administration in Hokkaido had failed miserably, undermining any assimilationist claims that would contribute to one basis for Japanese imperial expansion. Moreover, the fact that the Ainu had been the original inhabitants of certain Japanese islands threw into doubt the imperial genealogy by which the official government was authorized. Unlike the Formosans, therefore, the appearance of the Ainu threatened rather than supported the image of the Japanese colonialist cause. Members of the committee responded by using the widely believed theory of social Darwinism in their favour against the Ainu. As the Ainu had been classified by anthropologists such as Starr as 'Caucasian,' this made it easy for believers to see how an 'inferior' race could eventually surpass their Caucasian co-inhabitants.^{xix} Uchigasaki Sakusaburō, an ardent advocate of Taisho democracy, published the impressions of his visit to the exposition in *Taiyō*, noting that staff members running the pavilion had no reserves in pointing out such a 'fact' when confronted by inquiring visitors.^{xx} The results of the staff's efforts couldn't have been more successful. By the end of the fair the World's Progress Publishing Company, a temporary printing company set up specifically for the publication of materials pertaining to the fair, published an illustration of an evolutionary hierarchy consisting of twelve races (Fig.4). In it, the Japanese ranked third, yielding only to the Russian and the "Americo-European." Ranked in sixth place was the Chinese, and ranked in tenth was the Ainu. On the one hand, this social Darwinian ladder exemplifies the commission's triumph in

propagating their denigration of the Ainu. On the other hand, although the Japanese held the third highest rank, they were represented as female, in direct contrast to all of the other races, which were personified as male. Feminization is undeniably a key feature of the Orientalist's degrading gaze; however in this case the feminization of the Japanese may have sanctioned rather than hurt their status in the Far East as represented by the woman's facial features, which bear a resemblance to the allegorical figure who holds the "torch of Enlightenment" and the "book of Wisdom."^{xxxi}

Like the treatment of the Ainu, when the colonization of Korea was solidified in 1910, Japan added a Korean exhibit to their pavilion at the 1910 Japan-British Exhibition (Fig.5). The timing was somewhat awkward, given that the formal annexation of Korea had only occurred a few months earlier. Nevertheless, the *Official Guide* defended the decision on the grounds that "Korea is Japan's protégé, and there is such a strong affinity of interests...that this attempt to portray Japan as a colonizing power would not be complete if Korea were not represented."^{xxii} The accompanying Korean display illustrated how Japan had "awakened Korea out of her long sleep, and improved the country and the condition of her people," providing its "protégé" with all the appurtenances of modernity such as railroads, sanitation, and taxation.^{xxiii} South Manchuria, Formosa, and Ainu settlements were also shown as imperial accomplishments of the Japanese government (Fig.6, Fig.7). It is worth noting here that the photograph taken of the Ainu village in Figure 7 shows 'inhabitants' huddling around fire logs with the men holding various weapons. Regardless of the intended recreation of the "Feast of the Bear," the scene portrays virtually every trait prescribed to 'primitive' cultures: basic

mud and thatched-roof buildings, a lack of furniture (implying a nomadic existence), and weapons that indicate a hunter-gatherer mode of subsistence as opposed to an agrarian one. Overall, South Manchuria, Formosa, and Ainu settlements were represented in similar fashions to that of Korea but were much more muted by diplomatic concerns. Mutsu Hirokichi, one of the organizers that year, conveyed his attempts to mitigate potential anti-Japanese sentiments in a report that documented his visit to the Chinese Consul, who had "expressed his great regret that for the Chinese exhibits from Manchuria to be treated in just the same way as those from Taiwan it would offend the Chinese in general."^{xxiv} Indeed, objections raised by the Chinese as a result of offensive exhibitions were an issue to be treated with delicacy ever since the 1903 "World's Natives Building" incident. In 1903, on the eve of the fifth Industrial Exposition held in Osaka, a news report detailing plans for a living exhibition featuring 'the Chinese race' was released.^{xxv} This news infuriated many Chinese students living in Japan, who saw this as the last straw of a conspiracy to portray the Chinese as barbarians, especially by showing women with bound feet and opium addicts as "typical Chinese barbarians."^{xxvi} Students took to the streets in protest and the authorities officially cancelled the Chinese portion of the show to minimize the unwanted attention.^{xxvii}

Although China was not a Japanese colony, scholars such as Carol Ann Christ have made the argument that it was presented as such by the Japanese. Okakura Kakuzō, who was invited to become the first head of the Asian art division at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, facilitated the committee in refining their approach to presenting Japanese art in 1904.^{xxviii} As a distinguished

scholar, Okakura's opinions carried weight at home and abroad, especially regarding the pan-Asian vision for which he gained such recognition. Okakura believed that "Asia [was] one" in its humiliation caused by the encroachment and domination of the Western Powers over Asian lands, and that Japan stood "alone against the world" without "the benefit of a living art in China."^{xxxix} Ironically, this pan-Asian view took on a paternalistic and colonialist attitude of its own; Okakura asserted that Japan was the sole guardian of Chinese art as the "old and disenchanting" Chinese had "long since cast [their art] away."^{xxxix} It was therefore up to Japan to defend its cultural roots and ailing neighbor by adopting a protective stance over China, in lieu of a Western Power. Hoshi Hajime, a journalist who published a bilingual newspaper on the fairgrounds and wrote the 1904 handbook of Japan, echoed Okakura's sentiments in his 1902 article written in English for the magazine, *Japan and America*: "The nations of the West shall not be allowed to transform the soul of [the Chinese] people, no matter how much they may hack and cut at their flesh."^{xxxi} Okakura and Hoshi worked together to design the Japanese fine arts exhibition and its catalogue through which they portrayed China as requiring Japanese protection and cultural conservation.^{xxxii} In doing so, they helped capture the combined titles of colonial power and beacon of Asian culture. The Western press, who had long been aware of the land claims staked by several Western countries in China, fell in complete agreement with Hoshi and Okakura.^{xxxiii} In effect, the Japanese joined the West in denigrating China as they enjoyed the status it won them at China's expense. According to Hoshi's catalogue, five 'ancient' works by Chinese artists were included in the display of Japanese art, exemplifying Hoshi and Okakura's intended image of Japan as a conservator

as opposed to a beneficiary of Chinese culture.^{xxxiv} In this way, Japan tried to render China as a Japanese colony in essence.^{xxxv}

Another factor that contributed to the success of this image as a conservator was the fact that the Chinese fine arts were scattered throughout the St. Louis fairgrounds. As China had surrendered control of its customs system to Great Britain after the Opium Wars, British authorities such as Sir Robert Hart, the inspector general of Chinese Maritime Customs for almost fifty years, were put in charge of distributing and allocating Chinese artworks.^{xxxvi} Although Hart had worked for modernization in China from the beginning of his tenure by supporting the Chinese royal family as well as the formation of the Chinese navy and national postal service, his plans to present China as a cultured, modernizing country through its art were derailed by the executive decisions of Halsey C. Ives, the chief of the Department of Art for the St. Louis fair.^{xxxvii} Ives had long been an intimate friend of Shugio Hiromichi, the Japanese commissioner of fine arts, and considered himself a great admirer of Japanese art. In his letters to Shugio, Ives intimated that he made certain changes to accommodate the Japanese. "You will find," he wrote, "that I have had in mind the work of the Japanese artists in forming the classification [of art]...[and] in designing the building."^{xxxviii} Indeed, in the last few hours before the opening of the fine arts palace, Ives decided that there was no room for Chinese art; all artworks from the collections of Chinese viceroys were reclassified as "applied art," moved to the liberal arts building, and temporarily excluded from the official fine arts catalogue.^{xxxix} Consequently, a separate Chinese art catalogue was suddenly needed, which resulted in a short run of printed catalogues devoid of any pictures. Francis Carl, a cousin of Robert Hart and

head of the Chinese Commission in St. Louis, only gave protest at the insistence of Hart.^{xl} When space was eventually found, the reinstallation of Chinese art was done so poorly that Ives issued an order requesting that only certain works be moved to the fine arts palace and placed “fully exposed” in their cases as opposed to shielded by glass.^{xli} The person in charge of deciding which works were to be moved is unknown. However, the most important point of this politically imbued mess is the fact that although Hart sent a spectacular array of ancient and contemporary works—ranging from lacquer ware to paintings and bronze work—the only representative image that remained in the fine arts palace by the end of the fair was a portrait of the empress dowager painted by Kate Carl, an American and yet another of Hart’s cousins.^{xlii} Regardless of the reasons for this particular selection, the decisions that went into creating the final result directly reflects the crucial roles that foreigners like Hart and Ives played in determining how the Euro-American public perceived Japan and China through their displays of art (or lack thereof). This event also highlights the debate held between Western ‘inside men’ such as Hart and Ives, who took sides when it came to defending the Asian countries held dear to them and acted accordingly. Clearly, the Japanese commission also relied on the personal help of Western authorities to aid the causes that helped shape their desired national image. Regarding this treatment of China through the handling of Chinese visual arts, Japan once again, as with all the other examples listed above, made use of the nations and peoples flanking it to emphasize its imperial glory by contrast.

JAPAN AND THE WEST

To return to Neuhaus’ statement, which so belittled Western-style Japanese art in favor of more traditional works, we see that his opinion provides an appropriate segue into the examination of Japan’s comparison to Western countries. Scholars such as Alicia Volk and Angus Lockyer have extensively covered the self-exotification or reverse-Orientalism inherent in the committee’s attitudes towards Japanese art and pavilion architecture at expositions. Volk uses both “reverse-Orientalism” and “reverse Japonisme” as interchangeable terms that refer to “the dialectic of Japan’s modern identity formation.” This dialectic was formed out of a realization that occurred when the integration of Japonisme ‘hit home’ so to speak, and foreign ideas concerning Japanese art were put to use in Japan as a direct consequence of its increased visibility overseas. More specifically, “The primitivist and Orientalist conceptions of difference that are the basis for Japonisme...were also broadly appropriated in Japan across all modes of presentation in a type of self-fashioning that saw its most vigorous manifestation in the visual arts.”^{xliii} Indeed, if Said describes a facet of Orientalism as the West promoting presentations of ‘other’ cultures in ways that Westerners themselves had fashioned, Volk’s description of ‘reverse-Orientalism’ refers to instances in which a culture adopts and claims those Western perceptions for itself in an effort to promote its own interests through this mode of self-fashioning for a Western audience.^{xliv} This was exactly the attitude that the Japanese commission adopted in constructing the design of its exhibits and pavilions. In other words, a doubling of gazes took place: Japan saw itself through the eyes of the West and used that image to impress the Euro-American public at world expositions. By doing so, a Japanese national identity was created for both the

Westerners and the Japanese people to believe in.^{xlv}

Indeed, both Volk and Lockyer agree that the commission first and foremost catered to the Euro-American audience's demand for the exotic before considering their own agenda. In order to give the public what they wanted to see, the commission employed advisors such as David R. Francis and Imre Klralfy, both of whom belonged to that demographic and could assist in tailoring the pavilion's design to suit the public. In 1904, David R. Francis, the President of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, advised that Japan's art exhibits not be too "Westernized."^{xlvi} As a result, the authorities chose to hang Western-style works in a separate, smaller gallery compared to the seven "spacious" galleries set aside for traditional art—a decision Francis praised as reflective of Japan's "true" sense of art.^{xlvii} Even though Japanese Impressionists such as Kuroda Seiki were fast becoming acclaimed artists at home and abroad (Kuroda won a silver medal at the 1900 Universal Exposition in Paris, although he was not affiliated with the Japanese pavilion), the Japanese jury only selected one oil painting for display based on Francis' advice.^{xlviii} Like Francis, Klralfy assisted in planning the pavilion's landscape architecture at the 1910 Japan-British Exhibition. As Commissioner-General, Klralfy's input was highly valued, and when he suggested the following attractions he was met with little resistance: "An old Japanese street with full life produced;" a Japanese village; reproductions of temples; "Lantern Feasts!;" restaurants; tea houses; wrestlers (Fig.8).^{xlix} In Figure 8, for example, we see a reconstruction of a "typical" Japanese village, which was intended to immerse Euro-American visitors in the life of an 'average' Japanese citizen. As members of that demographic walk across the installed

'river' and in front of the painted background of misty mountains and vertiginous bridges, two hired Japanese 'villagers' converse with each other, seemingly unaware of the crowd coming toward them. Perhaps the two actors were just conversing as co-workers, but one should at least consider the strong possibility that they were in the act of role-playing—purposely ignoring the crowd to strengthen the immersion experience for them. This was the extent to which the commission wanted fairgoers to indulge in Japan's own form of Orientalizing itself.

Like the pavilions in previous years, Klralfy recommended that the 1910 pavilion also feature Japanese gardens. In the middle of the two gardens was a teahouse, where visitors could enjoy tea served by young women in traditional costumes, helping to transport fairgoers to a sort of fairyland (Fig.9, Fig.10). Figure 10 is a photograph of the tea-serving women who were stationed in the gardens. Together, they flank a waterfall; two women sit pensively on rocks while another woman in front of them purposelessly leans down to play with the water. They all seem to be oblivious to the camera, recalling the peeping, 'male gaze' so prevalent in both Western and Japanese canons of art history.¹ In the background, two more women pop out from the foliage as if they were friendly woodland creatures or mythical forest-dwellers. Evidently, these women conveyed a sense of docility, feminine modesty, and exoticism—traits that appealed to the average fairgoer who wanted to see this picture of Japan exactly. One gleeful visitor described it as a must-see place to go, if anything, "just for the pleasure of being served by the dainty and charming maidens whose English is as limited as it is delightful."^{li} Such a statement recalls the feminizing, sexualizing Orientalist gaze described by

Said, and it exemplifies the successful reverse-Orientalist effect that the committee desired and factored into all aspects of their pavilion.^{lii}

Alongside the efforts to emphasize their own 'Oriental' uniqueness, however, the committee still drew direct comparisons between Japan and the Western Powers. As early as 1867, displays explaining the geography of Japan described prefectures and landmarks as "the Sheffield of Japan," and "the Notre Dame of Japan."^{liii} As late as 1939 at the New York World's Fair, historical buildings were described as "designed to produce a spiritual effect akin to that awakened by the classic temples of ancient Greece."^{liv} In effect, this simultaneous pushing towards and pulling away from a strong resemblance to the West stimulated mixed responses from audiences. For example, on the one hand, the unofficial *Penny Guide* in 1910 attempted to use phrenology to match the Japanese anatomy with the British one in order to explain Japan's historical accomplishment.^{lv} On the other hand, most visitors were uninterested in seeing the similarities between themselves and the Japanese. For instance, it was "deeply depressing" for the editors at the *Daily Express* "to encounter... uncomfortable middle-aged Japanese thrust into black trousers and other 'improvements.'"^{lvi} There was a vacillation between admiration at the speed at which Japan had learned the lessons of modernity, and a plaintive regret that the transformations had affected the Japanese tradition. Such a reaction fits with Homi Bhabha's description of mimicry as one of the most successful forms of colonial power in that "no matter how polished the imitation of the colonizer by the colonized, their ethnic/racial difference always exists as a subtext of any appearance, performance, or accomplishment."^{lvii} However, this mixed response is also indicative of the

success that the commission had achieved in a world that wanted to categorize everything; for them, the escape from a label was an escape from bad opinion.

The Fight for the Westerner's Heart: How Japonaiserie Succeeded Chinoiserie

Returning to Kilralfy, his predilection for Japanese gardens indicate more than just the committee's reverse-Orientalist proclivities; they are also representative of the discourse of japonisme, a stylistic mode based on Orientalist notions that infiltrated the realm of art and trade alike, fuelling japonaiserie trends.^{lviii} Volk directly attributes the vogue for Japanese *objets d'art* to the succession of international expositions held between the 1860's and 1910.^{lix} Indeed, the gardens at the 1910 exhibition were so popular that the landscape architects who designed the grounds, Ozawa Kenjirō and Honda Kinkichirō, were asked to design a permanent garden at Clingendael in The Hague, the Netherlands. Such was the nature of the botany craze among the elite Euro-American *fin-de-siècle* public. Imported crafts like bronze cranes, stone lanterns, bonsai stools and complete garden structures like gates and rest houses were readily used in Japanese gardens in the West.^{lx} Interestingly, however, the plants and rocks themselves were more often than not imported from China.^{lxi} Botanists and Geologists like Joseph Rock and Bailey Willis were nicknamed "The Plant Hunters" for their commissioned expeditions to northern China to explore the botanic variety of 'Shangri-La;' they sent thousands of specimens back to their homelands and changed the face of Western gardens forever (Fig.11).^{lxii} Willis, whose expedition won him a gold medal in 1910 from the Geological Society of France, compared the Chinese plant specimens used for Japanese-style gardens to Indian

spices used to season English dishes; in both cases the style in which the imported goods were prepared was considered more important than the origin of the goods themselves because style is reflective of a public's admiration for the culture behind it, regardless of the materials used for its creation.^{lxiii} Moreover, the fact that Willis' book was entitled, *Friendly China*, and was written for the purpose of "promot[ing] a proper understanding of the Chinese people, whose steadfast self-respect and unalterable philosophy of life are forgotten in the turmoil of recent political events" highlights the West's shift in preference, based on political relations, for Japan and japonaiserie from its eighteenth-century predilection for China and chinoiserie.^{lxiv} This shift was, in large part, due to Japan's created image of itself as a formidable East Asian empire, based on comparisons to its neighbors like China, and the Western public's desire to believe in that image, as reflected by their demand for Japanese goods and styles.

Chinese objects, according to Christ, still remained relatively valuable or collectible at world expositions even when japonaiserie became the new trend, although the Chinese pavilion had little to do with representing those items. As mentioned before, Great Britain had control over the Chinese customs system, which resulted in a wide distribution of Chinese objects across fairgrounds as they were arranged by their city, treaty port, or province of origin (as opposed to their media or technique under the responsibility of the Chinese pavilion).^{lxv} The Chinese catalogue was also arranged in this way; the subcategories after location were manufacturers, dealers, or collectors, most of whom were British or French in management.^{lxvi} Thus, there are virtually no reviews of the 1904 Chinese pavilion itself; apparently, fairgoers were far more interested in reviewing Chinese

arts and crafts because they saw those items as representative of China's national image.^{lxvii} This was in contrast to the way visitors evaluated the Japanese pavilion as an embodiment of the entire country. Such a mode of evaluation was, in some ways, beneficial to Chinese interests as it promoted the lucrative Chinese sale of items by making it easy for fairgoers to place orders, thus indirectly bringing in much needed capital into Chinese coffers.^{lxviii} In other ways, however, this dispersion of Chinese goods emphasized the already disorganized, nonsensical Euro-American view of China both at and outside of world expositions. Edward Schneiderhahan, a visitor interviewed by the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* newspaper, remarked that he "cared little for the China section" because "somehow it always impressed you as topsy-turvydom."^{lxix} His description strongly correlates with the description presented by David Beevers, editor of *Chinese Whispers: Chinoiserie in Britain*, who argues that chinoiserie gained popularity in the first place because of its associations with "topsy-turvydom:" female sensibility, opulence, asymmetry, the rococo, the exotic, and the gothic.^{lxx} Thus, perceptions of nonsensical Chinese pavilions may not have sourced the success of Chinese items among Euro-American buyers, but they certainly fuelled it as the whimsical themes and, therefore, the aesthetic appeals of chinoiserie lived on in Western minds.

Despite the popularity of Chinese objects described by Christ, the rise of japonaiserie around the turn of the century outmatched the desire for chinoiserie by far. Starting from around 1856, the demand for japonaiserie began to rival and challenge the demand for chinoiserie.^{lxxi} As anyone acquainted with the basic principles of economics knows, the demand for one commodity does not actually alter the demand for its rival, and so it was regarding the sales of Chinese

items; they were not significantly reduced in sales but were instead reduced in fashionable merit as the craze for japonaiserie grew.^{lxxii} Heather McKenzie, author of *Madame Chrysanthème As an Item of Nineteenth-Century French Japonaiserie*, directly attributes the rise in the popularity of Japanese goods to the exposure that Westerners had to those items at world expositions. As these fairs were seen as “a combination of the Olympics, Disney World, the Superbowl, and the National Gallery” back then, and drew over 50 million visitors in total on average by 1900, the display of foreign art and crafts at expositions “played a major role in stimulating consumer trends and interest, prescribing fashions, and forming expectations” both inside and outside of the fairgrounds.^{lxxiii} For example, department stores like Liberty’s of London and Le Bon Marché (in Paris) featured displays related to the fairs and temporarily increased their stock of associated items. Additionally, the timing of large-scale musical or dramatic productions that drew on Orientalist themes often coincided with the timing of expositions, further enhancing the popularity of certain aesthetic, culturally based trends.^{lxxiv} Thus, unsurprisingly, around 1900, the displays in department stores began to focus on Japanese themes, and plays such as *Madame Chrysanthème* took off in fame as the Japanese commission’s tactics to garner Euro-American admiration progressively proved to be effective.^{lxxv} This shift in desired goods from Chinese to Japanese ones, this shift in trends from chinoiserie to japonaiserie, is chiefly responsible for the comparisons that fairgoers like Neuhaus drew between China and Japan as the two countries were reduced to two starkly different national images in the Western mindset. Yet, in a way, these countries were seen as the same in that there was only ever one niche for Japan *or* China to

fill, in the Euro-American world of Far Eastern-based styles.^{lxxvi} For example, La Porte Chinois, a well-known outlet of Chinese objects in Paris, eventually diversified to Japanese objects as well and became the meeting place for many japonaiserie enthusiasts like Burty, Charles Baudelaire, Edgar Degas, and Edouard Manet.^{lxxvii} Such a fact aptly illustrates this Orientalist, mish mashed, trivialized view of the two countries as being ‘the same thing’ to viewers in many ways. In short, although the Euro-American public understood that Japan and China were similar and different in many ways, they largely accepted an awry view of this concept. Instead of understanding that the two shared many cultural roots and yet had distinctly different cultures, they believed in a perspective that associated all positive traits with Japan, all negative traits with China, and treated both countries, in the end, as just foreign ‘others’ of abstract interest.

In a way, this widely endorsed perception can hardly be surprising. Just as the eighteenth-century public’s desire for all things rococo, whimsical, and gothic paralleled the peak of chinoiserie’s popularity in the eighteenth-century, the nineteenth-century public’s admiration for rationalization, order, and Darwinian progress paralleled the height of japonaiserie’s popularity. Yet it seems that neither of these trends ever died out; Beevers, Kuitert, and Volk agree that they merely alternated in succession from then on, although the length of the periods that each trend enjoyed varied according to the historical and political changes that accompanied it.^{lxxviii} As we have seen, the committee’s careful manipulation of its exhibits stimulated a strong interest in japonaiserie and Japanese styles. Surely then, these world fairs can be construed as the decisive events that solidified the desired image of Japan as the exemplar of Asian progress. The fact that the

characteristics associated with japonaiserie, in reference to Japan, continued long after the craze quelled in the late nineteen-twenties (in favour of chinoiserie once more) demonstrates the lasting impacts that the Japanese commission's design had on the Western mind.^{lxix}

The success of the Japanese commission was contingent upon the success of the similarities and contrasts it drew, according to which comparisons were most advantageously presentable, between itself, the Western Powers, and its East Asian neighbors. Perhaps the best measurement of their achievement is through the concurrence of Japanese and Western opinions concerning Japan's national image. The illustration of an evolutionary ladder in 1904, printed by the official publishing company of the St. Louis World's Fair, visually proves that the Japanese commission's efforts to create an admirable national image were overwhelmingly successful (Fig.4). Culturally, the committee's running use of self-exoticism prompted the formation of the Japanese national identity as well as the Euro-American audience's desire to emulate Japanese styles through certain Japanese imports. Such displays of reverse-Orientalism highlight the inevitable and complex offshoots of the Orientalist discourse. As the Orientalist gaze is considered a forceful one, the doubling of gazes inherent in reverse-Orientalism questions the presumed level of subjugation that Japan suffered because of its own acceptance and propagation of Western notions of Japanese culture. The progress of Japan's national image was in contrast to the way countries like China were viewed—as the Japanese image advanced, the Chinese image declined, relegated to the ranks of Korea, Formosa, and other colonies seen as manufacturing resources instead of cultural paragons in their own rights. Japan's assumption of

the role as sole conservator of Chinese art solidified this idea. Consequently, the switch in favor from chinoiserie to japonaiserie exemplified the West's acceptance of the Japanese image of superiority in East Asia as China had formerly been seen as the center of Eastern Enlightenment. Moreover, the perpetuation of these trends, which has continued to alternate in popularity from then on, forces us to accept that the automatic comparisons drawn between China and Japan, that were fostered in a colonial world obsessed with the measurement of race, are still very much alive in Western mindsets today. Yet, one must see that the Japanese committee's actions were largely in response to the rapid spread of empires that engulfed Japan's shores even before it opened its doors. Indeed, the Meiji authorities' careful navigation of politics and presentations ensured its national security for next seventy years—a feat among its less fortunate neighbors. From 1867 to 1939 the Japanese commission's attempts to forge the image of a unique empire in the minds of Westerners illustrated, through their exhibitions, a newly emerged visual language of melded Orientalist and colonialist persuasions, which they had learned to speak fluently.

APPENDIX



Fig.1: “Formosans.” Tableau in Palace of the Orient, Japan British Exhibition. *Official Report*, 282.



Fig.2: “Formosan Tea Planation.” Tableau in Palace of the Orient, Japan British Exhibition. *Official Report*, 282.



Fig.3: ‘Living exhibits’ brought in by Frederick Starr at the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition. Francis, 155.




Fig.4: “Types and Development of Man,” chromolithography by World’s Progress Publishing Co., 1904. Christ, 691.




Fig.5: The Korean exhibit in 1910. Hotta-Lister (pages not shown).



Fig.6: The Formosan exhibit in 1910. Hotta-Lister (pages not shown).



Fig.7: The Ainu exhibit in 1910. Hotta-Lister (pages not shown).



Fig.8: Recreation of a "typical" Japanese village (with painted background) in 1910. Hotta-Lister, (pages not shown).



Fig.9: "The Peace Garden" (with painted background) in 1910. Hotta-Lister (pages not shown).



Fig.10: Women in traditional Japanese attire in one of the Japanese gardens in 1910. *Official Guide*, 54.



Fig.11: A member of Bailey Willis' entourage in 1904. Willis (pages not shown).

ⁱ Wilde, Oscar, *Intentions*. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2004), 46-47.

ⁱⁱ For the sake of consistency, this essay will use 'exposition' when referring to these events instead of 'fair' or 'exhibition,' but will resort to using the latter terms when it is necessary to emphasize distinct changes. "Living exhibits" refer to people showcased as representatives of a tribe or culture. On the expense, see Neuhaus, Eugen. "The Galleries of the Exposition: A Critical Review of the Paintings, Statuary and the Graphic Arts in the Palace of Fine Arts at the Panama-Pacific International Exposition." San Francisco: P. Elder and Co, 1915. vii.

ⁱⁱⁱ Neuhaus, 38.

^{iv} *Ibid.*, 38-39.

^v This essay will use 'authorities,' 'commission,' and 'committee' more or less interchangeably as the research done here has suggested that these organizations were viewed as such. It should also be acknowledged that although members involved in these groups varied and changed, the overall purpose of all committees appears to have been the same.

^{vi} Reverse-orientalism, according to Alicia Volk, refers to the "primitivist and Orientalist conceptions of difference that are the basis for Japonisme" and how those perceptions were appropriated in Japan through "a type of self-fashioning that saw its most vigorous manifestations in the visual arts." See Volk, Alicia. *In Pursuit of Universalism: Yorozu Tetsugorō and Japanese Modern Art*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010, 16.

^{vii} *A History of China* (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 176.

^{viii} *Ibid.*

^{ix} *Ibid.*, 177.

^x *Ibid.*, 203.

^{xi} Fogel, Joshua A, *The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1996), 83.

^{xii} Benfey, Christopher, *The Great Wave: Gilded Age Misfits, Japanese Eccentrics, and the Opening of Old Japan* (New York: Random House, 2003), 263.

^{xiii} The Louisiana Purchase Exposition was also known as the St. Louis World Fair. Formosa was the former name of modern-day Taiwan; it was ceded by the Qing regime to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895. On Fujio, see Andō, Fujio. 支那漫遊実記. Tōkyō: Hakubunkan, 1892. 25-27.

^{xiv} Regarding the Sino-Japanese bond, Andō uses a Chinese expression often used in Japan that describes Sino-Japanese interests as united like the bond between lips and teeth—without the former, the latter is unprotected. *Ibid.*, 28.

^{xv} Francis, David R, *The Universal Exposition of 1904* (St. Louis, Mo.: Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co, 1913); Lockyer, Angus. *Japan at the Exhibition, 1867-1970* (2000), 146.

^{xvi} Said, Edward W, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 3.

^{xvii} Ōi, Kōji, *Louisiana Purchase Exposition, St. Louis in 1904: A Collection of Official Guidebooks and Miscellaneous Publications* (Kyoto: Editions Synapse for Eureka Press, 2009), 48-49.

^{xviii} The Ainu or Utari are the indigenous inhabitants of Hokkaido and the Kuril islands. In Japan, however, they have yet to gain recognition as 'indigenous' or 'native.' On the Ainu, see Lockyer, 161.

^{xix} *Ibid.*

^{xx} *Taiyō* was considered the most popular Japanese recreational magazine at the time. Uchigasaki, Sakusaburō, *Eikoku Oyobi Eikokujin 英國及英國人* (Tōkyō: Fuzanbō, 1914), 65-67.

^{xxi} Christ, Carol Ann, "The Sole Guardians of the Art Inheritance of Asia: Japan and China at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair" (*Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 8.3, 2000, 675-709), 689.

^{xxii} *Japan-British Exhibition, 1910: Official Guide* (Derby: Printed by Bemrose & Sons, 1910), 45-49.

^{xxiii} *Ibid.*

^{xxiv} Hotta-Lister, Ayako, *The Japan-British Exhibition of 1910: Gateway to the Island Empire of the East* (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1999), 155-156.

^{xxv} Yang, Jui-sung 楊瑞松, "Jindai Zhongguo Guozu Yishi Zhong De 'Yeman Qingjie'—Yi 1903 Nian Riben Dahan Renruiguan Shijian Wei Kexin De Tantai" 近代中國國族意識中的「野蠻情結」—以1903年日本大阪人類館事件為核心的探討, *Xin Shixue 新史學 (New History)* 21.2 (2010): 107.

^{xxvi} *Ibid.*, 148-149.

^{xxvii} *Ibid.*, 107.

^{xxviii} Christ, 681.

^{xxix} Virtually all of Okakura's books were published in Japanese as well as English to please his Western readers. *Ibid.*, 683.

^{xxx} *Ibid.*

^{xxxi} Hoshi, Hajime, "Japan's Role in the World Drama," *Japan and America* 12 (1902): 20), *WorldCat*.

^{xxxii} Christ, 683.

^{xxxiii} According to Harold Collins, the op-ed editor of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, Japan's "efforts to shelter and keep safe" Chinese artworks was "noble and philanthropic in gesture." Christ, 684.

^{xxxiv} Hoshi, Hajime, *Handbook of Japan and Japanese Exhibits at World's Fair, St. Louis 1904*. (St. Louis, 1904), 51.

^{xxxv} Christ, 677.

^{xxxvi} Christ, 692-693.

^{xxxvii} *Ibid.*, 693, 695.

^{xxxviii} *Ibid.*, 696.

xxxix Ibid., 701; Francis, 317.

xl Christ, 702.

xli Ibid.

xlii China was given only two positions on the prestigious painting jury, and they were not held by Chinese citizens but by Hart's cousins, Kate and Francis Carl. Naturally, this fact may have played a role in determining which 'Chinese' work was to remain in the fine arts palace. Francis, 317; Christ, 702.

xliii Volk, 10, 16.

xliv Said, 1.

xlv Ibid., 16.

xlvi Francis echoed Neuhaus' sentiments in his statement: "...it was a pleasure to study a national collection from which had been eliminated all work of foreign technique. It is a source of regret to observe a strong tendency, shared by so many of the younger Japanese, to forsake the purity and fine qualities of their native art for characteristics, the outgrowth of a civilization and educational training opposite to their own... ." Francis, 359.

xlvii Ibid.

xlviii On Kuroda, see *Kuroda Seiki the Master of Modern Japanese Western Painting* (近代日本洋画の匠). Tōkyō: Tōkyō Bunka Zai Kenkyū Jo 東京文化財研究所, 2007. 219. According to Francis, only 247 works out of the 712 offered were selected for exhibition. However, according to the catalogue, the only oil painting mentioned is a self-portrait by Chiyoji Yazaki. Thus, even if other forms of Western-style art were selected alongside Yazaki's painting, one has good reason to infer that the small gallery mentioned by Francis must have contained a very scarce sample of art indeed (Francis, 359). On the catalogue, see *The Exhibition of the Empire of Japan: Official Catalogue, International Exposition, St. Louis, 1904* (St. Louis: Woodward and Tiernan Printing, 1904), 57.

xlix Lockyer, 154.

¹ Starting from the Heian period, the term *kaimami* (垣間見) appeared as an erotic literary motif to describe instances in which a man peeps through a small gap to gaze at an unsuspecting woman. This term later carried on into evaluations of visual art. For the 'male gaze' see Mulvey, Laura. *Visual and Other Pleasures*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 14.

² Walker, Alicia S., *Savage to Civilized: The Imperial Agenda on Display* (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008), 49.

³ Said, 3, 190.

⁴ Morford, Henry, *Paris in '67, Or, the Great Exposition, Its Side-Shows and Excursions* (New York: G.W. Carleton, 1867), 208.

⁵ *The Japanese Pavilion, New York World's Fair, 1939* (New York: Japanese World's Fair Commission, 1939), 5.

⁶ Lockyer, 148.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Dean, Carolyn S., "Copied Carts: Spanish Prints and Colonial Peruvian Paintings" (*The Art Bulletin*. 78.1 (1996): 98-110), 104; Bhabha, Homi K., "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,"

October 28, *Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis* (Spring, 1984): 125-133.

⁹ 'Japonisme' is a term that technically varies in definition. It was originally coined in 1872 by the influential art critic and collector Philippe Burty. The authoritative French dictionary, *Le Robert*, defines it as "an interest in items from Japan, particularly for Japanese art" or "a Japanese influence on art." Volk extends this definition of 'Japonisme' to "a constellation of ideas concerning what Japanese art was, is, and could be—part of a larger effort to identify cultural difference in the geopolitical context of late nineteenth-century modernity. It was a product of the mutual 'discovery' of the peoples of Japan and Europe..." 'Japonaiserie' usually denotes tangible products of 'japonisme;' *Le Robert* defines it as "objects, usually of art, curios coming from Japan or of a Japanese style." In this study, 'japonaiserie' will be used according to this definition. For Volk's definition see Volk, 16. For the history of the word 'japonisme' and *Le Robert's* definition, see McKenzie, Heather. *Madame Chrysanthème As an Item of Nineteenth-Century French Japonaiserie*. University of Canterbury. French, 2004. 13.

¹⁰ Ibid., 17.

¹¹ Kuitert, Wybe, "Japonaiserie in London and the Hague: A History of the Japanese Gardens at Shepherd's Bush (1910) and Clingendael (c. 1915)," *Garden History: the Journal of the Garden History Society*. 30.2 (2003), 222-223.

¹² Ibid., 225.

¹³ Huttleston, Donald G., *Eight Famous Plant Hunters / Donald G. Huttleston* (New York: Brooklyn Botanic Garden, 1946), xiv-xv.

¹⁴ Willis, Bailey, *Friendly China: Two Thousand Miles Afoot Among the Chinese* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949), 33-34.

¹⁵ Ibid., xiii-xiv.

¹⁶ Christ, 693.

¹⁷ Ibid., 700.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Leigh, Edward, "Celebration of Louisiana Purchase Centennial a Roaring Success" *St. Louis Post Dispatch* (St. Louis) April 31, 1904.

²¹ Beevers, David, *Chinese Whispers: Chinoiserie in Britain, 1650-1930* (Brighton, England: Royal Pavilion & Museums, 2008), 18, 24, 59.

²² McKenzie, 150.

²³ Ibid., 144-145.

²⁴ Ibid., 151.

²⁵ Ibid., 154.

²⁶ *Madame Chrysanthème* is a novel written by Pierre Loti, which inspired the play (under the same title) and Puccini's opera, *Madama Butterfly*. Ibid.

²⁷ Beevers, 81.

²⁸ McKenzie, 155.

²⁹ Beevers, 81; Kuitert, 227. Volk, 13-14.

³⁰ Beevers, 90.

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MILITARY GAY COMRADES:

Negotiating the Homosocial(ist) Identity in Mainland China's Tongzhi Fiction

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ABSTRACT

As a sub-genre of online Comrade Literature, Military Comrade Stories (军事同志小说 *junshi tongzhi xiaoshuo*) from mainland China stand out as a body of fiction that is directly concerned with the ramifications of social control in Chinese society. These stories address the ambiguous sphere of homosociality in the Chinese military experience by featuring *tongzhi* as men serving in China's national army, playing with the dual identification of *tongzhi* associated with both military comrades and gay men. This paper considers the ramifications of homosexual characters disrupting the Chinese heteronormative power paradigm when they serve in the military. A close analysis of "Commitment" 《承诺》 (2008) by Qing Feng (青风), with a focus on the shifting relationship between the two male protagonists, presents a novel perspective on the nexus of homosocial friendship and homosexual desire in the Chinese context. "Commitment" subversively repositions homosexual characters traditionally oppressed by China's Communist regime within the figure of a military comrade who is closely associated with that persecuting authority. Thus, this paper posits that the modern understanding of *tongzhi* signifies the ideological formation of Communist comradeship and homosocialist bonding, exposing homoerotic tensions at the core of China's socialist ideology.

MILITARY GAY COMRADES

Billy Bragg's song, "Tender Comrade,"ⁱ limns a sentimental view of an affectionate soldier seeking compassion and consolation in the arms of another comrade during World War II.ⁱⁱ The song plaintively questions what a "tender comrade" will tell others about his relationships with other soldiers:

Will you say that we were heroes
Or that fear of dying among
strangers
Tore our innocence and false
shame away?
And from that moment on deep in
my heart I knew
That I would only give my life for
love

Brothers in arms in each other
arms
Was the only time that I was not
afraid
What will you do when the war is
over, tender comrade?
When we cast off these khaki
clothes
And go our separate ways
What will you say of the bond we
had, tender comrade?ⁱⁱⁱ

These lyrics depict the ambiguity of homosocial affective relations inherent in the camaraderie between soldiers. The imagery suggests a fluid boundary between the sexual and nonsexual dimensions of male same-sex intimacy

that antedates the influence of gay activism and the making of a discrete homosexual identity.^{iv} While specifically situated in a Western context, “Tender Comrade” evinces a thematic universality about the nature of intimate male-male bonding. In particular, the song speaks to Foucault’s broader vision of homoerotic friendship and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s notion of a homosocial^v and homosexual continuum in affective same-sex relationships.

Along these lines, Military Comrade Stories (军事同志小说 *junshi tongzhi xiaoshuo*), a sub-genre of online Comrade Literature, addresses the ambiguous sphere of homosociality in the Chinese military experience. This category of stories feature *tongzhi* as men serving in China’s national army, playing with the dual identification of *tongzhi* associated with both military comrades and gay comrades. Although military service is central to the construction of most States, where serving in the armed forces is often considered a defining characteristic of patriotic citizenship, it is often also where homosexuality is most clearly codified and scrutinized. Thus, *tongzhi* characters in Military Comrade Stories are men torn between their national duties, ideas of self and family, and sexualities. They symbolically represent patriotic men upholding Communist ideals and stereotypes of heterosexual masculinity in the army. At the same time, however, the social bonds between these men gesture at homoerotic intimacy, controverting preconceived notions of homosexuality. Therefore, Military Comrade Stories portray the continuum of homosocial and homosexual relations when *tongzhi* characters renegotiate the presumed links between masculinity and militarism, sexuality and State.

This paper considers the ramifications of homosexual characters’

disruption of the Chinese heteronormative power paradigm when they serve in the military. A close analysis of “Commitment” 《承诺》 (2008) by Qing Feng (青风),^{vi} with a focus on the shifting relationship between He Shuai and Weijun, presents an interesting perspective on the nexus of homosocial friendship and homosexual desire in the Chinese context. “Commitment” subversively repositions homosexual characters traditionally oppressed by China’s Communist regime within the figure of the military comrade who is closely associated with that persecuting authority. This paper posits that the modern understanding of *tongzhi* signifies the ideological formation of Communist comradeship and homosocialist bonding, exposing homoerotic tensions at the core of China’s socialist ideology.

MILITARY COMRADES: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL IDENTITY OF TONGZHI IN THE CHINESE ARMY

As a sub-genre of Comrade Literature, military *tongzhi* fiction stands out as a category of stories that are directly concerned with the ramifications of social control in Chinese society. The label *tongzhi* has a long history, originating in the early Qin Dynasty (221 BC - 206 BC), where it was originally used to refer to people with the same ethics and ideals.^{vii} The term “Comrade” (同志 *tongzhi*), which literally translates as “same will” or “of the same intent,” is commonly associated with Sun Yat-Sen’s famous quote, “the revolution has not yet succeeded; comrades we must struggle still.”^{viii} During the Communist Revolution (1921-1949), the Chinese Communist Party appropriated *tongzhi* as an honorific address term reserved for Chinese Communist Party revolutionaries who shared the same goal to overthrow

the Nationalist government and establish Communism. Being addressed as *tongzhi* during this time required the addressee's Party membership or demonstration of commitment to the Communist Revolution, often symbolizing recruitment into the Revolutionary Army.^{ix}

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Party promoted the use of *tongzhi* as a new address term to replace previous referents to an individual's social status and class.^x As part of the Party's strategy to establish an egalitarian system, the use of *tongzhi* was extended from soldiers in the Revolutionary Army to the general public as a generic and politically correct address term for everyone in China regardless of social class or gender. This popularized use of *tongzhi* over the past few decades has made this address term a political symbol loaded with Communist ideological connotations. Interestingly, it has now been reappropriated as the most popular word used to refer to Chinese homosexuals, gay men in particular.^{xi,xii} By taking the most sacred title from China's mainstream Communist ideology, *tongzhi* establish a sexual identity while also reclaiming a distinctively Chinese familial-cultural history.^{xiii} The term invokes the voice of Chinese revolutionaries striving to establish a new government, uniting *tongzhi* members and activists on the basis of shared beliefs and goals – to advocate for the equality of homosexuals in China.

Given the discursive history of *tongzhi* and how the meaning of the term has changed over time, it is unsurprising that *tongzhi* writers would take advantage of a polymorphic *tongzhi* character in Military Comrade fiction. This stylized use of *tongzhi* creates polysemic texts that undercut dominant political, social, and sexual discourses in modern China. Along the lines of this reading, Military Comrade Stories reveal how Mainland China's emergent *tongzhi* discourse integrates the

sexual into the social, political, and cultural. In Chinese communist scholarship, the People's Liberation Army, also known as the Chinese Red Army (红军 *hongjun*), is consistently endorsed as a model to be emulated for the nation's social and economic development.^{xiv, xv} The critical development prompting this dogma is the nation-wide campaign to "Learn from the Experience of the People's Liberation Army in Political and Ideological Work" launched by an editorial on the *People's Daily* in 1964.^{xvi, xvii} Aside from ardently commending the military's techniques and policies, the government's public rhetoric also endowed the army with numerous other virtues that were worthy of emulation. Accolades given ranged from "patriotism" and "a supreme revolutionary spirit" to honesty, discipline, courage, and admirable self-conduct.^{xviii} In other words, Comrades in the armed services were valorized as ideal men. Ultimately, the objective of this campaign to learn from the PLA was to fortify the Party's active leadership role in controlling China's economic and social development.^{xix} To this day, the Chinese national army still remains the symbol of Party control, strength, and political loyalty.^{xx}

Against this backdrop of the PLA's political and historical significance, the writing of homosexual relations into the Chinese military and mainstream Communist ideology does indeed borrow from the armed forces to do "political and ideological work."^{xxi} Military Comrade Stories thus harbor the potential to simultaneously undermine repressive sociopolitical and sexual discourses by framing issues of male same-sex relations from a multi-layered perspective. "Commitment" is one such novella that presents the continuum of homosocial and homosexual behaviors through a

tongzhi character that blurs the boundaries between military comrade and gay man.

In the first volume, the story recounts the experiences of He Shuai, the son of a wealthy and well-connected family, after he joins the army. Upon turning 18 in 1983, He Shuai announces to his parents that he has decided not to take the college entrance exams, but instead will volunteer for military service despite an ongoing war. Because of his arrogance and spoiled behavior, He Shuai is detested by the other soldiers. He is assigned a derogatory post, taking care of the pigpen until his mother visits him and gets him transferred to Squad Two, one of the National Army's "model units."^{xxii} He meets his Sergeant and Squad Leader, Lu Weijun, and the unit's 10 other soldiers. After training for several months, He Shuai achieves some acceptance amongst the other soldiers, but the squad is sent to China's contested border region with Vietnam, a place rife with sporadic conflicts. At the front lines, the group fosters an intimate community of mutual support as they face war's violence and death, doing their best to help each other through the ordeal. Near the end of the war, He Shuai is accidentally left behind after spraining his ankle and Weijun turns back to look for him. The two men struggle to get out of a forest in enemy territory, dealing with heavy storms and the need to find water and food. They each in turn get wounded or sick and must be tenderly ministered to by the other. After staying overnight in an abandoned hut to shelter from the rain, they are ambushed by Vietnamese soldiers. He Shuai is injured in their attack, and Weijun swears to risk his life to ensure He Shuai is taken back to safety. He Shuai's next memory is of waking up in a hospital bed, and his mother tells him that Weijun had passed away during battle. He Shuai believes that Weijun had sacrificed his life to save him, and swears

to live a socially respectable life by attending university, succeeding in his career, and getting married, promising to name his children after Weijun to honor him.

The second volume fasts forward 11 years, where He Shuai is wealthy and married, but has sustained a permanent limp from the war and is haunted by dreams of Weijun. His wife, Zhou Lili, is seeking a divorce to leave him for another man. One day, He Shuai is shocked to see Weijun at a bar in "S city." He Shuai learns that Weijun had survived and tried to look for him after the war, but since He Shuai had been out of the country, the two men did not cross paths again until that day. For the past few years, Weijun had been fighting in illegal boxing competitions to earn money. After spending some time together, the two men confess and acknowledge their gay love for each other as a culmination of their brotherly camaraderie from shared military experiences. He Shuai, upon receiving news that his father is in poor health, decides to move back to Beijing to take care of his parents. He Shuai also convinces Weijun to quit fighting and move back to Beijing with him to start their new life together. After several melodramatic plot turns, in which multiple characters proclaim their straight or gay love for either He Shuai or Weijun, causing misunderstandings that almost cause the two to sever the relationship, the two men finally end up together. The story ends on a lighthearted note where He Shuai and Weijun publicly declare their "marriage" during an outing at Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

At first glance, "Commitment" does not appear to be a story about homosexuality at all, but rather a sociopolitical critique of China's turbulent Communist history over the past few decades. The setting during the Sino-Vietnamese border skirmishes of 1979 up

until the 1990s fought by the Chinese People's Liberation Army also invites this analysis (Chen 1987).^{xxiii} This time frame coincides with the initiation of Deng Xiaoping's opening up reforms, ushering in a period of rapid socioeconomic development and instability vis-à-vis government power.^{xxiv, xxv} Given this context, it is unsurprising that descriptions of the army experience in "Commitment" are brimming with references to symbols and slogans of the Communist Party.

The story is drenched in red imagery: fresh red blood, blooming red flowers, and blushing or angered red faces. Two main characters have the word "red" (红 *hong*) in their names as well – Wang Shaohong (王少红) and Jianhong (建红). This imagery invokes references to red as the color of the Communist Party, and specifically the *Little Red Book* (小红书 *xiaohongshu* or 红宝书 *hongbaoshu*) of Chairman Mao quotations that formed the bedrock of the Cultural Revolution. The names of several characters in the novel are also borrowed from real-life Party officials; in particular, Li Feiyue (李飞跃)^{xxvi} and Li Gang (李刚)^{xxvii} are both well-known Comrades presently working as government officials for the Chinese Communist Party. This direct reference to Party officials caricatures their personas to criticize the homosocialist Communist government system, especially when all the soldiers in the novel turn out to be gay.

Aside from soldier names that parody actual Party officials, others echo the Communist practice of name-changing (改名风 *gaimingfeng*) to make individual names sound more revolutionary.^{xxviii} For example, the characters Lu Weijun (陆卫军) and Luo Weiguo (罗卫国) have fictional names that respectively mean "protect the army" and "protect the country," reaffirming

Communist discourse propagated during the Cultural Revolution that emphasized patriotism and a revolutionary spirit. In general, the sustained use of names and themes associated with the Communist regime makes reference to and criticizes the fact that many key Party leaders have extensive military backgrounds, influencing their ideological convictions.^{xxix, xxx}

Despite the explicit references to politics and class struggle symptomatic of China's rapidly changing social environment, "Commitment" presents more than a critique of the Communist regime – it also specifically focuses on how relations between men are bound up in patriarchal institutions. The novella conveys the continuum of male homosocial bonding as it intersects with male friendship, filial piety, class distinctions, national duty, and homoerotic desire. In Eve Kosofsky's study on *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire*,^{xxxi} she argues that the act of "draw[ing] the 'homosocial' back into the orbit of 'desire,' of the potentially erotic, ... is to hypothesize the potential unbrokenness of a continuum between homosocial and homosexual – a continuum whose visibility, for men, in our society, is radically disrupted."^{xxxii} In the Chinese context, Military Comrade Fiction reflects this continuum of male homosocial and homosexual relations. Indeed, the military gay *tongzhi* identity internalizes and deploys this tension from within the national army to critique China's larger framework of State power.

In "Commitment," the portrayal of one of the most important establishments of Chinese national culture – the People's Liberation Army – is done in an admixture of a preoccupation with institutional discipline and fascination with the situational homosocial desire that accompanies the world of men and militarism. When He Shuai enters the

army as a new recruit, he is immediately immersed in a strict disciplinary environment where “nobody cares where you come from, if you are the brother of a prince, or whatever power your parents may have, [because] here, [they were] all soldiers. This was a military troop, not a place to fool around.”^{xxxiii} Initially, He Shuai rebels against these strict disciplinary practices and is penalized by being consigned to serve as the pigpen caretaker. Later, when he joins Squad Two, Sergeant Lu Weijun warns him that “people cannot live like pigs” and that members in Squad Two “are wolves, and do not welcome pigs.”^{xxxiv} Nonetheless, it is because of these protocols and the desire to “not be a pig” that He Shuai is compelled to “work harder than ever before,” enabling him to establish good relations with fellow soldiers.^{xxxv} This sense of camaraderie amongst Squad Two soldiers is what eventually fosters strong homosocial bonds that blur the boundary between homosexual and heterosexual relations, particularly when the novella portrays an almost seamless progression from military *tongzhi* to gay *tongzhi* with an emphasis on male same-sex friendship.

In the midst of the stigma and shame associated with male homosexuality, intimate friendship between men has remained a consistently idealized model of same-sex relations. In his 1981 interview for the French magazine *Gai Pied*, Foucault offers a specific site for homosexuality’s development when he elaborates on the value of friendship for the gay community’s political and ideological future. “Friendship as a Way of Life” posits that “homosexuality is not a form of desire but something desirable” where “the development toward which the problem of homosexuality tends is the one of friendship.”^{xxxvi} Foucault describes queer male same-sex relations as one that is “still formless” in which partners “have

to invent, from A to Z, ... the sum of everything through which they can give each other pleasure.”^{xxxvii} In this way, Foucault cultivates friendship as a mode of homosexual existence, opening the philosophical canon of friendship to new and troubling avenues of desire and social refusal.

When drawing upon the military to elucidate his argument about homosexual intimacy posing a challenge to general social norms, Foucault states that “[t]he institution is caught in a contradiction” because “affective intensities traverse it which at one and the same time keep it going and shake it up.”^{xxxviii} The army epitomizes this contradiction when “love between men is ceaselessly provoked [*appele*] and shamed” and “institutional codes can’t validate these relations.”^{xxxix} Instead, these male same-sex relations “with multiple intensities, variable colors, imperceptible movements, and changing forms ... short-circuit [institutional codes] and introduce love where there’s supposed to be only law, rule, or habit.”^{xl} Foucault’s reflections on homosexual friendship gesture toward an enhanced recognition of what can be troubling in male-male companionship, and suggest how institutional structures such as the military facilitate those intimate relations. Rather than short-circuiting institutional codes, the male bonding depicted in “Commitment” simultaneously rehearses and inverts the tension between homoerotic desire and hegemonic power. After all, homosocialism is crucial to create the lines of desire and affective relations that undergird and activate the State’s ideological power, contributing to the formation of (sexual) subjects. In this view, Military Comrade fiction problematize the figure of a gay Chinese soldier, juxtaposing homosocialist camaraderie with homosexual intimacy to

renegotiate preconceived notions of male *tongzhi* relations.

The portrayal of a soldier's duty to both his family and nation manifests conflicting ideas about what kinds of behavior should define masculinity and an ideal man in contemporary Chinese society. Images of the family and themes of filial piety preside over the view of same-sex relations presented in "Commitment," especially as issues of national identity, gender, and class intersect through male homosocial narratives. Throughout the novella, He Shuai and other main characters talk about their families or responsibilities as filial sons, both in terms of their duty to national service as well as in marriage and raising a family after the war. It is clear from the start that all the men are of different social classes and it is only the army that brings them together, facilitating interactions that would not have happened outside the institution.

Despite these differences, the soldiers in Squad Two all share an ambition to be filial sons throughout their military service.^{xli} Filial piety is mentioned at several points in the story, where characters such as Lu Weijun and Liu Dazhou state that their "biggest aspiration after the war" is to "get married," "have a son," and be "a good man."^{xlii} However, He Shuai's relationship with his mother throughout "Commitment" upends the expected relationships concerning preconceived notions of masculinity, national identity, and filiality, contesting heteronormative conventions of the family.

Although He Shuai frames his decision to join the military in filial terms of "protecting his family [and] country" and "serving his duty" as a good son and citizen, the discordant mother-son relations resulting from such behavior contradicts traditional ideals of filiality.^{xliii} When He Shuai announces that he wants

to join the army, he does so in rebellion against his mother's wishes: Zhao Yunfang adamantly "warns" him that "if [he] tries to sneak past [her] to volunteer at the army, [he] no longer should consider [her as] mother."^{xliv} This recurring image of the family connotes parallels to the family model for State organization in socialist ideology and traditional Confucian philosophy central to Chinese culture and politics.^{xlv} The conflict between national duty, promoted by the government as an act epitomizing filial piety, and the rupturing of parent-child family relations criticizes the Chinese State's contradictory rhetoric in the 1980s. In a letter to his parents before being dispatched to the frontlines, He Shuai dramatizes this tension when articulating his decision to reject his parent's attempts to pull him out of the army. He Shuai writes that he "knows ... that he has repeatedly shamed [his parents] as their son" in going against their wishes and "causing them worry," but emphasizes that he is "desperately training" to "sacrifice for his country ... for honor ... [and] to prove that [he] is not worthless."^{xlvi} As this letter reveals, it is an act of ostensible "bravery" and hyper-masculinity embodied by a soldier going to war that is portrayed as a son's disrespectful, "unfilial," and "disagreeable" behavior towards his parents.^{xlvii}

In contrast, it is only in the second volume of "Commitment" that the narrative indicates He Shuai finally achieves the status of a filial son. This inflection point occurs after He Shuai and Weijun acknowledge their love for each other and have started making plans for their future together, including gay marriage. After He Shuai's father passes away, he informs his mother of his plans to move back to Beijing and live together with Weijun so that he can better care for her: "He Shuai told her about his future

plans, and the old woman was elated... Zhao Yunfang did not know what else to say, ... her heart felt comforted – comforted by her son’s filial piety.”^{xlviii} Zhao Yunfang’s implicit acceptance of her gay son as filial demonstrates the elision of references to homosexuality in conflict with filial piety throughout the novella. This representation gestures at a range of homosocial and homosexual acts compatible with cultural traditions. Although framed in terms of filial piety and duty as a male Chinese citizen, involvement in the People’s Liberation Army is portrayed as behavior that clashes with cultural values. In contrast, *tongzhi* relations evolving from military comrade experiences are indirectly endorsed as desirable for united families – and by extension, a compassionate and cohesive society.

COMRADES IN ARMS: AFFECTIVE GENDERED RELATIONS IN MILITARY CAMARADERIE

“Commitment” articulates the relationship between homosociality and homosexuality in forms that resist conventional discourses of masculinity and militarism. Indeed, gay males populate the portrayed national army, suggesting the ways in which the presumed links between masculinity, militarism, and heterosexuality should be reconfigured in contemporary society. The text reappropriates the patriotic soldier figure to signify homoerotic tensions inherent within the male camaraderie at the root of a successful national military. By queering the brotherly love between soldiers in Squad Two of the National Army across several decades, “Commitment” portrays the homosocial nature inherent in all male same-sex relationships, rethinking the nature of homosexuality vis-à-vis intimate friendship and patriarchal institutions.

The dynamic interaction between homosocial bonding and military asceticism in “Commitment,” rather than suppressing homosexuality, actually generates or reinforces queerness. Under strenuous conditions facing life and death, and the banality of life after facing death, the homosocial-cum-homosexual party in question is forced to recognize and create a new space in which same-sex relational desire can find acceptance.

Foucault’s notion of friendship as an alternative form of intimacy provides a useful interpretive lens to analyze how “Commitment” presents homosocial/sexual relations grounded in an image of reciprocity and care between men. These male bonds are essential in keeping soldiers on the battle lines as biopolitical subjects willing to fight and die for the State. Accordingly, the men in Squad Two help each other cope with the rigors of military life, the anxieties of battle, the depression of seeing other soldiers being injured or killed, and provide mutual moral support. In the trenches, they tell stories to keep each other’s minds off the rat infested and dirty environment around them.^{xlix} When He Shuai kills another man for the first time and feels sick with remorse, it is Jin Gui, another Comrade, who consoles him by telling him “not to think about it” and “not to be afraid” because they “are killing the enemy [in a] self-defensive war.”^l They sing heartwarming songs to comfort each other when they start to get homesick, and tend to each other’s wounds when someone is injured.^{li} It is only through these close relationships that the men are able to make it through the war together, driving them to proclaim that “[they] will be brothers in this life and the next” and that “the ones who survive ... must continue to live for [their] brothers who have died no matter what.”^{lii} Within this context, the extent to which military comrades depend on homosocial relations

for survival reflects Foucault's notion of intimate same-sex bonding as "a desire, an uneasiness, a desire-in-uneasiness" that truly does become "a matter of existence."^{liii}

Themes of gender fluidity and homoerotic desire traverse He Shuai and Weijun's relationship with the portrayal of gender performance as well as recurring references to gazing at the moon, illustrating a progression from military to gay *tongzhi* relations. In a story that appears to concern itself with war, power, and political commentary in recent Chinese history, the first prominent scene revealing gender ambiguity and homoerotic desire as thematic motifs occurs when the men play Catch Old K (捉老K), a game where players draw cards to determine the "Elder Master" (老大) and the "Little Brother" (小弟). The first pairing is between Jin Gui and Wang Shaohong, where the latter is dared to "deliver a love confession to the girl in [his] heart."^{liv} Wang Shaohong expresses an "internal monologue" that leaves the others soldiers speechless:

There is someone in my heart. I don't know when it was I started liking him. But when I found out, the feeling was already anchored deep in my heart, unable to be pulled out. Seeing that person laugh, I am happy; seeing him sad, I am even sadder. At first, I did not know what it was, but when I realized that it was love, I was scared at myself. I want to hide, but cannot bear to. Because, he makes people feel warm. After a long time of struggle, I decided to suppress myself: liking someone is no big deal, as long as I don't let you find out about it it'll be fine. This type of feeling is very bitter,

but also very sweet. A taste beyond words...

The idea of me and you together is impossible, but as long as I can continue seeing you, I will have enough from this life. I only hope that you do not disgust me. I just can't help liking you...^{lv}

In Mandarin Chinese, the pronunciations of "her" and "him" sound the same, and so this textual wordplay clues readers in to the homoerotic nature of Wang Shaohong's confession.^{lvi} The other soldiers in the story's diegesis, however, do not pick up on this conceit. They misunderstand Shaohong's confession and ask briefly who this "mysterious woman" is, but quickly dismiss his spontaneous monologue by advising him to "just straightforwardly tell her [his] feelings" rather than "torturing himself" over it.^{lvii}

The next pairing is between Weijun and He Shuai, where He Shuai is dared to "mimic a woman singing a song."^{lviii} He Shuai readily takes on the task, with "one hand holding onto the shape of a microphone" and the other "hand curled into *lanbuaazhi* (兰花指)," a hand pose traditionally used by female characters in Beijing Opera. At the end of the song, the other soldiers are stunned by the fact that his "performance was so real" – a simulacrum "real" enough to cause Weijun and Jin Gui's faces to "turn redder and redder, and then even redder and redder, like the sun setting in the West."^{lix} Not only does this scene engender clear references to Judith Butler's theory of gender performance, it also alludes to China's history of *Dan* actors in Beijing Opera.^{lx} As discussed in previous chapters, Butler posits that gender identity is the result of reiterated acting – one that produces the effect of a static gender while obscuring the contradiction and instability of any single

person's gender act. In this view, the specific act of performing gender constitutes who people are, and one's learned performance of gendered behavior (masculine or feminine traits) can disrupt heteronormative ideals. Therefore, He Shuai's overt enactment of gendered behavior as a female singer destabilizes the binary gender construction of man and woman, masculine and feminine, and by extension, blurs the distinction between homosexual and heterosexual behaviors.

The likening of He Shuai's performance to a *Dan* role advances the centrality of gender fluidity and homosexuality associated with the *tongzhi* identity, grounding these traits in Chinese cultural traditions. On this point, it is possible to view *Dan* roles in terms of drag and what Butler has singled out as "a way not only to think about how gender is performed, but how it is resignified through collective terms."^{lxi, lxii, lxiii} This effect is further evident in "Commitment" when Weijun teases He Shuai for not being able to grow a beard, calling him a "transvestite" (人妖 *renyao*), but later reflects that he first fell in love with He Shuai during "[his] performance mimicking a female singer."^{lxiv} Thus, the exhibition of "transgender" through He Shuai's *Dan* performance is akin to drag in that it "not only mak[es] us question what is real, and what has to be, but ... show[s] us how contemporary notions of reality can be questioned, and new modes of reality instituted."^{lxv, lxvi} He Shuai's singing performance reveals a form of gendered ventriloquism on which the artistic and iconographic, but markedly feminine, *Dan* tradition is predicated. By the same token, He Shuai's appropriation of a *Dan* role specific to traditional Chinese culture asserts a persona mimicking femininity and inherently draws attention to the fluidity of gender identity itself. In staging

a feminine aesthetic of male acting central to Beijing Opera, He Shuai overtly performs femininity, but subversively also performs the *very process of gender performativity* itself rooted in distinct Chinese familial-cultural roots.

This critical scene foreshadows later developments of homoerotic desire between the soldiers during and after the war. Weijun and He Shuai's character development educes the notion of gender performativity, where they are positioned in masculine and feminine roles respective to each other. Weijun is described as an ideal masculine figure: he is "tall and strongly built," "dependable and sturdy as a mountain," and an excellent soldier who "trains without end to be the best fighter."^{lxvii} In turn, He Shuai is "weak" when he first enters the army due to his "Young Master" (少爷 *shaoye*), pampered background, where his "results [during training] were never really good."^{lxviii} Upon joining Squad Two, he was always the one "falling behind after the others" and getting sick or injured after training exercises, but is requested to entertain the other soldiers during breaks with his "beautiful singing voice."^{lxix} At this juncture, Butler's ideas about gender performance as discursive practices are appropriate to examine He Shuai and Weijun's characterizations. In *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex,"*^{lxx} Butler posits that the body's intelligibility in relation to sex and gender is produced at the site of performativity or "specific modality of power as discourse."^{lxxi} As such, she maintains that all sexual identities are constitutive repetitions of a "phantasmatic original" working through a normative force – the practice of reiteration – to establish itself.^{lxxii}

But how are military *tongzhi* figures and brotherly camaraderie resignified as homosexual *tongzhi* and gay relations? By illustrating gender performance,

“Commitment” not only reveals the fluidity of gender but also how homosocial bonds fostering mentorship and solidarity can be congruent with the homoerotic friendship of an intimate gay male couple. The distinct masculine and feminine roles exhibited in Weijun and He Shuai’s relationship are made evident when they spend time alone in the jungle together. This exhibition of gender performativity also utilizes the military as an institution predicated on reiterative training to enforce a specific identity of the patriotic soldier. The military environment in “Commitment” is presented as a space marked by compulsory performance for both discipline and desire, complementing and reinforcing Butler’s proposed process of subject formation.

As the soldiers leave the trenches after their last battle, He Shuai sprains his ankle and is accidentally left behind by the troop. When Weijun realizes that He Shuai is missing, he goes back to search for him and finds him unable to walk. Weijun rescues him by carrying him on his back, gruffly asserting that “[he] has been carrying firewood on his back since the age of five” and that in comparison carrying He Shuai “is nothing.”^{lxxiii} However, Weijun falls from exhaustion and catches a fever from being soaked by the rain, and He Shuai tenderly nurses him, feeding him food and water “like he was feeding a baby.”^{lxxiv} After several nights in the jungle, they come across a deserted wooden hut, and decide to stay there to shelter from the incessant rain of the monsoon season. To relieve ennui, He Shuai teaches Weijun to waltz, and sings a heartfelt Cantonese song about the moon on several occasions. One night as they are sleeping outside and “gazing at the full moon,” He Shuai spontaneously starts singing “Lonely Traveler at the Edge of the World” 《天涯孤客》. As he

explains, it is “a song about the moon ... [telling] the story of a man drifting outside, who sees a moon, and thinks of his hometown.”^{lxxv} Weijun grows partial to the song, and asks He Shuai to sing it at night before they fall asleep.

This song brings to mind numerous Chinese poems featuring the reflection of the moon as a popular motif for love and homesickness.^{lxxvi} The lyrical refrain of “smiling at the bright moon and moonlight reflected in the pond [笑对朗月月光光照地塘上]” also evokes the well-known Chinese aphorism, “like flowers in the mirror, and the reflection of the moon in the water” (镜花水月 *jinhua shuiyue*), alluding to the ephemeral and illusory nature of mortal existence.^{lxxvii, lxxviii} Along the lines of this reading, the literary trope of the moon’s reflection in a pool of water also has a long tradition of being associated with themes of gender fluidity, addressing the tenuous relation between visual perception and the construction of gender.^{lxxix} In the Chinese tradition, one prominent example of this relationship between the moon’s reflection and gender fluidity is found in the figure of Guanyin (观音), a transsexual bodhisattva, who is paradigmatically depicted as gazing at the moon’s reflection in a pool of water.^{lxxx, lxxxi} Hence, Guanyin’s association with the Buddhist phrase and “water-moon” imagery suggests a specific skepticism of the reliability of gendered appearance in addition to a broader skepticism of perceived reality.^{lxxxii}

In “Commitment,” the moon is a recurrent symbol that connects He Shuai and Weijun’s friendship during and after the war: it is mentioned whenever the two men spend time alone together or think about each other at night. In this way, references to the moon reflect key developments in their changing relationship from military comrades to gay lovers. It is helpful to remember,

therefore, that the moon also has a long history of being associated with the Moon Elder (月下老人 *yuexia laoren*, also known as 月老 *yuelao*), the God of Marriage, who is supposed to connect, by an invisible red thread, persons who are destined to marry.^{lxxxiii}

After He Shuai's wife asks for a divorce, he goes out for a walk and gazes at the moon: "Raising his head, all I saw was the moon, big and round; this type of moon really made him recall a lot of things."^{lxxxiv} When He Shuai and Weijun are reunited, they go to sing at a KTV bar. He Shuai sings his song about the moon and at the end of the night the narrator reveals that "this night was just like that night 10 years ago next to the water spring, forever seared into He Shuai's sea of memories."^{lxxxv}

As Weijun walks home after spending the evening with He Shuai, he "raises his head and sees a big moon... [Weijun] smiled to himself, musing at how it seemed so many of his memories had to do with this moon."^{lxxxvi} It is also during the Mid-Autumn Festival celebrating the full moon that He Shuai first thinks about introducing Weijun to his family.^{lxxxvii} Later, after a night "strolling in the park and admiring the moon," the two men finally acknowledge their love for each other and He Shuai "raises his head to see that big round moon: he felt like crying out, this feeling of happiness pressed down on him so heavily it was hard for him to breathe."^{lxxxviii} Hence, what was initially a symbol of brotherly companionship in times of adversity comes to represent their shifting relationship and desire, reflecting strong male homosocial bonds that mature into homosexual love over time.

The moon in this text therefore signifies concomitant changes in the male homosocial-cum-homoerotic continuum and patriarchal kinship systems positioned

within a framework of patriarchal heterosexuality. This moon leitmotif presented as an extension of He Shuai's characterization capitalizes on the fact that the moon, in traditional Chinese culture, represents *Yin* (阴), the concrete essence of the female or negative principle in nature.^{lxxxix} As such, recurring references to the moon accentuates He Shuai's feminine behavioral traits and gender performance. He Shuai's fondness of the moon thus illustrates his projective identification with this conventionally feminine symbol, together with the connotations of gender fluidity and visual indeterminacy that the icon has historically represented. In other words, gender performance is reinforced by moon symbolism, destabilizing the homo/heterosexual and masculine/feminine relational binaries to emphasize a continuum of relations between the homosocial and homosexual.

With repeated depictions of feminine behavior, it is striking that actual women play a rather peripheral role in "Commitment," and appear to serve the sole purpose of strengthening homosocial/homosexual male bonds. In particular, the presence of Jiang Xiaoyun, a female nurse working in the army, and Zhou Lili, He Shuai's wife, generate the structural context of triangular, heterosexual tensions, but ironically only reinforce the homosocial/homosexual continuum of intimacy between He Shuai and Weijun. In discussing the relation of heterosexual to homosocial bonds, Sedgwick cites an essay by Gayle Rubin to argue that "patriarchal heterosexuality can be best discussed in terms of ... the traffic of women: it is the use of women as exchangeable, perhaps symbolic, property for the primary purpose of cementing the bonds of men with men."^{xc} In this view, relationships are not established between a man and a woman, but between two men,

where the woman serves “as a ‘conduit of a relationship’ in which the true *partner* is a man.” (Sedgwick 1985, 26, emphasis in original)^{xc1, xcii} The women that intersperse He Shuai and Weijun’s lives reflect this account: encounters with Jiang Xiaoyun and Zhou Lili prompt the men to recognize and strengthen their true homoerotic desires. Accordingly, the portrayal of the men’s response to women contests the dichotomy between homosocial and homosexual male bonds to concretize *tongzhi* relations as an all-encompassing concept.

Although conversation about women crops up frequently throughout the text, it is always mentioned in connection to their impact on male-male bonds. This is explicit in Volume One as the soldiers are immersed in an all-male military environment where “the subject of women was never met with silence.”^{xciii} When He Shuai and Weijun talk about their futures after the war, Weijun admits that he “really admires Jiang Xiaoyun” and “wants to find a wife,” but laments that he “can never be a match for Xiaoyun” and that “[he] really doesn’t know what he would want in a wife ... because he has never had [a woman] before.”^{xciv} He Shuai urges him to confess his feelings to Xiaoyun, but Weijun loses his temper and shouts at him for “making [him] sick” and “warns [him] not to bring up any ideas about Xiaoyun again.”^{xcv} In response, He Shuai tries to comfort Weijun saying that he “is the ringing image of an ideal man,” to which Weijun retorts that “if [he] was really that good, [He Shuai] should just marry him instead.”^{xcvi} Here, it is conversation about a woman that drives He Shuai and Weijun to first consider the ambiguity of their relationship to each other.

Similarly, it is He Shuai’s divorce from Zhou Lili that prompts him “to start having extreme doubts,” where he later admits that “he has lost interest in

women.”^{xcvii} Zhou Lili had accused He Shuai of being “unable to love her” because he could only think “of the war ... [and] of [his] Squad Leader,” leading He Shuai to realize that he was “truly in love with Weijun ... [and] nobody else.”^{xcviii} Moreover, it is only when Zhou Lili wants to get remarried that He Shuai is driven to fully pursue his relationship with Weijun, proposing plans for gay marriage.^{xcix} As such, these triangular schemas introduce heterosexual associations amidst homosocial relations, revealing that emerging patterns of male friendship, rivalry, mutual care, and love cannot be understood outside of its relation to women. To this end, the abstraction of women and heterosexual relations are juxtaposed against tangible experiences of male homosocial/homosexual intimacy, elevating the transcendent status of a male homosocial destination of desire.

GAY COMRADES: A MODE OF EXISTENCE BETWEEN INTIMATE FRIENDSHIP AND FRIENDLY ROMANCE?

With regard to male homosocial desire as a paragon of love that potentially transcends differences between men, it is interesting to note that the homosexuality depicted throughout “Commitment” turns out to represent anything but actual sexual relations. This aesthetic detail speaks to Foucault’s argument that homosexuality should not be a fixed identity but rather a fluid horizon of relational and ontological possibilities grounded in same-sex friendship, rather than a sexual act. By presenting homosexuality as a matter of friendship, Foucault posits an intimate homosocial relation between men detached from images of sex.^c He claims that the idea of “two young men meeting in the street, seducing each other with a

look, grabbing each other's asses and getting each other off in a quarter of an hour" advances a "neat image of homosexuality without any possibility of generating unease," and hence is ineffective in challenging social norms.^{ci} Instead, Foucault argues that it is "affection, tenderness, friendship, fidelity, camaraderie, and companionship" – i.e., sentimentalized forms of homosexual intimacy – that is "troubling" and more potently subversive of hegemonic ideologies.^{cii} Hence, friendship and sex are not diametrically opposed; rather, friendship offers gay politics an exodus from sexuality and the relational models that accompany it.^{ciii} In Foucault's view, insofar as the *tongzhi* community exhibits the "tying together of unforeseen lines of force and the subsequent formation of new alliances," the ties that bind this diverse community might be best designated as bonds of friendship.^{civ}

In "Commitment," the romance between He Shuai and Weijun is portrayed in a way that the two men are lovers and intimate without necessarily being homosexual. As a gay love story, it is striking that homosexuality is not mentioned until the very end of the text. Instead, an emphasis on *tongzhi* relations conflates the label's connotations of military comrade and homosexual comrade, thereby rendering both meanings of the term simultaneously intelligible via the figure of the gay soldier. To develop this image, the ubiquitous presence of *tongzhi* is stressed. This is made explicit in He Shuai's reflection that: "Actually, there are many *tongzhi* around... Everyone felt that it was relatively normal; I also did not think much of it. Everyone's human, it's just that ... some people like others of the same kind."^{cv} Indirect references to homosexual couplings are also evident when soldiers get particularly attached to one another (for example, when other soldiers from Squad Two are

depicted in pairs). When homosexual relations are finally explicitly mentioned, they are presented as a natural progression from the homosocial relations that were cultivated in the army. Otherwise stated, two men get together as a couple in which the experiences of desire and duty can be shared: their passionate lifetime union is only an extension of the friendship and loyalty they have always felt for each other while serving in the army. Accordingly, He Shuai and Weijun's homoerotic desire is described as "a feeling that has existed for a long time" but as something that they "did not understand before" and previously dismissed as "brotherly care" – an emotion that later unfolds as a "lifelong commitment" to loving each other.^{cvi} Nevertheless, romantic scenes do not describe anything further than the two men cuddling or kissing, and even then, only rather abstractly.

By emphasizing a de-eroticized intimacy between the two men, the text presents a departure from the limited and limiting forms of State-sponsored heteronormative associations to gesture towards an expanded and unmapped field of relations. This narrative development evinces Foucault's argument for the need to develop a "homosexual culture" beyond "the sexual act itself" to escape the "readymade [formula] of the pure sexual encounter."^{cvii} In his view, this is necessary to introduce "a diversification that would also be a form of relationship and ... a 'way of life'" where "to be 'gay' ... is not to identify with the psychological traits and the visible masks of the homosexual but to try to define and develop a way of life."^{cviii} By examining "Commitment" through this Foucauldian lens, the text introduces *tongzhi* as a concept that transcends age, status, and social class, replacing it with a diversity of desirable relations. The Military Comrade Story draws upon the historical importance of friendship, equality, and

non-biological kinship promoted by the Communist Party and epitomized by the ideological use of *tongzhi* as a form of address. The queering of homosocial camaraderie in the national military, therefore, challenges general social norms and inscribes a new form of homosexual intimacy that does not conflict with Chinese cultural values.

In the absence of a delineation of heterosexual and homosexual behaviors based on the sex act, the tricky issue of sexual orientation or object choice in He Shuai and Weijun's relationship gets resolved by what Constance Penley has referred to "an idea of *cosmic destiny*: the two men are somehow meant for each other and homosexuality has nothing to do with it."^{cix, cx} Although He Shuai and Weijun eventually acknowledge their homosexuality, they do so only as a result of their specific love for each other, rather than due to a more general desire for men. This is manifest in He Shuai's proclamation that "[he] has met many other men on the streets, but does not like a single one of them. The only person [he] likes is [Weijun]."^{cxii} Both men also repeatedly emphasize that they "belong to each other in this life and the next," will "never be separated," are "unable to go on living" without each other, and do not desire any other men.^{cxiii} Furthermore, the characters stress their identification with same-sex relations as *tongzhi* rather than *tongxinglian*, grounding their relationship in a term that subverts conventional paradigms of homosexuality.

But what is served, at the level of fiction, by having He Shuai and Weijun together romantically as homosexuals, yet somehow devoid of sexual relations altogether? This aesthetic style allows for a much greater range of identification and desire that deconstructs and renegotiates the meaning of a *tongzhi* identity – and by extension, what Foucault has termed "the homosexual mode of life."^{cxiiii} In Military

Comrade texts, homosexuality is presented "not [as] a form of desire but something to desire," where *tongzhi* relations signify a multiplicity of relationships along the homosocial and homosexual continuum. More specifically, *tongzhi* has a tri-layered signification: the term connotes homosexuality in popular culture, refers to revolutionary intentions as promoted in Chinese Communist discourse, and also evokes the socialist ideal for an equal society that transcends all heteronormative constraints. Indeed, Military Comrade fiction speaks to Foucault's notion of "the 'slantwise' position of [the homosexual]" represented by the polymorphous category of *tongzhi* in contemporary Chinese society.^{cxiv} The deconstruction and reconstruction of a *tongzhi* position "lay[s] out [diagonal lines] in the social fabric" to "reopen affective and relational virtualities" that "allow these virtualities to come to light" – namely, the "slantwise" position of a heterosexual/homosocial/homosexual person connected to the *tongzhi* identity.

The shifting meaning of Tiananmen in "Commitment" parallels this reappropriation of a *tongzhi* positionality to contest Communist discourse and heteronormative ideologies. As one of China's most emotionally and historically charged spaces, the Tiananmen gate and square has a long history, and its symbolic significance has been altered over the years in relation to China's imperial and bureaucratic world as well as revolutionary past. Built in 1415 in the Ming Dynasty, the Tiananmen Gate itself – The Gate of Heavenly Peace – was meant to be an entryway into the imperial and bureaucratic world of the Forbidden City. In Imperial China, Tiananmen played a significant role in the rituals of royal governance as the place where the emperor's edicts were announced. It became a public space only at moments of grave national crisis.^{cxv} However, as the

Square progressively developed into a political and educational hub during the Republican Era, it also became a forum for rallies and debates over national policy.^{cxvi} The May Fourth demonstration in 1919 had the greatest impact on this whole period of Chinese history, symbolically marking the inauguration of Tiananmen Square as a fully public and anti-governmental space.^{cxvii} , ^{cxviii} Tiananmen Square thereafter became the regular, chosen location for Chinese demonstrators to hold national rallies.

When Mao Zedong came to power, Tiananmen was recreated as both a public and official location endorsing the Communist leadership, underscored when giant photographs of Mao and Zhu De, the Red Army's leading general, were erected. After the Cultural Revolution in 1976, however, the people reclaimed Tiananmen as an open space for discussion concerning democracy and the arts.^{cxix} Thus, although Tiananmen still served as an intractable center of the government's power,^{cxx} the square also became a beacon of opposition. In contemporary China, Tiananmen is a symbolic space commonly associated with the Chinese Communist Party and Maoist ideology, but also of conflict and (failed) revolutionary intent, especially after the student protests and crackdown of 1989.

The resignification of Tiananmen as a place rooted in China's Imperial history to one connoting Maoist ideology and associated with revolutionary intent mirrors the reappropriation of *tongzhi* in Communist discourse. Throughout "Commitment," references to Tiananmen initially invoke it as a place representing the military comrades' "commitment" to national duty. However, at the end of the story, Tiananmen is resignified as a place that enables the emergence of non-normative *tongzhi* genders and sexualities, emphasized when He Shuai and Weijun declare their lifelong bond to each other

during an outing to the Square. Tiananmen in "Commitment" therefore becomes a space that facilitates gay bonding, ironically queering the Square's longstanding symbolism of bureaucratic power.

Weijun brings up Tiananmen as a place he wants to visit after the war, to which the other soldiers in Squad Two respond by committing to make a trip there together, emphasizing that "if we survive, we need to go together... We need to go."^{cxxi} Furthermore, He Shuai promises Weijun more than once to take him to Tiananmen.^{cxii} Hence, the aspiration to visit Tiananmen holds the soldiers together in dire times facing life and death during war. At the end of the story, He Shuai and Weijun finally make this trip to Tiananmen. However, the scene that develops at the Square itself has very different implications: when posing for a picture together, He Shuai kisses Weijun on the cheek. This gesture leads to an elaborate public disclosure of their *tongzhi* relationship, where they also announce their "marriage." In front of Jian Hong and Jian Fei, Weijun's siblings, He Shuai insists that he wants to "make it clear" to everyone that "he is [Weijun's] wife."^{cxiii} Weijun reaffirms that "Brother He has given [him] a family, [making him] very fortunate" and hopes that his siblings "can support [them] with [their] blessings."^{cxiv} In this scene, Tiananmen becomes the site for *tongzhi* identification and gay love, transforming the Square into a public arena where homosexual relations are made visible. Nonetheless, by positioning each other as husband and wife, He Shuai and Weijun reveal that they still situate themselves within a heteronormative paradigm.

"Commitment" was originally serialized in 2007, but was edited and reposted in 2008 with an appended epilogue. This epilogue takes the form of three diary entries from Xia Xiaofei, He

Shuai's nephew, expanding the time horizon of the story to include a third generation: the generation of youth in contemporary China today, and how they receive *tongzhi* relations. Xiaofei documents his experience going on a beach vacation with his Jiujiu^{cxxv} (He Shuai) and Uncle Lu (Weijun). The boy observes that the two men are very close friends – “just like brothers, ... almost even closer than brothers” – and deduces that their intimacy must have resulted from shared military experiences.^{cxxvi, cxxvii} Even so, Xiaofei idolizes the men for their camaraderie, and exclaims that “when [he] grows up, [he] wants to have such a friendship as well” and similarly make “a lifelong good friend.”^{cxxviii}

One day out at the beach, Xiaofei notices that He Shuai had gone underwater when swimming. Weijun dives repeatedly to rescue him, and resuscitates him with CPR. Xiaofei is in tears from worry, but picks up on their loving interaction once He Shuai is revived. He Shuai tells Weijun that his good leg had cramped up and he had started sinking, but “wasn't afraid” because he knew that Weijun “was just by his side” and that he “could not possibly die.”^{cxxix} He Shuai and Weijun then kiss each other, and even though He Shuai tries to pretend to Xiaofei that it was just “manually assisted breathing,” the child instantly understands the nature of their relationship. As Xiaofei writes: “Although I am a child, I'm not stupid, okay? ... In this world, I know that ‘tongzhi’ is a word with multiple meanings. ... Isn't it just two men in love? It's not so rare.”^{cxxx} The narrative ends on a positive note in which Xiaofei agrees to “keep their secret” with the promise of being “good friends,” where Xiaofei asserts that “no matter what, [Uncle Lu] is still my idol” and that “as long as they have my blessings, [He Shuai and Weijun] will definitely live a fortunate and happy life.”^{cxxxi}

The emphasis on He Shuai and Weijun's friendship in the epilogue once again invokes Foucault's argument of friendship as an alternative relational form – as “a desire, an uneasiness, a desire-in-uneasiness that exists among a lot of people” – enabled by homosexuality.^{cxxxii} The fluid movement from homosocial friendship to homosexual love embodied within the *tongzhi* identity speaks to the notion of homosexuality as an uncharted and labile space of relational possibilities. He Shuai and Weijun's version of friendship shifts away from homosexuality to fixed identity by focusing on *tongzhi* relations as a familiar catalogue of attitudes and behaviors associated with mutual care, responsibility, and understanding. Their relationship stresses a homosocial/sexual continuum comprised of lifelong loyalty to each other, reaffirming the conception of friendship valorized in queer discourse as a respite from social ostracism and an alternative to compulsory heterosexuality.

Thus, “Commitment” presents an account of queer community through the figure of gay male military *tongzhi*, developing a relational form that does not necessarily depend upon the conjugal couple or blood kinship, but nonetheless presents a legible and appealing image of intimacy. The text embraces friendship as a model for same-sex relations within a dominant heteronormative paradigm, emphasizing homosocial equality and longevity. Ultimately, “Commitment” forwards *tongzhi* characters grounded in friendship to replace the disrupted binary between homosexual and heterosexual behaviors with a continuum of homosocialist intimacy and desires.

SOLDIERLY CAMARADERIE: THE BOUNDARIES OF TONGZHI HOMOSOCIAL HOMOEROTICS

When Military Comrade Stories ironically position homosexual characters as patriotic and masculine soldiers, the *tongzhi* community establishes a form of emancipation from the Communist authority that represses and emasculates them. In “Commitment,” we see how Military Comrade Stories contribute to an effort to specify the proper boundaries of the State's authority in relation to other increasingly visible forms of social and political coercion towards homosexual desire. Experiences in the army, a conventional model for infallibility and discipline suppressing all symptoms of the human body, is exposed as an institution dominated by the overwhelming effects of emotional breakdowns and uncontrollable desires.

By repositioning queer characters within the figure of the military comrade representing the strong arm of the Communist regime, “Commitment” dismantles and inverts the relational structures that form the very backbone of patriarchal homosociality and the Party system. The work illustrates how the army brings men from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds together in an intimate space where same-sex friendship and love short-circuits political structures and class distinctions. Throughout the text, there is a sustained strategic blurring of relational boundaries – between friendship and romance, homosociality and homosexuality, soldier and lover. As a sub-genre, Military Comrade fiction rethinks the meaning of being *tongzhi* and the scope of *tongzhi wenxue* itself, repositioning the category of *tongzhi* as a mode of intimacy outside heterosexual norms. With an emphasis on friendship and camaraderie, the structure of the story allows the conception of *tongzhi* relations in the absence of sex altogether. Instead, the *tongzhi* identity and homosexuality becomes intelligible through same-sex relationships at the heart of

heteronormative ideals. At the same time, however, the novella reveals that characters are inevitably trapped within an institutional framework governed by patriarchal conventions. This is evident when the text co-opts the marriage trope and inscribes gender performance within male same-sex relations.

The idealization of queer friendship with respect to homosexual relations is central to Christopher Nealon's book, *Foundlings*,^{cxxxiii} in which he develops his method of “affect-genealogy.” For Nealon, queer texts are traversed by powerful longings that are both corporeal and historical; in their articulate hopes and desires, these texts gesture both toward impossible affiliations and a queer community connected across time. Nealon's study of “affect-genealogy” is germane to a discussion of emergent *tongzhi* texts and communities, particularly Military Comrade narratives. By drawing upon Nealon to read “Commitment” as a “foundling text” bridging three generations, the work brings together ascetic but passionate outsiders who share the desire for a *tongzhi* bond. As Nealon writes:

Because [foundling texts] do not properly belong either to the inert terminal narratives of inversion or to the triumphant, progressive narrative of achieving ethnic coherence, they suggest another time, a time of expectation, in which their key stylistic gestures, choice of genre, and ideological frames all point to an inaccessible future, in which the inarticulate desires that mobilize them will find some “hermeneutic friend” beyond the historical horizon of their unintelligibility to themselves.^{cxxxiv}

In this view, founding texts such as “Commitment” express a desire for an “inaccessible future”: a yearning for structures of life and communities that are not yet possible in twentieth-century China.^{cxxxv} Nonetheless, these texts inhabit a “time of expectation” as they wait for others – “hermeneutic friend[s]” – who will know how to read and empathize with them.^{cxxxvi} This sentiment is evident in the epilogue, where Qing Feng indicates that Chinese youth of the 21st century will be the ones affecting change in how *tongzhi* communities are established and perceived.

In contemporary China, hope for alternative forms of queer relation and community is a salient issue, particularly as *tongzhi* try to articulate alternatives to marriage and the heteronormality of social and gendered life. There is a need to expand the public sense of what counts as a relationship. Through references to Communist ideology, the military, and homosocialist desires, Military Comrade fiction sustains a desexualized image of the *tongzhi* couple. In the long run, these stories attempt to articulate a unified community somewhere between family and nation – a *tongzhi* movement based on same-sex friendship and intimacy that transcends hegemonic political, social, and cultural boundaries.

ⁱ Bragg, Billy. “Tender Comrade.” 1988.

ⁱⁱ Gary L. Lehring, *Officially Gay: The Construction of Sexuality by the US Military* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).

ⁱⁱⁱ Bragg, Billy. “Tender Comrade.” 1988.

^{iv} Lehring, *Officially Gay: The Construction of Sexuality by the US Military*

^v Sedgwick defines “homosocial” as a word that “describes social bonds between persons of the same sex; it is a neologism, obviously formed by analogy with ‘homosexual,’ and just as obviously meant to be distinguished from ‘homosexual’” (1985:1). She describes male “homosocial desire” in relation to an

unbroken continuum between male homosocial and homosexual relations.

^{vi} Most Comrade stories are published either anonymously or pseudonymously. Qing Feng, the author of “Commitment,” also follows this practice. Chinese netizens customarily use nicknames for all online interactions, but on Comrade websites pseudonyms also preserve anonymity of authors writing about provocative matters, protecting them from legal and social ramifications.

^{vii} Carol M. Scotton and Wanjin Zhu, “Tongzhi in China: Language Change and its Conversational Consequences,” *Language in Society* 12 (1983): 477-494.

^{viii} Wah-shan Chou, “Homosexuality and the Cultural Politics of Tongzhi in Chinese Societies,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 4(3-4)(2001): 27-46.

^{ix} Andrew Wong and Qing Zhang, “The Linguistic Construction of the *Tongzhi* Community,” *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 10(2)(2000): 248-78.

^x For example, common address terms *tongzhi* was intended to replace include: “Miss” (小姐 *xiaojie*), an unmarried woman of a privileged class or intelligentsia; “Mister” (先生 *xiansheng*), a man of the privileged class or intelligentsia; “Auntie” (阿姨 *ayi*), an older woman; “Master” (老爷 *laoye*), head of the family of a privileged class. For more information see 2008.

^{xi} Andrew Wong, “The Trouble with *Tongzhi*: The Politics of Labeling Among Gay and Lesbian Hongkongers,” *Pragmatics* 18(2)(2008): 277-301.

^{xii} In 1989, *tongzhi* was first used in the Chinese title of the inaugural Hong Kong Gay and Lesbian Film Festival (香港第一界同志电影节 *xianggang diyi jie tongzhi dianying jie*) as a term for same-sex desire. After the festival, *tongzhi* was widely adopted by gay and lesbian organizations in Hong Kong and was then exported to Taiwan, Mainland China, and diasporic Chinese communities (Chou 1997).

^{xiii} Chou, “Homosexuality and the Cultural Politics of Tongzhi in Chinese Societies.”

^{xiv} John Gittings, “The ‘Learn from the Army’ Campaign,” *The China Quarterly* 18(Apr-Jun)(1964): 153-159

^{xv} Robert D. Fisher, *China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010).

^{xvi} Gittings, “The ‘Learn from the Army’ Campaign.”

^{xvii} This campaign initiated an emulation movement that established the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a model for the whole nation to “learn from, study, and compare with” (NCNA 1964, qtd. from Gittings 1964).

All sections of society, from commercial industries, government departments, and rural work cadres, were called upon to study the “advanced” political and ideological work of the armed forces. This campaign lasted several months and reached fanatic intensity, where there was an exceptional amount of news about the PLA’s political achievements and of its model soldiers or companies (Powell 1965).

^{xviii} Gittings, “The ‘Learn from the Army’ Campaign.”

^{xix} This ideological rationale is articulated in an article printed in *Red Flag*, the Party journal, stating that the emulation campaign was initiated to ensure that the armed forces remained “under the absolute leadership of the Party [as] a responsive and obedient tool...” (“Political Work” 1964, qtd. in Powell 1965, 130).

^{xx} Fisher, *China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach*.

^{xxi} Ralph L. Powell, “Commissars in the Economy: ‘Learn from the PLA’ Movement in China” *Asian Survey* 5(3)(1965): 130

^{xxii} Qing Feng (青风), *Commitment* <<承诺>> (2008), accessed on February 9, 2013. <http://www.jjwxc.net/onebook.php?novelid=353537>, 4.

^{xxiii} King C. Chen, *China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications* (Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Stanford University, Hoover Press Publication, 1987.)

^{xxiv} Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawsky, *China’s Great Transformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.)

^{xxv} The Chinese economic reforms (改革开放 *gaige kaijiang*; literally “Reform and Opening up”) refers to the program of economic reforms named “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” reformists in the Chinese Communist Party led by Deng Xiaoping initiated in December 1978. The reforms led to a period of rapid economic growth which dramatically impacted social inequity and income disparities within the nation (Brant and Rawski 2008).

^{xxvi} Comrade Li Feiyue (李飞跃同志) started working for the Communist Party in 1985 and is the Committee Secretary of Guizhou Province for the Miao and Dong autonomous regions (贵州省黔东南苗族侗族自治州委书记).

^{xxvii} Comrade Li Gang (李刚同志) is the deputy director of the police department in the northern district of Baoding city, Hebei province. His name is infamously associated with the “My Father is Li Gang!” (我爸是李刚!) incident, where Li Qiming, Li Gang’s son, knocked down two girls and killed one of them when driving on school grounds in Hebei University. Instead of showing any sign of remorse, Li Qiming yelled at the security

guards and the angry crowd, challenging them to sue him because his “father is Li Gang.” The phrase became one of the most popular catchphrases amongst Chinese netizens to criticize the arrogance of children of government officials. The incident also exposes the extent of corruption within the government system itself, where people associated with the Communist Party expect to be above the law. Li Gang has since been named one of the “Four Big Name Dads” (四大名爹) amongst locals to refer to well-known cases of government corruption or excess.

^{xxviii} Xing Lu, *Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 2004.)

^{xxix} Powell, “Commissars in the Economy.”

^{xxx} Many leaders in the Chinese Communist Party have served as military commanders or as commissars.

^{xxxi} Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.)

^{xxxii} Kosofsky, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire*, 1-2.

^{xxxiii} Feng, *Commitment*, 3.

^{xxxiv} Feng, *Commitment*, 4.

^{xxxv} Feng, *Commitment*, 14.

^{xxxvi} Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” in *The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume One – Ethics Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 1981 [1997]), 135-136.)

^{xxxvii} Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” 137.

^{xxxviii} Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” 137.

^{xxxix} Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” 137.

^{xl} Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” 137.

^{xli} The virtue of filial piety in a patriarchal family structure creates significant hardships for Chinese homosexuals. In Confucian philosophy, filial piety (孝 *xiao*) is considered the first virtue in Chinese culture. Major components of filial piety include an emphasis on children taking care of and respecting their parents as well as producing a male heir to carry on the family name. Consequently, many *tongzhi* go to great extents to keep their homosexual identity concealed and often force themselves into heterosexual marriages to superficially fulfill these filial duties.

^{xlii} Feng, *Commitment*, 12; 17

^{xliii} Feng, *Commitment*, 1.

xliv Feng, *Commitment*, 1.

xlv The family as a model for the organization of the State ties into the notion of filial piety where Confucius believed the child should be subordinate to the parent and elders, and subject to the sovereign who is to be regarded as the father of the nation. As such, the State as the family writ large was considered the most harmonious, orderly, and natural form of government.

xlvi Feng, *Commitment*, 7.

xlvii Feng, *Commitment*, 7.

xlviii Feng, *Commitment*, 36.

xlx Feng, *Commitment*, 8; 9; 10.

l Feng, *Commitment*, 9.

li Feng, *Commitment*, 10; 12; 13.

lii Feng, *Commitment*, 7; 14.

liii Foucault, *Friendship as a Way of Life*, 136.

liv Feng, *Commitment*, 12.

lv Feng, *Commitment*, 12.

lvi The male-referent 他 and the female-referent 她 are both pronounced *ta*.

lvii Feng, *Commitment*, 12.

lviii Feng, *Commitment*, 12.

lix Feng, *Commitment*, 12.

lx The Dan (旦) refers to any female role in Beijing opera and is a traditional aesthetic practice entrenched in homoerotic implications. Traditionally, all Dan roles were played by men. Four famous Dan actors are Mei Lanfang, Cheng Yanqiu, Shang Xiaoyun, and Xun Huisheng. The prevalent custom of *xiadan* (dallying with *dan*) implies the intimate relationship between *dan* female impersonators and their admirers from officialdom or the literati (Zhang 1965, 1627-1638). For more information, refer to: Min, Tian. (2000); Li, Lingling (2001); Wu, Cuncun (2004).

lxi Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender* (New York: Routledge, 2004a, 216.)

lxii Judith Butler, "Imitation and gender insubordination," in *The Judith Butler Reader*, ed. Sarah Salih (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004b.)

lxiii In Butler's view, when men impersonate women, consciously assuming the feminine in exaggerated form, they enact a parody of femininity that reveals its

constructed nature and offers the critical distance necessary for resistance.

lxiv Feng, *Commitment*, 17; 36.

lxv Butler, *Undoing Gender*, 217.

lxvi Butler, "Imitation and gender insubordination."

lxvii Feng, *Commitment*, 4; 7; 19.

lxviii Feng, *Commitment*, 4.

lxix Feng, *Commitment*, 4; 5; 12.

lxx Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex,"* (New York: Routledge, 1993.)

lxxi Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex,"* 187.

lxxii Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex,"* 187.

lxxiii Feng, *Commitment*, 15.

lxxiv Feng, *Commitment*, 16.

lxxv Feng, *Commitment*, 18.

lxxvi For example, possibly the most famous poem is Li Bai's (李白) *Night Reflections* 《夜思》 in which he gazes at the moon and broods over missing his hometown. The moon as a symbol of love is also known to have been beloved by many Chinese poets: in A.D. 762, the well-known poet Li Taibo drowned from leaning over the edge of a boat one night in a drunken attempt to embrace the reflection of the moon (Williams 2006).

lxxvii Guoqiu Chen, "Discussing Lowers in the Mirror and the Moon in Water: an Investigation of a Poetic Metaphor [论镜花水月: 一个诗论象喻的考析]," in *Jinghua Shuiyue: Wenxue Lilun Piping Lunwen Ji* (Taipei, Taiwan: Dongda Tushu Gongsi, 1984, 1-12.)

lxxviii Carlos Rojas, *Flowers in the Mirror: Vision, Gender, and Reflections on Chinese Modernity* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2000.)

lxxix Rojas, *Flowers in the Mirror: Vision, Gender, and Reflections on Chinese Modernity*, 35.

lxxx Carlos Rojas, *The Naked Gaze: Reflection on Chinese Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008, 9.)

lxxxi In the Indian Buddhist tradition, Guanyin was originally a male bodhisattva, represented by the masculine figure of Avalokitesvara. Over time, the bodhisattva was feminized when introduced into China via translations of Buddhist scriptures (Rojas 2000:35). Allusions to this phenomenon can be found in several

classical Chinese works. See, for example: Tang Xianzu. *Mudan Ting*. Scene 28, p. 153, and scene 38, p. 156. (Cyril Birch, *The Peony Pavilion*, pp. 158 and 216.)

lxxxii Rojas, *The Naked Gaze, Reflections on Chinese Modernity*, 7-8.

lxxxiii C. A. S. Williams, *Chinese Symbolism and Art Motifs* (North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2006.)

lxxxiv Feng, *Commitment*, 23.

lxxxv Feng, *Commitment*, 25.

lxxxvi Feng, *Commitment*, 26.

lxxxvii Feng, *Commitment*, 27.

lxxxviii Feng, *Commitment*, 31.

lxxxix Williams, *Chinese Symbolism and Art Motifs*.

xc Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire*, 25-26.

xci Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire*, 26.

xcii Emphasis in original

xciii Feng, *Commitment*, 10.

xciv Feng, *Commitment*, 17.

xcv Feng, *Commitment*, 17.

xcvi Feng, *Commitment*, 17.

xcvii Feng, *Commitment*, 22; 26.

xcviii Feng, *Commitment*, 21; 34.

xcix Feng, *Commitment*, 37-38.

c Tom Roach, *Friendship as a Way of Life: Foucault, AIDS, and the Politics of Shared Estrangement* (New York: Statue University of New York (SUNY) Press, 2012.)

ci Foucault, *Friendship as a Way of Life*, 136.

cii Foucault, *Friendship as a Way of Life*, 136.

ciii Roach, *Friendship as a Way of Life: Foucault, AIDS, and the Politics of Shared Estrangement*.

civ Foucault, *Friendship as a Way of Life*, 136.

cv Feng, *Commitment*, 32.

cvi Feng, *Commitment*, 34; 35; 42.

cvi Foucault, *Friendship as a Way of Life*, 137.

cviii Foucault, *Friendship as a Way of Life*, 138.

cix Constant Penley, "Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and Popular Culture" in *Cultural Studies*, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York: Routledge, 487.)

cx In her discussion of slash fiction and female fandom of *Star Trek*, Penley observes that a question often debated is whether Kirk and Spock are having homosexual sex, or whether they can be defined as homosexual. She contends that slash authors frequently "try to write their stories so that somehow the two men are lovers without being homosexual" so as to "[put] them above the crude intolerance, xenophobia, and homophobia they abhor in the society around them" (1992:487). Through this aesthetic style of "having them together sexually but not somehow being homosexual," the stories actually allow for a greater range of fan identification and desire in the slash universe with regard to the binary oppositions of sex and gender in the heteronormative real world (1992, 497).

cxii Feng, *Commitment*, 34.

cxiii Feng, *Commitment*, 34; 37; 41; 42.

cxiii Foucault, *Friendship as a Way of Life*, 137.

cxiv Foucault, *Friendship as a Way of Life*, 138.

cxv One such moment occurred in 1644, when Li Zicheng, a peasant rebel from Shaanxi Province, seized the city of Beijing. During the heavy fighting that ensued, Tiananmen was badly damaged, perhaps almost destroyed. The gateway in Beijing today, with its five archways and elaborate superstructure, is a reconstructed version that was completed in 1651 (Spence 1990).

cxvi In the Republican Era, the new Department of Justice and Parliament were built on the west side of Tiananmen Square. Numerous universities and colleges are also established near Tiananmen. For example, Beijing University's main campus units for literature, science, and law, were all just to the east of the Forbidden City, within walking distance to Tiananmen. Other colleges were also clustered near the square, including the prestigious Tsinghua University (Spence 1990).

cxvii Orville Schell, "Introduction," in *Children of the Dragon: The Story of Tiananmen Square* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990, 11-15.)

cxviii The "May 4 Movement" refers to an entire event where Chinese scholars, scientists, writers, and artists struggled to explore new ways of strengthening China and incorporating the twin forces of science and democracy into the life of their society and government. Linked in its turn to a study of the plight of China's workers and peasants, and to the theoretical and

organizational arguments of Marxism-Leninism, the May 4 Movement had a direct bearing and influence on the growth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which convened its first congress in 1921 (Schell 1990).

^{cxix} Jonathan Spence, "The Gate and the Square," in *Children of the Dragon: The Story of Tiananmen Square*, ed. Orville Schell (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990, 16-37.

^{cxix} The Government used the square to hold solemn rallies and funeral ceremonies for Mao, who died in late 1976. The square was further expanded to house an elaborate mausoleum for Mao to the south of the Revolutionary monument (Spence 1990).

^{cxixi} Feng, *Commitment*, 12.

^{cxixii} Feng, *Commitment*, 12; 23; 26.

^{cxixiii} Feng, *Commitment*, 43.

^{cxixiv} Feng, *Commitment*, 43.

^{cxixv} A term referring to one's mother's brother in Chinese society. In this case, Jiujiu refers to He Shuai.

^{cxixvi} Citations refer to Epilogue diary entry 1.

^{cxixvii} Feng, *Commitment* (Epilogue), Entry 1

^{cxixviii} Feng, *Commitment* (Epilogue), Entry 1

^{cxixix} Feng, *Commitment* (Epilogue), Entry 3

^{cxixxx} Feng, *Commitment* (Epilogue), Entry 3

^{cxixxi} Feng, *Commitment* (Epilogue), Entry 3

^{cxixxii} Foucault, Friendship as a Way of Life, 137.

^{cxixxiii} Christopher Nealon, *Foundlings: Lesbian and Gay Historical Emotion before Stonewall* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.)

^{cxixxiv} Nealon, *Foundlings: Lesbian and Gay Historical Emotion before Stonewall*, 23.

^{cxixxv} Nealon, *Foundlings: Lesbian and Gay Historical Emotion before Stonewall*, 23.

^{cxixxvi} Nealon, *Foundlings: Lesbian and Gay Historical Emotion before Stonewall*.

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MAKING SENSE OF CAPITALISM

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ABSTRACT

Since the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, an increasing number of Mainland Chinese bankers have come to the financial hub of the Asia Pacific to work together with local Hongkonger Chinese bankers. Both Mainlanders and Hongkongers regard themselves as Chinese and work in the same financial institutions, but bring with them different sociocultural backgrounds. This paper explores how Mainlander and Hongkonger bankers make sense of the capitalist order they live and work in, and aims to understand how their senses of capitalism are shaped by their different sociocultural backgrounds. I argue that the two groups attribute different forms of meanings to capitalism. First, Mainlander informants are more prone to use social theories to understand capitalism, while Hongkongers are more likely to draw on individual or collective living experiences or experience-based folk theories. Second, Mainlanders are more likely to consciously naturalize capitalism (i.e., rationalize it as an unchangeable property of nature) than Hongkongers. Lastly, the two groups draw on different sensibilities in order to legitimize capitalism: while Mainlanders seem to believe in capitalism because they regard socialism as an anachronism, for Hongkongers, it is a sense of being lucky to live in Hong Kong that underscores their belief in the capitalist system. I conclude that, as the meanings of capitalism are always articulated through particular histories and local cultures, we

must pay attention to them to understand the appeal of capitalism.

INTRODUCTION

The 2007-2009 financial crisis affected the lives of millions around the globe and has reinvigorated both academic and popular debates about the term “capitalism.”ⁱ Although for opponents of the capitalist system, the word is infused with unchecked greed and selfishness and thus must be attacked and condemned, for its advocates it serves as a stronghold of freedom and a road to prosperity, and thus must be defended to the last. What is being debated here goes beyond questions like what capitalism is and how it is practiced; our concerns are instead deeply entangled with the issue of ideology. People care about capitalism not only because they are interested in positivist issues concerning capitalism, such as the causal linkages between capitalist practices and material prosperity, but also because the term “capitalism” has an ideological meaning for them. The heated post-crisis debates surrounding capitalism demonstrate the diversity of opinions towards capitalism, and invite questions about how people understand capitalism, and why there is such a diversity of capitalist meanings. After all, since its origination in Western Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries,ⁱⁱ capitalism as an ensemble of interrelated ideas and practices characterized by an emphasis on investing current profit for the sake of augmented profitⁱⁱⁱ has become dominant on a global scale.^{iv} Since the fall

of the Berlin Wall, industrial, agricultural, and service productions across the globe have been heavily shaped by capitalist logic. It is timely to ask how capitalism is understood, how it is legitimized, and how its meanings are shaped by specific cultures and histories. Since a social order's formation, propagation, and modification are all shaped by the meanings it invokes in people's minds,^v understanding these issues can help us empirically assess capitalism's historical rise to dominance.

My inquiry into the problems of capitalist meaning is inspired in part by the problem that Pierre Bourdieu addresses in his classic *Outline of A Theory of Practice*. There, in the context of understanding temporalities in the everyday life of rural Kabylia, Bourdieu asks how an established social order that is arbitrary in the sense of being one of many possibilities successfully reproduces itself, and is accepted as natural. Bourdieu contrasts two different modes in which a social order is represented in people's mind: opinion and doxa. In his own words: "when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles [...] the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call *doxa*, so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs."^{vi} An alternative way to put this is: "it is by reference to the universe of opinion that the complementary class is defined, the class of that which is taken for granted, doxa, the sum total of the theses tacitly posited on the hither side of all inquiry."^{vii} Thus, doxa represents the subjective reflection of the social order that is not yet explicit and has not yet been articulated. Unlike opinion, which is explicated and articulated and thus lays bare its assumptions and reasoning, the

assumptions and reasoning behind doxa are murky, and it accepts the social order as it is.

The doxa-opinion distinction is meaningful in understanding how a social order is comes to be accepted because these two categories represent two different modes of legitimization. Doxa, for instance, produces an "immediate adherence to the world" such that the "adherence expressed in the doxic relation to the social world is the absolute form of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness," because "it is unaware of the very question of legitimacy, which arises from competition for legitimacy."^{viii} Conversely, the field of opinion is the "locus of the confrontation of competing discourses"^{ix} that are explicit and articulated, serving as an instrument of politics because of their "symbolic power to impose the principles of the construction of reality."^x In other words, the doxic mode of legitimization achieves its function by its implicitness and inarticulation, its acquiescence in and uncritical acceptance of the status quo. In contrast, opinions, be they orthodoxy or heterodoxy, take explicitness and articulateness as their mode of existence, and they uphold the status quo by providing a symbolic system of explanation, classification and meaning. According to Bourdieu, the reproduction of social order draws on both modes of legitimization; mere opinions could not do the job alone. The unspoken, unquestioned, and unarticulated acceptance of social order is constantly transpiring in spaces beyond the domain of opinions, and precisely due to their muted and murky features, most social agents are not even aware of their existence.

My own questions about how people make sense of capitalism overlap with Bourdieu's exploration of the legitimization of social order, and

Bourdieu's opinion-doxa distinction deeply informs my pursuit of answers. After surveying the currently available social sciences literature on capitalism, I found that for the most part, this literature lacks explicit and direct discussions of the problem of meaning. Even studies of capitalism that do touch on the issue of meaning^{xi} typically tend to focus on its contents, rather than its forms. This paper thus proposes to examine the ways that people adopt in order to make sense of capitalism, and to explore the problems of capitalist meaning by studying the forms that the meanings of capitalism take. In the sections to come, I highlight the diversity of the forms that meanings adopt: sometimes they are directly drawn from social theories, sometimes they are apparently only the articulable tip of an iceberg of doxa, and at other times they take on the form of sensibilities and affects. The sense-making processes that drew on these diverse forms were not necessarily all intentional, but, after they took effect, capitalism appeared natural and justified in the eyes of my informants.

I chose Hong Kong as the field in which I would explore the forms of the meanings of capitalism, with bankers working in the financial hub of Asia-Pacific as my subjects. This decision was motivated by three reasons. First, as many social scientists have argued, global capitalism has entered (or re-entered)^{xii} a new stage sometimes called "finance capitalism."^{xiii} In this latest phase of capitalism, it is finance instead of industrial production that becomes the linchpin of the capitalist social formation. Following the call to "study up" capitalism studies,^{xiv} I expect to hear the staunchest defense of capitalism from bankers. This can be helpful in pinpointing the sturdiest stronghold of the capitalist moral order, yielding a deeper reading of capitalism's appeal.

Second, under finance capitalism, the pursuit of profit in many instances does not take the roundabout route of industrial production, but directly assumes forms as a metamorphosis between different kinds of financial, and thus intangible, assets. In other words, the production of profit oftentimes follows a formula of direct money-to-money transformation, M-M, instead of the orthodox Marxist formula of M-C-M (money-commodity-money), where money needs first to transform into a commodity before changing back into an augmented sum of money. Even in cases in which capital still follows the classic M-C-M movement, capital is now moving with greater ease, in wider geographic spreads, and at faster speeds, due to the technological developments, deregulation, and structural adjustments that swept across the globe during the neoliberalism vogue.^{xv} Moving freely across the now porous borders of nation-states, the capital of financial capitalism appears abstract, acultural, and mighty, and financial economics is oftentimes envisioned as a universally identical, penetrating, and all-powerful force.^{xvi} Are the meanings of capitalism also becoming universally the same? How do local cultures shape the meanings of capitalism? Questions like these require a timely and situated assessment of human subjectivity. Only by appreciating the local meanings of capitalism can we help to deconstruct the all-powerful notion of penetrative capital and thereby cast greater light on the reasons behind the increasing global dominance of capitalism. Studying the meanings of capitalism in a non-Western setting will help us to assess the local nature of capitalist meanings.

Last but not least, Hong Kong offers convenient opportunities to study the local nature of capitalist meanings in a very specific context. Since 1997, when Britain returned sovereignty of Hong

Kong to China, the banks in Hong Kong – be they local Hong Kong banks, Hong Kong branches of international banks, or Mainland Chinese banks’ Hong Kong offices – have hired a substantive number of Mainlander^{xvii} Chinese bankers to work in Hong Kong. Although there are no official statistics, one of my informants estimated that there were around 5,000 to 10,000 Mainlander bankers in Hong Kong. This “importation” of Mainlander bankers is a direct result of China’s economic expansion: the capital markets in Hong Kong increasingly serve Mainland China’s financial needs, and Mainlander bankers are thought to be better suited to serve Mainlander clients. For an anthropologist, the Mainlanders’ presence in Hong Kong finance presents an ethnographically interesting scene: these Mainlander bankers work together with local Hongkonger^{xviii} Chinese bankers, but given the unique histories of Mainland China and Hong Kong before and after 1949, these two groups have different cultural, social, educational, and professional backgrounds.^{xix} By investigating how the meanings of capitalism take different forms among these two groups of Chinese, I aimed to explore the specificities of a non-Western historical and cultural setting (i.e., the post-1997 Hong Kong financial sector) to a very subtle extent, and deepen my understanding of the question how capitalism is made sense of in people’s minds through local histories and cultures.

By juxtaposing Mainlanders’ and Hongkongers’ accounts, I contrast the patterns in the ways that Mainlanders’ and Hongkongers’ make sense of capitalism. I argue that the differences between the two groups in the forms that capitalist meanings assume lie mainly in the following areas: first, my Mainlander informants were more prone to use social theories to understand capitalism, while Hongkongers were more likely to draw on

individual or collective living experiences or experience-based folk theories. Second, Mainlanders were more likely to consciously naturalize capitalism than Hongkongers. Last but not least, acceptance of the capitalism order was caused by different sensibilities between the two groups: while Mainlanders’ belief in capitalism was enabled by a sense of socialism’s anachronism, Hongkongers’ sense of being lucky to live in Hong Kong underscored their belief in the capitalism system. To make such an argument does not, of course, mean that these distinctions above applied to every informant I encountered, nor that these distinctions will hold invariably over time; they are simply statements summarizing salient cultural tendencies I witnessed in the field. Overall, because the currently scarce social-scientific discussions of capitalist meaning center on content rather than form, I hope this paper will add to our understanding of different facets of meaning.

HUMAN NATURE, HISTORICAL LAWS, AND DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES: MAINLANDERS’ THEORETICAL DISCOURSES OF CAPITALISM

Let me begin by introducing Jeff,^{xx} a successful Mainlander investor working at Blackstone. Some background on Jeff is that he graduated from Peking University, a top liberal arts institution on the Mainland, and has worked for Goldman Sachs in both New York and Hong Kong. At the time of our interview, Jeff was 30 years old, and had been working in Hong Kong for six years. In answering my question concerning capitalism, Jeff firstly provided his explanation of why capitalism had achieved the status of global dominance.

Capitalism is the inevitable destination of human history. History can prove who is right, and who is wrong, and socialism has been proven wrong. It is as simple as that. Think about it! Socialism had its glorious historical moments, controlling one third of the world's land and population, yet it still managed to fail even given such a great historical opportunity. Its failure proved that it was problematic.

Here, Jeff's understanding of capitalism was supported by summoning the concept of historical inevitability. Given that Jeff had spent the first 22 years of his life in China, he very likely learned about this concept from Karl Marx's theory of historical materialism, which was taught in Chinese middle schools as a compulsory subject. According to Marx, history has its own laws – that is, the superstructure of the socioeconomic formation must be consistent with the development of the forces of production.^{xxi} Like natural laws, the law of history does not bend to human wishes, and will carry itself forward, no matter how human beings respond to it. The Chinese government, which still endorses Marxism as the state's official ideology, frequently refers to the historical “inevitability” that feudalism and capitalism will ultimately be supplanted by socialism and communism in order to boost its own legitimacy. In this sense, while growing up as a Mainlander, Jeff had been trained to think with the concepts of historical laws and historical inevitability. However, instead of believing in the Chinese Communist Party's self-serving view of the inevitable direction of historical progress, Jeff reversed the order of historical development, stating that it was capitalism, instead of socialism or communism, that represented the

inevitable destination of human history. China's move from a centrally planned economy to the market economy, then, was simply a realization of this historical inevitability; capitalism did not need to justify itself, because its global triumph had already been preordained.

Note that Jeff's entire response operates at an abstract, macro-scale level. We can see that Jeff deployed logical reasoning to explain historical events. More specifically, Jeff first made a claim: socialism was problematic in itself. Then, he cited evidence, such as the past glory of international communism and its ultimate downfall. Finally, he drew a conclusion, which was also a claim. This short exercise in logic demonstrates Jeff's reasoning skills. It is no doubt difficult to prove, in the abstract, that the “failure” of historical communism was entirely due to its inherent flaws. But by making the claim and providing the reasoning to support it, Jeff demonstrated that his understanding of capitalism is wrapped up in theoretical thoughts and aided by logical reasoning – tools that belong to the cultural arsenal of the discursive/theoretical/cognitive toolbox that we use to make sense of the world (for a toolkit conceptualization of culture, see Swidler).^{xxii} In addition, Jeff also mentioned certain historical facts – that socialist regimes, for instance, once controlled over one-third of the world's land and population – in his narrative of capitalism. His quick recall of this fact in the context of an ethnographic interview indicates that Jeff was relatively knowledgeable about the history of the global communist movement and had given the subject a great deal of thought.

Jeff went on. In addition to citing historical “laws” to justify capitalism, he also rooted his belief in capitalism in “human nature” in general, and of greed in particular:

Greed is human nature; you cannot change it. One always feels that what he or she has now is not enough: this is a universal human trait. Maybe, during the wartime, the Chinese people respected heroes like Huang Jiguang,^{xxiii} admiring him for his more lofty, non-material pursuits, but Huang is not a hero in our time. People now respect singers, movie stars, and entrepreneurs, who are all the rich and famous. During the last few decades, the whole world has become highly economics-oriented. I would say that this is rooted in human nature: greed is in human nature. We are different from lions and tigers: they stop pursuing more food when they are full, but we derive pleasure from our greed. If you think about it, you will see that if the economy does not grow, so what? No big deal, really. For in the past, humans have lived in poverty for thousands of years, and we all could live like that. But look at the last 50 years – the economy has grown exponentially. What we have achieved in the last 50 years probably has surpassed what humans had achieved over the thousands of years before that. This was partially caused by the government's policies, but I feel the policy factor is secondary. The key is that human beings are greedy; it is greed that propels people to pursue economic growth.

By this point, it should be clear that Jeff was a reflective, thoughtful informant and that his train of thought was moving swiftly. Jeff linked the “success” of capitalism to human nature in a firm and absolute fashion, citing greed

as the ultimate engine that propels capitalism forward. In Jeff's view, greed is able to serve this function because it is deeply rooted in human nature. Here, it is very clear that Jeff holds a naturalized view of human greed.^{xxiv} He achieves this naturalization of human greed not only by directly claiming that “greed is human nature, you cannot change it,” but also by comparing human greed with the modest appetite of lions and tigers. Although feline predators in the popular imagination are ferocious and presumably avaricious, following only their survival instinct, Jeff claims that even they know what is enough. In contrast, human greed is insatiable. Thus, human greed appears to be more deep-rooted than the greed one could find in nature, and is more natural, essential, and law-like. In this comparison, the deep-rootedness of human greed was both assumed and confirmed. Through this comparison, Jeff established the naturalness of human greed, and based upon this apparently solid foundation, he moved on to his conclusion.

In fact, there was a logical gap in Jeff's analysis. If greed was really a fixed feature of human nature, then how does one explain the global shift in *zeitgeist* during the past few decades that Jeff himself acknowledged? In fact, Jeff articulated a sense of disjuncture in history: though human beings have lived satisfactorily with poverty for thousands of years, and though only 50 years ago Huang Jiguang was a Chinese hero, today the whole world is focused on the economy and “development.” As a result, we might ask, if human beings were not as greedy 50 years ago as they are today, how can one factor – the alleged fixture of human greed – explain the spread and triumph of capitalism? Although his viewpoint could not account for this gap in logic, Jeff still maintained that a natural human greed drove capitalism forward.

My point here is that all theories are conceptual tools that we use to understand the world,^{xxv} and that all theories are partial and unable to account for all facts. By showing the gap in Jeff's theory of capitalism, my goal here is to sketch a fuller picture of Jeff's thinking.

In addition to cultural resources in the form of academic social theories, my Mainlander informants also drew on other non-theoretical resources to make sense of capitalism. These resources included accounts of one's life experiences, both individual and collective, and the folk theories they developed to understand these experiences. Their attempts to use experiences or experienced-based folk theory to understand capitalism can be seen in my conversation with Jeff:

If you asked me why the economy had to develop, I would say no, the economy does not need to develop. But you cannot simply ignore the expectation that the economy will develop, since you are living in this society, and the whole society expects the economy to grow every year. I guess only after one country's GDP per capita has reached a certain level could people of this country lose the expectation of growth. Like I went to Taiwan recently, and found that some youth there took pride in moving "down" the social ladder. I feel I am becoming like that. I guess when you reach a certain age, the things you want change accordingly. Like now, I have an opportunity to move to another company, which would pay me 50% more. Five years ago I would have taken it without hesitation, but now I have to think whether this new job would offer me a good work-life balance, whether it

allows me to spend more time with my family. I am saying that money is no longer my major pursuit.

Jeff first acknowledged that, to function in a capitalist society, one has to give in to the dominant ideology or way of life, at least to a degree. Later in the narrative, though, Jeff mingled a personal account of his life experiences with social theories explaining larger social changes. More specifically, he struck an analogy between an individual's life path and a society's developmental trajectory. As he himself approached middle-age, Jeff began to assign more weight to aspects of his life other than his career and money. In the same way, he stated, as a society grows richer, movement "up" the social ladder loses its charm as a widely pursued life goal. Here, the implicit assumption is that less affluent societies are more motivated to become rich, and this view is seemingly consistent with Jeff's conceptualization of fixed human nature. Yet the fact that one's desires and a society's desires are in constant flux seems to contradict that. Note also that Jeff's conceptualization of societies was marked by developmental stages. In societies that had achieved a certain material standard, people's wants changed accordingly: material affluence was less stressed. Here again, we see a Marxist (or Lewis Morgan-esque) conceptualization of stepwise societal progression, as well as a tight correspondence between the "economic base" and the "superstructure." Overall, Jeff's understanding of capitalism was informed by reflection on his own life mingled with academic theory.

In later interviews, I encountered many other Mainlanders whose cultural interpretations of capitalism resembled Jeff's, in the sense that they all drew upon similar, naturalized social theories and combined them with reflections and folk

theories based on personal experiences. For instance, when I asked Ivan, a real estate investor and a 29-year-old alumnus of Peking University, about his thoughts on capitalism, he gave a speech on freedom and entrepreneurship:

What is capitalism? Oh, it is a system where the government intervenes little. People living under capitalism are very entrepreneurial, and they make money under the condition of abiding laws. Under capitalism, everyone's potential can be realized to its maximum, and its freedom allows everyone to pursue goals that he or she deems worth pursuing. It is a system that protects you, and allows you to do what you want to do. Freedom is the basis for everything, and capitalism provides a set of institutions to protect freedom, to protect entrepreneurship. In sum, capitalism represents a freer, different system from socialism.

In Ivan's opinion, capitalism is a bulwark shielding individual freedom, whose value lies in its contribution to creativity. Every individual has talent to be cultivated, just like every law-abiding entrepreneur has potential money out there to be made. A free system allows these potentials to be cultivated and realized. In his view, individuality serves as its own justification and vindicates its own legitimacy; it does not need something else to prove itself. Here, Ivan's interpretation of capitalism echoed loud and clear the theories of scholars like Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman.^{xxvi} Ivan's unwavering belief in free enterprise and entrepreneurship reflected the economics training he received at Peking University, which was a stronghold of neoliberal ideology in China during the

reform era. Interestingly, an eloquent neoliberalist preacher himself, Ivan also admitted that neoclassical economics had little practical use in his own work as a real estate investor. This contrast highlights the conjectural, utopian nature of neoclassic economics, in which the theory is not measured against the world it seek to describe, but instead the world is measured against it.^{xxvii} By adopting methodological individualism, neoclassical economics ignores the social, cultural, and psychological factors that shape human behavior and reduces individual behavior to utilitarian calculation and decision-making.^{xxviii} Given its reductionism, neoclassical economics has limited explanatory power, yet its glorified focus on the market mechanism and its own mathematical rigor have earned its status as a "scientific" explanation of capitalism. Fully persuaded by this theory, Ivan was able to ignore its practical uselessness, and was convinced that the neoclassical utopia was the destination of all human histories. There is a gap between what neoclassical economics promises, and what it actually does, but people are sometimes willing to ignore this gap in order to legitimize capitalism.

After his Friedman-esque speech, Ivan responded to my follow-up question about the books he reads to reflect on capitalism:

After one starts working, who has time to read books? And in our time, who is going to care about the comparison between socialism and capitalism? Topics like these are meaningless. All socialist countries are moving towards capitalism now, so to compare these two systems is useless. Don't you think China is learning from the US all the time? We now all share the same ideology, and it doesn't matter whether it is called

socialism or capitalism; they are just names and labels. What matters is that we are all moving towards a direction that is full of freedom.

In this quote, Ivan shared with Jeff the sense that socialism was anachronistic.^{xxx} Although I never broached the term “socialism” myself in my interview questions, this term constantly popped up in Mainlander informants’ responses. To them, the poor economic performance and rampant restrictions under Maoist socialism provided a sharp contrast with the material affluence and relative freedom of the Dengist and post-Deng era, and socialism was deeply associated with a poor and shackled bygone era whose passing was perceived as good riddance. As capitalism’s triumph over socialism proved its superiority, socialism’s worthlessness was twofold. First, as a historical economic formation, it no longer existed, but above all, the resulting historical debacles had proved its misdirection. This sense of anachronism towards socialism, as it turned out, was widespread among my Mainlander informants.

The sense of anachronism towards socialism, in fact, is an example of a third resource that my Mainlander informants deployed to justify capitalism: sensibilities and affects that favor capitalism and/or disparage socialism. Conceptually speaking, sensibilities and affects are distinct from social theories and life experiences. They are different from social theories because they are emotional states existing within the bodies of my informants, and are not well-articulated, nor are they always discursive. They do not overlap with experiences in the sense that the invocation of experiences comes mainly in the form of memory, while the invocation of sensibilities and affects

comes in the form of intensity of feeling.^{xxx} However, affects and sensibilities are not totally independent from social theories and life experiences, either. For example, for my Mainlander informants, their sense of socialism’s anachronism was derived from their longitudinal experiences of living in an evolving China^{xxxii} and underscored by China’s post-Reform politico-economic institutional scaffoldings, which are oftentimes supported by social theories that were very different from their Maoist counterparts.^{xxxiii} The Dengist experiences of material affluence, relative individual freedom, and slackened ideological indoctrination led many informants to regard the market reforms as liberating them from the fate of Maoist extremities, and to cultivate positive affects towards capitalism. In other words, their capitalism-favoring sensibility is partially produced and conditioned by life experiences and social theories. The sense of anachronism that my Mainlander informants voiced towards socialism was not politically innocent, but in fact deeply influenced by ideology. It was simultaneously a critique of the Maoist past, a validation of the Dengist current moment, and an expectation of a more liberal and affluent future.

Jeff’s and Ivan’s ways of making sense of capitalism went beyond gender; a similar view was echoed by my female Mainlander bankers. Emma, a Mainlander banker working at Goldman Sachs, commented on the theories of her undergraduate major, economics:

Have you learned any economics?
I find economics can be applied to a wide range of social phenomena, and it helps us to understand hidden logic. The first lesson in economics is “maximization of interest,” and I increasingly find it true. The principles of economics

have been accepted for hundreds of years, and I guess there is a reason for it. I guess “maximization of interest” is based on human beings’ instinct to survive. Imagine some “savage” society, where one grabs a piece of meat; the first thought must be: “I am going to have it all to myself,” and altruistic thoughts, like “I want to share this piece of meat with others,” probably come second. I believe there are laws in economics, like income inequality. It is a natural phenomenon: only the fittest will survive, the same as biological evolution.

Here, Emma used neoclassical economics to make sense of social phenomena. We can see that Emma consciously naturalized the economic system in various ways. First, she believed that there were social laws lying behind economic phenomena, and she naturalized income inequality as a result of social processes that were similar to natural selection. Positions like these are an easy target for anthropological criticism, but they still hold a spell over the general public at large. The origins of these dubious positions can be traced to social scientists’ efforts to create social laws comparable to natural laws and to social Darwinism.^{xxxiii} Second, like Jeff, Emma also naturalized human greed, although she did not use the term “human nature” directly. Based on her hypothetical example of a “savage” society, we can tell that she was claiming that an individual thinks about himself or herself first, others second, and prioritizes one’s own needs over the needs of others. By setting her hypothetical example in a historical “savage” society, Emma naturalized human greed, making it deeply ingrained in human history, dating it back to a time when natural instincts reigned

and civilization had not yet taken off. Emma’s hypothetical example was not backed by any evidence from studies of hunter-and-gatherer societies or archaeological excavations, but it still aimed to ground the economic approach to social phenomena in human pre-history and human nature. Here we can see a naturalized, essentialized, and theoretical economic understanding of capitalism in action.

Like Jeff and Ivan, Emma also felt that “the distinction between ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ is no longer meaningful.” She explained:

In fact, I am a Communist Party member, but I don’t think there’s any difference between socialism and capitalism. Look at China now; I really don’t know where the line between socialism and capitalism is. Instead, I think it is more meaningful to delineate different developmental stages. “Material civilization” is one criterion to delineate these stages.

Here again, we witness a deeply rooted, taken-for-granted capitalist ideology at work. China still claims that it is socialistic, yet facets of its economic formations have turned toward capitalism, and the distinction between “socialism” and “capitalism” has become problematic and murky to Emma. Like Jeff, Emma took Morgan’s or Marx’s theories of developmental stages and reversed their order so that capitalism succeeded socialism. Her criterion for demarcating the stages signaled a clear Marxist influence. Although not explicitly stated, Emma also alluded to her sense of socialism’s anachronism, noting that China was itself turning toward capitalism, and implicitly claiming that China too has acknowledged that socialism is wrongheaded and unproductive.

Erica, a Morgan Stanley investment banker who graduated from Cambridge recently, also mentioned that she was a strong believer in natural laws and that, in the domain of economics, there were natural law-like economic principles. Erica's repeated stress on "natural laws" during our interview struck me, and I believe her views come partly from her engineering background, as the discipline of economics seldom claims that the "laws" it identifies are "natural." I asked her how she could claim that there were "natural" laws behind social phenomena, when human society itself is not "natural." The Cambridge engineering graduate responded:

Humans are part of nature, too. Have you ever read "Stories of the Ming Dynasty"?^{xxxiv} History has its own laws, just as a dynasty goes through circles of ups and downs and collapses when its *qi*^{xxxv} dies out. Or like the economic circles: they are natural circles, driven by human psychology, by human greed. It is natural that humans have greed. I don't see greed as a negative thing. It is a normal condition, a natural force to drive society forward.

The job of the government is to learn about the natural laws of the market and to moderate the market's functioning. It is also a natural law that there is income inequality, and the government should do something about it. It is an issue of human rights.

At the beginning of her account, Erica claimed that human beings are not outside nature, so that they too are governed by "natural" laws. But because it is unclear how she defines "nature" and "outside," the reasoning here is not

convincing. Even so, Erica still chose to take a naturalizing view of social phenomena, believing that there are natural laws underneath the social surface. Erica's mentions of *qi* and a contemporary Chinese popular historical novel indicate that her theory of history may have multiple sources, and that her notion of naturalization might be different from a Western, positivist, disenchanted one. However, in the context of traditional Chinese cosmology, the historical "laws" are not positive natural rules that are iron-like and external to human will; rather, they are laws that extend from humans and are thus not alien to human will.^{xxxvi} Erica's view of historical and social laws might thus be influenced by traditional Chinese view of those issues, but its dominant tone was positivistic and thus modern and Western.

Along with acknowledging the existence of social and historical laws behind socio-historical phenomena, Erica also claimed that human greed is natural. Because it is natural, something that everyone is born with, one does not need to have negative feelings towards it, because greediness is a perfectly normal human condition. This is the effect that naturalization strategies seek to achieve: by naturalization, cultural traits not only appear to be beyond human agency and are thus unchangeable; they also appear to be innocent and harmless. It is not only useless to fight nature; such efforts are unnecessary in the first place.

Did Erica also possess a sense of socialism's anachronism like Jeff, Ivan, and Emma? Upon hearing my question "What comes to your mind when someone mentions socialism?" Erica quickly responded: "What a question! Now I feel like I'm back in high school taking politics course exams." Although she was apparently trying to make a joke, her response was telling. In China, at least until the writing of this dissertation, high

school students were required to take a compulsory course in “politics,” either for two (for science track students) or three years (for social studies and arts track students). The main purpose of this course is to propagate Party-state doctrines and propaganda among the students. Most college students are also required to take courses like this, but because Erica left China for Cambridge after high school, her last encounter with those politics courses was back in high school.

My question about capitalism reminded Erica of her high school examinations. This recollection has three implications. First, it implies that, in Erica’s mind, knowledge about capitalism is useful only in examinations, and thus not in everyday settings. The c-word was used only in strictly academic and non-economic contexts, with little direct relevance and few implications for everyday life. Second, her response implied that after high school, Erica probably seldom encountered this term in a significant fashion. Third, it also implies that the c-word is used only in politics classes, and not in any settings other than that. Like many of my other informants, Erica recalled that the content of Chinese high-school politics classes was boring and the format rigid and formulaic. Erica felt that she did not learn anything useful from that class, and, when taking it, simply wanted to pass the exam and get it over with. My question about capitalism sent Erica back in time to a boring and formulaic setting, which contrasted sharply with the current moment, in which Erica is a financially independent and foreign-educated banker, working in an “interesting” (her own words) industry that offers real-world “relevance” and abundant learning opportunities. Out of this contrast emerged a sense of absurdity, and Erica seized it, making a joke out of it. Erica’s joke could thus be read as an

expression of her sense of socialism’s anachronism. Note that taking an exam in the politics course was a personal experience: Erica’s understanding of the meaning of the term “capitalism” was inseparable from her own educational experiences in China, and thus was entangled with the specificities of her particular life path.

From my interviews with these four Mainlander bankers, all in their late twenties, it appears that my Mainlander informants drew on a plethora of cultural resources to make sense of capitalism, of which social theories of a Marxist and neoliberal origin constituted a conspicuous part. Also, these social theory-based sense-making efforts did not stand alone; on the contrary, they were infused with experience-based understandings and sensibilities that were not explicitly discursive. Their sense-making efforts were thus formed through a network of interconnected cultural, theoretical, experiential, and affective resources that in turn made capitalism intelligible to my informants.

CAPITALISM IN EVERYDAY: HONGKONGERS’ EXPERIENCE- BASED CULTURAL MEANINGS

To begin the discussion of Hongkongers, let me describe a vignette that occurred when I interviewed Lisa, a Hongkonger banker working at the back office of HSBC. Over the coffee table, I again broached the topic of capitalism.

Author: Do you think it is appropriate to characterize Hong Kong’s economic system as capitalistic?

Lisa: Do you mean capitalism and communism? I don’t understand.

Author: I meant, do you think of

Hong Kong as a capitalist society?

Lisa: ... Yes.

Author: So what are the features of a capitalism society then?

Lisa: ... huh? ... Free [sic], I think it is free [sic] in the market la...

Author: Oh, freedom, so is the free market a good thing?

Lisa: ... err ... Yes, sometimes. I think sometimes, and ... err ... overall I think a free economy is better than a restricted one.

When I initiated the topic of capitalism, Lisa seemed to be a bit surprised by the topic, and she asked for clarification immediately afterwards: “Do you mean capitalism and communism?” she asked. She even paused before giving me a definite answer on whether Hong Kong is capitalist or not, a situation I never encountered when I asked Mainlander informants this same question. When pressed for features of a capitalist society, she again had to think for a long while before answering. This answer, however, was simply a short sentence, and a single feature was mentioned in response to a question that sought multiple elements. Overall, Lisa’s responses to my questions were consistently hesitant and scattered. I was frustrated that I was unable to solicit the answers I expected, but at that moment I did not realize the problem lay in the fact that the questions I was asking were abstract and theory-laden.

I made the same mistake again when I interviewed my second Hongkonger informant, Jasmine, who worked at a leading commercial bank.

Author: As a business major, you must have learned about Adam Smith at school. What do you think of the theory of the “invisible hand”?

Jasmine: I forgot all those things! (chuckling)

Author: Oh, I mean the theory that the market can run itself, and that government should intervene as little as possible. Do you agree with this kind of theory?

Jasmine: Well, I seldom think about issues like these.

Author: But do you think it is right for the government get involved in the economy, at least to a degree?

Jasmine: ... err ... I don’t think the government needs to, err, needs to, ... like, ... err ... , involve ... , not totally free market, err ... like, ... like, ... when it comes to problems, probably it takes a long time to return to normal.

Reminding me of the bumpy conversation I had with Lisa, I was initially baffled by Jasmine’s response. At the time, I thought that I was simply asking for her own opinion, rather than some technical or factual questions, and wondered why it was so hard for Jasmine, who graduated from a well-known university in Australia, to give an answer. Does this mean that Jasmine seldom reflected on her surroundings and did not have a cultural model of capitalism at all? Perhaps detecting the puzzled look in my eyes, half apologetically and half jokingly Jasmine explained to me that, for “Hong Kong students,” the sole purpose of

learning something is “to pass the exam.” Once the exam is over, “we forget all we learned!” She laughed after saying this, and I laughed, too.

In our echoed laughter, the realization came to me that I was asking the wrong questions. Failing to produce a coherent discourse on capitalism did not necessarily mean that Lisa and Jasmine had failed to interpret the meanings of capitalism. Instead, it simply shows that they were unfamiliar with the articulated, verbal, and social theory-derived forms of capitalist meaning. In fact, because the words like “freedom” and “economic cycle” appeared in their broken responses, I am confident that these verbal ideologies had reached them. But these ideas were not as deeply rooted in my informants’ consciousness, so they were not ready at hand when called upon. My informants simply grew up with little interest in these discourses.

Elsewhere during our interview, Lisa mentioned that when she started working for the bank, she took considerable pride in being a member of “the most professional group in society,” but that her enthusiasm was soon dampened by her dim job prospects when her bank out-sourced most of the back office work to Mainland China. Jasmine started her first finance position with aspirations to own her own property some day, but after she discovered the scary fact that all of her colleagues had settled down in public housing, she left that position right away. She did not, in her view, want to be one of those “losers.” Through their decisions, Lisa and Jasmine revealed their cultural models of capitalism, which were not put into words: in a capitalistic society, capital conveys “power” (the outsourcing of jobs affected Lisa negatively, but she had no say about this). It is legitimate for individuals to long to grasp that power (Lisa’s initial pride, Jasmine’s aspirations), and take actions to

access that power (Jasmine’s quitting). Capitalism is found in the trivialities of everyday life, not some theory-laden narrative of societal efficiency or national might. It is about jobs, apartments, and “losers;” it is a story about individual aspirations and actions. I started to understand that Hongkongers learned about formed views about capitalism largely through their everyday lives instead of through social theories.

After realizing this, I still asked but downplayed theoretical questions about capitalism when interviewing Hongkongers. Rather, I let the informants talk more about their jobs and their everyday lives and then looked for the meanings of capitalism embedded in those discourses. For example, when I interviewed Karen, a Hongkonger real estate analyst at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, I combined both theoretical questions and general questions about working and living in Hong Kong together:

Author: As a business major at the HKU, you must have learned neoclassical economics in school. Do you think this theory is convincing?

Karen: I don’t care. When I was studying it, I only wanted to get good grades in the class, so I learned what I was told. I did not form my own opinion on the stuff I learned.

Author: I see. Another question: how do you conceive the role that financial institutions played in the 2007-9 financial crisis?

Karen: This is too deep. I never thought about issues like this.

Author: For example, what do you think of the financial products like CDO?

Karen: Oh, that is very normal. The banks needed to make money... The reason why the industry exists is to make money, to create value for shareholders.

Author: Is there anything else that a bank should pay attention to, other than making money?

Karen: ... Ethics. You don't want to be like Lehman Brothers, who took on more risk than it could bear in pursuit of money.

Author: Do you think Hong Kong banks make the balance well between making money and ethics?

Karen: ... In Hong Kong, rich people got rich because they worked hard. There might be some luck, too, but for the kids from poor families, Hong Kong provides a good platform. The government guarantees you can graduate from college if you are poor but have good grades.

Author: You mentioned earlier you liked free economy, but now you still acknowledge that the government should play some role in the economy. Would you recommend Hong Kong's market-government relationship to China?

Karen: Hong Kong has been developing for many years, while China has only been developing for 30 years. So its developmental stage is different from Hong Kong and the US. Thirty years ago

Hong Kong was like China, and 100 years ago the US and the UK was like China today. You need to have a mature economy first, and then a free economy comes afterwards.

Author: But the US economy was freer before the Great Depression than after...

Karen: That is too deep—I don't know (chuckling).

Author: Do you think market economies are also capitalistic ones?

Karen: I don't know what capitalism is, what socialism is. I've heard of the term "capitalism" before, but I didn't care about it, so I don't know about it. Capitalism might be market economy, but this concept is meaningless to me.

Author: What do you care about in life?

Karen: Family. I don't care about capitalism, please don't talk about it with me!

From this and other conversations with her, I learned a few things. First, Karen learned about neoclassic economics at school, but to her, such theories were like the Party-state propaganda that Eva learned in her Mainland high school. She learned neoclassical economics mainly for the purpose of passing the class, which, in turn, was linked to her successfully graduating from the University of Hong Kong and landing a job. Unlike my Mainlander informants, Karen did not really reflect upon capitalism using neoclassical economics.

Second, Karen utilized her experience as a Hongkonger to make sense of capitalism. She mentioned that, in Hong Kong, rich people were rich because they worked hard, and that the Hong Kong government took measures to make sure that poor kids could also receive a good education. This was a discussion about economic inequality and the reproduction of such inequality, and Karen concretized these abstract concepts through the context of Hong Kong. Although it is doubtful whether all rich people in Hong Kong are rich thanks to their hard work, such a claim is not groundless per se. After all, many Hong Kong billionaires, such as Li Ka-shing, did come from a humble background. As a Hongkonger herself, Karen grew up with stories of self-made millionaires, and she could call on these when necessary. The ease with which Karen concretized the abstract concept of economic inequality was enabled by her experiences of growing up in Hong Kong. In addition, Karen mentioned that family was important to her elsewhere in our interview. By this, she probably meant that providing for her family, caring for family, and spending time with family was important. However, because all of these dimensions of family life are entangled in the capitalist processes of the production and reproduction of labor, we can also read Karen's stress on "family" as the prioritization of a practical, rather than a theoretical, approach to understanding capitalism.

Third, Karen also took capitalist socioeconomic formations for granted, which can be seen in her comment that it was "normal" for banks to introduce CDOs to make money. Here, note that Karen's taken-for-granted approach to capitalism differed from that of my Mainlander informants'. While Mainlanders used the concept of historical inevitability and developmental stages to

naturalize capitalism, Karen viewed capitalism as a social system: her use of words like "normality," "ethics," and "family" indicates that Karen understood capitalism as a social, instead of a natural, system. Put slightly differently, Karen took capitalism for granted without naturalizing it. This contrasts with many Mainlanders' tendency to naturalize capitalism.

Fourth, Karen also established a developmental relationship between China, Hong Kong, and the US: China was staggered 30 years behind Hong Kong, which in turn was 100 years behind the US. What was implicitly assumed here was that all societies follow the same developmental trajectory. Note also that the difference between stages was not in nature, but in degree. That is, in the Mainlanders' models, different stages were of a different nature: socialism, as a developmental stage, was qualitatively different from capitalism, the later and more advanced developmental stage that all societies are preordained for. In Karen's model, however, the transition between different stages was smoothly incremental: one stage linearly transforms into another. In fact, the term "stage model" might not be an accurate way to characterize Karen's model of development. A more accurate description might be that Karen holds a linear model of development, and that along that same developmental line, China, Hong Kong, and the US occupy different positions.

So far, we have seen that Lisa and Jasmine seldom thought about capitalism with the aid of academic social theories, but their behavior revealed that they had enough practical knowledge to grasp the dimensions of the whole picture and work in a capitalist society. Karen had heard of some capitalist theories and ideologies, but she was not interested in them and mainly understood capitalism through her

own experiences. This pattern resonated across the gender line. When I asked Peter, a private equity investor who had graduated from the University of Hong Kong and Oxford, about capitalism, his initial response was again that he did not know what “capitalism” was. After I explicitly linked “capitalism” and the “market,” Peter acknowledged that capitalism was a social system in which “price was determined by the market.” In this system, big companies “naturally” had an advantage over small firms, because of the “economy of scale.” Following my question about the relationship between the market and the government, Peter said:

I am not a very opinionated person. I used to read history books, which might have touched on the issue of the relationship between the market and the government, but I stopped reading these books a long time ago. I think it is unnecessary to read those books, because reading those books is just to read another person’s opinion, and those opinions might be wrong, or distant from reality. Now I only read books on investment practices, because to do my job I do not need to think about the relationship between the market and the government. I only need to know what the government’s policies are and which industries these policies have an impact on.

Like Ivan, Peter also acknowledged that neoclassical economics theories were irrelevant to his job performance, but unlike Ivan, Peter went further and said that all social-theoretical discussions were unnecessary. For him, practical knowledge informed by his life experiences and published practice guides were more relevant and important. However, here Peter missed the point that “practical” knowledge is also informed by theory, and there is no such thing as purely practical knowledge. Though he disparaged theoretical discussions of capitalism and called them irrelevant, Peter at the same time accepted the capitalist system as an absolute “reality”: his only possible relationship with it was to adapt to it, instead of reflecting on it and changing it.

I also talked to Peter about material inequality and tried to use everyday language to express the idea that the private exploitation of the results of social production was unjust.^{xxxvii} As I insisted on the injustice of inequality, Peter finally objected, sounding a bit annoyed:

What is wrong with inequality? If A is more capable than B, then A should make more than B. There is nothing wrong about that. If you want A and B to make the same, then it is unfair to A. I cannot agree with what you said. I agree with you that children born to rich families have more opportunities, but that is luck, and there is nothing you can do about it. It is the same for the animal kingdom, too. If a small fish hatched from an egg, and a big fish happens to be there, then the small fish will be eaten by the big fish right away. This is luck. You can only accept your luck – well,

maybe the government can do something about it, too.

As far as I can recall, this was the only interview during which some sparks arose between the interviewee and me. From this conflict, though, we can see that Peter was totally convinced by the bourgeois concepts of the possessive individual, individual effort, and proportional reward.^{xxxviii} In this way, Peter's view was typical amongst Hongkongers. In addition, the unequal socioeconomic situation was re-interpreted as an issue of luck, which is irrational and beyond human control. One cannot change one's own luck, nor can one try to change the socioeconomic situation; rather, the only thing one can do is, again, to adapt to the situation. Third, by introducing an analogy from the domain of nature, that is, a small fish being eaten by a big fish, Peter naturalized human inequality. Note here, however, that this naturalization took the form of an analogy; again, like many of my Hongkonger informants, Peter did not directly naturalize human nature or historical laws using concepts like historical inevitability or developmental stages, as some of my Mainlander informants did.

Born into a vegetable vendors' family, Peter had relied on hard work to climb up the social ladder. He outperformed most of his undergraduate classmates as a computer science major at a top notch Hong Kong university, studied finance at Oxford, and landed a well-paid finance job. I know it must have been hard to get where he is today, and my attack on socioeconomic inequality could have been read as an attack on his own accomplishments. Maybe that is why Peter became a bit annoyed and reacted by reinforcing his belief in capitalism. If this is the case, then we might be able to say that by adapting himself to capitalism,

capitalism also rewarded Peter, which, in turn, bound him to the situation to a deeper degree. Thus, to understand Peter's defense of capitalism, we also need to take his personal history and family life into consideration.

Elsewhere, in talking about the fairness of Hong Kong's educational system, in which the government could sponsor an individual who did not have sufficient financial resources to finish college, Peter shared with me his travel experiences on the Mainland. He said, "When I was traveling on the Mainland, I went to some remote villages that were still in abject poverty. I felt that I was lucky to be born in Hong Kong. If I were born into these villages, my life would for sure have turned out differently." In this case, Peter expressed his sense of luck at being born in Hong Kong. The object of Peter's sense of luck was in fact Hong Kong's abundant but equal opportunities and affluence, rather than the capitalist formation itself, but in Hongkongers' discourses, these things are intertwined. In Hong Kong, capitalism was widely perceived as being inherently linked to proportional fairness, and Hong Kong's affluence was widely attributed to its free market system.^{xxxix} I thus infer that this sense of luck underscored Peter's justification of capitalism.

Such a sensibility of being lucky to be a Hongkonger can be found in many of the interviews I did with other Hongkongers. Kathryn, a compliance officer at a European bank, mentioned that whenever she thought of China, the things that came to mind were that "China is a very unequal society," and that she was "lucky to be born in Hong Kong" where life is comfortable and governmental procedures are fair. Overall, from my interviews, I got a sense that many in Hong Kong are suspicious of the Mainland. During the Maoist era, poverty, unfair remuneration regimes, and

“backwardness” constituted the stereotypical image of the Mainland in Hongkongers’ minds. Nowadays, Hong Kong’s commitment to liberal ideologies is at the center of the perceived distinction between Hong Kong and the Mainland. In both cases, Hongkongers placed themselves in a more advantageous position compared to Mainlanders. In the face of the Mainland’s increasing power, this imagined psychological advantage might at times take the form of a sense of luck: *I cannot control what is going on in China, but within the city of Hong Kong, an enclave of civility and affluence, we still possess relative order, prosperity, and freedom. We are a lucky group.* To exaggerate the point, the situation is like when a fisherman finds a typhoon shelter as a storm rolls ashore: one cannot control what is out there at sea, but one is safe within the shelter and lucky to have refuge. Again, the capitalist system is not the sole object being validated by this sense of luck, but it is among the social formations and articulations that Hongkongers hold dear. Through this sense of luck, the capitalist order in Hong Kong becomes legitimized.

Overall, through accounts given by Lisa, Jasmine, Karen, Peter and Kathryn, I found that Hongkonger bankers also understood capitalism through a network of social theories, accounts of their experiences, and their sensibilities. Unlike Mainlander bankers, however, Hongkonger bankers were less likely to draw on academic social theories in making sense of capitalism; when they did so, they were less likely to draw on social theories that naturalized capitalism. Instead, because they grew up in capitalistic Hong Kong instead of socialist Mainland China, Hongkonger bankers directly drew on accounts of their own experiences to understand capitalism. Because they did not have meaningful, experiential engagements with socialism,

their tendency was to treat socialism as an impersonalized social-scientific concept, and they felt lucky to have grown up in capitalist Hong Kong. All of this set them apart from Mainlanders, who grew up under socialism and treated it as a historical error that needed to be rectified by a liberating capitalist future.

CONCLUSION

In this research, I learned not only that that ideological interpretations of capitalism are specific to location, but also that capitalist meanings take on a number of forms. To make sense of capitalism, Mainlanders often drew on social theories to naturalize capitalism and viewed socialism as anachronistic. These traits are products of China’s particular history: the educational system that indoctrinated students with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Reform and its drastic improvement of living standards, and their everyday experiences during the transition and metamorphosis of everyday Chinese life all helped to shape the forms that capitalist meanings took in the minds of Mainlanders. Hongkongers, in contrast, are inclined to draw on accounts of individual and collective social experiences to understand capitalism. Their preferences for experience over theory was also shaped by Hong Kong’s particular history: where the post-WWII education system refrained from touching on contemporary Chinese political affairs, the postwar economic takeoff produced a new generation of material affluence, and the sharply differing politico-economic arrangements between Hong Kong and the Mainland, particularly during the Maoist era, all helped to engender a deep suspicion of the Mainland among Hongkongers. Such a history shaped Hongkongers’ forms of capitalist meanings.

The triumph of capitalism over socialism and communism is a significant event in human history, and my informants taught me that we cannot understand this triumph simply as a natural expression of human desire for freedom, as certain popular discourses and scholars repeatedly insist. Rather, a multitude of forces are at work. Instead of assuming that one universal explanation is able to account for one of the most significant events of the 20th century, we should instead carefully examine what exactly capitalism and capitalist ideologies mean in particular places and at a particular time. In addition, we should pay attention not only to the content of a person's interpretation of capitalism, but also its form. One might be indoctrinated, learning that communism is the direction of human progress, but one's experiences might teach one a totally different lesson. One also might believe that capitalism liberates the entrepreneurial spirit, and this might add to one's sense that socialism belongs in the ash heap of history. The articulation of this assemblage of mutually reinforcing or conflicting forms of meanings, together with their contents, determine the contours of significance, moral value, and value judgments one holds towards capitalism, which in turn shapes peoples' social actions, resulting in the reproduction or modification of the global capitalist social order. Merely understanding the content of meaning is not enough, because the forms of meanings and the interactions between them are also of crucial importance. A start-up founder might read little about capitalism, but personal experiences may have led him to believe in its legitimacy wholeheartedly; an academic might read extensively about capitalism, developing a theory that takes a stand against it, but his or her lack of business connections might limit the theory's influence on actual capitalist practices. All in all, the meaning

of capitalism matters because it assumes forms that are locally cast. Only by addressing all facets of human endeavors in making sense of the social environment in which we live can we comprehensively understand the historical ascent of capitalism.

ⁱ Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (New York: Verso, 2010).

George Soros, *Financial Turmoil in Europe and the United States: Essays* (New York: Public Affairs, 2012).

ⁱⁱ Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol II: The Wheels of Commerce* (University of California Press, 1992).

ⁱⁱⁱ Sylvia Yanagisako, *Producing Culture and Capital: Family Firms in Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

James Fulcher, *Capitalism: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

^{iv} Eric Wolf, *Europe and People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

Sidney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986).

^v Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

^{vi} Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of A Theory of Practice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 164.

^{vii} Ibid., 168.

^{viii} Ibid., 168.

^{ix} Ibid., 168.

^x Ibid., 165.

^{xi} Michael Taussig, *The devil and commodity fetishism in South America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

^{xii} Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*.

^{xiii} James Cornells, "Veblen's Theory of Finance Capitalism and Contemporary Corporate America," *Journal of Economic Issues* 38, No. 1 (2004): 29-58.

^{xiv} Karen Ho, *Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

^{xv} David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Caitlin Zaloom, *Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology from Chicago to London* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

^{xvi} Ho, *Liquidated*.
Leslie Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

^{xvii} In *Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics* published by the Hong Kong government, I read that there were around 100,000 financial professionals in Hong Kong. However, as I am not sure who is counted as “financial professionals” in the *Annual Digest*, I decide not to cite this number.

^{xviii} By the term “Mainlander,” I mean that the person has spent his/her formative years on the Chinese Mainland, and self-identifies in such terms. By the term “Hongkonger,” I mean that this person has spent significant portion of his/her formative years in Hong Kong, maintains strong ties with the city (working and living in Hong Kong, significant family ties in Hong Kong, etc.), and self-identifies in such terms – even though he or she may carry a Canadian or American passport. The term “Hongkonger” can also be seen spelled as “Hong Konger,” or “Hongkongese,” or “Hong Kongese.” Although Hong Kong has been part of the People’s Republic of China for over 15 years, these two identity labels are still relevant in developing one’s self-perception and organizing social relations in Hong Kong. All my informants described themselves using one of these two labels.

^{xix} Gordon Mathews, Eric Ma and Tai-Lok Lui, *Hong Kong, China: Learning to belong to a nation* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).
Nichole Newendorp, *Uneasy Reunions: Immigration, Citizenship, and Family Life in Post-1997 Hong Kong* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

^{xx} Jeff was not the real name of my informant. In fact, for all the informants quoted in this paper, I do not use their real names.

^{xxi} Karl Marx, *Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy* (New York: Penguin, 1990).

^{xxii} Ann Swidler, *Talk of Love: How Culture Matters* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

^{xxiii} Huang Jiguang (1930-1952) was a Chinese soldier famous for his heroic deeds in the Korean War. According to Chinese state media, in a critical battle during the war, Huang threw himself onto the enemy’s

fire hole so that his comrades could march on and conquer the enemy’s blockhouse. Huang’s story was interpreted as self-sacrifice for some greater collective goal and was widely disseminated by the propaganda machinery of the Chinese Communist Party.

^{xxiv} Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol Delaney, *Naturalizing Power: Essays in Feminist Cultural Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

^{xxv} Pierre Duhem, *The aim and structure of physical theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

^{xxvi} Friedrich Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
Friedman, Milton. *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

^{xxvii} James Carrier and Daniel Miller, *Virtualism: A New Political Economy*. Oxford: Berg, 1998.

^{xxviii} Gary Becker, *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

^{xxix} Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
Kabir Tambar, “Iterations of lament: Anachronism and affect in a Shi’i Islamic revival in Turkey,” *American Ethnologist* 38, no. 3 (2011): 484-500.

^{xxx} Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

^{xxxi} Lisa Rofel, *Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

^{xxxii} Sara Ahmed, “Happy Objects.” In: *The Affect Theory Reader*, Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth (eds.), 29-51 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

^{xxxiii} Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee, *An Intellectual History of Modern China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Robert Frank, *The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

^{xxxiv} Chinese: 明朝那些事兒. It is a popular historical novel written by an amateur author, and it was released online beginning in 2006.

^{xxxv} In traditional Chinese culture, “qi (氣)” (pronounced “chee”) was regarded as an active forming principle of any living being. When one’s *qi* wanes, one’s life ends.

xxxvi Hui Wang, *Xiandai Zhongguo Sixiang de Xingqi (The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought)* (Beijing: SDX Press, 2004).

xxxvii Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

xxxviii Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan Turner, *Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).

xxxix Alvin Rabushka, *Hong Kong* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979).

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN THE CHINESE ANTI-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DISCOURSE

*“Nowhere in the world is a woman safe from violence.”
Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro of the United Nations*

*“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”
Margaret Mead*

Nancy Tang
Amherst College

Since Chinese women account for one-tenth of the entire world population, the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse effectively affects the well-being of at least one in ten people on our planet. Though the real extent of domestic violence in China is unknown, due in part to the relative “lack of nationwide attention to and study of domestic violence,” there is “a general sense that domestic violence is a grave problem in Chinese society.”ⁱ This essay aims to examine the “grave problem” of domestic violence and the anti-domestic violence discourse in China.

Three different actors participate in the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse: 1) the Chinese state and state agencies, 2) civil society activists (organizations and individual citizens), and 3) the international society. Their varied incentives, actions, and interactions regarding the prevention of and punishment for domestic violence produce the complex dynamics of anti-domestic violence discourse in China. These actors adopt one or several of the following three frameworks to understand domestic violence: 1) the gender equality/feminist framework that sees

domestic violence as a gender-based issue in patriarchal societies; 2) the international human rights framework that understands domestic violence as a form of human rights violation, and 3) the “family stability and social harmony” framework that defines domestic violence as “a threat to family stability and social harmony.”ⁱⁱ While the third framework is developed and used by the Chinese state and state agencies, civil society organizations and individual activists usually adopt the feminist framework, the human rights framework, or a combination of both.

Most current literature on the anti-domestic violence discourse in China focuses on the Chinese state’s responsibility to curb domestic violence and to provide its victims with legal protections.ⁱⁱⁱ However, the literatures’ authors fail to answer one question: why does the Chinese state have any incentives to address the issue of domestic violence? As Sally Engle Merry points out, since domestic violence is “deeply embedded” in existing power structures and oppressive systems, “powerful local groups often resist these changes.”^{iv} If the Chinese state, one of these “powerful local groups,” indeed lacks the incentives

to curb domestic violence, how can civil society actors persuade or pressure the state to do so? This essay does not directly address the state's responsibility. Instead, I will take the stance of civil society actors, analyzing the difficulties these actors might encounter in their anti-domestic violence discourse and evaluating the limited success of their activism. Specifically, I will explore the dilemma these actors might face: though it might sometimes be necessary or advantageous for civil society actors to adopt the "family stability and social harmony" framework for the state, the compromise and collaboration they carry out with the state is likely to distort or harm their original agendas. A more critical attitude towards the state, a clearer grasp of the state's and the civil society's agendas, and a more acute idea to utilize convergent interests with the state while confronting the state when interests diverge all contribute to the envisioning of a new relationship between the state and the civil society actors in the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse. Meanwhile, the transnational feminist movement heavily impacts the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse. Although Chinese culture is integral to understanding the dynamics of domestic violence, culture itself is not the cause of domestic violence in China. Cultural changes and institutional changes must go hand in hand to promote awareness on the issue of domestic violence in China. A recent picture campaign advocating the legislation of a new, separate Anti-Domestic Violence Law provides an example for understanding the effect of cultural-institutional interactions on curbing domestic violence in China and the necessity of awareness-raising in addition to legislative efforts.

CHAPTER 1: THREE FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE & THE DILEMMA OF EMBEDDED ACTIVISM

The three frameworks for understanding domestic violence in China mentioned above—the gender equality/feminist framework, the international human rights framework, and the "family stability and social harmony" framework—will be further elaborated in the first part of this section. The second part will scrutinize how and why Chinese civil society actors who mainly adopt the first two frameworks are still constrained by the rhetoric of the "family stability and social harmony" framework. This part will also argue that the "embedded activism" these civil society actors engage in yields limited success and hinders the advancement of their agenda; the "embedded" characteristics of their activism suggest that they face a tradeoff between resources and autonomy and that the state can appropriate or alter their agendas. The last part of this section will refer to Derrick Bell's interest convergence theory and explore what the most effective state-civil relationship in China should look like in order to curb domestic violence.

1.1: THE THREE FRAMEWORKS

Gender and human rights, the "two most widely adopted global feminist discourses" in the international community, have been "translated" and "localized" into the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse since the 1990s.^v As a result of the "dynamic interactions" between global and local "feminist forces and agents" during the past two decades, civil society activists now usually adopt both the gender equality and international human rights frameworks to understand domestic violence in China.^{vi} These two frameworks are usually integrated and not clearly separated from one another in the

Chinese context. Their adoption exhibits the heavy influence of the transnational feminist discourse on Chinese civil society actors.

Among these civil society actors, Domestic Violence Network (DVN) is indisputably the most prominent representative. DVN, the first and most influential Chinese NGO that takes domestic violence as “its exclusive focus of research and activism,” was founded on a “feminist consensus” to adopt both the gender equality and the international human rights frameworks.^{vii} DVN aims to localize “*bentubua*,” the transnational feminist and international human rights agenda against domestic violence, in the Chinese context.^{viii ix} According to L. Zhang, the establishment of DVN is not merely a local response to the global movement. On the contrary, local women’s rights activists “took advantage of the NGO momentum” after the 1995 Beijing Conference and bore the “political and established risks” to effectively expand the political space for “Chinese women’s civil society organizing.”^x DVN is the result of local Chinese activists in bringing into China the feminist and human rights perspectives on domestic violence.

Although DVN has localized to “respect and adjust to the current system,” L. Zhang correctly points out that the success entails compromises: “DVN’s definitions both of domestic violence and of the family reflect an extraordinarily feminist and progressive perspective, which is certainly not supported locally but instead is traceable to the international feminist human rights framework.”^{xi} As a result, the process of DVN’s “localization” inevitably became a process of institutionalization—assimilation into “China’s institutional culture and structure,” in which domestic violence is usually understood as a threat to the stability of families and the harmony of

society.^{xii} This understanding of domestic violence in China constitutes the “family stability and social harmony” framework, which differs and often conflicts with the international feminist human rights framework.

Chinese state agencies promote “domestic violence prevention and intervention” as a “harmony project,” emphasizing the threat domestic violence causes for “family stability and social harmony” rather than as “a gender injustice issue or a violation of women’s rights.”^{xiii} The “harmony” rhetoric, which came into existence with the Hu administration in 2002, perceives families and communities as the basic elements for building a stable and cohesive society in which the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can endure.

To understand the state’s role in the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse, we must first clarify the role of the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF). Since the “Reform and Opening-up” in the 1980s, ACWF, founded in 1949 by the CCP, has identified itself as “a mass organization for the advancement of Chinese women of all nationalities in all walks of life.”^{xiv} Though publicizing itself as the official women’s organization and a non-governmental organization, ACWF is by no means a civil society actor: “The ‘mass organizations’ that were established...and appeared ‘non-governmental,’ such as the Women’s Federation... were in fact outposts of the Communist Party in society.”^{xv} ACWF is a state-established effort aiming to “ensure an organized consensus and cooperation among the Chinese citizenry,” and it serves the interests of the state.^{xvi} Meanwhile, ACWF does play the important role of being a bridge and bond between the party and society. In fact, the ACWF serves as the main channel through which women’s rights advocacy groups build connections

and collaborate with state agencies. Since “state discourse wields more substantial influence on ACWF than does NGO discourse,” ACWF officials argue that civil society actors like DVN must “expand beyond its focus on domestic violence against women to connect with the ‘big’ political picture so as to gain support” from the government.^{xvii} As the result of the special role of ACWF, civil society actors cooperate with the Chinese state by cooperating with or working under the order of ACWF.

One significant consequence of working with ACWF is the necessity for civil activists to adopt the “family stability and social harmony” framework to advance their anti-domestic violence efforts. “The ‘harmony’ rhetoric, which in China tends to focus on the family, might potentially militate against DVN’s gender and human rights advocacy, which is primarily constructed to protect women’s individual and group interests.”^{xviii} The “family-centered approach” produced in the “family stability and social harmony” framework can pressure women to remain in abusive or violent relationships. It also privileges the policy preference for dealing with domestic violence through “mediation and administrative measures,” instead of criminal justice responses.^{xix} These social and policy implications of the “family stability and social harmony” framework, necessitated by the cooperation with ACWF, contradict the goal of civil society actors like DVN to promote women’s equality and human rights. How does the “considerable weakening of the gender and human rights perspectives” caused by the “family stability and social harmony” framework manifest in reality?^{xx} The adversity experienced by a famous Chinese women’s legal aid center can provide insights into understanding the complication of the relationship between civil activists and the state: Chinese “civil

society” actors engage in a “politics of engagement” that results in “embedded” characteristics of their activism, which trap them in the dilemma of choosing between resources and autonomy.^{xxi}

1.2: CIVIL SOCIETY, POLITICS OF ENGAGEMENT, & EMBEDDED ACTIVISM: THE “RESOURCES VS. AUTONOMY” DILEMMA FACED BY CIVIL ANTI-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACTIVISTS

Most literature on the civil society anti-domestic violence discourse in China mentions the former “Center for Women’s Law Studies and Legal Aid Services of Peking University” (also translated as “Peking University Center for Women’s Law Studies and Legal Aid Services,” “Beida Women’s Legal Aid Center,” or “Beida Women’s LAC,” henceforth referred to as “the Center”).^{xxii} However, on March 25, 2010, Peking University, the influential state-controlled educational institution backing the Center, published an online announcement that the Center would no longer be associated with the university.^{xxiii} After the cancellation, the Center was renamed as “Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counseling & Service Center and Beijing Qianqian Law Firm.”

Chinese media believe that the dissociation of the Center from Peking University happened because the Center had openly supported Deng Yujiao, who was charged with homicide in 2009. Deng, a 21-year-old female pedicure worker, stabbed a local official to death after his attempted sexual assault against her. After the incident, the Center was publicly active and vocal in advocating for a fairer and more open trial for Deng. Deng was found guilty but was not sentenced due to her mental state. The party-state is suspected to disapprove of the Center’s overt support for Deng.^{xxiv} Though faced

with difficulties in terms of funding, connections and recognition due to the dissociation from Peking University, the Center remains active. The experience of the Center is not unique; in fact, it illustrates the difficult situation of many Chinese civil society actors and their complicated and delicate relationship with the Chinese state.

“Civil society” is defined as a “sphere other than and even opposed to the state,” and the definition of civil society actors almost always includes “some combination of networks of legal protection, voluntary associations, and forms of independent public expression.”^{xxxvi} However, the civil society actors in the China usually have some form of connections with the state.^{xxxvii} Under the current authoritarian rule of the CCP, the boundary between the state and the society is unclear and the political environment is “restrictive yet... conducive” to civil activism.^{xxxviii} The Chinese civil society hence departs from the “other than the state” definition and shows “embedded” characteristics. “Embedded social activism” is defined as the non-confrontational and cooperative relationships Chinese civil society actors develop with the state in order to advance their activist causes.^{xxxix} Civil society actors fit into the “embedded activism model” by engaging in a “politics of engagement,” which is defined by its cooperative nature. Instead of adopting “confrontational tactics” such as voicing dissents, organizing protests, or engaging in civil disobedience, civil society actors adopt the “politics of engagement” to establish “relationships and structures of communication with those who work in and set policy for mainstream institutions.”^{xxxx} As a result of embedded activism through politics of engagement, both the goal of activism and the measure of activism’s success become (usually incremental) institutional changes.^{xxxxi}

DVN exemplifies the “embedded activism model” through its close ties to ACWF in its three major areas of activism: quantitative and qualitative research, gender education, and legal advocacy to educate society about domestic violence and to take domestic violence out of the private realm into the public.^{xxxii} Unlike other authors who believe the collaborative relationship between DVN and ACWF (i.e. the state) is crucial and beneficial for DVN, L. Zhang is aware that embedded activism is for DVN a “pragmatic strategy,” not a desirable goal in itself.^{xxxiii xxxiv} The close tie with ACWF does benefit DVN in three ways: it grants DVN access to ACWF’s broad grassroots base, creates networks for DVN to communicate with other state agencies including criminal justice and law enforcement agencies, and opens up politically legitimate channels for DVN’s advocacy. Though the embedded nature of DVN’s activism provides these necessary resources, it also causes a loss of autonomy and independence in adopting the feminist and human rights frameworks. The tradeoff between resources and autonomy is the dilemma faced by any civil society actor in China, like DVN or the Center. Because of their limited discursive and political power as NGOs, civil society organizations engage in politics of engagement, collaborate with state agencies, and aim for institutionalized changes. Yet the more they engage in embedded activism, the more their activism consolidates the entrenched “state-centered power structure” and marginalizes themselves in the embedded model of partnership with the state.^{xxxv}

We must be aware that the tradeoff between resources and autonomy is not limited to the Chinese context. Bumiller, when writing on how the agenda of the feminist movement against sexual violence had been appropriated by the

state to justify crime control and export American human rights policies overseas, points out that the “feminist alliance with the state is to a large extent unavoidable” because of the carceral and institutionalized regulative capacities of the state.^{xxxvi} Merry, having conducted research in multiple communities including India, Fiji, Hong Kong, etc., concludes that the transnational feminist discourse against VAW (violence against women) challenges states’ authority over their citizens at the same time as it reinforces states’ power. This is precisely because while the state is a potential human rights violator, it is also an agent for “carrying out human rights reforms.”^{xxxvii} However, the Chinese context can be further complicated due to the authoritarian nature of the state and the relatively limited nature of the Chinese civil society.^{xxxviii}

In the current Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse, Chinese scholars and activists are “very interested in developing their capacity to deal with violence against women,” but they remain “new to the problem and to the use of rights discourse.”^{xxxix} They are acutely aware of being situated in an authoritarian context where “the institutional guarantors of citizenship” that their western counterparts take for granted in the exercise of political rights do not yet exist in China. Confrontational tactics, as a result, could lead to suicidal and counterproductive results.^{xl} But since we have concluded that embedded activism also fails to advance the feminist/human rights agenda, as is illustrated in the difficult experience of the Center being dissociated from Peking University, neither completely cooperative nor entirely confrontational strategies seem to work.

How can Chinese civil society actors advance their causes out of this conundrum then? In the specific case of

anti-domestic violence, how can organizations like DVN and the Center get around the autonomy vs. resources dilemma of their embedded activism? Bell’s interest convergence theory provides a valuable lesson for the Chinese civil society actors: the attitudes towards the state and the according strategies must change.

1.3: INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY AND A MORE CRITICAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STATE

Bell’s interest-convergence theory describes a state like the authoritarian one in China with accuracy: the state has little incentive to promote women’s rights or curb domestic violence. According to Bell’s theory, a privileged group only provides “legal protections to a disadvantaged group when it supports the interest of the privileged.”? When the interests of the two groups diverge, the privileged group will no longer have incentives to sustain those legal protections.^{xli} If we only accept the convergent interest part of Bell’s theory, it may seem hopeless that civil society actors in the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse could advance any substantial changes. However, if these actors utilize the theory and aim to frame possible parts of the state’s interests as convergent with the interests of domestic violence victims and are aware when the state’s interests diverge with their activism, the conundrum of juggling resources and autonomy can be resolved. This would require the civil actors to develop a more critical attitude towards the state and clearer goals for their anti-domestic violence activism.

One of the strongest interests of the CCP is to maintain the stability of their domestic rule as a single party. The harmony rhetoric, from which derived the “family stability and social harmony”

framework, was developed in China because “if the party [CCP] wants to maintain its ideology-based legitimacy, it has to take stringent measures to restore social justice and harmony.”^{xliii} Since “domestic violence is still... strongly conceived as a factor undermining social stability,” the civil society actors can frame anti-domestic violence efforts as convergent with the CCP interests to maintain stability. By contending that domestic violence can lead to disturbance within families and communities, civil activists can highlight domestic violence as a threat to the stability of society as a whole.^{xliiii} This essentially requires these civil actors to adopt the “family stability and social harmony” framework when it is in the interests of the domestic violence victims to do so. But in many occasions, the “family stability and social harmony” framework prioritizes stability and harmony over the rights of individual women—therefore, the civil society actors need to discern when the state’s interests converge with those of the domestic violence victims and when their interests diverge.

Another strong interest of the Chinese state is to maintain the legitimacy of its single-party rule, not only domestically but also internationally. After “having undergone in recent years... an identity change,” China is more concerned about its national image in the international arena and more receptive and more sensitive to international human rights and humanitarian norms.^{xliv} China, as a signatory country of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), is obliged to implement gender equality and protection of women from violence on the legislative level. Civil society actors can and should hold the state responsible when the CCP fails to adhere to CEDAW provisions. Regarding CEDAW, civil activists should

point out to the CCP explicitly that the international interests of the Chinese state align with the interests of victims of domestic violence. This is, however, easier said than done. In reality, civil society actors often find themselves stuck between the goal to maintain “global standards of social justice” and the principle to respect “local cultural practices.”^{xlv} As intermediaries between the international and the local, these actors play a critical role in interpreting feminist and international human rights understandings of domestic violence to “appropriate, translate, and remake transnational discourses into the vernacular” and local discourse.^{xlvi} But the “international” can be antagonized as opposing the “local.” For example, after the dissociation of the Center from Peking University, the Center’s funding from the Ford Foundation was brought up by many as the “dubious foreign interference” explanation of the state’s distrust of the Center.^{xlvii} The “rule of law” rhetoric in China is also undergoing dynamic changes, making it potentially more difficult for civil society actors to criticize the state by referring to international norms. “In the 1990s and early 2000s, officials emphasized the need to build the rule of law in China and borrow concepts from foreign legal systems to do so.”^{xlviii} But in the 2010s, “they speak of defending the ‘socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics’ and stress the fundamental differences between China and other countries.”^{xlix} The increasing difficulty of translating international norms and conventions into the local context, however, should not deter Chinese civil activists from their feminist and human rights perspectives of understanding domestic violence. But it does require them to observe the interests of the state and the agendas of their activism and to identify when their agendas align with

those of the state and when they don't.

L. Zhang identifies “conscious de-politicization” and “self-censorship” as two characteristics of Chinese civil society actors.¹ Due to existing heavy state control and censorship, civil society actors should acknowledge that though they may need to cooperate with the state and narrate their agenda as convergent with the state's interests in many scenarios, their feminist and human rights agendas are of a confrontational nature with the harmony rhetoric of the CCP. How to incorporate the confrontational with the cooperative and decide when to use which of the two should concern Chinese civil society actors. For instance, DVN experts recently (2008-2012) drafted a proposal to legislate a separate “Anti-domestic Violence Law” in China. The proposal does not distinguish between the three frameworks. The first clause of the draft fits into the “family stability and social harmony” framework for understanding domestic violence in China. It states “the purpose and basis of the legislation” is “... building and protecting equal, harmonious and civilized marriage and family relationships” and promoting “social stability and harmony.”ⁱⁱ Meanwhile, many specific clauses in the draft explicitly affirm or implicitly refer to gender equality and human rights principles as well.ⁱⁱⁱ Though an admirable effort of the civil activists to combine all three frameworks for interpreting domestic violence, the draft legislation remains insufficient: it still lacks recognition of marital rape, contains no clear sentencing parameter for domestic violence, and privileges mediation over criminal justice responses—to limit only a few among many problematic provisions.

Merry states that “if human rights ideas are to have an impact, they need to become part of the consciousness of ordinary people.”^{liii} Bumiller argues that “[o]nly human rights projects that

genuinely empower citizens and resist state violence can counteract the growing danger of social control.”^{liv} In our specific context, “culture” should be defined as the general consciousness of the Chinese citizenry on the issue of domestic violence. So, how can ordinary Chinese citizens become more conscious about the anti-domestic violence discourse? How can there be cultural shifts to empower citizens to counter the state? Or are changes institutionalized by the state prerequisite for cultural changes? The next section of the essay will examine the role of “culture” in the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse and further explore the relationship between the institutional, and the cultural changes that are present in the discourse.

CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF “CULTURE” IN UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CHINA & AN INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INSTITUTIONAL AND THE CULTURAL CHANGES

On August 31, 2011, Kim Lee, wife of Li Yang, the celebrity founder of Crazy English (a popular English-language training institute in China), posted on the largest Chinese micro-blog site, *Sina weibo*, photos of her bruised forehead and knees.^{lv} Her photos and posts stimulated Chinese Internet users, encouraging victims of domestic violence in China to come forward and stirring wide discussions on the issue among Chinese citizens. Throughout the process, Ms. Lee has refused to phrase her experience of domestic violence as a “Chinese cultural” problem, turning down “CNN and Fox invitations” to discuss the “abnormal situations in China.”^{lvi} From her point of view, domestic violence is not an issue unique or particular to “any country, region or age group.” However, the reason why Ms. Lee's case has attracted

media attention seems to contradict her argument of the irrelevance of culture. According to Ms. Lee, she has received thousands of letters from women all over China after her post on *weibo*, many of them starting with “I’ve never told anyone...”^{lvii} Her background from a different culture and her legal status as an American citizen seem to empower her in ways that Chinese women are not — after her divorce was finalized about a year later, Ms. Lee claimed custody of her children and decided to remain in China. As an American citizen, she has the option to leave China whenever she wants. “Chinese women, she points out, do not have that option.”^{lviii} Were the repercussions resulting from Ms. Lee’s case entirely due to the fame of her husband and the venue of *weibo* she utilizes? Or were they also a possible result of clashes between cultures and values? I believe that trying to avoid the “culture” argument in Ms. Lee’s case leads to Chinese civil society’s missing a precious chance to discuss the sensitive “culture” issue in the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse.

As mentioned above, it is difficult for civil society actors to strike a balance between maintaining “global standards of social justice” and respecting “local cultural practices” in their anti-domestic violence activism, since “those who resist human rights often claim to be defending culture.”^{lix} But what is culture? In the specific context of China, what constitutes “culture” that prevents civil activists from applying the feminist or human rights frameworks?

According to the international human rights discourse, “culture” is defined as “traditions and customs,” i.e. “ways of doing things that are justified by their roots in the past.”^{lx} Scholars who write on domestic violence in China generally adopt the feminist and human rights frameworks to understand domestic

violence. They complicate the concept of “culture” by arguing that historical, economic and social factors work together to form the Chinese “culture” that renders women particularly vulnerable to domestic violence in China. According to these scholars, historical factors include the tradition of male domination and emphasis on collective identity. Though gender equality emerged as a concept when the CCP rose to power, the patriarchal tradition of placing women in “submissive and vulnerable positions” under male domination is still ingrained to “guide people’s behavior even in contemporary Chinese society.”^{lxi} Though Confucianism and socialism may appear contradictory on the surface, their mutual emphases on collective harmony discourage domestic violence victims from bringing up their grievances. Access to economic resources also factor into domestic violence in China: “[e]conomic dependence not only reinforces women’s inferiority in the family, but also restrains women from exiting violent relationships.”^{lxii} Moreover, on a societal level, “the public and the institutional indifference” and victim-blaming biases regarding domestic violence support violence in the home.^{lxiii} In existing literature, three specific biases are mentioned: women are considered as legitimate victims in society; domestic violence is sometimes distorted to equate love; domestic violence is an entirely private matter. Following this line of reasoning, we can ascertain two causes for under-reporting. On one hand, women do not report the violence they experience due to shame, unwillingness to incriminate family members, or fear for retaliation. On the other hand, W. Zhang, along with the other scholars, believes that “Chinese women are socialized to accept physical and emotional chastisement as part of the husband’s marital prerogative,” and therefore do not even identify most of

their spouses' violent actions as abusive.^{lxiv}

"Culture," according to these scholars who are adherents to feminist and human rights discourse, does contribute to domestic violence in China, even though "culture" is not explicitly named in their research. But though cultural elements definitely contribute to the prevalence and impact of domestic violence in China, it is problematic to attribute the root causes of domestic violence in Chinese society to culture. As Uma Narayan argues, due to the asymmetrical understandings of "cultural explanations" for violence against women in third-world countries and western countries and "cultural unfamiliarity" with non-western contexts, third-world women experiencing gender-based violence are considered "victims of their culture" in mainstream western feminist discourse.^{lxv} Narayan analyzes and juxtaposes dowry-murders in India and domestic violence murders in the US and concludes that feminists use cultural explanations because they are not familiar with the alien "other" they constructed in relation to the western "us." Following the same strain, it is problematic to suggest that Chinese culture is the sole contributor to domestic violence in China (just as it is problematic to suggest that Chinese culture is not relevant in understanding the issue of domestic violence). As stated in the first section of this essay, the feminist and international human rights perspectives were brought into China through vigorous interactions between the international and local as well as a gradual process of translation and "localization." Though products of translation and "localization," transnational feminist human rights understandings of domestic violence in China remain an import from the international discourse, since they do not arise from the indigenous context. While Narayan's writing is deeply rooted in a post-colonial narrative, Chinese

leaders' insistence on dealing with domestic violence using "approaches with Chinese characteristics" can be seen as an extension of the authoritarian state's attempt to affirm its different regime type. If the socialist market economy is a combination of socialism and market economy with "Chinese characteristics," then why can't anti-domestic violence approaches in China be "women's rights advocacy" with "Chinese characteristics?"^{lxvi} This framing—which potentially fits the CCP harmony rhetoric well—is alarmingly problematic but also reveals the reality for civil activists: Chinese "culture" is the product of complicated historical, political, economic and social factors and their interactions. Though culture does not single-handedly cause domestic violence in China, it would be ignorant and unrealistic for civil actors who seek to curb domestic violence in China to dodge the discussions on culture.

But how can civil activists mobilize cultural changes in China? Though "international human rights norms have had little effect on the [Chinese] state, these norms have shaped the advocacy efforts of Chinese women's rights groups"—if a top-down approach is ineffective at curbing domestic violence, grassroots and bottom-up efforts, which aim to produce changes in the perceptions of domestic violence, remain the only potentially powerful option.^{lxvii} In the Chinese case, neither legal and institutional changes nor cultural changes come easily. In fact, both forms of changes rely on the efforts of civil activists, and they stimulate each other through an interactive process. On one hand, "legal change may bring about social change by destabilizing existing meanings and delegitimizing accepted practices."^{lxviii} On the other, increased awareness and changing attitudes among citizens can pressure the state to institutionalize a formal legal protective or punitive apparatus. Solely

focusing on institutional reforms is not enough because without a growing legal consciousness—which requires cultural shifts in the Chinese context—legal changes would not be utilized by citizens even if they are implemented. Recent Chinese popular efforts to legislate the “Anti-Domestic Violence Law” illustrate the interactive process well.

On Nov. 13, 2012, a series of semi-nude pictures were posted on *weibo* and other social media sites to advocate “legislating the Anti-domestic Violence Law by collecting 10,000 signatures.” The volunteers posted the pictures to “attract attention and raise people’s awareness of violence against women,” aiming to collect 10,000 signatures on a petition against domestic violence. They intend to use the petition in “a letter addressed to the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, calling on legislators to accelerate the drafting of laws to end domestic abuse.” In other words, the petition will be part of the on-going effort to push for the legislation of the “Anti-Domestic Violence Law.” Though the semi-nude pictures have caused controversies and been characterized by some commentators as “sensational performance” or “behavior art,” the pictures have achieved their goal to stimulate discussions.^{lxix} While some offensive comments contain insults on the figures and body types of the volunteers featured in the pictures, counter-comments and news coverage point to patriarchy as the cause of both domestic violence and the harsh critique on women’s body types.^{lxx} Though the effect of the picture campaign on the possible new legislation remains to be seen, the campaign serves as a creative model for future discourse. Since institutionalized changes by themselves are not sufficient to benefit victims of domestic violence if the victims lack legal consciousness, the new “Anti-Domestic Violence Law” relies

on cultural shifts in order to be fully utilized. Efforts to urge for institutional and legal reforms must be accompanied by awareness raising techniques aimed at creating cultural changes—the picture campaign can claim success in this regard.

CONCLUSION: A PERSONAL REFLECTION

My personal interest in the topic was spurred by comments of several Chinese friends’ “culture”-based comments that sexual violence happens only in “western society” and not in China. Throughout my research, I found that sources on domestic violence in China are rather limited, with most being statistical analyses. Among the handful of sources focusing on the anti-domestic violence discourse in China I have found, the Chinese state is always assumed to be an active agent willing to promote women’s rights and curb domestic violence—an assumption not conducive to either women’s rights or domestic violence prevention in reality. I do not think the important weight assigned to the state in existing literature is groundless. However, I do believe civil society actors need to get rid of the circular mindset that when the “state is heavily involved and willing to advance changes—civil activists must cooperate with the state—[and] state involvement becomes even heavier.”? Civil activists should envision a strategic relationship with the state that is conditionally cooperative and/or confrontational.

Meanwhile, I have been experiencing frustration throughout the research. I am aware of the limitations of this research. Limited time and space aside, I have been struggling with a sense of intellectual detachment when analyzing the issue of domestic violence in China. Though I share their identities as a

Chinese woman, my knowledge of the diverse experiences of the nearly 700 million Chinese women is currently inadequate. More than 30 percent of Chinese women experience domestic violence—that is 200 million women. What are their experiences actually like? Why are their personal narratives missing? How do their social positions, whether characterized by economic independency or dependency, urban or rural residency, or level of education, affect their experience in intimate relationships? How do their positions in society impact, limit, or help them in terms of their resistance and resilience against domestic violence? Do civil society activists, individuals and organizations alike, understand and represent their actual experiences accurately? I cannot answer these questions I ask during my research.

Another frustration comes from the use of and research on *weibo*. Though the capacity of social media to circulate information and promote awareness can be far-reaching and influential, these forms of raising awareness are at best forms of passive activism. If we are satisfied by the re-tweeting of a powerful image or the posting a stimulating video and do not carry out further actions in our daily lives, social media activism could be counterproductive in terms of creating actual cultural changes, let alone institutional reforms. Though *weibo* has 400 million users, 900 million other Chinese people are not exposed to *weibo*. As the new “Anti-Domestic Violence Law” has been debated, further research on the relationship between legal and cultural changes remains to be seen in China.

As Margaret Mead once suggested, “small group of committed citizens” have the potential to “change the world.” Individuals, like organizations, participate in the civil activism against domestic

violence in China. I understand my research as a process of individual self-education on understanding the Chinese anti-domestic violence discourse. Though individual effort or influence is rather limited (and I am far from the “committed citizen” I aspire to be), individuals are the ones who make up the collective that we name “civil society.” I believe that frustration can be propelling and motivating precisely because it makes individuals alert and sober to existing injustice in our world and makes us aspire to mobilize change.

APPENDIX

(Source: <http://lady.163.com/photoview/51300026/34165.html>)

“Advocating legislating the Anti-domestic Violence Law—collecting 10,000 signatures”



“Advocating legislating the Anti-domestic Violence Law—collecting 10,000 signatures (appears in all pictures)”



“Domestic violence is not a private matter - Women's rights are human rights”



“Genders should be liberated; Violence should be eliminated”



“Proud to have a flat chest; Shame on domestic violence”



“Love my body. Do not hurt her.”



“Menstruation is not shameful; Domestic violence is.”



“I am allowed to act feminine. You are not allowed to beat me.”

- ⁱ Zhang, *Curbing Domestic Violence in China*, MAI 45:16.
- ⁱⁱ Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China,” 232; Bumiller, *In an Abusive State*; Zhang, *Curbing Domestic Violence in China*.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Zhang, *Curbing Domestic Violence in China*; Zhao, “Domestic Violence in China”; Yang, “An Alternative to Impact Litigation in China.”
- ^{iv} Merry, *Human Rights and Gender Violence*, 2.
- ^v According to L. Zhang, the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women hosted in Beijing created a “watershed moment in Chinese women’s perceptions and activism” on domestic violence, stimulating the emergence of women’s NGOs and activism against domestic violence. Zhang, “Chinese Women Protesting Domestic Violence,” 66, 70–77.
- ^{vi} Ibid.
- ^{vii} Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China.”
- ^{viii} “*Bentubua*”: □□□, meaning to localize, to make local.
- ^{ix} Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China.”
- ^x Zhang, “Chinese Women Protesting Domestic Violence.”
- ^{xi} Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China,” 231, 236.
- ^{xii} Ibid.
- ^{xiii} Ibid., 232.
- ^{xiv} “All-China Women’s Federation.”
- ^{xv} Ho and Edmonds, *China’s Embedded Activism*, 5.
- ^{xvi} Lu, “Broadening of Legal Aid and Women’s Rights in China,” 84.

- ^{xvii} Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China,” 233.
- ^{xviii} Ibid., 233.
- ^{xix} Palmer, “On China’s Slow Boat to Women’s Rights,” 167.
- ^{xx} Zhang, 236.
- ^{xxi} Ibid.
- ^{xxii} The Center is also a member of DVN.
- ^{xxiii} Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China”; Lay Lee and Regan, “Why Develop and Support Women’s Organizations in Providing Legal Aid in China?”; Yang, “An Alternative to Impact Litigation in China”; Lu, “Broadening of Legal Aid and Women’s Rights in China.”
- ^{xxiv} “Announcement on the Cancellation.”
- ^{xxv} Yan and Xie, “Interactive Mode of Netizen Opinions and Government—Taking the Case of Deng Yujiao as an Example (in Chinese)”; ifeng.com, “Peking University cancelling four organizations including the Women’s Legal Aid Center”; “Dissent in China.”
- ^{xxvi} Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory / Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato*, 74.
- ^{xxvii} Some scholars doubt whether there is a “civil society” in China at all. I agree with the point of view that “the emergence of a truly civil society” is limited by “the absence of laws and institutions” to protect non-governmental organizations and individuals. Goldman, *From Comrade to Citizen*, 22.
- ^{xxviii} Goldman, *From Comrade to Citizen*, 22.
- ^{xxix} Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China,” 229; Lu, “Broadening of Legal Aid and Women’s Rights in China,” 80–82.
- ^{xxx} Reinelt, “Moving onto the Terrain of the State,” 85; Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China,” 231–232.
- ^{xxxi} Reinelt contrasts the “politics of engagement” the U. S. battered women’s movement adopts in the 1990s with the more radical feminist stance of the movement in 1960s–70s. Bumiller (2008) refers to Reinelt’s writing on how the “imposition of regulations and the desire for stable funding sources” have pushed organizations fighting against women’s violence onto the “terrain of the state.” Bumiller, *In an Abusive State*, 4.
- ^{xxxii} Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China,” 228–231.
- ^{xxxiii} Lu, “Broadening of Legal Aid and Women’s Rights in China”; Lay Lee and Regan, “Why Develop and Support Women’s Organizations in Providing Legal Aid in China?”
- ^{xxxiv} Zhang, “Domestic Violence Network in China,” 236.
- ^{xxxv} Ibid., 232.
- ^{xxxvi} Bumiller, *In an Abusive State*, 2–15.
- ^{xxxvii} Merry, *Human Rights and Gender Violence*, 1–5.
- ^{xxxviii} See footnote 4.
- ^{xxxix} Merry, *Human Rights and Gender Violence*, 33.
- ^{xl} These institutional guarantors range from freedom of expression and association, an independent judiciary, an elected legislature, free media.
- ^{xli} Bell, *Silent Covenants*, 4, 58, 67–68; Satz, “Animals as Vulnerable Subjects,” 68–69.

^{xlii} Gilley and Holbig, "In Search of Legitimacy in Post-Revolutionary China," 20.

^{xliiii} Zhang, "Domestic Violence Network in China," 234.

^{xliv} Wu, "Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Responsibility."

^{xlv} Merry, 8.

^{xlvi} Merry, 3.

^{xlvii} The Center has also carried out research on the implementation of CEDAW in China founded by the British government.

^{xlviii} Minzner, "Rule of Law in China: Past, Present, and Future."

^{xlix} Ibid.

¹ Zhang, "Domestic Violence Network in China," 229.

ⁱⁱ 立法目的和依据: "为防治家庭暴力, 保护受害人的权利, 建设和维护平等、和睦、文明的婚姻家庭关系、抱紧社会和谐稳定, 依据宪法, 特制定本法" (translated by the author into English).

ⁱⁱⁱ "Domestic Violence Prevention Law of the People's Republic of China (Suggestions and Comments from Domestic Violence Network Experts)"

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Merry, *Human Rights and Gender Violence*, 3.

^{lv} Bumiller, *In an Abusive State*, 155.

^{lv} *Weibo* has approximately about 400 million users and imitates the model of Tweeter. However, *weibo* is heavily scrutinized and censored by the CCP.

^{lvi} Zhou, "Kim: Li Yang Must Bear the Consequences of His Actions."

^{lvii} Ibid.

^{lviii} Ibid.

^{lix} Merry, *Human Rights and Gender Violence*, 6. 8.

^{lx} Ibid., 10.

^{lxi} Zhang Wei, *Curbing Domestic Violence in China: Towards an Effective Criminal Justice Response*, Vol. MAI 45, 2006.

^{lxii} Ibid.

^{lxiii} Ibid.

^{lxiv} Zhang, *Curbing Domestic Violence in China*, MAI 45:32–44; Zhao, "Domestic Violence in China"; Chan, "The Chinese Concept of Face and Violence Against Women."

^{lxv} Narayan, *Dislocating Cultures*, 83–85.

^{lxvi} Due to limited space, this essay does not provide a discussion on the concept of "Asian values" in the international human rights discourse, or specifically, the transnational movement against domestic violence. However, this is a potentially complex topic worthy of extensive research.

^{lxvii} de Silva-de Alwis, "Opportunities and Challenges for Gender-based Legal Reform in China," 300.

^{lxviii} Fleury-Steiner and Nielsen, *The New Civil Rights Research*, 6.

^{lxix} "Naked Truth Used to Combat Domestic Violence."

^{lxx} Ibid.

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MISUNDERSTANDING THE WEST

A Comprehensive Critique on Zhao Tingyang and Traditional Chinese Political Thoughts

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ABSTRACT

This paper provides a comprehensive critique on “All-under-Heaven” (tianxia, 天下) concept advocated by Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang. Unlike previous critiques on Zhao and “All-under-Heaven,” which narrowly focus on contradictions in “All-under-Heaven” itself, this paper chooses to examine traditional Chinese political thoughts that lie behind “All-under-Heaven” and points out a huge misunderstanding of the West in Zhao’s works. Such a misunderstanding can be divided into two levels. First, in Zhao’s comparative study of Western and Chinese thoughts, he wrongly compares traditional Chinese philosophy with Western liberalisms and thus artificially creates a Chinese-Western division. The common ground shared between traditional Chinese philosophy and pre-modern or non-liberalism Western thoughts is completely ignored, and the uniqueness of the Chinese way is significantly exaggerated with this approach. Second, in his analysis of Western liberalisms, liberalisms are treated as a whole while divisions among different schools are not considered. By addressing Zhao’s misunderstandings, this paper aims to promote a meaningful communication between Western and Chinese political thoughts based on mutual understanding. And for those who are unfamiliar with Zhao and “All-under-Heaven,” this paper is also a helpful introduction to an

important concept in traditional Chinese political thoughts.

Key Words: Zhao Tingyang; All-under-Heaven; Chinese philosophy; Liberalism; International Relations; Communitarianism; Rawls

INTRODUCTION

During the past few years, there has been a revival of the study of traditional Chinese political thoughts due to China’s rising power and its increasingly prominent role in the world. Scholars of Chinese international relations have begun to promote a “Chinese School” of international relations theory based on traditional Chinese philosophy while many other Chinese intellectuals continue to view traditional Chinese thinking as a recipe for contemporary problems. With its status as an economic powerhouse, China has become more confident in its own development model, which is nevertheless greatly different from that of the West. Traditional Chinese political thoughts can thus provide philosophical justifications for a Chinese uniqueness, whether it is called “socialism with Chinese characteristics” or “Beijing consensus.”

Zhao Tingyang, a leading philosopher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), is considered as one of the most foremost advocates of traditional Chinese political thoughts in recent years. His 2005 work, “Tianxia Tixi,” has generated intense debates both

domestically and internationally. His “All-under-Heaven” (tianxia, 天下) concept gives a comprehensive view of how the world should be according to traditional Chinese thinking and a vivid example of a non-Western dominated international relations theory. Throughout his writings, Zhao seems to offer a new way out, not only for China, but also for the whole world. His book conveys the idea that many contemporary issues could be better solved by the traditional Chinese way than the present, Western-dominated way. Thus, China’s goal today should no longer be to save just China but also to save the world.

The Chinese utopia that Zhao advocates attracts numerous criticisms internationally. William A. Callahan, Professor of International Politics and Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester, is one of Zhao’s most prominent foreign critics. According to Callahan, the “tianxia” example that Zhao gives “shows how non-Western alternatives can be even more state-centric” and “require an even stronger policing of social, cultural, and political boundaries” compared with the Westphalian system.ⁱ However, like other foreign critics of Zhaoⁱⁱ, Callahan’s article is based on a narrow interpretation of Zhao’s theories. What we need to understand is that the “tianxia” ideal is just one example of Zhao and many other Chinese intellectuals’ great ambition. Their ultimate purpose, however, is to offer traditional Chinese political thoughts as a better alternative in dealing with both domestic and international issues. A truly comprehensive critique on Zhao therefore has to address this larger goal. A refutation of “tianxia” is not enough; an evaluation of traditional Chinese political thoughts needs to be included.

The purpose of this paper is to criticize Zhao Tingyang’s works in a broader scope. In general, Zhao presents a distorted view of the West when he promotes traditional Chinese philosophy, which in turn further enhances ideological conflicts between China and the West. Such a misunderstanding can be divided into two main levels. First, in his comparative study of Western and Chinese thoughts, Zhao wrongly compares traditional Chinese philosophy with Western liberalism and thus artificially creates a “Chinese-Western” division. This approach completely ignores the common ground shared between traditional Chinese philosophy and pre-modern or non-liberalism Western thoughts and significantly exaggerates the uniqueness of the Chinese way. Second, in analyzing Western liberalism, Zhao treats them as one together and neglects to consider divisions among different schools. For example, Zhao blames Rawlsian liberalism for the faults made by Hobbesian liberalism in the book “Tianxia Tixi.”

The argument below is divided into four parts. The first part Zhao’s “Tianxia and the Revival of Traditional Chinese Political Thoughts” includes a brief look at the main characteristics attributed by Zhao to traditional Chinese philosophy. Unlike Western liberalism which advocates the rights over the good, traditional Chinese philosophy can be understood as promoting the good over rights, which slightly resembles the views of non-liberal Western thoughts.ⁱⁱⁱ The second part, “A Comparison Beyond Parallel: Ills of Western Liberalisms,” presents Zhao’s criticisms of Western liberalism. I argue that such criticisms are also offered by non-liberal thinkers in the West and thus should only be seen as the ills of liberalism, rather than as the ills of the West as well. The third part, “From Machiavelli to Rawls: the Transformation

of Western Political Philosophy,” shows how Western thoughts have diverged from traditional Chinese philosophy in their transformation from “the good over rights” to “rights over the good.” The last part, “Liberalisms, Not Liberalism: a Distorted Rawlsian Liberalism,” exposes another mistake committed by Zhao in his study of liberalisms: treating liberalisms in singular rather than plural form. Presenting a more accurate understanding of liberalisms, especially Rawlsian liberalism, could also defend liberalisms against some of Zhao’s criticisms.

This paper should not be seen merely as a review exclusively focused on Zhao’s works. Its aim is to use Zhao as a typical example of today’s Chinese intellectual circle. Actually, the logic behind Zhao’s “tianxia,” which is based on rediscovering traditional Chinese concepts for modern problems, can also be found in the ideas of other Chinese thinkers such as Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong. To some extent, Zhao’s misunderstanding of the West is also reflected in their writings.^{iv} This misunderstanding is why I title this paper “Misunderstanding the West: A Comprehensive Critique on Zhao Tingyang and Traditional Chinese Political Thoughts.” A closer examination on Zhao’s original texts can provide valuable lessons in our understanding of traditional Chinese political thoughts and their contemporary advocators.

ZHAO’S TIANXIA AND THE REVIVAL OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE POLITICAL THOUGHTS

Literally speaking the Chinese character Tian (天) means the heaven while Xia(下) means below. “Tianxia” thus refers to everything below the sky, which in turn equals “the Earth” or “the world.”

But besides this simple physical meaning, Zhao argues that “tianxia” also contains two additional important meanings: 1) “Tianxia” includes “minxin” (民心) which can be understood as “people’s heart” or “the general will of the people”; and 2), “Tianxia” also carries the ethical and political idea of a universal institution for the world.^v

A closer look at Zhao’s writings reveals that both meanings are connected deeply with important concepts in Chinese philosophy. Therefore, we may arrive at a better understanding of the main characteristics of traditional Chinese political thoughts through the ideas of “people’s heart” and “a world institution” as analyzed in Zhao’s “tianxia.”

The “people’s heart” idea is introduced in Zhao’s work through a comparison with democracy (minzhu, 民主). According to Zhao, “the problem of the people’s heart, theoretically, must be a better representation than democracy of the problem of public choice” because “careful and sincere observations can better detect truth and come to a better reflection of public choice than do democratic elections, which become spoilt by money, misled by the media, and distorted by strategic votes.”^{vi} “People’s heart is not the desire of the mass, instead it is decided by public-minded governmental officials who aim for public good.”^{vii} “The unspoken theory is that most people do not really know what is best for them, but that the elite do, so the elite ought genuinely to decide for the people.”^{viii} Therefore, rather than counting on people to make their own choices in democratic elections, “people’s heart” in Zhao’s “tianxia” asks the elite to speak on behalf of the people, to determine people’s “true needs” and to cultivate “real goods and virtues.”^{ix}

What kind of institutions can best fulfill “people’s heart”? Here, the third

meaning of “tianxia” as “a world institution” comes to play its role. For Zhao, “an institution of freedom is not enough for people’s heart.” What is more important is that there should be order (zhi, 治) in “a world institution.”^x This order should always be “understood and interpreted in terms of familyship,” which “analytically implies for the wholeness and harmony of the world to be a world, for the necessary conditions for family happiness are always its wholeness and harmony.”^{xi} “The world’s effective political order must progress from All-under-Heaven, to state, to families, so as to ensure universal consistency and transitivity in political life, or the uniformity of the society, whereas an ethical order progresses from families, to states, to All-under-Heaven, so as to ensure ethical consistency and transitivity.”^{xiii} By contrast, there exists a disorder (luan, 亂) in the Western system of individuals, nations, and internationals, as it relies heavily on competition among interests and naively believes that individual desires can produce public good for the society through Adam Smith’s invisible hand.^{xiii xiv}

From the texts cited above, we come to view traditional Chinese political thoughts as theories which value the good over rights.^{xv} Zhao makes this point quite clear in his discussions of both “people’s heart” and “a world institution.” “People’s heart” is superior to democracy because it allows candidates “who best know the Way (Dao, 道) to improve the happiness of all peoples universally” by imposing this conception of good on the people.^{xvi} The Way is superior to people’s own votes from individual rights perspective.^{xvii} Similarly, “a world institution” based on “tianxia” is better than major Western models because it is a system with an order that is predetermined.^{xviii} While major Western models first recognize

different interests and then develop a spontaneous order based on conflicts among interests and the respect for individual rights, “tianxia” views the proper order as “the first condition for any possible happiness of each and all,” which is superior to individual interests.^{xix} Individual freedoms and rights can play their part only after there is order.^{xx}

In conclusion, the uniqueness of Zhao’s “tianxia” and other traditional Chinese political thoughts comes mostly from the prioritization of the good over rights,” which is somewhat opposite to modern liberalisms. Precisely because of this, Zhao’s criticisms towards liberalisms are also largely shared by many non-liberal Western thinkers, whether they are communitarians, traditionalists, or radical democrats. Thus, Zhao has made a grave mistake by equating the ills of liberalisms to the ills of the West. A study of pre-modern or non-liberalism Western thoughts reveals that there are common grounds between China and the West, which will be examined in detail in the next part of this paper.

A COMPARISON BEYOND PARALLEL: ILLS OF WESTERN LIBERALISMS

The ills that Zhao Tingyang attributes to Western liberalisms become more understandable once we put traditional Chinese political thoughts in the good over rights category as they are also largely shared by many non-liberal Western thinkers, including communitarians, traditionalists, and radical democrats.

Defects of liberalisms can be found in Zhao’s discussions of both “people’s heart” and “a world institution,” two important additional meanings of his “tianxia.” First, liberal democracies fail to appreciate the difference among people by seeing them in abstract terms.^{xxi} What they

fail to understand is that “some are virtuous and kind while others are selfish and evil.”^{xxiii} As a result, there will be a “moral degradation” in society because selfish and evil candidates achieve equal political status with the virtuous ones through universal suffrages in liberal democracy.^{xxiii} Second, liberalisms abandon the “common good” in their focus on individual interests. For Zhao, “no matter how rational they are, a group of selfish individuals could never identify where their long-term interest and common good truly lie because they solely focus on their own interest and are narrow-minded.”^{xxiv} By contrast, “people’s heart” is not a combination of individual wants and desires,” but instead is “public-minded for the common good.”^{xxv} Last, a liberal world institution cannot create peaceful order because of its ontology that sees individuals as its political foundation or starting point. For Zhao, “the political makes sense only when it deals with ‘relations’ rather than ‘individuals’” because “the political is meant to speak for coexistence rather than a existence.”^{xxvi} This is why only “tianxia” can restore order in the world as it is based on the Chinese ontology of relations that speak for coexistence, wholeness, and harmony.^{xxvii}

However, the defects of liberalisms that Zhao mentions should not be equated to defects of the West because there has always been a non-liberal tradition in the West that has many things in common with the traditional Chinese political thoughts exemplified by Zhao’s work. Candidates “who best know the Way (Dao, 道) to improve the happiness of all peoples universally” resemble the philosopher king that Plato discusses in “The Republic,” and Zhao’s comments on the common good remind us of Aquinas who “declared that the common good was qualitatively different in nature from that

of the individual.”^{xxviii} “People’s heart” is also similar to Rousseau’s general will in that the former can also be translated as the general will of the people. Moreover, similarities can also be found between Zhao and non-liberal contemporary Western thinkers, such as Alasdair Macintyre and Michael Sandel.^{xxix}

In his milestone work “After Virtues,” Macintyre, a thinker associated with academic communitarianism, also discusses the absurdity of liberalisms in treating individuals “from a purely universal and abstract point of view.”^{xxx} According to Macintyre, the Enlightenment, which gave birth to modern liberalisms is destined to fail partly because it completely detaches individuals “from all social particularity” and does not incorporate “moral and metaphysical theories and claims” that exist within the particular community.^{xxxi} Macintyre similarly criticizes the priority of individual rights by stating that “it would of course be a little odd that there should be such rights attaching to human beings simply qua human beings in light of the fact...that there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly translated by our expression ‘a right’ until near the close of the middle ages.”^{xxxii}

Sandel, another modern political philosopher who subscribes to a certain version of communitarianism and is immensely popular in China, also has a lot in common with Zhao Tingyang in his own criticisms of liberalism.^{xxxiii} In his first book, “Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,” Sandel argues that one of the greatest failures of liberalism is that “it relegates the good to a mere contingency, a product of indiscriminate wants and desires ‘not relevant from a moral standpoint.’”^{xxxiv} It is clear that Zhao makes similar points when he declares that democracy based on liberalisms “represents misled minds much more than independent ones, false wants much more

than true needs, and illusive advantages much more than real goods and virtues.”^{xxxv} In “Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy,” Sandel states that “to deliberate well about the common good requires more than the capacity to choose one’s ends and to respect others’ rights to do the same.”^{xxxvi} What is additionally needed is “a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake” and citizens who “possess, or come to acquire certain qualities of character, or civic virtues.”^{xxxvii} In other words, both Sandel and Zhao view individual rights and freedoms as insufficient for fulfilling the common good and realize the importance of virtues in the political sphere.^{xxxviii} After all, Zhao’s advocacy of “people’s heart” can also be seen as expressing “democracy’s discontent” under modern liberalisms.

Of course, some may say that communitarians are moral relativists who promote incommensurability between cultures and thus differ significantly from Zhao who argues for the universal concept of “tianxia.”^{xxxix xl} But one cannot help but wonder whether Zhao, who strongly emphasizes the Chinese-Western division in “tianxia,” is not a relativist himself. And even if we do not see Zhao as a relativist, there are still many non-liberal and non-relativist thinkers, including radical democrats and traditional universalists, whose theories have many things in common with Zhao’s.

Sheldon Wolin, a radical democratic theorist who provides a strong defense of the value of the political in his influential work “Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought,” is a thinker who belongs in this category. Wolin fiercely criticizes “the fragmentation of the political” and believes that “political theory must once again be viewed as that

form of knowledge which deals with what is general and integrative to men, a life of common involvements.”^{xli} This is the logic behind Zhao’s advocacy of “tianxia,” which he sees as being able to “ensure universal consistency and transitivity in political life.”^{xlii} Wolin shows a similar distaste for modern liberalisms when he directly blames the rise of liberalisms for “the decline of political philosophy.”^{xliii}

Adam Webb, who argues for a non-liberal globalization in his book “Beyond the Global Culture War,” is a traditional universalist who shares some of Zhao’s opinions. Webb greatly admires traditional Chinese academies that “centered on cultivating a virtuous character” and believes that the present liberal globalization is wrong in insisting that the “only way to coexist is by ‘living next to,’ not ‘living with.’”^{xliv} What we should do, according to Webb, is promote dialogues and communication among the universal elements that exist within each great tradition, including China’s “tianxia,” and “craft a world order that befits the multifaceted human spirit.”^{xlvi}

From the analysis above, we can conclude that Zhao’s ills of Western liberalisms should not be seen as the ills of the West, especially since Zhao has many friends among the non-liberal circle in the West today. Zhao artificially creates a Chinese-Western division by inappropriately comparing traditional Chinese political thoughts and western liberalisms. This approach exaggerates the uniqueness of Chinese philosophy, which undermines Zhao’s ambition for universalism. Moreover, Zhao also takes the differences between Chinese philosophy and liberalisms for granted and does not inquire how such differences came about. Without such an inquiry, Zhao will never become a true universalist who tolerates and appreciates differences. This absence is the reason that this paper offers a study of the transformation of

Western political thoughts in the following part.

FROM MACHIAVELLI TO RAWLS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The discussions above suggest that Zhao artificially creates the Chinese-Western division through a comparison that lacks logical sense. The ideological gap that exists between China and the West is mostly created not from differences in political philosophy but because of the gap between traditional Chinese political thoughts and Western liberalisms. Therefore, we cannot help but wonder how liberalisms came to play a dominant role in Western political philosophy. How does the “priority of the good,” shared by both pre-modern Western thinkers and Chinese philosophy, become the “priority of rights” advocated by Western liberalisms? If Zhao truly believes that one of the principles of Chinese political philosophy is “to turn the enemy into a friend,” an inquiry regarding the transformation of Western political philosophy has to be included.^{xlvii} After all, it is difficult to believe that you can “turn the enemy into a friend” when you merely state the enemy’s differences without trying to understand them.

To an extent, Machiavelli should be viewed as the thinker who started this process of transformation. During his time, “the lack of national unity, the instability of political life in the Italian city-states, and the easy access to status and power...necessarily called for casting off modes of thought inherited from an earlier age where politics had been tightly enclosed by a religious world-view.”^{xlviii} Machiavelli established a new political order through the “recognition of the complexity of interests” and offered “the new picture of political society as a

diagram of interest-propelled forces.”^{xlix} A single conception of good could never be applied to the political sphere when huge divisions and conflicts existed. The competition among interests thus became the new political reality. “Henceforth it would be increasingly taken for granted that while the cultivation of souls and personalities might be a proper end of man, it did not provide the focus of political action.”^l

There is also Thomas Hobbes, regarded by many as the founder of the liberalism political order. His most important legacy is the attempt to build a political order “on the most common ground, on a ground that is admittedly low but has the advantage of being solid.”^{li} “On this new basis, accordingly, the status of morality must be lowered; morality is nothing but fear-inspired peaceableness. The moral law or the natural law is understood as derivative from the right of nature, the right of self-preservation; the fundamental moral fact is a right, not a duty.”^{lii} Modern conceptions of individual rights, which play a central role in the liberalism political order, are then derived from this basis. For Hobbes, “the traditional teaching” of civic virtues “was built on air,” particularly because it paid no attention to the conflicts and struggles of reality. Instead, “virtue, if it means anything more than a man's power, is the habit of doing what tends to our own self-preservation, and to its fundamental condition, peace; vice is the contrary.”^{liii} For the same reason, rights become more important than “the good,” because individual rights set the boundaries for individual freedoms, which in turn makes co-existence possible in a world of conflicts.

Hence, “the older legitimizing idea of a common good” was given up by liberalisms, “for in a political universe of disconnected particulars a ‘common’ good had no meaning.”^{liv} The new liberal

conception of justice consisted of individual rights because the priority of rights, based on a principle of fairness and security, was determined by both the objective and subjective conditions of the human society. It was this new conception that David Hume discussed in his "A Treatise of Human Nature." According to Hume, "justice takes its rise from human conventions...and these are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of human mind with the situation of external objects. The qualities of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity; and the situation of external objects is their easy change, joined to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men."^{lv}

The strongest argument of this liberal conception of justice, however, is made in modern time by John Rawls, the most influential political philosopher of the twentieth century.^{lvi} The priority of rights is listed in the first principle of Rawls's "A Theory of Justice" and is further defended in his "Political Liberalism." According to Rawls, "each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override...The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests."^{lvii} He then rejects the older idea of a "fused" community by declaring that "the hope of political community must indeed be abandoned, if by such a community we mean a political society united in affirming the same comprehensive doctrine."^{lviii} A political order founded on a conception of good is impossible due to "the fact of reasonable pluralism together with the rejection of the oppressive use of the state power to overcome it."^{lix} From this perspective, Zhao's "tianxia" has no practical value for Rawls because "reasonable persons do not all affirm the same comprehensive

doctrine," and "the doctrine every reasonable person affirms is but one reasonable doctrine among others."^{lx} Hence, while Zhao sees a world order founded on liberalism as incomplete, liberalism in turn view Zhao's "tianxia" as impractical since it "is a claim that all equally could make" but "cannot be made good by anyone to citizens generally."^{lxi}

Of course, Zhao, with a Chinese perspective, will never be able to understand the logic behind liberalism. After all, China has been a united nation for most of its time and has never experienced "the lack of national unity" and "the instability of political life in the Italian city-states" that called for a liberalism political order in the first place.^{lxii} Long-time national unity enabled a conception of good based on Confucian teaching to have a long-lasting impact on all of society. As a result, there is a neglect of "individual rights in traditional Chinese political thoughts, to say nothing of the prioritization of "rights over the good." But China is not inherently different from the West. What makes China different is its particular historical circumstances. In fact, Chinese modernizations have already proved that China has many things in common with the West when placed in similar historical situations.

What surprises me the most is that Zhao simply takes China's particularity for granted. He does not even try to inquire how Western political philosophy diverges from that of China. The way he notes differences only further increases ideological conflicts between China and the West.

Rather than understanding the West in a Western way, Zhao criticizes Western liberalism from a Chinese perspective, which leads to further mistakes. As we will see in the next part of this paper, Zhao not only has a huge misunderstanding about the West but also holds an inaccurate view towards

liberalisms. Probably due to “the good over rights” idea in Chinese philosophy, Zhao treats liberalisms in singular form, as a particular conception of good rather than as a set of reasonable beliefs. Thus, divisions inside the liberal school itself simply disappear in Zhao’s universe.

LIBERALISMS, NOT LIBERALISM: A DISTORTED RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM

Anyone familiar with Western political thoughts knows the existence of different branches and schools inside liberalisms. There are both egalitarian liberals like Rawls and Dworkin, who have a strong concern for the question of social justice, and classic liberals such as Hayek and Popper, who are more concerned about restraining the power of the state.^{lxiii} Thus, a study of liberalism world order should first treat liberalisms in plural form. What we have is “liberalisms,” not “liberalism.”^{lxiv}

Zhao takes little notice of this fact in his discussions of liberalisms. He attributes defects to liberalisms as a whole rather than to specific schools of liberalism. He even blames Rawlsian liberalism for the defects of other schools of liberalisms.

Zhao discusses both Rawls’s ideas of the “veil of ignorance” and the Law of the People in “Tianxia Tixi.” According to Zhao, although neither the “veil of ignorance” nor “tianxia” is based on empirical facts, the two ideas present an entirely different understanding of human nature. “Unlike Rawls, who derives a selfish and self-interest principle from the “veil of ignorance,” China has always held to the principle of the common good and public welfare.”^{lxv} Zhao argues that Rawls’s Law of Peoples is unjust from two perspectives: it does not apply the Difference Principle, which regulates economic inequality on the global stage,

and it promotes an American hegemony by not tolerating the outlaw state.^{lxvi}

However, Zhao’s criticisms of Rawls are unsound because they are based on a misunderstanding of Rawlsian political philosophy. It seems to me that Rawlsian liberalism has become the scapegoat for the injustice created by other schools of liberalisms in Zhao’s discussions.

First, the people behind Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” are not selfish individuals who only care about their self-interests. Rawlsian individuals “are not focused exclusively on their own good, in the sense that they are ready to take advantage of others and free-ride whenever circumstances permit.”^{lxvii} Zhao needs to understand that although Rawlsian individuals do not “have to be altruistic to cooperate with others,” “they do normally have a sense of fairness or justice—a settled disposition to comply with terms of cooperation, and do their part, even on occasions when it is not to their benefit (so long as others manifest a like disposition).”^{lxviii} This is made clear in Rawls’s own discussions of the two moral powers of free and equal persons.^{lxix} For Rawls, we not only have “the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good” but are also able “to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation.”^{lxx} This is different from Hobbesian views that see individuals as “fundamentally self-centered and individualistic.”^{lxxi} Individuals in the Hobbesian liberalism only know how to rationally pursue their own conception of good. They ignore “the public role of reasons in enabling us to justify our conduct to one another, and then explain our choice of ends according to norms that are a condition for the existence of the social group” because the only thing that matters is self-

preservation.^{lxxii} They are probably the selfish individuals who can only come up with a principle of self-interest behind the “veil of ignorance” as Zhao suggests. But it is certainly absurd for one to judge Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” by placing Hobbesian individuals behind it.

Second, Rawls’s Law of the People does not deny justice at the global stage through the exclusion of the Difference Principle. Such a conclusion can only be reached through a misunderstanding of the Difference Principle. The Difference Principle has never been “the sole principle that prevents the society from becoming a world of the survival of the fittest over the weakest” that Zhao suggests.^{lxxiii} Instead, there are egalitarian elements in both Rawls’s Liberty Principle and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle.^{lxxiv} These principles demand public funding of elections so as to ensure the fair value of political liberties and public education in order to guarantee the equality of opportunity. Recent studies of Rawlsian political philosophy even show that inequalities between the most and the least advantaged are more restricted by equal liberties and the “fair equality of opportunities” than the Difference Principle.^{lxxv} They are also where disagreements between Rawls and libertarian thinkers like Hayek can be found.^{lxxvi} For thinkers like Hayek who do not believe in the fair value of political liberties and the equality of opportunities, welfare programs are the only thing that can alleviate the misfortunes of the least advantaged in society. But the same thing cannot be said of Rawls, who has stronger egalitarian requirements in equal liberty and opportunity principles, which both take precedence to the Difference Principle. As a matter of fact, Rawls becomes less interested in the application of the Difference Principle, not only internationally but also domestically, as he

chooses to take the principle out of the constitutional essentials raised in Political Liberalism.^{lxxvii} So a denial of a global difference principle should never be considered a denial of global justice. Instead, it should be viewed as a special concern for global justice because it “rests upon the assumption that it is possible for a well-ordered people to exercise political autonomy, that its members are economically self-sufficient (relatively speaking) and not subject to manipulation by external forces beyond their control, and that they can control their level of wealth through savings, investment, population control, and other measures.”^{lxxviii} As Rawls points out, “a society with few natural resources and little wealth can be well-ordered if its political traditions, law, and property and class structure with their underlying religious and moral beliefs and culture are such as to sustain a liberal or decent society.”^{lxxix} In addition, there will still be assistance to burdened states in the world despite the absence of the Difference Principle at the global stage. The Difference Principle, and the idea of reciprocity it entails, is “designed to apply under conditions of social cooperation to the basic structure of society” for “people engaged in social cooperation.”^{lxxx} Those who are handicapped and unable to participate in social cooperation are not the subjects of the Difference Principle even domestically. Thus, the difference principle is “not the proper response to the problem of global poverty, or to meeting handicaps and special needs, redressing misfortune, and so on.”^{lxxxi} “These are specific problems to address by reference to moral duties of assistance, mutual aid, and so on, and are to be determined by citizens’ democratic deliberations, on the basis of their knowledge of available resources once the demands of distributive justice are in place and satisfied.”^{lxxxii} In the words of Rawls,

“well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies,” and “the crucial point is...to assist burdened societies to become full members of the Society of Peoples and to be able to determine the path of their own future for themselves.”^{lxxxiii} In fact, due to Zhao’s deep prejudices towards both the West and the liberalist world order, we may even wonder whether he would still criticize Rawls for promoting benevolent despotism had the Difference Principle been included in the Law of Peoples.

Last but not least, Zhao’s hegemony accusation against Rawls is misconceived as Rawls himself has never promoted interventionism. The only state that cannot be tolerated in Rawls’s Law of Peoples is the outlaw state, whose aggressive and dangerous behaviors “deeply affect the international climate of power and violence.”^{lxxxiv} And these states should not be tolerated not only by liberal and democratic nations like the United States but also by decent hierarchical states that resemble the societies in Confucian Democracy and Zhao’s “tianxia” ideal.^{lxxxv lxxxvi} Regarding the relationship between liberal and non-liberal peoples, Rawls argues that “liberal peoples are to tolerate non-liberal peoples.”^{lxxxvii} And the toleration here is not only “to tolerate something against one’s value merely due to a belief in toleration,” as Zhao suggests, but also to “recognize these non-liberal societies as equal participating members in good standing of the Society of Peoples, with certain rights and obligations, including the duty of civility requiring that they offer other peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of Peoples for their actions.”^{lxxxviii} Then, Zhao’s view on Western toleration is actually based on the Hobbesian liberalism where social relations are “defined as a rational compromise among conflicting interests.”^{lxxxix} It is not the Rawlsian

concept of toleration in “justice as fairness” where “citizens have many final ends in common and among them is giving one mutual political justice.”^{xc} Hence, Zhao should have nothing to fear from Rawls’s Law of Peoples if his “tianxia” ideal is really based on “the principle of voluntariness” in dealing with other nations.^{xcii} The Law of Peoples will only outlaw Zhao’s “tianxia” when “tianxia” itself becomes “a popular example of new hegemony, whereby imperial China’s hierarchical governance is updated for the twenty-first century.”^{xciii} And when it does so, it is the duty not only of liberal people but also the responsibility of every peace-loving, non-liberal people, Chinese citizens included, to condemn this tyrannical world order founded on Chinese philosophy.

In short, Zhao presents a completely distorted view of Rawls’s ideas in “Tianxia Tixi.” Rawlsian liberalism, when properly understood, contributes to world peace and mutual understanding among different cultures. It is ironic that Zhao Tingyang, a self-proclaimed universalist who sees turning the enemy into friends as the principle of Chinese philosophy, turns a potential friend, Rawlsian liberalism, into the enemy by confusing it with other schools of liberalisms.

CONCLUSION

As a Chinese student who is interested in political philosophy, I believe that my country can play a more important and responsible role in the world with democratic political reforms and the right political leadership. However, the West will only appreciate Chinese contributions to a more peaceful and harmonious world when China can present an objective understanding of the West. An emphasis on Chinese characteristics based on a

misunderstanding of Western characteristics that do not fit into the Zhao's "tianxia" ideal will only create more ideological conflicts between China and the West. Yet, severe mistakes that Zhao makes in his advocacy of "tianxia" have led him to this wrong direction, which undermines his own ultimate purpose and makes the Chinese vision of world order unacceptable to Westerners.

This paper serves not only as a comprehensive critique on Zhao's views but also tells us what truly makes traditional Chinese political thoughts different in the modern era. The priority of "the good over rights" illustrates that the historical events which promoted the transformation of Western political philosophy did not happen in China's own history. Even so, I argue that Chinese philosophy can still be connected with non-liberal views in the West today and that both sides can have a better mutual understanding through such a philosophical bond. Moreover, although Chinese philosophy is different from those of liberalisms, it may still have one or two trusted allies inside the liberalism camp, as liberalisms are being developed to correct their own defects. Rawlsian liberalism, as discussed above, is a typical example of this case. Rather than criticizing liberalisms for the injustice in the present world order, it is better for Chinese intellectuals and government officials to understand liberalisms and help them to overcome some of their own limitations. China and the West can certainly have a more meaningful intellectual dialogue through this approach.

This paper should not be seen as a complete refutation of Zhao Tingyang's philosophical views. I fully appreciate the efforts made by Zhao in reviving traditional Chinese political thoughts and in advancing a new world theory from Chinese perspectives. However, analyzing mistakes and misunderstanding in his

writings can be helpful in creating a more accurate understanding of China and the West.

ⁱ William A. Callahan, *Tianxia, Empire and the World* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 111.

ⁱⁱ Allen Carlson's "Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A brief consideration of recent changes in China's approach to international order and the emergence of the tianxia concept" is another good example. "It is then difficult to imagine that any of the larger states along China's periphery would enthusiastically accept such a revision of the organizing principles underlying international politics within the region. Indeed, while some of China's small neighbors (such as Myanmar, or possibly Nepal) might view this Chinese dominated frame as entailing new opportunities to cement regime legitimacy and forestall certain forms of external involvement in their domestic affairs, it is also reasonable to anticipate that the majority of actors within Asia would construe any moves to recreate tianxia values and practices in the region as a threat. Thus, the promotion of such a system would have a deleterious impact on the security dynamic in the region." (Carlson 2011)

ⁱⁱⁱ See "Priority of Rights and Ideas of the good in John Rawls's "Political Liberalism" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)

^{iv} See Qin Yaqing's "The Possibility and Inevitability of a Chinese School of International Relations Theory" (*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*, no.3 2006: 7-13) and Yan Xuetong's "Xunzi's Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications" (*Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no.1 2008: 135-65)

^v Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 41.

^{vi} Zhao Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven'(Tian-xia)* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 24.

^{vii} Zhao Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of "a world institution"]* (Nanjing, Jiangsu: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005), 29.

^{viii} Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 24.

^{ix} Ibid. "But the problem of public choice remains unsolved today, and has become an even greater difficulty, for democracy represents misled minds much more than independent ones, false wants much more than true needs, and illusive advantages much more than real goods and virtues."

^x Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 31. Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 26.

^{xi} Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 26.

^{xii} Ibid.

^{xiii} Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 30. There is no doubt that Zhao Tingyang himself despises the pursuit of self-interest to the extents that he even uses the word "bullshit" (Goupi, ㄅㄨㄛˊ) in describing people's narrow mind in pursuing their own interest.

^{xiv} Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 29.

^{xv} Callahan, *Tianxia*. William A. Callahan also arrives at similar conclusion in his criticism of Zhao. "Tianxia is a

hierarchical system that values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite governance over democracy and human rights. It is literally a “top-down” prescription for the world’s ills.”

^{xvi} Zhao call this conception of good “true needs” and “real goods and virtues” (Zhao 2006, 24).

^{xvii} Zhao regards democratic elections as “voting for one of several dubious politicians” (Zhao 2006, 24).

^{xviii} Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 84-109. Zhao actually does a comparative study between tianxia and other major Western models: the UN model, the EU model, Roman Empire, Britain Empire and American hegemony in his book “Tianxia Tixi..”

^{xix} Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 26.

^{xx} In his defense of Chinese philosophy, Zhao argues that “there is no Chinese denial of the value of the individual, but rather a denial of the individual as a political foundation or starting point,” which further exposes that individual rights could only take a subordinate place in traditional Chinese political thoughts (Zhao 2006, 26).

^{xxi} Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 26.

^{xxii} *Ibid.*, 27.

^{xxiii} *Ibid.*

^{xxiv} *Ibid.*, 30.

^{xxv} *Ibid.*, 29.

^{xxvi} Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 26.

^{xxvii} *Ibid.*, 26-27.

^{xxviii} Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 25, Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, 209.

^{xxix} Personally I believe that this similarity partly explains the popularity of Michael J. Sandel in China nowadays.

^{xxx} Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 31.

^{xxxi} *Ibid.*

^{xxxii} *Ibid.*

^{xxxiii} Sandel has been named the “most influential” foreign figure of the year in 2011 by China Newsweek, a weekly magazine published by the China News Agency due to the popularity of his online course “Justice: What’s the Right Thing To Do” in China.

^{xxxiv} Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and Limits of Justice* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 174.

^{xxxv} Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 24.

^{xxxvi} Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996), 5.

^{xxxvii} *Ibid.*, 5-6.

^{xxxviii} Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 29. For Zhao, governmental officials have to be public-minded and virtuous so as to fulfill their political obligations while for Sandel, politics should cultivate “in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires” (Sandel 1996, 6).

^{xxxix} See MacIntyre’s “Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation Between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues” in *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives*, ed. Eliot Deutsch (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991)

^{xl} Michael Walzer, another modern communitarian thinker, actually discussed the impossibility of a world state in his “*Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and*

Equality” (New York: Basic Books, 1984) “The only plausible alternative to the political community is humanity itself, the society of nations, the entire globe. But were we to take the globe as our setting, we would have to imagine what does not yet exist: a community that included all men and women everywhere.” (Walzer 1984, 29)

^{xli} Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 388.

^{xlii} Zhao, *Rethinking Empire*, 26.

^{xliiii} Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, 256.

^{xliiv} Adam Webb, *Beyond the Global Culture War* (London, England: Routledge, 2006), 76, 116.

^{xliiv} Webb, *Beyond*, 116. “Surely Hindus, Muslims, and Christians have plenty of points on which they agree, for example.”

^{xlivi} Webb, *Beyond*, 116, 220.

^{xliivii} Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 27.

^{xliiviii} Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, 177.

^{xliix} *Ibid.*, 208-209.

^l *Ibid.*, 213.

^{li} Laurence Berns, THOMAS HOBBS In *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 298.

^{lii} *Ibid.*

^{liiii} *Ibid.*, 404.

^{liiv} Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, 249.

^{liv} David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford, 1739), 495.

^{lvi} Sandel, *Liberalism*, 16. A non-liberal view towards liberalism justice could be found in Sandel’s “Liberalism and Limits of Justice.” “Justice is the standard by which conflicting values are reconciled and competing conceptions of the goods accommodated if not always resolved. As such it must have a certain priority with respect to those values and those goods. No conception of the good could possibly defeat the requirements of justice, for these requirements are of a qualitatively different order; their validity is established in a different way. With respect to social values generally, justice stands detached and aloof as a fair decision procedure stands aloof from the claims of the disputants before it.”

^{lvii} John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 3-4.

^{lviii} John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 146.

^{lix} *Ibid.*

^{lx} Callahan, *Tianxia*. William A. Callahan actually follows this logic in his criticism of Zhao. “Last, it is necessary to point out the irony of one of Zhao’s main arguments. Each imperial system he criticizes—Roman, British, and American—has had its own utopian ideal to inspire its governance regime: Pax Romana, the civilizing mission, white man’s burden, free world, and so on. Hence all the “Western” empires discussed in Tianxia tixi have likewise argued that they are best for the world as the manifestation of an altruistic philosophical project that is not only just but also inevitable.” Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 60.

^{lxi} Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 61.

^{lxii} Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, 177.

^{lxiii} See Ronald Dworkin's "Taking Rights Seriously" (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978).

^{lxiv} See Hayek's "The Constitution of Liberty" (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978) and Popper's "The Open Society and Its Enemies" (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971).

^{lxv} Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 59.

^{lxvi} *Ibid.*, 97-98.

^{lxvii} Samuel Freeman, *Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy* (New York: Oxford Press, 2007), 266.

^{lxviii} *Ibid.*, 267.

^{lxix} Freeman, *Justice and the Social Contract*, 30. "Rawls's parties conceive of themselves as free, not in the sense that they may act on any desire they happen to have but in the sense that they are able to control, revise, and take responsibility for their final ends and desires by acting on and from reasonable and rational principles." John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: a Restatement*. ed. Kelly, Erin (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 2001), 18.

^{lxx} Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 19.

^{lxxi} Freeman, *Justice and the Social Contract*, 20.

^{lxxii} *Ibid.*, 23.

^{lxxiii} Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 97.

^{lxxiv} Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*.

^{lxxv} See Jeffrey Edward Green's "Rawls and the Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable Envy toward the Superrich" (American Political Science Review, 2013: 1-16.) and Samuel Freeman's "Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

^{lxxvi} See Andrew Lister's "The 'Mirage' of Social Justice: Hayek Against (and For) Rawls" (CSSJ Working Papers Series, SJ017 June 2011)

^{lxxvii} Rawls, *Political Liberalism*.

^{lxxviii} Freeman, *Justice and the Social Contract*, 291.

^{lxxix} John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples with "the Idea of Public Reason Revisited"* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 106. Rawls, "I would further conjecture that there is no society anywhere in the world—except for marginal cases—with resources so scarce that it could not, were it reasonably and rationally organized and governed, become well-ordered. Historical examples seem to indicate that resource-poor countries may do very well (e.g., Japan), while resource-rich countries may have serious difficulties (e.g., Argentina). The crucial elements that make the difference are the political culture, the political virtues and civic society of the country, its members' probity and industriousness, their capacity for innovation, and much else."

^{lxxx} Freeman, *Justice and the Social Contract*, 286.

^{lxxxi} Freeman, *Justice and the Social Contract*, 294.

^{lxxxii} *Ibid.*

^{lxxxiii} Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 106, 118.

^{lxxxiv} *Ibid.*, 81.

^{lxxxv} Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 64-66. "Two Criteria for Decent Hierarchical Societies—First, the society does not have aggressive aims, and it recognizes that it must gain its legitimate ends through diplomacy and trade and other ways of peace...The second criterion has three parts. (a) The first part is that a decent hierarchical

people's system of law, in accordance with its common good idea of justice (see secures for all members of the people what have come to be called human rights...Among the human rights are the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated similarly).³ Human rights, as thus understood, cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or special to the Western tradition. They are not politically parochial... (b) The second part is that a decent people's system of law must be such as to impose bona fide moral duties and obligations (distinct from human rights) on all persons within the people's territory... (c) Finally, the third part of the second criterion is that there must be a sincere and not unreasonable belief on the part of judges and other officials who administer the legal system that the law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice..."

^{lxxxvi} See Ranjoo Seodu Herr in "Confucian Democracy and Equality" in (Asian Philosophy

^{lxxxvii} Vol. 20, No. 3, November 2010, pp. 261–282)

^{lxxxviii} Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 59.

^{lxxxix} *Ibid.*, Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi*, 13.

^{lxxxix} Freeman, *Justice and the Social Contract*, 19.

^{xc} Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 208. In fact Rawls has made it clear that "justice as fairness" is not a modus-vivendi as the Hobbesian liberalism domestically and internationally in both "Political Liberalism" and "The Law of Peoples."

^{xcii} Tingyang, *Rethinking Empire*, 28. Zhao argues that "reciprocity has been a leading idea in Chinese thinking. And it has been performed within the norms of practical life to express mutual respect."

^{xciii} Callahan, *Tianxia*, 111.

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CULTURE CARD

The East Asian Olympics and the Politics of Mega-Events

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ABSTRACT

This article investigates the East Asian Olympiads (Tokyo 1964, Seoul 1988, and Beijing 2008) and how the three approached hosting the Olympics. Beginning with an analysis of mega-events, the article continues by examining how each country navigated political tensions, a history of Orientalism, and the burden of the Tourist Gaze to host a successful Games. The article argues that the East Asian Olympiads had the vital advantage of benign and unique cultures, ones that could highlight their recent economic booms, hide their political instabilities, and showcase their history and tradition in extravagant spectacles. Throughout the article, comparisons will be made with non-Eastern Games in order to capture the idea of an “Eastern Model.” In doing so, the article also seeks to demonstrate the adherence of each country to a soft power approach, and the potential benefits such a method can provide in solidifying a country’s position in the international arena.

In 1894, Baron Pierre de Coubertin began his speech at the Congress on the Revival of the Olympics Games by saying, “I raise my glass to the Olympic idea, which has crossed the mists of time like a ray from the all-powerful sun and is returning to shine on the gateway to the twentieth century with the gleam of joyful hope.”ⁱ Considered the father of the modern Olympics, Coubertin spearheaded the movement to bring the

ancient Greek Games to the contemporary world. The Congress oversaw the establishment of the International Olympic Committee, which began preparations for the 1896 Games to be held in Athens. Beginning with a modest 14 nations and a mere 241 athletes competing in 43 events,ⁱⁱ the Olympics has grown into a true mega-event, seeing 10,500 athletes from 204 nations competing at London 2012.ⁱⁱⁱ

Defined as a large-scale event with global publicity and far-reaching impacts, the concept of the “mega-event” became an integral part of the globalization narrative through Maurice Roche’s 2000 work *Mega-events and Modernity*. Roche writes about the potential for mega-events to “project the city to the world and... reposition the city in the world of global inter-city comparisons and economic competition.”^{iv} Globalization, the process of extending social relations across the international arena, has become of increased interest to scholars in all fields. With the advent of television broadcasting, mega-events have become international spectacles that can play an increasingly manipulative role in global relationships. Olympic Planning Committees can design programs catering to a diverse audience, with members of multiple backgrounds and predispositions, and count on their worldwide viewing.

For many host countries, the Opening Ceremony broadcast is the most significant representation of the nation. The study of international mega-events, despite their one-off nature, is particularly

useful to understanding transitions or movements in culture and politics. In many cases, the spectacle of the Olympics is the primary vehicle by which a nation or city's image is translated to the outside world, highlighting the importance of mega-events as objects of study. Observers tend to develop their conceptions and generalizations of unknown locales based on what they are presented in a fast, high-impact, highly filtered mega-event. This phenomenon provides a unique opportunity for nations to put their best foot forward. Indeed, the potential for manipulation by host countries and other bodies of power makes mega-events a fascinating topic for study, despite having drawn relatively little research attention. Writing again in 2006, Roche asserts that, "Reference to international sport and the Olympics is notably absent from many major analyses of globalization and of global culture."^v

Mega-events are powerful tools in shaping image, creating a frame of reference through which a nation, culture, political system, etc. can be judged in past, present, and future narratives. As Roche asserts, "International and supranational cultural events helped to create a fragile space, something of an 'international public culture,' in which 'official' versions.... were asserted and recognized in an international 'world of nations.'" These "official versions," both of a country's history and potential, are particularly important factors to consider in evaluating the history of mega-events such as the Olympic Games. In the span of sixteen or so days, how does a National Olympic Committee represent itself to the rest of the world community? How does this representation change prior associations as well as influence future assumptions? What impression of a country is cemented in the world's eyes?

At the end of the 1912 Stockholm Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin looked

to the future and expressed his dearest wishes for the 1916 Games: "May it contribute like its illustrious predecessors to the general welfare and to the betterment of humanity! May it be prepared in the fruitful labor of peaceful times. May it be celebrated, when the day comes, by all the peoples of the world in gladness and concord!"^{vi} Yet, just four years later, the Games in Berlin would be canceled in the midst of World War I. Striving for excellence, demonstrating respect, and celebrating friendship are the three Olympic values as proposed by the International Olympics Committee (IOC).^{vii} Yet, one can look to the 1980 Moscow Olympics boycotted by the United States of America, or the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics boycotted by the Soviet Union to see that these values are better on paper than in practice. Many assert that during the Olympic Games, "the usual political and economic structures that divide the world are supposed to be forgotten."^{viii} The unfortunate reality is that politics often sneak into the arena, turning sports into what George Orwell famously declared to be, "war minus the shooting."^{ix}

This element of international sports presents itself as a problem to all participating nations, but none more so than the host country. For two weeks, it receives the world's undivided attention, as journalists, commentators, and tourists arrive, intending to pick apart every element of the country's politics, culture, and economy. Mega-events such as the Olympics can be a great boon for nations hoping to solidify their place in the global community, but they can also be a great detriment should increased international attention turn negative. In many ways, the Olympics represent a nation's one and only chance to reach certain demographics and showcase its national vision. For Asian host nations, newly emergent onto the international scene, the pressure to

present their best face and to host an Olympics free from political controversy is even greater.

Asian countries have hosted the Summer Olympic Games a total of three times: in Tokyo in 1964, Seoul in 1988, and Beijing in 2008. Japan in the 60s, South Korea in the 80s, and China in the new millennium experienced periods of tremendous economic growth. The Olympics provided them with the chance to parade a newfound modernity and prosperity in front of an international audience. At the same time, each country faced immense pressure to fulfill the historical notion of exoticism expected by spectators and viewers.

In addition, the organization of the East Asian Games was affected by the need to play down the host countries' recent, particularly virulent political issues. From assassinations to environmental concerns, Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing each had to contend with unfortunate current events marring their political landscapes. Hosting a mega-event such as the Olympics posed the danger of humiliation and even greater stigmatization should politics play too heavy a hand in the proceedings. For its Olympics to be a success, each country needed to accentuate its new economic achievements, while presenting its political themes in muted ways and addressing the cultural expectations of outsiders.

This article analyzes how the East Asian Olympic hosts attempted to balance all of the important factors that could potentially detract from or contribute to a successful Games. Comparisons with "non-Eastern" Games such as Munich 1972 and Moscow 1980 establish an "Eastern Model" for hosting mega-events of Olympic caliber. The Eastern Model involves three parts: 1) International prestige as the ultimate goal, 2) Navigating obstacles of political instability, Orientalism, and the Tourist Gaze, and 3)

The advantage of exoticism. This analysis of the East Asian Games and the "Eastern Model" illuminates the cultural image-producing quality of the Olympic Games. Through the event, political leaders have "the opportunity to reshape the city's desired image."^x This reshaping plays an important role in the concept of soft power. A term coined by Joseph Nye, "soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others... It is leading by example and attracting others to do what you want."^{xi} The East Asian Olympic Games represented a direct attempt by the Olympic Organizing Committees to augment the soft power capacity of their respective nations. By following the Eastern Model, the organizers could present modern, unique, and open nations, ones that could be trusted to lead and help shape the world.

Perhaps, one would consider any attempt to categorize multiple Games under one heading to be foolhardy. The Olympics naturally resist being placed into collective narratives. This article intends to do just that by investigating the motivations and obstacles that separate the East Asian host countries from their non-Eastern counterparts. No such generalized theory will ever be complete, nor should it be, but perhaps "Culture Card: The East Asian Olympics and the Politics of Mega-Events" will begin a dialogue on the differences, some internalized, by those on both sides of the divide.

GETTING GOLD

The ostensible goal of the Olympic Games has remained unchanged since the revival of the movement in 1896: "to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity."^{xii} This lofty language has

come to define the Olympic spirit, one dedicated to creating a better world for all citizens. Though the motivational ethos behind the Olympic Charter has kept its principles throughout the years, each Olympic Games has had its own flavor, its own character, and its own goals that ride the undercurrent of Olympic idealism. All the calls for world harmony, trumpeted by officials and diplomats across the globe, go hand-in-hand with planning committees' labor over cost benefit analyses in trying to determine how much the Games will benefit their country. Each host country approaches its monumental task with differing sets of goals, obstacles, and strategies. These contrasts make each Olympiad unique, as both internal and external forces come into play.

In 2008, London mayor Boris Johnson countered claims that London's bid for the 2012 Olympics was, in hindsight, a mistake. According to Johnson, "This unprecedented level of investment will deliver iconic buildings, major improvements in transport infrastructure, crucial housing and beautiful parks – all of this in a part of the city neglected for decades."^{xiii} The mayor's words reflect a goal inherent to every modern Olympiad. The public support and investment generated by the mega-event provide the opportunity for economic growth and infrastructural improvement. Indeed, without the impetus created by absolute deadlines, media interest, and the influx of monetary resources that accompany the Olympic Games, one can imagine that many urban renewal projects would never have come to fruition.^{xiv}

Since the 1960 Games in Rome, host countries have come to see the Olympics as potential investment opportunities. Prior to 1960, such mega-events were rarely touted as profit-generating measures.^{xv} With the advent of international broadcasts, increased

international tourism, and commercialization, however, hosting the Olympics Games can now lead to new financial advantages in the world market. Using the push generated by the 1972 Summer Games, the city of Munich constructed a new north-south subway network, 145 miles of expressways, and new underground parking near the Olympic sites.^{xvi} Barcelona's 1992 Games saw only 17 percent of the budget allotted towards the actual sporting events, with the remainder devoted to urban renewal projects.^{xvii} In 1984, Los Angeles made an unprecedented \$225 million in profit, demonstrating the vast economic potential of hosting the Games.^{xviii} Profit aside, hosting the Olympics can provide much needed building and rebuilding in the world's largest cities; in addition, the international attention can generate future tourism, one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy.^{xix}

The primary motivation in hosting the Olympic Games in non-Eastern countries can thus be linked to financial benefits. If one, however, turns to the East Asian Olympiads, a different narrative emerges. As John and Margaret Gold state, "Seoul's decision to seek the 1988 Games was less inspired by the thoughts of financial benefit – which had yet to re-emerge when the city gained the nomination in 1981 – than by the success of Tokyo 1964, which the Koreans believed had altered perceptions of the Japanese and helped Japan join the ranks of the developed world in the cultural, social, diplomatic and economic fields."^{xx} Though Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing achieved great infrastructural growth because of the Olympic Games (one need only look to the *shinkansen* bullet train that has now come to epitomize Japan's economy), the East Asian Olympics were primarily a "coming-out" party for Japan, South Korea, and China. A traditionally Western-driven phenomenon, the

Olympics and the sports tradition were relatively new conventions in East Asia. Thus, the aims of Tokyo in 1964, Seoul in 1988, and Beijing in 2008 were primarily political. As countries little known or understood beyond their wartime histories, Japan, South Korea, and China used the Olympics as a vehicle for demystifying their country, elevating their standing in the international community, as well as increasing their prestige and strength both inside and outside the country.

Though non-Eastern countries also have had politicized aims in hosting the Olympics (notably in Berlin 1936), none has had as much at stake in presenting a strong face to the world; none used the Olympic Games as its *introduction* into the international community. For Japan, South Korea, and China, becoming the host country would be their first major moment in the world spotlight unconnected to World War II, the Korean War, or a Communist past. Enormous pressure was placed on their National Olympic Committees to leave a deep impression and legacy through the staging of the Games. During the preparations for the Tokyo Games, media outlets even designated the event a *seisen* (sacred war), meant to encapsulate the fervor with which Japan threw itself into establishing a foothold in the world arena.^{xxi} Though financial motivations were of course important in staging such an immense event, the differing political goals and mindsets of the East Asian Olympiads necessarily led to differing manifestations of their Games.

SPRINTS AND HURDLES

The build of athletes and their subsequent training regimes differ depending on whether their goal is a gold in the 400 meter or the 100 meter sprint. The same can be said for athletes running sprints or

hurdles.^{xxii} Just as the eventual goals differ between the two camps, so too do the obstacles each group must face. Thus, like Olympic hurdlers, the preparation for Eastern Olympics necessarily diverges from that of their non-Eastern counterparts. Three primary difficulties confronted the Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing Olympic Games, each of which required different methods of defense on part of the Olympic Planning Committees: political tensions, Orientalism, and the Tourist Gaze.

The first of these lies in the political situations of each Olympiad. Volatile tensions within the countries threatened the stability of the ruling parties, and political stigmas affected their reputations abroad. Tokyo in 1964 still felt many consequences of Japan's World War II loss. Following defeat, Japan fell under American occupation, and remained tied to its American counterparts until the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Even then, tendrils of American control remained in the country, as the simultaneous US-Japan Security Pact gave the US military great leeway in Japan, while at the same time providing no responsibility to protect Japan in event of an attack. This fact, coupled with the stipulation in the Japanese Constitution that made war illegal, led to a very lopsided relationship between the two countries.^{xxiii} Though significant changes were made to the treaty in 1960, Japan was still defined primarily as a US military outpost. Enraged by Japan's continued inferior position, thousands of protesters gathered on June 4, 1960 in Tokyo to protest Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, surrounding his home, the Diet building, and the American Embassy. Millions across the country likewise participated in condemning the national government.^{xxiv} The political atmosphere in the nation was marked by historical tension; participant

Shimizu Ikutarō commented, “Looking back, everybody’s past was filled with anxiety, fear, rage, hunger, and humiliation.”^{xxv} Such were the dangers that the Olympic Planning Committee needed to navigate and keep from the international gaze during the Games.

In 1988, Seoul was much the same. Following the Korean War, South Korea went through a series of brutal regime changes, none particularly democratic. In 1979, shortly after the decision to bid for the 1988 Olympics, President Park Chung Hee was assassinated in a military coup led by General Chun Doo Hwan, destroying all pretenses of democracy. According to the *New York Times*, Chun and his military followers gained control of “the police, the party, the army, the intelligence network, and the Olympic Games.”^{xxvi} Using martial law, Chun immediately closed the National Assembly, arrested opposition leaders, and banned political activities and demonstrations. These repressive actions reached a high point in 1980, when, on May 18, Chun sent Special Forces into the city of Gwangju to put down a student demonstration, resulting in hundreds of deaths in what would become known as the Gwangju Uprising^{xxvii}. On September 1, 1980, Chun Doo Hwan was officially inaugurated as the president of South Korea, establishing a regime marked by oppression and political fury toward the nation’s citizens. Protests continued in South Korea all the way to 1987, when Chun was forced to turn over power to a more democratic system. For the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, these political realities would need to be circumvented to avoid an Olympic legacy similar to that of Mexico City 1968, where the event was marred by the Tlatelolco massacre of anti-regime protesters.

China’s biggest obstacle in realizing its political goals lied in its own political system; the People’s Republic of China has had a largely negative reputation internationally. The environment and human rights record of the economic giant are often under scrutiny, and take precedence in many discussions about China. Prior to the Olympics, National Geographic published a special issue titled “China: Inside the Dragon” that covered many of the issues facing the “dragon.” The environmental degradation occurring across the country was a running theme in many of the articles of the issue.^{xxviii} The mostly negative effect on its own as well as the global environment has become one of the main issues associated with China’s growth as well as one of the defining characteristics attributed to the regime. Indeed the poor air quality of the city and the potential effects on athletes were often cited as rationales for Beijing’s failed bid for the 2000 Games. As the historians Cook and Miles assert, “...Beijing was still a severely polluted city at that time, with relatively poor infrastructure. It was certainly no surprise to most observers that the 1990s bid was unsuccessful.”^{xxix} Beijing faced the monumental task of demonstrating its progress over the previous ten years.

China’s reputation also suffered from the political status of its Communist party. The nation’s lack of genuine rule of law and its claimed human rights offenses were often at the forefront in the run-up to the Olympics. A December 2007 article in *The Times* asserted that, “China’s Communist regime remains troubling. Taiwan is continually threatened, dissidents remain in prison, the Internet is censored, intellectual property rights infringement and corruption are rampant.”^{xxx} During the torch relay earlier in 2008, actress Mia Farrow’s denunciation of China’s role in Tibet led

to Steven Spielberg's eventual withdrawal from producing the opening and closing ceremonies.^{xxxii} Huge protests over the matter caused a great deal of commotion in London, Paris, and San Francisco, where the torch relay had to be halted multiple times. The torch's journey through London was called the "caged torch procession" by BBC News, guarded as it was by Chinese and British security forces.^{xxxiii}

In addition to these political issues, Japan, South Korea, and China faced the discourse of "exotic weakness." In his famous 1979 work, philosopher Edward Said coined the term "Orientalism" to describe the historical process whereby Eastern nations gradually took on the reputation of being weaker and more feminine than their Western counterparts.^{xxxiii} According to Said, "men have always divided the world up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each other," and from these invented separations arose a dialogue where the relationship between the West and East was one "between a strong and weak partner."^{xxxiv} Ancient authors such as Herodotus, Hippocrates, and Aristotle set the foundation for many main themes of Orientalism, stating that "Asians are faceless hordes of people who live in conditions of servitude."^{xxxv} This mindset not only validated colonial trends, but also persisted and permeated twentieth century interactions between East and West. New discoveries about the Orient in anatomy, philology, and history molded and were added to the Orientalist mindset, creating an imagined, self-perpetuating stereotype that could lead to very concrete, very damaging policy decisions on a grand scale.

This distinction took on a particularly potent form in the discussion of sports culture, long associated with the masculine "West" and kept beyond reach of the feminine "East." Many

fundamental stereotypes of Orientalism have revolved around the physical body. Because accounts of sports rarely appear in the historical texts of Eastern nations, many scholars attributed this absence to a lack of interest in improving the body and a dislike of physical exertion. Orientalist dialogue took the Chinese Imperial Examinations to be the equivalent of the Ancient Olympic Games, using them as the epitome of each region's mindset. One was inherently drawn to sedentary, physically inferior activity, the other to sport and the powerful, masculine spirit. Orientalist tradition had long characterized Asian countries such as China as ones that shunned physicality, using ancient Confucian proverbs such as "esteem literacy and despise martiality."^{xxxvi} For the East Asian Games, such notions of weakness were obstacles to be confronted, and eventually overturned.

Beyond the historical reputation of the East Asian's physically weak body also lay the discourse of East Asia's "unusual" and "exotic" spirit, made up of countries still steeped in centuries-old traditions and out of touch with the modern world. From a long tradition of works (such as Puccini's opera *Madama Butterfly*, based on the short story by John Luther Long), came the 1957 Academy Award Winning *Sayonara*. Starring Marlon Brando, *Sayonara* provides a perfect example of how Japan was consistently portrayed in the international community. The movie begins with a montage of typical Japanese imagery: shrines, women in kimonos, quaint creeks, and stone bridges, accompanied by traditional *koto* music. Major Gruver's first introduction to Japan is by a friend who states, "They got kabuki there. All men no dongs."^{xxxvii} His time spent with a Japanese entertainer is full of tea ceremonies and craft shows to which he responds, "Well that's the cutest thing I ever saw, honey," demonstrating both his fascination with

and underlying mockery of “traditional” Japanese culture. His love interest, Hana-ogi (the name of a famous courtesan in Japanese history) expresses her inability to marry him with assertions that she must bring honor back to her family, another trope that alludes to ancient familial roots and ties. The movie ends with the double suicide of Major Gruver’s friend and Japanese wife, an act which the Japanese women call beautiful, “floating always together, like water lily,” and which the American men view with a healthy degree of disbelief. These were the dominant images of Japan prior to the Tokyo Olympics: a country both beautiful and quaint, stuck in tradition and the tropes of ancient society.

Similarly, *National Geographic* published an article on South Korea in August 1988 in order to provide an illustration of the country before the Games. To write this article, journalist Cathy Newman traveled to a remote village in Kyongju in order to capture the essence of Korea. Through her commentary, one gets the sense that South Korea was a country unchanged for thousands of years. She speaks to an elderly, traditional artist and reports his words:

“American line is sharp, unyielding: the Washington Monument, the tail fins of a car.” He sliced the air with a chopstick to illustrate. “Korean line,” he said, “is a curve: the softness of a woman in her *hanbok*, the green waves of mountains surrounding Kyongju, the jade ornaments that dangle like ripe pears from the gold Silla crowns.”^{xxxviii}

According to this dialogue, America is harsh modernity, South Korea gentle tradition. Newman moves on to document the lives of the Cho family,

among whom rigid customs prevail and Confucianism encourages the Korean conscience to follow the ideal of obedience to authority.^{xxxix} The article ends with an assertion that seems to apply to the country as a whole: “Their descendants keep faith with nature, living in a magical enclave bounded only by the Korean line that shimmers between reality and legend.”^{xl} Such language invokes the feeling of a nation that is entirely different from the United States, one driven by tradition and stagnancy, rather than by modernity and progress.

Similarly, the very same *National Geographic* issue that previously highlighted China’s political and environmental problems presented an article called “Village On the Edge of Time” detailing the lives of the Dong people on the outskirts of modern China. (Figure 1)



Figure 1

In this village in southern China, “songs are the record of traditions and a mythic history that is a thousand years old.”^{xli} Crossing through the land, the journalist comments on the structure of the village: “The bridge was as formidable as a dragon, with a scaly roof for its body and cupolas for its head and spine. I viewed it with the awe of a child who has just seen a fairy tale place jump out of a book.”^{xlii} It can be argued that most international audience members think of the Dong

people when they imagine the nation of China.

Yet, these narratives of East Asia did not fit with the economic realities of the time. Japan in the early 1960s was experiencing an upswing of unbelievable economic growth. Historians would call this period Japan's "economic miracle" (though later scholars would question this term at the collapse of the Japanese economy in the last decades of the 20th century). By the 1960s, Japan's real economic growth stood at an average of ten percent per annum.^{xliii} This recovery from a postwar economy where production capacity had fallen to thirty percent of pre-war levels was remarkable, a phenomenon worthy of exhibition in the international community. Improvements in infrastructure and transportation epitomized Japan's growth, as Tokyo was transformed into a truly modern city.

South Korea in the 1980s exhibited a similar economic model to that of Japan in the 1960s. The country experienced a period of extraordinary growth. In 1975, the country's GNP was \$44.3 billion. By 1980, it had risen to \$63.1 billion and by 1983, \$77.4 billion. At the same time, per capita income rose from \$1,207 in 1975, to \$1,586 in 1980, and finally to \$1,870 in 1983. Korean exports, valued at \$55 million in 1962, increased to \$24 billion by 1983.^{xliiv} South Korea was fast becoming one of the world's most important new economies, as well as one of the most urban.

China's economy took off in the second half of the twentieth century. Since 1978, when the country moved from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy, the country experienced an economic growth rate of nearly 9.5 percent each year.^{xlv} In 2001, the year China was awarded the 2008 bid, the nation surpassed Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world based on purchasing power parity.^{xlvi}

Though China remained behind the United States in GDP, its extraordinary economic success in the last few decades has brought the nation considerable international attention. Though similar to the economic boom experienced by Japan in the 1960s and South Korea in the 1980s, China's progress was not just fast; it was the fastest in the world. In 2005, after decades of growth, the Chinese economy showed no signs of slowing down. Analysts had predicted a drop from 9.5 percent growth in 2004 to 8.5 percent in 2005. They were forced to raise their forecasts when the figures in the third quarter stayed steady at 9.4 percent.^{xlvii} From 1989 to 2001, China's GDP increased from 1.69 trillion *yuan* to 9.59 trillion; its average growth rate of 9.3 percent far exceeded the international average of 3.2 (2.7 percent for developing countries, 5.2 percent for developed).^{xlviii} The Chinese government had to consider measures to artificially slow the economy out of fears of inflation or overheating. Dialogue ignoring these economic statistics was detrimental to a country that could become a major economic power in world affairs.

Given the history of Orientalism and the economic boom of the three countries, it would seem advisable for the planning committees to commit to the full expression of modernity in the East Asian Games. One final obstacle, however, made such a course of action a difficult one. Through popular images disseminated by the likes of *Sayonara* and *National Geographic*, one can see the dominant portrayal of East Asian nations historically presented to the majority of the international community. Failure to perpetuate this portrayal during the Eastern Games could hurt the host country's cause, as shown by the concept of the Tourist Gaze.

Coined by John Urry, the concept of the Tourist Gaze holds that "looking is

a learned ability and that the pure and innocent eye is a myth.”^{xlix} When tourists travel to or observe a foreign country, they do so through predetermined, colored lenses if you will, that naturally affect the act of viewing and processing. Media crafts these lenses, and a world of perceptions that a tourist originally inhabits, and acts through sources of information such as television, movies, and news reports. From these sources, a tourist associates distinct symbols with individual countries in their cognitive landscape, much like a map. Just as a traveler in Paris would situate himself in the city by a signpost for the Champs-Élysées, a tourist in Tokyo would look for *kabuki* and geishas to feel that they are truly in Japan. Tourism, then, is based on the collection of preformed signs, as visitors look for typical behavior and typical images. Tourists are the collectors of places.¹

A tourist who finds that the exotic location he wished dearly to visit was just the same as home would find himself thwarted. As Urry states, “If the particular place does not convey appropriate cultural meanings and display memorable visual features, the quality of the specific service may be tarnished.”^{li} The tourist, who goes to great length to leave the familiar and experience the unknown, does not wish to see more of the same. Even viewing the Seoul Olympic Ceremony on television and finding it indistinguishable from Los Angeles’ would diminish its attraction, restricting future impulses to visit South Korea.

Tourism in the last few decades has become the world’s largest industry. National tourism sources compete to advertise the unique individual nature of their countries. As sociologist Tim Edensor asserts, each country tries “to carve out a unique niche that might attract the ‘golden hordes.’”^{lii} To deny the visitor or the viewer the expectations they came

equipped with would be to commit a grave error in a country’s promotion. Despite Malcolm Crick’s assertion that tourism is “a manufactured, trivial, inauthentic way of being, a form of travel emasculated, made safe by commercialism,” the practical effects of such packaging cannot be denied.^{liii} Such attention would be greatly sought by countries with the cultural and historical capital to accomplish the goal of economic growth and international prestige. Thus, one sees that the obstacles facing the East Asian Olympics were, like the events themselves, highly complex. The East Asian Olympiads needed to reconcile the stigma of Orientalism with the need to accommodate the Tourist Gaze, all within the context of navigating political tensions and instability.

JUDO – THE GENTLE WAY

The instantaneous nature of the Olympics Games, during which international attention is extremely focused upon a single city for 16 days, presents both obstacles and opportunities for host countries. Anthropologist Don Handelman asserts that, “information in the modern state commonly is transmitted as images of images, copies of copies.”^{liv} Ideas of tradition are constantly changing, constantly in flux, and cannot be pinned down by those within or those outside a culture. Yet, mega-events and television provide a chance to grasp at these ideas, take hold of them and make them whole, or at least make some version of them whole for public consumption. Handelman goes on to state that media events, in their singular form, can mark turning points in the history of metanarrative.^{lv} The tank man image of Tiananmen Square is still used to illustrate one of the Chinese Communist Party’s worst moments. The increased connectedness of the global community

makes these defining moments all the more important. Regardless of a country's previous history, if it can present its version of culture and history in a persuasive media event, it has the potential to change future dialogue. Through events such as the Olympics, history is, in essence, made. The unknown is made known; culture, tradition, and history are molded into digestible forms.

This capability affords the host countries of the Olympics a great deal of power in the planning of their Games. Indeed, rather than submit to the forces of the Tourist Gaze, a host nation can conform to the gaze and at the same time use it to fulfill its own needs. Mega-events are thus distinct from ordinary tourism, where the controlling powers have relatively little influence over where a tourist wanders, or what a tourist sees. The Olympic Games are truly a packaged, staged phenomenon where the host nation can create the history and culture it wants others to internalize. Indeed, Handelmann acknowledges that, "copies of phenomenon enter domains into which the originals could not go."^{lvi} For the millions of viewers of the Eastern Olympics, what they see in the stadium or on the television screen can become their new ideal of the foreign nation. The Olympic Planning Committees have the chance to create their performed copy for international consumption.

In the staging of the East Asian Games, cultural concepts were sponsored and engineered by the Olympic Planning Committees for a specific purpose. Culture has the ability to circumvent many political and economic public relations thorns. This facility was, in many ways, unique to the East Asian Olympiads. Not only did non-Eastern countries not necessarily desire enhanced political standing, preferring economic gains to international grandeur, but also, in many ways, their cultures were not sufficient

distractions for evading political topics. The primary audience for most Olympic Games centers on the non-Eastern world. For them, seeing the Los Angeles or London Games would be much the same as their own everyday lives, neighbors in a sense both geographically and culturally. The Eastern Olympics could truly present a felt experience of transformation and separation.

The 1972 Munich Games and the 1980 Moscow Games provide useful comparisons with the Tokyo and Seoul Games. At the time, Munich, like Tokyo, faced the tremendous task of proving its complete divorce from its Nazi past. But, the kidnapping and subsequent killing of Israeli athletes on September 5 by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September marred the Games' reputation. Turning to the Official Reports, published in the aftermath of the Olympic Games by their respective Organizing Committee, one sees no attempt by the Munich Committee to avoid the topic of September 5-6, 1972. Political events were acknowledged, though blame was redirected in whatever way possible. In justifying the security system, the Munich Organizing Committee said only that, "these [Olympic Villages] should be no enclosed fortress with walls, barbed wire and watchtowers. There had never been such a completely enclosed village at previous Olympic Games."^{lvii} Similarly, in the Moscow Official Report, the boycott of the Games by the United States and other Western countries was mentioned, but blame was once again diverted to the opposing party. "For no reason at all some Western political leaders and mass media accused the USSR of violating "human rights" and demanded under this pretext that the Games be transferred from Moscow to another place."^{lviii} The non-Eastern Games represented here had no choice but to address these political issues in their self-assessments. Their only

defense was to redirect blame rather than avoid it entirely.

On the other hand, the Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing Official Reports largely ignored the political realities of their time. The Seoul Official Report offered a lengthy discussion of the country and the city's history. Their history seemingly ended with Korea overcoming the tragedies of the Korean War, presenting themselves as martyrs and victims at the hands of the Chinese and Japanese. The recent regime changes received no mention. Indeed, the spotlight commentary on Gwangju as one of the most important cities in South Korea contained no allusion, however subtle, to the massacre of protestors that occurred just a few years prior to the Olympics.

According to the Official Report, the major issues facing Beijing's bid had nothing to do with environmental degradation, human rights concerns, or media oppression. The major challenges for Beijing's bid were: 1) Exceedingly fierce competition, 2) Beijing's yet to be recognized advantages, 3) Difficulty in communicating with IOC members due to new regulations,^{lix} and 4) Weak points in infrastructure and city management.^{lix} The first three points were outside of Beijing's control; they were problems that the outside world placed on the city, not internal challenges. The fourth was shown as easily addressed with the monetary capital and passion of the Chinese people. This conscious selection of detail and omission of international accusations against China followed a trend established in Tokyo and Seoul.

Instead, special attention was paid in the East Asian Official Reports to the unique cultural traditions of Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing. In describing the elaborate stadiums for the Games, the Official Report endeavored to demonstrate how the designs invoked ancient tradition. Budokan Hall, used during the Tokyo

Olympics to house judo, "was constructed along the traditional Japanese architectural lines and is said to have been designed after the form of an ancient temple hall, and together with the stone wall, of the Imperial Palace, presents a unique atmosphere in the surrounding area."^{lxi} The Main Olympic Stadium in Seoul was designed so that its lines followed the curves of a Chosun Dynasty porcelain vase. The swimming pool imitated the iron turtle ships of the 16th century.^{lxii} For Beijing 2008, the Bird's Nest and Water Cube, though designed by international architects, both exhibit very traditional concepts. The two placed side-by-side conform to the principles of *fengshui*, balance and harmony. The round Bird's Nest representing the element of air contrasts with the square Water Cube and its element of water.^{lxiii} (Figure 2)



Figure 2

The Beijing Olympic Committee took the concept of staging spaces even further in the organization of the Olympic Village. Divided into four areas, the Village was configured according to allusions to Chinese tradition. Area A's theme featured the Rosefinch, a God of ancient legend and was designed in the wooden porch classical style of southwestern China. Area B's theme was the *pixiu*, a mythical wild animal said to repel the devil and bring happiness and good fortune. Area C's theme was the double fish, and

was filled with small bridges and running brooks typical of southeastern China. And finally, Area D's theme was the dragon, and was designed along the lines of the white mountains and black water of northeastern China.^{lxiv} Every effort was taken to present a cohesive cultural showing to the athletes in the Village, those most likely to present a believable, positive impression of China to the international community.

Nearly every element of the East Asian Games was coordinated to provide a unifying sense of a cultural Game. During the Tokyo Opening Ceremony, 28.8 kg of chrysanthemum perfume, made from the native Asian flower, were released into the stands to invoke a sense of exoticism.^{lxv} The Committee for the arts programs decided at an early date that only traditional Japanese art works would be included in services and displays. No international participation need take place in the cultural program.^{lxvi} Included amongst these traditional arts were *bugaku* (classic court music), *bunraki* puppet shows (one of the oldest and most tradition-bound arts), *kabuki* and *noh* (famous Japanese dramas), and Japanese painted screens and porcelain dishes. The services provided in the Tokyo Olympic Village included showings of Japanese movies, folk songs and dances, and an international club that taught the basics of such traditions as tea ceremony, *koto*, and calligraphy. (Figure 3)



"Not as easy as it looks"—the Japanese melodious "Koto"

In Seoul, every detail of the torch ceremony from torch design to runner uniforms was designed domestically to reflect South Korea's 5000 year-old cultural traditions.^{lxvii} Accompanying each group of runners were performers who would demonstrate Korean dance and song at each city stop. Red ginseng, considered a distinctly Asian plant known for its uses in alternative medicine, was given its own exhibition hall where visitors received samples and learned about its ancient history.^{lxviii} The twelve cultural posters designed to promote the games featured iconic scenes from Korea's ancient history, and carefully placed artwork in the Olympic stadiums "called for Korea's traditional patterns such as multicolor stripes, hunting scenes and embroidery to be included with a slightly modern interpretation [such as brighter colors and minimalistic designs] to display Korea's true image."^{lxix}

Beijing's staging of the Games also demonstrated a complete adherence to the idea of cultural display. Every element of the Games was tailored to fit some aspect of Chinese tradition. The torch named *xiangyun*, or lucky clouds, was designed to resemble a paper scroll (one of China's great inventions) and sported a millennium-old graphic.^{lxx} At the victory ceremony, winners were presented with jade-inlaid medals, inspired by the *huang*, an ancient Chinese ceremonial jade piece decorated with a double dragon and reed mat pattern.^{lxxi} The logo of the Games was meant to invoke calligraphy and the traditional Chinese seal to transform the character *jing* (capital) into a human figure running through the world with open arms.^{lxxii} The mascots for the Games (collectively known as *fuma*), Beibei (北北) the carp, Jingjing (京京) the panda, Huanhuan (欢欢) the child of fire, Yingying (迎迎) the Tibetan antelope, and

Nini (你你) the swallow, represented Chinese folk art and the concepts of prosperity, happiness, passion, health, and good luck, respectively. (Figure 4) The combination of the characters for their names revealed one of the slogans of the Games, Beijinghuanyingni (北京欢迎你), or Beijing Welcomes You. In addition, these mascots represented traditional Chinese elements of nature (Fire, Earth, Sea, Sky, and Forest), and drew from iconic animals in all of China's minority regions (including the Tibetan antelope).^{lxxiii}



Out of the three countries, China's attempts at reshaping its image were perhaps the most focused and elaborate. The Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony began in the Bird's Nest National Stadium, jumpstarting the 29th Olympic Games on August 8, 2008 at 8:00 PM. In 2001, when the IOC made a preliminary visit to Beijing, officials recommended the cooler, dryer September for the important event.^{lxxiv} Beijing courteously sidestepped this advice, deciding on one of the hottest and most humid months of the year. Throughout the Ceremony, commentators consistently referred to the stifling heat inside the stadium, uncomfortable for the athletes and spectators. (One NBC commentator even noticed that George W. Bush had chosen to take off his suit jacket.) One can surmise that this decision

occurred based on typical cultural lines. Eight (八) is a traditionally auspicious number because of its similar sound to the Chinese word for generating prosperity or wealth (发). Deciding even the date of the Olympics (08/08/08 at 8 PM) proceeded based on culture, tradition, and heritage, a solid marketing point for the Beijing Games and a demonstration of how culture can trump even practicality.

In his work *Inventing Traditions*, Eric Hobsbawm begins a dialogue on the concept of real, original culture; one that he does not believe necessarily exists. Many traditions that purportedly stem from centuries of practice are actually quite recent phenomenon.^{lxxv} Hobsbawm goes further to state that some nations and cultures use “ancient materials to construct Invented Traditions of a novel type for quite novel purposes.”^{lxxvi} In the case of the Tokyo Olympics, “traditional” arts such as the tea ceremony were ripped out of their very specific historical context in order to suit a commercial need. China has also had a long history of very carefully constructing its cultural image. Movies such as *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (2000) and *Hero* (2002) have sparked a fascination with Chinese martial arts and historical films. Director Ang Lee states, “In some ways, we’re all looking for that old, cultural, historical, abstract China—the big dream of China that probably never existed.”^{lxxvii} Through this creation of tradition, which seems an inherently contradictory experience, mega-events can serve to create a space where the official versions of a nation's culture enter into international consciousness.^{lxxviii}

In many ways, culture is chosen rather than inherited.^{lxxix} It can be molded to fit the needs of every generation, as well as to establish a priori a distinct, unified characterization of a nation. Ideas of Englishness, of *Volksgeist* (People's spirit), of *nihonjinron* (the discourse of

being Japanese) come to define and separate an entire group of people from the Other, in the process sometimes delineating “essential” qualities that are foreign to the people themselves.^{lxxx} Yet, these constant attempts to generate ideal images of nationalism are part of history in and of themselves, and pertain closely to the staging of mega-events. Invented traditions quickly became an advantage for the East Asian Olympics. The Olympic Planning Committees understood the power of staging their Games in a way that matched the expectations of the Tourist Gaze and yet demonstrated a type of exoticism that was unique, rather than backward.

Conversely, national tradition and culture were not significant in the creation of the Munich and Moscow Games. Rather than a national approach, these Games took an international approach. The cultural program of the Moscow Games included a special dedication to the German composer Handel.^{lxxxii} The Olympics stadiums in Moscow were built for “efficiency” (perhaps one can say cheaply to avoid huge financial costs).^{lxxxiii} The design section of the Moscow Official Report was relatively short and placed no specific emphasis on demonstrating the cultural heritage of Russia. (In contrast, the corresponding design section of the Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing Olympics occupy a large part of the overall Report.) The only German-centered program commissioned by the German Organizing Committee was entitled “100 Years of German Excavation at Olympia,” in order to demonstrate Germany’s role in bringing the Olympics back to the modern world.^{lxxxiii}

The journalist Richard Mandell covered the Munich Olympics in great detail. After his experience, he made the following assertion on the cultural element of the Games:

“Aicher and Daume, both of them up-to-the-minute Germans of our time, also opposed traditional design elements that might be single-outable as Bavarian or even folk-German in any way. German cosmopolitans now sneer at folksy art. A position paper early in the planning stages of the design department stated that anything “Teutonic” must be shunned. The souvenir *waldis*, the *dirndls* of the hostesses, and some of the grander sports facilities are all monuments to battles that Aicher lost. All the same, one did not find pretzels, beer steins, sausages, cuckoo clocks, or *lederhosen* at the Munich Olympics. All of this and comparable stuff were forbidden to those having access to the communications media.”^{lxxxiv}

In addition to a rejection of lederhosen and cuckoo clocks, the Munich Games had the distinct motivation to avoid culture and tradition because of its inherent, unchanging tie to its political past. Not a hint of red or neoclassical design that could be linked to Nazi Germany dotted the landscape of the Munich Games. In Munich, the overall impression of the Olympic Games was subdued by turning to grey tones. The buildings, rather than rising to monumental heights, instead grew out of the landscape and stayed “at a human level.”^{lxxxv} If one thinks back to the 1936 Berlin Games and the monuments built to showcase Nazi power, one can indeed see that history pushed the buildings down. Unlike the benign cultural traditions of East Asian countries, many non-Eastern countries have cultural histories that, because of their familiarity, offer no

sterile, safe haven from politically charged themes. In many ways, the dialogue of Orientalism presents some small mercy to East Asian countries that can focus on ancient thousand-year histories that depict them more often as victims than as conquerors.

The use of culture also allows East Asian host cities to influence many of the Orientalist stereotypes facing their nations. Rather than feminine and backward, clever manipulation of culture and special attention to staging can gradually change the meaning of “exotic.” Taking away the connotation of stagnant, cultural displays can simultaneously demonstrate modernity and tradition, fulfilling the expectations of the Tourist Gaze, as well as erasing age-old conceptions of weakness. Historian Sandra Collins brings into play the phrase “modern hybridity” to describe the East Asian Olympics, an amalgamation of modernity coupled with ancient culture.^{lxxxvi} The ‘Olympic Campanology’ (bell ringing) that played as Japanese Emperor Hirohito entered the stadium for the Opening Ceremony was a mixture of modern electronic music and cultural resonances.^{lxxxvii} During Seoul’s bid for the 1988 Games, the display in Baden-Baden featured their time-honored culture using advanced slide presentations. Korean Air stewardesses representing one of the most modern and advanced industries in Korea served visitors in traditional Korean costumes.^{lxxxviii} In the promotional video, “Beijing Olympics – One World One Dream,” viewers are shown a progression of images of multicultural athletes in Beijing’s most famous sites (runners crossing the Great Wall, basketball players in Tiananmen Square, a weightlifter in the Forbidden City, tennis players in Beijing’s office districts). The dominant impressions of Beijing presented by this promotional video are of international harmony, fine weather, and the

coexistence of modernity and ancient history. This mix of old and new, existing side by side, came to define East Asian countries, until the very idea of modern exoticism became a dominant trope. The “dialectic which has not yet reached synthesis, a harmony of many voices” has become something that is “utterly unique.”^{lxxxix}

By making distinctions between multiple Olympics, one can establish an “Eastern” model for the Olympics, one whose goals are primarily new international prestige, one whose obstacles are political instability, Orientalism, and the Tourist Gaze, and one that has the distinct advantage of cultural display able to avoid political topics and to enhance modernity. It is important to note that an avoidance of political topics is political in and of itself. Perhaps one can consider the Eastern Olympiads to be pursuing a type of cultural politics, using their ancient traditions as an alibi, as a front. The end goal remains highly politicized.

Judo, a Japanese martial art form created in 1882, translates literally to “The Gentle Way.” A particularly important maxim of the sport, *ju yoku gou o seisu*, means “skilled softness overcomes brawn.”^{xc} In many ways, Judo represents the perfect sports metaphor for the foreign policy technique taken by the East Asian Olympiads. By using their cultural strengths to redirect negative attention rather than using brute force to combat it, Japan, South Korea, and China employed a soft power approach for their own benefit.

EPILOGUE – A DIALOGUE ON CHINA

In his 2004 work, political scientist Joseph Nye asserts that “Asian countries also have impressive potential resources for soft power.”^{xcii} Since their respective

Olympic Games, Japan and South Korea have provided excellent models for China's soft power goals. Today, we see Japan as the land of animation and robots. Scholar Koichi Iwabuchi forwards that Japan's contemporary culture has reached a level of significance capable of threatening the assumed hegemony of American mass culture.^{xcii} Japanese videogames have a worldwide market. Sushi and ramen noodles extend into international households (and arguably most college dorms). South Korea has also managed to achieve cultural prestige without much political attention. Samsung Electronics was the world's largest handset maker in 2012, beating out Apple and Nokia.^{xciii} South Korean pop music has global appeal. (As a rather unorthodox example, take legendary American rapper Snoop Dogg/Lion, who recently stated that Korean pop was his guilty pleasure on blogging website reddit.^{xciv})

But the success of Japan and South Korea in their soft power goals has had several decades to take effect. China, as the most recent contender in the Olympics field, has not yet received the full benefit (if any) of its cultural displays. Several premonitory signs point toward a great increase in China's soft power. Bob Costas, a veteran of eight Winter and Summer Olympic Games stated, "This is the finest Opening Ceremony I have ever seen."^{xcv} And based on recent tourism numbers, China has risen greatly in the international consciousness.^{xcvi}

When Baron Pierre de Coubertin was asked about the Olympics to be held in 1940 in Tokyo, he stated, "I consider the arrival of the Games in Asia a great victory. In terms of Olympism, the only thing international rivalries can be is fruitful. It is good for every country in the world to have the honor of hosting the Games and to celebrate them in their own way, according to the imagination and means of its people."^{xcvii} "...According to

the imagination and means of its people" has truly become an integral motif in the East Asian Games and the Beijing Olympics. The arrival of the Games in Beijing has produced mixed reviews in the short-term. Scholarship, limited by time span and interest, has not yet assessed the long-term impacts of this mega-event. Yet, the words spoken by the Opening Ceremony commentators and the seamless acceleration of tourism all seem to point toward significant gains in China's soft power. Beijing, like its East Asian predecessors, was able to play the "culture card" in hosting the 2008 Olympics, integrating its foreign policy goals into the history and politics of sports.

ⁱ Pierre de Coubertin, *Olympism: Selected Writings* (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2000), 532.

ⁱⁱ "Athens 1896," *Olympic.org*, accessed November 11, 2012, <http://www.olympic.org/athens-1896-summer-olympics>.

ⁱⁱⁱ "London 2012," *Olympic.org*, accessed November 11, 2012, <http://www.olympic.org/london-2012-summer-olympics>.

^{iv} Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture* (London: Routledge, 2000), 10.

^v Maurice Roche, "Mega-events and modernity revisited: globalization and the case of the Olympics," *Sociological Review* (2006): 29.

^{vi} Pierre de Coubertin, *Olympism: Selected Writings* (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2000), 448.

^{vii} "Hope: When Sport Can Change the World," *Olympic Museum*, accessed May 8, 2012, http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic_Museum/Education/DPHOPE/DP_Hope_EN_web.pdf, 3.

^{viii} Limin Liang, "Framing China and the world through the Olympics opening ceremonies, 1984-2008," in *Documenting the Beijing Olympics*, edited by D. Martinez (London: Routledge, 2011), 75.

^{ix} George Orwell, "The Sporting Spirit" quoted in W. Tsutsui, "Introduction," in *The East Asian Olympiads, 1934-2008: building bodies and nations in Japan*,

Korea, and China, edited by W. Tsutsui and M. Baskett (Leiden: Global Oriental, 2011), 8.

^x Paul Close, David Askew, and Xu Xin, *The Beijing Olympiad: The Political Economy of a Sporting Mega-event* (Routledge: New York, NY, 2007).

^{xi} Joshua Kurlantzuk, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World* (Grand Rapids: Yale University Press, 2007), 5.

^{xii} "Olympic Charter," *Olympic.org*, accessed August 12, 2012, http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.

^{xiii} Simon Hart, "London is Fortunate to be Hosting Olympics, says Mayor Boris Johnson," *Daily Telegraph*, accessed November 13, 2008.

^{xiv} Stephen Essex and Brian Chalkley. "Olympic Games: Catalyst of Urban Change," *Leisure Studies* 17 (1998): 204.

^{xv} John R. Gold and Margaret R. Gold, "Introduction," in *Olympics Cities: City Agendas, Planning, and the World's Games, 1896-2016*, edited by John Gold and Margaret Gold (London, UK: Routledge, 2011), 3.

^{xvi} Munich Olympic Organizing Committee, *Die Spiele*. (Munich: pro Sport München, 1972), 324-330.

^{xvii} Gold and Gold, "Introduction," 3.

^{xviii} John R. Gold and Margaret R. Gold, "From A to B: The Summer Olympics, 1896-2008," in *Olympics Cities: City Agendas, Planning, and the World's Games, 1896-2016*, edited by John Gold and Margaret Gold (London: Routledge, 2011), 43.

^{xix} Charles H. Heying, Matthew J. Burbank, and Greg Andranovich, "World Class: Using the Olympics to Shape and Brand the American Metropolis," in *Tourism, Culture, and Regeneration*, edited by Melanie K. Smith (Cambridge: CAB International, 2006), 102.

^{xx} Gold and Gold, "From A to B," 43.

^{xxi} Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 143.

^{xxii} Training for hurdlers is focused on hip flexors, calves, and lower back. Training for sprinters is focused on hamstrings, abdominals, and obliques. See livestrong.com for more athlete spotlights.

^{xxiii} The Japanese Constitution was an American-led, American-drafted endeavor.

^{xxiv} Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970*.

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 133-135.

^{xxv} *Ibid*, 138.

^{xxvi} Manwoo Lee, *The Odyssey of Korean Democracy* (London: Praeger, 1990), 66.

^{xxvii} Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, *South Korea since 1980*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 31.

^{xxviii} Jarrett Wrisley, "Unjust Deserts," *National Geographic*, May 2008.

^{xxix} Ian Cook and Stephen Miles. "Beijing 2008," in *Olympics Cities: City Agendas, Planning, and the World's Games, 1896-2016*, edited by John Gold and Margaret Gold (London: Routledge, 2011), 346.

^{xxx} Can MacMurchy. "Chinese put Prosperity Before Democracy; The Western Push for Speedy Reforms will Fall Mostly on Deaf Ears Here," *The Times*, December 2, 2007.

^{xxxi} John Horne and Garry Whannel, "The 'Caged Torch Procession': Celebrities, Protesters, and the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay in London, Paris and San Francisco," in *Documenting the Beijing Olympics*, edited by Dolores Martinez (London: Routledge, 2011), 19.

^{xxxii} *Ibid*, 20.

^{xxxiii} Said applied his theory primarily to Middle Eastern countries, but he and other scholars have since extrapolated to other countries east of Europe, including Japan, Korea, and China.

^{xxxiv} Edward Said, *Orientalism*. (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 39-40.

^{xxxv} Susan Brownell, *Beijing's Games: What the Olympics Mean to China*. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 24.

^{xxxvi} *Ibid*, 35.

^{xxxvii} Marlon Brando. *Sayonara*. DVD. Directed by Joshua Logan. (United States: Warner Bros, 1957).

^{xxxviii} Cathy Newman, "Kyongju, Where Korea Began," *National Geographic*. August 1988, 265.

^{xxxix} *Ibid*, 267.

^{xl} *Ibid*, 268.

^{xli} Amy Tan, "Village on the Edge of Time," *National Geographic*, May 2008.

^{xlii} *Ibid*.

^{xliii} “Japan,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed May 8, 2012, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html>.

^{xliiv} Jarol B. Manheim, “The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy,” *The Western Political Quarterly* 43 (1990): 281.

^{xlv} Gregory Chow, *China’s Economic Transformation* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 9.

^{xlvi} “China,” *Central Intelligence Agency*, accessed May 8, 2012, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

^{xlvii} David Barboza, “China’s Economy Surges 9.4% in 3rd Quarter,” *New York Times*, October 21, 2005.

^{xlviii} Ye Zicheng, *Inside China’s Grand Strategy: The Perspective from the People’s Republic* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 47.

^{xlix} Urry and Larsen, *The Tourist Gaze*. (London: SAGE Publications, 2011), 1.

^l *Ibid*, 73.

^{li} *Ibid*, 49.

^{lii} Tim Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*. (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 39.

^{liii} Malcolm Crick, “Representations of International Tourism in the Social Science: Sun, Sex, Sights, Savings, and Servility,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18 (1989): 308.

^{liv} Don Handelman, *Models and Mirrors: Towards an Anthropology of Public Events*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 266.

^{lv} *Ibid*, 268.

^{lvi} *Ibid*, 267.

^{lvii} Munich Olympic Organizing Committee, *Die Spiele* (Munich: pro Sport München, 1972), 32.

^{lviii} Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee, *Games of the XXII Olympiad* (Moscow: Fitzkultura Sport Publishers, 1980), 334.

^{lix} These difficulties were not elaborated upon in the official report.

^{lx} Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee, *Bid Documents and Analysis: Passion behind the Bid; Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Volume I* (Beijing, China: LA84 Foundation, 2011), 16.

^{lxi} Tokyo Olympics Organizing Committee, 130.

^{lxii} Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, *Official Report: Organization and Planning Volume 1* (Seoul, Korea: Korea Textbook Co., Ltd., 1989), 162-164.

^{lxiii} John Horne, “Sports Mega-Events and the Shaping of Urban Modernity in East Asia,” in *The East Asian Olympiads, 1934-2008: Building Bodies and Nations in Japan, Korea, and China*, edited by William Tsutsui and Michael Baskett (Leiden: Global Oriental, 2011), 191.

^{lxiv} Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee. *Ceremonies and Competitions*, 213.

^{lxv} Tokyo Olympics Organizing Committee, 227. (It is important to note that the chrysanthemum is also the imperial flower, considered personal property of the Emperor.)

^{lxvi} *Ibid*, 270.

^{lxvii} *Ibid*, 62.

^{lxviii} *Ibid*, 248.

^{lxix} *Ibid*, 656.

^{lxx} Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee, *Bid Documents and Analysis*, 33.

^{lxxi} Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee, *Preparation for the Games: New Beijing Great Olympics; Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Volume III* (Beijing: LA84 Foundation, 2011), 275.

^{lxxii} *Ibid*, 265.

^{lxxiii} *Ibid*, 267.

^{lxxiv} International Olympic Committee, *Report of the IOC Evaluation Commission for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in 2008* (Lausanne, 2001), 59

^{lxxv} Eric Hobsbawm, “Inventing Traditions,” in *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.

^{lxxvi} *Ibid*, 6.

^{lxxvii} *Ibid*, 23.

^{lxxviii} Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity*, 22.

^{lxxix} Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” in *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions in Modern Japan*, edited by Stephen Vlastos (London: University of California Press, 1998), 12.

^{lxxx} Keizo Nagatoni, "Perception gaps: An Introduction," in *Japan and the West: The Perception Gap*, edited by Keizo Nagatoni and David W. Edgington (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 4.

^{lxxxii} Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee, 404.

^{lxxxiii} Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee, 404.

^{lxxxiiii} Munich Olympic Organizing Committee, 240.

^{lxxxv} Richard D. Mandell, *The Olympics of 1972: A Munich Diary* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 155.

^{lxxxvi} Munich Olympic Organizing Committee, 296.

^{lxxxvii} Sandra Collins, "The Fragility of Asian National Identity in the Olympic Games," in *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*, edited by Monroe Price and Daniel Dayan (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 186.

^{lxxxviii} Tokyo Olympics Organizing Committee, 221-222.

^{lxxxix} Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, 40.

^{lxxxix} Greg Sheridan, *Asian Values Western Dreams: Understanding the New Asia* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 215.

^{xc} "Soft Power," *Politics on the Other Side: Opposition in Japan*, accessed on April 8, 2013, <http://oppositioninJapan.blogspot.com/2007/02/soft-power.html>.

^{xc} Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Cambridge: PublicAffairs, 2004), 83.

^{xcii} Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 30.

^{xciii} "Samsung Beats Apple, Nokia as World's Largest Handset Maker," *Fox News*, April 27, 2012.

^{xciv} "I'm Snoop Lion! Ask me Anything!" *Reddit*, accessed April 1, 2013 http://www.reddit.com/r/IAMa/comments/14cb0c/im_snoop_lion_ask_me_anything/.

^{xcv} *Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony*, BBC, August 8, 2008.

^{xcvi} Despite the 2008 economic crisis, numbers of outbound tourists rose from 126,476 in 2009 to 135,423 in 2011, with notable increases amongst travelers from the Americas and Europe. The 2008 annual Fall Travel Trends Survey illustrated a jump of seven spots for Beijing to number 16, and Shanghai rising thirteen spots to number 20 amongst

international destinations. The same year, travel guides by Zagat and Mobil were first released for Beijing in the United States. The World Tourism Organization predicted that China would be the most popular tourism destination in the world by 2015. Source - World Tourism Organization, *Compendium of Tourism Statistics dataset* (Madrid, 2012).

^{xcvii} Coubertin. *Olympism*, 521.

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SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE AND NATIONALITY LAW

Establishment and Future Directions of the Korean Nationality Act in a Comparative Perspective

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ABSTRACT

A nationality law is an outgrowth of the nation's sociopolitical adaptations. Basic principles of nationality laws originated from Europe and were applied into modern nationality laws based on sociopolitical circumstances. This paper will demonstrate how the Korean Nationality Act is an outcome of continuous adjustments to sociopolitical demands in the first half of the twentieth century. It argues that the Act is the product of the Japanese colonial family registry system, the confiscation policy under the US occupation government, and ethnic nationalism movements around the world. A series of revisions on the law relaxed naturalization criteria, but the Act has not caught up with the changing landscape of Korea in the twenty first century. While there has been a significant increase in immigrants, refugees, and North Korean defectors, there has also been a major decrease in the ethnic Korean population. Under the current law, people acquire Korean nationality based on their parental bloodlines. This criterion deprives foreign residents of their basic rights. Furthermore, it reduces the potential number of the economically active Korean population, which pushes Korea towards an economic downturn. By examining the conditions that led to the establishment of the current Korean Nationality Act and highlighting the communal benefits of expanding the

nationalization criteria, this paper argues for broader nationalization criteria that are based on residency.

INTRODUCTION: NATIONALITY LAW, A SOCIOPOLITICAL PRODUCT

The Korean Presidential Transition Committee nominated Kim Jong Hun as Minister of Future Creation and Science in February 2013.¹ However, he resigned his candidacy one month later. The major controversy about this nomination was his foreign nationality. He is a Korean-American who had renounced Korean nationality after immigrating to the US, but recovered Korean nationality when he was nominated for the candidacy. Public opinion was divided. Supporters reasoned that he is ethnically Korean and competent for the position. On the other hand, opponents argued that he was an American citizen until he was nominated, which aroused suspicions that he only changed nationality in order to be in office. They also feared he might make decisions with US interests in mind, because he used to serve as a member of the CIA panel. Although the public did question Kim's intentions and competency for the position, the debate was centered primarily on whether residency or ethnicity determined being "Korean."

Various definitions of who is "Korean" have coexisted and changed over time. The supporters of the

nomination defined Koreans as descendants of ethnic Koreans. The opponents classified Korean as people who acquired Korean nationality through the Korean Nationality Act. However, these seemingly different opinions actually overlap. The Korean Nationality Act legitimatizes Korean nationals through Korean parentage. This criterion was not problematic when the majority of Koreans rarely traveled abroad, as they did in the past. However, globalization has changed this situation. Ethnic Koreans emigrated abroad, and foreigners acquired Korean nationality through naturalization. Thus, Korean nationals may not be ethnic Koreans, and vice versa. The Nationality Act, emphasizing Korean ethnicity, encounters difficulties recognizing and controlling residents, such as North Korean defectors and children of immigrant and refugee families. These stateless residents are left without basic rights. Given the current multi-ethnic demographic in Korea, there are questions regarding the applicability of the Korean Nationality Act, which emphasizes Korean ethnicity.

The Nationality Act's ethnocentric characteristic is a product of Korea's sociopolitical history. The Japanese colonial experience and the United States military occupation in the twentieth century defined its characteristics. The colonial government categorized Koreans by its family registry system. The registry system organized people by family, in which fathers were the heads. After the liberation, the US occupation government used the family registry system to legally differentiate Koreans from Japanese. The government's confiscation policy recovered Korean assets from the Japanese and legalized the family registry system's definition of Korean. The criteria evolved into the Interim Ordinance about Korean Nationality that, in turn, became a

foundation for the first Korean Nationality Act of the Republic of Korea. International ethnic nationalism of the twentieth century was also an important factor. The establishment of other countries' nationality laws is also comparably situational. Japan's pre-existing family registry system led its nationality law to emphasize parental bloodlines, and France's nationality law shifted back and forth between different principles to accommodate its shifting sociopolitical needs over time. Germany responded to immigrants' demands and so allowed them to acquire German nationality based on residency. Different nationality laws are established upon a series of adaptations to sociopolitical situations, so they are inherently adjustable.

Countries have adjusted their nationality laws by changing their nationality principles according to a spectrum with *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* at its ends. *Jus sanguinis* is a criterion of defining nationality which originates back to ancient Roman law. It literally means "law of blood," meaning that individuals acquire their nationality through their parental blood line. According to the Roman law, people were categorized as either slaves or free people. John Crook explicates that "free people are either free by birth, *ingenui*, or free by grant of freedom from slavery, 'freedmen', *libertine*." What distinguished people was their free status, and people inherited the free status from their parents.ⁱⁱ *Jus sanguinis* originated from this practice of succeeding the free status through parental bloodlines.

The counterpart to *jus sanguinis* is *jus soli*, which originated from the medieval European concept of *ligeance*. It literally means "law of soil," individuals acquire their nationality based on their place of birth. Kwon Young Sol finds the origin of this principle in the feudalism of

medieval Europe.ⁱⁱⁱ Myoung Soon Koo, Lee Chul Woo, and Kim Kee Chang provide a specific example that captures the birth of this principle: in medieval England, heirs needed proof of their right to inherit. A new law was introduced, and people even of foreign birth who were loyal to the king could exercise a right to inherit.^{iv} A place of birth became an issue in this legal case, and it shows the emergence of legal rights attached to the birth place and the origin of *jus soli*. *Jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* evolved and were applied into nationality laws. Countries established their nationality laws based on these principles and continuously adjusted to changing demand.

This paper will focus on the establishment and future direction of the Korean Nationality Act in the context of Korea's internal and external sociopolitical changes. Myoung, Lee, and Kim previously explicated the development and future of the Nationality Act, focusing on its legal aspects.^v This paper expands their legal analysis to sociopolitical aspects. Sociopolitical aspects from the Japanese colonial period to the Republic of Korea are examined. The examination further expands its scope to other countries' cases. The paper analyzes French, German, and Japanese nationality laws from the origins of nationality principles to the emergence of the nation-state and national identity, and finally the creation of nationality law. This comparative view enables the paper to explore whether Korea has unique aspects or shares common ground with other countries. Connections and mutual influences among different countries become clear in this comparative narrative. It further aims to uncover a sequential linkage between Europe and Japan and Korea. This paper also analyses the suitability of the Korean Nationality Act in its present state. Choi Kyeong Ok, criticized that immigrant families lack

basic rights within the Korean legal system.^{vi} New revisions of the Nationality Act can better protect rights of immigrant and refugee families and North Korean defectors as well as boosting the decreasing Korean population. This paper will study the relationship between sociopolitical factors and the establishment of the Korean Nationality Act in order to propose new revisions to the Nationality Act to effectively solve current problems in Korea.

PART ONE: EMERGENCE OF NATION-STATE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALITY LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Emergence of State Polity and National Identity

At first, a nationality law was the byproduct of nation-state building in the nineteenth century. Myoung, Lee, and Kim claim that the medieval concept of allegiance created a new legal discourse by adopting an ecclesiastical idea.^{vii} The Church insisted that the believers were connected to Jesus Christ through faith, and believer had constructed the Church as the mystic body. This concept was adopted as the people, living within the King's sovereign, were connected to the king through the law. This relationship created a new bond and equality among the subjects of the king. Myoung, Lee, and Kim insist that this new sense of equal status evolved into the French Revolution that upheld liberty, equality, and benevolence. The eighteenth century jurist, William Blackstone, claimed that "the first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural born subjects."^{viii} The division between the free people and the bondservants was transformed into the division between foreigners and citizens, and this new

discourse evolved into the creation of the modern nation.

Prior to the formation of modern nations, European states replaced the medieval kingdoms and emerged as a dominant polity in the nineteenth century. State as a polity had actually existed since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as empires, cities, and states. However, Italian cities shrank at the end of the eighteenth century, and the Holy Roman Empire also disassembled in 1806. State was eventually left as the dominant type of polity by the nineteenth century. John Lie argues that the state polity could survive the power battle among various polities because it merged people into one identity. Capitalist industrialization started in the 18th century and increased the size and duration of wars among polities. To win the wars, the polities needed more war supplies and soldiers than before. Consolidation of people intensified and expanded the states' rules and allowed the states to promote taxation and conscription. It strengthened their war-making capacity and enabled the state polity to win the competitions among diverse polity.^x The states amalgamated cities and kingdoms then started to reorganize the European politics as the interstate political structure since the nineteenth century.^x

In the process of developing a nation-state polity, a primitive sense of community evolved to a more mature idea of national identity. This change exploded in the French Revolution in 1789. An owner of the sovereignty changed from the king to the people, and the absolutist state transformed into the nation-state. The Revolution's mottos, such as liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty, spread across Europe. Popular democracy and nationalism swept the nineteenth century Europe. People gathered around the nation, and this national community reserved equal rights to the members. On

the other hand, this unity also functioned to exclude people who were not members of the nation. This exclusivity enhanced the sense of belonging and the national identity among the members. Lie claims that "all infra-national attachments became appropriated in the name of the collectivity."^{xi} Local attachments and loyalties transposed on the national identity. The national identity was a continuation of family lineage or village identities, which expanded into national identity.^{xii} The strengthened national unity consolidated local identities and transformed them to the national identity.

Establishment of Nationality Law: France, Germany, and Japan

This rise of national identity enhanced the exclusivity of the nation and created a problem with determining membership. Each nation-state flexibly decided its nationality principle according to a spectrum with *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* at opposite ends, depending on its needs and conditions. In France's case, its decision shifted back and forth between the two principles before, during, and after the Napoleonic regime. France's nationality law is generally considered to be a representative case of *jus soli*. However, Patrick Weil insists that the France Nationality Act had adopted *jus sanguinis*, and the French Revolution was one reason. The French society was exceedingly unstable as the Revolution became extremely aggressive and radical. People felt insecure and found it increasingly difficult to trust each other. This anxiety targeted foreigners. The 1793 Constitution expressed strong distrust against foreigners and imprisoned some of them. The French Civil Codes, under Napoleon in 1804, adopted *jus sanguinis* to consolidate the nation against foreigners. This acted to stabilize the society. However, a large number of

immigration into the border areas created new problems since 1851. For instance, a French man had the duty to serve 8 years of military obligation but a foreigner only enjoyed advantages of staying in France but did not perform this duty. To solve this kind of immigrant issues, *jus soli* replaced *jus sanguinis* in the French Nationality Act of 1889.^{xiii}

France further adjusted its nationality principle and Nationality Act several times in the twentieth century, because, while their native population decreased, their immigrant population increased dramatically. France needed immigrants to supplement its population decrease after World War I. The 1927 Nationality Act alleviated requirements for naturalization to be more inclusive of immigrants. However, the influx of immigrants exploded after World War II and created anti-immigrants sentiments. This demand pushed the French government to revise the Nationality Act and to restrict immigrants in 1993. Myoung, Lee, and Kim argue that the 1993 revision was a significant change to adopt a different nationality principle, *jus domicile*.^{xiv} This principle literally means law of residence. Children of foreign parents are no longer able to automatically acquire the French nationality by being born in France. These children are required to vow when they were between 16 and 21 years old if they want to acquire the French nationality. As we can see, the French Nationality Act is a product of practical adaptations to changing situations.

The Napoleonic regime influenced not only France. The Napoleonic Wars motivated Germany to establish a nationality act based on *jus sanguinis* in 1870 and the German Empire in 1871. The German Empire was derived from the Holy Roman Empire. Lie claims that the Holy Roman Empire loosely incorporated over hundred states and

nearly fifteen hundred lordships that were linguistically and culturally diverse. The Napoleonic Wars disassembled the Holy Roman Empire and created anti-French sentiments among these people. This change triggered diverse peoples to unify as the German nation and to establish the German Empire. The resistance and antagonism against foreign forces created the German consciousness. An idea of the great German ethnicity as a cultural unity emerged.^{xv} The first German Nationality Act was based on law of blood to promote German ethnicity. The Nationality Act was designed to support this ethnic identity and to help it evolve it into an ethnic nationalism based on German supremacy. Multiple revisions during Nazi Germany created the increasingly exclusive Nationality Act. The German Nationality Act became the representative case of *jus sanguinis* under these circumstances.

However, Germans faced internal and external pressure to revise their Nationality Act and to make it more inclusive of other ethnicities after World War II. Ethnic nationalism was internationally prevalent after WWII, but Germany was exceptional. Lee Yong Il insists that ethnic nationalism could not reemerge in Germany because of traumatic experiences from extreme ethnic nationalism during the war. Nazi massacres of other ethnicities based on German supremacy and their defeat in the war practically prohibited the reemergence of ethnic nationalism. Public opinions to openness grew positive. The Nationality Act was revised to newly allow multiple nationalities, renunciation of the German nationality, and naturalization by marriage. Further revisions aimed to be more inclusive. A large number of Turkish immigrated in 1960s, and the German population continued to decrease. Most significantly, the German reunification in 1990 catalyzed change.^{xvi} Finally, the

Nationality Act largely adjusted its *jus sanguinis* principle and limitedly adopted *jus soli* in 2000. Children of foreigners could acquire the German nationality if their parents fulfill certain residential requirements. After World War II as a turning point, the Nationality Act no longer adheres to *jus sanguinis*. The formation of the German nationality act and its principles reveal how it adapted pragmatically to political demands of the time.

This tendency is not only observed in the case of European countries. Asian countries also adopted the nation-state polity to enter the international political order. Japan was a vanguard of the emergence of the nation-state in Asia. Japan communication with the West increased during the Tokugawa period, and full-fledged nation-state building started in the Meiji period.^{xvii} The Japanese reformers wanted to reorganize the country as a nation-state to modernize the country and be competitive in the international politics. Andrew Gordon argues that the Meiji reformers first used the Meiji Emperor to establish a state polity and gather people as one nation. Previously, an emperor had not been the center of the Japanese politics.^{xviii} A military ruler, Shogun, used to reside in Edo, now known as Tokyo, and rule the country. The Daimyo divided other areas into domains which were ruled autonomously. The daimyo were under control of the Shogun but still maintained relative independence. The reformers reorganized this political structure to establish a modern state. The Emperor replaced the Shogun, and a central state directly governed the domains that were turned into prefectures. The reform also eliminated the samurai status system in August 1871, and people gathered as equal members of the Japanese nation. This idea of the Japanese nation introduced the shared traditions, language, and ancestors

among the people who previously did not have this sense of identity. Takashi Fujitani insists that the emperor as the symbol of the Japanese nation-state and Shinto as the representation of the Japanese spirit are inventions from this nation-state building.^{xix} The Meiji reformers tried to eliminate feudalistic characteristics and to implement a modern nation-state polity.

The reformers also modernized Japan's legal system. The first Japanese Nationality Act was established in 1899. The Nationality Act adopted the pre-war German Nationality Act and its *jus sanguinis* principle. Law of blood was applicable to Japan's own family registry system and created an image of the Japanese nation-state as a family. According to Yim Kyung Taek, Ito Hirobumi first introduced the concept of *jus sanguinis* in Japan in 1882. After listening to German jurist Isaac Albert Mosse's lecture about the German and the British nationality laws, he hired this German jurist to modernize Japan's legal system in 1886.^{xx} In addition to this German influence, the Japanese Nationality Act was based on *jus sanguinis* because it was applicable to Japan's pre-modern family registry system.^{xxi} The family registry system organized people by family. A father was the head of a family, and rest of the family members were listed under the father. This system clarified an individual's status and hierarchically organized Japanese society. *Jus sanguinis* of the Nationality Act legalized this system and created a new image of the Japanese family nation-state. The reformers insisted that while people belonged to a family in which the fathers were the heads, the family was part of the larger Japanese family in which the Emperor was the head.^{xxii} The family registry system, combined with the Nationality Act, continuously played an important role in defining who the

Japanese were. The Japanese nation-state became one giant family of the Emperor, as the descendant of the eternal blood line.

PART TWO: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOREAN NATIONALITY ACT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Japanese Colonial Period (1910 ~ 1945): Family Registry System

Members of the Japanese family nation were not limited to people in its islands. The “family” included colonized people. Japan built up a colonial empire, and the Japanese Nationality Act of 1899 recognized the colonized as Japanese nationals. Japan first appropriated Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Leaving Asia ideology for its colonial ambition.^{xxiii} Fukuzawa wrote a newspaper article, titled *On Leaving Asia*, in 1885, articulating that since other Asian countries were not capable of modernizing themselves, Japan had a responsibility to do so for them. The Japanese government developed his ideology into the idea of Pan-Asian solidarity, which asserted that Asian countries needed to unite against the Western forces. The role of Japan was to protect Asia and tutor other countries.^{xxiv} Under this political agenda, Japan first seized Ezochi, an island located at the South to Sakhalin. Russia and Japan competed to take over the island, so Japan occupied the Southern part and Russia took the Northern part in 1855. Ezochi became Hokkaido prefecture. Japan also subjugated most of the Ryukyu Islands as Okinawa prefecture in 1879. When the first Nationality Act was established in 1899, it recognized Ezochi’s indigenous people, Ainu, and the native Ryukyuan as Japanese nationals. The Japanese expansion went further. Japan won the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and colonized Taiwan.^{xxv} Korea was also colonized in

1910.^{xxvi} Kim Bum Soo claims that the colonized Taiwanese and the Koreans were legally Japanese nationals, just as the native Japanese were, under the Japanese Nationality Act.^{xxvii} The Empire of Japan ruled over a large part of Asia, and the Nationality Act recognized the colonized as Japanese nationals and therefore members of the multiethnic Japanese family empire.

However, the family registry system kept the colonized separate from the native Japanese. The native Japanese, including the Ryukyu people and Ainu, the Taiwanese, and the Koreans had their names in different family registries. The colonial government used this registry system to distinguish the native Japanese as *naichi jin* and the colonized as *gaichi jin*. *Naichi jin* literally means insiders, and *gaichi jin*, outsiders. Kim insists that this differentiation resulted in discrimination. *Gaichi jin* could not exercise their rights to vote or fill a government post. While the Nationality Act held people as the same Japanese nationals, the family registry system categorized the people as outsiders.

Under colonial rule, Koreans experienced the modern nationality system for the first time, which influenced how they constructed the first Korean Nationality Act after liberation. Japan colonized Korea while Korea was in its beginning phase of modernization, so Korea’s first experience of the modern nationality system was in acquiring Japanese nationality. The practice of the family registry system founded a criterion for what “Korean” was, and the first Korean Nationality Act borrowed its legal format from the Japanese Nationality Act. The ethno-centric and patriarchal aspects of the Korean family registry evolved into the *jus sanguinis* principle of the Korean Nationality Act. The experiences of the family registry system and the Japanese nationality law largely influenced the

adoption of *jus sanguinis* in the first Korean Nationality.

United States Military Occupation (1945 ~ 1948): Interim Ordinance about Korean Nationality

The United States' military occupation government arrived in Korea after Japanese colonial rule ended in August 1945 with Japan's surrender in WWII. Amid the Cold War, the US came to govern the southern half of the Korean peninsula. For Koreans, August 15th, 1945 was the first day of developing a sovereign modern nation-state. Various opinions arose on how to build sovereign Korea. Koreans established innumerable political organizations that were divided into right and left. This distinction coincided with the Cold War. The rightists supported Capitalism, and the leftists upheld Communism. According to Bruce Cumings, the leftists had a stronger voice than the rightists. Many anti-colonial nationalists participated in the leftist movement, and they had well-organized bases at the provincial level. The leftists' aims to strictly punish colonial collaborators and establish a socialistic Korea attracted the public.^{xxviii} This circumstance threatened the pro-capitalistic United States, so the US government came in to support the rightists. The international struggle of the Cold War led to the establishment of the Soviet Union occupation government in the northern half of the peninsula in August 1945, and of the US occupation government in the southern half below the 38th parallel on September 20th, 1945.

The occupation government imposed new policies and laws to manage departing Japanese and returning Koreans. Confiscation was one of the most urgent issues to prevent the drain of Korean assets by the leaving Japanese. The government tried to recover Korean assets from the Japanese and to return them to the government's treasury. First,

the occupation government promulgated the Act of U.S. Military Administration on September 25th to prohibit Japanese economic activity in Korea.^{xxxix} In order to do so, the government first needed to distinguish the Japanese from the Koreans. Kim Soo Ja explicates that the occupation government required Japanese nationals in Korea to register at local offices near their residences. They could not travel farther than 10 km from their residences without permission from the local police. In the case of Koreans, they recovered their original Korean names.^{xxx} The colonial rule had forced Koreans to change their Korean names to Japanese names.^{xxxi} The recovery of Korean names made it easier to differentiate Koreans from Japanese. The government tried to recognize native Japanese and forced them to return Korean assets and to eventually leave.^{xxxii}

The occupation government also utilized the colonial family registry system to recover Korean assets.^{xxxiii} Having names in the Korean family registry became a standard to determine who Koreans were.^{xxxiv} However, this process revealed a limitation. Myoung, Lee, and Kim point out that some Koreans did not have their names in the registry. For example, Sin Chae Ho was exiled to Russia before the Japanese annexation in August 1910 and so did not have his name in the registry, and he died before the liberation.^{xxxv} In such a case, the government could not recognize him as a Korean by the registry. Thus, the family registry system was not enough to fully determine who Koreans were.

The occupation government requested the South Korean Interim Legislative Committee to formulate a Korean nationality law in September 1947. Many of the Committee members were rightists, so the Interim Ordinance about Korean Nationality adopted the Japanese Nationality Act and generously included

colonial-era collaborators. The government established the Committee in December 1946 when the Joint Soviet-American Commission was indefinitely postponed in May.^{xxxvi} The Committee adopted the Japanese Nationality Act and drafted the Interim Ordinance in a short period; the Committee had only two hearings within two months and approved a draft on March 19th, 1948. The draft contained only 6 articles. The Committee members mostly consented on the draft, but Article 5, which was about recovering Korean nationality, turned out to be controversial. The subject of Article 5 was native Koreans who had acquired foreign nationality or listed their names in the Japanese family registry before August 9th, 1945.^{xxxvii} Article 5 generously allowed them to recover Korean nationality if they discarded their foreign nationality or removed their names from the Japanese family registry before this Interim Ordinance was enforced.^{xxxviii} Controversy arose. At the second hearing on February 6th, 1948, Hwang Bo Ik argued,

Some people became sons-in-law of the Japanese and took advantage of Japanese rule. They are now Japanese so cannot come back. What about their properties? I heard of a man who has a large property in Seoul. He has been lobbying to recover Korean nationality to avoid confiscation...In the case of the Japanese or Japanese collaborators, we should establish a certain procedure to prevent them from recovering Korean nationality...if we do not prevent, it will severely harm our national justice.^{xxxix}

Hwang's statement reveals that colonial-era collaborators tried to recover their Korean nationality to avoid confiscation

after liberation. Hwang and others strongly criticized Article 5 as a mean to accommodate the interests of collaborators. Nevertheless, Article 5 eventually remained. Kim Young Mi suggests that a reason was the high proportion of rightists among the Committee members.^{xl} Many of those rightist members had connections with Japanese, so they were relatively reluctant to eliminate the Japanese collaborators.

Republic of Korea (1948 ~ Present): Korean Nationality Act

Several weeks before the Interim Ordinance's enforcement, South Korea established the Constitutional Assembly on May 31st, 1948. The Interim Ordinance was not actually enforced, but the Assembly developed the first Korean Nationality Act based on it. The Legislative and Judiciary Committee created a draft, and the Assembly discussed and finalized the draft in four sessions. The first hearing took place at the 118th session on December 1st, 1948, and the second hearing followed in the 119th and 120th sessions during the following two days. A report on modifying the wording at the 121st session finalized the draft on the following day. The Constitutional Assembly promulgated the Nationality Act on December 11st. The Korean Nationality Act was developed from the Interim Ordinance and so was built from its major concepts.

The Nationality Act was based on the three principles of *jus sanguinis*, singular nationality, and avoiding statelessness. The Minister of Justice, Lee In, clarified these principles at the beginning of the first hearing.

The first principle of the Nationality Act is that people should be able to acquire Korean

nationality through their paternal lines. We are a single ethnic nation not like other nations, which are mixed, with multiple ethnicities. People should acquire Korean nationality through their paternal lines, so we can preserve our single ethnicity. The next principle is that a Korean national should not possess another citizenship. Moreover, an individual should not be left stateless. Avoiding dual nationality and statelessness is not only applied to Korea, but it has been commonly exercised throughout the world.^{xii}

Lee proposed *jus sanguinis* as the prior principle of the Nationality Act in this remark. People could acquire Korean nationality through fathers who were Korean nationals. Later in the session, he additionally acknowledged applying *jus soli* in a very limited way. He emphasized that *jus sanguinis* was the major principle to “preserve” Korean single ethnicity from getting mixed with other ethnicities. Lee predicated his argument upon the idea that Korea is a single ethnic nation-state. Thus, the Nationality Act was based to a significant degree on *jus sanguinis*.

As Lee declared, *Jus sanguinis* and singular nationality were to uphold the ideal of a Korean single ethnic identity. The Assembly members invoked the name of Tan’gun to emphasize this single ethnicity. During the second hearing, Park Yun Won opposed Item 1 of Article 3.^{xliii} Item 1 defined that a foreign wife of a Korean national could acquire Korean nationality. Park claimed that legitimatizing naturalization simply through marriage could possibly taint and threaten the purity of the Korean ethnicity that could be traced back to Tan’gun.^{xliiii} As Andre Schmid explains, Tan’gun refers to an age-old myth about the progenitor of the Koreans who binds them all into a

single ethnic family as his descendants. The Tangi, the Tan’gun calendar, dates his descent from heaven in 2333 B.C. and interprets Korean history as if it were a family genealogy. Scholars such as Yi Ik appropriated this mythical figure to challenge the Sino-centric ideology in the seventeenth century, and the nationalist use of Tan’gun only increased after the Japanese invasion.^{xliiv} Thus, when Park disagreed with allowing a foreign national to become a Korean national, he based his argument on the significance of protecting the pure Korean ethnicity descended from Tan’gun. He referred to Korea as the community of Tan’gun’s descendants. The concept of a single ethnicity served as one of the major arguments to claim Korean sovereignty after liberation and to define who Koreans were.

Upholding the single and authentic ethnicity was an international phenomenon of ethnic nationalism in the twentieth century.^{xliiv} The Assembly members often compared the Korean Nationality Act to other countries’ nationality laws. During the first hearing, Na Yong Gyun explained that the Japanese Nationality Act and European nationality laws largely influenced the draft of the Korean Nationality Act.^{xlivi} The *jus sanguinis* principle of the draft was predicated on other countries’ nationality laws. Many Assembly members insisted that upholding Korean ethnicity corresponded to global demands of the twentieth century. An Assembly member, Kim Myung Dong, asserted that every nation was trying to protect its pure ethnicity, and Item 1 of Article 3 would ruin the Korean pride of having maintained a single ethnicity for 5,000 years.^{xliivii} Lee Suk Ju also agreed that the single ethnic identity was Korea’s pride and made the culture more competitive in the world.^{xliiii} Emphasizing the Korean single ethnicity was a way to keep pace

with the global phenomenon and achieve recognition as a sovereign nation-state.

This single ethnic identity also replaced the idea of the multiethnic family empire in post-war Japan. Ethnic nationalism became dominant after Japan was defeated in World War II. Yim Kyung Taek argues that the Japanese government did not need to promote the idea of the multiethnic family empire anymore. Japan lost its colonies, so other ethnicities dramatically decreased among the Japanese nationals. Discourse on a peaceful single ethnic nation-state replaced the idea of the military multiethnic empire. The postwar Japanese Nationality Act defined people from former colonies as foreigners according to Treaty of Peace with Japan in September 1951.^{xlix} The Nationality Act newly defined Japanese-ness to consolidate people as the single ethnic nation and to stabilize the chaotic post-war society.

Western countries also used ethnic nationalism for political purposes. Woodrow Wilson insisted on self-determination of people, and Russia also advocated the idea. In the 119th session of the Constitutional Assembly, Seo Yong Gil complained that Korea had not yet achieved Woodrow Wilson's idea of self-determination.¹ Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the United States, declared that "people may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent."^{li} Self-determination was the idea that people could be ruled only when the people agreed on the rule. This term acknowledged the people as a political unit that held their sovereignty against external compulsions. A community of people was the main agent of sovereignty, and so the solidarity of the people was decisive to the fate of a nation-state. Ethnic nationalism utilized the idea of ethnicity to consolidate people as one community. In Russia's case, ethnic nationalism surged after Germany invaded

the Soviet Union in June 1941. Mikhail Agursky insists that Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, actually used the idea of Russian ethnicity rather than the Marxist ideology to unite the country.^{lii} The twentieth century countries politically utilized ethnic nationalism to consolidate their people and to develop sovereign nation-states.

The Korean Nationality Act was continuously revised later on, but the *jus sanguinis* principle remained. The 1962, 1963, and 1976 revisions relaxed naturalization and reinstatement rules. The revisions specified preconditions of naturalization, allowed the naturalized to take public posts, and simplified reinstatement procedures in order. The first revision took place on November 21st, 1962. The revision specified preliminary conditions for naturalization. These articles had strictly required foreigners to lose foreign nationality acquiring Korean nationality to prevent dual nationality.^{liii} The 1962 revision relaxed this restriction and allowed a 6 month grace period to lose the previous nationality. Revised articles stated that foreigners could acquire Korea nationality if they were stateless and had lost their foreign nationality 6 months prior to the acquisition of Korean nationality.^{liv} In addition, people with foreign addresses became able to reinstate Korean nationality.^{lv} The revision on September 30th, 1963 eliminated a discriminatory factor to the naturalized. A wife and offspring of a naturalized Korean became able to take a public post.^{lvi} The revision on December 22nd, 1976 simplified administrative procedures for requesting the reinstatement of Korean nationality.^{lvii} These three changes revised the Nationality Act to more tolerant of naturalization and reinstatement.

The first major change took place in the 1997 revision. Firstly, the improved social status of women pressured the

elimination of gender-discriminatory factors from the 1948 Nationality Act. In 1990s, well-educated and economically independent women increased in Korean society. Equal rights for women became an important social issue. The Korean National Assembly ratified the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1984, and the male-centered Nationality Act became controversial. Many civil organizations and women's rights organizations fought to change the 1948 Nationality Act that defined the father as the only legitimate person to legalize his offspring's Korean nationality.^{lxviii} The revision of December 13th, 1997 finally eliminated the gender discriminatory characteristic and permitted children of Korean mothers to also acquire Korean nationality.^{lix} The Constitutional Court later ruled that acquiring Korean nationality only through a Korean father, not mother, was discriminatory and unconstitutional in 2000.^{lx} Furthermore, discrimination against daughters was also abolished. There were cases that some children of Korean parents acquired Korean nationality after they grew up. In this situation, a daughter had been unable to acquire Korean nationality if she had a foreign husband.^{lxi} However, the 1997 revision also removed this regulation. 1990s' civil demand for gender equality significantly reshaped the Nationality Act.

Five revisions from 2001 to 2008 were also adjustments that reflected the changing society. An increased demand for naturalization in the 2000s led the 2001 and 2004 revisions to further alleviate naturalization rules. The revision on December 19th, 2001 was a follow-up measure for the previous revision. The 1997 revision allowed a child of a Korean mother to acquire Korean nationality, and this change was retrospectively applicable to a child born within 10 years prior to the

revision was enforced.^{lxii} However, the Korean Constitutional Court's decision in 2000 declared that the 10-year limitation was discriminatory. The limitation was expanded to 20 years in 2001 because adults, defined as people over 20 years old, were eligible to autonomously go through the naturalization process.^{lxiii} The revision of January 20th, 2004, created a rules to protect foreigners who failed in naturalization. According to the new rules, foreigners could acquire Korean nationality if they had failed naturalization because their Korean spouses had died or been missing. A foreigner who had an under-aged child from marriage with a Korean became also eligible for naturalization.^{lxiv} These revisions in 2001 and 2004 aimed to diminish discrimination and to protect rights of the growing number of foreign spouses and children.

On the other hand, demands to preserve "Koreanness" arose in the increasingly globalizing environment. The revisions of 2005, 2007, and 2008 were efforts to protect Korean identity. The revision of 2005 restricted renunciation of Korean nationality, in order to prevent the so-called "Birth Tours" which had become a social phenomenon. Some pregnant women flew to foreign countries that provided citizenships based on place of birth. Their babies obtained foreign citizenships which enabled them to avoid the mandatory military service in Korea. The revision also forbade a man to renounce Korean nationality if he was considered to have obtained his foreign citizenship without the purpose of residence. He would be able to renounce citizenship if he fulfilled or was no longer obliged to fulfill the military duty.^{lxv} It was an effort to stop a brain drain and to dispel public resentment of rich men avoiding the military service. The Family Registry Act was also abolished on May 17th, 2007. The Family Registry Act came

from the Japanese colonial rule, so the revision removed this colonial heritage. This nationalistic tendency continued to the revision on March 14th, 2008. The revision translated classical Chinese characters of law books into Korean. Legal jargons, written in Classical Chinese characters, were translated into simpler Korean words and sentences. These translations were to promote the use of Korean in official documents.^{lxvi} These revisions reflect Korea's attempt to strengthen the Korean identity within a rapidly globalizing nation.

However, the most recent change embraced globalization. The second major change took place on May 4th, 2010. The increased number of emigrants overturned the previously held singular nationality principle and allowed for multiple nationalities to be held simultaneously. The Nationality Act had required Korean nationals with foreign citizenships to abandon the citizenships when they become legal adults in order to maintain Korean nationality. However, the revision in 2010 limitedly allowed for multiple nationalities in 2010. It introduced a new term, "multiple nationality", to replace "dual nationality."^{lxvii} "Multiple nationality" indicates more than two nationalities and so implies greater inclusivity than dual nationality. Korean nationals do not have to abandon their foreign citizenships in order to maintain Korean nationality. Rather than abandoning other citizenships, the revision asked them to pledge not to wield their rights as foreign citizens in Korea.^{lxviii} The revised Nationality Act recognized them as Korean nationals in the territory of Korea, so foreign citizens' rights and duties were not applicable to them in Korea. This revision was a big shift that responded to the globalizing Korean and international environments. More children are born abroad and obtain foreign citizenships than ever before, and so

requiring them to abandon foreign citizenships causes the brain drain and the loss of Korean nationals. Allowing multiple nationalities is not a choice but necessity.

PART THREE: LIMITATIONS OF THE KOREAN NATIONALITY ACT IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

Increased Stateless Residents and Lack of Basic Rights

Allowing multiple nationalities was an effort to adjust the Nationality Act to the highly globalized Korean society in the twenty first century. The number of immigrants surged in Korea since 1990s. According to the Korean Ministry of Justice, the number of immigrants in Korea was around 50,000 in 1990 and arose to 95,778 in 1994. This population dramatically increased in the twenty first century. The 1997 revision was one of the major reasons. The revision significantly alleviated regulations for naturalization and reinstatement of Korean nationality.^{lxix} The number of immigrants grew to 1,066,273 in 2007 and 1,422,575 by January 2013. This change led to the diversity of the ethnic makeup of residents in Korea. People came to Korea from more than 40 countries in 2008 and from 136 countries by December 2012. The number of countries grew three times in four years. A series of revisions to relax naturalization rules were specifically related to the increase of marriage immigrants. The number of marriage immigrants increased to approximately 110,000 in 2008 and 147,591 by December 2012. The largest sending country was Vietnam followed by China, Japan, the Philippines, Cambodia, the US, Thailand, Mongol, and Uzbekistan in order.^{lsx} The diversity and number of marriage immigrants significantly increased, creating new social demands.

The Korean Ministry of Gender Equality and Family proposed the Support for Multicultural Families Act in 2008. This Multicultural Families Act for the first time legally recognized this population as multicultural families. A multicultural family was created by a marriage between a Korean national and a naturalized or foreign individual.^{lxxi} The enforcement of this Multicultural Families Act in 2013 was an effort to accommodate the growing foreign population's needs.

Notwithstanding these changes, the *jus sanguinis* principle of the Korean Nationality Act majorly excludes and marginalizes the immigrants. Many Korea-born children of unregistered immigrants are especially left stateless and discriminated against because of their parental status. Many of them drop out school. The Multicultural Families Act leaves out a large number of foreign residents. Its definition of multicultural family does not include immigrant worker families, many of which have worked in Korea for a long time. The Multicultural Families Act, which purpose is to protect the foreign population, excludes these immigrants. Children of unregistered immigrants are especially neglected because of their parental status. The number of unregistered immigrants was 178,233 by January 2013.^{lxxii} Choi Kyeong Ok argues that a large number of children, who were born in Korea from unregistered immigrant parents, are left stateless. The Korean government is neglecting the fact that these children unconditionally deserve fundamental rights. Because their parents are afraid of being deported, children are not able to continue their education, feeling alienated and insecure. The basis of the Nationality Act on *jus sanguinis* is hinders legal protection for stateless children.^{lxxiii} All children deserve legal protection regardless of their parental status.

Another neglected foreign population is the refugees in Korea. Many children of the refugee families are left stateless because they are not able to acquire any nationality from their parents' countries or Korea. The stateless children are deprived of basic rights. Korea joined the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1992. This is an international convention that sets out rights of refugees and the responsibilities of nation-states to grant asylum and protect human rights of refugees.^{lxxiv} The Korean government granted asylum for the first time in 2001, and the first refugee, who acquired Korean nationality, appeared 10 years later in March 2010. The Displaced Persons Act was enforced from July 1st, 2013 to protect rights of the refugees. Nevertheless, the Displaced Act remains to marginalize children of the refugee families. Kim Hyun Mee insists that half of the children from the refugee families were stateless in December 2012.^{lxxv} While these children can only acquire nationality through their embassies since the Korean Nationality Act is based on *jus sanguinis*, their parents are not able to contact their home country embassies because of possible persecution. The stateless status hinders children from receiving proper health services and public education, which results in some of the children experiencing developmental and linguistic problems.^{lxxvi}

A large number of the North Korean defectors are also in practically stateless situations. The 1997 revision allowed the defectors to acquire South Korean nationality if they prove their North Korean nationality, but the fulfillment of this precondition is unrealistic.^{lxxvii} According to Jong In Sop, the total 15,271 North Korean defectors entered into South Korea by January 2009. Only 250 defectors were able to apply for South Korean nationality in 5

years since 2004, and 44 among the applicants were rejected. Many of the defectors cannot acquire South Korean nationality, and foreign governments are often reluctant to accept the defectors as their citizens. In some cases, defectors identified themselves as Koreans in order to stay in South Korea, rather than leaving to another country.^{lxxviii} The North Korean defectors are practically stateless, left to wander South Korean society.

Population Decrease and Economic Downturn

Korea cannot exclude the significant number of its social members anymore because the society is suffering from population decrease. Korean society is anticipated to experience a severe population decrease, and following that, an economic downturn. The Korean National Statistical Office anticipates that the population growth rate will turn negative in approximately 2040, and this decline will reach -1.66% by 2060. After the Korean War, the number of total Korean population was low as 25 million. The total population increased to 38 million in 1980 and to 49 million in 2010 due to industrial developments. The number is expected to reach 52 million by 2030. However, after 2030 as the peak, the Statistical Office anticipates that the total number will start to decline back to 43 million by 2060.^{lxxix} The severe population decline is unavoidable in the near future. More and more people marry late, and young couples avoid having children because of financial burdens. The decrease in the birth-rate will lead to the total population decline. The decline of the economically active population is even faster than that of the total population.^{lxxx} The number of the economically active population will reach the peak by 2016 as 72.9% of the total population then turn to decrease to 63.1%, in 2030 and 49.7%, by 2060.^{lxxxi} This decline of the economically

active population directly influences Korean economy. Even though Korea has advanced technology, the decline would seriously drop the industrial growth rate and eventually cause economic downturn. This decline further burdens each individual. The elderly population will exceed the youth population by 2017. The aging index will jump from 68.4 in 2010 to 394 by 2060.^{lxxxii} This index suggests a situation that 10 economically active people support 10 dependents consist of 8 elders and 2 children in 2060.^{lxxxiii} The young, economically active population will have a heavy burden of supporting the society. The inevitable decrease of the Korean population is destructive and burdensome in the twenty first century.

CONCLUSION: INTRODUCTION OF JUS DOMICILE (LAW OF RESIDENCE)

This paper argues that nationality laws are outgrowths of sociopolitical adaptations. A nationality principle, *jus sanguinis*, originated from the custom that the ancient romans passed down free status by parental blood line. The medieval allegiance based on *ligeance* evolved to *jus soli*. Like believers united under Christ, people united under a king. This idea created new sense of community which grew to national identity. The state adopted this idea of nation and created the nation-state polity in the nineteenth century. Modern nationality laws emerged in the process of nation-state building. France, Germany, and Japan flexibly adjusted their nationality laws. The French Nationality Act adopted *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* in turn, and the German Nationality Act continuously diminishes its *jus sanguinis* characteristics. The establishment of the Japanese Nationality Act was also situational. The German Civil Code influenced the Japanese legal system, and *jus sanguinis* was applicable to

Japan's existing family registry system. Comparative examinations on developments of these nationality laws reveal their situational characteristics.

Based on these comparisons, the paper focuses on the establishment of the Korean Nationality Act in the twentieth century. The Japanese colonial rule and the United States military occupation government significantly influenced the Nationality Act's establishment. During the colonial period, the Japanese Nationality Act recognized the colonized as Japanese nationals. However, the colonial government used the family registry system to differentiate the colonized. The Koreans had their names in the Korean registry separate from the Japanese registry. When the US occupation government came in, the government utilized the Korea registry to recognize Koreans. People who were not listed in the registry or listed in the Japanese registry were subjects to confiscation of their assets. This policy functioned to legalize the Korean registry after liberation. An initial draft of the first Korean Nationality Act was the Interim Ordinance about Korean Nationality in 1947. The South Korean Interim Legislative Committee developed the Interim Ordinance based on the Japanese Nationality Act and the family registry system. The Ordinance was not actually enforced, but the Constitutional Assembly established the first Korean Nationality Act based on it. Three principles of the Nationality Act were *jus sanguinis*, singular nationality, and avoiding statelessness. *Jus sanguinis* was to emphasize the Korean single ethnicity and to coincide with international phenomenon of ethnic nationalism. Sociopolitical situations of the twentieth century Korea created the Nationality Act.

The Nationality Act was continuously revised depending on circumstances. Among multiple revisions,

the 1997 revision was especially significant as it allowed Korean women to legitimize their family members' Korean nationality. This shift was a result of the improved women's social status in 1990s. Another important revision took place in 2010. The revision altered the singular nationality principle of the Nationality Act, and permitted multiple nationality responding to the increasingly globalizing 2000s' environment. However, these revisions are not sufficient for social demands of twenty first century Korea. The *jus sanguinis* principle of the Nationality Act leaves out a large number of residents stateless; stateless North Korean defectors and children of unregistered immigrants and the refugee families are deprived of basic rights. The declining Korea population further necessitates the alteration of the Nationality Act based on *jus sanguinis*.

A solution is an adoption of *jus domicile*. This principle allows an individual to acquire nationality based on residency. Korea-born foreign children can acquire Korean nationality regardless of their parental status. An introduction of this principle will decrease the number of stateless residents, resulting in an increase in the Korean population. This change protects basic rights for more people, stops the anticipated economic downturn, and consolidates residents in Korea as one nation. Myoung, Lee, and Kim argue that the German case is comparable to Korea. Foreign residents in Germany make up as much as 8% of the total population. The country revised its nationality law in 2000 to limitedly adopt *jus soli* principle; German-born foreign children may acquire German nationality if their parents have permanent residency or have lived for more than 8 years with a permission to indefinitely reside.^{lxxxiv} Likewise, the Korean Nationality Act also needs a territory-based principle. While parental residency is decisive in the revised

German Nationality Act, this paper proposes jus domicile: meaning that residency of children themselves determine their acquisitions of nationality. The Australian nationality law is based on this principle and requires 10 years of residency. 7 years would be proper for Korea as children enter elementary school at the age of 8. The Koreans need to shift their paradigm of nationality and social members. The Korean Nationality Act is merely the situational product of sociopolitical demands. The idea of a single ethnic nation is not uniquely Korean but the internationally circulated political propaganda of the twentieth century. There is no need to adhere to this political tool anymore. The Koreans need to change the way they regard foreign residents. Foreign residents have largely participated in Korean society since 1990s. They have worked in many of unpopular but necessary jobs for Korean economy. They have managed the so-called “3D” labors, which mean dangerous, dirty, and difficult labors. Foreign resident families deserve proper treatments with basic rights. Most of all, globalization is inevitable. More and more foreigners move into Korea every year. How to peacefully coexist with new comers and consolidate social members are significant issues in the twenty first century. The old paradigm of ethnic exclusivity and separation is ineffective and even dangerous. Adopting jus domicile is a significant way of starting to change the old paradigm.

This paper recommends further research on Korea’s experience of nationality system and an application of jus domicile in the context of a multiethnic society. The development of the Korean nationality system is closely intertwined with the Japanese colonialism. The colonial experience created a significant number of stateless ethnic Koreans, because some people escaped

the Japanese colony for anti-colonialist movements and in order to survive. Historians can closely inspect historical narratives about stateless ethnic Koreans before, during, and after the Japanese colonial period and discover the influence of colonialism on single ethnic identity. Further studies on the application of jus domicile are also necessary. Germany’s adoption of jus soli is a desirable case to compare with Korea, since Germany’s legal system influenced that of Korea, and the two countries similarly have strong single ethnic identities. A case study can analyze changes in German society after it limitedly adopted jus soli about a decade ago. It will provide guidelines to apply jus domicile into the Korean Nationality Act. 21st century Korean society demands change, and its Nationality Law must answer to that call.

ⁱ This paper refers to South Korea as Korea, for convenience. The paper uses the term, South Korea, when it needs to differentiate North and South Korea.

ⁱⁱ John Crook, *Law and Life of Rome* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), 36 and 38.

ⁱⁱⁱ Kwon Young Sol, “Hōnpōp ũ kungminchohang kwa kujōkōp,” 93.

^{iv} Myoung Soon Koo, Lee Chul Woo, and Kim Kee Chang, *Nationality and Law: The Origins and the Future* (Seoul: The Korea University Legal Research Institute), 20-23.

^v Ibid.

^{vi} Choi Kyeong Ok, “Education Right of Children in Multicultural Families of Korea,” *Korean Comparative Public Law Association* 13 (2012).

^{vii} Myoung, Lee, and Kim, *Nationality and Law*, 32-33.

^{viii} William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the laws of England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), 354.

^{ix} John Lie, *Modern Peoplehood* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 106 and 113.

^x The Peace of Westphalia back in 1648 can be pointed out as it constructed a foundation of the interstate system that later evolved into the world's international system. This series of peace treaties majorly involved the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom of Spain, and the Dutch Republic. It upheld sovereignty over empire so initiated a new political order based on sovereign states in Europe.

^{xi} *Ibid.*, 126.

^{xii} *Ibid.*, 126-127.

^{xiii} Patrick Weil, "Nationalities and Citizenships: The Lessons of the French Experience for Germany and Europe," in *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, ed. David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 76-77.

^{xiv} Myoung, Lee, and Kim, *Nationality and Law*, 111-112.

^{xv} Lie, *Modern Peoplehood*, 149 and 151.

^{xvi} Lee Yong Il, "The German Passion for the Hegemonic State in the Modern World System and the Ideologies of the Integration in Germany," *The Korean Historical Association 200* (2008): 558-570.

^{xvii} The Tokugawa period refers to an era between 1600 and 1868. It was called after the military rulers' family name during the time. It is followed by the Meiji period that lasted until 1912.

^{xviii} Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University, 2009), 62-65.

^{xix} Fujitani Takashi, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 1-2.

^{xx} Isaac Albert Mosse (1846-1925) established the foundation of the Meiji Constitution.

^{xxi} Yim Kyung Taek, "A Study on Japanese Nationality and the Establishment of the Image of 'Japan': Focusing on *jus sanguinis* and the Concept of a Single-ethnic Nation," *Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology 45* (2012): 7-8.

^{xxii} *Ibid.*, 8-9.

^{xxiii} Fukuzawa (1835 ~ 1901) was an enlightenment writer who founded the newspaper, *Jiji-Shinpo*, Keio-Gijuku University, and the Institute for Study of Infectious Diseases.

^{xxiv} Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan*, 115.

^{xxv} A series of Japan's win over Russia and China alarmed the Chinese. It motivated China to modernize the country and establish a modern legal system. Asian countries triggered and influenced each other in their modernization processes.

^{xxvi} In relation to Ezochi and the Ryukyu Kingdom, Mark Caprio brings an interesting insight in his *Japanese Assimilation Policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945*. "In question here is our image of 'colonized.' Specifically, what constitutes 'colonized' territory? Which people were 'colonized'? A scan of colonial historiography suggests answers to these questions are very much determined by contemporary geopolitics: liberated states were colonized; incorporated regions were not. Territories that remain a part of another state are generally excluded from this discussion ... In Japan's case, Korea and Taiwan were colonized; Okinawa and Hokkaido were not" (6). He points out the contemporary politics' influence on the colonial historiography narratives.

^{xxvii} Kim Bum Soo, "Who is Japanese?: The boundaries of the 'Japanese' in Post-War Japan," *Journal of Korean Political Science Association 43* (2009): 184.

^{xxviii} Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 99-100.

^{xxix} The occupation government transferred assets, recovered from the Japanese, to the South Korean government in 1948.

^{xxx} Most of the Korean names were recovered by 1947.

^{xxxi} Kim Soo Ja, "The Settlement of 'Korean' Boundary had been shown in the Discussion Process about the Legislation of the Korean Nationality Act before and after Establishment of Korean Government," *Journal of Korean modern and contemporary history 49* (2009), 116-119.

^{xxxii} However, at the very beginning, the occupation government briefly allowed the Japanese officials to stay and keep their posts for the purpose of administrative convenience since the government did not have sufficient knowledge about Korea so was

scarcely prepared to govern the country. The Koreans strongly opposed, and the government soon dismissed the Japanese from their posts.

^{xxxiii} In addition to confiscation, differentiating the Koreans and the Japanese was important to bring the dislocated Koreans back to the peninsula. For instance, Hwasook Bergquist Nam, in *Building ships, building a nation: Korea's democratic unionism under Park Chung Hee*, insists that the Japanese colonial government had shipped about 1.5 million Korean laborers to Japan, Sakhalin, and the South Pacific islands from 1930 to 1940.

^{xxxiv} *Ibid.*, 119.

^{xxxv} Shin was an independence activist, historian, and journalist under the colonial rule. He published the newspaper, *TaeHan maeil sinbo*, and actively supported the ethnicity-centered Korean history. He emphasized Tan'gun to unite the Koreans. He died in 1936 in a jail in China and posthumously acquired Korean nationality in 2009. Myoung, Lee, and Kim, *Nationality and Law*, 42.

^{xxxvi} The Committee dissolved in May 1948.

^{xxxvii} The original draft wrote the date as August 9, 4278 according to the Tan'gun calendar. The Committee minutes and the Constitutional Assembly minutes used the Tan'gun calendar in order to emphasize the Korean ethnicity. This paper converts the Tan'gun calendar into A.D. for convenience.

^{xxxviii} Interim Legislative Committee, *Interim Legislative Committee Minutes* (Interim Legislative Committee, 197th Session, 1948), 2.

^{xxxix} Hwang was a member of a rightist party, Handokdang, and a representative of Joŋla province elected by popular vote. Interim Legislative Committee, *Interim Legislative Committee Minutes* (Interim Legislative Committee, 203rd Session, 1948), 2, translation by author.

^{xl} Kim Young Mi, "Migunjoŋgi Namjosŏnkwadoipoŋuwoŋ ū soŋgrip kwa hawltong," *Han'guksaron* 32 (1994): 273-279.

^{xli} National Assembly, *First Hearing on Nationality Act* (Constitutional Assembly, 118th Session, 1948), 3, translation by author.

^{xlii} Park (1908 ~ 1994) was a representative of Koŋngnam Province elected by the popular vote. He later moved to North Korea during the Korean War.

^{xliii} National Assembly, *Second Hearing on Nationality Act* (Constitutional Assembly, 119th Session, 1948), 5-6.

^{xliv} Yi was a scholar of the Realist School of Confucianism during the late Choson Dynasty. Andre Schmid, *Korea between Empires 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 172, 176, 181, and 187.

^{xlv} Prasenjit Duara, "The Global and Regional Constitution of Nations: The View from East Asia," *Nations and Nationalism* 14 (2008): 341-343.

^{xlvi} Na (1895 ~ 1984) was an anti-colonial nationalist who studied at Waseda University in Japan. He was elected as a member of the Constitutional, fourth, fifth, and sixth National Assembly of South Korea. National Assembly, *First Hearing on Nationality Act*, 9.

^{xlvii} Kim was a member of a centrist party, Sinjindang, and reelected for the second National Assembly. His political view can be described as center-right.

^{xlviii} Lee was a rightist who supported the first President of South Korea, Rhee Sung Man. National Assembly, *Second Hearing on Nationality Act*, 6-7.

^{xlix} The treaty is also commonly called as Treaty of San Francisco. This treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers officially ended World War II. Yim Kyung Taek, "A Study on Japanese Nationality," 22.

^l Seo (1912 ~ 1992) founded a rightist party, Hanmindang. He studied at Yonsei University in Korea. National Assembly, *Second Hearing on Nationality Act*, 7.

^{li} It is excerpted from Wilson's speech to the Congress during the Joint Session on February 11, 1918. His speech triggered an anti-colonial uprising, the March 1st Movement, in the colonial Korea 6 months later.

^{lii} Jo Ho Yeon, "Isipsegi Russiasa esŏŋi kungmintonghap kwa minjokjuŋi," *The Korean Society for Western History* 1 (1999): 238.

^{liii} Korean Nationality Act, Article 3, 5, and 8.

^{liv} Korean Nationality Act, Article 3, 5, and 8, 1962 partly revised.

^{lv} Korean Nationality Act, Article 14, 1962 partly revised.

^{lvi} Korean Nationality Act, Article 10.

^{lvii} Korean Nationality Act, Article 14, 1976 partly revised.

^{lviii} Korean Nationality Act, Article 2.

^{lix} Korean Nationality Act, Article 2, 1997 revised.

^{lx} Korean Constitutional Court, 1997Hun-Ga12 (August 31, 2000).

^{lxi} Korean Nationality Act, Article 4.

^{lxii} Korean Nationality Act, Article 7 of Supplementary Provisions, 1997 partly revised.

^{lxiii} Korean Nationality Act, Article 7 of Supplementary Provisions, 2001 partly revised.

^{lxiv} Korean Nationality Act, Article 6, 2004 partly revised.

^{lxv} Korean Nationality Act, Article 12 and 14, 2005 partly revised.

^{lxvi} The Framework Act on the National Language was established on January 27th, 2005 and required public institutions to write official documents in Korean. This Act aimed to abolish a custom that writing formal documents in classical Chinese characters. Mastering classical Chinese characters used to denote a person's educated status. This custom disappeared, but English seems to replace classical Chinese characters in 2010s Korea.

^{lxvii} Korean Nationality Act, Article 11, 2010 revised.

^{lxviii} *Ibid.*, Article 10.

^{lxix} Korean Nationality Act, Article 3, 5, and 6, 1997 revised.

^{lxx} Ministry of Justice. "Monthly Statistics." http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/COM/bbs_03/BoardList.do?strOrgGbnCd=100000&strRtnURL=MOJ_40402000&strFilePath=moj/&strNbodCd=noti0703 (accessed March 17, 2013).

^{lxxi} Support for Multicultural Families Act, Article 2.

^{lxxii} Ministry of Justice, "Monthly Statistics," http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/COM/bbs_03/BoardList.do?strOrgGbnCd=100000&strRtnURL=MOJ_40402000&strFilePath=moj/&strNbodCd=noti0703.

^{lxxiii} Choi, "Children in Multicultural Families," 311.

^{lxxiv} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* (Geneva: UNHCR Communications and Public Information Service, 2010).

^{lxxv} Kim conducted research on 173 children of the refugee families.

^{lxxvi} Kim Hyun Mee et al., *Han'guk goju nanminadong Saenghwal siltae josa mit jiwon Pangan yon'gu* (Seoul: Save the Children, 2013), 14-16 and 43-47.

^{lxxvii} Korean Nationality Act, Article 20, 1997 revised.

^{lxxviii} Jong In Sop, et al. *Mugukjoŋja kwalli mit cheryujilso hwakrip ul wihan chedo yon'gu*. (Seoul: Ministry of Justice, 2009), 113 and 124.

^{lxxix} National Statistical Office, *Future Population Projection: 2010~2060* (Seoul: National Statistical Office, 2011), 3.

^{lxxx} The Statistical Office defines that the economically active population includes people between 15 to 64 years old.

^{lxxxi} This future population projection anticipates that the number of the economically active population will reach 37 millions by 2016. Then, the number declines to 32 millions in 2030 and to 21 millions by 2060. *Ibid.*, 11.

^{lxxxii} The Statistical Office calculated the aging index as (over 65 years old population / 0~14 years old population) x 100.

^{lxxxiii} *Ibid.*, 16 and 17.

^{lxxxiv} Myoung, Lee, and Kim, *Nationality and Law*, 106.

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A CASE STUDY OF *MIGHTY ATOM*

What does anime look and smell like?

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INTRODUCTION

Mighty Atom – starring the mechanical boy-hero whom Americans know from *Astro Boy* – has served as the poster child for Japanese *anime* (animation) and *manga* (comic books) for more than half a century. The popular manga serialization of *Mighty Atom* led to the creation of Japan’s first animated television series, which, despite a remarkably small budget, established aesthetic and distributional precedents that still remain influential upon the current anime phenomenon. Yet, consulting scholarship on either the illustrated or animated *Mighty Atom* series reveals a predominate focus upon the series’ creator: Tezuka Osamu, or the “God of Manga.” The scholastic pedestal erected in history for Tezuka, etched with inscriptions such as “the innovator of modern story manga” and “the creator of Japanese animated television,” currently overshadows the dynamic combination of factors that led to the series’ cultural and historical significance. *Mighty Atom* – drawn, re-drawn, animated, and disseminated internationally over several decades – cannot be the work of a single man, no matter how godly. This misguided academic trend stems from an overdependence upon auteur theory (artistically) and great man theory (technologically): it does not presume that Tezuka existed in an artistic vacuum, yet continues to attribute the artistic and technological successes of his projects back to Tezuka and his postwar Japanese

environment. This results in an essentialist body of literature on “Japanimation,” which wrestles anime into a lineage of artistic innovation based upon unfounded claims of national purity. These claims themselves have emerged due to a lack of focus upon the non-directorial, extra-Japanese influences in the history of anime.

By traveling far back in time beyond conventional starting points, such as *Akira* and *Pokémon*, to Japan’s first full-length animated television series, I will examine *Mighty Atom*’s production and distribution in light of cultural scholar Kōichi Iwabuchi’s notion of the “cultural odorlessness” of post-war Japanese products. This new perspective will ultimately reveal that the case of *Mighty Atom* calls for a transnational, culturally impure definition of what anime looks and “smells” like. This is far easier said than done given the numerous forms of Atom’s diegesis. Published weekly, monthly, and in volumes, often re-drawn and edited to fit within particular printing parameters, and then adapted into three separate television series, Atom does not exist linearly or immutably. Constantly re-designed to appeal to popular interest, and occasionally killed off and then re-constructed in the subsequent series, the most mechanical part of Atom is his interchangeability. Thus, before tying *Mighty Atom* into a broader argument about cultural influences upon anime, these particular complexities will be thoroughly explored in a case study meant to pinpoint key aesthetic, technological,

and ideological influences upon the series from illustrated genesis to international distribution on television screens. First, the text will be divorced from methodologies that over-exaggerate the important, albeit limited contributions of Tezuka. Then, the social, industrial, and personal factors that coalesced in the production and distribution of *Mighty Atom* in Japan and in America will be traced to reveal the dynamic nature of the work. Finally, the bi-cultural odor of *Mighty Atom* will reveal a new set of issues facing scholarship on anime as a cultural phenomenon, ultimately revealing that the tradition should be called neither distinctly Japanese nor devoid of nationality.

THE FEELING OF GREAT MEN

Mighty Atom, the character Tezuka Osamu would first draw in 1950 and later animate in 1962, is undoubtedly the product of deep-seated passions for both illustrating and animating, a concept emphasized by scholar Frederik Schodt:

As [Tezuka] used to joke much later in life, while manga were like his wife, animation was like his mistress – the implication being that while he loved manga, his passion for animation was almost beyond control.ⁱ

However, unlike Schodt, this case study questions not which Tezuka loved more but rather the very implication of paternity: is Tezuka really the father of *Mighty Atom*?

Tezuka was born in November of 1928, in Toyonaka City, Osaka, the oldest of three sons of a pair of art-loving parents. He grew up in Takarazuka City, Hyōgo surrounded by the same muses that would fuel his artistic career: the Takarazuka Revue and Disney animation.

The former stands counterpoint to suggestions that kabuki theater held influence upon Tezuka's style,ⁱⁱ given that the Takarazuka Revue is an all-female troupe which performs adaptations of primarily American musical theater. The latter, however, was the most profound and widely recognized influence upon young Tezuka. Tezuka's cinephilic parents not only owned a 16mm projector but also were able to obtain Disney and other foreign animated films, such as *Snow White*, which was quite a feat during World War Two given the rigid limitations and inspections placed upon foreign mail by the National Mobilization Law (国家総動員法) in effect from 1938 to 1945.

A trip to the Tezuka Osamu Manga Museum in Takarazuka contains a treasure trove of diaries and sketches from Tezuka's childhood and documents frequently cited in defense of Tezuka's title, the "God of Manga," bestowed upon him for his life-long, unprecedented style of comic book illustrating: "story manga." Tezuka strayed from his manga predecessors by refusing to conform to the convention of making each page a single frame corresponding to a scene in a narrative (Image 1). Instead, as a child he divided his pages into smaller frames, constructing scenes from various vantage points in a way most commonly described as "cinematic" (Images 2-4).ⁱⁱⁱ The influence of cinema upon Tezuka's manga is visually apparent, but the influence of Disney is more deeply rooted in Tezuka's aesthetic philosophy.

The Illusion of Life, a key text on animation techniques by Disney animators Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston, is one of a variety of "how-to" books that reveal the primacy of narrative clarity in the Disney world:

The most important consideration is always the "story point." It has

been decided, for example, that a certain piece of business will advance the story; now, how should it be staged? Is it funnier in a long shot where everything can be seen or in a close-up featuring the personality? Is it better in a master shot with the camera moving in, or a series of short cuts to different objects? Each scene will have to fit the plan, and every frame of the film must help to make this point of the story.^{iv}

By making films in which style and structure become subservient to content, Disney Studios created a filmography characterized by a sort of magical photorealism: characters not strictly of this world, yet organic enough to appear alive, as if filmed in an alternative, albeit parallel, reality.

An infamous lesson discussed by Thomas and Johnston best exemplifies the marriage of Disney to a naturalistic aesthetic. The half-filled, emotional flour sack (Image 5) is intended to teach aspiring animators the fundamental concept of consistency of mass in animated characters to promote a believable, three-dimensional space. By rejecting the flatness of early animated films (Image 6) as well as contemporaries' volumetrically inconsistent animation such as the Warner Bros. super-elastic Daffy Duck (Image 7), Disney Studios created a philosophy of animation dependent upon notions of realism. These basic tenets – narratives that unfold in organic realities and possess recognizable consistencies, such as mass – permeate the Tezuka style and epitomize how his cinematic worlds – both on the page and on the screen – function to create narratives in three-dimensional space. This direct inheritance of animation philosophy suggests why literature on Tezuka can often be divided into two groups: that which treats his

work as the product of the innovative “God of Manga” and that which describes him as the “Disney of the East.”

In the end, both directions fall short of a thorough investigation of the aesthetics, themes, and innovations that are important in a discussion of *Mighty Atom*. Overwhelmingly, though, recent research has focused on the former: countless books have been written on Tezuka, such as *God of Comics: Osamu Tezuka* and even *The Astro Boy Essays*. While works of this sort are cited in this case study for their thorough research relating to the life of Tezuka, they largely represent an academic effort that has unfortunately focused on just compiling biographical information of the alleged auteur behind 100,000+ pages of manga and dozens upon dozens of films and television shows.

Advocates against discussing “Tezuka as auteur” often have ended up merely changing the focus to Disney, as exemplified by animation director Hayao Miyazaki's harsh eulogy in the May 1989 edition of *Comic Box*:

Tezuka's early works are almost all imitations of Disney. To them he merely added his own narrative element. I say added, but his worlds continued to be created under huge influence from Disney. As a result, he always had an inferiority complex... It becomes understandable if you think of his work in animation as a hobby – something a rich man might do for a diversion.^v

In the very same edition, Miyazaki also goes on to note, “When I was finally forced to admit that my drawings actually did look like Tezuka's, I took out the sketches I had stored in the drawer of our dresser and burned them all. I burned them and resolved to start over from

scratch.”^{vi} In light of this confession, his sharp criticism of Tezuka as a wealthy emulator of Disney seems more emotionally driven. Yet Miyazaki’s beliefs still embody the attempt to redirect praise from Tezuka to Disney. This attempt has created a new set of problems rooted in flawed generalizations. For instance, the television version of *Mighty Atom* was run on a small budget and release schedule: had it actually been animated in the “Disney” way, Tezuka’s Mushi Productions would have needed 3,000 full time animators.^{vii} In reality *Mighty Atom* was created with less than a hundred, leading to a visual product that has been discussed by others as the *anti-thesis* of the Disney aesthetic. Schodt attempts to solve this problem by simply adding more names:

In reality, [Tezuka’s] art style owes a great debt not only to Disney, but to Max Fleischer, as well as Japanese artists who preceded him, such as Ryuichi Yokoyama, Suiho Tagawa, and Noboru Oshiro.^{viii}

Praised as one of the most influential artists of the 20th century, Tezuka has become the subject of academic literature so deeply rooted in auteur theory that the only alternative so far has been to add more auteurs to the list when discussing his work.

Pam Cook critiques the use of director as “a criterion of value” in her deconstruction of the history of auteur theory:

Cinematic authorship hinges on notions of agency and control, traditionally vesting these in the figure of the director, whether this can be substantiated by historical research or not. With the “historical turn” in film studies,

scholars have returned to the archives to investigate evidence of the fine details of aesthetic and financial decision-making in order to uncover the significant contributions of others involved in the filmmaking process... individual agency and control thus become less important than the social, industrial, and personal factors that govern the collaborative business of film production at specific historical moments.^{ix}

The examination of *Mighty Atom* below will reveal that it is precisely the “fine details of aesthetic and financial decision-making” that allow for a thorough understanding of the historical and cultural significance of the series. Furthermore, “individual agency and control” by Tezuka *should* be less important specifically because of his lack of involvement in the entire production process, the heavy thematic imprint upon the text left by the socio-political factors surrounding the production, the autonomy and ingenuity of the animators in his studio, and the transformation that *Mighty Atom* would undergo in America – as *Astro Boy* – which would later change the aesthetics and content of the Japanese show as well.

Overlooking these details not only perpetuates a shallow approach to artistic analysis of “Tezuka’s creations” but carries over into a technological history of animation that attributes shifts in industrial methods to individuals. Such a misguided belief can be seen in a 2003 issue of *Sight* magazine:

“Because of his intoxication with Walt Disney, [Tezuka] created Mushi Productions, negotiated by himself with sponsors, and succeeded in having *Mighty Atom*

broadcast as a series of thirty-minute episodes on TV. In doing so, he laid the foundation for the modern Japanese TV-animation business, but over the years *Mighty Atom* also created new conventions in the industry, to the point where it also served as the cornerstone for the current low-wage system in which people are now employed.”^x

Despite the insightfulness of this claim, which rightfully gestures toward the production system introduced to Japanese animation for the first time by the *Mighty Atom* television series starting in 1963, this quote also exemplifies the conventional version of technological history in Japan: that at least Tezuka or Disney should be credited for shaping the very direction of anime as an industry. Thus the issue becomes not only one of correcting the artistic history of animation drafted by those who trace manga and anime back to Tezuka but also one of rewriting the oversimplified version of industrial history, in which Tezuka-ism seems to be for 1960s Japanese animation what Taylorism was for historians of early animation.

In their seminal book *Film History Theory and Practice*, Allen and Gomery describe the pitfalls of great man theory:

Certainly, the history of technological change in the cinema involves individuals whose training, skills, aptitudes, and, finally, achievements single them out for special consideration by the historian. To deny that Thomas Edison, W. K. L. Dickinson, Lee de Forest, Theodore Case, or Herbert Kalmus played a part in the technological history of the cinema is not only shortsighted

but historically unsupportable. However, by foregrounding the role of the individual in technological change, the “great man” theory excludes or greatly reduces consideration of other factors.^{xi}

These “other factors,” or Cook’s “fine details” – in this case of the text *Mighty Atom* and the various factors which acted upon its production to create an unprecedented work of art – are exactly what have been lost in previous literature. Simply acknowledging the fact that Tezuka did not exist in a vacuum, or that he was heavily influenced by Disney, has not proven sufficient for the purposes of illustrating the historical, aesthetic, and industrial importance of *Mighty Atom*. This cannot be achieved if there is an underlying assumption that these factors and contributors have allowed for the creative actualization of the talents of an individual. Tezuka may have introduced Atom to the world, but he quickly began to share his responsibilities of artistic fatherhood. When the animated version of *Mighty Atom* began production, a large team was required that functioned rather autonomously from Tezuka. Paternity testing reveals that Atom is not the offspring of a creative individual but rather the wunderkind of a coincidental collective.

THE BIRTH OF THE GREAT ATOM

Atom, the eponymous hero, actually predates the *Mighty Atom* manga series. In the summer of 1950, Tezuka was asked to create a story for the comic publication *Shonen*, and originally proposed a science-fiction narrative entitled *Atomu Tairiku* (Atom Continent). Tezuka chose to import the English-derived word “atom” because atomic power was a hot topic in post-war Japan

and because as a ferociously anti-war artist, Tezuka had envisioned portraying a world in which atomic power was used for creation rather than destruction. Ultimately, a variation upon the title that he resubmitted was approved, *Atomu Taishi* (Ambassador Atom), and only after having the title accepted did he begin to consider who or what “Atom” would be. Eventually, Atom was introduced as a secondary character in the series, highly robotic and quite geometric (Image 8). Only by the suggestion of his editor Takeshi Kanai did Tezuka reboot the character and create a new series focusing on the robot boy, *Tetsuwan Atomu* (previously and hereafter *Mighty Atom*).^{xii}

Mighty Atom began publication in *Shonen* in April 1952, a month marked not only by the end of the American occupation but also by the rise of Tezuka as a domestically renowned manga artist. Set in the futuristic Japan of 2003, the story focuses around Atom, a highly functional and seemingly emotional robot boy created by Doctor Tenma (in the English version, Dr. Astor Boyton II) as a replacement for his recently deceased son, Tobio (Astor Boyton III). In the first installment, Dr. Tenma is disappointed by Atom’s inability to grow physically beyond childhood and sells him to a circus. Shamed and orphaned, Atom lives a life of misery and confusion until he is discovered by Professor Ochanomizu (Dr. Packidermus J. Elefun), who rescues him and soon after marvels at Atom’s superhuman powers (Image 9): a state-of-the-art robotic brain, the ability to speak 60 languages, a 100,000 horsepower atomic reactor at his core, perfect memory, jet packs for flights, pistols in his posterior, a stomach for holding and disposing of food, ears one thousand times more sensitive than those of a human, and search lights in his eyes. Despite this overwhelming list of strengths and his never-ending drive to

help the human race, Atom is treated with prejudice by others and is constantly plagued by the realization that he is not a real boy. Atom is driven by this struggle through the manga series as he fights crime, lives with a robot family created by Professor Ochanomizu, and deals with a deep-seated identity crisis.

In her book *Millennial Monsters*, Anne Allison writes off this identity crisis suffered by Atom as a product of the times (Image 10).^{xiii} Tezuka had created *Mighty Atom* in the 1950s alongside many other artists, such as revolutionaries in the *jidaigeki* genre (Japanese period film), who also struggled with issues of split identity in a post-war, newly globalized Japan. While *Mighty Atom* could very well be placed within this same thematic tradition, an examination of the socio-political influences and personal factors acting upon Tezuka before he introduced Atom to the world reveals a man who, since his own childhood, had his eyes on America.

Literature on Tezuka tends to discuss his work as that which is a mirror of Japanese national identity. For example, Susan Napier identifies *Mighty Atom* as a landmark for Japanese animation, but she posits that anime is a “cultural form that clearly builds on previous high cultural traditions... from such Japanese traditional arts as Kabuki and the woodblock print.”^{xiv} This quest for a unique, national purity of Japanese art history is complicated by Tezuka’s lifelong fascination with the West. Tezuka has cited the American Civil Rights Movement as a source of inspiration for *Mighty Atom*,^{xv} which can be seen in the innumerable acts of prejudice committed by humans against Atom and his mechanical brethren. Of all those who have attempted to pinpoint the primary source from which Tezuka drew inspiration, the most promising suggestion comes from a voice unfamiliar to the English-speaking world: Tezuka’s sister,

Minako. In an article in *Asahi Shinbun* from April 7th, 2003, entitled “Atomu no haha, Takarazuka kageki?” (Atom’s Mother, Takarazuka Revue?),^{xvi} author Mamie Kawai cites an interview with Minako during which she recounts attending a Takarazuka version of *Pinocchio* with whose production Tezuka was absolutely obsessed. In fact, Minako even draws strong comparisons between the creation scenes of Pinocchio and Atom (Images 11-12).^{xvii} Minako was not the first to recognize that *Mighty Atom* shares similarities with *Pinocchio*, a fact that would later, somewhat serendipitously, lead NBC to hire Producer Fred Ladd (who at the time was working on *Pinocchio in Outer Space*) to adapt the *Mighty Atom* television show into its American release version, which Ladd would infamously rename *Astro Boy*. For now, however, it remains a compelling observation by Minako that Tezuka drew not from previous high cultural traditions, but rather from a Disney classic in the form of musical theater.

Mighty Atom continued to be serialized throughout the 1950s as Tezuka grew in popularity throughout Japan, but as time passed, Tezuka became increasingly busy with other projects, and Atom spent nearly a decade sharing shelf space with hundreds of other characters that continued to populate Tezuka’s world of manga. Despite the several American influences upon Atom – from his birth to his crisis to his very name – it would not be until direct American intervention into the series that Atom would travel across the Pacific as a harbinger of peace under the name Astro Boy. For this process to begin, Tezuka would first have to give in to his “mistress,” animation, and in doing so, lose control of both the character and the series. As *Mighty Atom* became *Astro Boy*, Atom freed himself from the God of Manga.

ATOM TAKES FLIGHT

In “Limiting Movement, Inventing Anime,” a chapter of *Anime’s Media Mix* that traces the genesis of anime to *Mighty Atom*, Marc Steinberg argues that *Mighty Atom*’s aesthetics are far more indebted to manga than to Disney – not just narratively through adaptation, but visually through a continuation of what Steinberg identifies as the “dynamically immobile image”:

To understand the technical and aesthetic context for anime’s emergence and *Tetsuwan Atomu*’s explosive success, it is necessary to abandon the presupposition that the essence of animation is to make things move realistically – the form of smooth movement assumed by mainstream cinema and the cinematic style of animation that was Disney and Toei’s operative ideal – and take into account the influence of the predominately “still” image media of manga.^{xviii}

What Steinberg repeatedly emphasizes is the static nature of limited animation, an alternative version of dynamism, which was not invented by the creators of *Mighty Atom* but was rather taken to an unprecedented extreme. To understand this polar shift away from Disney, one must first recognize that Tezuka articulated a desire to animate that would ultimately overpower his obsession with artistic control:

After all, the audience for [Momotaro and the Divine Sea Warriors] – children – had all been evacuated to the countryside, so hardly anyone even noticed the film when it came out. I sat in the freezing Shochikuza movie

theater, which had somehow survived the bombings, and watched the film. I watched, and I was so impressed that I began weeping uncontrollably. The lyricism and the child-like spirit in all the reels were like a warm light, illuminating my mummified spirit, depleted of both hope and dreams, I swore then: “I will someday make my own animated films.”^{xxix}

Through his strong friendship with Tezuka, Schodt provides invaluable insight into the film viewing habits of Tezuka that brings substance to this bold declaration. While it is easy enough for Tezuka to have sworn from an early age that he would eventually transition from manga to anime, this pledge appears to be more formidable when considering that Tezuka watched more than 365 movies a year, seeing *Bambi* more than eighty times and *Snow White* over fifty.^{xx} By June of 1961, Tezuka had formed Tezuka Osamu Productions, and within a year, the company grew from six employees to more than sixty. After experimenting with a thirty-eight minute colored short, *Aru machikado no monogatari* (Story of a Certain Street Corner) (Image 13), Tezuka made the decision to shift gears with a pilot for a TV version of *Mighty Atom* and marked the occasion by changing the name of the studio to Mushi, which in Japanese means “bug” and is written with the character Tezuka worked into his pen name (治虫, read “Osamu,” though literally “Osa-mushi”) as an insect-loving child (Image 14).

With the exception of *Otogi Manga Calendar*, a one- to three-minute weekly, animated TV installment by Otogi Productions starting in 1961 (Image 15), Japan had never had a domestically made animated television series before and

certainly nothing the length of a traditional episode (24 minutes to accommodate six minutes of commercials). Nevertheless, animated television was not unheard of in Japan, because in addition to Disney feature films, the Japanese were also watching series such as *Mister Magoo* (United Productions of America) and *The Flintstones* (Hanna-Barbera) in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Tezuka and his team in fact attest to having studied both in detail before pursuing the *Mighty Atom* animation project.^{xxi} The trouble with creating an animated series was almost entirely economic: Tezuka began by “paying his and others’ salaries out of his own pocket,”^{xxii} and even when the *Mighty Atom* pilot proved to be a hit, Tezuka offset the economic concerns of the TV stations and the program sponsor by “asking what amounted to approximately one-half of the production cost.”^{xxiii} Despite the perilous economics of the situation, Tezuka and his team approached the project with admirable determination, as described by Mushi animator Yamamoto Eiichi:

Everyone gave up their holidays and their Sundays, and worked until the last train went home. Those like me, who were single, found going home late to an empty apartment and getting up early to come to work a pain, so we just continued drawing through the night... Where we held our pencils in our right hands, or where our pinkies rubbed against the paper, the skin started to peel and turn raw, making the drawings bloody, so we had to wear bandages. When hungry we had ramen or fried noodles delivered from a neighborhood shop, and when

tired we crawled under our desks
and went to sleep.^{xxiv}

This display of dedication on the part of dozens of workers would be the force to actualize an animated version of *Mighty Atom*. Nevertheless, this model was physically and economically unstable, and the first steps taken to ensure the production of at least an initial batch of episodes fundamentally changed the very process of animation. As Allen and Gomery note, “The simple availability of technology does not in itself determine filmmaking practice, nor does it necessarily specify a general direction for artistic innovation.”^{xxv} Thus, while many scholars have marveled at the processes implemented to render *Mighty Atom* visually, the techniques listed below should be introduced not as inventions but rather as ingenious innovations upon the very concept of limited animation born of both economic necessity and artistic insight. They were not inevitable but rather the result of a small production office that was in constant discussion to determine the most pragmatic, albeit artistic solutions to resource problems. Mushi Productions introduced aesthetic innovations in *Mighty Atom* that cannot be attributed to a single creative individual, that were not informed by previous Japanese high cultural traditions, and that will later resurface in history as the conventions of anime.^{xxvi}

“Limiting” the animation. Live action film is traditionally projected at 24 frames per second. Animation conforms to the same standardized system, and yet the number of distinct frames within any given second of screen time varies between studios, within a studio, and even within the same movie. In order to obtain smooth, “realistic” animation, Disney and other “full animation” studios often create an average of 18 individually-distinct images to fill an animated second,

meaning that a couple of those frames are photographed twice to fill film time. While the technique of cel animation, which features drawings on transparent sheets of cellulose nitrate and camphor, helped to prevent the task faced by early animators of starting from scratch for each individual frame, the workload remains tremendous. As a result, “limited animation” studios, such as United Productions of America and Hanna-Barbera, effectively halve their duties and resource costs by frequently “animating on the twos,” or composing twelve frames for each second of film and photographing each frame twice. The distinction between “limited” and “full” animation differs depending on who is doing the defining and what factors contribute to the definition process, but any work with fewer than 12 individually composed frames per second would generally be described as “limited.” Mushi Productions is known for having implemented the extremely limited technique of “animating on the threes,” equivalent to a third of the amount of work required for Disney animation. Yet, even that description does not paint the entire picture. In fact, eight frames for a second of screen time are the *most* ever found in *Mighty Atom*. Occasionally in the series, a single frame is photographed 24 times (or more!) to fill a second (or more!) of screen time with entirely static images (Images 16-17).^{xxvii} In fact, one episode of *Mighty Atom* contained only 900 drawings to fill ~1,320 seconds.^{xxviii} As a result, this style of animation becomes heavily dependent upon a dynamic soundtrack and dialogue, because otherwise the audience would notice that they are watching something that tests the artistic barriers between animation and still photography. “Animating on the threes” would eventually become a central part of the anime aesthetic.

Moving the camera. While not an innovation of Mushi Productions, one technique used much more heavily in *Mighty Atom* than with previous works of limited animation is movement of the camera. Simple zooms (Images 18-19) or pans (Images 20-21) draw inexpensive movement out of what would otherwise be considered static. This aspect of *Mighty Atom* is highlighted in Steinberg's discussion of the dynamically immobile image and is often evoked as an example to illustrate similarities between anime and manga.^{xxix}

Cycling/Sliding Movement. Movement loops have been used since the advent of animation, and yet movement in *Mighty Atom* is economized in a way that continues to advance the narrative while even further limiting movement on screen. For example, when Atom walks, his movement cycles consist of about half a dozen cels that are used over and over in a loop while a longer background is slid in the opposite direction (Images 22-23). Furthermore, when he flies, or when a vehicle moves across the screen, animators simply slide the foreground and background in opposite directions without even needing to create new cels (Images 24-25).

Segmentation. As in previous versions of limited animation, individual parts of cels, such as character arms and legs, are used to segment characters, allowing animators to move a part of Atom without changing his entire body. However, where *Mighty Atom* breaks from other limited animation of the time comes in scenes of dialogue, where the entirety of the screen remains still (robots don't blink!) except for a character's mouth. Yamamoto describes the spontaneity used in this process: "we would only use three: closed, wide open, and halfway open, randomly repeating these using three-frame shooting" (Images 26-28).^{xxx}

Rapid Shot Changes. Mushi animators realized that extended single shots required more nuanced movement than shorter shots, a fact that contributed to a philosophy of animation dependent upon rapid editing comparable to a Hollywood action movie. Occasionally, this was taken to such an extreme that *Mighty Atom* contains photographs edited together quickly enough to prevent the audience from noticing that they are watching a combination of still images (Images 29-32).

Bank System. Compared to Japanese animated shorts, and even the feature-length animated films that were created in Japan by the early 1960s, the length of *Mighty Atom* is incomparably colossal: over four series, the show clocks in at just around 2,500 minutes of screen time. The combined effect of all Mushi animators' aesthetic innovations could still not account for the actualization of this enormous five-year project had it not been for their highly organized system of saving, filing, and later reusing cels between episodes throughout the series; this would become known as the bank system. By recognizing that a limited cast of characters in recurring locales would eventually result in the necessity of repeated cels, Mushi Productions began this process early and reaped the benefits progressively.

With a fundamental alteration of the limited animation process and an enormous amount of work, Mushi Productions celebrated a strong domestic debut of *Mighty Atom* on January 1, 1963, and within the first month the show reached an initial peak with roughly a third of TV-owning Japanese households tuning in.^{xxxi} As Tezuka had dreamed, Atom had taken flight off the page and into television sets around the country. With his dream as reality, however, he quickly became preoccupied with his many other manga projects that were his

economic lifeblood, which was critical as he continued to pay most of the bills at Mushi Productions. *Mighty Atom* began a gradual decline over an eight-month period, and the animators continued to spend much more than the show was making. *Mighty Atom*, and Mushi Productions, would need to reach a wider audience to stay afloat. This proliferation began with an NBC representative watching from a Tokyo hotel room.

THE BIRTH OF ASTRO BOY

After being contacted by one of his employees in Tokyo who had seen *Mighty Atom* a month after its premiere, NBC Enterprises executive Jim Dodd took an immediate interest in the series. Dodd did not understand Japanese, nor had a Japanese television show ever been adapted and sold for American distribution, and yet Dodd believed that the show could be economically dubbed and released. His strategy was simple: “We don’t plan to advertise the fact that the series is being animated in Japan. We’re not going to deny it, if anybody asks, but we’re not going to publicize it, either.”^{xxxii} In Dodd’s opinion, the only thing noticeably Japanese about *Mighty Atom* was the dialogue, and with English dubs and some story adaptation, that cultural signature would be lost. For this, Dodd contacted Fred Ladd, who was known for having adapted European animated shorts into the American television series *Cartoon Classics*. At the time, Ladd had just finished work on *Pinocchio in Outer Space*. Dodd recognized the similarities between *Pinocchio* and *Mighty Atom* and believed Ladd to be the man for the job. With Ladd on board, Dodd contacted Mushi Productions and Fuji TV, who sent over Fujita Kiyoshi as a legal representative, and Dodd convinced Fujita to sell NBC the rights to assemble a pilot from the first episode of the series.

If it were successfully sold to local stations and well received by audiences, NBC would then adapt 52 episodes. Dodd’s work was finished just as Ladd took center stage, and his task was straightforward: produce the re-dubbing of the first episode of *Mighty Atom*, with the intention of introducing Americans to an English-speaking Atom.

If only the story were so simple. As Ladd attests, he believed that his job “was not just to dub the show, but to *American-ize* it,”^{xxxiii} and yet the choices he made within that process proved to be far more innovative and remarkable than the kind of cultural cleansing that NBC had imagined. What resulted from this international distribution project led to a complete transformation of *Mighty Atom* into *Astro Boy*, resulting in a new version of the show that would not only take off within the States, but one that would economically fund, narratively redirect, and thematically repolarize the series being produced back at Mushi Productions.

Ladd’s memoirs on the production process reveal that he was granted many liberties. Ladd believes his artistic freedom was a direct result of his success with *Cartoon Classics*. However, the primary reason was more likely fiscal, given that Ladd was even underselling NBC’s next cheapest alternative: adapting and dubbing in Puerto Rico would only cost \$1,800 an episode.^{xxxiv} Ladd’s proposal was one that had never existed before in the world of dubbing: he would cast three voice actors (Billie Lou Watt, Gilbert Mack, and Cliff Owens) to play all the parts and *also* serve as co-writers alongside him for the English script. By all recording as a group instead of individually, Ladd believed that the English audio for an entire episode could be finished in a single day at Titra Sound Studios, from 9:30 to 5:30. Ladd ended up producing two pilots, *The Birth of Atom*

(*Mighty Atom* Episode 1) and *Expedition to Mars* (*Mighty Atom* Episode 3), and both were completed on time and under budget. With the project green light, Ladd's American-ization process resulted in five substantial changes to the series.

New Title. From the start, Ladd and Dodd were both displeased with the awkward translation of *Tetsuwan Atomu* as *Mighty Atom*, and Ladd's first decision as producer was to change the name of the series.^{xxxv} NBC sales executive Bill Breen had noted to Ladd that "in American comics, there was always a this-boy and a that-boy,"^{xxxvi} and so by borrowing *Astro*, the name of the whale from *Pinocchio in Outer Space*, together they created *Astro Boy*. While it remains unmentioned in accounts from the period whether the name "Atom" was changed due to its potential association with Japan or the atom bomb, "Astro" stuck from the start, likely a direct result of its galactic etymology in the midst of the space race.

New Soundtrack. As noted earlier, the extremely limited animation of *Mighty Atom* meant that Mushi Productions had depended heavily upon the soundtrack and dialogue to carry the narrative, and Ladd seemed quite conscious of the amount of power he had in his remaking of the soundtrack:

"The burden on us...was to make the American viewer think he/she was seeing more animation than was actually on the screen! How to do that? By bombarding the senses, that's how; by playing to the ear, if not to the eye."^{xxxvii}

A comparison of the Mushi Pro and NBC pilots reveals dramatically different soundscapes: the latter a true bombardment of foley sounds and filler action sounds such as "bam!" and "whoosh!"

Theme Song. The original episodes of *Mighty Atom* from Mushi Productions began with an orchestral score by Tatsuo Takai over the opening credits. Ladd commissioned Don Rockwell to write lyrics to the tune thereby creating a theme song, and those would be the words that would open every episode of *Astro Boy*.^{xxxviii} Early on in the adaptation process, Ladd and his team began to encounter problems as NBC started to reject certain episodes of *Astro Boy* due to excessive amounts of violence, a problem requiring direct communication with Mushi Productions. Tezuka went to New York City for the first time on a trip to NBC, and later Ladd would take his first trip to Mushi Productions in Tokyo. Upon Tezuka's arrival, Ladd presented him with what had been adapted so far, and he writes of how Tezuka mostly warmly received the introduction of a theme song.^{xxxix} In fact, upon Tezuka's return to Mushi Productions, *Mighty Atom* would immediately begin airing (in mid-1963) with a Japanese adaptation of the same song, which would later become emblematic of the entire series. This was the first of many changes made in the American adaptation of *Astro Boy* that would be worked back into *Mighty Atom* by the animators at Mushi Productions. But the collaboration process was not always a smooth one. Miscommunications due to the language barrier, cultural differences in programming content that led to problems with the NBC censors, and Ladd's strong opinions and direct control over many important artistic and financial decisions meant that at times NBC and Mushi Productions were strongly at odds.

Lip-synching. Ladd spent an enormous amount of time constructing dialogue that would "labially match" the animation, oftentimes focusing so heavily upon a realistic lip synch that the actual

content and direction of the dialogue would be sacrificed:

A good adaptor is a writer who can write natural-sounding dialogue, while keeping all the labials in the adaptation, and keeping them in the same places in which they occur in the original dialogue.^{xi}

If only Yamamoto from Mushi Productions had informed NBC that his animators were actually *randomly* animating mouth movements for dialogue. Neither Dodd, Ladd, nor any of the three voice actors spoke any Japanese, and Ladd's experience in dubbing – combined with a desire to appear authoritative over the process – likely led the entire team to believe that the Japanese version was realistically lip synched. What resulted was a large allocation of resources toward a moot effort, despite the fact that Ladd writes in his book^{xii} that he produced labial consistency by comparing the sounds in his script to the phonetic transcripts supplied by Mushi Productions.

New Theme. Having just finished *Pinocchio in Outer Space*, Ladd focused heavily on the parallels between Pinocchio and Atom:

Atom was actually different from Pinocchio in a very significant way: Pinocchio did not know right from wrong. Tetsuan [*sic*] Atom always knows right from wrong.^{xiii}

This made sense to Ladd, considering the fact that the *Astro Boy* project was being funded by NBC as “children’s programming,” and that he was working in an industry dominated by Disney, so spectators would notice the likenesses right off the bat. The trouble with Ladd placing primary interest upon Astro’s

differences from Pinocchio is that he seems to have failed to realize that the heart of Atom’s struggle – and the theme of the series introduced by Mushi Productions – is inherently different from that of Pinocchio. *Mighty Atom* is not a remake of a Disney classic, even if (Takarazuka) *Pinocchio* may have heavily influenced Tezuka. *Mighty Atom* was marketed to children and adults in Japan because Atom, in the process of fighting bad guys, is also a minority struggling in an oppressive, homogenous society. Ladd loses sight of this crisis early on:

In my version [of the first episode], I’d have a narrator say that Tobio is driving his car on an electronic highway of the future; the highway, not the boy, is actually controlling the car. Suddenly, there’s an electronic glitch! – the highway control breaks down! Tobio’s car crashes and poor Tobio is an innocent victim! American audiences sympathize with innocent victims; we can understand the father’s grief when his good son is lost in an accident that never should have happened!^{xiiii}

Mighty Atom opens with Tobio dying in a car accident due to his own negligence. He is recklessly driving on a futuristic highway and crashes into innocent victims: in a world full of advanced technology, man is only a threat to himself. From the very first minute of the series, Ladd drastically changes the opening sequence: in a world full of advanced technology, man faces his own mortality only when machines fail to function as they are created.

In *Astro Boy*, Astro, like Pinocchio, aligns himself much more strongly with humans, even though he is not a real boy. In the process of American-izing the

series, the entire NBC team seems to have fundamentally overlooked a key American ingredient: *Mighty Atom* was directly inspired by the civil rights movement that was going on in America at the very same time as the adaptation process.^{xliv} There remains the possibility that Ladd and his team *did* recognize the allegory underlying *Mighty Atom* but chose not to translate it into *Astro Boy* for political or artistic reasons. Most likely, however, is the case that Ladd focused upon the same themes established by Pinocchio: if they worked for Disney, why not for NBC? This thematic transformation is consistent with the changing of artistic audiences. Mushi Productions, for economical reasons, needed to target all of Japan, while NBC could afford to release something “just for children.” With this in mind, it becomes understandable why *Mighty Atom* contained graphic violence that NBC fought hard with Mushi Productions to censor in *Astro Boy*.

Ladd and his team started by simply altering the soundtrack of *Mighty Atom* in the creation of *Astro Boy*, and yet slowly he also began enlisting editors and artists at NBC to re-edit certain sequences and cover up Japanese characters and iconography. Ladd recognized that NBC did not look favorably upon how increasingly violent *Mighty Atom* was becoming, and his quick-fix solution, due to the fact that episodes were being released continuously in Japan, was simply to re-order the series and skip over particularly graphic episodes in favor of cleaner ones. Ladd’s method worked temporarily but lacked foresight and came at the expense of the original narrative structure of *Mighty Atom*. The first two episodes produced of *Astro Boy* correspond to the first and third episodes of *Mighty Atom*, but this jumping around began to accelerate uncontrollably. The ninth episode of *Astro Boy* is actually the seventeenth episode of *Mighty Atom*! This

presented many problems: Ladd and his actors/writers began to take more liberties with the narrative and thematic structure; many episodes that Mushi believed they were selling to NBC were actually going unused; and, rather quickly, NBC was demanding new episodes from Mushi that were overlapping with the Japanese release schedule. Further, these up-to-date episodes were likely to be rejected by NBC for the very same violence and murder that had forced Ladd to skip over previously received episodes. The model was unsustainable and was forcing Ladd and his team to further cut down an already extremely minimalistic image track.

What resulted was NBC’s applying pressure directly to the animators back at Mushi Productions because, after all, the money being made by American distribution had become a necessary part of the Mushi Productions budget. By that time, Tezuka was already committed to several other artistic projects – mostly manga – and, realizing the fiscal reality of the situation, encouraged his studio to oblige. What resulted was a toning down of the violence in *Mighty Atom* to accommodate *Astro Boy*, in addition to many other small changes to streamline the distribution process. This is why, around the latter half of the first series, all the signs in *Mighty Atom* begin to be written in English.^{xlv}

NBC would purchase another 52 episodes for *Astro Boy*, for a complete run of 104 episodes over two years, and *Mighty Atom* would finish airing on December 31, 1966, with episode 193. Both series attained their highest ratings during their second seasons with a peak of 40% of viewers in Japan,^{xlvi} several months after *Mighty Atom* had adapted many of the conventions of *Astro Boy*. Paradoxically, Ladd’s efforts to Americanize *Astro Boy* ended up removing American aspects – such as references to the Civil Rights

Movement – and instead seemed more directly to Americanize *Mighty Atom*, with Mushi Productions adapting the theme song, realigning the narrative, and changing Atom’s town to look more like a futuristic New York City than Tokyo.

In a bi-national effort accomplished by two teams both working on extremely low budgets and rapid production schedules, *Mighty Atom* and *Astro Boy* became more and more similar, to such an extent that in Japan, depending upon the context, the character is known both as Tetsuwan Atomu (Mighty Atom) and Asutoro Boi (Astro Boy). Thus, as a result of the international distribution of *Astro Boy*, the *Mighty Atom* series being watched back in Japan became increasingly influenced by NBC’s Americanization process: two names, a theme song, less violence, and English diegetic signs. These dynamic incorporations lead to a much broader question: if *Mighty Atom* is the origin of anime, is anime really Japanese?

WHAT DOES ANIME LOOK AND SMELL LIKE?

In his seminal text *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*, cultural scholar Kōichi Iwabuchi spends hundreds of pages delicately, and rather insightfully, examining various questions pertaining to the cultural identity of Japanese products. Iwabuchi begins his book by arguing that pop cultural exports of Japan – notably, a list that begins with “animation”^{xlvi} – are culturally “odorless.” In the particular case of animation, Iwabuchi presents many factors contributing to this lack of a cultural odor, such as the fact that more than 99% of exported animation is dubbed into another language, augmented by creators making “characters that look non-Japanese because they are

clearly conscious that the market is global.”^{xlvi} This echoes Dodd’s belief that NBC could sell *Astro Boy* without local stations realizing the show was actually animated in Japan. While Iwabuchi’s argument is much more complex and overarching than can be explicated here, his starting points must be introduced to understand a relevant trend in literature on anime.

In opposition to work such as that by Napier, which places anime within a lineage of high cultural Japanese traditions, critics have established a scholastic camp that evokes Iwabuchi’s notions of cultural odorlessness. Even Schodt, in his rather informal approach to Tezuka’s career and relationship with *Mighty Atom*, offers a similar criticism:

As Tezuka noted wryly years later, intellectuals and critics who talked about Mighty Atom often imputed great philosophical meaning to the long pauses and limited action of the film. They assigned a high-art motive to it that had never really existed in the beginning – even calling it a “uniquely Japanese technique” and a clever application of the Kabuki tradition of *mie*, where actors freeze in a dramatic flourish.^{xlix}

In light of Tezuka’s adoration of Takarazuka theater and the economic situation which gave rise to Mushi Production’s cel bank system, it would seem difficult to substantiate an argument rooting the aesthetics of *Mighty Atom* in kabuki *mie* (besides Napier,¹ this idea can also be found in *God of Comics*^h) and yet it is but one of many such conclusions commonly reached by essentialist writers on “Japanimation.” To combat this descent into Orientalism, scholars of anime have begun to combine Iwabuchi’s notions of cultural odorlessness with

another concept in his book: *mukokuseki* (literally, “statelessness”), which Iwabuchi defines as “racially, ethnically and culturally unembedded and/or erasing national/cultural characteristics.”^{lii}

Proponents of the statelessness, or non-nationality, of animation^{liii} have a growing tendency to argue that anime has become a global phenomenon precisely because it lacks cultural odor to such an extent that it can be “glocalized,” or distributed in local markets around the world in a form that feels local instead of imported. A commonly cited example of this is *Captain Tsubasa*, a Japanese animated television show surrounding a soccer star that became so popular in the Middle Eastern Arabic version (*Captain Majid*) that few viewers would be able to identify it as a foreign series.^{liv}

This movement in the literature is certainly an improvement upon former work that illegitimately attempts to interpret animation as a mirror of Japaneseness. Nevertheless, these efforts paradoxically come back into direct conflict with Iwabuchi’s thesis in two ways. First, heralding anime as *the* form of *mukokuseki* animation directly conflicts with Iwabuchi’s conclusion that “the exclusive association of Japanization with glocalism looks tenuous and essentialist”^{lv} precisely because it is inherently nationalistic (and thus ignorant of other dynamic, global traditions of animation) to argue that Japan is the most “stateless” state. Second, by overemphasizing the importance of hybridity in globalization, what remains forgotten of Iwabuchi is that “this does not mean that the ‘national’ has become insignificant. On the contrary, its persisting significance is newly articulated precisely through transnational movements.”^{lvi}

By trying to refocus the conversation surrounding anime from one of Japaneseness to *mukokuseki* through the concepts introduced by Iwabuchi, scholars

have lost sight of the very premise upon which Iwabuchi introduces cultural odorlessness: a concept that “offers new and significant insights into understanding the decentered nature of transnational cultural power.”^{lvii} Thus, while these two groups of literature seem directly at odds, the truly informed, nuanced approach necessary to discuss the decentered nature of anime production without forgetting the existence and importance of national cultural power should be found somewhere *between* the two methodologies.

This requires a scholar of serialized anime to operate under these assumptions:

- the existence of national production models and artistic traditions;
- the possibility that those models and traditions may or may not economically and/or artistically influence a work of animation;
- the possibility that a work of animation may or may not change significantly during the process of international distribution;
- the possibility that those significant changes may or may not alter the original work of animation in its domestic form;
- the possibility that those alterations upon the domestic form of a work of animation may or may not lead to extra-national influences upon national models and traditions.

In adherence to this model, the relevant social, industrial, and personal factors that contributed to the creation and proliferation of *Mighty Atom* and *Astro Boy* have been thoroughly examined here to illustrate the direction that literature on anime should take in order to illustrate the truly dynamic nature of the text shaped by cultural and industrial influences that are transnational, yet can be traced back to

national models and traditions, historical contexts, and artistic collaborators with decision-making powers. Many have convincingly argued that the aesthetics of *Mighty Atom*, in addition to the low-budget production model introduced by Mushi Productions, set the standard for subsequent animated television in Japan, which gave rise to the anime phenomenon.^{lviii} But in order to make definitive statements about the aesthetic look, industrial composition, and/or cultural odor of anime, the proper role of a researcher should be to look delicately at the fine details of aesthetic and financial decision-making while remaining cognizant of larger issues of cultural power. Otherwise he runs the risk of publishing work that will later be criticized as essentialist or Orientalist. The various parts of *Mighty Atom* can now be traced back to historically substantiated factors: Tezuka drawing upon Disney's dream of an illusion of life for consistency of mass; Mushi animators adapting to strapped resources by creating the dynamically immobile image; Ladd and Rockwell introducing Japanese animated television to the opening theme song; NBC executives censoring violence and changing narrative direction in both *Astro Boy* and *Mighty Atom*. Scholars reconstructing a non-essentialist history of animation will need to stay mindful of the decentered nature of transnational cultural power while also remaining aware of the fact that the impact of individuals, collectives, and national contexts can very well shape aesthetics and production models. As an origin story, *Mighty Atom* and its distinctly bi-cultural components mark just the beginning of the ripe history of influences, innovations, and decisions that remain to be written of the history of anime. Yet this sole work manages to single-handedly deflate both arguments that marry anime to Japanese high cultural

traditions and attempts to ignore the persisting significance of nations by evoking *mukokuseki*.

A few months after the conclusion of the *Mighty Atom* television series, Tezuka published a short article lamenting the end of Atom:

The Mushi Productions' executive in charge of the *Mighty Atom* series died the very day we finished production on the last TV episode, and to me his funeral was also like a funeral for Atom. O Atom, I thought at the time, May you rest in peace...^{lix}

What Tezuka never realized was that Atom would never die. Not only has Atom been redrawn and reanimated after Tezuka's death, after the bankruptcy of Mushi Productions, and after the international proliferation of anime, but also, more importantly, both Atom *and* Astro live on: they have sparked the fundamental aesthetics and cultural odor of the anime phenomenon.

IMAGE APPENDIX



Image 1: From the 1930s manga *Norakuro*, published for a decade in *Shōnen Kurabu*.




Image 2: "Cinematic Manga" – Transformations in Phoenix appear frame by frame.



Image 3: "Cinematic Manga" – Tezuka illustrates dialogue with shot/reverse shot.



Image 4: "Cinematic Manga" – Characters run as if toward a camera.




Image 5: The "emotional flour sack" from *The Illusion of Life*.




Image 6: From *Felix the Cat*.



Image 7: The ever-changeable Daffy Duck.




Image 8: Ambassador Atom.




Image 11: Pinocchio being created.




Image 9: Atom and his special powers.




Image 12: Atom being created.



Image 10: Atom plagued by an identity crisis.



Image 13: From *Aru machikado no monogatari* (Story of a Certain Street Corner)



8-3-「原色甲蟲図譜」第2集(1943年1月)



8-1-「動物の世界」(1942年7月)



7-1-「原色日記」(1942年10月4日—1943年10月23日)

Image 14: Tezuka would capture, illustrate, and categorize bugs as a child.







Image 15: From *Otogi manga calendar* (Instant History).




Images 16-17: Two consecutive static shots from *Mighty Atom*.





Images 18-19: Zoom in on a static image in *Mighty Atom*.




Image 22-23: Walking cycles in *Mighty Atom*.



Images 20-21: Pan across a static image in *Mighty Atom*.




Images 24-25: Vehicular travel in *Mighty Atom*.





Images 26-28: The three possible shapes of mouths in *Mighty Atom*.



Images 29-30: A fight sequence in *Mighty Atom* composed entirely of static images.





Images 31-32: A fight sequence in *Mighty Atom* composed entirely of static images.

ⁱ Frederik Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 1st (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2007), 56.

ⁱⁱ Susan Napier, *Anime from Akira to Howl's Moving Castle*, 2nd, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 4.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Tezuka Osamu Kinenkan no Hon*, (Takarazuka: Tezuka Productions, 2003), 10.

^{iv} Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston, *The Illusion of Life*, (New York: Hyperion Books, 1995), 53.

^v Hayao Miyazaki, *Starting Point*, trans. Beth Cary and Frederik Schodt (San Francisco: VIZ Media LLC, 2009), 197.

^{vi} *Ibid.*, 193.

^{vii} Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 66.

^{viii} *Ibid.*, 44.

^{ix} Pam Cook, *The Cinema Book*, 3rd, (London, England: British Film Institute, 2008), 479.

^x Yoichi Shibutani and Mamoru Oshii, "Naze Tezuka Osamu wa Atomu ga kirai datta no ka," *Sight*, April 2003, translated in Frederik Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 1st, (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2007), 153.

^{xi} Robert Allen and Douglas Gomery, *Film History Theory and Practice*, 1st, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1935), 111.

^{xii} Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 18-20.

^{xiii} Anne Allison, *Millennial Monsters: Japanese Toys and The Global Imagination*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 57.

^{xiv} Napier, *Anime from Akira to Howl's Moving Castle*, 4.

^{xv} Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 123.

^{xvi} Mamie Kawai, "Atomu no haha, Takarazuka kageki?" *Asahi Shinbun*, April 7, 2008.

^{xvii} Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 52.

^{xviii} Marc Steinberg, *Anime's Media Mix*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 33.

^{xix} Osamu Tezuka, "Atomu no Shi," *Chuo Koron*, April 1967, translated in Frederik Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 1st, (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2007), 59.

^{xx} Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 59.

^{xxi} *Ibid.*, 67.

^{xxii} *Ibid.*, 65.

^{xxiii} Steinberg, *Anime's Media Mix*, 19.

^{xxiv} Eiichiro Yamamoto, *Mushi Puro no kōbōki*, (Tokyo: Shinchosha), 92-93, translated in Frederik Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 1st, (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2007), 48.

^{xxv} Allen and Gomery, *Film History Theory and Practice*, 113.

^{xxvi} See also Yamamoto, *Mushi Puro no kōbōki*, 105-107; Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 71; Steinberg, *Anime's Media Mix*, 15.

^{xxvii} Yamamoto, *Mushi Puro no kōbōki*, 105.

^{xxviii} Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 67.

^{xxix} Steinberg, *Anime's Media*, 25-31.

^{xxx} *Ibid.*, 16.

^{xxxi} Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 185.

^{xxxii} Fred Ladd and Harvey Deneroff, *Astro Boy and Anime Come to the Americas*, (North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc., 2009), 21.

^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, 25.

^{xxxiv} *Ibid.*, 25.

^{xxxv} *Ibid.*, 10.

^{xxxvi} *Ibid.*, 15.

xxxvii Ibid., 23.

xxxviii Ibid., 24.

xxxix Ibid., 24.

xl Ibid., 21.

xli Ibid., 21.

xlii Ibid., 12.

xliii Ibid., 14-15.

xliv Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 123.

xlv Ladd, *Astro Boy and Anime Come to the Americas*, 36.

xlvi Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 188.

xlvii Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2002), 1.

xlviii Ibid., 94.

xlix Schodt, *The Astro Boy Essays*, 153.

¹ Napier, *Anime from Akira to Howl's Moving Castle*, 4.

ⁱⁱ Natsu Power, *God of Comics: Osamu Tezuka and the Creation of Post-World War II Manga*. (Jackson, MI: University of Mississippi Press, 2009), 133-134.

ⁱⁱⁱ Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization*, 28.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ See also Mamoru Oshii, Kazunori Itō, and Toshiya Ueno, "Eiga to wa jitsu wa animeshon data," *Yuriika* 28, no. 9 (August 1996): 77; Mark MacWilliams, *Japanese Visual Culture*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008).

^{lv} Mark MacWilliams, *Japanese Visual Culture*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), 15.

^{lv} Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization*, 46.

^{lvi} Ibid., 52.

^{lvii} Ibid., 24.

^{lviii} See also Schodt; Steinberg; Charles Solomon. "On DVD, the Return of the Original Astro Boy," *New York Times*, April 9, 2006, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/arts/television/09solo.html>>

^{lix} Tezuka, "Atomu no Shi," 150.

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THE POWER OF INVISIBILITY

American Empire in the Conundrum of Yasukuni Shrine

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ABSTRACT

Controversies surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan regularly appear in international media. As territorial disputes, textbook controversies, and other history-related issues continue to rile nationalistic rhetoric in East Asia, Yasukuni remains the preeminent symbol of East Asia's enduring contests over what should constitute "accurate" history. Yet, Yasukuni is only discussed in the context of Japan's bilateral relations with South Korea and China. This article operates from the position that the United States has engaged in imperial and colonial practices since its formation as a nation-state and through to the present. Within that context, the article examines religious reforms instituted during the Allied Occupation of Japan and their effects on the postwar Yasukuni Shrine. After locating the United States in the historiography of Yasukuni Shrine, the article concludes that the United States should feature more prominently in the discourse on the shrine and in other East Asian history-related issues in general.

INTRODUCTION

Tensions are high in East Asia. Japan's diplomatic relations with its neighbors revolve around balancing the economic necessity of amiable trade relations and the domestic political

expediency of antagonizing its neighbors. Holding symbolic value as well as geopolitical and economic consequence, various territorial disputes in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea currently receive prominent attention by international media.ⁱ In the midst of this dynamic lies the Yasukuni Shrine, a sacred Shintō space in Tokyo, Japan, dedicated to those who died on behalf of the Empire of Japan.ⁱⁱ Its rites of propitiation give peace and rest to the over 2,466,000 spirits enshrined there.ⁱⁱⁱ While people across the world generally treat cemeteries, burial grounds, and memorials to the deceased with solemnity and respect, Japan's premier memorial to its past soldiers consistently sparks outrage in East Asia. Japan's bilateral relations with China and Korea deteriorate whenever senior members of Japan's government make official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, because it is generally viewed by East Asian government officials and lay people alike as the symbol *par excellence* of Japan's recalcitrance in acknowledging atrocities it committed during the Second World War, including the "Comfort Women,"^{iv} the Rape of Nanjing,^v and Unit 731.^{vi} The shrine became internationally controversial in the 1970s when it was discovered that the spirits of fourteen Class-A war criminals from World War II had been enshrined there.

The United States does not feature prominently in the

historiography of Yasukuni Shrine. In my argument, I will start with the premise that imperialism and colonialism accurately characterize the historical experience of the US nation-state, contrary to pervasive exceptionalist discourse that represents American history otherwise. Presuming the imperial character of the US, I will examine the encounter between specific actors within the American Occupation regime (1945-1952) and the constituents of Yasukuni Shrine to accomplish two objectives: to locate the influence of the US in the postwar history of the shrine; to establish the shrine as a symbol of the historical amnesia and militarism shared by Japan and the United States.

The policy decisions enacted after interaction between the leaders of the Shintō establishment and the Religions Division of the Occupation—in the context of the overall Occupation framework and the theme of American imperialism—will shed light on why the shrine continues to exacerbate political tensions in East Asia today.

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE

The term *empire* when referring to the US was first used by Thomas Jefferson, who envisaged the new country as an “Empire of Liberty” that would spread freedom across the globe.^{vii} He viewed this new type of empire as an exemplar of freedom in a world dominated by tyrannical European colonial empires. Ironically, realizing Jefferson’s vision would entail systematic racial oppression and imperialistic expansion across the continent. Colonial conquests and annexations—against Native North America, Mexico, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, Alaska—constituted the formation of

the US nation-state and foreshadow American imperial power overseas, beginning in the nineteenth century. In spite of this pattern of intercultural relations, popular discourse in the US on itself as an empire is rendered controversial and seemingly inappropriate by American exceptionalism, which portrays the US as a unique and superior country due to its birth from an anti-imperial revolution motivated by belief in personal freedom, free enterprise, and liberal rights.^{viii} For example, exceptionalism is fueled by statements made by people like former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who in 2003 said, “We don’t seek empires. We’re not imperialistic. We never have been. I can’t imagine why you’d even ask that question.”^{ix} In situations where administrations had to justify blatantly colonial enterprises (e.g., the Philippines), the state empowered itself through strategies that produced spaces of exception (e.g., Guantanamo Bay) where deviations from domestic law, international law, and the values idolized in the Declaration of Independence can be ignored.

Although imperialism and colonialism overlap, they are separate phenomena. Engseng Ho defines colonialism as the foreign presence in, possession of, and domination over bounded, local places.^x Imperialism, on the other hand, refers to foreign domination—without the necessity of presence or possession—over expansive, transnational spaces and many places.^{xi} He dissects the history of empire into three broad phases. The first phase began in the sixteenth century, when the Americas were conquered through settler colonization, with power being “manually” exercised on the ground.^{xii} Military conquest effectively legitimized the empire’s

ownership and extraction of land and labor within the colonies, as did the self-proclaimed divine right to settle “new” lands and spread the word of God.

Improvements in transportation and communication technologies facilitated imperial expansion into Asia and Africa in the nineteenth century, composing the second phase of the history of empire. While this phase of imperialism was also accompanied by colonialism, it was of a “thinner” type,^{xiii} whereby metropolises maintained dominance via commercial, military, and administrative personnel rather than by large settler populations. Colonial India is arguably the archetype for this phase of empire, since it was bureaucratically administered rather than overrun by Britons. Moral critiques of the earlier phase of empire by eighteenth century Enlightenment thinkers led to slavery and other forms of direct human bondage losing legitimacy, while bestowal of “civilization” by the West (and Japan) arose as justification for taking possession of a colony’s land.

Ho’s third stage of empire begins at the close of World War II, when the United States alone was able to project its military power through sea and airspace with an extensive and rapidly expanding network of military bases across the Pacific and Eurasia. Critiques of the second phase of empire, like those of the first phase in the eighteenth century, resulted in the language of legitimization further shifting away from overt support for colonialism. Nominal respect for the sovereignty of former colonies started to become the norm. The idealistic rhetoric of the day hailed the end of colonialism with anticolonial and nationalistic movements drawing upon Woodrow Wilson’s famous assertion of

the value of self-determination.^{xiv} Ironically, the US took the lead in this new era of indirect imperialism by representing itself as a benevolent, anticolonial force while simultaneously engaging in neocolonial enterprises.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF ANTICOLONIAL IMPERIALISM

Following World War II, humanity witnessed the mass dismantling of colonial empires and the rhetorical rise of “independence, freedom, and democracy for all,” with the United States at the helm. Former colonies would not—or could not—revert to their pre-colonial social structures, since the nation-state “provides the only accountable, acceptable, and disciplinable custodian for investments from far away”.^{xv} Chatterjee similarly asserts that old-order forms of economic and strategic control over foreign territories and their natural and productive resources transformed after World War II into new, informal strategies exercised through diplomatic influence, economic incentives, and treaty obligations.^{xvi} Economically, ideals of global commerce and free trade continued from the second phase into the third, though the language evolved from universal exchange into global investment—from bestowing civilization, to aiding in development. The creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and similar organizations embodied the transformation from “civilization” discourse to capital investment and development projects. However, these global institutions tend to perpetuate and magnify economic and developmental inequalities rather than to ameliorate them. If one looks at even the broadest measure of global

inequality—gross domestic product (GDP)—the gap between the richest and poorest nation was 22 to 1 in 1900, 88 to 1 in 1970, and 267 to 1 in 2000,^{xvii} reflecting ever-improving capabilities of imperial economic structures to regulate, extract, integrate, and penetrate civil society.^{xviii} Colonies rushing toward independence suddenly became categorized as the “Third World,” areas waiting for wealthier countries to aid in balancing payments, stabilizing currency, building infrastructure, and protecting private property.^{xix} The US took the lead in supporting these formally anticolonial, international economic structures that enforced the formation of sovereign nation-states across the world for purposes of global capitalism—an economic empire in a sense. Here the critical distinction between colonialism and empire is evident, as well as how the US can be seen as an anticolonial empire.

Chatterjee defines “imperialism” as the power to declare the colonial exception.^{xx} In all phases of empire conceptualized by Ho,^{xxi} colonial rule was predicated on cultural difference between the colonizer and the colonized, with the assumption that the colonizer’s culture was wholly superior. Specifically, the dominant society’s moral judgments of those cultural differences functioned to justify imperial rule. As democratic publics become increasingly politically assertive with a rhetoric of high morality and critiques of colonial rule abroad, states adapt to such critiques by changing the manner in which they declare a cultural difference in order to establish a colonial exception. Chatterjee maintains that declarations of cultural difference based on a given norm (e.g., attainment of “civilization,” democratic values) lead to the position that imposing

colonial rule onto a society can, and should, deviate from universal moral values such as human rights and national self-determination—the “colonial exception.”^{xxii} Declaring a colonial exception necessitates a corollary pedagogical project,^{xxiii} whereby the imperial power assumes the responsibility to raise the colony up to the norm that was used as the excuse to declare the colonial exception in the first place.

Chatterjee’s concept of the “imperial prerogative” and the “colonial exception” may be applied to the (US-led) Allied Occupation of Japan. Imperial Japan had violated what the US proclaimed to be universal ideals (i.e., free enterprise, liberal democracy, and the separation of religion and state). These violations, many thinkers postulated, were the foundational causes for what the US saw as Japan’s fanatical militarism and necessitated the US to correct the civilizational flaws of Imperial Japan.^{xxiv} Though US rule in post-defeat Japan was never described or acknowledged as colonial, the US nevertheless governed as a neocolonial overlord, beyond challenge or criticism, as inviolate as Japan’s god-emperor had ever been.^{xxv} Similar to formal colonial situations, the US from the outset declared a pedagogical objective in occupying Japan: to dismantle the state and ideological structures that it believed set Japan on a militaristic rampage and, in the void, plant the noble seed of democracy and liberty so that Japan would never again disturb the peace of the world. In other words, the US would attempt to “civilize” Japan by imposing onto it an American-style political culture. Viewed in these terms, the Occupation of Japan can be seen as a neocolonial project, which, in certain respects, has never actually ended.

THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Historian John Dower characterized the Allied Occupation of Japan and its goals of “demilitarization and democratization” as a “remarkable display of arrogant idealism—both self-righteous and genuinely visionary.”^{xxvi} Postwar administration of Japan’s former Axis partner, Germany, was divided among the Allies—the United States, England, France, and the Soviet Union—and thus was not subjected to the unilateral authority of the US. Indeed, the prospects of taking total control over a pagan, “Oriental” society by white men evoked an exoticism that was absent in the occupation of Germany—a sentiment reminiscent of the formal age of imperialism that characterized the pre-World War II international arena. Japan’s unprecedented loss of sovereignty to a foreign power provided a point of departure from which a new order could be established. For the (American) victors, an ambitious project of democratization, based on the exceptional American model, could be imposed on Japan – a democratic “revolution from above” in Dower’s terms. For the vanquished, Japanese responses to defeat in many ways can be seen as an “embrace,” an opportunity to take advantage of the structural changes made possible by Occupation authorities and to actively shape the future of Japan in their own way.^{xxvii}

Contrary to the planning for the German Occupation, American policy-making for postwar Japan reflected the complex and competing views within the various branches of government regarding the future of America’s role in Asia.^{xxviii} This dynamic may explain the abrupt, rightward shift in overall policy

three years into the Occupation, known now as the “reverse course.” Planning for post-surrender Asia began on December 28, 1941, when President Roosevelt created the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.^{xxix} This committee established five interdepartmental subcommittees to explore foreign policy options. One of these subcommittees, the Territorial Subcommittee (TS), formed on March 7, 1942, debated and struggled with issues such as unconditional surrender, the Imperial institution, economic policies, and Japan’s post-defeat boundaries.

An ideological rivalry soon developed between a pro-China group and a pro-Japan group within the TS that foreshadowed the “reverse course” in Occupation policy. Pro-China hardliners believed that Japan’s imperialistic aggression was primarily due to the emperor-centric political system and the domination of giant financial and industrial monopolies called the *zaibatsu*.^{xxx} Led primarily by avowed “anti-Japanese bigots,”^{xxxi} they also predicted that Republican China would eventually rise to be the leader of Asia. To prevent Japan from ever again posing a military or economic threat to the US and its future interests in Asia, the pro-China group urged the elimination of the emperor system, the enfeeblement of Japanese capitalism, and the radical reformation of Japan’s political and economic structures.^{xxxii} Important for the purposes of this paper is that many of the highest-level American supporters for radical reforms in Japan were actors who wished to permanently subdue Japan’s economic, military, and political power. Thus, many of the fundamental reforms that people often applaud the US Occupation for were, in fact, not

altruistically motivated (at least at the policy-making level).

Operating with a vastly different orientation and led by Joseph C. Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, the “Japan crowd” was comprised of people with extensive diplomatic experience in Japan, considerable facility with the language, and, as a result of their high-level careers, experience associating with Japanese aristocrats close to the throne. Grew believed that the emperor system was the only institution that could prevent fascism from returning, or even worse, a communist takeover. Eugene H. Dooman,^{xxxiii} Special Assistant to Grew, saw the emperor as “a living manifestation of the racial continuity of the Japanese people” and believed that Japan would literally fall apart without the throne.^{xxxiv} Their claims received intellectual and moral support from scholars not directly employed by the Occupation, such as John F. Embree of the University of Chicago, author of the first English-language anthropological study on Japan.^{xxxv} Arguably, the greatest intellectual support for retention of the emperor for American imperial interests was Ruth Benedict’s famous *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (1946), which Sociologist Elson Boles describes as being a classically orientaling work that justified the need for the US to spread its culture abroad.^{xxxvi}

Overall, these Japan experts opposed abolishing the monarchy and imposing radical economic and political reforms, and instead advocated purging the “military clique” and their fanatic followers who had appropriated the state’s institutions for their own chauvinistic ends.^{xxxvii} Though wholeheartedly against militarism, the Japan experts preferred an approach that would preserve continuity with

conservative elements of Japan’s government, thereby preventing the spread of communism. The Occupation ultimately pursued this approach.

In December 1944, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was created to coordinate planning between civilian and military agencies. On August 15, 1945, Japan accepted the surrender terms in the Potsdam Declaration.^{xxxviii} On September 22, 1945, SWNCC issued a document entitled the “US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” (henceforth “Post-Surrender Policy”), which described the structure and objectives of the Occupation.^{xxxix} A military regime administered nominally by the Allied Powers (though the US held supreme authority)^{xl} was to be established and would strive to eradicate Japanese militarism, strengthen democratic tendencies among the people, and encourage the development of liberal political groups.^{xli} Known as General Headquarters (GHQ) or SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), the US regime’s specific directives would be based on the principles outlined in the Potsdam Declaration and the “Post-Surrender Policy.” For example, SWNCC’s provision calling for “Freedom of Worship” was incorporated into the Shintō Directive of December 15, 1945, eliminating state sponsorship of Shintoism and strictly separating religion and state. Particularly, the policy stipulated that the Supreme Commander—General Douglas MacArthur—would practically exercise his authority through Japanese government machinery and agencies, including the emperor, though he could intervene directly and by any means if he deemed it necessary.^{xlii} He was not

obligated to back the emperor or any other (Japanese) government authority.

In the end, the Occupation would exercise its authority through a largely intact Japanese bureaucracy, with the emperor being shielded from all prosecution for his war responsibility despite it being fought in his name. Drawing intellectual support from scholars such as Embree and Benedict, the US government believed that retaining the emperor would guarantee the obedience of the Japanese people by virtue of his “spiritual” authority.^{xliii} The American approach to the Occupation of Japan, though primarily motivated by pragmatic concerns of governance, followed the same trajectory set forth by previous American imperialist enterprises such as the colonization of the Philippines, which was still an American colony at the time of Japan’s unconditional surrender. For example, due to the linguistic and cultural differences between the US and the Philippines, the maintenance and execution of authority also required indirect rule through bureaucratic apparatuses, though with overwhelming military power to enforce such rule. The language of legitimization/justification is also related, since American imperial efforts in the Philippines were to be an exercise in Christianization and civilization. Occupying Japan was to be a mission in democratization. Resulting from shifts in geopolitical relations stemming from the onset of the Cold War and the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, the idealistic and radical reforms of the first two years of the Occupation fell victim to the very authority that had imposed them in the first place. Similar to what occurred in the Philippines, the Japanese would be guaranteed independence once they proved capable of ruling themselves as

a democracy—Jefferson’s “Empire of Liberty” at work. In both cases, the US would maintain a military presence after independence was returned.

Although the contemporary strength of Japan’s democracy and economy certainly suggest that the Occupation was an overall success, select policy decisions adhered to by the American Occupation regime would effectively prevent postwar Japanese society from identifying seriously with its own responsibility for the destruction wrought by the Pacific War. The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was one such decision that (understandably) contributed to postwar Japan’s tendency to claim itself as the ultimate victim of World War II, to the consternation of Japan’s former victims. Not only protecting the emperor from being prosecuted for any responsibility for the war, but also actively denying his role in directing it was another such policy decision with profound consequences for postwar Japan. Dower perhaps described this consequence best: “If the man in whose name imperial Japan had conducted foreign and military policy for twenty years was not held accountable for the initiation or conduct of the war, why should anyone expect ordinary people to dwell on such matters, or to think seriously about their own personal responsibility.”^{xliv} Furthermore, retention of the imperial institution left untouched many ritual bonds linking Shintō and the state. Reforms concerning Yasukuni Shrine would thus contribute to Japan’s historical amnesia surrounding World War II.

YASUKUNI SHRINE 1869-1945

The Yasukuni Shrine is a peculiar institution that has accompanied Japan's modernization. From apparently innocent beginnings as a display of the emperor's gratitude for loyal soldiers, this shrine would become the central ideological vehicle through which Japanese society militarized and embarked on the self-destructive path that was the Second World War. The inception of Yasukuni also coincided with that of modern *Shintō*, a religion commonly believed to be the ancient, unchanging, indigenous religion of Japan. In fact, what is now called Shintō (Way of the Kami) used only to be disparate, localized cults devoted to tutelary deities, with no doctrine, set institutions, professional clergy, or historical founder. Shintō was invented concurrently with the Japanese nation-state, with nationalists arguing that performing Shintō rituals was how one properly venerated the emperor and fulfilled one's civic duty. Such propositions that Shintō was not a religion—whereas Buddhism and Christianity were religions—would confuse Occupation authorities in their attempts to democratize Japan and institute the principle of religious freedom. Yasukuni is a controversial shrine presenting a wide range of interrelated problems that touch on contemporary constitutional concerns about the separation of religion and state, questions about Japan's acknowledgement of its aggressive past, and anxieties about Japan's future. What follows is a review of its invention at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the ideological symbolism it represented until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

In the late Tokugawa period (1600-1868), a long-standing nativist intellectual movement called *kokugaku*

(national scholarship) became increasingly concerned with the role of the imperial institution, which had traditionally served a symbolic and legitimizing function for the military government (*bakufu*) or *shōgun*. Ideologically led by the religious and populist teachings of Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843), followers of the *kokugaku* tradition began to combine anti-foreign sentiment with a religious fervor centering on Amaterasu^{xlv} and a restoration of her direct descendent, the “priest king” (the emperor), to political power. In 1854, Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived with his “black ships” and forced Japan to engage in international trade and diplomacy, resulting in the Kanagawa Treaty (1854) and later the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1858), which established for foreigners extraterritorial rights and opened ports for trade. These treaties used the term *shūkyō* (sectarian teachings) when referring to Westerners' rights to practice Christianity.^{xlvi} Using *shūkyō* as a translation for religion (based on a Christian model) reinforced Japanese associations of religion with “evil, foreign teachings” that encourage loyalty to authorities other than the Japanese imperial state.^{xlvii} This negative connotation of foreignness that attached to discussions of religion further fueled nativism and contributed to the birth of modern *Shintō*.

Perry's arrival concretized the foreign threat and hastened the breakout of a series of civil wars in the late nineteenth century between domains that supported the imperial court and those that supported the Tokugawa Shogunate—a period of history known as the Meiji Restoration. In 1866, the western domains of Satsuma and Chōshū formed an alliance

in order to overthrow the Tokugawa, restore the emperor to political power, and expel Europeans from Japan.^{xlvi} The following year, Emperor Kōmei (1831-1867) died of smallpox, leaving his teenage son Mutsuhito to be enthroned as Emperor "Meiji," which means "enlightened rule" although, not unlike his predecessors, his authority was controlled by the oligarchs surrounding him.^{xlix}

BIRTH OF A NEW SHRINE, BIRTH OF A NEW NATION

A guidebook published by the Japanese government for the families of deceased soldiers included a speech given by an imperial representative explaining the emperor's decision to build a shrine dedicated to the soldiers who fought and died for him in the Restoration.¹ Deriving from the deep compassion and gratitude of the emperor, this shrine—originally named the *Shōkonsha* (Spirit Invoking Shrine)—was built in Kyoto to console the spirits of the war dead. Klaus Antoni's discussion of the "bad death" concept is helpful for comprehending the religious motivation for constructing the Shōkonsha. In its Japanese manifestation, it was believed that the souls of people who died premature, unnatural, or violent deaths, or who died far away from home as strangers, would become *onryōgami* (bitterly hating, vengeful gods).^{li} These vengeful spirits would terrorize the living unless placated through ritual offerings. The newly enthroned Meiji Emperor ordered the construction of the Shōkonsha in this religious context.^{lii}

Although the desire to console the spirits of loyalists who died violent deaths in service to the emperor is

implied by the shrine's original name, a more political motivation—attaching prestige to those who fight for the new government—could very well have been an equally, or even more, powerful motivation. A cabinet ordinance dated May 10, 1868 mentioned the importance of "rendering great services for the country" more than the need to "console their souls," which was only stated once.^{liii} The wording of this ordinance therefore suggests a greater political, rather than religious, motivation, even behind the initial purpose for creating of the Shōkonsha. Despite a clearly powerful political motivation, the direct connection between the shrine's religious and civic functions would remain explicit until 1945. In 1869 the capital was moved to Edō, renamed Tōkyō, and the Kyōto Shōkonsha was transferred to Kudan Hill in the new capital.^{liv}

Further efforts to coalesce Japanese nationalism are evident in the 1870s. Disaffected with the particular direction Japan's new leadership was then taking, Saigō Takamori, leader of the Satsuma domain and major player in the Meiji Restoration, began leading the secession of his hometown of Kagoshima from the central government.^{lv} The government's efforts to prevent this secession resulted in an armed conflict called the Saigō Rebellion in January 1877.^{lvi} After its successful suppression in September of the same year, the government changed the official name of the Tōkyō Shōkonsha to *Yasukuni Jinja* (Peaceful Country Shrine) in an announcement to the defied spirits of the war dead.^{lvii} Two reasons motivating this change can be discerned from archival documents. First, the term "shōkonsha" refers specifically to the calling of spirits who are housed *temporarily* in an altar, and

was therefore an inappropriate name for the *permanent* enshrinement of the nation's patriotic souls.^{lxviii} Interestingly, it took the government ten years from the shrine's construction in 1869 to discover the technical meaning of "shōkonsha", and to decide to change its name.^{lix} Second, the Saigō Rebellion prompted the name change. Seeking to cement the loyalty of its troops and gain the support of dissenters, the Meiji government began to emphasize the divine rewards bestowed upon loyal citizens and expressed the desire for solidarity in the face of the foreign threat—the desire for a "peaceful country."

The political value of Yasukuni Shrine can further be seen in the favor shown to it by the emperor. In Shintō, the Grand Shrine of Ise (*Ise Jingū*) in Mie Prefecture is paramount because it is dedicated to the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, the direct ancestor of the emperor. Its prestige is evident given the regular visits and patronage from the imperial house since the early Heian Period (794-1185). Despite the continued *religious* primacy of the Grand Shrine of Ise into the Meiji era, the new emperor donated to Yasukuni as a permanent endowment for shrine expenses an estate yielding about 50,000 bushels of rice—a grant so big that it rivaled the Grand Shrine of Ise in terms of imperial patronage.^{lx} Administration of Yasukuni was placed under the Military Affairs Office until the Military Ministry was established, thereby remaining under military auspices from 1872 until Japan's total defeat in 1945. For its first two years, the chief priest was appointed by the military; after 1879 only regular priests were employed.^{lxi} Since this shrine was a product of Japan's national formation, no tradition existed that would

determine its festival dates or ceremonies. The government scheduled these dates and ceremonies to correspond to anniversaries of important events in the Restoration, thereby linking the emperor's new government to what would become the religious aspirations of Japan's new nationalists.^{lxii}

STATE SHINTŌ

Prior to 1868, the worship of *kami* was interwoven with Buddhist rituals, teachings, and institutions.^{lxiii} Shintō was neither a fully independent set of institutions nor did it represent a distinct philosophical tradition. Only in the late eighteenth century, when a centralized imperial government began domestic nation-building, did Shintō emerge as a coherent entity that various scholars and priests of the *kokugaku* tradition claimed was central to the political and intellectual life of the emerging nation-state. Nativist ideologues in the new government enforced a nationwide "separation of kami and buddhas" (*shinbutsu bunri*), resulting in widespread destruction of Buddhist temples, artifacts, and estates.^{lxiv} To exert its control over newly established Shintō shrines, the government instituted a hierarchical system of shrines governed and partly funded by the state.^{lxv} Gyan Prakash reasons that networks of railroads, irrigation, mining, and administrative agencies helped to configure India as an actual entity.^{lxvi} So, too, can the Japanese government's efforts to establish a state-organized form of Shintō and administer through it be seen as a crucial step in mapping out the geographic, political, and intellectual space of the nation.

As Buddhists and, particularly, Christians were being persecuted in attempts to create a state orthodoxy, Meiji leaders began to acknowledge that such actions could invite the wrath of Western militaries. Increasingly aware of Western intellectual trends regarding the separation of church and state, statesman (and Christian) Mori Arinori in 1872 began urging pragmatists within Japan's Home Ministry to expel the most radical nativists from the government. Due in part to his efforts, domestic pressures for civil rights, and the fear of Western intervention for the sake of Japanese Christians, in 1875 the government officially recognized the right to "freedom of religious belief," though with a caveat: one could believe whatever one chose as long as one's actions did not prove "an impediment to acceptance of imperial proclamations and the government of the emperor."^{lxvii} While these restrictions rendered freedom of religion virtually meaningless, it sparked an important change in the state's conception of Japan's national identity. Since nominal freedom of religion was guaranteed in the Meiji Constitution of 1890, government officials could no longer justify special treatment of Shintō organizations. The Home Ministry solved this problem by declaring that Shintō rituals at nationally ranked shrines were to be considered "official" or "public" rites, whereas rituals at all other shrines, temples, or churches were considered "religion."^{lxviii}

Contradictions inherent in the state's conception of religion as personal (and therefore selfish) belief and ritual as nonreligious, public, and moral duty fueled many debates in Japanese politics that were never fully resolved.^{lxix} While Japan increasingly engaged in international wars,^{lxx} domestic debate

about the religiosity of State Shintō, as well as critical thought in general, was subordinated to the state's need to mobilize for total war, with Shintō rhetoric and the promises of apotheosis at Yasukuni Shrine reaching a feverish pitch in the 1930s.^{lxxi} Attendance at Yasukuni drastically increased after 1931,^{lxxii} when the army initiated the Manchurian Incident,^{lxxiii} setting Japan on a trajectory that ultimately resulted in total defeat in The Second World War.^{lxxiv} The degree to which the increase in visits to Yasukuni was voluntary is impossible to determine. However, the state instituted policies to maximize engagement with the shrine. For example, starting in the 1930s and lasting until 1945, all schools had an assigned military instructor whose purpose was to inspire "proper attitudes towards emperor and country," including leading trips to Yasukuni Shrine to honor the war dead.^{lxxv} In September 1938, the government-general of Korea (which had been an official Japanese colony since 1910) issued two documents outlining a strategy for the administration to overcome the "circumstances of the times" (*jikyoku*), a euphemism for the military crisis facing Japan on the Asian continent.^{lxxvi} Included in these documents were plans to establish a Korean Yasukuni to enshrine souls sacrificed while serving in Korea since annexation. The Japanese government attempted to utilize the empire's total resources for war and believed that, in order to do so, assimilation efforts in Korea needed to be expedited. These efforts were expressed through the propaganda slogan "Japan-Korea, one body" (*naisen ittai*). Although a Korean Yasukuni never came to fruition, its presence in these documents supports Yongwook Ryu's contention that

“despite its religious outward appearance, the Yasukuni Shrine is essentially a political institution representing the state and its interests.”^{lxxvii}

YASUKUNI SHRINE UNDER THE GAZE OF THE OCCUPATION

“We’ll meet at Yasukuni!”

~common battle cry of Japan’s armed forces as they charged into certain death.

Based primarily on principles set forth in the Potsdam Declaration and the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, the Allied Powers proclaimed two ultimate objectives in occupying Japan. First, they would eliminate ultranationalism and militarism by vigorously suppressing all institutions expressive of militaristic values so that Japan would never again threaten US interests or the peace and security of the world. Second, they would cultivate a peaceful and responsible government respectful of the ideals and principles of the United Nations that would be supported “by the freely expressed will of the people.”^{lxxviii} A peaceful and responsible government, policy-makers believed, would be inconceivable without first instituting the right to religious freedom and the correlative principle of the separation of church (religion) and state.^{lxxix} Importantly, if a desire among the Japanese people for religious freedom was to be encouraged, Occupation personnel must also respect all Japanese religious institutions. The enigma of Yasukuni Shrine proved to be problematic for the staff of the Religious and Cultural Resources Division (RCR) in their efforts to achieve the mission of the Occupation.

RCR research into Yasukuni revealed the obviously militaristic

nature of the shrine’s aesthetic and functional purpose. The Yasukuni Shrine occupies a large, lucrative piece of real estate in the Kudan District of central Tokyo, within walking distance of the Imperial Palace^{lxxx}—the center of Tokyo’s symbolic, material, and political power. Set off by a particularly massive bronze *torii* gate,^{lxxxi} the shrine’s precinct is filled with cherry trees, signifying the beauty and fragility of a short, hopefully heroic life.^{lxxxii} Large stone lanterns illuminate the walkway to the central structure, presided over by imposing statues of military heroes from 1868 onward, such as Ōmura Masujirō (1824–1869), founder of the modern Japanese army.^{lxxxiii} Next to the shrine is the Yūshūkan, a museum filled with exhibits of military uniforms, manned torpedoes used on suicide missions, kamikaze airplanes, bloodied bandanas, poetry written by kamikaze pilots before their final flights, and more. The chrysanthemum flower, symbol of the emperor, adorns many of the shrine’s surfaces, indicating the intimate relationship between the shrine and the imperial house.^{lxxxiv} Furthermore, the shrine’s administration and funding had always been under the auspices of the war and navy ministries, whereas all other nationally ranked shrines had been administered by the Home Ministry.^{lxxxv} Finally, the fact that only those who died in military service were enshrined, excluding hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties, made the militaristic nature of the shrine irrefutable.^{lxxxvi}

However, since the shrine also embodied an intimate relationship between the living and the dead, RCR staff could not ignore what they also saw as the shrine’s undeniably religious character. In a 1946 interview about the government’s treatment of shrines as

secular institutions, expert advisor Miyaji Naokazu^{lxxxvii} opined that “religion is intercourse between human beings and what is superhuman. Therefore, all shrines naturally fall in the category of religion.”^{lxxxviii} Though William A. Bunce, head of the RCR, his staff, and even Japanese such as Miyaji were inclined to see the shrines as religious, they were confounded when confronted by shrine leaders’ contentions that Yasukuni was, in fact, not a religious institution, but rather a civic one meant to promote patriotic morality based on reverence for the nation’s war dead, much like Arlington National Cemetery—established in the late 1860s—functioned to promote patriotism and national unity following the American Civil War. Furthermore, Shintō shrines had always been treated bureaucratically by the government as nonreligious. Indeed, since the Yasukuni Shrine was the only nationally significant institution where Japan’s war dead were collectively honored,^{lxxxix} razing the shrine as a militaristic organization would be akin to a hypothetical invading force destroying Arlington National Cemetery and prohibiting all commemoration for the nation’s defeated soldiers. Many Occupation personnel believed that such a course of action would not be well-received by the Japanese. What may be termed the “Yasukuni Problem” of the Occupation period was, therefore, concerning how to simultaneously protect the principle of religious freedom *and* eliminate all of the causes of Japan’s militant nationalism when one of the pivotal ideological vehicles was—in the minds of the Occupation—a religious institution.

The complex interplay between specific Occupation authorities,

Japanese advisors, and shrine leaders in the context of America’s “imperial democracy,”^{xc} ultimately resulted in Yasukuni Shrine becoming a legally recognized religious organization. Accompanying that legal recognition was a complete severance of state funding and patronage of any kind. Further, this status as a religious organization, along with the American decision to absolve the emperor of all war responsibility, preserved enough of Yasukuni’s original ideological components for it to continue to shape national memory (and amnesia) into the postwar period.

DISESTABLISHMENT OF STATE SHINTō

On the morning of October 8, 1945, Tokyo newspapers with headlines such as “Shinto Official Status Abolished” reported a broadcast of an interview conducted on a NBC radio show with John Carter Vincent, the chief of the Department of State’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs and a member of the above-mentioned pro-China group. Vincent responded to a question about plans for “National Shintō” with, “Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, insofar as it is directed by the Japanese Government, and as a measure enforced from above by the government, is to be done away with.”^{xci} Occupation headquarters in Japan had no prior information on the subject and was in no way prepared to answer the tsunami of questions posed by Japanese religionists and journalists. After obtaining confirmation that this strategy was actually officially sanctioned, the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) of the Occupation

government was ordered to begin working on a directive that would dismantle State Shintō as well as the dissemination of militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology everywhere. CIE was responsible for advising the Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, and for implementing policies regarding media, education, and religion.^{xcii} Within a few months of CIE's establishment on September 22, 1945, separate divisions were organized within it specifically dedicated to education and religion.

William K. Bunce was a Navy lieutenant who had been trained as an historian and had earned a Ph.D. from Ohio State University. From 1936 to 1939, he taught English at Matsuyama High School in Ehime Prefecture, an opportunity that showed him the extent of the infiltration of Shintō ideology into schools while also giving him a particular appreciation for the beauty of Japanese religions—primarily various Buddhist and local Shintō sects—and the aesthetics of their structures.^{xciii} With only the contents of the Vincent interview and the provisions included in pre-surrender documents as guidelines, the Religions Division began a staff study.^{xciv} Regarding this staff study, Bunce mentioned in a memo dated October 20 that he was studying “the various aspects of Shintō for the purpose of making distinctions sufficiently precise to afford a rational basis for the eradication of Shintō nationalism without interfering with harmless religious practices.”^{xcv} After seven weeks, Bunce completed the “Shintō Directive,” which abolished the official sponsorship and compulsion that had brought extremist, emperor-centered nationalism—often characterized as an “emperor cult”—into existence.^{xcvi} Dismantling the

ideological vehicles that maintained such religious nationalism, he believed, would destroy the cult itself. Surprisingly, to many Japanese, the directive did not order the closing or destruction of even a single shrine. There was a provision allowing “the maintenance of Ise, Yasukuni, and all other ‘State Shintō Shrines’ through private gifts, provided that such support was ‘in no way derived from forced or involuntary contributions.’”^{xcvii} However, it was deleted after the second draft, indicating ambivalence about the nuances of the problems presented by these shrines and concerns about the repercussions of any potential policy.^{xcviii}

The Japanese government had always treated Yasukuni and other nationally ranked shrines as nonreligious, national institutions. Had CIE adhered to this interpretation, abolishing Yasukuni and all other “military shrines” would not technically have been a problem, since they were not considered religious institutions. In other words, CIE could order the abolishment of Yasukuni and not hypocritically violate the separation between religion and state. However, from the outset CIE disregarded arguments that shrines were not religious and—believing in the religious significance of Yasukuni and Ise Shrines—was deeply concerned about societal reactions to any policy scenario.^{xcix} After all, CIE did not want to engender a grudge amongst the people that may come to haunt Japanese-American relations upon termination of the Occupation.

YASUKUNI SHRINE: RELIGIOUS,
OR NOT?

Though it did not dictate the destruction of any particular shrine, the Shintō Directive prohibited state sponsorship of public funerals and commemorative ceremonies for the war dead, mandated the removal of monuments and statues of a clearly militaristic or ultra-nationalistic nature, and lessened the influence that Shintō shrines dedicated to the veneration of the war dead were believed to exert.^c To Bunce and his staff, Yasukuni and the *gokoku*^{ci} shrines were both undeniably militaristic and religious in nature. In the summer of 1946, Bunce hired William Woodard as a special projects researcher. His first assignment was to conduct a staff study on “military shrines” to determine “whether their evident militaristic uses during the previous decades were inherent or the result of the use made of them by the extremists.”^{cii} Although a consensus could not be achieved, Woodard’s studies into these shrines suggested that there were genuine religious beliefs attached to them and, therefore, as private institutions they would not exert an undesirable influence over Japanese society. There was also a sense of urgency in Woodard’s report that, if restrictions on public commemoration of the war dead continued despite growing desires for such commemoration, the Japanese people may come to regard shrines as public institutions, which would undermine Occupation efforts to instill an appreciation for the principle of freedom of religion and the separation between religion and the state.^{ciii} The most notable criticism of Woodard’s position was put forth by Francis Motofuji (1949), who noted inconsistencies in Woodard’s assumptions of the war dead shrines as religious institutions, as well as his

arbitrarily and unjustifiably limiting the size of some shrine precincts and merging some but not others.^{civ}

Formulating a coherent policy for the future of Yasukuni and the *gokoku* shrines was complicated by their simultaneous militaristic and religious characteristics. Perhaps giving greater cause for hesitation when writing a specific policy was the fact that Yasukuni Shrine was the only nationally meaningful institution for honoring Japan’s war dead. In intra-divisional memoranda documenting CIE and RCR deliberations about this problem, concern about the right of any nation to commemorate their war dead abounds. Even the preeminent religious studies scholar Daniel C. Holtom, who did not directly participate in the Occupation due to health reasons,^{cv} but who nevertheless exerted great influence as the world’s foremost Shintō scholar, vigorously argued for the protection of this right and against the arrogance of even considering denying it to any nation. In an unpublished essay submitted three days before the Shintō Directive was issued, he wrote, “[just picture] the depth of resentment that would be stirred in our own people if the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier were closed or destroyed and efforts to perpetuate the memory of family members lost in battle were denied normal expression by foreign conquerors. For a foreign power to invade this sensitive area of faith with external edicts implemented by force of arms would be a supreme manifestation of want of skill in dealing with the sacred aspects of an alien culture.”^{cvi} The complexity of the Yasukuni problem and the changing international environment (the onset of the Cold War) prevented any concrete decision from being made about the

shrine until August 28, 1951, when a directive issued that “no repressive action would be taken and that [those] military shrines located on state-owned land should be permitted to purchase their precincts on the same basis as other religious institutions similarly situated.”^{cxvii}

HOW YASUKUNI SHRINE SURVIVED THE OCCUPATION

Occupation authorities were not alone in making decisions about the future of Yasukuni. Shrine leaders and government officials were terrified that the future of shrines and Shintō were in the hands of White Christian Americans. The shrines and their faculty had been administered by the army and navy ministries for decades and were not organized to handle the crisis confronting them. Leaders of Shintō shrines and affiliated organizations^{cxviii} attended a conference to discuss the future of Shintō shrines and, after accepting that Occupation policy could not be modified, within a few months decided to form the Association of Shintō Shrines (*Jinja Honchō*). This association and other organizations often took the initiative to present potential reforms to CIE that would allay their misgivings and protect the existence of the shrines. The leadership of Yokoi Tokitsune, who became associate head priest of Yasukuni on November 16, 1945, best represents these efforts.^{cxix} During his frequent meetings with Bunce and his Japanese advisors, Yokoi presented such ideas as changing the name of the shrine, registering it as a religious corporation under the new Religious Corporations Ordinance,^{cx} democratizing bereaved family representatives,^{cx} and shifting the

shrines away from military associations (including transforming the attached military museum into an entertainment facility). Thanks in large part to Yokoi’s leadership many reforms that allowed Yasukuni to survive were achieved, such as the appointment of Tsukuba Fujimaru (who had no military connections) to replace Admiral Takao Suzuki as the new head priest. Additionally, rituals and events that had military or national significance were removed from the annual shrine calendar and replaced with rites and ceremonies that were more closely related to the everyday religious practices of the Japanese people.^{cxii} Particularly important was a new festival, the Mitama Matsuri,^{cxiii} created to comfort the spirits of fallen soldiers through traditional practices associated with the care of ancestral spirits. Along with providing private memorial services for individual families, this festival aided in transforming Yasukuni into a “shrine of the people.”^{cxiv}

Perhaps the single change during the Occupation that most directly impacted the postwar character of Yasukuni Shrine was its legal transformation under the Religious Corporations Ordinance from a secular state institution into a self-supporting, private religious organization.^{cxv} Yokoi and the rest of Yasukuni’s priesthood were forced to explore new sources of revenue with which to maintain the shrine and the livelihoods of its staff, prompting them to travel throughout Japan in search of voluntary groups of supporters from among bereaved families. Although Yokoi succeeded in establishing a stable financial foundation for Yasukuni Shrine’s survival, the number of worshippers attending the paramount Spring and Autumn Festivals declined drastically.^{cxvi} Nonetheless, Yasukuni was saved from

destruction because shrine leaders made changes sufficient to convince Bunce and his staff that it would no longer espouse militarist or ultra-nationalist ideology.

POSTWAR JAPAN, YASUKUNI SHRINE, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Bunce, Woodard, and the rest of RCR ultimately permitted Yasukuni Shrine's survival because they believed that it had become a private religious institution that would serve the commemorative needs of the Japanese people without indoctrinating them with militarism. Along with the imperial house, Yasukuni represents a tangible link with Japan's imperial and militant past, with its rites performing substantially the same ideological functions that they did before 1945.^{cxvii} Dower illustratively examines how Japanese responses to total defeat and occupation were highly varied. Deep rifts exist within Japanese society concerning a large range of historically controversial issues, including the exoneration of the emperor of all responsibility for the war and the continued existence of Yasukuni Shrine.^{cxviii} Indeed, the shrine has only become more controversial since Japan regained its sovereignty on September 8, 1952. While Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates the strict separation of religion and the state, the courts interpreted it as guaranteeing the prime minister's right to visit and patronize Yasukuni as a private citizen, though not as the prime minister. Whether the prime minister is considered to be acting as a private citizen or not has come to depend on niceties, such as whether he used an official or private car to get to the shrine; whether his donation came from

public or private funds; and whether he uses his title as prime minister when signing the shrine register.^{cxix} A brief review of two important court cases with profound consequences for the domestic controversies surrounding Yasukuni Shrine will be helpful in illuminating its polarizing effects on Japanese society.

In 1977, a legal case was heard in the Japanese Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the mayor using public funds to pay a Shintō priest to perform a traditional ground-breaking rite for the construction of a municipal sports hall. This case established what is called in Japanese legal parlance the "object and effect standard" (*mukuteki kōka kijun*).^{cxx} The judge ruled that the mayor in this case was not promoting Shintō in any way and that the rite was in accordance with "general social customs" and therefore constitutional.^{cxxi} The major implication of this ruling was that engagement between state and religion is legitimate within certain limits. Yasukuni apologists and the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were thrilled because the longstanding struggle to renationalize Yasukuni had progressed in their favor as it could now be argued that state patronage of Yasukuni was only about honoring the war dead, and not about reviving State Shintō. A second Supreme Court ruling, this time in 1997, found that the use of public funds by the governor of Ehime prefecture for annual offerings to Yasukuni and the local gokoku shrine had a religious purpose and was therefore unconstitutional. These seemingly irreconcilable rulings signal deep emotional fissures and legal ambivalence in Japan concerning Yasukuni and the civic role of Shintō in

general. The particularity of Yasukuni is also highlighted by the perplexing question of why all senior political officials may participate in acts of veneration at the Grand Shrine of Ise, an unambiguous religious institution, without any criticism or controversy whatsoever.

In the late 1970s, Yasukuni secretly conducted an enshrining ceremony that resulted in the shrine's multi-layered controversies spilling across national borders. From 1946 to 1948 the Allied Occupation convened at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), more commonly referred to as the "Tokyo Trials." At this tribunal the Allied Powers tried Japan's leaders for war crimes that had no legal precedent.^{cxxii} "Class-A" war crimes—crimes against the peace^{cxxiii}—were reserved for Japan's top leadership who, upon conviction, were summarily executed or sentenced to life in prison.^{cxxiv} As early as 1956, conservative groups such as the Japan Society for War Bereaved Families (*Nihon Izokukai*) began lobbying for a revival of state funding for Yasukuni Shrine.^{cxxv} Thanks to the obstinacy of Tsukuba Fujimaro, Yasukuni's first and longest-serving postwar chief priest, the shrine resisted pressures from the Izokukai and even the Ministry of Health and Welfare to enshrine war criminals.^{cxxvi} However, Tsukuba's death in 1977 resulted in his office passing to former Imperial Navy officer Matsudaira Nagayoshi, who permitted the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals^{cxxvii} to be conducted the following year. After the enshrinement had occurred and the public became aware a year later, Yasukuni Shrine issued a public statement declaring that these men had "laid down their lives for national duty and should thus be

worshipped as martyrs of the Shōwa era."^{cxxviii, cxxix} Matsudaira also reopened the Yūshūkan military museum, which takes a positive view of Japan's role in the Pacific War, for the first time since 1945 in 1985.^{cxxx}

With the enshrinement of war criminals at Yasukuni, visits to the shrine were no longer relegated to domestic controversy. Out of the twenty-seven postwar Japanese prime ministers, starting with Yoshida Shigeru in 1951, fourteen have visited Yasukuni during their administrations.^{cxxxi} Significant rebuke was not forthcoming over these visits from any country until 1985, when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited in his official capacity on the sensitive day of August 15—the 40th anniversary of Japan's defeat in The Second World War. While protest groups primarily in South Korea and China were most offended by these visits, they were not concerned about the constitutional issue of the separation of religion and the state, as was the case in Japan. Instead, these anti-Japanese protestors' grievances centered on the fact that fourteen Class-A war criminals were still enshrined in Yasukuni and decried that visits by the Prime Minister proved that Japan (as a whole) was glorifying its wartime past and refusing to acknowledge its responsibility for such atrocities as the Rape of Nanking and the Comfort Women.

Even though three prime ministers had visited Yasukuni since 1978 prior to Nakasone, neither China nor South Korea protested. It is widely speculated in Japan that international concern about Yasukuni began with the publishing of an article in the *Asahi Shimbun*^{cxxxii} newspaper by Katō Chihiro on August 7, 1985, reporting on popular Chinese opinions of

Yasukuni Shrine. Allegedly, Katō sought to apply as much pressure as possible on the prime minister to prevent him from visiting Yasukuni by raising awareness of this issue in China and working actively to make it an international problem. Although his intention has not, and probably cannot, be proven, the outbreak of vigorous protests caused political problems for Nakasone and the Chinese Party chairman, Hu Yaobang, both of whom had been committed to improving Sino-Japanese relations. Nakasone's capitulation to Chinese pressures to cease official visits had the unintended effect of legitimizing Chinese accusations of Japan as an obstinate nation that refuses to officially acknowledge its past wrongdoings. Japan's leaders, however, have not only apologized on multiple occasions, but have also given China billions of dollars in economic development aid.^{cxxxiii} In light of this, many Japanese believe that the almost eight years it took for China to even mention the enshrinement of the war criminals proves that demonstrations invoking Yasukuni and other issues (e.g., Rape of Nanjing, Comfort Women) are purely political acts meant to strengthen China's diplomatic position vis-à-vis Japan.

Though powerful politicians and interest groups have led the charge to revise many of the Occupation era's liberal reforms, much of Japanese society has identified with and worked to protect the ideals of peace housed in Japan's postwar Constitution. Japan's academic and educational communities have been among the most powerful social actors opposing any positive views of Japan's wartime past. Championed by historian and educator Ienaga Saburo and his famous lawsuits against the Ministry of Education for

whitewashing history textbooks of supposedly "inappropriate" passages or expressions, Japan's Teacher's Union (*Nikekyoso*) was able to somewhat limit the government's ability to censor educational materials, though this remains a contentious issue today.^{cxxxiv} Conservative responses to such left-wing movements present the left as inflicting condemnation on all of Japan's past. Right-wing ideologues, such as Tokyo's governor Ishihara Shintarō, characterize Japanese critiques of Japan's past as "masochistic" views of history (*jigyaku shikan*). Ceaseless attempts to pass a bill that would nationalize Yasukuni Shrine, "correct" the "masochistic" view of history in textbooks, and revise the constitution to allow Japan to have armed forces with offensive capabilities are representative of the postwar conservative political agenda.

An all too often overlooked aspect of postwar Japanese society has been the tenacity of its antiwar activists, who are certainly aware of Japan's responsibility for the past. As Mark Selden notes, in contrast to the speed with which the US anti-Iraq war movement atrophied, Japanese pacifism and activism have been sustained since Japan's surrender in September 1945 to the present day.^{cxxxv} That the number of privately funded peace museums in Japan far exceeds those in the rest of the world is but one measure of the Japanese people's commitment to the value of peace. The strength of this value in Japanese society can also be seen in passionate anti-nuclear movements and funding for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Perhaps most notably, although the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party has led the movement to eliminate the "no war" Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

for over fifty years, overall public opinion has remained steadfast in the spirit of forever renouncing war, which many consider to be “an achievement of universal significance.”^{cxxxvi} These rifts in Japanese society concerning Yasukuni Shrine indicate that there is no consensus in Japan on the nation's master historical narrative, despite international media portraying Japan as a monolith.

LOCATING THE US IN THE CONUNDRUM OF YASUKUNI SHRINE

The “reverse course,” the rightward shift in policy three years into the Occupation, reflects Partha Chatterjee's “imperial prerogative” and satisfies Ho's criteria for the third phase of empire.^{cxxxvii} With the normalization of the Cold War paradigm (communism versus capitalism), the US moved to make Japan a bulwark against communism in Asia, as well as a base from which the US could impose its will onto East Asia. The “colonial exception” in this case was the perceived and declared necessity that liberal freedoms must be limited and the conservative status quo maintained in order to protect Japan from the evils of communism. In line with Chatterjee's argument, a pedagogical project opened up whereby Japan had to be elevated to a standard determined by the United States. This involved the imposition of American cultural values, one of which was Christianity. For example, Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur told the US Congress in a radio message on February 24, 1947, “Through the firm encouragement...of this yet frail spearhead of Christianity in the Far East lies hope that to hundreds of millions of backward people...may

come a heretofore unknown spiritual barrier against the infiltration of ideologies [communism] which seek by suppression the way to power and advancement.”^{cxxxviii} Declaring a colonial exception also led to the US undermining many of the liberal reforms it had imposed in the first place, beginning with the burgeoning labor movement that had ties to the Communist Party of Japan.^{cxxxix} This rationale was seized upon to justify the creation of the 1951 San Francisco Security Treaty (renewed and strengthened in 1960), which provided for a permanent US military presence on Japanese soil to maintain regional peace and security and to quell “large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan.”^{cxl}

Although Engsang Ho's criteria for the third phase of empire were drawn from the perspective of transnational Muslim societies in the Indian Ocean, the history and presence of the US in Japan exemplifies his conception of empire. He posits that in the post-Second World War form of empire, both political territories and its people are sovereign, yet subordinate to the imperial power, which presents a maximal projection of military force.^{cxli} Furthermore, the US has historically hidden its imperial character behind anti-colonial and “democratic” rhetoric. Ho describes this strategy as one of “invisibility”—the US does not acknowledge its extra-constitutional actions abroad, thereby allowing its own public to sustain the nation's anti-colonialist self-regard.^{cxlii} Neither does the US formally recognize the existence of hierarchy in its foreign relations, preferring instead to describe its allies and client states as “friends,” though in the words of former President George W. Bush, those friends are either “with us or against us.”^{cxliii}

In the case of Japan, despite the formal occupation ending on April 28, 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect, US imperial presence persisted. It is most concretely represented by the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, described by Carol Gluck as the culmination of the transformation from a reformist postwar into a Cold War postwar.^{cxliv} A veneer of mutuality decorated what was actually a very unequal treaty. By forcing Japan to grant to the US the territorial means to establish a military presence in East Asia, the treaty effectively bound Japan to American Cold War military geopolitics.^{cxlv} For instance, the US Joint Chiefs included in the treaty an intentionally vague provision known as the “Far East Clause,” which allowed Washington to use American military forces in Japan to ensure “international peace and security in the Far East.”^{cxlvi} From its Japanese bases the US could engage in any military operation without consulting Tokyo beforehand. The treaty set no termination date and would require American consent either way.^{cxlvii} Okinawa, which was administered by an American military government until 1972, would serve as the headquarters of the American base; there is still a heavy American military presence there.

Other American decisions, such as retaining the emperor (though divested of all political power), proclaiming him the symbol of the people, and actively promoting the myth that the emperor and the Japanese people were deceived and co-opted by fanatical militarists all contributed to Japanese society primarily identifying itself as the victim. Gluck argues that this self-victimization served the needs of the Occupation, because, from that point forward, Japan could embark on a path to democracy and freedom, under the guidance of the

United States.^{cxlviii} During the Cold War, the US controlled Japan’s foreign policy, allowing Japan to focus solely on economic growth.^{cxlix} US power was no less influential in Japan’s domestic sphere, however. With the CIA supporting the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who worked to remilitarize and support US-led wars abroad, it should not come as a shock that that party ruled uncontested until 1993.

CONCLUSION

With approximately eight million visitors annually,^{cl} Yasukuni Shrine has not faded into an obscure relic of the past. Initially rising out of the threat of destruction by Western imperialism—ultimately concretized by the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1856—Yasukuni Shrine and Shintō formed a “sacred canopy” that helped to unify and integrate a heterogeneous population for the purposes of nation-building, modernization, and then military expansion.^{cli} Being defeated and occupied by the United States almost 90 years later resulted in the rapid dismantling of nationalized Shintō and the transformation of Yasukuni into a privately run organization. But, despite the coerced removal of religion from public institutions in Japan, many Japanese continue to believe that Shintō and Yasukuni Shrine should play a central role in the life of the nation because of the need to appreciate the sacrifices of past generations. Others believe Yasukuni should be done away with because it glorifies some of the most atrocious and tragic times of human history. Still others remain somewhere in the middle.

Indeed, Yasukuni Shrine has come to represent a wide range of

memories, experiences, and emotions. To members of conservative interest groups, it represents the glory of Japan's imperial past—a glory that should be restored by renationalizing the shrine and encouraging pride among the youth for Japan's heroic history.^{clii} To many Chinese and Koreans, Yasukuni symbolizes the injustice of Japan's shameless denial of its war of aggression that resulted in extreme suffering and destruction. Japanese war veterans and the bereaved who mourn and venerate at Yasukuni, on the other hand, see this shrine as a meeting place where they can fulfill promises made long ago to their loved ones to “meet again at Yasukuni,” praying that Japan will remain peaceful and never again go to war.^{cliii} One must not forget the experiences of the various participants in the Occupation of Japan with Yasukuni Shrine. Recognition by Occupation authorities that the shrine was more than simply a vehicle for militarism was a significant factor that facilitated the shrine's preservation into the postwar era. Perhaps most vocally, Daniel C. Holtom decried anyone having the gall to deny a society its right to mourn the dead. Implicit in Holtom's contention was that Yasukuni Shrine represents the universal experience of mortality and the need for solace through commemoration.

Whether one sees this shrine as symbolic of Japan's glorious past or its historical amnesia, of the vitriol of East Asia's trauma or the sacrifices of a generation for a peaceful world, or even of our universal mortality, that Yasukuni is a conundrum of our times is undeniable. I contend that, if anything, the enduring paradox of Yasukuni Shrine represents the legacy and continued presence of empire in the world today.

APPENDIX OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

GHQ	General Headquarters of the Occupation in Tokyo
SCAP	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; also used to refer to the Occupation regime in general
TS	Territorial Subcommittee
CIE	Civil Information and Education Section of the Occupation regime
RCR	Religious and Cultural Resources Division of CIE
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
IMTFE	International Military Tribunal for the Far East; a.k.a. the Tokyo Trials
<i>Amaterasu</i>	The goddess of the sun in Shintō, creator of the Japanese race and direct descendant of the Emperor
<i>Bakufu</i>	"tent government;" refers to the feudal regime led by a military general, known as the Shōgun
Chōshū	A feudal domain during to Tokugawa period (1600-1868); played a central role in the Meiji Restoration
<i>Gokoku Jinja</i>	"Shrines for the protection of the nation," gokoku shrines were constructed throughout Japan to serve as local monuments to the war dead
<i>Ise Jingū</i>	"Grand Shrine of Ise," dedicated to the sun goddess Amaterasu
<i>jigyaku shikan</i>	"masochistic view of history," a phrase used by conservative ideologues to attack critical views of Japanese history
<i>Jikyoku</i>	"circumstances of the times," a euphemism for the military crises facing the Japanese army on the Asian mainland
<i>Jinja Honchō</i>	"Association of Jinja Shrines," an association formed by Shintō shrine leaders seeking prevent any destruction to the shrine from Occupation religious reforms
<i>Kami</i>	a divine being in Shintō, including natural places, formations, and forces
<i>Kokugaku</i>	"National Studies," a nativist intellectual movement popularized by Hirata Atsutane
Meiji Restoration	A chain of wars and diplomatic events resulting in the overthrow of the Tokugawa government and restoration of political power to the Emperor
<i>mukuteki kōka kijun naisen ittai</i>	"object and effect standard," a legal precedent allowing the government to interact with religion within certain limits
<i>Nihon Izokukai</i>	"Japan-Korea, one body," a propaganda slogan used in colonial Korea to promote assimilation
	"Japan Society for War Bereaved Families," a conservative political interest group with a mission to re-nationalize Yasukuni Shrine, among other things

<i>Nikkyoso</i>	"Japan Teacher's Union," a labor union of educators known for its critical stance on the Liberal Democratic Party and the conservative agenda
<i>onyōgami</i>	"bitterly-hating, vengeful gods;" refers to the souls of the dead who died an early or violent death and continue to haunt the living
<i>Sakoku</i>	"closed country;" refers to the self-isolation policy of the Tokugawa government
Satsuma	The most powerful feudal domain in Tokugawa Japan; played a central role in the Meiji Restoration
<i>shinbutsu bunri</i>	"separation of Buddhas and kami;" refers to a policy of the early Meiji government to separate the worship of kami and Buddhas in an effort to create an organized form of Shintō
<i>Shogun</i>	"military commander;" the defacto rulers of Tokugawa Japan, though their rule was legitimized by the consent of the Emperor, who was purely a figurehead
<i>Shogunate</i>	"rule of the shogun;" the Tokugawa government
<i>Shōkōnsha</i>	"spirit-invoking shrine," it was the original name of Yasukuni Shrine
<i>Shūkyō</i>	"sectarian teachings," the term used to refer to "religion;" carries a connotation of Christianity and Buddhism, not Shintō
Tokugawa	A dynasty of feudal military commanders who ruled Japan from 1600 to 1868; first led by Tokugawa Ieyasu
<i>torii</i>	A traditional Japanese gate found at the entrance of Shintō shrines; marks the boundary between sacred and profane space
<i>Yasukuni Jinja</i>	"Peaceful Country Shrine," a controversial shrine built in 1868 that is dedicated to the spirits of Japan's war dead
Yūshūkan	A military museum attached to Yasukuni Shrine; presents a revisionist version of Japanese history that paints the Pacific War as one of defense

The women were kidnapped, coerced, or deceived into recruitment and consisted primarily of Koreans, though women from all of Japan's occupied territories, and Japan itself, were involved.

v Also known as the Nanjing Massacre, it consisted of mass murder of unarmed soldiers in retreat and civilians. Widespread rape and looting also occurred. Though estimates are highly contested internationally, historians estimate casualties to be between 250,000 and 300,000.

vi Based in Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo in Northeastern China, it conducted brutal biological experiments on Chinese, Korean, and Russian POWs.

vii Robert W. Tucker, *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

viii Nadine Schuurman, "American Empire," ed. Derek Gregory et al., *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 25.

ix Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 1.

x Engseung Ho, "Empire through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46, no. 02 (2004): 211, doi:10.1017/S001041750400012X.

xi Ibid.

xii Ibid., 226.

xiii Catherine Lutz, "Empire Is in the Details," *American Ethnologist* 33, no. 4 (2006), 595.

xiv Woodrow Wilson first proclaimed the value of self-determination in his "Fourteen Points" speech presented to Congress on January 8, 1918.

xv Ho, "Empire through Diasporic Eyes," 227.

xvi Partha Chatterjee, "Empire and Nation Revisited: 50 Years after Bandung," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6, no. 4 (2005): 498, doi:10.1080/14649370500316752.

xvii Lutz, "Empire Is in the Details," 594.

xviii Julian Go and Anne L. Foster, *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003), 18.

xix Ho, "Empire through Diasporic Eyes," 227.

ⁱ See <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/09/201292722139105715.html>

ⁱⁱ See <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/about/foundation.html>

ⁱⁱⁱ There are no physical remains of the deceased at Yasukuni Shrine. Instead, their spirits are enshrined there and elevated to the status of *kami*, which roughly translate to "deities" in English.

^{iv} "Comfort Women" (*ianjū*) was a euphemism used by the Imperial Japanese Army to refer to the system—sponsored by the Japanese government—of sexual slavery instituted throughout combat areas.

xx Chatterjee, "Empire and Nation Revisited," 495.

xxi Ho, "Empire through Diasporic Eyes."

xxii Chatterjee, "Empire and Nation Revisited," 495.

xxiii Ibid.

xxiv See: Okazaki Masafumi, "Chrysanthemum and Christianity: Education and Religion in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952," *Pacific Historical Review* 79, no. 3 (August 1, 2010): 393–417; Avery Morrow, "Patriotism, Secularism, and State Shinto: D.C. Holtom's Representations of Japan," *Wittenberg University Asian Studies Journal*, vol. 36 (2011): 1–32; and Meitetsu Haruyama, *Yasukuni Jinja to wa nani ka?* [What is Yasukuni Shrine?], (Tokyo: National Diet Library, 2006), http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/publication/refer/200607_666/066603.pdf.

xxv John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./The New Press, 1999), 27.

xxvi Ibid., 23.

xxvii This response to defeat is also reminiscent of Japan's response to the arrival of Commodore Perry in the 1850s, when Japan's young leadership recognized how backward the country was and understood the need to modernize and adopt Western ideas and technology. Thus, Japan's ability to rapidly adapt to drastic change was once again evident following The Second World War and contributes to our understanding of why the Occupation was so successful.

xxviii Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 201.

xxix Ibid., 202.

xxx The four largest and most important zaibatsu groups were Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Yasuda. Though the Occupation initially dismantled their overwhelming corporate power, the reverse course resulted in their incomplete dismantling and a lasting influence on the economy of postwar Japan. True, they are not nearly as powerful as they used to be, but the contemporary prominence of the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Mitsubishi are evidence of their enduring legacies.

xxxi Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 203. Takemae notes that bigotry was in no short supply in the Occupation government, or in any of the highest policy-making

bodies for that matter. Indeed, John Dower wrote a critically acclaimed book, *War Without Mercy* (1986), on the intensely racial nature of the US war against Japan (and vice-versa).

xxxii Ibid.

xxxiii Eugene H. Dooman was born in Osaka, Japan, to Presbyterian missionaries. He was fluent in spoken and written Japanese.

xxxiv Marlene J. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 32.

xxxv Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 204.

xxxvi Elson Boles, "Ruth Benedict's Japan: The Benedictions of Imperialism," *Dialectical Anthropology* 30, no. 1–2 (March 1, 2006): 27–70, doi:10.1007/s10624-005-5057-y.

xxxvii Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 32.

xxxviii Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 41. The Potsdam Declaration, issued on July 26, 1945, was the Allied ultimatum demanding Japan to surrender unconditionally or face "prompt and utter destruction." This "destruction" referred to the atomic bomb, which was still top secret at the time. The Declaration also announced that Japan would be occupied until a new order was established and guaranteed that democratic freedoms and fundamental human rights would be observed.

xxxix Ibid., 227.

xl Ibid., xxix. Other Allied participants came from Australia, Britain, India, and New Zealand.

xli Ibid., 211.

xlii Ibid., 231.

xliii Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 283.

xliv Ibid., 28.

xlv In Shintō mythology Amaterasu is the Sun Goddess and creator of the Japanese race.

xlvi Sarah Thal, "A Religion That Was Not a Religion: The Creation of Modern Shinto in Nineteenth

Century Japan,” in *The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief in Politics and History*, ed. Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 103. Although these “unequal treaties” did not technically allow for overt proselytization by foreign missionaries, many missionaries did so anyway.

xlvi Ibid., 101.

xlvii The popular saying *sonnō jōi* (“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians”) exemplified the emotional environment of the Late Tokugawa period.

xlvi Marius B. Jansen, “The Meiji Restoration,” in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 353.

¹ *Chapter IV - The Yasukuni Shrine*, Preliminary Report: The Yasukuni Shrine, 1947, 1, Box 5978, Folder 29, SCAP Records at the National Archives in College Park, MD.

li Klaus Antoni, “Yasukuni-Jinja and Folk Religion: The Problem of Vengeful Spirits,” *Asian Folklore Studies* 47, no. 1 (1988): 127, doi:10.2307/1178255.

lii *Chapter IV - The Yasukuni Shrine*. The Meiji Emperor’s father, Kōmei, had expressed interest in dedicating a shrine to the spirits of loyalists who had died in the efforts of the Restoration, but the political power of the shogunate was still too strong at that point to actually pursue the idea.

liii “Ordinance, 10 May 1868.” in *ibid.*

liv *Chapter III - The Tokyo Shōkon-sha*, Preliminary Report: The Yasukuni Shrine, 1947, 1, Box 5978, Folder 29, SCAP Records at the National Archives in College Park, MD.

lv Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Time to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

lvi This rebellion was later renamed the Satsuma Rebellion and inspired the 2003 film *The Last Samurai*, starring Tom Cruise.

lvii Antoni, “Yasukuni-Jinja and Folk Religion,” 124.

lviii *Chapter IV - The Yasukuni Shrine*, 3.

lix Ibid.

lx Ibid.

lxi The one exception was the appointment in 1938 of General Takao Suzuki as Chief Priest.

lxii *Chapter IV - The Yasukuni Shrine*, 6.

lxiii Kuroda Toshio, James C. Dobbins, and Suzanne Gay, “Shinto in the History of Japanese Religion,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 1981): 5, doi:10.2307/132163.

lxiv Antoni, “Yasukuni-Jinja and Folk Religion,” 102.

lxv William P. Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 158. Yasukuni Shrine enjoyed the highest status possible—an Imperial Shrine of Special Status (*bekkaku kanpeisha*)

lxvi Gyan Prakash, *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); *The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief in Politics and History* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 11.

lxvii Thal, “A Religion That Was Not a Religion,” 104.

lxviii Ibid., 105. From this point onward, Shintō was divided into two institutional categories, Shrine Shintō (*jinja shintō*) and Sect Shintō (*shūha shintō*). The former was the state sanctioned form. The latter was the localized, unorganized form that persisted in rural areas with charismatic leaders. The state’s understanding of *religion* as doctrinal belief rather than ritual action is also evident here, which conforms in a sense to Western secular conceptions of religion as belonging to the realm of private belief.

lix Ibid., 106.

lxx Sino-Japanese War 1895, Russo-Japanese War 1905, Manchurian Incident 1931, and the Pacific War 1937-1945.

lxxi The literature on the various causes for Japan’s fascistic transformation in the 1930s is massive and unfortunately cannot be addressed here. Although I argue that Shintō rhetoric was a very significant factor, I recognize that rhetoric alone does not explain why Japan militarized the way it did.

lxxii *Chapter VI: Worshipers*, Preliminary Report: The Yasukuni Shrine, 1947, 2, Box 5978, Folder 29, SCAP Records at the National Archives in College Park, MD. Based on records submitted by Yasukuni

Shrine staff, the Staff Study conducted on Yasukuni Shrine estimated that visitors increased every year from 1.3 million in 1921 to 2.4 million in 1933. Eleven million visited in 1940. The author of the Staff Study acknowledged in a footnote that, although these figures are likely inaccurate, they at least indicate a trend.

^{lxxxiii} The Manchurian Incident was a staged event engineered by the Japanese Army that created a justification for invading Northeastern China, known in English as Manchuria.

^{lxxxiv} Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa, *Religion in Japanese History*, First, Lectures on the History of Religions, New Series no. 7 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 198. Major events include the rise of domestic terrorism (1932), Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), an attempted *coup d'état* by a group of fanatic young army officers (1936), the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 that precipitated a full-scale China War, Soviet-Japanese border clashes (1938 & 1939), and Japan's participation in the Tripartite Pact (1940), and of course, entering The Second World War in 1941.

^{lxxxv} Wilhelmus H. M. Creemers, *Shrine Shinto after World War II* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 161.

^{lxxxvi} Mark Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (University of Washington Press, 2009), 146.

^{lxxxvii} Yongwook Ryu, "The Yasukuni Controversy: Divergent Perspectives from the Japanese Political Elite," *Asian Survey* XLVII, no. 5 (2007): 171, doi:<http://dx.doi.org/AS.2007.47.5.705>.

^{lxxxviii} Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions*, 14.

^{lxxxix} *Ibid.*

^{lxxx} Harry Harootunian, "Memory, Mouring, and National Morality: Yasukuni Shrine and the Reunion of State and Religion in Postwar Japan," in *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, ed. Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 148.

^{lxxxii} The *torii* gate is perhaps the most well-known symbol of Shintō. It marks the boundary between sacred and profane space. It is of simple design, consisting of two vertical posts connected at the top by a horizontal beam.

^{lxxxii} Harootunian, "Memory, Mouring, and National Morality," 148.

^{lxxxiii} John Breen, ed., *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 16.

^{lxxxiv} For a more in-depth description of Yasukuni's ritual space, see Breen (2004).

^{lxxxv} Thal, "A Religion That Was Not a Religion," 105.

^{lxxxvi} Breen, *Yasukuni, the War Dead*, 149.

^{lxxxvii} Miyaji Naokazu was a Shintō historian from Tōkyō Imperial University. He was one of many Japanese scholars to advise Bunce on religious policy for the Occupation. See Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions*, 62.

^{lxxxviii} Naokazu Miyaji and Antei Hiyane, "An Interview with Dr. Naokazu Miyaji," *Contemporary Religions in Japan* 7, no. 2 (June 1, 1966): 143.

^{lxxxix} Although Yasukuni was the only significant shrine dedicated to the war dead that pertained to all of Japan, other shrines called the *gokoku* ("nation-protecting") shrines served the same function as Yasukuni, but were specific to various cities throughout Japan. The emperor would not visit the local *gokoku* shrines, whereas he would visit Yasukuni.

^{xc} Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 28.

^{xci} Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, 55.

^{xcii} Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 141.

^{xciii} *Ibid.*, 376.

^{xciv} Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, 65. Staff studies were conducted to explain to the Chief of Staff in concise statements the nature of the problem, why a directive was necessary, and what it would accomplish. The three documents that contained general guidelines for the Occupation were the Postdam Declaration, the "US Initial Post-Surrender Policy," and the Joint Chief "Basic Directive."

^{xcv} *Ibid.*, 62.

^{xcvi} The real name of this directive was "SCAPIN-448: Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship,

Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto (Kokka Shinto, Jinja Shinto).”

^{xcvii} Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions*, 63.

^{xcviii} Ibid.

^{xcix} Creemers, *Shrine Shinto after World War II*, 46.

^c Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, 148.

^{ci} The gokoku shrines are similar in function to Yasukuni, but are specific to each prefecture. They were established for people who could not travel to Tokyo, but who nevertheless wished to pay their respects to their loved ones.

^{cii} Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, 164.

^{ciii} William P. Woodard, *Staff Study Summary of Shrines for the War Dead*, Preliminary Report: The Yasukuni Shrine, Undated Draft, Box 5932, Folder 4, SCAP Records at the National Archives in College Park, MD.

^{civ} Francis Motofuji, *Comments on Suggestions Made for Disposition of Military Shrines*, Intra-Division Memorandum, 1949, Box 5931, Folder 20, SCAP Records at the National Archives in College Park, MD.

^{cv} Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, 26.

^{cvi} Mark R. Mullins, “How Yasukuni Shrine Survived the Occupation: A Critical Examination of Popular Claims,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 65, no. 1 (2010): 102, doi:10.1353/mni.0.0109.

^{cvi} Ibid., 126.

^{cvi} Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, 57. These were Dai Nippon Shingi Kai (National Association of Shrine Priests), Kōten Kōkyū Sho (Institute for the Study of Imperial Writings), and the Jingū Hōsai Kai (Ise Worshipers Association)

^{cix} Mullins, “How Yasukuni Shrine Survived the Occupation,” 121.

^{cx} The Religious Corporations Ordinance officially recognizes groups as religious organizations under the new constitution, thereby affording them protection from interference by the state, while also preventing any patronage by the state for religious institutions.

^{cx} Mullins, “How Yasukuni Shrine Survived the Occupation,” 121. This reform would allow members to elect their own representatives in the various bereaved family organizations.

^{cxii} Ibid., 123.

^{cxiii} Ibid., 121. The creation of this festival was inspired in large part by the folklore scholarship of Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962), who in 1946 participated in a lecture series intending to provide a “correct” approach to Japanese culture for Japan’s postwar society.

^{cxiv} Ibid., 124.

^{cxv} Ibid., 125.

^{cxvi} Ibid. Yearly estimates of visitors declined from approximately 730,000 in 1944 to 30,000 in 1947.

^{cxvii} John Breen, “The Dead and the Living in the Land of Peace: a Sociology of the Yasukuni Shrine,” *Mortality* 9, no. 1 (2004): 83, doi:10.1080/13576270410001652550.

^{cxviii} Dower, *Embracing Defeat*.

^{cxix} Ibid., 71.

^{cxix} John Breen, “‘Conventional Wisdom’ and the Politics of Shinto in Postwar Japan,” *Politikologija Religije* 4, no. 1 (2010): 72. This Supreme Court case determined that Article 20 of the Constitution, which stipulates the separation of religion and state, only forbids state involvement with religion “beyond and appropriate level.” What was considered “appropriate” would depend on the “object” involved and the “effect” of the state’s actions.

^{cxix} Ibid.

^{cxix} Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 444.

^{cxix} The charter for the Tokyo tribunal defined “crimes against peace” as, “the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing,” quoted in Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 456.

^{cxix} A wealth of literature and debate on the Tokyo Trials exists. There are accusations that they trials were unfair and represent the epitome of “victor’s

justice.” What is important for the purposes of this paper is that the Japanese people played no role in the trials of their leaders—“bystanders” in Dower’s terms (*Embracing Defeat*, 475)—contributing to a general lack of identification in Japan with a sense of responsibility for the war.

^{cxxv} Breen, “The Dead and the Living in the Land of Peace,” 85, 87. Other notable groups include the Glorious War Dead Society, National Shrine Association, and the Yasukuni Worship and Tribute Society.

^{cxxvi} Breen, *Yasukuni, the War Dead*, 8–9. Since a spirit cannot be enshrined without all of the personal information of the deceased person, Yasukuni Shrine depends on the willingness of the Ministry of Health and Welfare to send them the pertinent information prior to apotheosis. This Ministry has not only been willing, but actively pressured Shrine officials to enshrine controversial figures, such as the Class-A war criminals.

^{cxxvii} These Class-A war criminals included wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō and General Matsui Iwane, the man held responsible for the Rape of Nanjing.

^{cxxviii} The Shōwa era refers to the rule of Emperor Hirohito (1926–1989).

^{cxxix} Tetsuya Takahashi, “Legacies of Empire: The Yasukuni Shrine Controversy,” in *Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the Struggle for Japan’s Past*, ed. John Breen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 109.

^{cxxx} Although it describes itself as a museum, the historical narrative that it presents paints a picture that most historians would argue is inaccurate at best. For example, Watanabe Tsuneo, the editor of the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, commented that “. . . [the Yūshūkan] praises militarism and children who go through that memorial come out saying ‘Japan actually won the last war’”, cited in Selden, “Japan, the United States and Yasukuni Nationalism”, 72.

^{cxxxi} A Japanese Prime Minister can stay in office indefinitely until the House of Representatives either loses confidence or otherwise decides to elect a new Prime Minister.

^{cxxxii} Asahi Shimbun is a popular newspaper with almost 11 million subscribers nationally.

^{cxxxiii} Saori N. Katada, “Why Did Japan Suspend Foreign Aid to China? Japan’s Foreign Aid Decision-Making and Sources of Aid Sanction,” *Social Science Japan Journal* 4, no. 1 (April 1, 2001): 39–58, doi:doi:10.1093/ssjj/4.1.39.

^{cxxxiv} Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 547.

^{cxxxv} Mark Selden, “Japan, the United States and Yasukuni Nationalism,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 43, no. 45 (November 8, 2008): 74.

^{cxxxvi} Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 560.

^{cxxxvii} Chatterjee, “Empire and Nation Revisited,” 487; Ho, “Empire through Diasporic Eyes,” 226.

^{cxxxviii} Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 377–8. Outright proselytizing was somewhat thwarted by William K. Bunce, who more meticulously adhered to the principle of religious freedom and the separation of religion and state. Despite increased proselytizing efforts allowed for by the Occupation, few Japanese actually responded to such efforts.

^{cxxxix} Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 271.

^{cxl} Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 331, <http://library.nsa.gov.ng/handle/123456789/243>.

^{cxli} Ho, “Empire through Diasporic Eyes,” 211.

^{cxlii} *Ibid.*, 231.

^{cxliii} George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” September 20, 2001, Transcript, (Washington D.C.: Office of the President of the United States), <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

^{cxliv} Carol Gluck, “The ‘End’ of the Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millennium,” in *States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection*, ed. Jeffrey K. Olick (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press Books, 2003), 295.

^{cxlv} *Ibid.*

^{cxlvi} Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 503.

^{cxlvii} *Ibid.*

^{cxlviii} Gluck, “The ‘End’ of the Postwar,” 203.

^{cxlix} *Ibid.*, 295.

^d Caroline Rose, "Stalemate: The Yasukuni Shrine Problem in Sino-Japanese Relations," in *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, ed. John Breen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 25.

^e Mark R. Mullins, "Secularization, Deprivatization, and the Reappearance of 'Public Religion' in Japanese Society1," *Journal of Religion in Japan* 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 65, doi:10.1163/221183412X628442.

^f Breen, "The Dead and the Living in the Land of Peace," 86.

^g *Ibid.*, 88.

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