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WINNING THE SOUTH, LOSING THE PENINSULA

A Study of the US Counterinsurgency Experience in Southern Korea, 1945-1948

Doori Song

Columbia University

ABSTRACT

The US occupation of South Korea was not without difficulty. From the time of its establishment on September 8, 1945 to the time of its disbandment on August 15, 1948, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was constantly challenged by an insurgency. Because they helped to liberate Koreans from Japanese colonial rule, Americans did not anticipate major resistance movements in Korea. They also did not expect that the majority of Koreans would sympathize with the resisters, who called for a left-leaning mode of state governance. Because of America's Cold War agenda, the USAMGIK had little choice but to subdue those opposing democratization in southern Korea.

By instituting various counterinsurgency mechanisms such as policing operations, education programs, and trust-building measures while enlisting the support of Korean elites, the US ensured that its objectives in Korea were met. In the end, the USAMGIK suppressed the insurgents and established the first nationally elected South Korean government on August 15, 1948. The success of the overall campaign, however, turned out to be only temporary—victory came at the expense of creating a more volatile and deep-rooted conflict.

INTRODUCTION

From the time of its establishment on September 8, 1945 to the time of its

disbandment on August 15, 1948, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was constantly challenged. American authorities had not anticipated major resistance movements in Korea because the peninsula was liberated from Japanese colonial rule on August 15, 1945. They had also not expected that the majority of Koreans would sympathize with the resisters, who called for the establishment of a left-leaning mode of state governance. It was indeed not uncommon to see civilians condone or even participate in uprisings opposing USAMGIK policies. How, then, did US authorities deal with these resistance movements?" Because of the United States' Cold War agenda, which required its occupation forces to contain the spread of communism, the USAMGIK had to subdue any opposition movement that sought to thwart the building of a sustainable democracy and capitalist economy in southern Korea. By instituting various counterinsurgency mechanisms such as policing operations, education programs, and trust-building measures while enlisting the support of Korean elites, the USAMGIK devised a campaign to ensure that its objectives were met. In the end, the USAMGIK managed to suppress the insurgents and help establish the first nationally-elected South Korean government on August 15, 1948.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE COUNTERINSURGENCY PERSPECTIVE

This paper aims to provide a critical examination of the USAMGIK counterinsurgency experience in South Korea. Although many studies have been conducted on various cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency, there is a limited amount of research for South Korean cases. The number of existing works is low and several of them are partial to a specific ideological orientation. The nation-state histories of the US and Republic of Korea (ROK), for example, are noteworthy for their ideologically aligned interpretations. According to these views, the overall counterinsurgency experience is seen as nothing more than a “victory” in one of their many allied fights against communism.ⁱ The insurgents are invariably classified as communist agitators and given little mention of their motives or interests. Although these views align with the capitalist interests of both the US and South Korea, these statist interpretations risk misrecognizing aspects of history.ⁱⁱ This is especially the case with the interpretations that deal with an ideologically antithetical “Other.”ⁱⁱⁱ Notwithstanding slight modifications, the nation-state views of the US and ROK have been resistant to change because elements of the Cold War still exist in the Korean peninsula.

Revisionist accounts of the USAMGIK experience began to appear along with the progressive social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Bruce Cumings’ two-volume book, *The Origins of the Korean War*, deserves special mention for its exhaustive coverage of developments in Korea before the Korean War (1950-1953). In contrast to the nation-state perspectives of the US and ROK governments, Cumings recounts the USAMGIK experience from a critical point of view. He aims to produce a “counter-history,” in a Foucauldian sense, by introducing dynamism and diversity into what was previously considered

immobile and homogenous.^{iv} The works of Cumings and others reveal that the motives of the Korean insurgents were not entirely inspired by communist interests but by desires to purge all vestiges of the former Japanese colonial-state.^v The insurgents’ main concerns were to nationalize industries, reform land-holdings, reduce rice collection quotas, and exile colonial-state collaborators. They ultimately opposed the USAMGIK because its policies intended to revive several institutions from a prior colonial era. Allowing the USAMGIK to rule is ultimately regarded as a failure by insurgents, not because they were unable to communize the Korean peninsula, but because they failed to expel the colonial-state vestiges that they vehemently abhorred.^{vi} Other revisionist accounts have also helped to expand existing views by revealing how some of the insurgents protested simply to protect their supplies of rice or to conserve Korean traditions.^{vii}

This paper also approaches the USAMGIK experience from a revisionist angle. It employs a mode of analysis that has recently risen in significance in the field of security studies: the counterinsurgency perspective. Although there are revisionist accounts that address the subject of USAMGIK counterinsurgency, none of them systematically analyze the topic from recent theoretical perspectives. The breakthroughs in this method of analysis are largely the product of innovative new studies conducted in the post-Cold War era.^{viii} The cumulative contributions and interplay of these works, predominantly by political scientists and military analysts, have led to a more systematic understanding of cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The aim of this paper is to historicize the USAMGIK counterinsurgency experience through the framework of the counterinsurgency perspective. Based on data collected from

declassified USAMGIK documents, Korean newspapers, and propaganda manuscripts, this paper argues that in the context of the Korean peninsula, the US occupation failed to eliminate the fundamental causes of insurgency and to prevent those causes from returning.

PRINCIPLES OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY PERSPECTIVE

According to the counterinsurgency perspective, there are no two identical cases of insurgency, but fundamental commonalities do exist in most cases. First, almost every case of insurgency and counterinsurgency reflects an incompatible political objective between the state and large group of civilians. Although domestic political disputes can be resolved without violence, physical acts of protest often erupt when diplomatic efforts have been exhausted. History has shown that this often occurs when a dissident group, representing a communal or socioeconomic body, feels alienated or is denied recognition by its political system.^{ix} The Hukbalahap rebels in the Philippines, for example, precipitated mass revolt against the state in 1946 because the Philippine government refused to seat them in legislature. Many other clashes of this type were common after World War II in postcolonial settings where social institutions and norms were subject to new stresses and strains amid processes of modernization.^x The clash between the French and Front de Libération in Algeria, the British Commonwealth's conflict with the National Liberation Army in Malaya, and the US Army's battle with the Viet Cong in South Vietnam are three prominent examples.

Another core aspect of insurgency and counterinsurgency is an asymmetrical balance of power between the insurgent

and counterinsurgent forces.^{xi} The counterinsurgents possess much greater power from their control of law-enforcing units, such as policemen and soldiers. They also have the advantage of controlling the main transportation and communications systems within their territorial borders. Meanwhile, the insurgents have limited access to funds, personnel, weapons and technology. They are generally outnumbered by a ratio of ten to one against the state in terms of manpower.^{xii} In Malaysia, for example, the insurgents consisted of about 5,500 units in 1948 while the British Commonwealth possessed over 40,000 soldiers. The Front de Libération in Algeria likewise had about 29,000 fighters in 1956 compared to the 400,000 member army of France. Insurgent forces also rarely have a permanent base of operations because they are required to move frequently in order to avoid capture. This requires much time and energy and makes coordination and organizational work slow and inefficient.

The decisive factor that ultimately settles an insurrectionary conflict is the support of the host nation's neutral "third party"; that is, when a national consensus among the civilian population is reached in favor of one side.^{xiii} The strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the third party, according to the counterinsurgency perspective, differs between the insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. For the insurgents, since their relative strength is much weaker, they have no choice but to resort to unconventional battle tactics such as terrorism, vigilantism, guerilla warfare, or propaganda warfare to delegitimize and demoralize the state and to coerce or persuade the civilian population. A conventional attack against the much stronger counterinsurgent force is tantamount to self-destruction.^{xiv} In addition, the insurgent group must take an offensive position against the

counterinsurgent group because the former seeks to replace the current political structure that the latter aims to perpetuate. The insurgents must make the first move and be ready to assume the functions and characteristics of an alternative government.^{xv} They may also look to collect taxes and supplies from supporters or organize the population into local militia units that gradually develop into a regular army. The Chinese Communist Party during the early-to-mid twentieth century, for example, proceeded along this course of action until they assumed power of the Chinese mainland in 1949. The insurgents also have the advantage, especially against foreign-led counterinsurgent forces, of civilian populations that tend to be more sympathetic towards their cause due to bonds of nationalism, race, history, or other commonalities.^{xvi}

On the other hand, the counterinsurgents must be cautious not to overexert their advantages. Conventional fighting tactics—such as the use of machine guns, land mines, or airstrikes—should be avoided because they are expensive and have the potential for collateral damage. They will kill some insurgents but others will inevitably emerge to replace them.^{xvii} The counterinsurgents must instead work to persuade the general public to reject the insurgents' political cause. They do so by demonstrating their legitimacy as government leaders. The populace should be provided with adequate security, access to state capital, education, and political participation.^{xviii} Counterinsurgents must be ready to serve the public as social workers, teachers, physicians, and civil engineers. They should also collaborate with supportive members of the host population to help rally support for their cause.^{xix} According to General Rene Emilio Ponce, counterinsurgency campaigns are “90% political, social,

economic and ideological and only 10% combative.”^{xx} The results are more optimal when coercion, such as torture, intimidation, or blackmail, is not used to ensure the public's cooperation. In the Philippines, for example, the practice of ending police brutality while instituting a campaign based on attraction and fellowship helped Governor Ramon Magsaysay subdue the Hukbalahap rebellion.^{xxi} Field Marshal Gerald Templer likewise succeeded in suppressing the insurgents in Malaya after convincing the public to accept British Commonwealth forces as guardians and friends.^{xxii} Without the support of the civilian population, according to Mao Zedong, both sides are like fish out of water—for the relationship between the combatants and the people is like that between fish and water.^{xxiii}

Overall, an effective campaign requires an appealing and just political cause for both the insurgent or counterinsurgent forces. The tactics for victory, however, are different between the two groups. The insurgents must be visible to the civilian population but invisible to the counterinsurgents. According to Carl von Clausewitz, they must employ offensive tactics that nibble at but don't bite the shell of their much stronger opponent. The insurgents must “mobilize like fog” around the counterinsurgents' perimeter and “form a dark and menacing cloud out of which a bolt may strike.”^{xxiv} In addition, a healthy mix of terrorism to deter civilians from complying with the state and propaganda to persuade neutrals to join their camp is imperative for the insurgents. In opposition, the counterinsurgents must demonstrate good leadership and composure. Their law enforcement units should be used moderately and carefully so as not to harm civilians or damage civilian property. The welfare of the people must also be protected by ensuring their safety and well-being. Meanwhile,

the counterinsurgents must work to legitimize the current government body by fostering public trust in the existing political system.

THE US COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHERN KOREA, 1945-1948

When US occupation forces arrived in southern Korea after the end of World War II, their top priorities were to revive the economy and to develop a foundation for sustainable democratic growth. After the 1945 Yalta Conference, where the US, Soviet Union, China and Great Britain discussed terms for a four-power trusteeship over Korea, the US and Soviet Union came to occupy the southern and northern halves of the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel respectively. The stakes in Korea were high for America because the US could not afford to “lose Korea to the Soviets” and jeopardize its position, primarily in Japan, to halt the spread of communism in the Far East.^{xxv} It was imperative for the USAMGIK to build a democratic and capitalist base that could contain and delegitimize the Soviet-led communist system in northern Korea. The US could not tolerate any element of communist support in southern Korea because of its Cold War agenda.

BUILDING A RICE ECONOMY

Establishing a nationwide rice collection program was one of the first crucial steps that the US took to carry out its mission in southern Korea. By stimulating the production of rice and other grains, the USAMGIK aimed to boost the south’s economy so that it could compete with development of the communist north. Since virtually all of the peninsula’s heavy industries, power plants and mineral deposits were concentrated in northern Korea at the time, the

agriculturally rich south turned to producing rice and grains to develop its economy.^{xxvi} Postwar rice production was also important globally because rice was the staple food for more than half of the world’s population at the time. Since 90% of rice was produced in East Asia, much of the Cold War competition in the region centered on a race to produce rice.^{xxvii} In southern Korea, about 40% of the cultivated land was devoted to rice production. The second and third most produced crops were barley at 16% and soybeans at 9% of cultivated land.^{xxviii}

The USAMGIK aimed to win the favor of civilians through its rice collection program. Because basic necessities such as food and clean water were scarce after World War II, the USAMGIK sought to produce an agricultural surplus that could provide for all southern Koreans. American authorities believed that such a scenario would convince Koreans of the merits of the US developmental model.^{xxix} They consequently worked to ensure that rice was effectively gathered and distributed throughout the south. They needed an estimated four million tons of rice to meet the demands of southern Koreans.^{xxx} Although imports of food from the US curtailed the amount by several thousand tons, the rice program served as the main channel for food collection and distribution. The cooperation of Korean farmers was essential because over 80% of southern Koreans at the time lived in rural farmland areas. Seoul had the least number of planted rice paddies at 437 while the rural provinces of Jeolla (353,996), Gyeongsang (340,134), and Chungcheong (214,451) had the most.^{xxxi} In order to gain support for rice production, the USAMGIK encouraged mass participation through public statements such as “the future of Korea is dependent on the successful collection of summer grains and rice!”^{xxxii} USAMGIK

personnel also distributed printed manuscripts, such as *The Farmers Weekly*, to educate farmers about how the US aimed to address Korea's economic situation.

The rice collection program functioned by assigning rice collection quotas to each province in southern Korea. Following each harvest season, farmers in each province had to transfer their shares of rice to local bureaus that were supervised by US authorities. The USAMGIK's task was then to distribute the supplies of rice throughout the south to feed as many Koreans as possible. In order to facilitate the process, US officials employed law-enforcement units from the Korean National Police (KNP) and volunteers from youth groups to ensure that all rice quotas were met. The particular duties of these units were to arrest farmers who failed to meet their shares and to detain agitators who sought to subvert the overall collection program. Rewards such as ration cards and credit slips were also handed out as incentives for farmers to meet their rice quotas.

The USAMGIK activated several institutions in the agricultural sector to help with the overall collection effort. Many of these institutions continued rice collection practices from the former Japanese colonial-state.^{xxxiii} For example, when the New Korea Company was instituted by the USAMGIK in November 1945, its assignment, just like during the colonial period, was to make rice crop estimates for the purpose of assigning and collecting rice quotas.^{xxxiv} Although the USAMGIK understood that the use of this colonial-state apparatus would displease many Koreans, they chose to revive it for efficiency: American officials deemed the former colonial-state mode of rice collection to be the most efficient and pragmatic at the time.^{xxxv} Among the 212 large companies turned over to the USAMGIK, 195 of them had

been operated by Japanese executives. The USAMGIK passed laws to change titles of Japanese firms to Korean names. For example, they renamed the Chosen Food Company to the Korea Commodity Corporation, the Oriental Development Company to the New Korea Company, and the Chosen Import Materials Control Corporation to the Materials Control Company.^{xxxvi} The USAMGIK believed that the southern economy would fall dangerously behind the developments of the communist north without the help of these agencies.^{xxxvii}

Although several farmers complied with the USAMGIK's rice collection program, many were reluctant to participate. Those most opposed were Korean leaders of local people's committees. Since the USAMGIK banned the preexisting system of rice collection that had been established by people's committees after the end of colonial rule, committee leaders who continued to collect rice were arrested and often harassed by USAMGIK personnel. American authorities refused to recognize people's committees as governing bodies because only the USAMGIK was appointed to govern southern Korea by the supreme commander of the Allied Powers.^{xxxviii} The USAMGIK asserted the primacy of its rice collection program over all preexisting systems. Rice in unauthorized transit or on sale in other than USAMGIK distribution channels was confiscated.^{xxxix}

Many people's committee leaders and other Korean nationalists aimed to counteract the rice collection program of the USAMGIK through two main means. One was by engaging in propaganda warfare to slander the USAMGIK and to persuade farmers to support their cause. They repeatedly accused the USAMGIK of seeking to turn Korea into an American colony. After the USAMGIK revived several colonial-state institutions to collect

rice, the dissidents exploited the situation by declaring that Americans, like former Japanese colonialists, were looking to exploit Korean farmers and laborers.^{xi} They propagated messages such as “American imperialists are trying to turn Korea into a slave of the US!” and “We must oppose becoming slaves of monopoly capitalism!”^{xii} They also spread messages through leaflets, posters and word of mouth that the USAMGIK was shipping Korean rice out of Korea to feed Americans and Japanese. According to one propaganda manuscript, the USAMGIK had allegedly been caught trying to ship out Korean rice from Inchon in oil barrels.^{xiii} The dissidents also discouraged Koreans from eating food handed by US servicemen. They spread rumors that the USAMGIK was distributing food that caused infertility for women and brain damage for children.^{xiii} America’s goal, they claimed, was to control Koreans by limiting their physical and mental capabilities.

The propaganda efforts ultimately convinced many Korean farmers, especially in the Gyeongsang provinces, to stop transferring rice to American authorities. Many farmers recognized people’s committees as governing bodies, paid taxes to committee leaders, and demanded the US to “turn over control to the people’s committees.”^{xiv} Although the rice collection program helped to improve Korea’s food situation, rice production remained below targeted levels and required an increased importation of raw materials.^{xv} The dire situation prompted the New York Times to publish an article under the header “Korea’s Rice Bowl has Hunger Crisis: Largest Producer is Poorest Fed because of Terrorism and Failed Quotas.”^{xvi}

Another goal of the propaganda campaign was to criticize Korean employees of the USAMGIK. The dissidents classified them as national

traitors and collaborators like the Koreans who were accused of the same transgressions during the Japanese colonial period. One leaflet read, “We produce more rice than we eat, and many people are starving to death. Why?” The faithful dogs of Japan, who oppressed us in the past, now have new masters. They turned into faithful dogs of America and are killing our brethren with crueler methods.”^{xvii} Another flyer read, “We have to oppose the pro-Japanese in the grain collection program. These scoundrels are enriching their pockets while farmers are starving and suffering. The time for Korean independence is when the pro-Japanese die!”^{xviii} The propaganda messages resonated deeply with the Korean populace because many Korean employees of the USAMGIK were in fact known for their past treachery with colonial authorities.^{xix} For example, over 80% of KNP officers in middle-to-high ranked positions had served as law-enforcement officers for the Japanese Governor-General.¹ They provided the resistance movement with a strong basis for effective propaganda to hate the police. According to Korean dissidents, these “racial traitors” and their “Japanese imperialistic ideas” were preventing Korea’s complete independence. If the interests of workers and farmers were not considered, then Koreans, they claimed, would become “slaves” of another “colonial economic system all over again.”^{li}

Propaganda warfare led to the other means through which the dissidents defied the USAMGIK—acts of public protest. The propaganda campaign convinced many students and young individuals of left-wing or poor families to demonstrate against the USAMGIK. Although some of the youths did not know what they were protesting, their actions nevertheless demoralized US servicemen and encouraged other

Koreans to join their cause.^{lii} During the autumn months of 1946 in particular, thousands of farmers partook in mass uprisings that resulted in the deaths of nearly 200 policemen. Many farmers refrained from fulfilling their rice quotas because they preferred the rationing systems of people's committees. They also did not want to give in to the rice-collecting policemen who had "wronged" them in the past. KNP units often encountered violent retaliation when they tried to arrest non-compliant farmers. The anti-police riots broke down the morale and discipline of policemen and deterred them from fully performing their duties.^{liii} Korean dissidents also concentrated their attacks on revived colonial-state agencies. One flyer directly told demonstrators to "concentrate your attacks on the pro-Japanese New Korea Company."^{liv} The dissidents likewise targeted Korean farmers who partook in the USAMGIK's rice collection program. One leaflet written in blood-red script read, "The man who completes his quota is the enemy."^{lv}

The resisters told the USAMGIK that the attacks would stop only if a new crop distribution system, similar to the one developed by the Soviets in the north, was established in the south. This was not because they wanted to further Soviet interests. Rather, it was because the method of production in the north was perceived as a model that could maintain Korea's political independence and freedom from capitalist exploitation.^{lvi} Such a model was attractive to many Koreans who had endured poverty and hardship under the capitalist system of the Japanese colonial-state.

Yet because of America's Cold War agenda, the USAMGIK refused to give in to the resistance movement and responded in several ways. American authorities rebuked the propaganda messages of the dissidents, claiming that the USAMGIK did not ship "even one

kilogram of grain to any place outside of Korea."^{lvii} They accused the dissidents of smuggling rice to sell in black markets in Japan. American authorities also accused the dissidents of exploiting young students who were "too young and too immature" to know what they were doing.^{lviii} They issued statements saying that the dissidents were harming the interests of the Korean people by pursuing their own selfish interests. The USAMGIK called on Koreans to help stamp out and correct the "many ills in Korea" by cutting off ties with the resistance movement. For example, it encouraged Koreans to report "unofficial" rice collection programs to US officials so that contraband could be seized and put in proper channels.^{lix}

The USAMGIK intensified its suppression efforts against the insurgents. One common tactic of law-enforcing units was to enter the homes of non-compliant farmers to search for hidden supplies of rice. Other tactics served to intimidate and blackmail farmers until they reached their quotas or to classify non-compliant farmers in official records as "communists" to be blacklisted.^{lx} Although law-enforcing units were not allowed to search homes nor seize property without a warrant, ordinance 176 excused such actions if there was "reasonable ground to believe that there has been, is being, or is about to be committed therein a crime punishable by one year imprisonment or graver penalty."^{lxi} The ordinance allowed the USAMGIK to incarcerate thousands of non-compliant farmers until their families brought in enough rice to satisfy their quotas. Many Koreans began to regard law-enforcing units as "goon squads" because men in uniform continued to commit physical assaults against Koreans.^{lxii} Many Koreans began to hate and fear USAMGIK personnel after they learned about these occurrences. The

USAMGIK admitted that a percentage of the concerns of the people were warranted.^{lxiii}

DEMOCRATIZATION AND KOREANIZATION

One of the core objectives of the USAMGIK was to democratize and “Koreanize” political institutions in southern Korea. American authorities concluded that an anti-communist ideology was not the sole answer because it only created an appearance of social order. A vigorous and successful democratic policy had to be instituted to eliminate the communist threat and resistance movement.^{lxiv} American occupation forces had to move quickly because the US trusteeship in Korea was to end in no later than five years according to the 1945 Potsdam Declaration. Their main goal before they withdrew was to construct a National Assembly—a nationally-elected legislative body that could function as an interim government until a Korean chief of state was elected.

The USAMGIK assembled an advisory council made up of Korean leaders on October 5, 1945 to assess the political situation of southern Korea. Leftist leaders, such as Yo Un-Hyong, refrained from participating in the council because they did not want to recognize a foreign authority over their provisional governments.^{lxv} They sought to nationalize industries, reform landholdings, purge colonial state collaborators and exercise sovereignty through their own government systems. Rightwing leaders, however, embraced the USAMGIK, using their resources and English language skills to form a coalition with American authorities. Landowners and entrepreneurs of the Right used the USAMGIK as a means to protect their capital against leftist leaders who sought

to confiscate their property.^{lxvi} They maneuvered to secure positions of power in the US-led system and informed occupation authorities that Korea would become communist if leftist leaders assumed power.

Because of America’s Cold War imperatives and ease of communication with English-speaking rightwing politicians, the USAMGIK selected right-leaning leaders to serve as committee members of most bureaucracies.^{lxvii} The rightwing Korean Democratic Party (KDP) secured the most positions among active political parties, getting sixteen out of eighty-one representatives into administrative offices. All but one of the eight bureaucracies included members of the KDP, three of whom were chairmen: Kwansu Park of the Legislative and Judicial Department, Do Yeon Kim of the Fiscal and Economic Department and Jin Cheol Jeon of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Department.^{lxviii} The National Society for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (NSRRKI) had the second highest number of rightwing representatives with twelve. The majority of others were members of right-of-center groups or non-affiliates of political parties.^{lxix}

The right-leaning advisory council urged American authorities to allow the National Assembly, rather than the people, to elect the first president of South Korea. Rightwing leaders believed that a general election would result in a leftist victory.^{lxx} Members of the KDP especially wanted Syngman Rhee as chief of state because of his opposition to leftist agendas. They offered Rhee financial support and relied on him to prevent leftist leaders from seizing their land and industries. Rightwing leaders also told the USAMGIK that Korea would become communist if Syngman Rhee did not become president. Although US officials were cautious about their support for

rightwing groups and Syngman Rhee, they agreed with the Right and decided to hold a general election to select only representatives for the National Assembly. In accordance with rightwing proposals, the task of the National Assembly was to draft a constitution and elect the executive branch of South Korea.^{lxxi} The USAMGIK nevertheless prioritized the election of National Assembly members, promoting the process as a framework for future democratic elections.

The USAMGIK enacted a general franchise law on November 15, 1946 in order to prescribe qualifications for voters. Koreans could register to vote if they were born of Korean parents, twenty one years of age and were listed in a Korean family register. They could not vote if they were mentally ill or convicted of crime against citizens or the government. In addition, the USAMGIK denied Koreans the right to vote if they were guilty of collaboration with Japanese authorities.^{lxxii} Election officials commonly disenfranchised Koreans if their family registers indicated wrongdoings for either offense. They also scrutinized the names, addresses, occupations and household owners of Korean registrants.

American officials hired several Korean leaders to work as election committee members during the election process. Their main duties were to instruct Korean citizens on registration and voting procedures as well as to administer local polling sites on election day. They gave lectures in public places, such as schools and auditoriums, and distributed printed copies of election laws to voters in every district. The USAMGIK aimed to redefine the term “election” in Korea because many Koreans were accustomed to “voting for whomever Japanese supported” during the elections of the colonial era.^{lxxiii} Teaching Koreans about American-style democratic elections was one of the major objectives of the US

occupation. American authorities also told election committee members to make sure that all eligible Koreans, both men and women, had equal opportunities to vote. Because men usually made decisions on behalf of their households, American officials were concerned that wives and children would not be able to make their own decisions.^{lxxiv} They advised election committee members to sufficiently instruct women and young adults in order to convince their husbands and fathers that they were capable of voting.

American officials also encouraged Koreans to participate in the election through public statements and media prints. They gave speeches through radio and posted large displays about the election on billboards, walls, street posts and buses. They even published instructions on how to register and vote in cartoon form for illiterate Koreans. According to a national estimation, about 80% of the Korean population was illiterate at the time.^{lxxv} A high voter turnout rate was imperative for the USAMGIK because a poor showing would substantiate claims that the elections were illegitimate and not representative of the Korean population.^{lxxvi}

The USAMGIK dispatched law-enforcement units from the KNP and other constabulary forces to provide security and protection. Korean affiliates of the USAMGIK also mobilized youth organizations, such as the Northwest Youth Corps, the Dae Han Labor Organization and the Federation of Labor Unions for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, to assist in matters of the national election. One of their main duties was to prevent violence and sabotage by anti-election activists. They were stationed around voting sites to prevent attacks by dissidents and to ensure safe transport of ballot boxes and booklets. The USAMGIK also issued

orders to keep law-enforcing units a minimum distance of 100 meters from polling places, hoping to prohibit them from using coercion to force registration.^{lxxvii} US officials sent checklists to district leaders to ensure that the elections were conducted in free and open atmospheres. The USAMGIK was adamant about holding legitimate elections in southern Korea.

The results of the first national election exceeded the expectations of the USAMGIK. The final tally reached a turnout rate of about 90% among eligible Korean voters. The USAMGIK interpreted the outcome as a positive sign that Koreans could one day manage their own democratic form of government.^{lxxviii} American officials were especially surprised by the fact that a little less than half of the final tally consisted of female voters. One US authority declared at a post-election conference that “Korean women have proven themselves outstanding.”^{lxxix}

Yet what impressed US authorities the most was the fact that every election winner was an opponent of communism. The 200 member body of successful candidates primarily composed of individuals from rightwing groups, such as the National Society for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (57), the Korean Democratic Party (29), the Tai Dong Youth Association (13), and the National Youth Group (6). The others declared themselves as neutral or without party affiliation. None of the candidates from the Women’s National Party won a seat in the National Assembly. The KDP had the highest success rate, getting about a third of their candidates elected for office.^{lxxx} US officials commended the KDP for “maturing into political manhood” and becoming one of the leading parties of southern Korea.^{lxxxi} They also regarded the overwhelming selection of right-leaning candidates as proof that Koreans

preferred democracy to communism. The USAMGIK even claimed that the election results were “indirectly representative” of northern Korea because about one-eighth of the total votes were made by Koreans in the south who had recently come from the north.^{lxxxii}

US authorities further highlighted the success of the election by stressing the failures of the Korean resistance movement. They emphasized that the election produced a favorable outcome despite the dissidents’ attempts to deter Koreans from voting. Many terrorists armed with rifles, grenades, homemade bombs and bamboo spears had harassed eligible voters during the election process. Several of them stationed themselves on hills around voting sites and fired their guns at voters.^{lxxxiii} Others set off explosives in polling places to destroy ballot boxes and to discourage election committee members. Several polling places reported that their registration books were stolen or destroyed by terrorists.^{lxxxiv} The homes of election committee members were also common sites of terrorism during the election process. Dissidents threw grenades and dynamite into the living quarters of several officers and chairmen. One election committee leader was found shot and decapitated in his home in Ulsan.

The resistance movement had also used propaganda during the election process to spread its message. Students and members of leftist groups distributed handbills opposing the election. Park Hun Young and other oppositionists published magazines, such as *The People’s Friend*, *The Front-line of Democracy* and *The People’s Korea*, to oppose the election.^{lxxxv} Some of them advised citizens to spurn or even murder candidates from rightwing groups. Other forms of propaganda threatened to harm Koreans looking to vote. One handbill read that they would “give the knife of justice” to anyone who tried to vote.^{lxxxvi}

Another leaflet declared “If you register to vote, then our country will forever be a colony of America!”^{lxxxvii}

The efforts of the dissidents, however, ultimately failed to achieve their desired effect. American authorities detained hundreds of agitators and deterred many others from attacking polling sites. The mere presence of American soldiers in “hot spots” prevented occurrences of terrorism.^{lxxxviii}

Korean dissidents rarely attacked polling sites or voters if American soldiers were nearby. Moreover, among the 8.2 million eligible voters, 7.7 million ended up registering and 7.1 million eventually casted their ballots.^{lxxxix} More than two-thirds of major political institutions in southern Korea underwent reforms to align with the results of the election process. The USAMGIK transferred nearly all judicial, legislative and administrative powers to Koreans. The National Assembly wrote the first constitution and elected the executive branch of South Korea—the president, vice president and prime minister. The aim of the USAMGIK was to transfer the entire administrative process to Koreans.^{xc} US General John Hodge proclaimed that “the tremendous vote polled by patriotic and freedom loving citizens in the United States zone is an unprecedented victory for democracy over the all-out efforts of communist directed propaganda, terrorism and wanton slaughter.”^{xc} The USAMGIK interpreted the election results as proof that Koreans preferred the US developmental model.

Many Korean dissidents, however, refused to recognize the outcome of the election, claiming that it was unrepresentative of southern Koreans for several reasons. First, they argued that USAMGIK workers coerced eligible voters into voting. They claimed that civilians were denied ration cards by provincial authorities if they did not

partake in the voting process. Many polling places and rice distribution sites were, in fact, stationed together on election day. Because voters needed to show their family registration booklets, which were primarily used to obtain ration cards, in order to vote, the USAMGIK combined the two activities at one site in order to accomplish both tasks at the same time.^{xcii} This meant that those who did not vote were likely to miss their ration cards that month. According to the testimonies of several Korean dissidents, it was common to see Korean voters, right before they received their ration cards, vote for whomever the ration card distributors recommended.^{xciii}

The dissidents also claimed that the conditions of voting sites were unacceptable. Not all voters marked their ballots in privately enclosed booths as outlined in official USAMGIK guidelines. There were no curtains to screen voting booths from the public’s gaze in more than half of the 62 voting precincts.^{xciv} Most voters filled out their ballots on tables in front of USAMGIK personnel. Although the duties of law-enforcing units were said to help preserve peace and order at voting sites, they nevertheless restricted the freedom of voters.^{xcv} Several policemen and defense corps units, sometimes in uniform, stood inside polling stations. The dissidents resented the fact that employees of the USAMGIK and rightist groups “helped” voters complete their ballots.^{xcvi} Although some Koreans such as the illiterate genuinely needed help with their ballots, many voters, especially women, experienced pressures to vote quickly and for whomever their helpers recommended.^{xcvii} The dissidents accused the police of interfering in political matters by favoring one side to the detriment of the other. They also viewed defense corps groups as gangs dominated by rightist elements.^{xcviii}

The resisters also argued that the eligibility requirements to vote rendered the voters partial towards the interests of the USAMGIK. They claimed that select Koreans were purposely labeled as “criminals” to deny them the right to vote.^{xcix} Koreans who partook in past uprisings against USAMGIK operations, such as those during the autumn uprisings of 1946, had indeed been disenfranchised. Many of their family members were also denied the right to vote. In addition, the dissidents claimed that the USAMGIK was being selective about political participation, citing as proof the exclusion of Jeju province from the first conference of the National Assembly. The USAMGIK did not recognize Jeju in the conference because of its “small vote as a result of communist violence.”^c American authorities regarded provincial leaders of Jeju as “Soviet Stooges” who were opposing USAMGIK directives because of communist inclinations. They claimed that evidence of communist infiltration from the north was a firmly established fact.^{ci} Koreans dissidents accused the USAMGIK of hypocrisy and of holding elections that were fair only in name.

The resistance movement also rejected the election results because the election process did not include all major political leaders. The most obvious absences, for example, were those of Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik. They both withheld from the elections because they opposed the idea of having a national election that did not include northern Koreans. The two Kims also rejected America’s plan for Trusteeship and separate elections in Korea.^{cii} There were also very few left-of-center candidates who had run for office. For example, Jeong Eun Bo of the South Korean Labor Party, Young Mo Jung of the People’s Revolutionary Party, and Dong Gyu Park of the Democratic Young Men’s Alliance all withheld from running. They refused to participate because they

supported or had already established provisional governments before the entry of US occupation forces. Jeong Eun Bo, for example, wanted to give all political power to people’s committees. Young Mo Jung likewise aimed to give political power to people’s committees so that they could initiate reforms that mirrored those in the north.^{ciii}

American authorities disapproved that leftist leaders refused their invitation to participate in the election. They attempted to build a coalition between right and left wing parties in order to implement government programs with the support of all political parties.^{civ} But because major leftist leaders continued to resist, the USAMGIK accused them of blocking Korean unification and Korea’s progress toward democratic self-rule.^{cv} Leftist leaders abstained from the elections because they did not want to delegitimize their political platforms by recognizing foreign authority. Moreover, according to official reports from election committees, much of the Korean public became apathetic about the election once they realized that some of the top political leaders were not participating.^{cvi} Many Koreans were disappointed because “persons who should be there” were omitted and “those who should not be there” were included.^{cvii}

CONCLUSION

The counterinsurgency operation of the USAMGIK may be regarded as a success when considering the results after its occupation in Korea. It is true that the campaign boosted rice production levels after the USAMGIK instituted a nationwide rice collection program, which included suppressing its resisters. It is also true that the campaign helped to establish the first nationally-elected legislative body on May 10, 1948, which then founded the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.

Yet many of the effects of the campaign, according to the counterinsurgency perspective, suggest that it was unable to eliminate the root causes of insurgency. The use of coercion—though effective in suppressing insurgents in the short-term—evoked deep repulsion among many Koreans. Although the USAMGIK frequently repeated the slogan “In a democracy heads are counted, not broken,” the US occupation experience suggests that heads were broken and not counted. Farmers were often beaten, thrown into prison, tortured or blackmailed if they failed to meet their rice collection quotas. Many Koreans were also disenfranchised or coerced into voting for select candidates in the first national election. A high-ranking US official even admitted that “it cannot be claimed that there was no intimidation, no force, used to influence the people.”^{cvi} The use of these measures can be attributed to the USAMGIK’s Cold War agenda.

Another shortcoming of the overall campaign was the USAMGIK’s inability to win the hearts of the Korean masses. American authorities attempted to frame their objectives in ways to appeal to the Korean people. In the economic sphere, the USAMGIK reiterated to the Korean public that rice was being produced and collected only for domestic consumption. American authorities also echoed statements that developing Korea into an independent, unified nation was their highest priority. Yet many of the employees and institutions of the USAMGIK had difficulties working with the people. Many citizens viewed Korean affiliates of the USAMGIK as “national traitors” or unwanted remnants of the former Japanese colonial-state. And indeed, many Korean policemen and bureaucrats had cooperated with Japanese authorities during the colonial era. Also, a high percentage of the institutions used by

the USAMGIK were revived institutions from the prior colonial era. Consequently, many Korean citizens refrained from partaking in USAMGIK programs if they were run by collaborators or colonial-state apparatus. They maintained that pro-Japanese elements in government would dissuade Koreans from serving the country.^{cix} Although American authorities were aware of the situation, their need for highly trained personnel led them to hire former employees of the Japanese colonial-state. Men who had worked for the Japanese Governor-General were trained in the bureaucracy since there was little incentive to find the resources to newly train other men.

The first Republic of Korea lacked the public’s trust. Many Koreans felt a sense of failure for being unable to claim sovereignty for their own country.^{cx} They did not view the national legislative body as being truly representative of the South Korean population. In addition, they were reluctant to comply with state orders that were issued and enforced by national traitors, and many were still sympathetic to the political cause of the resistance movement. Although the USAMGIK managed to suppress many of the dissidents, the spirit of the resistance movement lingered and later manifested itself in uprisings, for example, in Jeju and Yeosu provinces. These uprisings mirrored many of the insurrectionary elements from before—they were instigated by Koreans who wanted to manage their own crops rather than partake in the government’s rice collection program, and they were prompted by dissidents who wanted to revenge on Korean servicemen who had wronged them during the colonial era.

The Korean War may also be thought of as an extension of insurrectionary conflict. When seen from the perspective of revolutionary warfare, the Korean War was the terminus of a

three stage conflict—terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and full-scale war.^{cx} Koreans continued to oppose the US-led government system in South Korea in part because of their desire to prevent Koreans with questionable pasts from attaining political power. America's persistent support for those Koreans laid the foundation for insurrection and civil war in Korea.^{cxii} Furthermore, the insurgents in the South may have "lost" South Korea to the USAMGIK in 1948, but they continued to try to "win" the Korean peninsula even after the establishment of the ROK.

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ⁱⁱ Prasenjit Duara, "The Global and Regional Constitution of Nations" *Nations and Nationalism* 14 (1999): 28.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid., 24.

^{iv} Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology* (New York: New Press, 1998), 375.

^v Dong-Choon Kim, *The Unending Korean War* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), 35.

^{vi} Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2009), 5.

^{vii} Gi-Wook Shin, "A Critique of Colonial Modernity in Korea." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41 (1999): 794-796.

^{viii} See David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Chicago: ABC Clio, 2006); Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." *Naval War College Review* 51 (1998): 46-57; Samuel Huntington, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961); Eliot Cohen, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency." *Military Review* (2006).

^{ix} Samuel Huntington, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 560.

^x Ibid., 557.

^{xi} David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Chicago: ABC Clio, 2006), 185.

^{xii} Samuel Huntington, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 562.

^{xiii} David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 190.

^{xiv} Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961), 145.

^{xv} Samuel Huntington, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 575.

^{xvi} David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. 185.

^{xvii} Ibid. 188.

^{xviii} Eliot Cohen, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency." *Military Review* (2006): 95.

^{xix} David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. 187.

^{xx} Bruce Hoffman, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006): 106.

^{xxi} Ibid.

^{xxii} Samuel Huntington, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 575.

^{xxiii} Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. 150.

^{xxiv} Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 481.

^{xxv} US Nation Security Council, "NSC 68: US Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950.

^{xxvi} Statement on Independence and Unification of Korea. Mikun Jo□ nggi Cho□ ngbo Charyojip. *Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsō□ jip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8*. Kangwo□ n-do Ch'unch'o□ n-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yo□ n'guso, 1995.

^{xxvii} John Kerry King, "Rice Politics" *Foreign Affairs* 31 (1953): 453.

^{xxviii} Agricultural Production Goals. 24 January 1947. Department of Agriculture. Mikun Jo□ nggi Cho□ ngbo Charyojip. *Chillet'ū* (F.E. Gillette) *Pogosō*, *Chō□ n Pō□ m-dae Chaep'an Kirok, 1946-1948*. Kangwo□ n-do Ch'unch'o□ n-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yo□ n'guso, 1996.

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^{xxxii} Summer Grain and Rice Collection Program. 16 September 1946. Mikun Jo□ nggi Cho□ ngbo Charyojip. *Chillet'ū* (F.E. Gillette) *Pogosō*, *Chō□ n Pō□ m-dae Chaep'an Kirok, 1946-1948*. Kangwo□ n-do Ch'unch'o□ n-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yo□ n'guso, 1996.

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REGIME STABILITY OR MINERAL WEALTH?

China's Interest in Trade with North Korea

Annie Meyjes

Harvard University

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the rapid rise in bilateral trade between North Korea and China between 2001 and 2012 from a political and mineral policy perspective, relying primarily upon the International Trade Centre's Sino-DPRK trade data. It argues that Beijing's North Korean trade decisions were based upon a combination of a national foreign policy of Korean peninsular stability and a desire to increase economic development in the three northeastern provinces bordering North Korea. An analysis of provincial Chinese actors also suggests that local leaders acted upon Beijing's economic growth targets by seeking to develop both domestic mineral production as well as mineral and transport connections with North Korea. What is more, North Korean minerals were attractive locally for both the satisfaction of domestic demand and for arbitrage. The analysis presented in this paper provides insights into Chinese decision-making at both the national and local levels of government, as well as an understanding of implications for Sino-DPRK relations with the rise of Xi Jinping.

INTRODUCTION

North Korea and China have shared a history based upon mutual struggle and communist ideology since China's sponsorship of North Korea in World War II and China's support of the North in the Korean War. When China opened to the world in the late 1970s, it

strove to maintain relations with its isolated neighbor to the northeast. During the Soviet era, communist nations (dominated by the Soviet Union and China) accounted for 70 percent of North Korea's total trade volume.ⁱ Two major events in the early 1990s, however, shifted Sino-DPRK relations, including trade patterns. The first was China's decision to normalize diplomatic relations with South Korea, thereby hampering economic relations with the North. Secondly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's decision to require North Korea to pay for its trade in currency instead of barter, China moved to do the same. This movement was paralleled by China's desire to shift its relationship with North Korea to one based on trade instead of aid.ⁱⁱ As a result, trade between the two nations plummeted.

Although economic interaction between China and North Korea suffered during the 1990s, bilateral trade recovered with force in the 2000s. The volume of Sino-DPRK trade in the latter portion of the last decade is unprecedented, even taking into account China's policy of trade-over-aid. Total bilateral trade rose 449 percent between 2000 and 2009 alone, compared to a fall of over 11 percent between 1995 and 2000.ⁱⁱⁱ This paper seeks to determine the cause of the rapid increase in trade between the two nations, and will posit two alternative explanations: one based upon Chinese foreign policy and the other on Chinese mineral policy. It will also refer to a third, overlapping alternative explanation, based upon

Chinese northeastern provincial development interests.




Figure 1: DPRK Trade With its Two Largest Partners^{iv}

The first section of this paper will outline the two primary alternative explanations and the third overlapping explanation. In the second section, it will then describe the frameworks of analysis that will be used to judge which, if either, of the two alternative explanations is dominant. The third section will evaluate the two alternative explanations. Finally, the fourth will present conclusions and draw implications for future Sino-DPRK relations. Ultimately, this paper will show the multifaceted nature of China's interests in North Korea: foreign and mineral policy have each played a role in driving increased Sino-DPRK trade since the mid-2000s, as have China's domestic economic development goals. As such, a thorough understanding of the layers of China's relationship with North Korea is crucial to forecasting future relations between the two nations.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

I. ECONOMIC OUTCOME OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

The first alternative explanation is that the rise in Sino-DPRK bilateral trade has been the economic outcome of shifting Chinese foreign policy since the early 1990s. This paper will rely upon the joint hypotheses of Bates Gill, John Park, Scott Snyder, and Drew Thompson to elucidate what will be referred to as the "foreign policy alternative explanation."

After Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reform and opening in China at the Third Plenum of 1978, North Korea became increasingly aware that China would seek to establish diplomatic relations with its rival South Korea.^v The combination of China's overarching policy goal of Peaceful Rise, as well as the demands of managing relations with both North and South Korea meant that China would need stability on the Korean Peninsula in order to continue developing economically. China has had several strategic desires in maintaining relations with both nations. On the one hand, it is interested in retaining a communist ally in the North and a buffer against US-South Korean military forces. On the other, it fears the instability of a nuclear North

Korea and a potential refugee crisis it would face should the North Korean regime collapse (not to mention the benefits of trade it receives from South Korea). Snyder asserts that after observing the potential for a refugee influx into northeastern China during North Korea's Great Famine in the late 1990s, China sought to re-stabilize relations with the North.^{vi} Relations between the two improved with a series of exchanges of high-level officials in the early 2000s.^{vii} China's North Korea policy appeared to shift again in 2003 due to a confluence of three key events: North Korea's nuclear test, the United States' invasion of Iraq, and Hu Jintao's replacement of Jiang Zemin as the leader of China. As John Park states, China became fearful that a nuclear North Korea would be next on the United States target list with the imposition of the Bush Doctrine.^{viii} Increased threats of peninsular instability drove China to expedite improved relations with North Korea and re-stabilize the region. China's North Korea policy under Hu Jintao came to embody two key ideals: the denuclearization of North Korea in the long-term, and more importantly, the stability of the Kim regime. China came to believe that by economically supporting North Korea with trade (and also investment), it might ensure the survival of the Kim regime.^{ix} Ultimately, this would prevent a collapse scenario that would be disastrous in the eyes of the Chinese, ensure peninsular stability, and allow China to continue undeterred on its Peaceful Rise.

II. TARGETED INTEREST IN NORTH KOREA'S MINERAL RESOURCES

The second alternative explanation posits that bilateral trade between North Korea and China increased due to China's specific interest in North Korea's mineral

reserves. North Korea is a mineral-rich country. The nation is estimated to have the world's largest supply of magnesite (between three and four billion tons), hold between two and four billion tons of iron ore, and possess stores of rare earth metals in its Gyung-Sung and Hur-Chon regions.^x North Korea's mineral reserves are so sizable, that analysis by Gooheon Kwon of Goldman Sachs Economic Research has estimated that the total stock of reserves is 140 times greater than North Korea's 2008 GDP, and its development could cover the potential costs of a reunification with South Korea.^{xi} Of particular relevance to China are North Korean coal and iron ore. According to Gill, China's imports of North Korean coal rose 54 percent between 2009 and 2010, while iron ore imports doubled over the same period.^{xii} What is more, Thompson suggests that minerals collectively made up 41 percent of all North Korean exports to China in 2008.^{xiii} This paper will address whether China's importation of North Korean minerals is coincidental, being simply the easiest way to increase trade with North Korea as a product of foreign policy, or arises out of a targeted mineral policy goal of the Chinese government.

To do so, this paper posits three distinct sources of Chinese interest in North Korean minerals. First, Chinese commodity demand increased rapidly over the past decade as the country's economic growth skyrocketed. As described by Daniel Gearin, despite being the world's largest producer of many minerals, China faces a shortage in 19 of 45 major minerals.^{xiv} Perhaps in the face of an inability to sufficiently increase domestic supply, China turned to North Korean imports to compensate. Alternatively, the mid-2000s saw a global increase in commodity market prices, as evidenced by a 191 percent increase in the Global Commodity Metal Price Index between

2001 and 2012.^{xv} This second rationale posits that China sought to either import North Korean minerals at below-market prices for domestic consumption, or to turn to export them globally for profit. Finally, China may have been stimulated to seek North Korean minerals in an effort to begin mineral stockpiling as rivals Japan and the United States sought to do the same. This paper will investigate whether some combination of these three interests in North Korean natural resources led China to pursue increased bilateral trade in the last decade.

III. THIRD OVERLAPPING EXPLANATION – CHINA'S NORTHEASTERN DEVELOPMENT

Although this paper will seek to differentiate between the relative strength of China's foreign and mineral policies toward North Korea, China has a third domestic economic policy which overlaps these two alternative explanations: the development of its three northeastern provinces Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. After Chinese economic reform began, the development of China's southern and eastern regions took off, leaving the stagnant northeastern provinces behind. Cheng Li cites that Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin's provincial ranks as industrial producers fell from 2nd, 7th, and 15th to 5th, 14th, and 18th, respectively, in subsequent years.^{xvi} The fall in productivity of northeastern China can perhaps be attributed to economic policy under Jiang Zemin, who focused more closely on generating record national economic growth rates and was less concerned with the distribution of economic development. With Hu Jintao's assumption of China's three-pronged leadership position, policy shifted more toward sustainable development.^{xvii} This meant that the three northeastern provinces came back under national

scrutiny, as evidenced by Hu's "Plan of Revitalizing China's Northeast."^{xviii} Given their shared borders with North Korea, Jilin and Liaoning in particular benefit significantly from increased bilateral trade; Thompson suggests that 75% of North Korean trade passes through Liaoning province alone.^{xix} Both provinces enhance their economic prospects significantly by utilizing their geographical comparative advantage with North Korea, and perhaps advance their standing nationally as a result. The third domestic explanation will be referred to throughout this paper as a factor that overlaps both primary alternative explanations.

FRAMEWORKS OF ANALYSIS

In order to discern which of the two alternative explanations is more favorable, this paper will rely upon two major frameworks of analysis and also several supplementary analyses. The first is a comparison of two financial models of Sino-DPRK trade. In one model, a chart of North Korean exports to China will be overlaid with relevant foreign policy events: political and diplomatic exchanges. The second model will overlay the same chart of North Korean exports to China with mineral-related events—major Chinese investment deals in the North Korean mining sector and Chinese mineral policy directives. Both models will seek to determine whether there is a causal relationship between foreign or mineral policy-related events and trade outcomes via North Korean exports to China. Trade data for this analysis will come from the International Trade Centre, an UN-sponsored organization interested in developing economies' trade.^{xx} Information on political and diplomatic exchanges will be drawn primarily from Bates Gill's work, along with a variety of secondary sources. The North Korea Econ Watch blog, Chinese

policy directives obtained from scholarly articles, Chinese news sources, and provincial government websites will provide the data for the mineral analysis. This framework of analysis will enable a quantitative comparison between the foreign policy and mineral policy alternative explanations.

The second major framework in this paper will be a qualitative analysis of national and local Chinese directives relating to foreign, economic, and mineral policy. These directives will be obtained from secondary source analyses (Fan and KPMG), Chinese news releases on the directives, and provincial government websites. The policy directives will be analyzed to determine the intent of the Chinese government in its relations with North Korea. In conjunction with close readings of Chinese policy pieces, this framework will also rely upon a study of the policy decision-making processes and balance of power dynamics in the Chinese government. Scholarly articles will serve as resources on these two elements. It is important to note that intentions are likely

to be different between actors within China. That is, the central government in Beijing may be more focused on broader regional stability in its relations with North Korea, while officials in the local provinces may be more concerned with securing commodities at cheap prices. An analysis of key actors within the Chinese political sphere will provide crucial insight into the motives of China in trade dealings with North Korea.

Given the dominant evidence in favor of the foreign policy alternative explanation delivered by the two primary frameworks of analysis, this paper will include a third framework consisting of supplementary evidence in favor of the mineral alternative explanation to provide completeness. Specifically, this paper will introduce an analysis of Chinese mineral exports and commodity market prices, as well as a discussion of the Chinese coal market as it relates to North Korea. Together, the two primary frameworks of analysis and the more minor elements will provide a collective picture of China's aims in its relations with North Korea.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

I. COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL MODELS




Figure 2: Foreign Policy Financial Model^{XXI}

Figure 2 above is a graphic representation of North Korean exports to China between 2001 and 2012 in thousands of USD. Key foreign policy events are numbered one through sixteen (brackets represent events attributed to a year as opposed to a specified date), with each representing a visit between Sino-DPRK senior officials, either in China or North Korea. The first point of emphasis is that the only major official exchange not represented on this graph is Kim Jong-Il's first visit to China in late May 2000 (not pictured due to lack of 2000 export data), emphasizing that relations between the two countries were frosty up until 2000. Two key trends can be deciphered from the chart itself. The first is the cluster of events between 2004 and 2006, and the second is the takeoff in exchanges beginning in early 2009. The earlier period consists of visits between Kim Jong-Il and Hu Jintao, and also visits made by North Korean senior legislator Kim Yong Nam, Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi, and Commerce Minister Bo Xilai. What can explain such a rapid reconstitution of relations between Chinese and North Korean senior officials after the deficiency between 2001 and 2003? Although the Chinese became intent upon reestablishing diplomatic relations with North Korea by 2000, observable changes to foreign policy (with senior-official exchanges used as a proxy) did not occur until after 2003. As previously suggested, two major events in 2003 constituted a shock to China in its DPRK relations: North Korea conducted its first nuclear test and the United States invaded Iraq.^{xxii} The combination of the two 2003 events served as a signal of North Korean instability and its potentially violent ramifications, causing China to increase exchanges in counter.

The second notable element in this chart is the takeoff in high-level exchanges between China and North

Korea at the beginning of 2009 after a stagnant 2006-2008 period. 2008 served as a second key shock-year for the Chinese government in its North Korean relations due to Kim Jong-Il's stroke. Given evidence of Kim's rapidly deteriorating health, China became increasingly aware of the need for a leadership transition in North Korea. As in 2003, the threat of instability stimulated China's desire to increase exchanges. Most notably, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao led a large Chinese delegation to Pyongyang in October 2009, during which China and North Korea signed a major agreement encompassing tourism, development, and education. Park argues that this visit was the culmination of strong Chinese efforts to increase relations with North Korea via trade.^{xxiii} In addition to Wen Jiabao's notable visit, Gill and Snyder collectively found 120 total diplomatic exchanges between the two nations in 2009 alone.^{xxiv}

Together, the 2004-06 and 2009 series of events as illustrated by the foreign policy financial model substantiate the first alternative explanation. In the years before both of these periods, China was presented with evidence of instability within the North Korean regime, and exchanges picked up between the two countries in the following years. As a result, after the 2004-2006 period of exchanges, total North Korean exports to China increased by 62.56 percent between 2006 and 2008. Following the pivotal 2009 period, North Korean exports to China increased 50.63 percent between 2009 and 2010 alone. Given the clear pattern between the clustering of significant number of high-level meetings between the two nations followed by a period of rapid trade increases, this paper argues that foreign policy—using diplomatic exchanges as a proxy—did indeed impact bilateral trade between the two nations. As was the case with Wen

Jiabao's 2009 Pyongyang trip, visits between North Korean and Chinese

officials resulted in concrete decisions on the part of both nations to shore up trade.




Figure 3: Mineral Financial Model^{xxvi}

In the mineral policy financial model, key events consist of major investments made by Chinese companies in the North Korean mining industry as well as Chinese government policies specifically relating to mineral development (for example, Jilin Province's 12th Five-year plan references the promotion of North Korean natural resources). Two points of comparison can be made between this mineral model and the foreign policy model. On the one hand, both similarly lack major events before 2003, corroborating the fact that this year served as a turning point in Sino-DPRK relations. More importantly, however, the mineral policy model lacks the clustering pattern exhibited in the foreign policy model, and instead shows a relatively consistent series of events between 2003 and 2012 (Figure 3).

Whereas in the foreign policy model clustering of diplomatic exchanges was clearly followed by rapid increases in DPRK exports to China, in the mineral policy model, no clear causal relationship

can be drawn between mineral policy events and increases in trade. Although trade does increase in the years following the first 2003 mineral event, the steady stream of mineral investments and policy directives does not provide conclusive evidence toward any particular mineral shock causing greater bilateral trade. Moreover, it would be dangerous to extrapolate that the emergence of a more concrete mineral policy in 2003 directly led to the takeoff in Sino-DPRK trade given that the 2004-2006 period saw a decline in North Korean exports to China. As a result, based upon the comparative models of North Korean trade and foreign and mineral policy events, it appears as though Chinese foreign policy makes a far more clear impact on economic outcomes between China and North Korea.

II. CHINESE POLICY DIRECTIVES

This section will rely upon the analysis of five major elements of Chinese policy: central and provincial government 10th, 11th, and 12th Five-Year economic Plans; the 2003 National Policy on Mineral Resources; the 2007 Plan of Revitalizing Northeast China; and the 2011 white paper entitled “China’s Foreign Policy for Pursuing Peaceful Development.” These policies span the foreign, mineral, and economic realms, and additionally, relate to actors at both the national and local levels. This section will seek to determine whether China’s foreign policy or mineral policy is rooted more strongly in economic policy, thereby being the primary influence on trade outcomes with North Korea. It will begin by separately outlining national foreign and mineral policies, and then delving into which plays a larger role in economic policy by way of an analysis of actors within China.

Beijing’s foreign policy goals are most clearly presented in its 2011 white paper, “China’s Foreign Policy for Pursuing Peaceful Development.” This white paper outlines five key elements of China’s broad foreign policy at the national level: support for a Harmonious World; an independent foreign policy of peace; new thinking on security based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination; international responsibility; and regional cooperation or good neighbor policy.^{xxvii} Despite the fact that this paper was published in 2011, the policy elements it describes have been active in China throughout the Hu Jintao period. With the exception of the shift from “Peaceful Rise” to “Peaceful Development”, they are not starkly different from those under Jiang Zemin.^{xxviii xxix} Each of these foreign policy goals serves China’s broader interest in

Peaceful Development. As Park states, China’s foreign policy enables it to secure both external stability so that it may concentrate on economic growth, and develop relations with other major countries for trade.^{xxx} China’s two North Korean policy interests of long-term denuclearization and regime stability can be seen to fit in this broader 2011 white paper. Denuclearization works toward China’s goal of Harmonious World and regional cooperation, and DPRK regime stability meets the priorities of new security thinking and regional cooperation.

Chinese mineral policy can be illustrated with the 2003 “Policy on Mineral Resources”, which emphasizes broad, sustainable mineral development. The central government notes that although China does have vast swaths of domestic natural resources, their development is hindered by poor natural conditions. Thus, while China primarily seeks development of its own mineral resources, “it is an important government policy to [...] make use of foreign markets and foreign mineral resources”.^{xxxi} What is more, the 2003 policy states that foreign direct investment in other countries’ minerals “is of great significance for the common prosperity” and that “prospecting for and exploitation of hard rock mineral resources in other countries has [...] begun”.^{xxxii} It is evident then that Beijing’s mineral policy, as stated in 2003, is far more explicit toward its intentions with the DPRK than its foreign policy. While its North Korean foreign policy can be interpreted within the language used in the 2011 white paper, the central government mineral policy is clear that China would be interested in mineral trade and investment in North Korea.

It is next important to determine the extent to which these separate foreign and mineral policies work into China’s economic policies, and to draw upon the

point of view of local actors. Three key pieces of economic policy were in place during the relevant 2000-2012 period in China: the 10th, 11th, and 12th Five-Year Plans, in which the central government outlined the various economic goals of the nation, including GDP and production targets. The transition in policy between the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans in 2006 is most notable. Since the institution of economic reforms by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Chinese Five-Year Plans consistently emphasized economic growth rates as the primary target of the central government.^{xxxiii} Fan notes that economic policy through the Jiang Zemin era gave little recognition to growing income inequality within China, particularly in its northeastern provinces.^{xxxiv} This changed under Hu Jintao with the 11th Five-Year Plan. The language of emphasis in the 11th plan, Hu's first, shifts from "getting rich first" to "common prosperity".^{xxxv} In addition, the 11th plan introduces the word "steady" in reference to economic growth, which emphasizes a shift toward a longer-term focus by the national government.^{xxxvi} The long-term economic development emphasis was carried through into the 12th Five-Year Plan, published in 2011 with references to "higher quality growth" and "inclusive growth".^{xxxvii}

Given the national goal of reducing income inequality evidenced in the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans, it is important to look at policies specifically pertaining to the three poorer border provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. Such policies provide a lens into how national level economic policy is implemented provincially. The 2007 national-level "Plan of Revitalizing Northeast China" references hastening the process of opening-up on a local scale, the "[uplifting of] basic and raw materials industry", as well as transportation construction along the border with North

Korea.^{xxxviii} Thus, a clear trail can be seen between a broader economic decision to reduce disparity in economic growth, and the mechanism for doing so in the Northeast: reconstituting industrial and mining production and moreover, connections to North Korea. Further evidence toward this fact can be seen in Jilin's 2004 "Plan of Revitalization of Old Industrial Bases", where the province looked to increase economic cooperation and trade with North Korea.^{xxxix} Its provincial 12th Five-year Plan also seeks to increase economic cooperation with North Korea, and emphasizes the importance of the development of a port at Rajin, North Korea.^{xl}

The third, overlapping alternative explanation is clearly supported through these policy directives, at both the national and local level. The national drive to stabilize development is converted into targeted northeastern policy to increase industrial and mineral production. These directives are then monetized at the local level: as Jilin province illustrates, the national directive to increase provincial development is interpreted as license to develop minerals and transportation with North Korea in order to drive economic growth. Connecting provincial development to North Korea, therefore, serves two functions for local leaders: it provides profit in the mineral and transport sectors, and more importantly, successful economic growth can serve as a promotion mechanism to coveted central government positions.

In assessing whether these policy directives are evidence toward the first or second primary alternative explanations, one must distinguish between actors within China. Interpreting Chinese foreign, mineral, and economic policy directives *at the national level* does not provide overwhelming evidence toward the first or second alternative explanation when viewed in isolation. The language

contained in Chinese national foreign and mineral policies can certainly be interpreted in relation to North Korea, but it is not explicit that either policy works directly into China's economic policy via the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans, where northeastern development appears the primary objective. On the other hand, given the chain in which economic policy at the national level leads to connection with North Korea at the local level, first through targeted northeastern development plans and then provincial revitalization and Five-Year plans, it is clear that local actors have interpreted national directives as license to engage in mineral and transportation development with North Korea. Simply viewing the local policy directives in isolation, it appears as though provincial mineral interest in North Korea is the dominant factor in economic engagement. In order to determine, though, whether national economic policy toward North Korea results primarily from foreign or mineral policy, one must look toward the balance of power within Chinese policy decision-making. That is, how are foreign and mineral policies determined in China? Are the individuals vested with ultimate decision-making power the same for both policies?

Constitutionally, the National People's Congress (NPC) retains all law-making authority within China, but in reality, the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) at its head are the true decision-makers, while the NPC serves as a rubber stamp.^{xli} Under Hu Jintao (in charge during the primary period of interest in this paper), the PBSC was comprised of nine members. While Hu, as Party General Secretary, President, and Chair of the Military Commission, had final decision-making authority in China, he appeared to be more interested in governing by consensus than perhaps

his predecessor Jiang had been.^{xlii, xliii} From the foreign policy perspective, several key bodies have the ability to impact final decisions made by the PBSC and the leader of China. The most important of these institutions are Leading Small Groups (LSGs), the International Department underneath the party Central Committee, and to a lesser extent, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce. While the Ministries certainly have involvement in foreign policy making, senior ministers are typically out-ranked by other individuals involved in the decision process.^{xliv} As such, the Ministries appear to have more of an implementation role in Chinese policy as a body of the State and not the superior Party. Similarly, although the Chinese military also retains some influence over foreign policy, its role has diminished due to its increasing professionalization.^{xlv}

Given the importance of rank in Chinese party politics and the makeup of these bodies, it appears as though the LSGs, especially the Foreign Affairs Work Leading Small Group and the National Security Work Leading Small Group, exert the greatest influence over the PBSC's decisions. While the membership rosters of these two LSGs are unknown, China scholars assert the likelihood that their memberships overlap greatly if not entirely.^{xlvi} Hu (previously Jiang and now Xi Jinping) served as head of both groups with Xi Jinping as his deputy (likely now Li Keqiang) and was supported by other members including individuals in the Politburo and various ministries (such as Liang Guanglie, the Minister of Defense, and Dai Bingguo, a State Councilor and senior diplomat).^{xlvii}

After the LSGs, the International Department appears to be the next most significant foreign policy body, especially in North Korea relations. Traditionally, the International Department under the party's Central Committee served as the

key diplomatic body in relations with communist governments. From 1997-2003, the director of the International Department was Dai Bingguo (subsequently a State Councilor and LSG member), who was replaced by Wang Jiarui in 2003.^{xlviii} Schambaugh describes that the International Department has seven key functions in diplomatic exchanges, three of which are especially relevant to North Korea. The Department is responsible for sending party leaders abroad (such as Hu's 2005 visit to North Korea), hosting foreign leaders (including all of Kim Jong-Il's visits to China from 2000-06), and publicizing China's policies overseas.^{xlix}

From the mineral policy perspective, two bodies appear to be responsible for the most important decisions: the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). Mineral policy is not covered by an LSG under the PBSC, nor does mineral policy feature prominently in a PBSC member's policy portfolio.^{1, li} Within the Chinese political structure, both the NDRC and the MLR fall under the State Council, and so are outranked by LSGs as bodies of the PBSC. Furthermore, it is important to note that between the NDRC and the MLR, the NDRC is the more powerful of the two, and is commonly considered the most powerful organ under the State Council.^{lii} This might suggest that because the NDRC's policy portfolio covers broader economic themes while the MLR's policies specifically relate to minerals, mineral policy in general is watered down in China to the extent that it must fit within the NDRC's broader goals for the economy.

What, then, are the implications of the structure of Chinese foreign and mineral policy decision-making bodies on North Korean trade policy? Given the arrangement of policy portfolios within

the Chinese party and government structure, it is evident that foreign policy is far more powerful. The LSGs under the PBSC and the International Department under the Central Committee are higher ranking than the NDRC and MLR as party rather than state bodies, and include China's most senior officials. Thus, regardless of the extent to which China's central leaders or other influential policy actors are interested in incorporating mineral policy into economic policy, simply given the rank-order of the decision-making structure, foreign policy necessarily dominates mineral policy at the highest levels of the national government. As such, although China's national economic policy does not explicitly reference North Korea, the implicit authorization that China's Peaceful Development and Northeastern development policies provide to local-level actors consequently takes a greater foreign rather than mineral policy flavor. This analysis of Chinese policy directives suggests that at the local level, trade decisions with North Korea are impacted more by mineral policy given the manner in which local actors monetize national directives, while at the national level, foreign policy plays a more dominant role. Both alternative explanations are supported by policies at different levels of the Chinese government.

III. SUPPLEMENTARY FACTORS

It appears thus far as though the foreign policy alternative explanation has more support given that both the financial models and national policy directives fall in its favor, while only local policy directives favor the mineral alternative explanation. However, there are a few pieces of supplementary evidence that do suggest targeted Chinese interest in North Korean mineral reserves. This section will proceed by analyzing supplementary

evidence from the perspective of the mineral alternative hypothesis. It will consider evidence as it relates to Chinese interest in North Korean minerals to serve skyrocketing domestic demand, Chinese profit-seeking motives, and will conclude by examining Chinese mineral stockpiling.

A. COVERING DOMESTIC SUPPLY SHORTAGES

While China is the world's largest producer of many minerals, it continues to face critical shortages due to its rapid population and economic growth rates. A study of China's coal industry is especially illustrative in this respect. China is the world's largest coal producer and has the world's third largest coal reserves, yet it became a net importer of coal in 2009.^{lviii} As previously mentioned, Chinese policy directives at both the national and provincial level have sought not only to increase domestic mineral production, but also to turn to international imports to compensate. The national government has sought to curb coal exports since 2002, has altered tax structures in 2006 and 2007 to encourage coal imports, and then has abolished coal import tariffs and export tax breaks.^{lv} Why, if China is capable of producing sufficient coal domestically to meet demand, has the country sought coal imports? In all likelihood, it is actually easier and cheaper for China to import coal than to rely upon domestic production, simply due to the organization of China's coal industry.

China's domestic coal is largely sourced from Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, and Shanxi provinces in northwestern China, yet most of China's coal demand comes from the southeast.^{lv} Given the high expense of transporting coal from the northwest directly to the southeast by road or rail, instead the domestic coal typically travels due east by rail to major ports such as Qinhuangdao and then

south by sea to major demand centers such as Guangzhou.^{lvi} Even though the rail-sea transport method does reduce costs as compared to the road-rail method, importing coal is still often cheaper. Richard Morse and Gange He believe that this indeed became the case in 2009 when China became a coal importer for the first time.^{lvii} In the same year, North Korean coal production rose by 440,000 tons, and mineral fuel exports to China rose 25.2 percent over 2008 (and 53.8 percent between 2009 and 2010).^{lviii,lix} Skeptics might suggest that China couldn't possibly satisfy its domestic demand by increasing mineral trade with a small producer like North Korea. Yet, in 2009, North Korea was China's second largest supplier of anthracite coal.^{lx} This evidence, then points toward the fact that China indeed believes it must begin to source coal imports, especially after seeing new pricing realities in 2009, and that North Korea was a viable option to compensate for domestic shortages. The subsequent section's discussion of North Korean coal and iron ore export prices corroborate the attractiveness of North Korea as a mineral supplier.

B. PROFIT SEEKING


The number of foreign investments in North Korea is difficult to say, based on the hazardous business environment there. On the low end of the spectrum, the Nautilus Institute estimates 25 foreign investments into North Korean mining projects, 20 of which are Chinese (implied to be since 2001).^{lxi} By contrast, Thompson found 138 total Chinese joint ventures in North Korea between 1997 and 2010, 56 of which were in extractive industries.^{lxii} Nevertheless, China represents the largest foreign interest in North Korean mining to-date. While Thompson argues that Chinese joint ventures in North Korea are a result of

broader foreign policies of regional stability and denuclearization, this paper argues that FDI in North Korean minerals provides evidence toward the mineral policy alternative explanation from a profit-seeking perspective. The bulk of Chinese FDI in North Korea comes from smaller firms located within Liaoning and Jilin provinces (34 percent and 29 percent of Chinese FDI in North Korea, respectively).^{lxiii} At most, this points toward the third alternative explanation—provincial firms’ decisions to monetize national directives to increase provincial economic development.

More likely, the preponderance of FDI by small firms in Jilin and Liaoning suggests an independent interest in profit seeking. Thompson goes on to state that

Chinese FDI in North Korea is positively correlated with rising commodity prices through 2007.^{lxiv} In this respect, two potential goals are possible: first, China might have sought to develop and import North Korean minerals at below-market prices to then export internationally at profit. Alternatively, the Chinese might have imported cheaper North Korean minerals for domestic consumption. The first argument is likely not the case, at least on large scale nationally. North Korea’s largest exports to China are coal and iron ore. By plotting a chart of North Korean mineral fuel exports to China (including coal) along with China’s world coal exports, the lack of relationship between the two is quite clear.

Figure 4^{lxv}



If China was indeed relying upon North Korean mineral fuels for arbitrage, one would expect to see a rise in North Korean mineral fuel exports to China,

followed by a rise in total Chinese coal exports, which is not the case.

As for the latter objective of importing cheap North Korean minerals for internal profit, the Chinese are able to

import minerals from North Korea at below market prices. For example, a 2011 Nautilus Report notes that prior to 2007, North Korea exported anthracite coal to China at below market value, and has continued to export coal for electricity-generation and iron ore at significant discounts.^{lxvi, lxvii} Even if China does not nationally seek to turn North Korean mineral imports at a profit in world markets, it is at least able to source coal and iron ore for itself at cheaper prices by turning to North Korea. It is interesting to further consider whether China's provinces exhibit internal profit seeking via North Korean coal and iron imports. That is, given the competitive drive of Chinese provinces to increase economic growth in order to incur greater favors from Beijing, it is quite possible that the northeastern provinces seek to import cheap North Korean coal as a substitute for domestically produced coal. Then, the provinces might seek to ship their own coal to other Chinese provinces to earn a margin spread over the substitute North Korean coal. At this point, while competition between Chinese provinces is well known, it is impossible to prove internal coal arbitrage by the northeastern provinces. Exact prices of imported North Korean coal in Jilin and Liaoning are unknown, as are prices at which the northeastern provinces trade coal with other Chinese provinces. Nevertheless, when combined with the analysis on China's coal industry in the previous section, the evidence on coal and iron ore export prices presented in this section indeed suggests that China has more broadly looked toward North Korea's minerals both to satisfy domestic consumption needs and for profit.

C. MINERAL STOCKPILING

Beyond interest in North Korean minerals for consumption and profit

motives, China may seek North Korean imports in order to supplement strategic stockpiles of minerals, especially rare earths. China is presumed to hold 90 percent of the world's rare earth reserves, and evidence suggests increasing efforts by the national government to stockpile the minerals, given their importance in technology production and efforts by the United States and Japan to do the same.^{lxviii} Beginning in the 1990s, China's Ministry of Land and Resources has been developing strategic mineral plans.^{lxix} In 2007, China began taxing rare earth exports (currently as high as 25 percent), and in 2008, the ministry published a paper entitled "Guidelines for the Development of Natural Resources," which declared rare earth minerals protected by the central government. In 2011, it increased a resource tax on rare earths.^{lxx} Meanwhile, North Korea is thought to have significant rare earth reserves in its Gyung-Sung and Hur-Chon regions.^{lxxi} David von Hippel and Peter Hayes argue that "due to the DPRK's competitive labor costs relative to costs of Chinese labor, development of DPRK rare-earth resources for export would yield significant benefits."^{lxxii} Yet, despite the attractiveness of North Korean rare earth minerals to a China obviously intent upon stockpiling, at least over the past decade, rare earth minerals could not have been a primary Chinese interest. Rare earth mining is notoriously complicated, even beyond the typical difficulties that North Korean mining projects present. The separation of rare earth minerals from their surrounding rock is very labor intensive, and the process releases a significant amount of toxins to the environment.^{lxxiii} Thompson notes that China has no officially recognized investments in North Korean rare earth mines at this point.^{lxxiv} Thus, while China may be interested in North Korean rare earth minerals for the purpose of

stockpiling going forward, Chinese stockpiling interests cannot be seen as a legitimate cause of the increase in bilateral trade between the two nations over the past decade.

In summary, the supplementary evidence presented in this section regards the Chinese coal industry, North Korean coal and iron ore export prices to China, and rare earth stockpiling provides support for the mineral alternative explanation. China is indeed interested in North Korea as a remedy for domestic mineral shortfalls, as well as a supplier of cheap minerals, though not for profit on an external level. On the other hand, the third stockpiling facet of the mineral alternative hypothesis cannot be proven with respect to rare earths given the lack of development of North Korea's rare earth industry at this point.

*UNITING THE FRAMEWORKS –
WHICH CHINESE POLICY
DOMINATES IN TRADE WITH
NORTH KOREA?*

By collectively examining the evidence in this paper, it becomes clear that each of the alternative explanations finds support as a byproduct of China's overarching national objective of Peaceful Development. Indeed, China's dominant goal serves to unite economic, foreign, and mineral policy. With respect to North Korea, Peaceful Development necessitates two goals: long-term denuclearization, but more importantly, regime stability. China clearly believes that in order for the regime to survive, it needs money, and bilateral trade is a vehicle for foreign exchange generation in North Korea. By using diplomatic exchanges as a proxy for Chinese foreign policy, this paper's foreign policy financial model illustrates the direct impact of foreign policy decisions in increasing bilateral trade. The dominance of foreign policy over mineral

policy at the highest levels of China's decision-making processes also supports the first alternative explanation.

Despite the fact that neither the mineral policy financial model nor an analysis of national policy and decision-making corroborate the hypothesis that a targeted interest in North Korean minerals caused the rise in Sino-DPRK bilateral trade, two key pieces of evidence do indeed support this second alternative explanation. At a provincial level, Chinese leaders have monetized national directives to stabilize and expand their economic growth by seeking to develop both domestic mineral production and mineral and transport connections with North Korea. Additionally, an analysis of the structure of China's coal industry and the prices it is able to receive on minerals trade with North Korea does indicate a targeted interest by the Chinese in North Korean minerals both to satisfy domestic demand and for arbitrage. Finally, Chinese policy directives at both the national and provincial levels suggest a keen interest, as part of the overarching Peaceful Development goal, in inducing stronger economic growth and development in the three northeastern provinces nearest North Korea.

The evidence presented in this paper points toward 2003 being the single most crucial year in Chinese policy making in the last decade. Although China's Peaceful Rise policy had been in place since the 1978 reforms, it took new form in 2003, uniting Chinese goals as relates to North Korea. Whereas Deng and Jiang had been focused on economic growth without concern for its distribution, the rise of a more reform- and stability-oriented Hu Jintao in 2003 led China to shift its rhetoric toward Peaceful Development. It was the institution of Peaceful Development that enabled the third alternative explanation of development of the northeastern

provinces to take hold. 2003 was also the year in which North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, and China watched the United States invade Iraq. While China had maintained a policy toward North Korea of a Peaceful Rise with long-term denuclearization and regime stability as its goals, under Hu, China began to place more importance on reconstituting relations with North Korea in a trade-versus-aid manner. This, then, enabled the first alternative explanation—that China’s increase in trade with North Korea was caused by foreign policy interests. 2003 was important in China from a mineral perspective as well, marked by the publishing of a national Policy on Mineral Resources. Again, Hu Jintao’s rise played a distinct role. While China had relied upon resource development to drive economic growth under his predecessors, it was not until Hu’s rise to power that China began looking to North Korea to satisfy domestic shortages with intent to profit, and began mineral stockpiling. With the rise of a new leadership group in China this year, it remains to be seen whether China’s current policies on North Korean trade will continue into the next decade.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COMING YEARS

Whether or not the ascension of Xi Jinping will constitute a change in China’s North Korea policy is difficult to determine at this early stage. Xi’s rise represents the return of the Shanghai Clique of Princelings to political power, a turn from the last ten years under Hu’s Youth League (CCYL) faction.^{lxxv} Under Jiang Zemin, the Princeling-Shanghai clique was known for its focus on economic growth, while the Hu-CCYL group was aligned with reform and more equitable economic distribution. Xi has been assumed to exhibit more conservative Communist beliefs, a

departure from Hu.^{lxxvi} While the full breadth of Xi’s beliefs is as yet unclear, already in his first year in power, China has seen two major departures from the past ten years. In the first place, China’s decision to publish an unprecedented list of banned North Korean trade items in September 2013 marks a potentially sharp change in China’s North Korea policy.^{lxxvii} China’s new policy may represent a move to crack down upon North Korean efforts to import dual-use technology, indicative of China’s increasing frustration with the nuclear policies of its neighbor. Alternatively, China may instead have published its September 24th document purely for show to powers, such as the United States, who are skeptical of China’s enforcement of international sanctions against North Korea. Perhaps the next major North Korean provocation will elicit an illustrative response from China under Xi. Secondly, China has experienced a potentially significant internal economic change under Xi after its Third Plenum this November. While China’s broad rhetoric has largely remained the same, many analysts have argued that Xi Jinping has made himself the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping.^{lxxviii} Again, the results of this Third Plenum will take months or years to provide clear implications on China’s North Korea policy. At this point though, two opposing interpretations of this combination of initial changes under Xi can be made.

If indeed Xi’s ascension marks a return to conservative Communist policies, and he exercises his increased power rather than relying upon consensus building as under Hu, China may see a lesser emphasis on northeastern provincial development than in the last ten years. In the same vein, it is possible that provincial and business leaders will be given a shorter leash in their attempts to monetize national policy directives. Finally, if

China's September 24th banned-trade list points toward Chinese intentions to crack down upon its unruly neighbor, these changes may together decrease bilateral trade with North Korea.

More likely, however, are far more modest changes within China after the rise of Xi Jinping. As the second ranking official in China for the last five years under Hu, Xi's portfolio most prominently featured foreign policy.^{lxxxix} Given Hu's emphasis on consensus decisions, it is likely that most of China's North Korea policy over the last five years had Xi's support (and potentially did for the five years from 2003-2006 when Xi was the fifth ranking member on the PBSC). While Xi has indeed consolidated power after the Third Plenum, it is likely that his policy preferences as relates to North Korea have already been seen at this point. Thus, China may intend to crack down on North Korea's illegal trading, yet still seek to increase legal bilateral trade to maintain regime stability.

Over the coming years, this author hypothesizes that the specific forms of trade and foreign direct investment emphasized with North Korea will continue to be predominantly minerals based, but transportation will also play a major role. China's mineral demand continues to rise, and the development of North Korea's mineral resources will continue to be attractive, particularly if the DPRK improves its mining infrastructure. China has already shown interest in two key DPRK projects that are currently in early development stages - the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) and the Rason Industrial Complex and Rajin port. The GTI, an offshoot of the UN's Tumen River Area Development Program, is a partnership between China, Russia, Mongolia, and South Korea that seeks to create an economic zone along the Sino-DPRK border. Along with the development of a port at Rajin, the GTI

will allow for easier Chinese access to North Korea's mineral-rich northern regions, as well as the ability to transport products without having to travel around the Korean Peninsula.^{lxxx} Although the GTI and Rajin port development have been goals of the Chinese, especially Jilin province, for some time, it was not until 2010 that successful development truly began.^{lxxxi} As China's goal of increasing its economic and transportation infrastructure in North Korea is realized, further increases in bilateral trade with its northeastern neighbor become even more probable.

APPENDIX:

FOREIGN POLICY FINANCIAL MODEL KEY

1. Jan 15-20, 2001: Kim visits China, again meets with Jiang in Beijing and spends four days in Shanghai (Wang).
2. Apr 19-21, 2004: Kim visits China, meets with Hu Jintao in Beijing (Wang).
3. Oct 18-20, 2004: Kim Yong Nam visits China, agrees to six-party talks (Wu).
4. 2004: China's International Department exchanges 10 delegations with North Korea. The only country with more delegations was Japan at 13 (Schambaugh).
5. Oct 2005: Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi and Commerce Minister Bo Xilai visit DPRK for 60th anniversary of the founding of the KWP (Park).
6. 2005: Hu Jintao visits North Korea (Schambaugh).
7. Jan 10-18, 2006: Kim visits China, tours Hubei and Guangdong provinces, and meets with Hu in Beijing (Wang).
8. Oct 4, 2009: Wen Jiabao visits DPRK on the 60th anniversary of bilateral relations. Also present are Commerce Minister Chen Deming, and National

- Development and Reform Commission chair Zhang Ping. China pledges \$21 million for education, tourism, and development (Park).
9. Late Oct 2009: Choe Thae-bok, secretary of the KWP central committee, leads a delegation to Beijing (Snyder, “China-Korea Relations”).
 10. Late 2009: Kim Yang-gon, director of the United Front Department of the KWP visits China for five days (Snyder, “China-Korea Relations”).
 11. 2009: China and North Korea exchange 120 delegations and over 40 events as part of their “friendship year” (Snyder, “China-Korea Relations”). Gill cites nine major party-to-party exchanges this year, including Chinese Minister of Defense Liang Guanglie, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, and Politburo Standing Committee Member Zhou Yongkang.
 12. May 3-7, 2010: Kim visits China, meets with Hu in Beijing. Reportedly, Hu urges Kim to refrain from provocations and insists on market reforms (Bajoria and Xu).
 13. Aug 26-30, 2010: Kim visits China, tours Jilin, its capital Changchun (where he meets with Hu), and Harbin (Wang).
 14. 2010: Gill cites twelve major party-to-party delegations between China and North Korea this year, including Wang Jiarui, Zhou Yongkang, and Dai Bingguo.
 15. May 20-26, 2011: Kim visits China, tours Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Jiangsu provinces, and meets with Hu and Wen Jiabao in Beijing. Six other Politburo Standing Committee members (including Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang) also meet with Kim (Wang).
 16. 2011: Gill cites four major party-to-party exchanges this year (Gill).
- Not on chart: May 29-31, 2000: Kim Jong-Il visits China, meets with Jiang Zemin in Beijing, Xinhua notes significance to new century of relations (Wang).

MINERAL FINANCIAL MODEL KEY

1. Oct 2003: CPC Central Committee and State Council release “The Strategy of Revitalizing Northeast China and Other Old Industrial Bases” (Chinaneast.gov).
2. Dec 2003: Policy on Mineral Resources released, focusing on sustainable development and also “[making] use of foreign markets and foreign mineral resources” (English.gov.cn).
3. Feb 6, 2004: Jilin provincial government announces its “Plan to Revitalize Old Industrial Bases”, which expresses a desire for ports and border trade with North Korea (Jilin Provincial Government).
4. Mar 2005: Beijing signs the “Investment Encouragement and Protection Agreement” during the DPRK Premier’s visit (“The Political Economy of Chinese Investment in North Korea”, NK Econ Watch).
5. Oct 2005: While Wu Yi and Bo Xilai are visiting DPRK, China Minmetals Corp signs an agreement to create a joint venture in coal mining in the DPRK (“Minerals, Railways Draw China to North Korea”, NK Econ Watch).
6. Feb 8, 2006: Jilin provincial government announces its 11th five-year economic plan, explicitly stating a goal of “going out” to North Korea with a “focus on... resources cooperation and development” (Jilin Provincial Government).
7. Mar 14, 2006: Chinese government ratifies its 11th 5-year economic plan, notable for emphasizing “common

- prosperity” and reduction in income inequality (Fan).
8. 2006: Luanhe Industrial Group of China reportedly invests in a 51% stake in Hyesan Youth Copper Mine for 15 years. *Later opposed by DPRK Second Economic Commission, and mine was closed due to flooding from 1994-2009 (“Chinese Firms Acquire Managerial Control of Large N.Korean Copper Mine: Sources”, NK Econ Watch).
 9. Nov 2007: North Korea’s Daepung Investment Group announces a \$10 billion fund with China’s Development Bank to help Chinese firms in North Korea build roads, rails, and ports (“North Korea, China Will Start \$10 Billion Fund, Yonhap Reports”, NK Econ Watch).
 10. Nov 21, 2007: Chinese firm (not named) signs 50-year contract for control of Musan iron ore mines (“Musan Mine into Chinese Hands?”, NK Econ Watch).
 11. Dec 2007: Chinese government releases “Plan of Revitalizing North East China”, citing “sustainable development” and enforcement of “state policies of resource conservation” (Xinhuanet).
 12. June 2008: China’s S Group invests \$57 million in a joint venture iron ore mine. The mine had allegedly been up and running just south of Pyongyang since 2H 2007. The firm is reportedly also interested in magnesite mines (“Chinese Invest in DPRK Mining”, NK Econ Watch).
 13. Dec 12, 2008: Henan Yima Coal Mining Group invests in a 10 million ton coal mine and a 1.2 million ton coal chemical project (“Chinese Expand Reach Over DPRK’s Coal”, NK Econ Watch).
 14. 2009: Ministry of Land and Resources publishes white paper citing need to “regulate the supply-demand relationship [of rare earth minerals] in the market” (Arredy, *The Wall Street Journal*).
 15. Nov 23, 2009: Jilin provincial government announces China’s approval of the first cross-border zone in the Tumen River Delta (“China Approves Tumen Border Development Zone”, NK Econ Watch).
 16. Jan 4, 2010: China takes 11 rare earth blocs in Jiangxi and Ganzhou under national control (Arredy, *The Wall Street Journal*).
 17. Feb 2010: China announces \$10B investment in the DPRK via Daepung Group, unclear in what (“China to Send \$10 B Investment to DPRK”, NK Econ Watch).
 18. Mar 2010: China announces Chuangli Company acquired 10-year rights to develop port number one at Rajin (“China Leases Rajin Port for 10 Years”, NK Econ Watch).
 19. April 2010: China’s Global Steel seeks stake in Musan iron ore mine, reportedly offering 7 billion yuan and 10 million tonnes of iron ore per year (“Pramod Mittal Eyes Stake in DPRK Mines”, NK Econ Watch).
 20. May 2010: Chinese enterprise granted operational control and 60% of profits at Saebyul Coal Mining Complex (“Chinese Take Complete Control of Mines”, NK Econ Watch).
 21. Feb 16, 2011: Jilin provincial government announces its 12th Five-year economic plan, referencing “promoting [North Korea’s] national resources to... expand market share” (Jilin Provincial Government).
 22. Mar 14, 2011: Chinese government ratifies its 12th 5-year economic plan, which focuses on “higher quality” and “inclusive growth” (KPMG).
 23. 2011: Xiyang Group of Liaoning agrees to a \$38 million joint venture to develop 500,000 tonnes of iron

powder per year. *Deal terminated a few months later (“DPRK Mining Investment Woes”, NK Econ Watch).

- Not pictured: June 20, 2012: China issues white paper entitled “The Situation and Policies of China’s Rare Earth Industry”, suggesting a need to increase production, as well as active national management of such commodities (Information Office of the State Council, PRC).

- Sept 22, 2012: China announces that China Overseas Investment Co will manage a \$476 million fund to invest in North Korea (“DPRK Investment Seminars”, NK Econ Watch).

- Late 2012: 70 specialists from Jilin’s Department of Commerce visit North Korea to work on joint ventures (“China to Provide North Korea with Consultation on Management and Operation of Joint SEZs”, NK Econ Watch).

- Feb 2013: Weijin Investment Group of Hunan announces a \$20 million investment in a North Korean gold mine and luxury hotel (“Chinese Company to Invest in Gold Mine, Luxury Hotel in North Korea”, NK Econ Watch).

ⁱ Pui-Kwan Tse, “The Mineral Industry of North Korea-2000,” *United States Geological Survey*, accessed November 16, 2013. <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2000/9315000.pdf>.

ⁱⁱ Scott Snyder, *China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 110.

ⁱⁱⁱ Dick Nanto and Mark Manyin, “China-North Korea Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, December 28, 2010. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf>.

^{iv} Scott Snyder, “North Korea’s Growing Trade Dependency on China: Mixed Strategic Implications,” Asia Unbound Blog, *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 15, 2012, <http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/06/15/north->

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^v Liu Ming, “Changes and Continuities in Pyongyang’s China Policy,” in *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*, ed. Kyung-Ae Park and Scott Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), 219.

^{vi} Snyder, *China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security*, 120.

^{vii} *Ibid.*, 121-124.

^{viii} John Park, “The Rise of China and its Impact on the North Pacific Security Environment,” *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies*, no. 20 (Korea Economic Institute, 2010): 140. http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/JAS-Park_Final.pdf.

^{ix} Drew Thompson, “Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea,” *U.S.-Korea Institute Report*, (Washington, DC: SAIS, 2011), 5. http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/USKI_Report_SilentPartners_DrewThompson_020311.pdf.

^x David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Development,” *The Nautilus Institute*, September 13, 2012. http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/1990-2009-DPRK-ENERGY-BALANCES-ENGAGEMENT-OPTIONS-UPDATED-2012_changes_accepted_dvh_typos_fixed.pdf.

^{xi} Gooheon Kwon, “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks (Part I),” *Goldman Sachs Economic Research, Global Economics Paper No. 188*, September 21, 2009, http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/global_economics_paper_no_188_final.pdf.

^{xii} Bates Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influences,” *USIP Special Report 283* (United States Institute of Peace, July 2010), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/China's_North_Korea_Policy.pdf.

^{xiii} Drew Thompson, “Silent Partners,” 4.

^{xiv} Daniel Gearin, “Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments in North Korea,” *US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, October 10, 2010, 3.

^{xv} Index Mundi, *Commodity Prices*, 2013, <http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/>.

^{xvi} Cheng Li, “China’s Northeast: From Largest Rust Belt to Fourth Economic Engine?” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 9 (January 30, 2004), 1, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm9_lc.pdf.

^{xvii} Cheng Li, “China’s Northeast: From Largest Rust Belt to Fourth Economic Engine?” 3.

^{xviii} “‘Plan of Revitalizing Northeast China’ Released,” *Xinhuanet*, last modified December 19, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/19/content_7279455.htm.

^{xix} Thompson, “Silent Partners”, 25-26.

^{xx} International Trade Centre, *Bilateral trade between Korea, Democratic People's Republic of and China*, 2013, http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Product_SelCountry_TS.aspx.

^{xxi} See Appendix for chart key and relevant sources.

^{xxii} See Gill paper for a discussion on party-to-party relations as a distinct feature of Sino-DPRK interaction.

^{xxiii} John Park, “The Rise of China and its Impact on the North Pacific Security Environment,” 143.

^{xxiv} Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy.”

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^{xxvi} See Appendix for a larger version of this chart, its key, and relevant sources.

^{xxvii} “China’s Foreign Policy for Pursuing Peaceful Development.” *GOV.cn*, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-09/06/content_23362744.htm.

^{xxviii} Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, “China’s Foreign- and Security-Policy Decision-Making Processes Under Hu Jintao,” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 38, 3 (2009), <http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/view/61>.

^{xxix} Park adds in “The Rise of China” that China’s foreign policy can be synthesized into two principles: “nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and cooperation and participation in multilateral institutions”.

^{xxx} Park, “The Rise of China”.

^{xxxi} “China’s Policy on Mineral Resources (2003),” *GOV.cn*, December 2003, http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/28/content_17963.htm.

^{xxxii} *Ibid.*

^{xxxiii} Anne Wu, “What China Whispers to North Korea,” *The Washington Quarterly* 28, 2 (January 7, 2010): 35-48, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1162/0163660053295239>.

^{xxxiv} Cindy Fan, “China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010): From ‘Getting Rich First’ to ‘Common Prosperity,’” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47, 6 (2006): 708–723., <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/597/300.pdf>.

^{xxxv} *Ibid.*, 709.

^{xxxvi} *Ibid.*, 710.

^{xxxvii} “China’s 12th Five-year Plan: Overview,” *KPMG China*, March 2011, <http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Publicationseries/5-years-plan/Documents/China-12th-Five-Year-Plan-Overview-201104.pdf>.

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^{xli} Reuter’s Connected China interactive Chinese government tool provided background for this section.

^{xlii} Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” *SIPRI Policy Paper*, September 26, 2010, <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf>.

^{xliii} Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” *Hoover Institute, China Leadership Monitor no.* 26, <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM26AM.pdf>.

^{xliv} Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox. “New Foreign Policy Actors in China.”

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^{xlvi} Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups.”

^{xlvii} *Ibid.*, 8-10.

^{xlviii} David Schambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’: The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party,” *China: An International Journal* 5, 1 (March 2007), <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/chn/summary/v005/5.1shambaugh.html>.

^{xlix} *Ibid.*

¹ Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups”.

^{li} John Dotson, “The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders,” *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Research Report*, March 23, 2012, 13, 48,

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^{lii} Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” *Congressional Research Service*, March 20, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf>.

^{liii} “China,” *U.S. Energy Information Administration*, April 23, 2010, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf>.

^{liv} Alicia Campi, “The New Great Game: Potential Impact of Mineral Development in Mongolia on China, Russia, Japan, and Korea” (prepared remarks, East-West Center, Washington, D.C., September 18, 2012).

^{lv} Richard K. Morse and Gang He, “The World’s Greatest Coal Arbitrage: China’s Coal Import Behavior and Implications for the Global Coal Market,” *Stanford Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Working Paper* no. 94 (August 2010): 3, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22966/WP_94_Morse_He_Greatest_Coal_Arbitrage_5Aug2010.pdf.

^{lvi} *Ibid.*, 3-4.

^{lvii} *Ibid.*, 1

^{lviii} Kyung-soo Choi, “The Mining Industry of North Korea,” *The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, August 4, 2011, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-mining-industry-of-north-korea/#axzz2kTCwSnb9>.

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^{lxi} Kyung-soo Choi, “The Mining Industry of North Korea”.

^{lxii} Drew Thompson, “Silent Partners,” 61.

^{lxiii} *Ibid.*, 50-51.

^{lxiv} *Ibid.*, 55-56.

^{lxv} International Trade Centre, *Bilateral trade between Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of and China*.

^{lxvi} Nathaniel Aden, “North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: 1995-2009 Energy and Minerals Trends and Implications,” *The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, July 7, 2011,

<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/dprk-prc-trade-aden/#axzz2lZJVmgCU>.

^{lxvii} Since 2007, the report suggests that anthracite coal export prices have actually risen due to 1) increasing DPRK marketization, 2) declining anthracite quality, and 3) increasing competition in anthracite supply to northeast China.

^{lxviii} James Arredy, “China Moves to Strengthen Grip Over Supply of Rare-Earth Metals,” *The New York Times Online*, February 7, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704124504576117511251161274>.

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^{lxxi} David Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Development.”

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K-FILMS, K-DRAMAS, K-POP, NEXT UP... K-VARIETY?

Korean Variety—The New Addition to the Hallyu

Hui Min Lee

New York University

INTRODUCTION

On April 16, 2013, a Korean television broadcasting station, MBC, uploaded a video titled “Psy Gentleman – Wet Psy! (Wet Psy’s meaning and history)” on its official YouTube channel, MBC entertainmentⁱ. Following the official release of Korean singer Psy’s latest song “Gentleman,” many listeners have wondered about the lyrics of the song, especially the line “You know who I am, Wet Psy!” MBC’s video explains that “Wet Psy” actually means “Wet (armpit) Psy,” as Psy was previously well-known for his sweaty underarms before he became popular due to “Gangnam Style”. The video then goes on to explain the seemingly random characters that appear in the “Gentleman” music video. Interestingly, these seven strangers are the members of the Korean variety show *Infinity Challenge*, which is produced by MBC. Psy has been featured on the show multiple times and has a close relationship with the cast. The featuring of these television personalities shows the integral presence of variety shows in the Korean media industry. However, few studies have been conducted on the societal impact made by South Korean variety shows. Perhaps this is because variety shows have often been associated with entertainment and are thought to have little influence over the culture of South Korea. I propose the importance of viewing beyond the comical façade of variety shows and recognize the role that they play in shaping Korean society, both

culturally and economically. Korean dramas have been “considered by some media scholars as the most powerful medium of proposing a framework for representing the world as a world with meaning and order, and redefining the context of the world in projecting a social imaginary”ⁱⁱ. Similarly, Korean variety shows, which use the same mediums (the television and the Internet) as K-dramas to reach out to their viewers, reflect societal trends and in turn have the power to reinforce stereotypes and “order” in society. Many scholars have analyzed the ways K-dramas shaped Korean society. By applying these same modes of analysis, I hope to explore and understand the role of Korean variety shows in shaping Korean society. This paper will focus on three main themes: the gender representations in the shows, the way nationalistic sentiments are promoted via the shows, and the way the shows introduce other countries and their cultures to Koreans. But before we delve into these themes, it is important to first understand the rise in popularity of Korean variety shows – why them, why now?

POPULARITY OF KOREAN VARIETY SHOWS

The rise in popularity of Korean variety shows (hereafter, K-variety) makes it perhaps the most unexpected addition to the *Hallyu*, or “Korean Wave.” Unlike K-dramas and K-pop, K-variety often

does not have “highly attractive stars” or “absorbing narratives that revolve around emotion-ridden family relationships”ⁱⁱⁱ. Compared to other media forms like dramas and films, K-variety is also rarely imported by other countries and is missing from much of the Korean government’s efforts to export Korean cultural products and the cultural industry.

Variety shows like *Infinity Challenge*, however, have become a staple source of comedy in Korean society, providing viewers with much entertainment and relieving them of stress. Like K-dramas, these variety shows enable fans “to take temporary flight from the routine and ordinary”^{iv}. These shows can be characterized as sketch comedy shows combined with reality television, whose main aim is to make people laugh. This paper will closely analyze two variety shows, *Running Man* and *Infinity Challenge*. In both shows, television personalities on the program are given a theme and a mission to accomplish in every episode. For *Running Man*, the most frequent mission involves eliminating the other members on the show in order to become the sole survivor. *Infinity Challenge* is a little different in that the missions are not quite so repetitive. Common themes, such as *Infinity Company*, where members play the roles of company workers in an imaginary company, repeat throughout the show with varying missions.

With the development of the Internet in recent years, these variety shows began reaching an international audience as well. As media and cultural studies professor Keehyung Lee puts it, “the Korean wave is more than a passing fad,” and *Hallyu* has been “increasingly framed as a legitimate and highly publicized cultural phenomena to be reckoned with”^v. However, I wish to point out that *Hallyu* is not merely limited to Korean films, dramas and pop music. The rise in popularity of Korean variety shows

has signaled its newest addition to the regional and increasingly international outreach of the Korean culture.

To a certain extent, it can be said that the rise of K-variety is a by-product of *Hallyu*. As international audiences come into contact with K-films, K-dramas, and K-pop, they are exposed to Korean culture, which includes K-variety. In addition, the Korean media industry is designed in a way to promote interdependence between music, drama, film and variety. As media scholar James Bennett explains, “the television personality system intersects and intermingles with wider formations of celebrity culture”^{vi}. Actors and idol stars often guest on variety shows when they are promoting their newest dramas and albums. In fact, “appearing in [variety] shows is considered crucial for idol groups because it enables them to reveal their seemingly genuine selves to the audiences” and create a fan base for themselves^{vii}. Conversely, many fans of idols and actors also start to watch variety shows because their favorite stars are on it.

In addition, research has shown that audiences are more “interested in popular content that is locally relevant, and regionally accessible”^{viii}. In recent years, K-variety has started to record some of its episodes abroad. In these overseas recordings, producers of the shows always include the culture of the overseas location in the episode, often increasing the regional and international outreach of the show, which allows the show to “capture other large cultural markets”^{ix}. Coupled with the cultural proximity of Korean culture to other East Asian cultures, these shows are made more “relevant” to viewers in different countries, increasing its “cultural meaning,” and allow them to “appeal to more than one cultural market”^x. According to media scholar Tania Lim,

the increase in appeal of the shows increases the likelihood that “broadcasters, advertisers, and audiences will aid the circulation of [K-variety] within the region”^{xii}. In Singapore, *Running Man* became the first Korean variety show since the beginning of *Hallyu* to be screened on national television.

However, official circulation of the show is insufficient to account for the immense popularity of *Running Man* and other variety shows. Instead, a key driver behind the outreach of the show is the Internet. Even though some countries do import K-variety programs, these imports usually lag behind the screening of the episodes in Korea. On the other hand, the newest episodes of the shows are usually available without subtitles online on the same day as the screening in Korea. The Internet also allows the formation of fan communities where fellow viewers of these shows come together to discuss the characters in the show or the content of the episodes. These fan communities tend to give rise to ‘subbing teams,’ where current fans group together to translate all the episodes of the shows. These communities serve as an important platform for more viewers to gain access to the shows. As media scholar Brian Hu describes it, “the collective act of translation mobilizes resources from around the world in order to sustain the emotional investment necessary for fandom,” thus maintaining the popularity of these variety shows^{xiii}.

As mentioned earlier, this paper will focus on two specific outdoor variety shows: *Running Man* and *Infinity Challenge*. *Running Man* is currently the most popular K-variety internationally, whereas *Infinity Challenge* is the most popular K-variety domestically^{xiii}. *Infinity Challenge* is also featured on England Channel 4’s “The Greatest Shows on Earth” where the host, Daisy Donovan, “travels around the globe featuring some of the most popular

television shows around the world”^{xiv}. However, the difference in international popularity of the shows is not simply because of the difference in the style of the entertainment but also because of the availability of subtitles online since most international audience do not have proficient knowledge of the Korean language. It is almost impossible to find the newest episode of *Infinity Challenge* with English subtitles online as compared to *Running Man*, which has a steady stream of English translations occurring every week, giving the latter a clear advantage in their access to the international audience. The analysis done on *Infinity Challenge* in this paper is thus conducted by watching the show with Chinese subtitles instead.

Both *Running Man* and *Infinity Challenge* are known for being largely unscripted, with writers and producers planning the general theme and flow of the episodes and leaving the actual interaction to the cast themselves. This element of spontaneity allows the show to reflect social sentiments and trends that surface as the cast members ‘act’ as themselves and “emphasize the continuousness and authenticity of their ordinary personas”^{xv}. By simply being themselves in the show and coming across as ordinary people in society, their adlibs and dialogues naturally conform to their personal views and represent how societal norms shape their thoughts and ideals. As Bennett puts it, “ordinariness functions as an ideological marker of class and gender,” and thus the emphasis on ordinariness of popular television personalities places them in a position of power to “actively promote and maintain particular meanings about what it means to be ‘ordinary’ across a range of identity formations [including] national identity [and] gender”^{xvi}. The cast members of K-variety are then able to define various forms of masculinity in the Korean

society via their representations of themselves.

GENDER REPRESENTATION

In K-variety, the majority of the fixed cast in the shows are men, especially for outdoor variety programs: *Running Man* has 6 male cast members and 1 female cast member, *Infinity Challenge* is made up of an all-male cast, and another outdoor variety show, *2 Day 1 Night*, is made up of an all-male cast as well. Usually, female guests, from idol stars to actresses, are looked upon as objects of desire by the male cast members, who are often fans of these guests. On the other hand, if the female guests are famous comedians or television personalities, they are viewed almost like 'brothers' to the male cast. The difference in treatment lies in the portrayal of the stars on television. One thing I must clarify is that the boundary between actors and television personalities is not a clear-cut line, as can be seen from the role of actress Song Ji Hyo in *Running Man*, who changed her profession from an actress to a television personality on the show.

When female stars are featured as fixed cast in K-variety programs, they are usually portrayed as weak and feminine. However, they always have a certain masculine character in them that allows them to survive in these shows. Usually appearing without makeup, these female stars, who are mostly actresses or singers, come across as ordinary women instead of celebrities. They are thus placed in contrast to female guests on the episodes, who often appear with full makeup and pretty hairstyles. In *Running Man*, the role of actress Song Ji Hyo shows the drastic change from an actress guesting on a show to a fixed cast on the show. Initially appearing on Episode 2 as a guest star, she was welcomed by the male cast with loud cheers and much excitement. Her

tenacity allowed her to shine on the show, and she was eventually offered a fixed appearance, becoming the only female member of the fixed cast on *Running Man*.

As communications scholar Do Kyun Kim pointed out, the "media content of *Hallyu*" usually includes "messages empowering women," and "the roles of men are often portrayed as supportive to women"^{xvii}. In *Running Man*, Song's character is gradually shaped into an 'Ace' on the show. With each repeated appearance on the show, Song's "television self" is "increasingly authenticated [and] coheres into the form of a 'genuine' personality"^{xviii}. She comes across as witty, sharp and daring, occasionally even outshining her male counterparts in terms of courage. In Episode 133, she is portrayed as a woman without fear when she completes the world's tallest bungee jump at the Macau Tower for a mission without any hesitation, unlike the male guest actor Lee Dong Wook, who hesitates for up to thirty minutes before making the jump, and her fellow cast members (excluding Kim Jong Kook, who was not present) who do not dare to take up the challenge. Her bravery distinguishes her from the social stereotype of girls being 'weak' and allows her to come across as a strong and independent woman. It thus seems as though she is breaking gender stereotypes via her character in the show. I, on the other hand, contend that she reinforces the gender stereotype of females being generally 'weak'. She is the only woman to 'survive' in an all-male cast, distinguishing her from the average woman in society. In Episode 138, Song drags the female guest, actress Min Hyo Rin, during a mission to avoid elimination. Compared to other female guest stars on the show, who often 'require' protection from the male cast during missions, Song comes across as a 'superwoman'. The gender roles that involve Song are also occasionally

reversed. In Episode 55, a mission required the male cast members to piggyback the female guests and Song and run down a street. While all the other couples had the men piggyback the women, Song piggybacked Gary, a male cast mate instead. Her strength and bravery assigns her masculine characteristics, which then justifies her position as a fixed cast in the male-dominated show. Over the course of the show, her fellow cast mates then gradually treats her as family and 'brotherly'. In other words, she has become a 'man'.

Yet, as much as her characteristics portray her as manly and strong, Song is still a female. Another common element in most variety shows is the existence of romantic interest between a male cast and a female cast. Cast members and producers use this romantic element to increase the appeal of the show, making certain scenes in the variety show seem 'drama-like'. In *Running Man*, Song is often paired up with Gary, forming the 'Monday Couple'^{xxix}. In the show, Gary often plays the "supportive role" to Song, sharing hints with her and even sacrificing his nametag at the end of the mission to allow her to win^{xx}. However, it seems that, without Gary's support, Song is usually unable to win on her own, as her physical strength is still inferior to that of most of her fellow male counterparts.

Besides the representation of females via Song's character in the show, hyper-masculine elements are also rewarded on the show. Kim Jong Kook fulfills this role as a hyper-masculine character. During the final mission where the cast members are required to rip each other's nametags off, a caption reading 'Sparta,' accompanied by a tiger's roar and a fierce narration, always accompany Kim's initial appearance on the television screen. Being an avid body builder, his strength and agility are the strongest among all the characters in the show,

making him the most feared person during missions that involve chases. His hyper-masculinity is often emphasized in contrast to his fellow male cast mates. In Episode 113, Kim inverted fellow cast Yoo Jae Suk during a wrestling match for a mission. Yoo's apparent physical weakness is portrayed alongside Kim's strength. However, Kim also displays a "manufactured versatile masculinity," where he displays characteristics that are both tough and cute, through exercising "different images, gestures and voices"^{xxxi}. In some instances, he performs cute gestures (*aegyo*) and his nametag is even modified to include a heart shape with his name changed to *Kookie* instead of *Kim Jong Kook*. Kim's "masculinity is flexible, transformable, and hybridized," increasing his appeal to the viewers of the show^{xxii}. In this show, the hybrid and hyper-masculinity as portrayed by Kim is revered and Kim becomes the most powerful character in the show, increasing the attractiveness of having a good body to the viewers and reinforcing the "'momjjang' (also known as body-master) syndrome, a socio-cultural trend that began in South Korea in the early 2000s"^{xxiii}.

The gender representations by Song and Kim can be viewed as a form of "gender performativity" whereby "sexuality and gender are culturally constructed through the repetition of stylized performances of gender," and, through repetition, reinforce gender expectations^{xxiv}. Gender performativity also takes place in K-variety in the form of parodies. In the same way that Song jokes that she is "just wearing a skirt" and is actually a "boy" in Episode 138 when a fellow *Running Man* cast mate, Haha, comments that they are in an "all-boys school," the male characters in the show often parody women. On episodes that feature female guests, the cast is usually divided into couples. However, there tends to be a lack of females, resulting in

the formation of one male-male couple. One of the men in the couple is then asked to 'act' as a female. This 'female' is further expected to fulfill (and thus reinforce) gender stereotypes of women – the lack of physical strength and the visual appeal by putting on makeup and a wig. In Episode 139, Lee Kwang Soo, acting as a 'female', is filmed putting on lip tint and looking innocently at the camera, trying to highlight 'her' beauty.

This parody of women is also occasionally done on *Infinity Challenge*. On variety programs, elements are often exaggerated in order to bring laughter to the viewers. The parodies of women are thus brought to an extreme level with elaborate makeup, costumes and hairstyles. Unlike *Running Man*, however, the aim of parodies in *Infinity Challenge* is to emphasize the 'ugliness' and not the 'prettiness'. This difference in aim is perhaps due to the fundamental difference in cast members of the shows. *Running Man* features a wide range of multi-talented entertainers, including singers, actors and comedians. Singers and actors are often assumed to have a basic visual appeal. On the other hand, the cast members of *Infinity Challenge* are mainly comedians who often use their looks and body to generate laughter and entertainment. In other words, *Infinity Challenge* uses the 'ugliness' of the cast to appeal to its viewers. With hardly any good-looking, 'visual' character in the show, *Infinity Challenge* distinguishes itself by putting across the message that 'it is ok to be ugly'. In fact, members often tease each other about their looks and conduct rankings of 'ugliness' amongst themselves.

This element of 'ugliness,' however, is extremely important to *Infinity Challenge*. The lack of good looks allows the members to come across as average and ordinary. *Infinity Challenge* thus comes across as a show featuring seemingly average middle-aged men who are able to

perform extraordinary tasks. In contrast to K-pop idols, the older age demographic of the members in the show brings them closer and makes them more relatable to the general Korean audience. Their on-screen performances are "naturalize[d]" and they appear "just-as-they-are"^{xxv}. In addition, members of *Infinity Challenge* such as Gil and Jung Jun Ha have also made use of social networking platforms, like Twitter, to confirm their authentic selves via a "process of interaction" with fans^{xxvi}.

As mentioned previously, the members of *Infinity Challenge* are always able to accomplish seemingly impossible tasks. So far, they have succeeded in numerous long-term projects, including a Bobsleigh challenge, Aerobics, Wrestling and Competitive Rowing. Beyond mere entertainment, I propose that the members of the show represent the ideal that "ordinary people [are] a source of potential power"^{xxvii}. By stressing their own 'ordinariness' and by coming across as "behaving rather than performing," the members of *Infinity Challenge* are able to motivate and empower the average Koreans to pursue their dreams and ideals^{xxviii}. Yet this ability to complete extraordinary tasks is not unfounded. The show never fails to highlight the hard work that the members put in in order to master the necessary skills. From the daily practices resulting in calluses on their hands when training for the Rowing competition, to the wrestling boot camp that resulted in full body sores, the show puts across a clear message: with hard work, nothing is unachievable. In the highly image-conscious Korean society, this message thus helps ordinary Koreans to not be discouraged because of their looks.

Just as Bennett mentioned, "the stress on television personalities' ordinariness reveals how television personalities are capable of representing or reconciling value- or ideological-

conflicts”^{xxxix}. Song Ji Hyo’s character in *Running Man*, placed in contrast with female guest stars on the show, shows how K-variety is able to “offer an idealized buffer space to reconcile the conflicting discourses of femininities in reality – traditional women who are... dependent on men at one extreme; and superwomen who are completely independent at another extreme”^{xxx}. Kim Jong Kook’s character in *Running Man* reinforces society’s admiration and pursuit of hybrid masculinity. Beyond gender representations, with the “*kkonminam* syndrome” and the “*momjjang* syndrome” in Korea, the members of *Infinity Challenge* appeal to average Korean men, who possess neither muscular bodies nor a “pretty boy image,” and empower them to continue working hard^{xxxi}. It thus seems as though variety shows are designed to target the entire Korean population – child-like characters are also present in the shows via Haha (who is in both *Running Man* and *Infinity Challenge*) and Lee Kwang Soo^{xxxii} – which makes K-variety a good platform to promote nationalistic sentiments and to show the world to Koreans.

While Do Kyun Kim suggests that “*Hallyu* [dramas] present some limitations in terms of cultural diversity when a product is exported to other countries, because they are comprised of primarily Korean stories, Korean performers, and Korean locations,” K-variety programs are able to overcome these limitations^{xxxiii}. The featuring of Korean stories, performers and locations allow these shows to promote nationalistic sentiments and appeal to viewers who are interested in the Korean culture. In addition, these shows have begun to feature episodes that are filmed abroad, increasing its “cultural diversity” and its relevance to regional audiences. The shows are thus a part of Korea’s globalization and modernization efforts as they localize and show Korean

citizens different cultures around the world.

NATIONALISM

In contrast to K-dramas and K-pop, which some argue “have little to do with traditional Korean culture or collective popular sentiments,” K-variety has always been a platform for promoting Korean culture and nationalism in Korea^{xxxiv}. By featuring Korean stories, performers, and locations in a fun and entertaining manner, these programs are able to easily reach out to a large Korean audience. Excerpts in some shows have also taken the form of social satires, poking fun at governmental policies, censorship and social issues. A recent legal case shows the extent of the social critic offered by variety programs. A politician, Kang Yong-Seok, had sued comedian Choi Hyo-Jong for his political remarks on the variety show *Gag Concert*. Kang later withdrew the lawsuit after “the show’s writers came back with an entire episode lampooning [the] lawsuit”^{xxxv}. *Infinity Challenge* has also poked fun at Korea’s international relations through the use of captions reading “This is not befitting of a country hosting the G20 conference” and “There is no peace amongst provocation” in Episode 223, when three of the members were hesitant to disarm in order to co-operate with each other^{xxxvi}.

Nonetheless, not all variety shows choose to adopt a critical stance in social and political issues. Instead, shows like *Running Man* choose to promote nationalism in a subtler manner by featuring Korean traditional stories as the themes of some episodes and filming in iconic landmarks. The location of filming sites in Korea promotes “encounters between stars of television programs and buildings by star architects’ as an everyday experience”^{xxxvii}. These locations

demonstrate the beauty of Korea to the viewers. From the Suwon World Cup Stadium to the Gyeonghui Palace, *Running Man* has hardly ever repeated a location in its 140 episodes. With each location featuring beautiful modern buildings and interior designs, or nostalgic traditional architecture, Korea is portrayed as a country that has both “modernized and retained its tradition”^{xxxviii}.

The feature of iconic landmarks has also spurred urban tourism in Korea, benefitting the economy. As media scholar DeBoer pointed out, “any city that tries to build an economy based on tourism must project itself as a dreamscape of visual consumption”^{xxxix}. Along with scenic locations promoted by K-dramas, the specific buildings and landmarks that are identified in K-variety help to construct a Korea that is scenic both naturally and artificially. The Korean tourism sector grew with the popularity of K-drama and is likely to continue to grow with the increasing outreach of K-variety in the regional and the international market.

However, simply promoting the country within the show is insufficient to reach out to foreigners. *Infinity Challenge* brings this promotion to a whole new level through its overseas specials. Through these special episodes, the “national logo” is rendered “a highly marketable brand,” and culture is exported overseas as a “cultural good”^{xli}. In the “New York Cooking Special,” the show’s cast went to New York City, USA, to promote Korean cuisine. In addition, they took part in the production of a *Bibimbap* advertisement that was played at New York City’s Times Square. Also, with the burst in popularity of Psy, three members of *Infinity Challenge* flew to New York City and participated in Psy’s New Year’s Countdown performance at the Times Square Ball Drop event this year.

Other than promoting Korean culture abroad, *Infinity Challenge* is also more openly critical about social issues in Korea and promotes Korean nationalism in a more obvious manner. Social and political events are featured in the show with little hesitation. In Episode 294, the members created a parody of Psy’s famous “Gangnam Style.” In turn, they named their parody “Dokdo Style” and began singing a song proclaiming that the Dokdo Islets belongs to Korea. The Dokdo Islets, also known as Takeshima to the Japanese, have long been a disputed territory between South Korea and Japan. This episode is not the first time that the show sought to raise awareness on this territorial dispute and promote nationalism by claiming that it belongs to Korea, instead of taking a neutral stance. In earlier episodes 266-268, the entire mission is targeted at the Dokdo conflict. However, the reference to the conflict is less explicit, with the clues in the mission hinting to the Dokdo Islets dispute. These clues are designed in such a way that only Koreans are able to understand them and link them to the conflict. The unique design of the clues thus situates Koreans in a closed community, promoting nationalistic sentiments via elements that only they can relate to.

Social issues are also frequently discussed on the show, raising awareness of the social environment in Korea and helping Koreans to better understand their society. In Episode 320, the cast members of *Infinity Challenge* work as taxi drivers for a day. Their taxis are not differentiated from average taxis on the roads, and their passengers do not know beforehand that they are the drivers. In the episode, interactions with citizens help the members (and thus the viewers) to understand various problems that average Koreans face in society. One passenger explains that he lives in anxiety everyday due to his insecure job at an illegal bus

company. Another shares his personal experience of going out of business, as huge corporations are squeezing out small shops in Korea. In addition, the hard lives of taxi drivers are also highlighted.

Through the discussion of political and social issues alongside the 'less-serious note' provided by entertainment, variety programs are able to raise the awareness of these issues to a larger audience. At the same time, these shows seek to promote the Korean culture and traditions as well as the modernity of Korea via their locations, storylines and themes. These nationalistic elements position Korea as an "independent cultural force," and it is this "sign of Korean nationalism" that allows K-variety to have a "powerful appeal across Asia"^{xliii}. K-variety also makes use of this powerful appeal to show different cultures to Koreans while promoting nationalistic pride by showing the popularity of Koreans abroad.

GLOBALIZATION

Similar to the "two-way symmetrical approach to cultural exchange" that communication scholars Jeong-Nam Kim and Lan Ni suggested, "cultural diplomacy" is enhanced via the cultural exchange conducted in K-variety^{xliiii}. In recent years, the effect of this cultural exchange can be observed in economic terms. Hotspots have been created in other countries after those places were featured on Korean variety programs. Tour packages have also been designed to bring Koreans to the overseas filming locations previously shown on variety shows^{xliv}. The Think Coffee branch at Mercer Street in New York City has become a hotspot for Korean visitors ever since it was featured in *Infinity Challenge*^{xlv}. At the same time, the show is also able to show these locations to any overseas viewers who may be living in that

particular country, further boosting the popularity of the featured locations.

Nevertheless, different programs have different methods of participating in the globalization process in Korea. By filming abroad, variety shows are also able to expose Koreans to different cultures around the world. The locations featured are not merely limited to Asia – *Infinity Challenge* has gone to New York City, Alaska, Russia, China, Guam, Japan and Hawaii. However, in *Infinity Challenge*, the introduction of iconic places and the cultures in different countries are peripheral to the main theme of the episodes. A short 20-second feature on the place is usually shown when the members first arrive at the location, but the games and mission take precedence over cultural exchange. Instead, *Infinity Challenge* taps on the 'foreign-ness' of the place to increase the freshness of the program.

At times, it also focuses on showing Koreans abroad. In episode 308, the *Infinity Challenge 2013 Calendar Delivery Special*, the influence of the show around the world is emphasized. Every year, the show produces an annual calendar, and the cast members deliver the calendars personally to some buyers. This year, the show decided to conduct deliveries overseas as well. 5,157 requests from all over the world were received, and the breakdown is shown in the episode to highlight the vast outreach of the program – 1,500 from East Asia, 1,960 from America, 615 from Europe, 535 from Middle East and South-East Asia, 469 from Australasia, and 78 from Africa. During the delivery in New York City, a buyer is revealed to be a Korean American police officer in the New York Police Department (NYPD). An interview with him revealed that he is proud to be able to protect fellow Koreans in New York City. In addition, the episode also featured Psy, who flew in from

Philadelphia to meet Noh Hong Chul, the *Infinity Challenge* member sent to deliver the calendars in New York City. The NYPD officer and Psy are just some examples that illustrate *Infinity Challenge's* aim to show Koreans' achievements all around the world, promoting nationalistic pride while showing the world to Koreans.

On the contrary, *Running Man* adopts a very different approach to show the world to Koreans. The popularity of Koreans abroad is shown as a coincidence, peripheral to the main mission of the episode. Since the first overseas episode on June 19, 2011, *Running Man* has chosen to focus on Asia, filming in numerous locations including China, Macau, Thailand, Vietnam and Hong Kong. From the hordes of fans that gather at almost all the locations to see the *Running Man* cast, the popularity of the cast is portrayed as close to that of 'world stars'. As Bennett rightly observes, "television personalities' fame has always extended beyond national borders"^{xlvii}. In the *Asia Race Special* earlier this year, the popularity of Lee Kwang Soo – gauged from the number of placards with his name and the screams of fans when he appears – led to other cast members calling him the "Asian Prince". In another instance, the filming that was scheduled to occur in a shopping center in Hong Kong had to be cancelled and the venue changed, due to the large amount of fans that gathered at the original location.

The immense popularity of the *Running Man* cast members is always shown in the overseas specials, but the main focus of the show is still the mission. These missions, when conducted abroad, usually include the cultural elements of the specific country. In the *Asia Race Special*, the mission is revealed via a Vietnamese cultural performance. When *Running Man* filmed in China, the cast wore Chinese traditional costumes and performed a

mission on the Great Wall of China. In addition to filming abroad, some episodes of the show also involve foreign guest stars such as Jong Tae-Se, a North Korean footballer, and Hong Kong film star Jackie Chan. Cultural exchange is thus more explicitly shown in *Running Man* than in *Infinity Challenge*, but both shows seek to expose Koreans to other countries.

In the *New York City Special* episode of *Infinity Challenge*, members Yoo Jae Suk and Haha were able to casually identify scenes in *Spiderman* and *Friends* that were filmed around the city. This perhaps shows the influence of the West in Korea, but more recently this influence has become more of a cultural exchange. I propose that cultural imperialism today is no longer unidirectional. Some have argued that the "core-peripheral model" still exists today, with Korea becoming the core, and that Korea is now a 'sub-empire' due to *Hallyu*. However, with the featuring of other cultures in K-variety, "understanding among people" of different cultures is enhanced, and "opportunities for cooperation" have increased^{xlviii}. As media scholar Tania Lim proposed, the portrayal of other cultures "not only boost[s] the flow of Asian content regionally, but also increase[s] the intersection of cultural identities and consumer tastes of people from different geographically bounded territories"^{xlviii}. The creation of this hybrid taste serves to further increase the appeal of *Hallyu* products and thus increases the soft power that Korea has. In contrast to Keehyeung Lee's argument that "any self-reflexive understanding of *Hallyu* as one of the potential conduits for cross-cultural sensibilities and inter-regional dialogues" is currently lacking, I contend that K-variety has conducted this "self-reflexive understanding" and that *Hallyu* has gradually moved away from the core-

peripheral model, focusing instead on cultural exchange and understanding^{xlix}.

GENTLEMAN PSY

In Psy's latest music video, "Gentleman," the cast members of *Infinity Challenge* are not featured as themselves. Instead, they are featured as one of their *Infinity Challenge* characters. From 'Hybrid' to 'Ha&Soo', the music video seems to be an advertisement for the variety show itself. In MBC's YouTube video that explains the 'strangers' in the music video, the 'strangers' are not identified as their original name, but are identified as the nicknames for their characters. For example, comedian Noh Hong Chul is not identified as himself; rather he is identified as the 'Elevator Guy in Psy's Gangnam Style music video'. In addition, links to the specific *Infinity Challenge* episodes where those characters are featured are included in that YouTube video. It thus seems as though Psy is doing for *Infinity Challenge* what he did previously for K-pop with Gangnam Style – he is doing a global shout-out and is raising the awareness of the show to his fans. By mentioning that he is 'Wet Psy' and inserting an excerpt of *Infinity Challenge* in his music video, he gives credit to the show for shaping his television persona and popularity before Gangnam Style. The close interaction between the different genres in the Korean media industry, in this case between K-pop and K-variety, allows for such cross-promotion to occur and helps to boost the popularity of *Hallyu* in general.

CONCLUSION

From the analysis of gender representation and the role that Korean variety programs play in promoting nationalism and globalization in Korea, there is little doubt that K-variety plays a

significant role in reinforcing and shaping societal ideals and beliefs and is poised to become the next element of *Hallyu*. However, it is largely pushed forward by experienced and older entertainment artists, such as the "Nation's Emcee" Yoo Jae Suk. Younger television personalities may thus be overshadowed, as they are usually not the leaders on the show. The cross-appearance of actors and singers as fixed cast members on variety shows may also be unsustainable, as these stars may choose to focus on their primary jobs instead. Actor Song Joong Ki left *Running Man* in order to focus on his drama, and member of idol girl group After School Lizzy did the same for her album promotion. It is thus uncertain if K-variety is a fad or a permanent driver of the *Hallyu*. Perhaps, just as the popularity of K-dramas were revived with the introduction of younger stars via "Boys Over Flowers," K-variety may get its miracle should the time come. For now, at least, it is indeed an up-and-coming cultural phenomenon as a part of the *Hallyu* wave that is not to be ignored.

ⁱ MBC. "PSY GENTLEMAN – Wet Psy! (Wet Psy's meaning and history)." *YouTube*. April 16, 2013. Accessed 27 Apr. 2013

ⁱⁱ Angel Lin and Alvin Tong, "Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan 'Asian Us': Korean Media Flows and Imaginaries of Asian Modern Femininities," in *East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave*, ed. Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 94.

ⁱⁱⁱ Keehyung Lee, "Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of 'the Korean Wave' in Contemporary South Korea," in *East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave*, ed. Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 181.

^{iv} Lin and Tong, "Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan 'Asian Us'," 93.

^v Lee, "Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of 'the Korean Wave'," 177-78.

^{vi} James Bennett, *Television Personalities: Stardom on the small screen*. (London: Routledge, 2010), 190.

^{vii} Sun Jung, "K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile" in *Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption: Yonsama, Rain, Oldboy, K-Pop Idols*, (Hong

Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 168.

^{viii} Tania Lim, "Renting East Asian Popular Culture for Local Television: Regional Network of Cultural Production," in *East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave*, ed. Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 37.

^{ix} Ibid. 49.

^x Ibid. 40.

^{xi} Lim, "Renting East Asian Popular Culture for Local Television," 40.

^{xii} Brian Hu, "Korean TV Serials in the English-Language Diaspora: Translating Difference Online and Making It Racial." *The Velvet Light Trap*, Number 66, (Fall 2010): 36.

^{xiii} "Gallup Poll: Which TV show do Koreans enjoy the most?" *allkpop*, April 3, 2013. Accessed April 10, 2013.

^{xiv} "'Infinity Challenge' cast calls Psy and brings in hilarious cameo from English actress Daisy Donovan." *allkpop*. Apr 10, 2013. Accessed April 27, 2013.

^{xv} Bennett, *Television Personalities*, 2.

^{xvi} Bennett, *Television Personalities*, 30, 191.

^{xvii} Do Kyun Kim, "Hallyu and the Telenovela: Strategies for Media Globalization," in *Hallyu: Influence of Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond*, ed. Do Kyun Kim and Min-Sun Kim, (Seoul: SNU Press, 2011), 374.

^{xviii} Bennett, *Television Personalities*, 125.

^{xix} The show used to film on Mondays, so the pair jokes that they are a couple only on that day of the week.

^{xx} Kim, "Hallyu and the Telenovela," 374.

^{xxi} Sun, "K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile," 165.

^{xxii} Ibid., 165.

^{xxiii} Sun Jung, "Bae Yong-Joon, Soft Masculinity, and Japanese Fans: Our Past Is in Your Present Body" in *Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption: Yonsama, Rain, Oldboy, K-Pop Idols*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 64.

^{xxiv} Sun, "K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile," 165.

^{xxv} Bennett, *Television Personalities*, 124.

^{xxvi} Ibid., 173.

^{xxvii} Ibid., 152.

^{xxviii} Ibid., 140.

^{xxix} Bennett, *Television Personalities*, 149

^{xxx} Lin and Tong, "Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan 'Asian Us,'" 114.

^{xxxi} Sun, "Bae Yong-Joon, Soft Masculinity, and Japanese Fans," 58.

^{xxxii} Haha, nicknamed 'Haroro' (similar to the cartoon penguin named Pororo), is extremely popular with children. His television character, and arguably he himself, is often childish and competitive. Lee Kwang Soo, nicknamed 'Giraffe' for his height, is the youngest in Running Man and is known for being a 'betrayal,' as he often cheats in order to win. Because of his character,

he is often belittled in the show and seen upon as one of the weakest, just like a child amidst a group of adults.

^{xxxiii} Kim, "Hallyu and the Telenovela," 387.

^{xxxiv} Lee, "Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of 'the Korean Wave,'" 184.

^{xxxv} "Lamprooning the pols: A hitherto off-limits target proves irresistible." *The Economist*, January, 21, 2012. Accessed April 10, 2013.

^{xxxvi} The mission given to the members for that episode was to eliminate each other using paintball guns.

^{xxxvii} Stephanie DeBoer, "Scaling the TV Station: Fuji Television, Digital Development, and Fictions of a Global Tokyo," in *Television, Japan, and Globalization*, ed. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, Eva Tsai and JungBong Choi, (United States of America: The Regents of the University of Michigan, 2010), 73.

^{xxxviii} Youna Kim, "Globalization of Korean Media: Meanings and Significance," in *Hallyu: Influence of Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond*, ed. Do Kyun Kim and Min-Sun Kim, (Seoul: SNU Press, 2011), 50.

^{xxxix} DeBoer, "Scaling the TV Station," 83.

^{xl} Koichi Iwabuchi, "'Ordinary Foreigners' Wanted: Multinationalization of Multicultural Questions in a Japanese TV Talk Show," in *Television, Japan, and Globalization*, ed. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, Eva Tsai and JungBong Choi, (United States of America: The Regents of the University of Michigan, 2010), 27.

^{xli} Lim, "Renting East Asian Popular Culture," 42.

^{xlii} Kim, "Globalization of Korean Media: Meanings and Significance," 58.

^{xliii} Jeong-Nam Kim and Lan Ni, "The Nexus between *Hallyu* and Soft Power: Cultural Public Diplomacy in the Era of Sociological Globalism," in *Hallyu: Influence of Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond*, ed. Do Kyun Kim and Min-Sun Kim, (Seoul: SNU Press, 2011), 145.

^{xliv} Heemang Tour. "한인텔 뉴욕 야경 투어." Accessed April 10, 2013.

^{xlv} Isabella Moschen, "A Coffee Shop, as Seen on TV, Becomes a Must-See for South Koreans." *The New York Times*, September 21, 2012. Accessed April 10, 2013.

^{xlvi} Bennett, *Television Personalities*, 19.

^{xlvii} Kim and Ni, "The Nexus between *Hallyu* and Soft Power," 141

^{xlviii} Lim, "Renting East Asian Popular Culture," 45

^{xlix} Lee, "Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of 'the Korean Wave,'" 188

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TWO KINGDOMS UNDER GOD

Caesar and Christ in the Jerusalem of the East

Brian Jihyuk Kim

Princeton University



ABSTRACT

It is a widely accepted notion that the colonization and annexation of the Korean Chosun Dynasty (1392-1897) under Japanese imperial rule was the natural catalyst that led to the consolidation of Korean national identity and its fight for independence in the 20th century. But the often forgotten point is that there was never actually a single consensus on the direction of Korean national identity to begin with, even after Korea had officially become a Japanese Protectorate under the 1905 Eulsa Treaty. It was precisely within this embryonic period of Korean national identity discourse that Protestant Christianity entered the Korean peninsula and became the unlikely source of inspiration for Korean national identity formation. This paper will examine the complicated

position of a self-proclaimed apolitical Protestant Mission in Korea and trace Protestant Christianity from its entry to growth in Korea, as well as its far reaching political implications in Korean court politics. The intersection of Protestant Christianity with Korean identity formation will especially be examined on the basis of the Christian role in the March 1st Independence Movement of 1919, the first major organized protest for Korean independence and autonomy against Japan.

Japanese police arrested Paik Yong Sok, a Korean milk-seller, on June 28, 1912 for being a Presbyterian Christian. He was blindfolded, hung up, and beaten for two days until he was forced to confess to conspiracy against Japanese imperial rule.¹ On the same day, Chi Sang-chu, a Korean clerk and

Presbyterian, testified that a Japanese policeman had covered his mouth, poured water into his nose, and pressed lit cigarettes against his flesh until he confessed to plotting to assassinate Count Terauchi, the Japanese Governor-General of Korea.ⁱⁱ Likewise, Im Do-Myong, a Korean barber, was beaten with an iron rod at the Japanese police headquarters in Seoul until he confessed to similar involvement in anti-Japanese activities.ⁱⁱⁱ He, too, was a Presbyterian, and only one of thousands more who suffered in the same way. Across the Korean peninsula, Christians were crucified on wooden crosses, missionary schools closed and their students arrested, churches torched along with their Bibles and hymnals, and entire congregations flogged for alleged conspiracy.^{iv} Despite demographically representing less than two percent of the Korean population, some 300,000 Korean Christians came to be perceived by Japanese authorities as the prime movers of the Korean nationalist independence movement, which culminated on March 1st, 1919 when an estimated two million Koreans spilled into the streets in a synchronized public protest against Japanese imperial rule.

How had Protestant Christianity, an alien Western faith introduced merely a few decades earlier in 1884, become implicated in an indigenous Korean nationalist movement against Imperial Japan? After all, Christianity had long been negatively associated with western imperialism and had often been the victim of domestic nationalistic efforts to drive out foreign, western influence. It was a strange wonder, then, that Koreans living in the traditionally isolationist, Confucian Chosun Dynasty, nonetheless discovered an unlikely ally in Protestant Christianity and went so far as to assimilate this Western religion to challenge Japanese authority in their own domestic fight for independence. Here was a rare marriage

between the universalistic, civic ideals of Western Christianity and the particularistic, nationalistic values of Korean patriots, where a western faith usually the target of domestic nationalism emerged as its greatest partner. It was, indeed, thanks to the often-overlooked divergence between the Korean Protestants and the Protestant missionaries as well as the relative independence of the Korean Protestants under the Protestant Mission's "Nevius Method" that Christian ideals became repurposed with a particularistic, nationalistic twist opposed by the missionaries themselves. Regardless of an internal schism, it was at the same time the inescapable affiliation of the nationalist Korean Church—however independent—with the extraterritorial authority of the Protestant Mission in Korea that ultimately triggered the success of the March 1st Independence Movement in eliciting international backlash against Japan.

It is a widely accepted notion that the colonization and annexation of the Korean Chosun^v Dynasty (1392-1897) under Japanese imperial rule was the natural catalyst that led to the consolidation of Korean national identity and its fight for independence. But the often forgotten point is that there was actually never a single consensus on the direction of Korean national identity to begin with, even after Korea had officially become a Japanese Protectorate under the 1905 Eulsa Treaty. In other words, the intersection of Protestant Christianity and Korean nationalism is especially difficult to articulate since the latter was in a constant state of flux as disparate nationalist schools of thought and movements disappeared as quickly as they came, reflecting and adjusting to structural disruptions in the regional political order. In order to determine how the Protestant Church, then, eventually entered into a

mutually reinforcing relationship with the widespread, domestic nationalist campaign that climaxed on March 1, 1919, it is important to examine the changing landscape of Korean national identity and its relationship with Protestant Christianity as it developed through a series of nationalist movements starting in the late 1800s. The first of such movements occurred in 1884, coincidentally the same year Dr. Horace Allen, the first Protestant physician and missionary, set foot in Korea.

The Kapsin Coup of 1884 was a nationalist movement instigated by a select group of educated *yangban* elites including Kim Ok-Kyun, Yun Chi-Ho, and So Jae-Pil, who came to despise the traditional superiority wielded by Qing China in the Neo-Confucian worldview of the Korean Chosun court. On the heels of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876 in which Japan sought to subvert Chinese primacy in Chosun Korea, these progressive *yangban* intellectuals were among the first to become cognizant of the changing realities of their surroundings, namely the decline of China and the rise of Japan.^{vi} They established *kaenhadang*, or the Enlightenment Party, and made no secret of their contempt for the subservient position conservative Queen Min imposed on Chosun in its orientation relative to China. Pak Kyu-Su, a *kaenhadang* elite aspired to shatter this Confucian, Sino-centric worldview of Korea as a Chinese vassal state: “Let’s look at the location of the Middle Kingdom. Turn this way, and America becomes the Middle Kingdom. Turn that way and Korea becomes the Middle Kingdom.”^{vii} Kim Ok-Kyun, a progressive Korean *yangban* educated in Japan, too, was no less critical of China in his Journal of 1883 (Kapsin Illok): “It is shameful that China has traditionally treated Korea as its vassal state and it is...due to this tributary relationship that Korea’s prospect to

emerge as an independent nation is rather bleak.”^{viii}

Kim’s attack was not only in word, but also in deed. It was, in fact, under Kim Ok-Kyun’s own leadership that the Enlightenment Party contrived the Kapsin Coup in December 1884, its sole objective succinctly recorded in the Kapsin Illok: “[To] put an end to the empty formalities of tributary relation with China.”^{ix} Serious for success, Kim, organized a thousand Korean soldiers and invited 150 Japanese troops into the Korean capital of Seoul to help murder the country’s leading conservatives and expel the pro-Chinese Queen from Chosun politics once and for all.^x Not to be outdone, however, the frightened Queen Min enlisted the help of Qing China, who immediately intervened, dispatching 1,500 soldiers into the Korean royal palace to quash the political coup and the pro-Japanese followers of the Enlightenment Party.^{xi} Despite a bloody end to their insurrection, the progressive *yangbans* of the Kapsin 1884 Coup nonetheless heralded a tectonic shift in Korean national identity discourse. To them, Japanese-style westernization, not a centuries-old Neo-Confucian worldview, had seemed the key to future Korean survival vis-à-vis a shifting world order in which China no longer held sway.^{xii}

Protestant Christianity, from the very moment of its entry, stumbled into this political whirlpool and became inadvertently implicated in the domestic coup d’état. Unlike Roman Catholic missionaries from Europe who had often been massacred by the anti-West Chosun authorities for proselytizing and encroaching on Korean territory, Protestant missionaries from America did not dare venture into Korea until their safety as American citizens had first been guaranteed under the 1882 Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, signed into action in 1884 between the United States and Korea.^{xiii} Although the Treaty, strictly

commercial in nature, did not grant Americans the legal right to openly preach Christ in Korea, it sufficed to embolden the Foreign Mission Board of the US Presbyterian and Methodist Churches to immediately begin deploying missionaries to Korea, starting with Horace Allen in 1884 and Horace Underwood, Henry Appenzeller, William Scranton, and John Heron in 1885.^{xiv} Camouflaging their religious commission to evade Korea's anti-Christian laws, these missionaries worked strategically, pursuing "indirect evangelism," in which they strove to establish schools and hospitals rather than church buildings to propagate Christian teachings under the guise of western education and medicine.^{xv} In this context, a political breakthrough was achieved in 1884 when Robert Maclay, an American missionary in Japan, secured a royal permit through none other than Kim Ok-Kyun—the same man who would lead the progressive Kapsin Coup only a few months later—to establish a hospital and school in Korea for the purpose of "Western" ^{xvi} scholarship.^{xvii} In other words, Protestant Christianity had become poised to enter the Korean peninsula, intimately tied to the political sponsorship of the pro-Japanese, progressive Enlightenment Party of the 1884 Kapsin Coup.

One can only imagine the horror of the Protestant Mission, then, when the Kapsin Coup failed and the conservative Min faction resurged even stronger as a result. This domestic development rendered precarious the political position of Protestant missionaries, now dangerously allied to a treasonous faction that had rebelled and failed against the Queen. Only a fortunate stroke of serendipity delivered the Christian Mission from the dismal fate of its progressive Korean sponsors. In fact, purely by

chance and sheer coincidence, Paul von Mollendorf, the foreign court advisor present in the Korean royal palace on the night of the Kapsin Coup, thought it best to summon American physician-missionary Dr. Horace Allen to treat Prince Min Yong-ik, the powerful cousin of Queen Min who had been wounded in an assassination attempt during the insurrection.^{xviii} Allen's own record of the incident demonstrates the utter spontaneity of this fateful interaction between the Korean royal family and the American Protestant:

"After being rushed across the city under an escort of native troops, I found the foreign representatives spattered with blood.... Prince Min was lying at the point of death with arteries severed and seven sword cuts on his head and body."^{xix}

Allen resuscitated the dying Prince Min, staying by the leader's side for three months until he fully recuperated.^{xx} And, thus, the fate of Protestant Christianity in Korea was overturned. For saving the life of the Prince, Allen earned the trust of the Korean royal court and the conservative Mins, who expressed full gratitude by inviting Allen into the palace and granting him the official rank of court physician.^{xxi} One day the partner of a pro-Japanese faction and next day the savior of its pro-Chinese enemy, Protestant Christianity had teetered its way into the very heart of Korean politics itself.

Thereafter, Allen exercised his political leverage as a court physician to facilitate the work of the Protestant Mission on the Korean peninsula. He immediately capitalized on his newly acquired access to the Korean royal family and successfully received authorization from King Kojong to construct a Royal

Hospital for the practice and teaching of western medicine.^{xxii} With no small amount of flattery and cajolery, Allen assured the King that this court-sponsored Hospital would certainly “endear the people to their monarch,” then proceeded to recruit fellow undercover American missionaries as workers for the newly chartered royal medical institution.^{xxiii} His political strategy of indirect evangelism was, after all, to gain access to the Korean natives through innocuous means of education and medicine as a first step toward conversion. Riding on this momentum, missionary Henry Appenzeller, too, exploited a royal connection through Allen and requested a permit for a new Western school, which the King delightfully endorsed in 1885, sponsoring the first modern Korean school with the court’s own funds and personally naming it “Paejae Haktang” or “Hall for Rearing Useful Men.”^{xxiv} Queen Min also showered her support for the man who had saved her cousin, demonstrating her personal favor by bestowing the name “Ewha Haktang” to a girls’ school begun by the Methodist mission in 1886.^{xxv} The breakthrough of early Protestant Mission into Korea, therefore, benefited from its political connection to the Korean court and the strategically a-religious presentation of the Mission as a benign force to the Korean people.

But the Foreign Mission Board of US Presbyterian and Methodist churches was less than pleased with the Protestant Mission in Korea. A *Foreign Missionary* article in September 1885 reprimanded the missionaries in Korea to exercise special caution, noting that “nothing could be more uncalled for, or more injurious to our real missionary work, than for us to seem to take any part in the political factions of Korea.”^{xxvi} The United States Minister to Korea essentially issued a death sentence to the Protestant mission

in Korea, specifically ordering Americans “to refrain from teaching the Christian religion and administering its rites and ordinances to the Korean people.”^{xxvii} The reason cited for such a restriction order was, again, that the 1882 Treaty of Amity between the United States and Korea had never legalized Christian activity of Americans in Korea, making missionary work technically illegal.^{xxviii} After all, Christianity was decidedly a sensitive matter with inevitable political opposition from Korea, since faith in this western religion, which banned idols and preached equality before God, could easily threaten the foundational values of a hierarchical Confucian Korean society that instead worshipped ancestors and depended on a social caste system.^{xxix} Even the royal patronage of the Min faction for American missionaries was solely on the grounds of medical practice and education, and certainly not an indication of official toleration for Protestant Christians.^{xxx} Moreover, as the defeat of the progressives in the 1884 Kapsin Coup had previously shown, constructing Christian goals upon the political goodwill of any one faction in the volatile Korean court was a dangerous gamble that could easily go awry.

Such was the essence of the ensuing tug of war between Caesar and Christ: facing pressure from their home countries, American missionaries in Korea were forced to choose between due obedience to the anti-Christian laws of the Korean Kingdom or unflinching devotion to the expansion of God’s Kingdom no matter the political circumstances or the means it might take for success.^{xxxi} To the extent that utter deference to the anti-Christian laws of the Korean King would have stifled the prospect of missionary activity in Korea altogether, the choice between Caesar and Christ was simple and, perhaps, even predictable for missionaries like Horace Underwood, who

chose God over King: “We’re under higher orders than that of the Korean King...[and] our duty [is] to preach and take the consequences, resting for authority on the word of God.”^{xxxii} As his wife Lilius Underwood, also a missionary, would record later, the two went on to evangelize in rural villages, baptizing converts in secret, “teach[ing] and preach[ing] in public and private” and even managing to establish Chongdong Church, the first Protestant Church in Seoul, with 14 members in 1887.^{xxxiii} Such religious activities must have raised eyebrows in the Korean court, which did voice its complaint to the US legation in Seoul that work “not authorized by the 1882 Treaty [between US-Korea]...shall cease.” Surprisingly enough, however, no actual persecution followed from the Korean government.^{xxxiv} For the time being, indeed, it seemed that Christ had won.

Also of special utility in the light of Chosun’s anti-Christian laws was the endorsement of the “Nevius Method” by the American missionaries in Korea. In fact, searching for a less disruptive way to penetrate an anti-Christian Korean society that was xenophobic towards all things foreign, the Protestant Mission adopted the “Nevius Method,” an evangelization strategy advocated in 1885 by John L. Nevius who was a missionary of the American Presbyterian Church in China.^{xxxv} The Nevius Method was a way to ensure that the native converts would come to own and take charge of most operations of their church from the financing of their congregation to even the construction of their own churches. The desired effect was to minimize the impression of Protestant Christianity as a foreign religion, and the promotion of it, rather, as a domesticated, independent religion close to the people. As a three-pronged strategy, the Nevius Method promoted “self governing, self supporting,

and self propagation” of churches among the converts, thus promising independence and autonomy to a native population that traditionally suspected the overbearing influence of foreigners.^{xxxvi} Horace Underwood, certainly one of the most passionate missionaries in Korea, fully endorsed the Nevius Method in 1890 as a way to guarantee the autonomous self-multiplication of the Church:

After careful and prayerful consideration, we were led to adopt [the Nevius Method], and it has been the policy of the Mission. Let each [man]...be an individual worker for Christ, and to live Christ in his own neighborhood...to do evangelistic work among their neighbors, to...provide their own buildings.^{xxxvii}

In practice, the Nevius Method fostered a spirit of independence among the churches and encouraged them to become autonomous in their functions. In the spring of 1890, for example, when a group of new Korean converts from Sorai village asked for assistance in the construction of their church, Underwood replied that they “already have plenty of trees, stones, straw as materials” to build the church on their own.^{xxxviii} In this way, the Nevius Method absolved the Protestant missionaries of the dangerous risk of having to manage the daily operation of every single church in an anti-Christian country, while at the same time ensuring that the churches were independent and operative on their own.

Before proceeding, it is especially illuminating to investigate further the bold persistence of Protestant missionaries like Horace Underwood during this period, and more interestingly, the equally unusual tolerance of Protestant activities by the normally ruthless, anti-Christian Korean government. No doubt, the Protestant

missionaries were primarily driven by their spiritual conviction in daring to proselytize in a country that had previously slaughtered Catholic missionaries; however, while not discrediting the intensity of the missionaries' religious fervor, it was, rather, the extraterritorial authority of the Protestant Mission—decidedly an indirect American establishment in Korea—that emboldened the missionaries even further in their religious undertakings. By the same token, it was in recognition of this extraterritorial status of the Protestant Mission, given its predominantly American constituents, that the Korean royal court felt politically reluctant to fully execute its anti-Christian policies against proselytizers.^{xxxix}

The Chosun court, in fact, held a political agenda that prioritized friendship with the Americans over punishment of their religiosity. After all, the 1882 Treaty of Amity between the United States and Korea had been endorsed specifically to recruit the political support of Washington in counterbalancing competing foreign powers on the Korean peninsula, namely Japan. Commodore Robert Shufeldt who had negotiated the US-Korea Treaty noted, in 1882, the political utility of American presence in Korea as recognized by the Koreans themselves:

“Both Corea and China are anxiously looking for protection against the growing aggression of Japan on the peninsula. In this connection, the Viceroy informed me in the strictest confidence that the King of Corea would now be glad to see an American man of war in the Seoul River.”^{xxl}

Therefore, the desired companionship with the American government, though it arrived on the Korean coast in the form

of the Protestant mission, held large political implications for the Korean royals, who naively prayed that they had, in signing the Treaty, discovered a potential friend in the United States to counteract the rising threat of Japan.

Then, for the Korean royal court, looming behind the Protestant Mission in Korea was the specter of the American flag, a reality constantly heeded to by both the missionaries and the Korean government authorities themselves. In fact, Horace Allen, in his interactions with King Kojong, frequently conflated Protestant Christianity with the political power of the United States, arguing that unlike Catholicism, which would at once render Korea inferior to the authority of a European Pope, Protestant Christianity could groom Korea to enter the progressive world of liberty, equality, and independent spirit exemplified by the powerful Protestant America.^{xii} More importantly, the Koreans themselves acquiesced to the extraterritorial power of the Protestant Mission in Korea, each time punishing and incarcerating *only* the native Korean Christian converts, but absolving the American missionaries, of the same consequences.^{xlii} In what became known as the “Pyongyang Incident of 1894,” when a few missionaries, concerned for the plight of their converts who had been imprisoned for their faith, flexed their political muscle and proceeded to contact the US and British legations in Seoul for assistance, the Korean government hurriedly released the Korean converts from jail, fearing for potential damage in their relations with the missionaries' home countries.^{xliii} Referring to the Mission's extraterritorial status in this specific incident, the wife of missionary Horace Underwood even reflected that, “This victory [in the Pyongyang incident] made the people generally realize...that behind the missionaries was a power which could

overcome even magistrates and Governors.”^{xliv} The occasional expression of disapproval from the technically anti-Christian Korean government, therefore, proved perfunctory and rarely posed a real threat, as confirmed by Allen: “By 1890, the anti-foreign law had by common consent become a dead letter and was superseded by a general goodwill.”^{xlv} Such extraterritorial firepower of the Protestant mission would return again to assist the Protestant nationalists in the Independence Movement of March 1st, 1919.

The extraterritorial authority of the American Protestants had shielded the Christians from the wrath of the royal court, but it failed to offer protection from the arbitrary violence of Korean mobs who desired to expel Japanese and Western influence.^{xlvi} In fact, despite the benign neglect of Protestant activity under the Korean government, an unexpected popular shift in Korean national identity discourse threatened the very existence of the Protestant Korean Mission from the root. The Donghak Peasant Revolution of 1894, indeed, was a massive anti-feudal, anti-imperialist insurrection that spread across the nation from the southern provinces of Korea and persevered for a year in its protest against the feudalistic *yangban* elites of Confucian Korean society.^{xlvii} Most importantly, the revolution was anti-Western, anti-Japanese, and specifically anti-Christian, orchestrated by followers of the *Donghak* faith (literally, Eastern Learning, 東學) who deliberately named their religion this way to combat *Sohak* (literally, Western Learning, 西學), the Korean term for Christianity.^{xlviii}

Proclaiming themselves the “People’s Party” and their meetings the “People’s Gathering”, 4,000 armed Donghak peasants convened on February 17th, 1894 with the slogan “Expel the

Japanese and Western Bandits.”^{xlix} Calling China and Korea “lips and teeth” and vowing to deliver their King from the corruption of the rapacious *yangban* elites, the Donghak peasants declared in their manifesto that they were “sworn to death... in [their] common goal to drive out the Japanese and foreigners, to bring them to ruin and to cleanse the country of perfidious people.”¹ The Donghak peasants truly believed that the future of Chosun lay in reforming its inefficient social hierarchy, and, most importantly, in consolidating the powers of the East (Dong)—namely Korea and China—against the hostile influence of Japan and the West.^{li}

By far, the greatest, albeit unprecedented, consequence of the Donghak Revolution was that it incurred in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) on Korean home soil, triggering the de-facto rule of Imperial Japan over Korea. In fact, in a political *déjà vu* eerily reminiscent of the Kapsin Coup from just ten years earlier, the pro-Chinese Queen Min once again employed the assistance of Qing China in her attempt to subdue the domestic Donghak insurrection. The Qing mobilized more than 2000 troops to assist the Korean court, but not without first provoking the Japanese, who preemptively sent some 6,000 of their own soldiers to challenge Chinese intervention in Korea.^{lii} With an imperial agenda in mind, the Japanese soldiers marched into the heart of the Korean capital in 1894, murdered Queen Min inside her own palace, shocked the Qing Chinese by annihilating them in the Sino-Japanese war that ensued, and slaughtered an estimated 100,000 Korean peasants who mobilized themselves in a reinvigorated, Second Donghak Revolution against Japan.^{liii} Contemporary Korean historian Pak Un-Sik (1859-1926) recorded that from 1894 until the end of the Sino-Japanese war in

1896, at least 300,000 peasants lost their lives and that the Japanese had almost entirely obliterated the Donghak movement.^{liv} Above all, King Kojong fled to the Russian legation in Seoul in 1897, practically leaving his decrepit kingdom in the hands of enemy Japan and, thus, marking an impolite ending to the 600-year-old Chosun Dynasty.

The Donghak Revolution, responsible for this chaotic series of political upheavals, immensely complicated the position of Protestant Christianity in Korea. For one, the anti-Western Donghak Peasant Revolution had wreaked havoc upon Korean Christian communities, and Protestants and Catholics, natives and missionaries alike suffered as a result. Especially, Protestant missionaries in the countryside even had to evacuate from their respective villages, taking shelter in Seoul merely to save their lives from the onslaught of the Donghak peasant mobs.^{lv} Meanwhile, mission buildings fell victim to armed Donghak soldiers, who indiscriminately burned church buildings to the ground.^{lvi}

The more significant repercussion of the Donghak Revolution for the Christian mission, however, lay elsewhere. In fact, the violence of the Donghak peasants meant that Protestant missionaries naturally came to appreciate the intervention of Japanese soldiers when they arrived in 1894 to slaughter the anti-Christian Donghak peasants. From the perspective of the Protestant missionaries, the Protestant Mission had crossed into an interesting relationship with Japan in which it felt indebted to the Japanese military for indirectly delivering the Protestant mission from further suffering under the Donghak Revolution.^{lvii}

From here, experiences of the Protestant missionaries and the Korean natives showed the first symptoms of divergence. The indigenous Korean Christians, in fact, had a different story to

tell about Japan. Under uninvited Japanese militarism, their Queen had been murdered, their King exiled, and six centuries of their Kingdom's history forcefully curtailed. Japan had made no secret of its imperialistic ambitions on the Korean peninsula, and with the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, it was on the fast track to become ruler over the Korean peninsula under the Eulsa Protectorate Treaty of 1905. The Protestant Mission was therefore thrust into the uncomfortable political position of having benefited from Japanese military intervention in Korea, while the very people it served had suffered and bled by the same Japanese hand. This tension only multiplied for the Protestant Mission, placing the missionaries in an uneasy position when a large number of Korean Protestant converts became involved in the establishment and activities of the Independence Club, a progressive, anti-Japanese organization with an obvious nationalistic bent.

The formation of the Independence Club, which occurred in July 1896 shortly after King Kojong's flight to Russia, was a development in the Korean national identity discourse that seriously complicated the position of the Protestant missionaries vis-à-vis the Protestant Koreans. Founded almost as a quasi-substitute government in the absence of the Korean monarch, the Independence Club had been inaugurated as a "self-strengthening movement" under the leadership of none other than So Jae-Pil and Yun Chi-Ho, both *yangban* turned Protestants who had participated in the progressive 1884 Kapsin Coup against the conservative Min faction.^{lviii} The Independence Club enjoyed enthusiastic participation from Protestant Korean teachers of prominent mission schools such as the Paejae Haktang and Kyongsin Hakkyo, and counted among its members mission school graduates such as future

Korean President Yi Sungman (Syngman Rhee).^{lix} Moreover, participation in the Independence Club, which had 8 local chapters across the peninsula, proved higher where Protestant Christians were numerous, and in the Pyongyang branch of the Independence Club alone, all 17 leaders were Protestant.^{lx} Hosting twice a “People’s Assembly,” which was attended by more than 10,000 Korean patriots in the capital Seoul for a public discussion about Korea’s future, the Independence Club advocated constitutional, representative monarchy for Korea, and even erected an Independence Gate modeled after its French counterpart to vouch for similar Korean autonomy from Japan and China.^{lxi} Reaching a membership of 4,173 by 1898 and over 10,000 by 1904, the Independence Club, with a strong Protestant following, quickly became recognized as the biggest umbrella organization for nationalistic, patriotic action under Japanese rule.^{lxii}

Ironically enough, the missionaries had only themselves and their teachings to blame for the gravitation of their Protestant converts to the politically charged activities of the Independence Club. After all, it was the missionaries themselves who had entered the Korean peninsula in the first place as conveyors of Western education and modern scholarship. It was in fact, through missionaries and the teachings in their mission schools that Korean citizens of all social classes had first come into contact with the democratic consciousness of the West and the decidedly Protestant ideals of “equality before God.”^{lxiii} It was here that the elite *yangbans* had come to denounce the very social hierarchy in which they flourished, confessing as one man did in his newfound Protestant faith that “God did not make one man a yangban and another *sangnom* (*low fellow*).”^{lxiv} And it was also in the unique role of the Mission in translating the Bible

that *hangul*, the Korean language, not classical Chinese, was exclusively and universally offered to “women, children, and ignorant men in the church,” raising Korean consciousness.^{lxv}

It was surely not a surprise, then, that when the chance arose in the crash of the conservative Confucian order in 1897 for progressive ideas to be openly expressed for the first time in the public discussion of Korea’s uncertain future, Protestant Koreans, being among the few to have imbibed Western ideas, were first to respond to the call of the Independence Club.^{lxvi} After all, as author Martha Huntley put it, it was “inadvertently, the mission schools [that had] aided Korean opposition to Japanese colonialism...[and]...political enlightenment was a byproduct of mission education.”^{lxvii} Indeed, politically forward-minded Koreans were simply more likely to support the progressive agenda of the Independence Club in 1897, and it was not one bit strange that these Koreans “came mostly, if not solely, from the church community.”^{lxviii} After all, when the Japanese finally declared Korea its protectorate in the 1905 Eulsa Treaty, the missionaries were operating 773 of the 1218 schools in the modern education system in Korea.^{lxix} In other words, it was none other than the missionaries themselves who had equipped their converts with the means to conflate in their minds the progressive ideals of the Protestant Church with nationalistic politics. The Protestant Mission in Korea, had, therefore, ironically sown the seeds of its own conundrum.

In fact, thanks to the involvement of the Korean Protestants in the nationalistic Independence Club, the missionaries, by association, too, had to maneuver the difficult choice between either deference to the incoming Japanese rulers or loyalty to the Koreans who cried out for independence.^{lxx} Immediately

drawing a line between themselves and the activities of the Independence Club, however, the missionaries in Korea invoked the Protestant belief in separation of state and religion. “The missionaries strongly believe, with the Boards at home, that...it is better for Disciples of Christ to patiently endure some injustice than to carry Christianity in antagonism to the [Japanese] government under which they labor,” wrote Arthur Judson Brown in 1902, the General Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions.^{lxxi} Missionary Charles Allen Clark, too, insisted on the apolitical neutrality of the Church, condemning the Korean Protestants for harboring anti-Japanese, nationalistic sentiment: “Our position has been that the church is a spiritual organization and as such is not concerned with politics either for or against the present or any other government.”^{lxxii} Missionary Samuel F. Moore stationed in Seoul even mentioned specifically that being “engrossed with the Independence Club had little thought or purpose in the work of the Church.”^{lxxiii}

However, such proclamations of neutrality, especially if based on a spiritual argument of separation of church and state, must be questioned further for authenticity unless one is to believe that the Protestant Mission was purely a spiritual organization devoid of any political biases. Indeed, as examined once before, the predominantly American community of Protestant missionaries enjoyed full extraterritorial authority as, practically, an American constituency in Korea, and, thus, no matter how spiritually convicted or genuine, the missionaries always stood within the jurisdiction of the American government and the laws of their home country. As suspected, the political reality of the American missionaries was that their home government in Washington had betrayed its 1882 Treaty of Amity with

Korea, formally acknowledging, instead, the Japanese occupation of Korea under the secret 1905 Taft-Katsura Agreement.^{lxxiv} In reciprocation, Japan had promised to acknowledge the US occupation of the Philippines.^{lxxv} The following decree which John Sill, the U.S. Minister to Korea, delivered to the missionaries in Seoul was articulate enough: “Refrain from any expression of opinion or from giving advice concerning the internal management of the country, or from intermeddling in its political questions.”^{lxxvi} After all, given their religious work in Korea, it was politically wise for the missionaries to maintain friendly ties with their local Japanese authorities. Reverend Arthur Brown, for one, wrote in a letter of praise to Japanese diplomat in the US, Hanihara Masana, that “Japanese administration is far better than Korea would otherwise have had, and far better than Korea had under its rule.”^{lxxvii} In other words, the “neutrality” that the Protestant Mission adopted was in and of itself far from neutral, but, rather, a political euphemism for the pro-Japanese—as opposed to pro-Korean—attitude already embraced at home in Washington. The missionaries, in effect, had chosen Caesar over Christ.^{lxxviii}

This was reason enough for a sharp divergence between the Protestant Mission and the Protestant Koreans. In fact, the Protestant nationalists of the Independence Club, which became the “New People’s Association (Sinminhoe)” in 1907, harshly criticized the “apolitical” stance insisted by the missionaries, who only sought to quash the anti-Japanese sentiment of the Koreans. For instance, so angry was Protestant Yun Chi-Ho, President of the New People’s Association and founding member of the former Independence Club, that he cursed the Protestant Mission in his private journal:

The arrogance and thoughtfulness of missionaries are alienating the Koreans in schools and churches...There will be a great revolt some day in the near future on the part of the Koreans unless the missionaries change their attitude. What a pity!^{lxxxix}

Kim San, a young Christian youth, who later became an active leader in the March 1st movement also added to the sentiment:

One thing in particular made me angry...was hearing an American missionary tell the people, "God is punishing Korea for the mistakes she has made. Now Korea is suffering to pay for these. Later God will let her recover after penance is done...In Europe, the Christian nations did not turn the other cheek. To fight was to gain victory...All over Korea, young men felt the same."^{lxxx}

It was the once again the Protestant Mission's very own Nevius Method that had sown the seeds of divergence. Even the mere possibility of divergence between political Protestants and their "apolitical" missionary authorities lay in the Mission's Nevius Method of fostering independence and autonomy among the indigenous churches and their leadership. As mentioned before, the Nevius Method, which was designed for the domestication of the western church in xenophobic countries like China and Korea, had decentralized the role of the mission authorities while encouraging self-governance of the indigenous church network.^{lxxxii} In action, even as it discouraged anti-Japanese activities among the Korean Protestants and supported Japan behind closed doors, the Protestant Mission in Korea included in the 1901 Resolution of the Mission

Council a blanket statement that enshrined the principle of the Nevius method: "Our Church neither forces *nor prohibits* its members to take part in state affairs or join any political party (my emphasis)."^{lxxxiii} In 1907, thirty-six Korean church elders joined to form the Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of Korea, making a formal gesture that began to exclude missionaries from church administration.^{lxxxiii} In other words, although Protestant Christianity's teachings and values were not explicitly designed for any form of anti-Japanese nationalistic activism, the decentralized and relatively autonomous Korean churches under the Nevius Method were free to repurpose Protestant ideals for nationalistic purposes within their own individual congregations.^{lxxxiv}

Such was the fuel behind the explosive growth experienced by the Korean Protestant Church starting from the time of the 1905 Protectorate Treaty leading up to the Japanese annexation in 1910. In fact, the Korean-run Protestant Churches, of which there were 321 in 1905, began catering to the pent-up nationalist sentiment of the Korean populace.^{lxxxv} In a flagrant example of what the missionaries told them not to do, indigenous Protestant Churches and mission schools conflated Christianity with nationalism, presenting Biblical struggles of the Israeli people as analogies for the sure victory of the Korean *minjok*, or race. "When one looks at the language and deeds of Christians, they profess that the people of Israel under the oppression of Egypt succeeded in their exodus for national independence and liberation under God's help and under the leadership of Moses," recalled Paek Nak Chun, who lived through the colonial era, "They teach the Biblical story that during the war with another nation, the people of Israel were vindicated by David, the Apostle of Justice who destroyed the giant

Goliath.^{lxxxvi} Even in mission schools like Sungin High School, students came up and used sermons from the Bible to share their active resistance against the Japanese, and as Protestant nationalist Cho Mansik recalled, “We did not mistake the message.”^{lxxxvii} Hymns such as “Believers are like Soldiers of the Army!” “Onward, Christian Soldiers,” and “Soldiers of Christ Rise” were favorite selections of these Protestant congregations for obvious reasons.^{lxxxviii} This was the powerful moment where particularistic patriotism and anti-Japanese nationalism were able to coalesce with the universalistic values of Christianity under the auspices of the autonomous indigenous Protestant Churches in Korea.

The nationalistic Protestant Christianity of indigenous Koreans, in this way, resonated with the psychological and political vacuum of the Korean people who, under strict Japanese rule, had become deprived of a public forum for political exchange and collective action.^{lxxxix} Such Koreans flocked to the Church en masse for this specific reason, as confirmed by the *Korea Daily News* in 1907, a newspaper run by a British man and therefore exempt from much Japanese censorship:

Over the years the people of Korea have felt bewildered and helpless under government oppression and Japanese maltreatment. As a result more and more have been converted to the faith of the West. Lately their numbers keep growing even more, and it now seems that Korea as a whole rebounding from oppression and maltreatment may well turn into a Christian nation.^{xc}

Not surprisingly, by 1907, the number of churches in Korea had doubled in just two years to 642 churches and in the

meantime Protestants had experienced “The Great Pyongyang Revival” and “A Million Souls for Christ Movement,” which swept across the nation, gaining tens of thousands of new believers.^{xcii} After a meager following of a couple hundred believers in 1890, the Protestant Church gained 50,000 believers by 1905, leaping yet again to more than 200,000 by 1909.^{xciii} Powerful Koreans such as Yi Won Gung, the most famous Confucian scholar in Korea, Kim Chong Si, former chief of police of Seoul, and Yi Sang Jae, former secretary cabinet and later executive leader of the Seoul YMCA joined the indigenous Protestant Church during this period.^{xciii} Native Korean churches had also taken the initiative of establishing churches in their local communities and according to the *Chosun Christian News*, by 1908, Korean churches had established “an average of two schools for every one of the 345 counties in all the land.”^{xciv} According to the Report of the World Missionary Conference in 1910, two thirds of all the boys and girls in school were attending Christian schools. By 1910, the presence of Korean Protestants had increased to the extent that Korea was being dubbed the “Jerusalem of the East.”^{xcv} The Korean Protestant Church had evolved into a formidable tinderbox of anti-Japanese, nationalist sentiment.

To be certain, the powerful and authentic religious experience of Christianity is not to be ignored as one sure cause of the Protestant Boom during this period. In fact, the experience of revival among Christians was reportedly supernatural, with people “clenching their fists and striking their heads against the ground in a struggle to resist the power that would force them to confess their misdeeds.”^{xcvi} The *Missionary Review of the World* reported similarly in 1907 that the “whole congregation of Changdaehyon Presbyterian Church united in audible

prayer which rose and diminished in fervor like the waves of the sea.”^{xcvii} Still, however, religious experience alone as a cause of the Protestant Boom does not explain why the Japanese authorities grew so overly defensive, going so far as to send spies into congregations to search the mission premises, and even reading school essays written by students.^{xcviii} In fact, the Japanese, too, suspected that it was certainly not religious experience alone, but rather the potential of the indigenous Protestant Church as an agora for political exchange that inspired hundreds of thousands of Koreans to flock to the church.

So aggressively paranoid of the Korean Protestant Church were the Japanese authorities that, in what became known as the infamous Conspiracy Case Trial of 1911, the Japanese police arrested hundreds of Koreans for no apparent reason, charging them groundlessly for conspiring to assassinate the Japanese Governor-General Terauchi Masatake. It was by no coincidence that of the 123 prosecuted, 94 were Protestant Christians, including nationalist Christian leaders like Yun Chi-Ho.^{xcix} What exactly ensued in the torture room until these innocent Christians were made to confess to crimes they had never before heard is not of concern, and its details are already disclosed in the opening of this paper. What does emerge, however, as a point of interest is that 1911 was only the beginning of intense Christian persecution in colonial Korea. Even more importantly, it was the increasingly harsher persecution of Protestant Christians as the Japanese, more ruthless each time, forced closing of mission schools, banned mission textbooks and burned Bibles that tested the patience of the Protestant Missionaries who had until then sided—or remained “neutral”—with Japan. Though in disagreement with their converts regarding the role of Japan or the

independence of Korea, the Protestant missionaries were increasingly agitated by the violence exerted on fellow Christians by the Japanese. Here was the once pro-Japanese, but now increasingly frustrated missionary, Arthur Judson Brown, following the Conspiracy Trial of 1911: “It is about as difficult for those who know them (the prosecuted) to believe that any such number of Christian ministers, elders, and teachers, had committed crime as it would be for the people of NJ to believe that the faculty, students, and local clergy of Princeton were conspirators and assassins.”^c The pendulum between Caesar and Christ was swinging once more.

On March 1st, 1919, the fateful day of the March 1st Independence Movement, nothing could challenge the Protestant Church as the largest, most effective, most networked group of Koreans on the Peninsula, what with its thousands of pastors, church workers, some 300,000 believers, 2000 churches, 10000 schools, hospitals, church newspapers, the YMCA, the YWCA, and more.^{ci} Not all nationalists were members of the Protestant Church, of course, but no other organization enjoyed in its representation such participation from all social classes and such widespread distribution throughout all provinces on the peninsula as the Protestant Church, which included 11 churches in Seoul, 260 in Pyongyang, 76 in the Southeastern Cholla province, 126 in the Kyongsang Province.^{cii}

It was no surprise that despite representing only two percent of a population of 20 million, when nationalist sentiment peaked after President Woodrow Wilson’s support for “self-determination” in 1918, Christians came to spearhead the independence movement of Korea. Sixteen of the thirty-three signatories to the March First Declaration of Independence were Protestants, as well

as 10 out of the 11 organizers of Tokyo Korean Declaration of Independence.^{ciii} It was also no surprise that the Movement began from the churches and mission schools, which had grown to become centers of Korean anti-Japanese sentiment. Missionary Frank Smith reported that after the Declaration of Independence was read in churches, mobs—both Christian and non-Christian—“each time collected from the church and started from there,” marching into the streets in protest against Japanese rule.^{civ} It was also not surprising, that, when the Japanese began its crackdown, they targeted Christians as the conspirators behind the Independence Movement, crucifying them and tying them to telephone poles to flog them. After all, Missionary Frank believed it was “but natural for the police to take the whole thing for a Christian movement.”^{cv} But this time, the Japanese, by destroying the Korean Church and testing the patience of the Protestant Mission, had at last squandered the political goodwill of the Protestant missionaries, who gathered finally under the moral banner of “No neutrality for brutality,” using their extraterritorial authority to bring the censure of their home countries upon Japan.

In fact, it was the extraterritorial authority of the missionaries, who were inevitably affiliated with the Protestant Korean Church though not supportive of its independence activities, that triggered a boomerang effect from their home countries now stimulated by the brutalities of the Japanese government. Missionaries like Dr. Frank Schofield took pictures of the Japanese brutalities and published 5000 copies of them in a booklet, *Unquenchable Fire*, distributing them to their home countries.^{cvi} The Methodist

Episcopal Church in the USA became concerned for the Korean Church, inevitably attached to the Protestant Mission in Korea, and reported that “as representing the Christian sentiment of a majority of the American churches...we cannot remain silent while a defenseless people are made the victims of massacre.”^{cvii} The American Protestant Mission Board, PCUSA, published reports of destruction in Korea and submitted them to the US Congress, while missionaries in Korea wrote back to their home countries, revealing shocking details that were published in the newspapers back home: “Korea seems to some observers to be punished for being Christian almost as much for being patriotic if not more,” blared a *Literary Digest* article in May 1919.^{cviii} Korean interests suddenly became American interests as Korean Churches, attached indirectly and inevitably to their American missions, were attacked and burned. Senator Norris in the United States Senate and Senator McCormick even read the reports of the Federal Council of Churches in Congress on July 15, 1919 presenting the destruction of the Korean church as a threat to the American Mission.^{cix} Startled by the unexpected international criticism that had been triggered by the mission, the Japanese government finally deposed its own Governor-General, Hasegawa, in August of 1919 and quickly adopted a “conciliation” or “cultural” policy, ending militaristic governance over the Korean peninsula.^{cx}

Although the Protestant Church's organization and values had certainly never been structured for anti-Japanese activism, the Koreans joined the Protestant church in the early 1900s. Under the relative independence of the Nevius Method, they reshaped Christian values to support their anti-Japanese sentiment, even at the cost of divergence with the missionaries. When the Japanese understandably turned towards this anti-Japanese, nationalistic Korean Church in an effort to throttle anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, it unwittingly agitated the American Protestant Mission, inevitably attached to their work in the Korean Church. The allegiance of the Protestant Mission had been put to its final litmus test—and Christ had won.

ⁱ Frederick Mckenzie, *Korea's Fight for Freedom* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1920), 225.

These testimonies were heard in the Seoul Appeals Court and documented by the author Frederick Arthur Mackenzie during his visit to Korea.

ⁱⁱ Ibid

ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid, 226.

^{iv} Pamphlet Collection, 7, 13; McKenzie, 259.

^v Alternate spelling: Joseon, Chosen

^{vi} Kang, Woong Joe. *The Korean Struggle for International Identity in the Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866-1882* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005).

^{vii} Shin, Yong-ha, *Modern Korean History and Nationalism* (Seoul: Jimoondang Publishing Company, 2000), 30-31.

^{viii} Ibid, 48.

^{ix} Ibid, 45.

^x Ibid; Kang, Wi Jo, *Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of Christianity and Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

^{xi} Matsutani, Motokazu. *Church over Nation: Christian Missionaries and Korean Christians in Colonial Korea*. Cambridge: Harvard University; Shin, Yong-ha, *Modern*

Korean History and Nationalism, trans (Seoul: Jimoondang Publishing Company, 2000), 60; Shin, 45.

^{xii} Shin, Gi-Wook, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 26.

^{xiii} Cho, Eunsik. *The Great Revival of 1907 in Korea: Its Cause and Effect* (Missology: An International Review, 1998), 290.; Matsutami, 59; The treaty was negotiated in 1882, but it was not signed into action until May 1884.

^{xiv} Matsutami, 60.

^{xv} Ibid, 149.

^{xvi} "Western" in quotes because the Christian missionaries sought to disseminate Christian teachings and values by establishing schools and hospitals mainly as a cover for missionary work.

^{xvii} Matsutami, 60.

^{xviii} Kang, Wi Jo, *Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of Christianity and Politics* (Albany: 1997), 15; Matsutami 61.

^{xix} Kang, 15.

^{xx} Ibid; Matsutami, 61.

^{xxi} Matsutami, 61.

^{xxii} Ibid, 63.

^{xxiii} Ibid; Wells, Kenneth M. *New God, new nation: Protestants and self-reconstruction nationalism in Korea, 1896-1937* (Honolulu, 1990), 27.

^{xxiv} Kim, In Soo. *Asian Thought and Culture: Protestants and the Formation of Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920: a Study of the Contributions of Horace G. Underwood and Sun Chu Kil* (New York, 1996), 59.; Pak, Chong-Shin. *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*. Seattle, 22.

^{xxv} Kim, 61. To this day, Ewha Haktang, which evolved into the Ewha Womens University is a premier women's college in South Korea.

^{xxvi} Kang, 17.

^{xxvii} Matsutami, 68.

^{xxviii} Ibid.

^{xxix} Wells, 27.

^{xxx} Matsutami, 68.

^{xxxi} In reference to the New Testament, where Jesus, confronted about whether or not to pay taxes, tells his followers to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's.

^{xxxii} Matsutami, 68.

xxxiii Kim, Insoo, 48; Matsutami, 68.

xxxiv Ibid, 68.

xxxv Kim, Insoo, 49.

xxxvi Cho, Eunsik. *The Great Revival of 1907 in Korea: Its Cause and Effect*, 291.

xxxvii Kim, Insoo, 49.

xxxviii Ibid, 50.

xxxix Matsutami, 74; Pak, 119.

xl Kang, Wong Joe. *The Korean Struggle for International Identity in the Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866-1882* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), 126.

xli Matsutami, 65.

xlii Matsutami, 74, 75.

xliii Ibid, 75.

xliv Ibid, 76.

xlv Wells, 28.

xlvi Matsutami, 209.

xlvii Shin, 73.

xlviii Ibid.

xlix Ibid, 83.

¹ Ibid, 82, 104.

li Ibid, 104.

lii Ibid, 91. Kang, Wi Jo, 33.

liii Shin, 104.

liv Ibid, 108.

lv Matsutami, 73.

lvi Ibid. As already mentioned, Protestant Christianity was persistently presented as a force wholly different from Catholicism, which was relatively more identified with Western imperialism and, thus, less welcomed by Koreans due to the implications of being “subjected” to Papal authority. Meanwhile, Protestant Christianity had political association with “Protestant America,” although, to the Donghak peasant rebels, the distinction didn’t matter much.

lvii Ibid, 209.

lviii Shin, 15. During the Coup, the two men had been pro-Japanese. But after Japanese imperialistic ambitions

became clear in the late 1890s, these two men turned anti-Japanese but were equally reform-minded as before.

lix Pak, 126.

lx Pak, 127.

lxi Shin 137.

lxii Pak, 126.

lxiii Park, Yong-Shin “Social Change and Christian Universities in Korea” (1997), 515.

lxiv Park, 514.

lxv Kang, Wi Jo, 31.

lxvi Wells, 9.

lxvii Kim Insoo, 66.

lxviii Pak, 126.

lxix Mckenzie, 213

lxx Yu, K. Kale, *American Missionaries and the Korean Independence Movement in the Early 20th Century*, 175.

lxxi Yu, 175.

lxxii Ibid, 176.

lxxiii Matsutami, 190.

lxxiv Cho, 290.

lxxv Ibid.

lxxvi Yu, 174.

lxxvii Kang, Wi Jo, 14.

lxxviii There was of course as in any other case a small minority of missionaries who opposed Japanese authority. Horace Allen, for one, wrote in his journal that he shed tears for the plight of Korea. But it must be remembered that this was far from the general attitude of missionaries and Allen, by the time of his writing, had discontinued his missionary work.

lxxix Matsutami, 332.

lxxx Matsutami, 344.

lxxxi Kim, In Soo, 49.

lxxxii Yu, 193

lxxxiii Pak, 34.

lxxxiv Pak, 35

lxxxv Pak, 29.

lxxxvi Yu, 182.

lxxxvii Ibid.

lxxxviii Matsutami, 219.

lxxxix Pak, 119.

xc Pak, 34.

xcii Pak, 29.

xciii Cho, 298.

xciv Matsutami, 200.

xcv Kim, Insoo, 61.

xcvi Park, Sandra, "Rebuilding the Jerusalem of the East: North Korea's Christian Past, Present, and Future," (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1990), 27-34.

xcvii Cho, 29.

xcviii Park, Sandra, 29.

xcix Matsutami, 219.

cx Matsutami, 283; In addition, testifying to the divergence between missionaries and the Korean protestants, no missionary was prosecuted during the Conspiracy trial of 1911, and missionaries denied involvement in any of the independence activities suspected by the Japanese government.

cxii Matsutami, 221.

cxiii Pak, 130.

cxiv Pak, 33.

cxv Wells, 9.

cxvi Pamphlets, 6.

cxvii Pamphlets, 6.

cxviii Kim, In Soo, 173.

cxix Kim, In Soo, 173.

cxviii Takayoshi Matsuo and S. Takiguchi, *The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part Two: The 1st March Movement and the Japanese Protestant*, 53; Pamphlets, 10.

cxix Pamphlets, 12.

cx Kim, 174.

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POWER OF PLACE AND PLACE OF POWER

Seignior Shang Kexi's Temple-Building Career in Guangdong in the Early Qing

Mengxiao Wang
Yale University

ABSTRACT

This paper reflects on the role of sacred places in the political world in late Imperial China. Focusing on Shang Kexi's 尚可喜 religious activities in his prefecture, Guangdong, during the Ming-Qing transition, this paper explores Shang's strategies of constructing and reconstructing Buddhist temples, as well as the functions of these temples in his power operation. A former Ming general who surrendered to the Qing and was conferred the title of seignior by the new government, Shang Kexi endeavored to demonstrate his local authority and establish subtle relations with the central government by (re)building sacred places. On the basis of a close reading of records in many local gazetteers and other historical texts, I find that, using these religious sites as a tool in his political life, Shang allied himself with deities so as to legitimize and even sanctify his military victories, rearranged local Buddhist landscapes in order to discipline the Sangha community, built temples in the Beijing style to send greetings to the Emperor in the capital from a remote locality, and negotiated with the central government to obtain greater autonomy in his own territory.

The relation between religion and politics, and the role played by sacred sites in power operations, is always intriguing,ⁱ especially during dynamic times. During this period, tensions existed between the new regime and the adherents of the previous dynasty, between the Manchus and Han Chinese people, and between the

central government in Beijing, the capital city, and many local forces. While many subjects of the Ming dynasty chose to be ordained in monasteries so as to reject summons from the new government, the Qing royal administration enacted regulations to control religious circles and endeavored to convert Buddhist monks to their new regime.ⁱⁱ Against this background, the religious activities of Shang Kexi (尚可喜, 1604-1676), one of the “*sanfan*” (三藩, the three famous seigniors), deserve our attention. Focusing on his temple-building career in his province, Guangdong (廣東), a province far from the capital Beijing, this paper explores the strategies of constructing and re-constructing temples in a transitional period, and the functions of these temples in local politics.

As a Han Chinese, Shang Kexi was a diligent general in the Ming army but defected to the Qing in 1634. Shang made great contributions to the new regime in numerous battles and, in 1649, he was conferred the new title “Pingnan Seignior” (平南王), which means “one who conquers southern China.” To fulfill the promises implied by this title, Shang and his army marched south to Guangdong with another seignior, the “Jingnan Seignior” Geng Zhongming (靖南王耿仲明). At the end of 1649, they finally conquered Guangzhou (廣州), the capital of Guangdong, and slaughtered its inhabitants.

Three years after his conquest, in 1652, Shang Kexi ordered Desheng Temple (得勝廟, Temple of Victory) and

Taiping Temple (太平庵, Temple of Peace) to be built on the battleground outside the small north city gate (*xiaobeimen* 小北門) of Guangzhou city where his army had been stationed for nine months. This marked the beginning of Shang Kexi's extensive and systematic temple-building career in Guangdong. According to records in local gazetteers, he successively built or renovated

Guangqing Temple (廣慶寺) in 1663, Dafo Temple (大佛寺) in 1664, Tandu Temple (檀度庵) in 1665, Nanhua Temple (南華寺) in 1667, the Hall of Heavenly Kings (*Tianwang dian* 天王殿) in Haichuang Temple (海幢寺) in 1672, and the Guanyin Hall (觀音殿, Hall of the Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva) in the 1670s. (See "Table 1" below for details)

Table 1: Temples Built and Renovated by Shang Kexi in Guangdong

Time	Name of Temple	Building Details	Gazetteer Records
1652	East Desheng Temple (東得勝廟)	Both temples were built on the battleground outside the small north gate (小北門) of Guangzhou, where Shang's army had been stationed for nine months in 1649.	<i>Extended Gazetteer of Panyu County</i> (番禺縣續志), Vol. 5, printed in 1931.
1652	Taiping/Baiyun Temple (太平庵/白雲庵)		<i>Gazetteer of Guangzhou City</i> (廣州府志), Vol. 88, block-printed in 1879.
1663	Guangqing/ Feilai Temple (廣慶寺/飛來寺)	The temple was renovated, and monks from Nanhua Temple were invited to stay in it as abbots.	<i>Gazetteer of Qingyuan County</i> (清遠縣志), Volume 3, printed in 1937.
1664	Dafo Temple (大佛寺)	The temple was restored in a style imitating that of those in the capital city, and many Tibetan lamas were invited to stay in the temple.	<i>Extended Gazetteer of Panyu County</i> (番禺縣續志), Vol. 36.
1665	Tandu/Yaoshi Temple (檀度庵/藥師庵)	The temple was built near the small north gate for the nun Ziwu (自悟), Shang Kexi's daughter, who was ordained.	<i>Gazetteer of Panyu County</i> (番禺縣志), Vol. 24, printed in 1871.
1667	Nanhua Temple (南華寺)	The locations of the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch (六祖殿) and the Depository of Sūtras (藏經閣) were switched in renovation.	<i>Gazetteer of Qujiang County</i> (曲江縣志), Vol. 16, printed in 1875; <i>General Gazetteer of Nanhua Temple</i> (曹溪通志), printed in 1836.
1672	Haichuang Temple (海幢寺)	The Hall of Heavenly Kings (天王殿) in the temple was renovated with royal green glazed tiles.	<i>General Gazetteer of Guangdong Province</i> (廣東通志), Vol. 229, printed in 1822.
1670s	Guanyin Temple (觀音殿)	The Hall was renovated with royal green glazed tiles.	<i>Extended Gazetteer of Panyu County</i> (番禺縣續志), Vol. 41.

In this paper, I will ask several questions: Why and how did Shang Kexi build and rebuild these sacred places? How did he benefit from the rich resources of the local Buddhist tradition in Guangdong? What were the reactions from the local Sangha (Buddhist) community and from lay people to Shang's projects? What kind of role did these sacred sites play in Shang's political life, including both governing the local community and maintaining a subtle relationship with the royal government? And, finally, we can ask more general questions: *how is a site transformed into a sacred place of power through a political discourse, and how is the power of a sacred place employed for a political purpose?*

Some previous studies hold that Shang Kexi deeply regretted his brutal massacre in Guangzhou and built these temples in order to assuage his guilt.ⁱⁱⁱ Examining carefully the official historical records of Shang Kexi's political life, the local gazetteers in Guangdong during the Qing dynasty (which record a lot of informative inscriptions on tablets and bells), and the many discourses by literati and monks about the temples built by Shang, however, one finds a different and more complicated story. On the basis of a close reading of these texts and case studies of several temples, I argue that, as a person with ambiguous identities (a general of the former Ming dynasty but a disloyal turncoat, a seignior conferred his title by the new government but an alien Han Chinese among his noble Manchu fellow officials, a cruel slaughterer but a devout follower of Buddhism), Shang Kexi endeavored to establish his absolute authority on a local scale and to maintain

a subtle relationship with the central government as a Han Chinese seignior from a remote province. Sacred places played a significant role in achieving these goals: by constructing and reconstructing

religious sites in Guangdong and granting them political powers, Shang Kexi allied himself with the Buddha or gods of popular religions, disciplined the local Sangha community, and negotiated with the central government in Beijing.

CREATING A PLACE OF POWER: *Building Temples On A Battleground And Establishing Local Authority*

The starting point of Shang Kexi's temple-building career was the construction of East Desheng Temple and Taiping Temple in 1652, which were built as memorial edifices on the battleground where Shang and Geng's army had been stationed for nine months in 1649.^{iv} Building temples on battlegrounds is a deep-rooted tradition in Chinese history, practiced especially during dynastic transitions. It is a strategy often employed by a new regime to comfort the violated people.^v Some scholars assert that Shang Kexi also built these temples on the battleground in order to console local people after he slaughtered the population of the city.^{vi} Nonetheless, in the inscriptions on tablets and an iron bell found in these two temples, Shang Kexi did not express this purpose directly. Instead, he demonstrated his gratitude for the secret battle assistance he claimed to have received from several Buddhist and popular deities. By endowing these newly constructed sacred places with his political power, Shang claimed that his military victories in the past and his political power in the current were blessed and thus sanctified.

The East Desheng Temple was constructed on the eastern foot of Baiyun Mountain together with the West Desheng Temple on the other side, a project carried out by another general—the Jingnan Seignior, Shang Kexi's colleague in conquering Guangdong. The positions were chosen according to the

places where the military bases were located: the Pingnan Seignior stationed his troops to the east of Baiyun Mountain, and the Jingnan Seignior to the west.^{vii} (予營於白雲之東，靖藩營於白雲之西) Both temples were dedicated to Guan Yu (關羽), the God of War in Chinese folk faith. The local county gazetteer records the inscription on the tablet in the Eastern Desheng Temple, in which the combat between the Qing army and Ming officials in Guangzhou is described exaggeratedly in the voice of Shang Kexi.^{viii}

Elaborating on the processes they used to produce dynamite and defeat their enemies, Shang highlights his primary purpose in building the temple: “so as to advocate the god Guan Yu’s will, and not to forget his blessings.” (以崇關帝志，不忘宣祐也) The word “will” (志) here is quite illustrative: by praising the god’s will as well as advertising his own military victory, Shang hints that the god actually desired his victory. Throughout the inscription, Shang mentions the god Guan Yu five times, attributing successes during the war to Guan Yu’s protection. He attributes the soundness of the soldiers, the quick triumph over the high city wall, and their foes’ fear of dynamite to Guan Yu’s benediction, proudly proclaiming his and the Jingnan Seignior’s secret and sacred bond with the deity: “The Jingnan Seignior and I, from the north to the south, have always been protected by God Guan Yu secretly.” (因惟予與靖藩，自北而南，常默有契於帝)

Dedicated to Buddhist deities, Baiyun Temple, or Taiping Temple, was built to the north of Baiyun Mountain after the two Desheng Temple projects were accomplished in the same year, 1652.^{ix} (即舊營之巔，既建武廟矣，又於山之陰，更建白雲庵，以祀大士) Shang Kexi ordered a huge iron bell to be cast and hung in Baiyun Temple (see

Figure 1 below), and briefly narrated his military victory in the bell inscription (see Figure 2 below):

In the seventh year during the reign of our emperor, I, the Pingnan Seignior, received imperial orders to restore Guangdong. On the sixth day of the second month, our troops arrived at Baiyun Mountain to the north of Guangdong, being quartered at the foot of the mountain for nine months. Generals and soldiers were energetic and diligent, troops and horses safe and sound. During that time, we cast cannons and made dynamite without any difficulty, seeming to be assisted secretly by gods. On the second day of the eleventh month of that year, Guangdong Province being restored, we recalled that time and could not forget. Therefore, I make this donation to sponsor the construction of Taiping Temple, with a sculpture of the Buddha inside. Thus, I order the inscription on this bell, so as to record the power of the Buddha forever. (今上龙飞之七年，平南王奉命恢粤，二月初六师抵五羊城北白云山，结营山阿，凡九阅月。将士奋腾，兵马无恙。其间铸炮制药，随手而应，阴有神助。是年十一月初二日恢省，追溯不忘，乃捐贖建造太平庵，内塑佛像。爰勒之钟鼎，以志佛力于不朽，乃镌以铭)^x

This inscription on the iron bell tells a story similar to that on the tablet in East Desheng Temple. Their successful production of dynamite, which was crucial

in winning the war, is especially emphasized again, and ascribed to the power of deities. Two primary differences in this piece compared to the tablet inscription in East Desheng Temple stand out: first, the triumphant conquest is here attributed to the Buddha, instead of the God of War; second, the Pingnan Seignior is described as the sole general who received imperial orders to restore Guangdong in this narration, while the Jingnan Seignior's participation and contribution is completely excluded.



Figure 1: Iron bell found in Baiyun Temple, now collected in Guangzhou Museum^{xi}



Figure 2: Rubbing of the inscription on the iron bell, collected in Guangzhou Museum^{xii}

The first different point is quite understandable, since Baiyun Temple was designed to enshrine a Buddhist deity, who, according to the inscription on the bell, was the Buddha, but according to another piece recorded in a local gazetteer, was the Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva.^{xiii} In the inscription dedicated to Guan Yu in the East Desheng Temple, the process of their expedition from north to south and the details of their battles were described exhaustively—from which we can infer that as the God of War, Guan Yu's principal function was to guide them to a military victory. In contrast, the inscription on the bell draws special attention to the safeness and soundness of troops and horses, which emphasizes the merciful power of Buddhist deities in protecting the lives of living beings. The construction of these two kinds of temples demonstrates the pragmatic orientation of traditional faiths and the flexibility of worshippers: whenever a deity seemed beneficial, it was adopted into a shrine. Sometimes, it was not even necessarily a particular deity, but one with a vague image in a particular category, such as the ambiguous identity of the Buddhist deity (the Buddha or the

Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva) in the Baiyun Temple.

The second different point, that the Jingnan Seignior's name is excluded in this inscription on the bell, represents the subtle competing relationship between these two seigniors. Both the Pingnan Seignior and the Jingnan Seignior were Han Chinese and generals from the previous Ming dynasty, and both made great contributions to the establishment of the new regime in the early years of the Qing. Emperor Shunzhi (順治) ordered them to conquer Guangdong using hand-to-hand combat for two reasons: first, the Ming troops in Guangdong were extremely robust and difficult to defeat; second, the two seigniors could thus prevent each other's political power from growing too extensive. After the conquest of Guangdong, however, the two seigniors began to compete with each other in pursuit of absolute control on a local scale. They vied with one another to build luxury mansions, levy taxes, construct religious sites, and so on. Years later, a local prefect, Yang Yongjian (楊雍建), could not bear their fighting any more and presented a memorial to the Emperor, stating that one province could not stand two seigniors, and requesting that the Emperor reappoint one seignior to another province.^{xiv} (一省不堪兩藩, 請移一藩于他省) The Jingnan Seignior was finally reappointed to Fujian Province in the year 1660, which marks Shang Kexi's success in this battle.

Situating this inscription, which omits the Jingnan Seignior's name, against this background, one can infer that Shang Kexi could have done this intentionally when casting a memoir on the bell. Compared to a tablet, which was usually made of stone and stood in front of a temple, the bell was made of iron and hung inside Baiyun Temple. Characters cast on an iron bell tend to last longer

than those inscribed on a stone tablet. In addition, bells serve as ritual instruments in Buddhist monasteries, being involved in regular ritual performances. All these features of the iron bell give it higher status than tablets. Therefore, including the Jingnan Seignior's name in the tablet inscription but excluding it in the bell inscription could be understood as a way to demonstrate Shang Kexi's claim that conquering Guangzhou was his own contribution, and to pocket the blessings from Buddhist deities without sharing with his competitor.

Based on these analyses, we can clearly see Shang Kexi's desire to be memorialized by the contemporary local people and later generations. But what aspects did he want people to remember, and what aspects did he wish to obscure? Indeed, Shang Kexi calculated carefully. In both the inscription on the tablet in East Desheng Temple and that on the bell in Baiyun Temple, he intentionally omits the tough process of the war between his army and the Ming troops in Guangzhou,^{xv} instead describing it as going smoothly without a hitch. By clipping historical events and reshaping the history according to Shang Kexi's own political agenda, the memorial construction of sacred places actually became a way of concealing and forgetting.

Moreover, at the place where Shang's troops were stationed outside the small north gate of Guangzhou on Baiyun mountain, there was another very famous monastery, Jingtai Temple (景泰寺), which was almost ruined because Shang's army cut off all bamboo shoots and trees in and around it to make cannons.^{xvi} (乃造攻具於寺前, 凡九閱月, 沿峰竹木, 斬發殆盡) After the war, however, Shang did not make any effort to restore this temple, but chose to construct two new temples to honor the Buddha and other gods, as well as his own military

victory. There are multiple possible reasons that Shang made no effort to restore the Jingtai Temple, but looking at this in light of Shang's partial narrations of his expeditious and trouble-free conquest in the two inscriptions examined above, we are given the sense that it was his political interests which inspired him to conceal his crime of ruining local religious sites and slaughtering the city. He may have hoped the citizens would forget about the bloody battle that took place three years prior and remember only his glorious victory and his sacred connection with the deities. In this way, by constructing new sacred places and claiming protection from deities, Shang Kexi was trying to justify his political power and even sanctify it, thus establishing his authority on a local scale.

MANIPULATING THE POWER OF PLACE:

Intervening In Local Tradition And Disciplining The Sangha Community

In addition to creating new religious sites, Shang Kexi also spent considerable energy and funds rebuilding pre-existing ones, some of which were rather old and had enjoyed imperial favor in several previous dynasties. When discussing sacred places in Varanasi, Hans Bakker argues that one of the most remarkable or tragic qualities of a sacred place is that "it holds a special attraction for believers of other religions."^{xvii} To put this in a political context, Bakker's argument can be adjusted as follows: sacred places, especially those favored by former regimes, hold a special attraction for rulers in a new government. Since these places have already been places of power, appropriating the power of such places becomes a very effective way for new governors to establish their authority.

In particular for Guangdong, the Nanhua Temple proved a favorable

option for Shang Kexi, not only thanks to the imperial favor it enjoyed through the Tang, Song, Yuan and Ming dynasties, but also because it was one of the most celebrated Buddhist monasteries of the Chan School. Monk Huineng (慧能), the Sixth Patriarch of the Chan School in the Tang dynasty, once lived and taught there, and the temple still housed his mummified body.^{xviii} (See Figure 3 below) Occupying a high position in both the political world and Buddhist society, Nanhua Temple inevitably attracted Shang Kexi's attention and he became interested in reconstructing it. By debating with monks from Nanhua monastery and re-locating the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch (六祖殿), Shang Kexi endeavored to intervene in the local Buddhist tradition and discipline the Sangha community in his prefecture.




Figure 3: The Mummy of Huineng in Nanhua Temple^{xix}

Containing the mummy of Monk Huineng, the core building in Nanhua Temple was the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch, which had been located toward the right rear of the Hall of the Mahavira Buddha (大雄殿). (See Figure 4 below) Showing great respect for Monk Huineng, Shang

Kexi decided to rebuild the Nanhua Temple and relocate the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch

Patriarch to a better site.




Figure 4: Map of Nanhua Temple in the Year 1671^{xx}

In “Record of the Pingnan Seignior’s Reviving of the Nanhua Temple,” (國朝平藩重興南華寺記) Shang first expresses his admiration for Nanhua Temple and his regret that he had no opportunity to visit it before he conquered Guangdong:

Ever since Buddhism was transmitted to China and accepted by the Chinese people within the territory of China, there have been innumerable tremendous temples [erected] on precious mountains. Among these prominent Buddhist sites, the Nanhua Temple is the first and foremost, since it inherited the Buddha’s legacy, and was the origin of the five schools of Chan Buddhism. I was born and grew up in the northeastern

part [of China], but had heard about the reputation of the Nanhua Temple for a long time. However, it is tens of thousands of *li* to the south of my hometown, thus I had never had an opportunity to visit it. (自像教東來，應化震旦，寓以內，寶山鉅刹，古德振錫者，更僕不能數也。而選佛名區，輒以南華屈第一指，以其為世尊衣鉢，而五宗之派之所由衍耳。余生長三韓，飫聞已久，天南萬里，引眺無從)^{xxi}

Then, Shang Kexi states his concern about the “inferior” location of the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch and his plan to relocate this hall to the site right behind the Hall of the Buddha:

I was concerned about the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch, Monk Huineng, located to the east of the Hall of the Buddha. The path was very circuitous and the space terribly narrow, which was not in appropriate scale to such a hall. Furthermore, the Sixth Patriarch established his teachings of “no-thinking” and “no-dwelling,” named the “Dharma Gate of Non-duality.” But the Hall of the Buddha and that of the Patriarch were on two different paths, which was not an appropriate arrangement in the spirit of such a hall. I secretly wanted to move the Hall of the Patriarch right behind the Hall of the Buddha, and move the Depository of Sūtras to the old site of the Hall of the Patriarch, so as to indicate the true legacy of the Buddha’s teachings, and [the fact that his teachings engendered] direct “sudden enlightenment.” (但念祖殿居佛殿東，道紆地隘，厥制弗稱。又祖之立教，以無念無住，號不二法門。而佛殿祖殿，歧出兩途，厥義亦弗稱。竊欲移祖殿於佛殿後，移藏經樓于祖殿之址，以見正印真傳，頓教直入之意)^{xxii}

According to Shang Kexi’s criticism, not only did the smaller scale of this hall fail to suit the remarkable status of the sixth patriarch, but the relative positions of the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch and the Hall of the Buddha also did not properly represent the supposed relationship between Monk Huineng and the Buddha. Shang Kexi describes the sacred places in a Buddhist vocabulary, applying real space to symbolize the spiritual space in the Buddhist master’s discourse, such as “no-

dwelling” from Huineng’s *Platform Sūtra* (壇經)^{xxiii} and “Dharma Gate of Non-duality” from the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* (Ch. *Weimajie jing* 維摩詰經).^{xxiv}

Finally, Shang Kexi refers to a supportive opinion of a *fengshui* expert (風水家, a geomancer): “Meanwhile, a *fengshui* expert observed the situation and drew a map, which was in accordance with my opinion.” (適青烏家，相度形勢，審曲繪圖，不謀而符，遂決意更之)^{xxv} Based on all those considerations, Shang finally decided to rearrange the halls in Nanhua Temple—switching the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch and the Depository of Sūtras, which had been situated right behind the Hall of the Mahāvira Buddha before Shang’s renovation.

Furthermore, in this record, Shang Kexi also mentions a natural miracle that he interpreted as supporting his reconstruction: “The Spring of Planting Staff began to flow again after it had dried up for many years, and the common people were all very merry about this unprecedented event.”^{xxvi} (卓錫泉，枯涸多年，忽爾濬發，萬眾翕然，以為得未曾有) There is a tale about this spring related to Monk Huineng. It is said that when Huineng left his teacher Hongren’s (弘忍, the fifth patriarch in the Chan School) monastery with his robe and bowl (*yibo* 衣鉢, a metaphor for “legacy of dharma” in Chan Buddhist tradition) and came to the Nanhua Temple for the first time in the seventh century, he wanted to wash the robe but could not find a pure spring, so he planted his staff on a particular point on the earth and suddenly a beautiful spring burst out from that point.^{xxvii} Springs have always played an important role in various sacred sites among far-flung Buddhist areas. Here, with such a tale referring to the sixth

patriarch, Master Huineng, and, moreover, the direct legacy of the Chan School from the fifth patriarch, this spring gained a sacred power and became a sanctified site. After Huineng passed away, however, this spring ran dry many times, the most recent of which happened in the year 1665.

From a piece of inscription titled “Mister Anda’s Inscription on the Tablet besides the Spring of Planting Staff” (俺達公卓錫泉碑記) written by Shang Kexi’s eldest son Shang Zhixin (尚之信), we can reconstruct a more complete story about the miracle mentioned by Shang Kexi. In the year 1668, Shang Kexi visited Nanhua Temple together with Shang Zhixin, who was addressed respectfully as Mister Anda. Noticing that the spring had dried up, Shang Zhixin told a monk in the temple: “I will plant a staff here for Master Huineng.” (我當為師卓一錫) Then he made a great donation to the temple, ordering monks to inscribe the tablet again and carry out prayer. Before long, the spring began to flow again and the well nearby was soon filled up. Shang Zhixin was very pleased with this and wrote a poem to record this miraculous event:

The birth of this spring, who probably stimulates it? The death of this spring, it has not ceased being originally. No birth, no death, who can recognize the noble truth. Drying up outside, filling up inside, the spiritual spring becomes silent. Today I follow Master Huineng’s step, planting the staff for you.^{xxviii} (泉之生，誰或激，泉之滅，原不息。不生不滅，真諦誰識。外枯中腴，靈機偶寂。我今從師，為師卓錫)

Here, Shang Zhixin quotes the key words “no birth, no death” from the famous *Heart Sūtra* (Ch. *Xinjing* 心經) and uses the spring as a metaphor for this concept, in a like manner with his father who connects real spaces with discursive spaces in Buddhist sūtras. Moreover, Shang Zhixin’s statement of his contribution of following Monk Huineng and triggering the spring to flow again seems to be very proud, if not arrogant. He is actually trying to say that his power of changing the natural landscape and producing miracles equals that of the revered Monk Huineng.

Being inscribed on a stone tablet erected next to the spring in 1668, this magical event might become very popular among monks from Nanhua Temple and even common people in that area. Therefore, it is no wonder that Shang Kexi refers to the rebirth of this spring in his record so as to justify his own intention of rearranging the locations of halls in Nanhua Temple. Showing his son’s great capability in reviving this sacred spring, Shang Kexi seems to be very confident in his own project of relocating the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch. Nevertheless, though grateful for Shang Kexi’s generous donation in renovating the halls, monks from the Nanhua Temple appeared strongly against Shang’s plan of relocating the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch. The abbot, Monk Derong, led the entire Nanhua Sangha community to present a “Statement of the Pingnan Seignior’s Replacement of the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch” (啟平南王遷移換六祖舊殿基址) to Shang Kexi, explaining several inconveniences:

The shape of this mountain is like a lively elephant, with its teeth, horns, four feet all lively in appearance. And the Hall of the Patriarch is [now] located right

below the elephant's nose, on its left chin. Since the nose of an elephant is most necessary for its life, and the chin is below its nose, the site where the Hall of the Patriarch is located is the place where the geomantic treasures aggregate [and it] has lasted for over a thousand years without any change... The mummy of the Sixth Patriarch dwells in this site, on which the divine spirit relies, being so supernatural and so efficacious, that from the Tang dynasty until now it has not been destroyed. Now your highness grants us a favor to rebuild the Nanhua Temple, and to relocate the Hall of the Patriarch to the site of the Depository of Sūtras. We humbly think that the site of the depository is the boundary of the dragon vein, not a place where vitality aggregates. Moreover, it is on the right side of the elephant's nose, from which the elephant exhales. If you relocate the Hall of the Patriarch to this site, there are three inconveniences. First, as for any common constructions of earth and wood, when they endure for many years, they even become divinely efficacious; now as for a site where a Bodhisattva's fleshly body dwells, after standing here for over thousands of years, how could it not be divinely efficacious? Second, the incense for the Sixth Patriarch could be inherited because the Hall of the Patriarch is located at the most prominent spot of this mountain. Once it is relocated to a place that exhales the lively spirit, we are afraid that our monastery will decline. Third, for any sacred site, the rise always follows the downfall. Now you

want to relocate the Hall of the Patriarch, then the old site of the hall would become a wasteland—how will you deal with it in the future? We are afraid that once this ground becomes empty, it would be coveted by outsiders, creating infinite trouble for the monks.^{xxix} (本山形如生象，牙角四足，儼然具備。而祖師殿正當象鼻之下，居於象之左頷。蓋象之性命在鼻，而頷在鼻下，祖殿居之，為一山風脈所聚，歷來千餘年無異……祖師肉身居此，神所憑依，至靈至異，自唐至今，而不毀也。今蒙王恩修建，愆將祖師殿移建于藏經閣，僧融等竊念此系界水，非元氣所聚，且居象鼻之右偏，其為脫氣，若一移建，不便有三。凡尋常土木之形，歷年已久，尚有靈驗，今以肉身菩薩居址，歷千餘年，豈無靈應？不便移動一也。祖師香火流傳，皆由祖殿踞山形之勝，一旦遷移脫氣，恐至山門寥落，不便二也。從來勝地，有廢必有興，今將祖殿移建，則舊址便同甌脫，將來作何究竟。融等恐此基一空，將來啟外人覬覦之心，貽僧眾無窮之累，不便三也)

From this long statement, we can see that the monks had two concerns: on the one hand, the old site of the hall was the place where the sixth patriarch's fleshly body dwelled and on which his divine spirit depended; on the other hand, a possible change in ownership of the land would likely be disputed and criticized by outsiders. Thus, they sincerely presented this statement to Shang Kexi, begging him to keep the Hall of the Patriarch in its original site.

The most intriguing element is that in their debate, Shang and the monks both employed discursive vocabularies that were supposed to be well understood and accepted by the opposite side to express their own opinions about a sacred place. In the main body of his statement, Shang applies the doctrines of Chan Buddhism, especially concepts from Huineng's *Platform Sūtra*, such as “no-thinking” and “no-dwelling,” to justify his decision of moving the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch to a position right behind the Hall of the Buddha. The monks, on the other hand, speak primarily of the geomantic disadvantages of relocation, a concern that sounds more likely to come from a government official who would care about *fengshui* and hire a *fengshui* expert in designing new constructions.

Nevertheless, the result was ironic in both ways. In spite of the rejections from monks, Shang still carried out the project of relocating the hall. The monks' agency, however, was not entirely suppressed. In the *General Gazetteer of Nanhua Temple* that was revised and recompiled by Monk Zhenpu (釋真樸) and Ma Yuan (馬元) several years later, it is recorded that “the Pingnan Seignior adopted the words of a *fengshui* expert, thought the scale of the old Hall of the Sixth Patriarch was not appropriate, and thus relocated it to the place right behind the Hall of the Buddha.”^{xxx} (平藩用形家言，以舊殿厥制弗稱，乃改建大殿後) Clearly, the monks did not buy Shang Kexi's arguments about “no-thinking,” “no-dwelling,” or “non-duality.” Shang's painstaking and calculated discourses with Buddhist vocabularies are completely omitted here; instead, the geomancer's opinion, which is only mentioned in one sentence in Shang's personal statement, becomes the sole justification for his project of reconstructing Nanhua Temple. Although Shang successfully

accomplished his project, his understanding of a sacred place in terms of Buddhism, especially Chan Buddhism, was not accepted by the professional monks from Nanhua Temple at all.

Monks could only express their objections in such an obscure writing style. But why did Shang Kexi insist on relocating the hall despite their strong objections? His action should be considered in the larger religious context of the early Qing period. At the time, Guangdong was one of the most prominent places where literati adherents to the former Ming dynasty were ordained in order to escape from the political life in a new dynasty (*taochan* 逃禪).^{xxxi} Monks in Nanhua Temple mostly came from this group of people. As a recently established ruler from the new regime, Shang Kexi on the one hand used every means to win over these monks, and on the other hand also tried to discipline them by intervening in religious affairs and manipulating local Buddhist tradition. As a sacred place that had enjoyed the favor of royal families from the Tang dynasty to the Ming dynasty, Nanhua Temple became one of the most revered temples and also a place of power, which unavoidably attracted ambitious politicians from a new government.

Therefore, relocating the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch, the very core building of a place that had been unmoved for hundreds of years, was a significant move in Shang Kexi's political career. Moreover, in the map of Nanhua Temple drawn in 1671 (see Figure 4 above), one can find the life-temple of the Pingnan Seignior (平南王生祠) at the lower-right corner inside the temple.^{xxxii} This provides clear evidence of Shang Kexi's intention to expand his power and even immortalize himself together with the Buddha and Monk Huineng. By rearranging the landscape in such a celebrated temple in

spite of the monks' protests, Shang Kexi displayed his utter authority over the local Sangha community, and more generally, the whole territory of his prefecture.

A SACRED PLACE IN THE BEIJING STYLE:

Paying Allegiance To And Negotiating With The Central Authority

Besides establishing his power in his prefecture and interfacing with the local Sangha community, Shang Kexi also had to manage his relations with the central government in the capital city, Beijing, as a Han Chinese general who had converted to the new Manchu regime. Since the Qing government spent much energy controlling and regulating religions, especially Buddhism, Buddhist sacred sites again became an effective device for Shang to demonstrate his allegiance to and negotiate with the central authority.

Out of this political concern, Dafo Temple (literally, "Big Buddha Temple") was built on the relic site of Longcang Temple (龍藏寺) from the Ming dynasty, in imitation of the temple building styles in Beijing, the capital city. The statue of the big Buddha in this temple was also carved in the style of the capital.^{xxxiii} Shang Kexi explains that the primary intention of this project was to "send greetings to the Emperor in Beijing from a remote place."^{xxxiv} (上为天子祝釐) Later a poet Fan Feng eulogized Shang's construction of Dafo Temple, comparing him to Anathapindika, a generous businessman and a chief lay disciple of Gautama Buddha who honored the Buddha by laying out about 1.8 million gold bricks in a grove. The last two lines of this poem read: "Laying out gold on the ground of previous Longcang Temple, kowtowing in southern region to pay homage to the Emperor."^{xxxv} (黄金布地圍龍藏，吁首南交祝紫宸)

Interestingly, although Shang Kexi was equated to Anathapindika because of his generosity in building Dafo Temple, one can easily notice the main difference between these two: while Anathapindika donated the grove for a religious leader—the Buddha himself—Shang Kexi dedicated Dafo Temple directly to a political leader—the Qing Emperor. The sacred place thus became a pragmatic tool employed by Shang Kexi in his politics.

In addition to honoring the Emperor, a more personal motivation also played an important role in the construction of Dafo Temple. Shang Zhilong (尚之隆), another of Shang Kexi's sons, married a princess and lived in Beijing. In the 1660s, the Emperor granted Shang Zhilong a favor, permitting him to pay a visit to his parents with his wife in Guangdong. Receiving this exciting news, Shang Kexi decided to build a pure altar that would suit the status of the Emperor's daughter and son-in-law. Dafo Temple in the style of Beijing was thus brought into being as the altar for Shang Zhilong and his royal wife to perform rituals. Along with a daughter of the royal family, Shang Zhilong also brought a group of Tibetan Buddhist lamas from the capital city to Guangdong. The lamas were hired to hold a grand overall dharma ceremony for 49 days, the ritual of which was so splendid that contemporary people had rarely seen it before.^{xxxvi} (修四十九日无遮胜会，斋醮之华盛，亦近世之所稀覯)

Why were there Tibetan lamas instead of local Buddhist masters in the Chan School? In the first place, monks from the capital city were apparently superior to regional monks in Guangdong. Taking the primary purpose of this Dafo Temple and its close relationship to the royal family into account, however, we can connect Shang Kexi's arrangement to the holistic religious climate in the Qing

dynasty. Because of the concern for safety on the borderland as well as conditional preference, the Qing royal family preferred Tibetan Buddhism (*Zangchuan fojiao* 藏傳佛教) to Han Chinese Buddhism (*Hanchuan fojiao* 漢傳佛教). Thus, besides building Dafo Temple in the Beijing style, Shang Kexi and his son also invited Tibetan lamas, who were favored by the central government, from Beijing. Exerting these dual means of building sacred places and carrying out rituals, Shang Kexi considered carefully how to cater to the royal government's religious taste and demonstrate his allegiance to the central authority.

What happened to these Tibetan lamas later also deserves our attention, since the records and comments represent the attitude of the local people toward the lamas from a completely divergent religious culture. According to the gazetteer of Nanhai County, the lamas stayed in Guangdong after the grand ritual ceremony and were hosted in Dafo Temple as abbots. After Shang Zhixin, Shang Kexi's eldest son and the second generation of the Pingnan Seignior, was executed upon imperial order, the lamas left the temple in succession.^{xxxvii} (逮尚藩敗，喇嘛相繼去) In 1735, Liu Shu (劉庶), the prefect of Guangzhou City, invited a Chan master, Monk Zile (自樂禪師), from Haichuang Temple to act as the abbot at Dafo Temple. The author comments: "Monk Zile possessed a high Buddhist morality, thanks to whom the ethos of Chan got inspirited during that time."^{xxxviii} (自樂道行清高，當時禪風爲之一振) Although there is no direct judgment of the Tibetan lamas, from the indifferent narrative about their departure and the especially exciting commentary on the Chan master, it is not difficult to see the local people's preference. It was most

likely that the Tibetan lamas only stayed in Guangzhou relying on the Pingnan Seignior's favor because they could be used by Shang Kexi to pay allegiance to the central government, but had never won the support from local people. Thus once the Shang family fell out of power, the lamas had no choice but to leave Guangdong and abdicate to local Chan monks.

Nevertheless, the relation between Shang Kexi and the central government was more complicated than just a relation between an overpowering monarch and a completely subordinate subject. As a general who made enormous contributions in helping the Qing establish their regime, but at the same time a Han Chinese and a turncoat from the former Ming, Shang Kexi had an inevitably awkward position in the new dynasty. His fellows, the Pingxi Seignior Wu Sangui (吳三桂), the Jingnan Seignior Geng Zhongming (the two other families of the "sanfan," Three Seigniors), and Geng's son Geng Jimao (耿繼茂), rose in rebellion against the Qing government successively.^{xxxix} Although not as ambitious as his fellows and never having rebelled in his lifetime, sometimes Shang Kexi's behaviors also seemed to have gone beyond his political status.

This subtle relation was also presented in Shang's temple-building projects. When he first conquered Guangzhou and was about to construct his own mansion, he had planned to build it in the style of that of Beile (貝勒, a rank of Manchu nobility right below that of Prince) and ordered many royal green glazed tiles (*lilulima* 綠琉璃瓦) to be produced. After Shang presented his request to the central government, however, he received a command saying:

The building styles of the mansions of a common minister

and a member of the royal nobilities are different. Since the Pingnan Seignior and the Jingnan Seignior were both promoted to the position of seigniors from commoners, their requests of using green glazed tiles to build their mansions could not be permitted.^{xi} (民爵與宗藩制異，察平靖兩藩，均由民身立爵，所請用綠色磚瓦之處，礙難準行)

Thus the central government forbade him from using these tiles, since he was not a member of the Manchu nobility but a Han Chinese. Having already finished the production of these tiles, Shang Kexi applied them to the construction of sacred places, such as the Hall of Heavenly Kings (天王殿) in Haichuang Temple, the Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva Temple on Yuexiu Mountain, the Temple of Guan Yu, and Dafo Temple.^{xii} (若粵秀山之觀音寺，武帝廟，及大佛寺，皆此種磚瓦也)

From this event we can draw several interesting points: first, Shang Kexi desired to build his own mansion in a royal style imitating those of the Manchu nobles in Beijing, which obviously demonstrated his political ambition. Second, Shang Kexi had ordered the glazed tiles to be produced even before he received permission from the central government. Third, after being prohibited, Shang did not abandon all the royal materials, but still made use of them in his temple-building career. Considering his luxurious life in general, especially the massive construction projects in Guangdong, it might not be proper to infer that Shang did this just because he did not want to waste the expensive green glazed tiles. There could be a possibility that he was trying to negotiate with the

central government: even if building his own mansion with materials that symbolized royal identity was banned by the Emperor, Shang could still take advantage of his absolute power on a local scale to use these materials in building religious sites. Therefore, sacred places in the Beijing style not only served to pay allegiance to the royal authority, but also served as an ambitious claim for Shang's autonomy in his own province.

EPILOGUE:

Sacred Places In And After Power Operations

Shang Kexi's temple-building career constituted a great part of his political life. The numerous religious sites built by Shang played a significant role in his power operations, including both establishing his authority on a local scale, and dealing with his relationship with the central government. Based on Shang Kexi's constructions and re-constructions of different temples, we can summarize several patterns in building sacred places and applying them in politics. First, as displayed in the case of East Desheng Temple and Taiping Temple, a brand new temple built on previous military sites can be endowed with political power, functioning as both a way of representing and concealing, and of remembering and forgetting at the order of the builder. Second, as for a conventionally celebrated temple like Nanhua Temple, power derived from the sacred place itself becomes an object of desire for politicians of new regimes, attracting them to manipulate the power of the site by rearranging its original landscape. Third, a sacred place built on a remote site but in the fashion of the capital city can serve as an architectural metaphor, symbolizing the builder's homage to a central authority, and, at the same time, his or her ambition to imitate the noble style. These three patterns worked together organically in

Shang Kexi's temple-building scheme, and simultaneously bolstered his power.

The afterlives of these temples are also illuminating for us to understand the nature of a sacred place. East Desheng Temple and Taiping Temple gradually declined in the later period, and very little of them remains today.^{xiii} Dafo Temple was renovated by several officials and country gentlemen in the Qing dynasty and the Republican period before it was transformed into a factory during the Cultural Revolution. Now one can find its relic site on a street in Guangzhou City.^{xiiii} On the other hand, Nanhua Temple has enjoyed a seemingly endless stream of pilgrims up until today, and still boasts a reputation as the “foremost precious monastery in the eastern Yue.” (東粵第一寶刹)^{xiv} The divergent fates of these religious sites provide an opportunity for us to reflect on the nature of a sacred place: compared to shrines built on the basis of the teachings, tales, and even fleshly (physical) bodies of famous religious figures, the lives of sites constructed with the support of a political figure and his sovereign power tend to be much more transient.

ⁱ For example, James Robson studies the power operated on a celebrated Buddhist mountain, Nanyue (南嶽), in medieval China. See James Robson, *Power of Place: The Religious Landscape of the Southern Sacred Peak (Nanyue) in Medieval China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009). Timothy Brook studies the relations between gentlemen's Buddhist activities and their political appeal in the late imperial China. See Timothy Brook, *Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

ⁱⁱ See Zhou Shujia 周叔劼, *Qingdai fojiao shiliao jigao* 清代佛教史料輯稿 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi, 2000). In this book, Zhou collects various materials reflecting the Qing government's regulations of both Chinese and Tibetan Buddhisms.

ⁱⁱⁱ Liang Yongkang 梁永康, *Guangdong fojiao shi* 廣東佛教史 (Hongkong: Zhonghua fojiao tushuguan, 1984), 78-79.

^{iv} Ding Renchang 丁仁長 and Liang Dingfen 梁鼎芬, *Panyu Xian xuzhi* 番禺縣續志 [Extended gazetteer of Panyu County] (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1967), 386.

^v For example, Halperin indicates that the temples built on battlefields in the Song dynasty were used to comfort the war dead. See Mark Halperin, *Out of the Cloister: Literati Perspectives on Buddhism in Sung China, 960-1279* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), 112-30.

^{vi} Xing Zhaohua 邢照華, "Pingnanwang tiezhong ji mingwen kaoshi" 平南王鐵鐘及銘文考釋, *Zhongguo lishi wenwu* 中國歷史文物 3 (2005).

^{vii} Fan Feng 樊封, *Nanhai baiyong xubian* 南海百詠續編, ed. Zhang Zhi 張智, vol. 62, *Zhongguo fengtuzhi congkan* 中國風土誌叢刊 (Yangzhou: Guangling shushe, 2003), 101-02.

^{viii} Ding Renchang and Liang Dingfen, *Panyu xian xuzhi*, 1872-75.

^{ix} Fan Feng, *Nanhai baiyong xubian*, 101-02.

^x Mai Yinghao 麥英豪, ed., *Guangzhoushi wenwuzhi* 廣州市文物志 (Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu chubanshe, 1990), 277.

^{xi} See Xing Zhaohua 邢照華, "Pingnanwang tiezhong ji mingwen kaoshi."

^{xii} Ibid.

^{xiii} Fan Feng 樊封, *Nanhai baiyong xubian*, 101-02.

^{xiv} Wu Zhongkuang 吳忠匡, ed., *Man Han mingchen zhuan* 滿漢名臣傳 (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1991), 191.

^{xv} In a later biography of Shang Kexi, the tough process of the war is recorded in detail. See Anonymous, *Qingshi liezhuan* 清史列傳, ed. Tianjin tushuguan lishi wenxian bu 天津圖書館歷史文獻部, *Sanshisanzhong Qingdai renwu zhuanji ziliao huibian* 三十三種清代人物傳記資料匯編, vol. 6 (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2009), 606-08.

^{xvi} Fan Feng, *Nanhai Baiyong Xubian*, 103 – 04.

^{xvii} Hans Bakker, "Construction and Reconstruction of Sacred Space in Vārāṇasī," *Numen* 43:1 (1996): 41.

^{xviii} See the biography of Huineng in Zanning 贊寧, *Song Gaozeng Zhuan* 宋高僧傳, ed. Fan Xiangyong 范祥雍 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 175. See Faure's descriptions of Huineng's mummy in Nanhua Temple in Bernard Faure, "Relics and Fleshly Bodies: The Creation of Ch'an Pilgrimage Sites," in *Pilgrims and Sacred Sites in China*, ed. Susan Naquin and Chün-fang Yü (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

^{xix} Shi Chuazheng 釋傳正, *Nanhua shiliu* 南華史略 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), 2.

xx Ma Yuan 馬元 and Shi Zhenpu 釋真樸, *Caoxi tongzhi* 曹溪通志 [General gazetteer of Nanhua Temple], ed. Bai Huawen 白化文 and Zhang Zhi 張智, *Zhongguo fosizhi congkan* 中國佛寺志叢刊, vol. 111 (Yangzhou: Guanglin shuju, 2006), 49-50.

xxi Ibid., 264.

xxii Ibid., 265-66.

xxiii Huineng 慧能, *Tanjing jiaoshi* 壇經校釋, ed. Guo Peng 郭朋 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 31-32.

xxiv Li Yizhuo 李翊灼 ed., *Weimojie jing jizhu* 維摩詰經集註, vol. 8 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi, 1977).

xxv Ma Yuan and Shi Zhenpu, *Caoxi tongzhi*, 266.

xxvi Ibid.

xxvii Ibid., 84.

xxviii Ibid., 269.

xxix Ibid., 509-12.

xxx Ibid., 98.

xxxi Cai Hongsheng 蔡鴻生, *Qingchu Lingnan fomen shilüe* 清初嶺南佛門事略 (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997), 17-22.

xxxii Ma Yuan and Shi Zhenpu, *Caoxi tongzhi*, 111, 99.

xxxiii Mai Yinghao, ed., *Guangzhoushi wenwuzhi*, 188.

xxxiv Fan Feng, *Nanhai baiyong xubian*, 76-77.

xxxv Ibid., 77.

xxxvi Ibid., 78.

xxxvii Zheng Rong 鄭榮, Gui Dian 桂玷, and Zhao Heci 招賀慈, *Xuxiu Nanhai xianzhi* 續修南海縣志, vol. 5 (block-printed, 1910), 15b.

xxxviii Ibid.

xxxix See Meng Sen 孟森, *Qingshi jiangyi* 清史講義, ed. Wu Jun 吳俊 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1998), 143 - 53.

xl Fan Feng, *Nanhai baiyong xubian*, 106.

xli Ibid.

xlii See Xing Zhaohua, "Pingnanwang tiezhong ji mingwen kaoshi."

xliii Mai Yinghao, *Guangzhoushi wenwuzhi*, 188.

xliv See the first half of the couplets hanging on two sides of the front gate of the Nanhua Temple.

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EXPANDING POPULATIONS

The American Multiplication Table in the Chinese Context

Ryan Mikkelsen

Washington University in St. Louis

“People are indeed the essential of commerce, and the more people the more trade; the more trade, the more money; the more money, the more strength; and the more strength, the greater the nation...All temporal felicities, I mean national, spring from the number of people.”

~ Daniel Defoe (1660-1731), English novelist

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the strong pronatalist population rhetoric of American colonials, particularly Benjamin Franklin, and compares such positions to the pro-population views of the early communist party in China, particularly Mao Zedong. Why did both nations adopt pronatalist positions early in their respective histories? This paper presents the historical context behind Benjamin Franklin’s and Mao Zedong’s decisions as well as the arguments that each leader put forth regarding an expanding population. The paper transitions to examine the difference in outcomes for the respective policies, specifically how the United States was successfully able to avoid overpopulation while the People’s Republic of China developed an unsustainably large population. The paper concludes by arguing that the success of early American population policies was contingent on more than simply having the space to accommodate an expanding population and a lower initial population. In fact, various freedoms and the ability to make individual choices within the United States ultimately influenced the ability to control overpopulation, as evidenced by the existence of a “population frontier.” A

corresponding lack of individual freedoms under the leadership of Mao Zedong in China is linked to the disastrous Chinese overpopulation throughout the 20th century, culminating with the implementation of the one-child policy.

The birthrate among white Americans in 1800 exceeded the birthrate of any country, developing or otherwise, anywhere in the world at the turn of the 21st century.ⁱ In the early years of nationhood, Americans reproduced at historically unprecedented rates, a phenomenon that continued for the first half of the country’s existence. Reflecting on this fecundity of American couples in 1846, Indiana Democrat Andrew Kennedy defined the increase as being nothing short of an “American multiplication table.”ⁱⁱ However, when considering nations that experience a rapid population increase immediately following formation, the People’s Republic of China is typically the prime example, not the early United States. How does this unrivaled “American multiplication table” compare to China’s infamous population growth? In both situations, early leaders, in particular Benjamin Franklin and Mao Zedong, supported an expanding population. By

examining the historical and personal context surrounding each leader, it becomes clear why both Franklin and Mao promoted each policy: Franklin desired a growing population to facilitate American western expansion while Mao, on the other hand, wanted a larger population in an attempt to validate the benefits of socialism and rule by the Communism Party. This historical background also helps explain why each policy was or was not successful: American social and political institutions allowed people to make individual reproduction decisions while Chinese socialism influenced such choices.

From the middle of the 17th century to the end of the 18th century, every European nation-state actively sought to have a larger populace. Elites in both England and France, two of the largest world powers at the time, bragged about their respective territorial size as an indicator of national well being and status. English political economist Sir William Petty recognized as early as 1662 that a large number of subjects was a source of wealth for a country when he concluded, “fewness of people, is real poverty.”ⁱⁱⁱ Some 80 years later, in 1741, this analysis still held true when German demographer Johann Peter Süssmilch noted: “A state which has only half as many inhabitants as its circumstances and food permit, will be only half as fortunate, powerful, and wealthy as it could and should be.”^{iv} According to the scholars and leaders of 17th and 18th century Europe, a larger population was not only desirable but also a goal that every government should actively pursue. Historian Alan Houston, however, traces the roots of pronatalism – or the support of higher reproduction rates – even further back in time, identifying biblical roots for advocating population growth. The result, according to Houston, was that in 17th and 18th century Europe “a large and thriving

population was a sign of God’s grace and favor.”^v Moreover, while “population was an index of social health, depopulation indicated decay and corruption.”^{vi} Supported by traditional values, population in 17th and 18th century Europe was not only a measuring stick for development and advancement, but also a popular topic of concern.

Economist Adam Smith also addressed the relationship between population and wealth in his famous 1776 treatise *The Wealth of Nations*. Smith concluded that a larger population was in fact the *most* indicative characteristic of a nation’s future growth.^{vii} Smith promoted the notion that an increased level of wealth led to a larger population, so to complain of a larger population was inherently to lament “the greatest public prosperity.”^{viii} For Smith, children were a source of wealth. This reality was particularly true for the North American continent where “labour is there so well rewarded that a numerous family of children, instead of being a burthen is a source of opulence and prosperity to the parents.”^{ix} Labor in America at the time was expensive, and parents could afford to have children, knowing that their children would be able to find jobs and support themselves.

Such was the contemporary dialogue surrounding population growth when Benjamin Franklin wrote his influential 1751 essay entitled *Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, etc.* In it, Franklin presented a revolutionary concept in demography: a country’s population cannot exceed the amount of subsistence that the country’s land provides. Franklin’s caveat: depending on the degree of development, different societies are capable of producing different levels of subsistence, provided the same land. A higher level of subsistence, in turn, led to early marriages and more children, promoting the

strength of a nation.^x As a result, Franklin concluded, in much the same manner that Mao would many years later, that the American population could and indeed ought to expand at its current miraculous rate as this was proof of a higher state of development. Franklin even went so far as to calculate just how quickly the American population was doubling. His estimate of a 25-year doubling period proved remarkably accurate, predicting the American population in 1890 over 100 years later off by only 0.13%.^{xi}

Franklin felt so strongly about population growth that he even challenged several cultural norms that inhibited it. An avid supporter of early marriage because it fostered population growth, Franklin addressed common social views regarding marriage and children in his short article “The Speech of Polly Baker” published in 1741. Franklin depicted Miss Polly Baker, a young lady brought to court for having another child out of wedlock. Rather than admitting guilt, however, Polly Baker defends her situation by asking “Can it be a Crime (in the Nature of Things I mean) to add to the Number of the King’s Subjects, in a new Country that really wants People? I own it, I should think it rather a Praise worthy, than a Punishable Action.”^{xii} By suggesting that single mothers and bastard children ought to be supported rather than punished, Franklin challenged many of the cultural norms of his time, including the role of marriage, for the sake of a encouraging a larger population.

Scholars have questioned, though, how Franklin, inclined to speculate on the future of things and skilled in the art of “political arithmetic,” could neglect to acknowledge the disastrous Malthusian implications of sustaining his calculated doubling-rate of only 25 years.^{xiii} Throughout his political career, Franklin pursued what he felt to be the highest

interests of the American people at the time. Approaching population issues from a mercantilist point of view, Franklin viewed population growth as a good thing.^{xiv} Unlike many later demographers, for Franklin, a larger population would not lead to widespread poverty or deleterious societal issues, especially regarding relations with Britain. Rather, as historian Alan Houston notes, “when it came to population growth, he did not see disruption and instability, as when a child outgrows its parents, but mutual benefit.”^{xv} While such a rapid explosion in population would have been an insupportable catastrophe under different circumstances, the colonies were blessed with large and resource-filled stretches of land. Economic growth within the colonies, then, was a direct result of a high reproduction rate.^{xvi} Recognizing this critical relationship, Franklin, as an economist, became an ardent supporter of a growing American populace.

Franklin, as a politician and diplomat, also advocated for an expanding population because it led to an expanding nation. In 1754, Franklin published an essay entitled “A Plan for Settling Two Western Colonies” in which he outlined the future importance of the Ohio River Valley. Franklin argued that the region would undoubtedly become not only prosperous but also a major asset to whatever country could claim it. The question was whether that country would be England or France. To ensure British success, Franklin suggested that “it would be the interest and advantage of all the present colonies to support these new ones... so that the new colonies would soon be full of people.”^{xvii} By establishing British settlements in the area, Franklin reasoned the colonies would strengthen trade with Native American tribes, become safer, and grow more powerful. Perhaps more importantly, the British would also prevent the French from

achieving these same ends. British settlements in the Ohio Valley would preclude a much-feared union of the French possessions of Canada and Louisiana. French unity would hem the American colonies in from the west, essentially restricting British growth to the Appalachian Mountains while leaving the rest of the continent open to France. Looking ahead, Franklin recognized the potential for either British or French occupation. The key to each nation's success was an ability to provide a population that could fill the area. As a result, Franklin stressed the importance of the British colonies not only acting and reproducing but also doing so quickly, for every moment that passed allowed France to strengthen its hold over the region.

Franklin was not the only or the last political figure to recognize the large role population was playing in the colonization of the new world. When the Spanish Governor of Louisiana Baron Hector Carondelet gave his report on the conditions of the territory, he identified that "The fundamental American threat" to Spanish Louisiana was "not military but demographic."^{xviii} Carondelet reported that the region now contained 40,000 Americans "who have been uniting and multiplying in the silence of peace... with a remarkable rapidity."^{xix} In much the same manner, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh noted in 1818 the phenomenal rate of increase of the American population and America's corresponding ability to secure territory: "You Americans need not trouble yourselves about Oregon, you will conquer Oregon in your bedchambers."^{xx} Franklin recognized in 1754 what Carondelet would later report and what Castlereagh would later concede—the American ability to reproduce had tremendous ramifications. Franklin sought to direct land expansion for the good of the nation, and he encouraged population

growth as the tool to achieve it.

Starting in 1798 with the publication of Reverend Thomas R. Malthus's *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, an increasing number of countries and societies around the world began to acknowledge the disadvantages of a rapidly growing population. China, however, remained a notable exception well into the 20th century. Though China had a large population for hundreds of years, wars, famine, and a high infant mortality rate had traditionally kept the rate of increase in check. For much of Chinese history, peasants engaged in agriculture, which required large amounts of manpower. Because infant mortality was so high, Chinese parents often had many children in order to ensure that several survived to manage the farm and take care of the parents in old age. On a national level, emperors in ancient China considered a large population to be the source of power and strength for a prosperous kingdom.

Beyond the practical benefits of a large population, however, China's pronatalist culture stemmed from basic underpinnings in classical Chinese philosophy and Confucianism. Traditional Chinese philosophy held that the universe started from life and reproduction. Confucianism incorporated these notions and eventually magnified their significance such that "sexual relations were the driving force of changes in the universe."^{xxi} Without reproduction, nothing could exist. In fact, according to Chinese scholar Zhou Yutong, "Confucianism is a philosophy of reproduction."^{xxii} Ancestor worship, extremely prevalent within Chinese culture, was initially practiced by the Chinese as a means of recognizing and giving thanks for their ancestors' ability to reproduce. Filial piety or obedience and respect for one's parents was the logical corollary to ancestor worship, and the

greatest way one could show respect for his or her parents in Chinese culture was to carry on their lineage by reproducing.^{xxiii} Therefore, since ancient times, Chinese people, for both practical and cultural reasons, were accustomed to high birth rates and valued reproduction.

The significance of these deeply ingrained cultural norms is most clearly seen in the traditional idioms and sayings that still permeate Chinese society today. For instance there are the Chinese expressions 多子多福 “more children, more happiness or fortune”^{xxiv} and 四十同堂五十气常 “four generations under one roof equals five generations of prosperity.”^{xxv} One saying even goes so far as to contend, “five sons are not too many for a man.”^{xxvi} Children were a blessing in Chinese culture and if someone had few or no children, it was generally looked upon as a punishment for doing something bad in the past. “To die without sons” or “to be the last one’s family line” are common insults in China.^{xxvii} When the Chinese government first began implementing restrictive birth policies, the main resistance came from traditional Chinese values.^{xxviii} Even today, the rural population, more heavily influenced by traditional ideas than Chinese urbanites, has greater difficulty accepting government directives regarding population, and vehemently resists such efforts.^{xxix} Rural families are often willing to pay heavy fines to have a second or third child, because they view children as an indispensable source of wealth.^{xxx} Together, these traditional sayings and contemporary phenomena among China’s rural population demonstrate the profound and lasting impact of pro-population Chinese philosophy and Confucianism on Chinese society.

Such were the existing ideologies surrounding population on October 1, 1949 when Communist Party Chairman

Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China and began implementing his own pronatalist population policies, known collectively as 人多力量大 “the more people, the greater the strength.”^{xxxi} That same year, Mao began refuting the idea of a potentially oversized Chinese population, saying, “It is a very good thing that China has a big population... Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed.”^{xxxii} Mao reasserted his position in 1957, claiming, “as long as we have many people, it is easy to do things.”^{xxxiii} Indeed, Mao would defend his pronatalist stance throughout the entirety of his career as Chairman of the Communist party. Furthermore, because of his position as Party Chairman, Mao had direct control over the course of Chinese population policy—his word was final.^{xxxiv} Just as with Benjamin Franklin, though, it is insightful to examine precisely why Mao, often in contrast to his peers, so strongly insisted on a growing population.

In crafting many of his policies, whether involving population or not, Mao drew heavily from his own experiences. As a result, Mao’s background and rise to power determined his unique outlook on all manner of topics, including population. As an example, out of the five initial members of the Central Committee Secretariat in 1949, only Mao had never studied abroad.^{xxxv} Many of the Communist Party’s leaders traveled to either Russia or Europe to study Marxism; Mao, however, felt that Chinese culture was more important than Western culture. Having never studied abroad, Mao insulated himself from Western ideas regarding population, studying in greater detail the traditional Chinese pronatalist philosophies described above. In addition

to his domestic education, Mao's childhood and family experience likely influenced his population policies. Mao was born into a poor peasant family as one of four children. As a child, Mao undoubtedly saw the benefits of having more children around the house to help out. However, each of Mao's siblings would die relatively young (at 24, 29, and 47 years old) while fighting for the Communist Party. Later in life, three of Mao's own children died at young ages. These personal experiences, growing up as a poor peasant and experiencing the loss of loved ones, pushed Mao towards a pronatalist stance.

Mao was first and foremost a military leader, and consequently, he approached many problems with a militaristic mindset. More than that, Mao conceptualized subjects best in military terms. For instance, in describing the fecundity of Chinese mothers, Mao once compared women to aircraft carriers, using the analogy that women gave birth to children who would leave in a similar manner to planes that would take off from aircraft carriers.^{xxxvi} Having successfully overcome both the Guomindang and Japanese armies, Mao developed a profound appreciation for the importance of population size when fighting against technologically superior foes. As a result, Mao viewed a large population not as a problem but rather as a form of military capital.^{xxxvii} In fact, Mao maintained a strong belief that it was precisely a large and growing Chinese population that would ensure China's ascension as a world power in the second half of the 20th century. In November 1957, he shocked even Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev by claiming that American nuclear bombs would not be enough to destroy China, as the Chinese would simply have to "get to work producing more babies than ever before."^{xxxviii} For Mao, the Chinese ability

to reproduce meant that China could withstand attack or war from any nation, with the assumption that the population would soon rebound to its original level.

Beyond a strictly militaristic perspective, Mao also approached population from a Marxist standpoint. Under a socialist system, an increasing population is simply an asset to production. Marx criticized Malthus' identification of a large population as the reason for the existence of suffering, instead contending that the issue lay with the capitalist system not distributing the wealth evenly as the population continued to grow. Marxist principles held that a larger population simply meant a larger labor supply, increased production, and a stronger economy. Marxism and the support of a limited population were fundamentally and ideologically incomparable. Questioning the benefits of an expanding population in essence amounted to questioning the veracity of Marxism. Because of this duality, many Chinese citizens up until the 1970s blindly accepted that a growing population was a benefit to society.^{xxxix} Mao himself strictly adhered to Marxian principles and steered Chinese policy down a path of population growth. Mao argued against the "theory of human mouths" through his own "theory of human hands," essentially emphasizing the productive rather than the consumption qualities of a population.^{xl} This analysis led him to declare in 1949 "Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production."^{xli} Mao's belief in the principles of Marxism solidified his support of a larger population.

The historical context and individual reasoning behind both Benjamin Franklin's and Mao Zedong's pronatalist policies are particularly important because they better inform why the outcome in each situation was so

radically different. Americans, pursuing westward land expansion, used an incredibly rapid rate of increase over the span of the first 120 years of nationhood to populate and settle what would become the continental United States. The increase in population, expansion of territory, and abundance of natural resources quickly made the US a world power. In China, however, Mao Zedong's growth policies led to an unsustainable and catastrophic increase in population. After Mao's death, Chinese officials were forced to adopt increasingly severe family-planning measures, culminating in the draconian One-Child Policy in an attempt to limit a rate of population increase that had spiraled out of control. Even today, China suffers from immense environmental issues and urban sprawl, the results of its population growing too rapidly.

Why were these results so disparate? How can one nation's pronatalist policies turn out so much better than another's? It is easy to argue that the key difference lies precisely in the fact that America had the land and the resources to accommodate such unprecedented levels of population growth whereas China did not. Another common explanation is that China started with a much larger initial population. Beneath these superficial conclusions, however, lies a more profound explanation for America's success and China's failure, indicated by the reasons that each nation first pursued its respective policy. The American and Chinese societies had distinct social and political differences, mainly seen in freedoms in America and a lack thereof in China. Rather than rendering any comparison impossible, these societal distinctions serve to better inform an analysis of outcomes. The freedom to have a desired number of children is demonstrated in America by the

phenomenon of the moving fertility frontier while the lack of freedom in China is seen in the implementation of socialist policies.

Early Americans enjoyed the ability to purchase their own land, one freedom that Chinese citizens lacked. As historian Walter Nugent writes in his book *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion*, "young Americans could procreate as fast as biology allowed in the secure expectation that productive land awaited their many children."^{xliii} The US government made the purchase of frontier property extremely easy by selling large tracts of lands for pennies an acre. Federal land laws grew less and less stringent over time, such that by 1862, any settler could receive 160 acres of land for free under the Homestead Act, provided that they occupied and "improved" it for a period of five years.^{xliiii} This situation is starkly different from the land ownership potential in China after the ascension of the Communist Party in 1949. Specifically, the Communist Party seized the property of wealthy landlords and redistributed it among the peasant class. In both instances, the government was supplying land to those who needed it. The critical distinction, however, lies in the political and social conditions under which this supplying of land was taking place. In America, the government freely and fairly sold land to those willing to purchase it; in China, the land was forcibly taken and subsequently given out under the auspices of socialist equality. The government supplying of property in China is not similar to the freedom in America to purchase and occupy that property.

Beyond the freedom to purchase their own land, Americans were also free to choose both how many kids to have and the age at which they married, a factor strongly correlated to population increase. These decisions, conducted at an individual level, allowed married couples

to determine how many children would be appropriate for their unique circumstances. Pioneer Timothy Flint remarked in 1815, "I have never seen a country to appearance more fruitful in men... The process of doubling population, without Malthus and without theory, without artificial or natural wants, goes on I am sure on the banks of the Ohio as rapidly as anywhere in the world."^{xliv} However, what Flint observed in 1815 had been going on just a few years earlier along the Appalachian Mountains, and would be occurring just a few years hence somewhat further west. The population phenomenon, in fact, moved with the western frontier. In their 2004 study, economist Michael R. Haines and historian J. David Hacker examined fertility data at the county level from 1800-1860 both temporally and spatially. They found a statistically significant correlation between longitude and fertility rates in America at the time. Moreover, they demonstrated that this high fertility rate moved with the frontier, specifically that birth rates increased, stabilized, and then declined, as the frontier got further away.^{xlv} This incredible phenomenon reflects the fruition of one of Benjamin Franklin's original hopes for an increasing American population: successful westward expansion.

In examining this moving fertility frontier, it is as important to determine what caused the original spike in reproduction along the western frontier as it is to determine what caused its decline, because without the latter America would inevitably have developed many of the same population problems that China experienced some 180 years later. But first, why the massive spike in reproduction rates along the American frontier? In a crude sense, "frontiers were," as historian Walter Nugent points out, "lusty places, and without the love and lust, they would've remained as empty of white

people as the far edges of New Spain and New France did."^{xlvi} The frontier by definition lay at the edge of society, indeed at the edge of the New World, and this dangerous, exciting position may have led to increased rates of reproduction. More concretely, however, due to the hard lifestyle and degree of manual labor that the frontier required, more men tended to move west than women, resulting in a natural surplus of young adult males. This high male to female ratio created a younger, earlier marriage age along the frontier, ultimately implicating more children per marriage.^{xlvii} Moreover, children on the frontier were, as Adam Smith noted, an asset.^{xlviii} More children meant that a family could farm more land, produce more crops, and live a better life. Additionally, parents need not be concerned that their children would lack land of their own. In reflecting on the nature of frontier parents, Benjamin Franklin remarked, "such are not afraid to marry; for if they even look far enough forward to consider how their Children when grown up are to be provided for, they see that more Land is to be had at Rates equally easy, all Circumstances considered."^{xlix} The western frontier, advancing as the boundary of the civilized world, created an environment conducive to high reproduction rates, and the availability of land provided an outlet for subsequent generations to continue to push westward as their parents had before them.

The frontier was a region of high reproduction rates, but what caused Americans to so drastically change their habits as the frontier moved away? This phenomenon is hard to attribute to one reason alone; rather the decline appears to be a combination of several coinciding factors. One dominant explanation is the subsequent diminishing of land availability. To ensure one's children did not move away, settlers had to be able to guarantee

them some form of property via inheritance. With a decline in available land, this became less and less realistic. The rise of new urban centers compounded this problem by providing children alternative, non-agricultural work opportunities as well as easy methods of transport between these new cities. Society also demanded that children be sent to school. Thus, the cost of raising children, mainly in the form of larger inheritances per child, began to rise, rendering large numbers of children unrealistic. Why was it necessary to keep children at home? As Haines and Hacker explain, “in a society without adequate financial markets and intermediaries and with a heavy reliance on wealth holding in the form of real property (land, structures, livestock, and equipment), provision for old age was much more likely to be found in the form of children.”^l However, the shift away from frontier life also brought the increased availability of banks and other investments, changing how parents conceived savings and investment, shifting from existing in their children to lying in other forms of wealth.

Fascinatingly, the decline in fertility rates can also be attributed to the ideational transitions that accompany modernization. The fact that people across all levels of society went through this fertility swing at about the same time “argues that the growing influence of secular values has changed people’s willingness to control and plan family size.”^{li} In fact, in his 1977 study, demographer Ron J. Lesthaeghe found that in the case of Belgium, fertility decline was positively correlated to percentage of citizens voting for socialist, liberal, or communist candidates and negatively correlated with the size of the population paying Easter dues in the Catholic Church.^{lii} In the context of America, similar studies relating the number of children given biblical names

and high fertility rates have concluded many of the same results. The decline in reproduction rates as the frontier advanced ultimately came about as the multiple side-effects of modernity, less land, the rise of cities and banks, and ideational changes, combined to alter people’s decisions to have children.

In the case of China, however, the communist Chinese government under Mao Zedong made people’s ability to freely decide on topics such as marriage age, number of children, and family planning, more difficult than in the US through its socialist policies. On a practical level, the Chinese government made it hard to practice family planning by prohibiting the importation and production of contraceptives. Additionally, as Chinese historians Zongli Tang and Bing Zuo note, “birth control was considered not only to be illegal and inhumane, it was also treated as the by-product of capitalism.”^{liii} In the years following the revolution, there was very little support for any sort of family planning, especially once the idea became related to western capitalism. The result was that young married couples often struggled for realistic alternatives to bearing children. Chinese journalist Liu Binyan recalls his personal experience with his wife at the time: “Neither of us wanted to have a baby yet, but contraception was discouraged and abortion forbidden by government policy. By 1952, contraceptive devices had disappeared from the market.”^{liiv} The Communist Chinese government, in an effort to have a larger population, strictly limited access to contraceptives and other methods of family planning, restricting couples’ abilities to choose when it came to having children.

More than just inhibiting the ability to practice family planning, the Communist party also constantly sought to influence peoples’ perceptions – and

therefore their choices – regarding population. The Party primarily reinforced the benefits of a large populace to society through media propaganda. The government argued that having more children demonstrated the improvement and flourishing of China, because such children could not have been supported before Communist rule.^{lv} Accordingly, the Communist Party also incentivized women to have more children by providing families with more ration coupons for each additional child, creating a system that essentially benefited large families.^{lvi} Chinese mothers were even given awards by the Party for having more children. This idea was based on a Soviet policy, whereby women received political and financial rewards for having more children. China adopted the policy by awarding congratulatory flags to women with large families that read 人丁兴旺五谷丰登 “people will flourish, reap abundant grain.”^{lvii} Furthermore, historian Judith Shapiro identifies a “traditional culture of patronage and obedience to authority, a coercive organizational status” within China.^{lviii} This cultural heritage would have made it less likely, even difficult, for people to disobey Mao’s policies, including those regarding population.

As a result, having many children developed over time to become a civic duty, an obligation to the Communist Party. In a reflection on her time spent in China during the Cultural revolution, *Red Azalea*, Chinese author Min Anchee describes how “Mother said that she wouldn't ever have produced nine children with my father if she had not wanted to respond to the Party's call, ‘More population means more power.’”^{lix} Although *Red Azalea* is fictional, the sentiments expressed within are indicative of the broader, coercive societal trends that existed at the time, mainly the

necessity to reproduce. The recollections of Chinese Journalist Liu Banyan further corroborate Anchee’s experience: “I remember a man who worked at the Youth League Central and whose wife kept on having children until she was completely exhausted. She had eleven.”^{lx} While just one example, the quote brings to light the reality that Chinese couples at the time were no longer having children for pleasure or to increase the probability of old age insurance. Having children was both an effort and a chore, and most importantly, a civic duty.

The Chinese population, denied access to contraception and bombarded with pronatalist propaganda from the Communist Party, had little freedom when it came to practicing reproduction; moreover, they also lacked the freedom to effectively question these policies. Soviet Socialism as practiced under Mao did not allow for any dissenting views to be incorporated. Mao stifled political opponents and perceived threats in all facets of government, including any contrary ideas regarding population. This lack of political agency meant that the pronatalist policies espoused by Mao could not readily be called into question. As noted by Judith Shapiro in her book *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, “Soviet dogma had a deeply constraining effect on Chinese intellectual life, determining which topics could be studied and which schools of thought were considered acceptable.”^{lxi} In the field of demography, no school of thought was more widely disallowed than Malthusianism, as evidenced by the silencing of Ma Yinchu.

Perhaps the largest tragedy of the Chinese population growth is that it might have been avoided had the warnings of Ma Yinchu been heeded. An economist and demographer, Ma was the president of Peking University, the most prestigious institution of higher education in China.

Also a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Ma, acting as a concerned Party member, gave a report in 1957 titled *New Demography* that cautioned against China's growing population. He predicted that the overpopulation of China would inhibit economic development in the future. As described in *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, "In that era, however, any argument for population control was perceived as a form of Malthusianism."^{lxiii} Malthusianism, in turn, directly conflicted with socialism and was a tool for capitalist enterprise. Despite maintaining key differences with Malthus, Ma was stripped of his title as president in January of 1960 and silenced for the next 20 years. Both nationally and across the Peking campus, the Party sponsored huge campaigns involving tens of thousands of posters denouncing Ma's arguments. As a result "there was little chance that population issues could be openly discussed as long as Ma's ideas remained ideological heresy."^{lxiiii} After Ma lost his titles and positions, the "population issue became a forbidden topic, and nobody dared to touch upon it."^{lxiv} Paraded before the nation as an example of what could happen if one criticized, or even questioned, the Communist Party's population policies, Ma exemplifies the complete lack of freedom that Chinese citizens suffered from.

The conditions in Communist China under Mao, including basic socialist assertions that a growing population would support economic growth, an inability to practice family planning, a perceived civic duty to reproduce, and a lack of political and intellectual freedom are all heavily contrasted with the flexible and adaptable realities of America. More than just having the land space and the need for a population to fill it, America also provided the political environment for people to choose contraception and

marriage age and even gave people the choice to question the ramifications of an expanding population.

Most modern demographers agree that overpopulation is indeed detrimental to a nation's development. However, as demonstrated by the two very different outcomes between the early United States and China, this is not always the case. With much of the world still developing today, this comparison serves as a reminder that a rapid rate of reproduction is not necessarily cause for alarm. As in the case of the early United States, an expanding population can actually be a source of strength for a country with plenty of land and resources. Additionally, a high rate of reproduction in the developing world may still be held in check by high rates of infant mortality, war, or disease. The comparison provides the lesson that as these developing nations stop waging wars and increase nutrition and medical care, thereby lowering rates of infant mortality and disease, they must also put into place the political and social institutions that allow a fertility transition to occur. Both the US and China's leaders adopted a pro-population growth stance; only the American political and societal institutions, however, provided the freedom to adopt that stance as the situation changed. Additionally, the Chinese government's recent easing in the One-Child Policy makes this comparison particularly relevant. Chinese citizens, pressured at one time into bearing too many children and later limited to just one, will finally have the freedom to choose the correct number of kids for themselves. While this might seem like cause for concern, perhaps in easing these restrictions, Chinese government leaders are recognizing what the early American fertility frontier demonstrated; modern Chinese parents will find the costs of additional children to outweigh the benefits. The rest of the world can rest

easy; China's population will likely remain stable.

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- ⁱ Walter T.K. Nugent, *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion*, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 234.
- ⁱⁱ Myron P. Gutmann, et al. eds., *Navigating Time and Space in Population Studies*, (Dordrecht: Springer 2011) 37.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Alan C. Houston, *Benjamin Franklin & the Politics of Improvement*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008) 116.
- ^{iv} *Ibid.*, 116.
- ^v *Ibid.*, 117.
- ^{vi} *Ibid.*, 121.
- ^{vii} Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Edwin Cannan, ed. 1904. Library of Economics and Liberty. 18 November 2013.
- ^{viii} D. P. O'Brien, *The Classical Economists Revisited*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 68.
- ^{ix} Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Edwin Cannan, 1904. Library of Economics and Liberty. 18 November 2013.
- ^x Benjamin Franklin, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, Comp. Leonard Woods Labaree, William Bradford Willcox, and Barbara Oberg, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959).
- ^{xi} Conway Zirkle, "Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Malthus and the United States Census." *Isis* 48.1 (1957): 58-62. *JSTOR*. Web. 8 Dec. 2013.
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- ^{xiii} Dennis Hodgson, "Benjamin Franklin on Population: From Policy to Theory." *Population and Development Review* 17.4 (1991): 639-61. *JSTOR*. Web. 24 Oct. 2013.
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- ^{xv} Alan C. Houston, *Benjamin Franklin & the Politics of Improvement*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 130.
- ^{xvi} *Ibid.*, 122.
- ^{xvii} Benjamin Franklin, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, Comp. Leonard Woods Labaree, William Bradford Willcox, and Barbara Oberg, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959).
- ^{xviii} Walter T.K. Nugent, *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion*, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 51.
- ^{xix} *Ibid.*, 51.
- ^{xx} *Ibid.*, 233.
- ^{xxi} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 359.
- ^{xxii} *Ibid.*, 359.
- ^{xxiii} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 360.
- ^{xxiv} *Ibid.*, 360.
- ^{xxv} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, (Cambridge:

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- Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30.
- ^{xxvi} Geping Qu, Jinchang Li, *Population and the Environment in China*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 176-177.
- ^{xxvii} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 360.
- ^{xxviii} *Ibid.*, 348.
- ^{xxix} Geping Qu, Jinchang Li, *Population and the Environment in China*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 118.
- ^{xxx} *Ibid.*, 192.
- ^{xxxi} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20.
- ^{xxxii} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 360.
- ^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, 351.
- ^{xxxiv} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20.
- ^{xxxv} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 358.
- ^{xxxvi} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31.
- ^{xxxvii} *Ibid.*, 31.
- ^{xxxviii} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32.
- ^{xxxix} Geping Qu, Jinchang Li, *Population and the Environment in China*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 118.
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- ^{xli} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 346.
- ^{xlii} Walter T.K. Nugent, *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion*, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 223.
- ^{xliiii} *Ibid.*, 231.
- ^{xliiv} Myron P. Gutmann, et al. eds., *Navigating Time and Space in Population Studies*, (Dordrecht: Springer 2011) 39.
- ^{xli v} *Ibid.*, 37-63.
- ^{xli vi} Walter T.K. Nugent, *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion*, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 233.
- ^{xli vii} Myron P. Gutmann, et al. eds., *Navigating Time and Space in Population Studies*, (Dordrecht: Springer 2011), 44.
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- ^{xlix} *Ibid.*, 39.
- ^l Myron P. Gutmann, et al. eds., *Navigating Time and Space in Population Studies*, (Dordrecht: Springer 2011) 41.
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, 43.
- ^{lii} *Ibid.*, 43.
- ^{liii} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 346-347.
- ^{liv} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and*

the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32.

^{lv} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 346.

^{lvij} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32.

^{lvii} *Ibid.*, 30.

^{lviii} *Ibid.*, 12.

^{lix} Anchee Min, *Red Azalea*, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1994), 99.

^{lx} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32.

^{lxi} *Ibid.*, 26.

^{lxii} Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 41.

^{lxiii} *Ibid.*, 23.

^{lxiv} Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, *Maoism and Chinese Culture*, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 351.

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Blessed Are They Who Are Open-Minded:

An Analysis of the Beatitudes in the Union Edition of the Chinese Bible

Gina Elia

University of Pennsylvania

ABSTRACT

I study the effects of the translation of the Beatitudes in the Chinese *Union Bible* by examining the terminology used for several key words and phrases. I first construct an idea of how these terms might be conceived in Chinese as opposed to in English, and then look at interpretations of the Beatitudes by several Chinese scholars. With the help of these materials, I examine to what extent the translation of the Beatitudes into Chinese subtly shifts the meaning of the text. I conclude that the translation of the Beatitudes de-emphasizes the theological aspects of the text and focuses on its worldly value as a set of instructions for living a morally superior life in the here and now. However, there is evidence that some non-orthodox churches read the Bible in a spiritual sense, closer to the way it is frequently interpreted in the west. This challenges the assumption that non-orthodox churches generally promote looser versions of Protestantism than orthodox churches, as it reveals that such a conclusion is predicated upon the unwarranted presumption that the Bible is read the same across Chinese Protestant contexts.

INTRODUCTION

Although Protestants constitute only one percent of the mainland Chinese population, this percentage nevertheless translates to over ten million people.ⁱ Several scholars, mostly but not exclusively writing in Chinese, have begun

to study the social and political dimensions and context of Chinese Christianity, though fewer studies concentrate on its underlying theology and how it compares to Western Christianity. For a much longer period—almost as long as translations of Christian scripture have existed in China—much scholarship in many languages has been produced which examines the nature and methodology of Biblical translation in China.ⁱⁱ However, few scholars have strived to combine these two fields of study by thinking about the manner in which Chinese translations of the Bible might affect the development of theological thought in China.

In this paper, I propose to study one passage of Chinese Biblical scripture, the Beatitudes (shānshàng bǎoxùn de bāfú 山上宝训的八福) in the Book of Matthew (Mǎtài fúyīn 马太福音).ⁱⁱⁱ I will examine the terminology used for several key words in the passage that carry implicit assumptions about the way Christians in the West conceive of their faith. These include the words and phrases “God,” “poor in spirit,” “mercy,” “persecute,” and “Kingdom of heaven”. I will utilize dictionaries and several writings on Bible translation theory in China to first construct an idea of how the Chinese translations of each of these terms might be conceived in Chinese as opposed to in an English-language Bible. I will then look at interpretations of the Beatitudes by several Chinese scholars, along with one Western analysis, for comparative purposes. With the help of these

materials, I will examine the ways in which English-reading and Chinese-reading Christians conceive of the values described in the Beatitudes, and to what extent the translation of any of the terms above plays a role in these two reading traditions. The Chinese dictionaries that I will use, the *Hànyīngdàcídiǎn* 汉英大辞典 and the *ABC Comprehensive Chinese-English Dictionary*, were chosen for their ease of use and comprehensive coverage of the Chinese language. The English dictionary I will use is the *Oxford English Dictionary*, also for its comprehensive nature.

Chinese Protestants are not one homogenous group of people. Based on their backgrounds and experiences, they inevitably come to the Bible with different expectations and interpretations. One clear example is that in China, both officially registered churches and unsanctioned, unofficial “house” churches exist within Protestantism. These churches do have certain differences in belief and outlook, though it is difficult to conduct studies on this, as the house churches must remain secretive.^{iv} The official Protestant churches tend to be composed of educated people and to take a more liberal stance on Biblical interpretation. Members of house churches, on the other hand, tend to consist mostly of uneducated people coming from rural areas where there is no strong tradition of orthodox Protestantism to be found.^v Accordingly, this means that house churches are more likely to practice a more folk-belief-inspired, heterodoxical form of Protestantism than the government-approved churches, although one might expect that these, too, would be unlikely to perpetuate a Western religious tradition in its original form.^{vi}

Furthermore, there of course exists a socioeconomic and educational distinction between different groups of

Protestants. I do not mean in this paper to suggest that one unified reading for the Beatitudes exists across all of these groups of people, which indeed is not the case anywhere in the world that the Beatitudes are read. Rather, my goal is to examine the translation of certain phrases in order to suggest a framework for how to conceive of the Beatitudes in a Chinese context, based mostly on the viewpoints of Chinese intellectuals from both the orthodox and unorthodox Protestant traditions. This could be of use in comparative studies of how more specific groups read the Beatitudes.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BEATITUDES TO CHRISTIANITY

The paper is interested in the nuances of scriptural interpretation that exist in two distinct cultures, and the extent to which these nuances are caused by the translations of theologically-significant terms. In order to eliminate confounding variables to the greatest extent possible, it was imperative to choose a passage from the New Testament, the only set of scriptures not shared by any religious tradition other than Christianity. The Beatitudes specifically were chosen because they are written in the form of a series of moral and behavioral instructions from Jesus, and thus explicitly detail the values that Christians believe necessary to lead a godly life. Furthermore, the passage is punctuated with many terms whose meanings are vague at first glance and, in fact, have been often discussed and debated in the long history of scriptural scholarship.

A NOTE ON THE CHINESE BIBLE EDITION CHOSEN AND THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF BIBLE TRANSLATION IN CHINA

There have been many translations of the Bible into Chinese. Evidence exists that some books or even the whole Bible may have been translated as early as the Tang Dynasty, though none of these specimens survive in the present.^{vii} The first so-called “modern” translation of the entire Protestant Bible was completed by Robert Morrison and William Milne in 1823 (43). Many more translations followed in the wake of this one.

The makings of the *Union* Bible (*Héběběn* 和合本), the edition referenced in this paper, began in the late nineteenth century (193). It is the most recent major Protestant Bible translation effort using Mandarin, undertaken by foreign missionaries and first published in its entirety in 1919 (328). Although some revisions have been made to the text in the years since it was published, mostly of an editorial nature, the most widely-available version of the *Union* remains the original translation. This is the primary edition of the Bible used by Protestants in contemporary China.^{viii}

The *Union* was translated primarily from the *New Revised* version of the Bible, with cross-referencing to the original texts in Biblical Hebrew and Ancient Greek.^{ix} However, in its New Testament translation, this edition of the Bible preserves the Greek meaning to a greater extent than the *New Revised* version does.^x Therefore, in addition to using the *New Revised* text to compare the Chinese translation, I will also compare the original Ancient Greek terms.

ANALYSIS OF THE BEATITUDES

General Comments on the Translation Style of the Beatitudes

Before I begin analysis of specific terms in the Beatitudes, I will provide several general comments on the nature of the *Union* translation that stem from Thor

Strandenaes’s study on the translations of various Chinese-language editions of the Bible. Strandenaes points out that whenever a theological or dogmatic issue is at stake in the translation of a phrase, the formal correspondence method of translation from the ancient Greek is employed. Overall, the text is a conservative, fairly literal translation of the Ancient Greek, with heavy reliance on the *New Revised* version.^{xi} The translation attempts to stress the internal conviction of faith that is so important to Protestantism.^{xii} It also specifically emphasizes the Beatitudes as a series of entrance requirements to God’s kingdom, rather than as “eschatological blessings.”^{xiii} Both of these effects of the translation may contribute to the fact that the Beatitudes are subtly secularized in the *Union* Bible, as will be explored in the analyses of specific terms below. With these general comments in mind, I will now move on to analyses of the translations of some of the key terms of the passage.

“shén 神” *v.* “shàngdì 上帝” *v.* “God” *v.* “Theos”

The word “God” is used twice in the Beatitudes, in the sentences “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God” and “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God.”^{xiv} The translation of this word has been a matter of intense contention since the first attempts to translate the Bible into Chinese, and justifiably so; centrally important to Christianity, the translation of this word alone has the potential to direct the course of how the faith as a whole is interpreted and practiced by Chinese Christians. Because so much has been written about the translation of this word into Chinese, I will give a condensed history of the discussion here, based mostly on Irene Eber’s convenient

summary of the affair, and then move on to less vehemently disputed terminology in the Beatitudes.

In the early days of Bible translation, there was no consensus on what term for God to use. A number of variations existed in various translations, including “shàngdì 上帝”, “shén 神”, and “tiānzhǔ 天主”, among others. Over time, as missionaries began to develop arguments for the use of one term or another, “tiānzhǔ” came to be employed more often by Catholics, while Protestants continued to debate over the advantages and disadvantages of “shàngdì” and “shén.”^{xv} While the arguments between the missionaries were complex, they can be divided into two broad categories. Those who were in favor of the term “shàngdì”, such as missionary Walter Henry Medhurst, believed that the term “shén”, which connoted a group of spirits or ancestors as opposed to one God, was too close to the polytheistic beliefs of the Chinese to be used to refer to the one and only God of the Christian faith.^{xvi} After conducting a thorough examination of the use of both of these terms in many Chinese classics, Medhurst observed that “shàngdì” seemed to always be used in the context of a supernatural being who had never been created, but had always existed, and from whom all creation had been born. He therefore argued that “shàngdì” was the obvious choice for the translation of “God”, or “theos” in the Greek.^{xvii} In response to arguments that the Chinese had never known a monotheistic God and therefore could not understand the concept of a single God as founder of all creation, James Legge, who supported the use of “shàngdì”, argued that the Chinese classics contained evidence that the Chinese had practiced monotheism at an earlier time in their history.^{xviii}

As already mentioned, those who supported the use of “shén”, such as

missionary William Boone, argued that this term would be easier for the Chinese to relate to, since they believed the Chinese could only conceptualize of deities in the context of a polytheistic framework.^{xix} Boone did not agree with Medhurst’s interpretation of the “shàngdì” term, writing that “shàngdì” was simply the proper name of a high-ranking Chinese deity.^{xx} In any case, he argued that as a generic term rather than a proper one, “shén” was more appropriate than “shàngdì” because it implied that God is unnamable, and that only generic terms can be used to refer to him. The original Greek word “theos”, he pointed out, was a generic term, not a proper one.^{xxi}

Eventually, missionaries began to perceive that they needed to ask Chinese people how they interpreted the terms, since it was their perspective as the intended audience that mattered the most, not that of the missionaries.^{xxii} When queried on the subject, however, the Chinese only added fuel to both arguments. It was concluded from the queries that generally, literate Chinese associated “shàngdì” with Heaven, while both literate and illiterate Chinese associated “shén” with ancestral spirits, both malevolent and benevolent.^{xxiii} This would seem to support the argument that “shàngdì” should be used to translated “theos” or “God”. However, the Chinese people queried also generally agreed that “shén” connoted the idea of an unnamable God better than “shàngdì”, which added weight to the opposing argument.^{xxiv}

Ultimately, the *Union* edition did not attempt to solve this problem, but skirted the issue, simply publishing two editions of its translation, one with “shén” as the translation of “God” or “theos” and one with “shàngdì” as the translation of choice. To this day, both Bibles are available in mainland China, and individual Christians can choose which

translation they prefer to use. The fact that Chinese Christians are presented with a choice regarding how to refer to God is quite remarkable. This presumably opens up dialogue between Christians in China concerning how best to refer to God, which means that the Christian God's very representation in language is less definitive than it is in English or ancient Greek. This has several effects. On the one hand, it emphasizes the impossibility of perfectly representing the concept of God through the human construct of language, as Western Christians also believe. On the other hand, though, the choice also allows Chinese Christians to become divided in how they principally conceive of God, in one or the other of the manners described above. This allows them greater flexibility in how to conceive of God than Western Christians using the English or ancient Greek texts have.^{xxv}

“Xūxīn 虚心” v. “poor in spirit” v. “*ptochos tō pneumati*”

The sentence in which this expression appears is, in English, “Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven”.^{xxvi} At first glance, this passage seems strange to a native-level English speaker. The phrase “poor in spirit” conveys a sense of someone whose spirits are low—a description which could potentially refer to those who are miserly, those who are selfish, and those who remain in a state of perpetual depression, among other negative connotations. Yet, given Christian values of selflessness, compassion towards others, and joy in the Holy Spirit, it seems unlikely that Jesus would claim that people with such negative mindsets could be blessed by God. In light of these tenets, it makes more sense to interpret this phrase as meaning “humble” or “modest”.

In Rector Robert Eyton's nineteenth-century book-length analysis

of the Beatitudes, he explains that the phrase “poor in spirit” refers to those who are humble because they have been so faith-filled as to have “known God”, and therefore are more aware of their own inferiority in comparison. He further comments that the reason this phrase is often misunderstood by English speakers is most likely because of the translation “poor” of the original Greek “*ptochos*”.^{xxvii} However, the original Greek word “*ptochos*”, according to Barclay Newman's *Greek-English Dictionary of the New Testament*, is equivalent to the English words “poor; miserable; begging; pitiful or inferior.” “Inferior”, the most similar to “humble” or “modest” of this group of words, nevertheless has a more negative connotation. There is no avoiding the fact, then, that even the original Greek maintains the ambiguity of the phrase.

The choice of the missionaries to translate “poor in spirit” as “xūxīn” therefore reflects their bias that this term be interpreted as “humble” or “modest”, even though other interpretations are possible. According to the *Hànyīngdàcídiǎn*, the term “xūxīn” means “open-minded; modest; with an open mind.” Nowhere does the entry suggest that “xūxīn” conveys any of the negative connotations that “poor in spirit” does to a native-level English speaker. Thus, in one sense, it may appear that the interpretive bias of the missionaries that resulted in them translating “poor in spirit” as “xūxīn” means that this phrase is less vague to Chinese readers of the Bible. Certainly, this is how it is unambiguously interpreted by many Christian Chinese Protestants, such as Lín Xiàngāo 林献羔, also known as Samuel Lamb in English (1924-2013).^{xxviii}

Furthermore, the translation omits any specific mention of the word “spirit”, present in both the English and Ancient

Greek renditions. This may have been done intentionally to avoid the complexity of translating the theologically-significant word “spirit.”^{xxxix} In mentioning the “spirit,” the English term references that part of human beings that Christians believe to be supernatural, linked to God. Eyton’s interpretation of the phrase as referring to those who “know God” further highlights the suggestion in the English phrase “poor in spirit” of a link between this world and the world beyond. By eliminating that word altogether, the Chinese expression remains grounded in the reality of the everyday, and the link between this tangible world and the immaterial world of God fades significantly.

“Xūxīn” was also one of the traits that was valued in ancient Chinese philosophies such as Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.^{xxx} This connotation allows an entryway for other philosophies to meld with the message of the Beatitudes, which are considered distinctly Christian in the West. This characteristic encourages the intersection of different ideologies in a way that the Beatitudes as they are read in the West do not, at least not with ideologies outside of the Christian framework. In fact, one of the striking features of Chinese Christians is the way in which many of them seem to seamlessly meld Christian and pre-Christian tradition and belief, apparently without thinking it problematic.^{xxxi} The fact that the translation of the Beatitudes into Chinese subtly encourages this combining of philosophies may help to explain why more Chinese Christians do not view mixing folk belief and Protestantism in observance as a contradiction.^{xxxii}

The *ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary*’s entry “xūxīn” adds another layer of complexity to the word. The second listing of its entry reads

“timid; fearful”. This definition is noticeably absent from Eyton’s interpretation of the phrase “poor in spirit”, and also differs from the senses of “poor in spirit” in English, according to the *Oxford* definition of “poor”, and “ptochos” in Greek of “miserable; begging; pitiful”. Thus, the use of “xūxīn” also implies that Jesus approves the possession of a certain kind of fear or timidity, presumably of the Lord. Palpable fear of the world beyond this one is certainly evidenced in Chinese Protestantism. In general, non-orthodox sects believe in the possibility of possession by evil spirits and the necessity of exorcism, ideas which have fallen out of favor with many Western Christians.^{xxxiii} Many of them also continue to practice ancient funeral rites alongside Christian ones, fearing that the Christian ones alone will not be enough to ward off evil spirits from attacking them.^{xxxiv} This kind of mixing of traditional and Christian faiths is not uncommon, and marks one of the major differences between Protestantism in China and in the West. The second meaning of “xūxīn” could serve to validate this continued reliance on traditional rites out of fear.

Lín Xiàngāo’s perspective on the Beatitudes is unique among those examined in this paper. He was a pastor of one of the unorthodox house churches, and is famous for speaking out during his lifetime against the orthodox church, which he saw as moving away from the spirit of Christianity and becoming a more bland, government-controlled organization.^{xxxv} He—saw “xūxīn” as referring to the spirit, thus re-centering the word on the more abstract, theological meaning it conveys in its English rendition.^{xxxvi} In his analysis, he suggests a more literal translation for the phrase, “línglǐ pínqióng 灵里贫穷” [rough translation: poverty within the soul],

which he interprets as “zài línglǐ pòchǎn 在灵里破产” [rough translation: bankrupt within the soul].^{xxxvii} He further argues that, though this instruction does not literally entail that good Christians must necessarily be financially poor, poverty in Ancient Greece may have had something of a correlation to the first Christians who were “xūxīn”, the ones who paved the way for others to follow their lead. He speculates that, having no material wealth to obsess over, they instead turned their entire minds, hearts, and spirits to the consideration of God.^{xxxviii} Thus, he re-centers the meaning of “xūxīn” on the spirit while still connecting the trait’s origin to the material world.

“Liánxù 怜恤” v. “mercy” v. “eleēmōnes”

This word appears in the line “Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.”^{xxxix} The main way in which this translation differs from the English and Ancient Greek is that the latter two terms connote the idea of “forgiveness”, while the Chinese translation does not. The Greek word “eleēmōnes” is defined as “pitiful; merciful; compassionate.” According to the *Oxford*, “pity” denotes the feeling of having sympathy or compassion for another. “Mercy” encompasses both of these ideas, and further carries the meaning of “forgiveness toward those whom it is within one’s power to punish or harm.” In the English translation, the choice of “mercy” over “compassion” or “pity” indicates that the translators wanted to emphasize the dimension of “forgiveness” in this word, the feature that separates “mercy” from “pity” or “compassion”. This emphasis is seconded by Eyton’s analysis, in which he explicitly points out that the meaning of this passage is to forgive one’s fellows.^{xl}

The Chinese word “liánxù”, however, does not convey this nuance of meaning. Its entry in *Hànyǐngdàcídiǎn* reads: “pity; take pity on; have compassion for.” The *ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary* seconds this meaning exactly. Any connotation of “forgiveness” is absent from both. Forgiveness is an important trait of Christianity; therefore, its absence in the dimensions of the meaning of “liánxù” is striking. To have compassion and pity for others in the broadest sense is quite different from cultivating the ability to have compassion and pity for those who have personally harmed one, physically or psychologically. Because the connotation of forgiving others disappears in the translation of this passage, the importance of forgiveness is de-emphasized.

While forgiveness may not be as significant in the Chinese rendition of this phrase, it seems that Chinese Christians generally do at least take the dictum to act compassionately toward others seriously. It appears that the Chinese Christian population is generally harmonious.^{xli} Furthermore, the writings of several Chinese religious figures stress compassion as potentially the most important aspect of Christianity. Wáng Míngdào 王明道 (1900-1991) wrote that he believed the most important teaching of the Bible was the promotion of good will and good behavior toward others. He wrote that nobody would notice whatever particular theological views Christians hold, but that they would observe, and hopefully be persuaded by, their model behavior.^{xlii} Dīng Guāngxùn 丁光训, known in English as K.H. Ting (1915-2012), was the former President of the China Christian Council. He framed his understanding of the Beatitudes, and the Bible in general, around the significance of compassion toward others.^{xliii} Thus, one’s treatment of others seems to take on

central importance for several writers on Christian scripture in China, though any discussion of *forgiving* others is conspicuously absent from their work.

This is another word that, like “xūxīn”, was heralded by ancient Chinese philosophies as an honorable moral attribute.^{xliv} Therefore, it has the same effect on the text.^{xlv}

“Bīpò de rén 逼迫的人” *v.* “they that have been persecuted” *v.* “*dediōgmenoi*”

This phrase appears in the English sentence, “Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”^{xlvi} The Greek word means “persecute; seek after, strive for; force out or away; practice (hospitality); follow, run after.” According to *Oxford*, “persecute” means “to subject someone to hostility or ill-treatment.” The Chinese word “bīpò”, on the contrary, according to the *Hànyīngdàcídiǎn*, means “force; compel; coerce; restrain.” The *ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary*’s entry for this word is essentially the same. The English word thus emphasizes suffering for one’s belief, but the Chinese word adds the additional meaning of being forced or compelled to behave or believe in a certain way. While the difference in the meaning between these terms is nuanced, it is nevertheless significant. The word “persecute” often carries with it the implication of coercion—that is, an underlying reason that persecution occurs is to discourage people from agreeing with the philosophy that is under attack. Thus, in a sense, persecution acts as a force that “compels” people to choose a certain path as opposed to another in society. Nevertheless, this sense is not an explicit part of the definition of the term. The Chinese word is actually closer in meaning to the original Greek, in the sense of “to force out or away”, than the English word

is. This makes sense, since a pattern emerges throughout the *Union*; its translations more accurately reflect the ancient Greek reading, in the sense of “to force out or away” than those in the *New Revised* version.^{xlvii} One consequence of this alteration in meaning is that not just persecution, but more specifically being ostracized and banished, are emphasized as desirable situations for Christians to be in, in the sense that their reward will be great in heaven.

This stance is reflected in Wàng Míngdào’s interpretation of this passage. He writes that true Christians are always persecuted; if a so-called Christian is not at the moment undergoing persecution, then she is not a true Christian but rather a hypocrite. She may call herself a follower of Christ, but her God is the world of secular materialism, not the Christian God.^{xlviii} Lín’s study also highlights the centrality of this Beatitude—he argues that fulfilling this condition is a prerequisite for achieving any of the other values in the Beatitudes.^{xlix} Both Wàng Míngdào and Lín, then, place crucial importance on the one Beatitude that does not have to do with moral character, but rather with how Christians are treated by people of the world. Their standpoint contrasts sharply with Eyton’s teaching on the subject. While Eyton admires those who have been persecuted historically for their faith, he admonishes those who would unnecessarily seek out persecution.¹ While a Christian should endure persecution in good faith if it does come his way, it is not a responsibility or requirement that he go searching for it, and that his life be one unending stream of persecution. Thus, Wàng and Lín’s stances emphasize the greatness of social persecution more than Eyton’s interpretation does. Persecution is still important in Eyton’s conception, but it is not the most important among the values that the Beatitudes espouse.

“Tiānshàng 天上” v. “heaven” v. “ouranois”

Thus far, I have argued that many of the terms in this passage have been subtly secularized in their Chinese translations. One major argument that might be made in opposition to this is to point out that, regardless of the way these words are translated, the passage is still framed as a list of traits one needs to possess in order to enter heaven, which is quintessentially abstract and otherworldly.

The word “heaven” is used multiple times in the Beatitudes, always translated the same way in English. The original Greek word, which is also the same in each instance it is used, means both “heaven” and “sky”. The Chinese translation uses “tiānguó” for the first mention of “heaven” or “ouranois” and “tiānshàng” for the other, rather than remaining consistent with the same word as the Ancient Greek and English texts do. In both Chinese dictionaries, “tiānshàng” is listed as meaning “sky”. It thus denotes the non-religious sense of “heaven” (or “heavens”, more commonly in English), as opposed to “tiānguó”, the usual translation of “heaven” used when referring to the abode of God. Using “tiānshàng” in the second instance creates an image of a “heaven” which is somehow entwined with and part of the physical sky, as opposed to being beyond it, as western Christians typically imagine heaven, and as the *Oxford* confirms.

This melding of spaces is reflected in one of the large difficulties missionaries experienced in trying to convey Protestantism to the Chinese. They noted that the distinction between sacred and secular space was more blurred in China than it was in the West. This made it difficult to convey to the Chinese one of the integral tenets of Protestantism, a conception of one’s relation to God and journey through life as individualistic,

private, and cordoned off from one’s experiences in the secular world.^{li} The use of the word “tiānshàng” for “heaven” in this passage reinforces this lack of distinction between secular and religious space.

The conception of heaven as both an abstract entity and a component of the familiar world is present in theologian Wú Léichuān’s (1870-1944) analysis of the Beatitudes. He understands the “Kingdom of heaven” as referring to a society of economic equality—in essence, heaven for him is communist.^{liii} It is clear in his theological writings that he conceptualizes all of Jesus’ teachings as centering around one key message, much as the writings of Chinese sages do. He interprets the central message of Jesus’ teachings to be the glory of the “Kingdom of heaven” and the salvation it provides. Therefore, having concluded that the entire sermon is a description of the ideals of heaven, Wú argues that the text can also be read as instructions for how to create a heaven on earth. Reading in the context of the May Fourth Movement, Wú embraced an interpretation of the Beatitudes that would largely support the social and political aims of that movement, calling for an end to economic inequality, social injustice, and intolerance.^{liiii} In making this explicit connection between the current political and social situation of China and the Biblical text, Wú changes the focal point of the passage from a consideration of what will get people into heaven to a tract for social change in the here and now. His actions therefore clearly indicate that he conceives of the secular and the spiritual not as separate realms, but as inextricably intertwined.

CONCLUSION

There are of course limitations in a study of this sort, the scope of which is necessarily limited by space constraints.

One feature that needs further investigation is the Western analyses of the Beatitudes, in order to obtain a more representative sample of how they tend to be interpreted in that context. While the writings of four Chinese theologians have been examined, it could only be beneficial to read more of those as well. It is also important to reflect that the Biblical interpretations I have utilized represent, in the case of both the West and the East, the viewpoints of learned scholars and intellectuals. The interpretations of the majority of Chinese people go unvoiced. In some ways, this is unavoidable in critical analysis of a text—people outside of the formal study of Biblical scripture or intellectual inquiry infrequently record their thoughts on such matters. More research into this dimension of the Bible’s audience in China needs to be conducted. Perhaps such a study would be better suited to the realms of anthropology or sociology than to literary or scriptural studies, as it would likely involve interviewing vast numbers of Chinese Christians. Clearly, it would also be a worthwhile endeavor to examine other key terms in the Beatitudes, as well as the *Union Bible* in general.

Throughout the course of this paper, it has become clear that there is no neat way to label the alterations in the fabric of Protestantism that the translation of the Beatitudes in the *Union Bible* creates. If any one pattern emerges, it is the de-emphasis of the more abstract, cerebral aspect of Protestant belief, such as one’s relationship to God, the idea of heaven, and the presence of sin, and the greater focus on improving one’s everyday reality. Many admirers and students of the Bible in China, such as Wú Léichuān, professed to be Christian not because they held Jesus’ teachings to be worthwhile due to his divinity as the son of God, but rather because his teachings were of high

moral value, due to their similarity to the teachings of ancient Chinese sages. Wú wrote that the divinity of Jesus was “too mystical to fathom and too controversial to be helpful.”^{liv} Scholar Tang Yi, in his list of possibilities for what will become of Protestantism in China, includes one that describes a world in which Protestantism is integrated into Chinese culture – like Buddhism before it – and made both human-centered and sinless.^{lv} Hunter and Chan go on to predict that, in a similar vein, Protestantism in China may grow to be more concerned with social and political involvement than its predecessor in the West.^{lvi} This certainly seems to describe the picture of *orthodox* Protestant Biblical interpretation in China that has emerged from this examination of the Beatitudes.

The emphasis in the Chinese translation of the Beatitudes on the more concrete, moralistic aspects of the text, rather than on the theological ideology underlying it, is reflected in Yieh’s essay, where he speculates that interest in the Beatitudes has actually fallen in recent years as scholars of Christianity in China move away from an interest in “humanity” to one in “divinity”.^{lvii} Yieh points out that one feature that all the Chinese writers examined in his essay share is their tendency to think of the Beatitudes in the context of some kind of tract for how to harmonize with others.^{lviii}

One notable exception to this rule is the interpretation of the Beatitudes given by Lín Xiàngāo. His interpretation is, overall, more spiritual in focus than that of the other Chinese writers examined, and more in line with traditional Western interpretation. He announces at the beginning of his study of the Beatitudes that one of its primary goals is to “convey the good fortune of the spirit”, which automatically casts the passage into a more abstract framework.^{lix}

Because he was a pastor in an unorthodox church, as opposed to the other thinkers critiqued in this paper, it is possible that unorthodox churches in China tend to maintain a greater focus on the more abstract, otherworldly, spiritual aspects of Protestantism than the orthodox church, which emphasizes using religion as a tool to further political and social causes. This is contrary to what one would expect, based on Hunter and Chan's statement that orthodox Chinese churches are more in line with traditional Protestant belief.^{lx} Their statement surely stems from the observation that many unorthodox churches combine Protestant and traditional Chinese religious and spiritual tenets, which is certainly heterodoxical in the strict sense of Western Protestantism. However, it is important to recognize that in absorbing traditional ceremonies concerning the afterworld into their Protestant beliefs, these supposedly heterodoxical churches place a greater emphasis on the spiritual dimension of the religion than the orthodox churches do, which in fact seem rather secularized. It may be necessary, therefore, to reconceive of how to define what constitutes "being more faithful to orthodox, Western Protestantism" in the study of these two branches of faith.

The translation of the Beatitudes into Chinese resulted in several nuances of translation that in general de-emphasized the otherworldly, theological aspects of the text and focused on its worldly value, as a set of instructions for living a morally superior life in the here and now. These findings reflect the missionaries' desire to emphasize the moral and character-building qualities of the passage, rather than its implications on how to conceive of the cosmos and one's relationship to God and heaven.^{lxi} Most Chinese people who have written about the Bible, both proclaimed Christians and those outside of the faith, have interpreted it more as a

guide for social change and character-building than as a revelation of the world beyond ours.^{lxii} The subtly different translation of the Beatitudes in the *Union* edition fuels this response to the Bible, encouraging a more secularist, humanist approach to its teachings.

Nevertheless, at least one theologian, Lín Xiàngāo, reads the text mostly as a reflection and promise of the world to come, in spite of its translation. His departure from the interpretations of others in the orthodox church suggests that further inquiry into how unorthodox churches read scripture, as opposed to the orthodox church, may reveal much about the way these two groups conceive of their faith. Hunter and Chan argue that unorthodox churches read the Bible more literally than the orthodox one does.^{lxiii} However, although the Beatitudes in Chinese emphasize a more secularized approach to Christianity, with an emphasis on improving the here and now, Lín Xiàngāo continues to read spiritual meaning into the text. It is thus necessary to consider that, in some contexts, the scriptural reading practices of the orthodox and unorthodox churches in China may be the opposite of what Hunter and Chan suggest.

APPENDIX 1: THE BEATITUDES IN ANCIENT GREEK, ENGLISH AND CHINESE (MATTHEW 5: 3-12)

Ancient Greek

³ makarios ho ptōchos ho pneuma hoti autos eimi ho basileia ho ouranos ⁴ makarios ho pentheō hoti autos parakaleō ⁵ makarios ho praus hoti autos klēronomeō ho gē ⁶ makarios ho peinaō kai dipsaō ho dikaiosynē hoti autos chortazō ⁷ makarios ho eleēmōn hoti autos eleeō ⁸ makarios ho katharos ho kardia hoti autos horaō ho theos ⁹ makarios ho eirēnopoios hoti autos kaleō hyios theos ¹⁰

makarios ho diōkō dikaiosynē hoti autos eimi ho basileia ho ouranos ¹¹ makarios eimi hotan oneidizō hymeis kai diōkō kai legō pas ponēros kata hymeis pseudomai egō ¹² chairō kai agalliaō hoti ho hymeis misthos polys en ho ouranos gar houtōs diōkō ho prophētēs ho pro hymeis

English

³ Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. ⁴ Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted. ⁵ Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. ⁶ Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled. ⁷ Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. ⁸ Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. ⁹ Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called sons of God. ¹⁰ Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. ¹¹ Blessed are ye when *men* shall reproach you, and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. ¹² Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you.

Chinese

³ 虚心的人有福了！因为天国是他们的。⁴ 哀恸的人有福了！因为他们必得安慰。⁵ 温柔的人有福了！因为他们必承受地土。⁶ 饥渴慕义的人有福了！因为他们必得饱足。⁷ 怜恤人的人有福了！因为他们比蒙怜恤。⁸ 清心的人有福了！因为他们必得见神。⁹ 使人和睦的人有福了！因为他们必成为神的儿子。¹⁰ 为义受逼迫的人有福了！因为天国是他们的。¹¹ 人若因我辱骂你们，逼迫你们，捏造各样坏话毁谤你们，你们就有福了。¹² 应当欢喜快乐，因为你们在天上的赏赐是大的。在你们以前的先知，人也是这样逼迫他们。

ⁱ Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 278.

ⁱⁱ Chloë Starr, introduction to *Reading Chinese Scriptures in China*, ed. Chloë Starr (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 1.

ⁱⁱⁱ Note that after the first mention of a Chinese term, only pinyin will be used to refer to it. Also note that by “Chinese” I mean “Mandarin” or Pǔtōnghuà 普通话 in the context of this paper. This is the language of most editions of the Bible in contemporary China, although there do exist earlier translations written in Classical Chinese, as well as several translations into other topolects of Chinese. See the collection of essays edited by Irene Eber called *Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact*, for more information on the translation of the Bible into Chinese languages other than Mandarin. The website www.worldscriptures.org also contains publication information and a brief history for Bibles published in twenty-six Chinese topolects.

^{iv} Hunter and Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China*, 3:64-65.

^v *Ibid.*, 7.

^{vi} *Ibid.*, 254.

^{vii} Jost Zetzsche, *The Bible in China: The History of the Union Version or the Culmination of Protestant Missionary Bible Translation in China*, (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999), 25.

^{viii} Jost Zetzsche, “The Work of Lifetimes: Why the Union Version Took Nearly Three Decades to Complete,” in *The Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact*, ed. Irene Eber, Sze-Kar Wan, and Knut Walf (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999), 77-99. Upset that this translation of the Bible was done by foreigners, several Chinese scholars published new versions of the New Testament of the *Union* in the years immediately following its release, although these versions make such minor changes that it is more appropriate to call them “revisions” than new translations. They are not as popular as the original translation (see Zetzsche, *The Bible in China*, 360-361). In 1979, The Chinese government organized a committee that would have, for the first time, significantly altered some of the theologically-important terminology of the *Union* version, though these revisions were never published because the government, in its own words, became pre-occupied with the sudden resurgence of activity in the Protestant Church after the end of the Cultural Revolution (*ibid.*, 336-361).

^{ix} Zetzsche, “The Work of Lifetimes,” 9.

^x Thor Strandenaes, *Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, as Expressed in Five Selected Versions of the New Testament and Exemplified by Mt 5:1-12 and Col 1*, (Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), 98.

^{xi} *Ibid.*

^{xii} *Ibid.*, 98-99.

^{xiii} *Ibid.*, 93.

^{xiv} 5 Matthew 8-9 (New Revised Standard Version, 1885, from this point on abbreviated NRSV).

xv Irene Eber, "The Interminable Term Question," in *Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact* (see note 8), 138.

xvi Ibid., 140.

xvii Ibid., 139.

xviii Ibid., 142.

xix Ibid., 141.

xx Ibid., 142.

xxi Ibid., 141.

xxii Ibid., 152.

xxiii Ibid., 153.

xxiv Ibid., 160.

xxv While different terms for God do exist in English and Ancient Greek as well, this is not really the same phenomenon. In English and Ancient Greek, an awareness exists that all terms for "God" are simply synonyms for that word, whereas the distinction between "shàngdì" and "shén" represents a disagreement about the fundamental way in which to conceive of God. It is somewhat akin to being undecided between whether to use "Zeus" or "God" to refer to the Christian entity in English, since "Zeus", like "Shàngdì", is the proper name of a supreme mythological deity (see Eber, "Interminable Term Question," 142).

xxvi 5 Matthew 3 (NRSV).

xxvii Robert Eyton, *The Beatitudes*, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd, 1895), 16-19.

xxviii Lín Xiàngāo 林獻羔, "Shānshàng Bǎoxùn 山上宝训," Ye-su.cn (n.d.)

xxix Eber, "Interminable Term Question," 135.

xxx Strandenaes, *Principles of Chinese Bible Translation*, 93.

xxxi Hunter and Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China*, 163.

xxxii Note, though, that given the vast array of different Protestant groups in China, this is an oversimplification. Most likely, orthodox churches would not approve of this behavior, given their qualities outlined above, on p. 1-2.

xxxiii Hunter and Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China*, 7.

xxxiv Ibid., 163.

xxxv "Chinese House Church Leader Samuel Lamb Dies," in *Christian Today* (2013). www.christiantoday.com.

xxxvi Lín Xiàngāo, "Shānshàng Bǎoxùn," 12.

xxxvii Ibid., 14. Lín Xiàngāo may or may not have known that the missionaries who translated the *Union*, recognizing that "xūxīn" differed rather significantly from "poor in spirit", added a footnote to the first edition of the *Union* that read, "Xūxīn, yuánwén zuò xīnlǐ pínqióng de 虚心, 原文作心裡貧窮的" [rough translation: "xūxīn" in the original text is written "poor in the heart"]. However, this note was dropped in subsequent editions (see Strandenaes, *Principles of Chinese Bible Translation*, 85).

xxxviii Lín Xiàngāo, "Shānshàng Bǎoxùn," 14-15.

xxxix 5 Matthew 7 (NRSV)

xl Eyton, *Beatitudes*, 73.

xli Hunter and Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China*, 158.

xlii John Yieh, "Reading 'The Sermon on the Mount' in China: A Hermeneutical Inquiry on Its History of Reception," in *Reading Christian Scriptures in China* (see note 2), 152.

xliii Ibid., 156.

xliv Strandenaes, *Principles of Chinese Bible Translation*, 93.

xlv See my analysis of the role of "xūxīn" in this capacity above, on p. 6.

xlvi 5 Matthew 10 (NRSV)

xlvii Strandenaes, *Principles of Chinese Bible Translation*, 82.

xlviii Yieh, "Reading 'The Sermon on the Mount' in China," 153.

xlix Lín Xiàngāo, "Shānshàng Bǎoxùn," 19-20.

l Eyton, *Beatitudes*, 182.

li Hunter and Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China*, 145.

lii Yieh, "Reading 'The Sermon of the Mount' in China," 148.

liii Ibid., 149.

liv Ibid.

lv Hunter and Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China*, 265-266.

lvi Ibid., 269.

lvii Ibid., 159.

lviii Yieh, "Reading 'The Sermon on the Mount' in China," 156.

lix Lín Xiàngāo, "Shānshàng Bǎoxùn," 11.

lx Hunter and Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China*, 254.

lxi Strandenaes, *Principles of Chinese Bible Translation*, 93; 98-99.

lxii Chloë Starr, "Modern Chinese Attitudes Toward the Bible" in *Reading Christian Scriptures in China* (see note 2), 13-31.

lxiii Hunter and Chan, *Protestantism in Contemporary China*, 254.

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THE “KOREAN WAVE” IN TAIPEI

The Construction of Beautiful Women

Xinyan Peng

University of Virginia

ABSTRACT

This thesis is based on my June 2013 fieldwork in Taipei, Taiwan, which was funded by two grants from the University of Virginia: the East Asia Center’s Ellen Bayard Weedon Travel Grant and the Raven Society Fellowship. It discusses the influences of Korean popular culture, especially fashion and beauty styles, on young Taiwanese women. These influences come from media products exported to Taiwan, such as Korean pop music and television dramas, and they shape how young Taiwanese females construct their physical appearance to fit new standards of beauty. I argue that the adoption of Korean-style clothing and other Korean aesthetics about women’s bodies affects how female attractiveness is expected to be defined and pursued by today’s young Taiwanese women. I emphasize an ironic paradox in this process: the local reception of Korean fashion in Taipei both expands the possibility of diverse female roles and, at the same time, restricts young Taiwanese females’ expression of self.

INTRODUCTION

The term “Korean Wave” refers to the increasing global popularity of South Korean popular culture, which was first driven by the spread of Korean television dramas in the late 1990s and later strengthened by Korean popular music and the Korean fashion industry. Journalists in Beijing originally coined the term in mid-1999 when they noticed a

growing appetite for Korean cultural exports among Chinese people. The Mandarin Chinese translation for “Korean Wave,” *hanliu*, literally means “flows of Korea.” The Korean Wave has not only swept East Asian countries such as Japan, China, and Taiwan, but also has spread to the rest of Asia, Europe, the United States, Africa, and many other parts of the world. This phenomenon has generated much sociological and anthropological research, especially on South Korean domestic entertainment industries, such as television drama and popular music, as well as on the local reception of the Korean Wave in foreign lands.

In this thesis, I will analyze the Korean Wave from the perspective of gender theory—a study of the social construction of femininity and women’s bodies—and, more specifically, I will analyze the construction of female physical attractiveness in Taipei. I intend to link the female imagery portrayed in South Korean media products, such as television dramas and popular music, with the social construction of standards of physical attractiveness and femininity.

This interest started with a conversation with a female friend at the University of Virginia, who is a Ghanaian young woman in her early twenties and considers herself quite a fan of Korean TV dramas. She told me about a Korean TV drama named *Prosecutor Princess*. This drama series, with many unexpected twists and turns, tells the story of how Ma Hye-ri, a wealthy Korean young woman graduating from an elite law school in South Korea, established her career as a

prosecutor and found her true love. The part of the plot that impressed my friend the most was the heroine's process of losing half of her weight. My friend narrated, "Everything was triggered by her finding out that her crush was in love with her best friend instead of her while she was studying in the law school. She came back home and cried from morning to night. This made her mother decide to stop spoiling her with desserts and start the weight-losing plan by force. She woke up in the next morning only to find that she was no longer in her bedroom but in a cell-like basement with a treadmill. She cried out, 'Mom, I am hungry,' only to see a plate of salad vegetables slipped through under the window by her strong-minded and yet sympathetic mother. Then two strong guys (presumably her soon-to-be trainers) came in and carried her together to the treadmill. What follows was a series of snapshots of her running on the treadmill, and eventually, there appeared a slender girl running on the treadmill. She took out all the clothes that her rich dad bought for her but she could not fit into before, picked the most beautiful one, put on makeup, and walked outside of the basement. When she was walking on the street, everyone walking past her would turn around and stare at her; especially the girls walking past her would jealously focus on her slender body shape as well as her pale skin that came from a lack of sunshine in the basement where she lost her weight." This friend of mine from the University of Virginia, an American representative of Korean TV drama audience, confessed that it was at that moment when she felt a strong pressure to lose weight and get pale in order to match those specific Korean female beauty standards and buttress her self-confidence. Then we had a discussion about the portrayal of beautiful women – their appearance and body and the socially constructed norms dominating women's

pursuit of attractiveness in Korean TV dramas. This is what first aroused my interest in doing a serious anthropological study on the topic of female beauty influenced by the Korean Wave.

In order to ground this study of female attractiveness in community-based fieldwork, I went to do research in Taipei, Taiwan in June 2013, with funding from the East Asia Center and Raven Society at the University of Virginia. Before I went to Taipei, I did short interviews of Korean television drama fans at the University of Virginia and asked subjects about beautiful women and romance in Korean television dramas. My ethnographic work in Taipei involved a month of participant observation, mainly in beauty-product stores and shopping centers filled with South Korean clothes, as well as in-depth interviews with both female and male storeowners and young female customers.

Korean-style clothing has flowed to Taipei as, due to South Korea's increasing exportation of media products in the last decade, the Korean Wave has gradually overtaken Japanese popular culture in Taipei. I argue that the growing consumption of Korean fashion has reinforced new understandings of what a beautiful female should look like. The adoption of Korean-style clothing and other Korean aesthetics about women's bodies affects how female attractiveness is expected to be defined and pursued on the part of today's young Taiwanese women. However, there is an ironic paradox involved. Although Taiwanese young females now think that they have more agency to explore different styles of femininity with the import of the distinctive Korean fashion, the very social norms of female physical beauty created in the Korean Wave demand a certain female body that is often unattainable. In other words, the local reception of Korean fashion in Taipei both expands the possibility of diverse female roles and

restricts young Taiwanese females' expression of self at the same time.

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: a literature review, a description of my methodology, ethnographic data description, ethnographic data analysis, and, last, my conclusion. The literature review summarizes some highly relevant sociological and anthropological studies of gender, femininity, the female body and attractiveness, with an emphasis on East Asia and an elaboration of how these works relate to my study. The methodology section describes the places of my ethnographic research and the demographic and background information about my informants. I also include a description of my participant observation methods and specific interview questions. Next I describe my informants' narratives and opinions and the results of my observations, which sets the stage for my in-depth analysis of these ethnographic data. In the end, I draw some general conclusions for my study.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This research project is fundamentally a study of gender and gender roles, and the foremost figure in gender studies is Judith Butler, an American post-structuralist philosopher and a leading figure in feminist philosophy. She challenges "the pervasive heterosexual assumption in feminist literary theory" in her groundbreaking book *Gender Trouble*.ⁱ She argues that the dominant definitions of gender, masculinity, and femininity are restricting and that a hierarchy is thus created, which excludes certain types of gendered expression. Her definition of gender is as follows:

Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to

produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.ⁱⁱ

Her theories on sex, gender, and sexuality open up new possibilities of expressing masculinity and femininity. According to Butler, gender is a social construction that has a high level of performativity. In a particular culture, certain types of gender or gendered expression are achieved through repeated actions and rituals that are sustained over time and eventually get naturalized.ⁱⁱⁱ Butler proposes that this naturalization process will lead people to hold "habitual and violent" assumptions, which delegitimize some minority groups in terms of gender performance and sexual practice.^{iv} Butler suggests that biological differences of sex do not match the cultural construction of gender, and also breaks down the assumed gender binary by depicting sex, gender, and sexuality as different but related spectrums. Femininity is not, therefore, defined by biological features but by cultural production. She cites what Simone de Beauvoir states in *The Second Sex*: "one is not born a woman, but, rather, becomes one."^v Through repeated actions and rituals of cultural meanings, a woman is no longer an object but a process, a becoming, that does not end or reject change. In short, the production of gender norms for both men and women is regulated and sustained through social meanings. Therefore Butler suggests that a woman's body acts as both an active agent performing femininity and as a passive medium on which cultural meanings are inscribed.^{vi} In her conclusion to *Gender Trouble*, Butler challenges the identity politics involved in feminist theories and social movements, by proclaiming that there is no need to have "a doer behind the deed," but that "the doer" is variably constructed in and through the deed.^{vii} Butler's theories,

including performativity and the cultural construction of gender, encourage me to pay close attention to how young Taiwanese females use fashion to create different images and styles of femininity.

In order to understand how gender is socially constructed, I also want to review theories on the relationship between body and power, represented by Foucault in his work *Discipline and Punish*, published in 1975. In his writing, Foucault describes the body as “the object and target of power.”^{viii} According to him, the body is the instrument through which hierarchy is implemented and power is enforced. This implicit mechanism of power, enacted through social norms governing one’s body, functions just like the panopticon, in which prisoners feel constantly watched and are thereby disciplined.

With regard to the female body specifically, I want to highlight the theory of Susan Bordo, a modern feminist philosopher known for her contributions to the field of contemporary cultural studies, and the study of the “body.” Susan Bordo’s book *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body*, published in 1993, is based on her research on the female body and slenderness in the West, particularly in the U.S. She introduces a duality of nature and changing cultural notions of where the body stands:

Over the past hundred and fifty years, under the influence of a variety of cultural forces, the body has been forced to vacate its long-term residence on the nature side of the nature/culture duality and encouraged to take up residence, along with everything else that is human, within culture.^{ix}

The reason why the body has been taken from the nature side to the culture side is

that we experience and conceptualize it through the mediation of how it is constructed by and associated with cultural images.^x She cites Mary Douglas’ understanding of body as a powerful symbolic form on which “the central rules, hierarchies, and even metaphysical commitments of a culture are inscribed” as well as a system of “natural symbols that reproduce social categories and concerns.”^{xi}

In her chapter “Reading the Slender Body,” Bordo underlines the “disquieting meaning of contemporary beauty ideals in an era of greater female presence and power than ever before,” or what she calls “the tyranny of slenderness.”^{xii} Similar to Foucault, Bordo believes that the physical body is an instrument and medium of power, which leads to the social manipulation of the female body by the power relationship between sexes.^{xiii} In order to achieve their “ideal” romantic or sexual relationship with males, females feel compelled to sustain the “appropriate” body, even though it means restricting diets or diligent workouts. Hence, the female body becomes docile to external regulation and subjection, as females make more and more efforts to appeal to whimsical fashion and the “ever-changing, homogenizing, elusive ideal of femininity.”^{xiv} Bordo poses anorexia nervosa as a paradox that originated in the pursuit of slenderness on the part of females—they care desperately and passionately about the “ideal” female body in order to reach the stage of “coolness, effortless confidence, and casual freedom.”^{xv}

In her attempt to explain why women in Western cultures seem to be more obsessed with slenderness than men, Bordo ascribes gender-coded significance to the body, which “overdetermines slenderness as a contemporary ideal of specifically female attractiveness.”^{xvi}

Associating the perception of the female body with the shift of females from domestic to professional spheres in the industrialized West, Bordo postulates that the revulsion, among both males and females, towards a plump body may be viewed as “expressing rebellion against maternal, domestic femininity.”^{xvii} As more and more females enter the male-dominated professional world, Bordo claims:

It is required...of female desire...to be normalized according to the professional (and male) standards of that world; female bodies, accordingly, must be stripped of all psychic resonances with maternal power.^{xviii}

Rose Weitz, a researcher focusing on women, health, sexuality, and the body at the School of Social Transformation of Arizona State University, also investigates how power structures interplay with social norms of the female body in *The Politics of Women's Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior* (2003). In the introduction to this edited volume, Weitz defines the social construction of women's bodies as the process through which relevant ideas become socially accepted and naturalized. She argues that this social construction of the female body is also “an intensively political process, reflecting competing groups, divergent vested interests and differential access to power.”^{xix} In her opinion, socially constructed ideas regarding women's bodies have greatly influenced the power differential between women and men throughout human history. A chapter written by Sandra Lee Bartky in this volume, “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” builds on Butler's perspective of regarding femininity as a becoming, an achievement, “a mode of

enacting and reenacting received gender norms which surface as so many styles of flesh.”^{xx} Bartky's chapter discusses the nature and imposition of three categories of disciplinary practices, and how those practices contribute to the production of femininity. Those three categories include:

...those that aim to produce a body of certain size and general configuration; those that bring forth from this body a specific repertoire of gestures, postures, and movements; and those that are directed toward the display of this body as an ornamented surface.^{xxi}

In her conclusion, Bartky presents a paradox in which women become more subject to “the dominating gaze of patriarchy” as they begin to realize increasing self-determination politically, economically, and sexually.^{xxii}

In the third part of this edited volume, titled “The Politics of Appearance,” Weitz asserts that women's appearances dramatically affect their lives in a society still largely dominated by men. She states:

Attractiveness serves as an indirect form of power, by increasing women's odds of obtaining the protection of powerful men—as long as the women's attractiveness lasts. Among other benefits, attractiveness typically brings women more marital prospects and friendships, higher salaries, and higher school grades...^{xxiii}

More importantly, according to Weitz, what is ironic about social norms governing female beauty is that few female bodies can satisfy those norms for their lifetime, or even just for a short

period of time. If most females cannot “naturally” meet certain standards of attractiveness held by the whole society, it is not surprising that women have turned to artificial means, from makeup and corsets to diets and, more recently, plastic surgery.

“Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the Colonization of Women’s Bodies,” a chapter written by Kathryn Pauly Morgan, calls for “a feminist analysis to understand why actual, live women are reduced to ‘potential women’ and choose to participate in anatomizing and fetishizing their bodies.”^{xxiv} She claims that plastic surgery is becoming the norm for females and leading to a societal shift that stigmatizes women who do not use plastic surgery. Morgan presents three paradoxes of choice that originated in the rising popularity of plastic surgery. First, Morgan argues that what is being created by plastic surgery, most of the time, “is not simply beautiful bodies and faces but white, Western, Anglo-Saxon bodies in a racist, anti-Semitic context.”^{xxv} Meanwhile, it seems at first sight that females intentionally make the choice to get plastic surgery; however, Morgan believes that this seeming choice indicates females’ conformity to the socially constructed norms of beauty and compulsory heterosexuality – women obtain artificial features of beauty through plastic surgery in order to be attractive to men. Therefore the second paradox is the colonizing culture of viewing a female’s body as “a kind of raw material to be exploited in terms of appearance, eroticism, nurturance, and fertility,” instead of as the real existing woman.^{xxvi} The third paradox is that even though the set of procedures involved in cosmetic surgery are “elective” by definition, pressure to achieve “perfect appearance” makes *elective* technology *imperative*. In the end, Morgan concludes that in any culture where femininity is defined in terms of

submission to men, the achievement of femininity through “appearance, gesture, movement, voice, bodily contours, aspirations, values, and political behaviors” is obligatory of any woman who wants to be liked by others, especially male members of the society.^{xxvii}

Mijeong Han’s chapter, “Body Image Dissatisfaction and Eating Disturbance among Korean College Female Students: Relationships to Media Exposure, Upward Comparison, and Perceived Reality,” describes two sociological experiments conducted to examine the effects of exposure to slender female bodies in the media. Han states that traditionally a round face and chubby body were considered ideal; however, “young females in Korea today seem to be captivated with having a thin body like models in fashion magazines.”^{xxviii} According to many South Korean health professionals, there is a rising social obsession with slenderness, which poses serious health threats to females, including anorexia nervosa. It is believed by health professionals and media critics that the presentation of incredibly slender female characters provides unrealistic goals for average young Korean females, and cultivates a societal obsession with slenderness. Han then investigates how the social variables of “upward comparison” and “perception of thinness as realistic” cause young Korean females to become dissatisfied with their own body image and develop eating disorders. Han defines “upward comparison” as the tendency to compare oneself with “someone who is perceived to be better on important social dimensions,” which the author suggests would lead to self-devaluation and feeling of inferiority, according to social comparison theory.^{xxix} Han hypothesizes that females with more exposure to media images of thinness would display higher levels of upward comparison, have a greater chance of

dissatisfaction with her own body image, and develop an eating disturbance. Also, Han describes the tendency among South Korean college female students to transform thinness shown in the media into real-life practice, and defines it as “the concept of thinness as realistic.” Han postulates that the body image in the media that is perceived to be real by audiences is more likely to affect reality, and therefore females with more exposure to thinness in media will also have greater chances of developing an eating disturbance due to dissatisfaction with their bodies. In short, the two variables, “upward comparison” and “perception of thinness as realistic,” combine to affect how females understand the way their bodies should be. After introducing how the two experiments were conducted with magazine ads and television shows respectively, Han concludes that upward comparison in particular was a significant predication of eating disturbances in studies of both magazine ads and television shows, even though the level of significance differs in the two experiments.

Like Han’s research, this study of the perception of the female body under the sway of Korean popular culture in Taipei also demonstrates how the media initiates upward comparison among audiences and shapes reality. Moreover, my work provides a case study of transnational popular cultural flows in the new era of globalization. For many, globalization is a unilateral process of material and cultural flows from the West, as the “center,” to the rest of the world as the “periphery.” However, the cultural exchange between “peripheral” countries, such as those in East Asia, challenges the notion that globalization equals “Westernization,” as is seen in Koichi Iwabuchi’s study of the rising cultural influence of Japan among other East Asian countries, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*

(2002). Thanks to Japan’s economic boom and the power of the media, the circulation of Japanese popular culture among other East Asian countries in the late 20th century and early 21st century was intensified. The theory of “cultural imperialism,” which used to be dominant in defining the nature of globalization, emphasized “the unidirectional flow of culture from the dominant (in most cases equated with the United States) to the dominated.”^{xxx} However, Iwabuchi elaborates on the decentering of globalization today, arguing that new globalizing forces have made transnational cultural flows “much more disjunctive, non-isomorphic, and complex than what the center-periphery paradigm allows us to understand.”^{xxxix}

Therefore, according to Iwabuchi, we should “reconsider the nature of transnational cultural unevenness highlighted by cultural imperialism discourses,” and acknowledge the bidirectionality of the flow of material, capital, ideas, etc. in a global exchange.^{xxxii} Scholars such as Iwabuchi acknowledge that transnational flows do not make the rest of the world replicate the West. What is important in the process of breaking the homogenized Westernization is not only transnational cultural flow among “peripheral” countries, but also how a specific culture is deterritorialized while being exported from its place of origin and then reterritorialized.^{xxxiii} In this regard, Iwabuchi quotes the New York University Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Language and Literature, Mary Louise Pratt: “While subjugated peoples cannot readily control what emanates from the dominant culture, they do determine to varying extents what they absorb into their own and what they use it for.”^{xxxiv}

Iwabuchi illustrates this localization process in transnational

cultural flow using the example of Japanese popular culture:

...the international spread of mukokuseki popular culture from Japan simultaneously articulates the universal appeal of Japanese cultural products and the disappearance of any perceptible “Japaneseness,” which...is subtly incorporated into the “localization.”^{xxxv}

He claims that the yearning for Japanese popular culture in other parts of East Asia is not necessarily due to an appreciation of Japan’s image or the way of being Japanese, but to a desire for consuming Japanese popular culture just like other types of commodities. Hence Iwabuchi’s work reveals the shifting nature of transnational cultural flows in the local appropriation and consumption of foreign cultural products, such as that of Japanese popular culture in East Asia. This shift to an emphasis on the localization of foreign culture leads to a shift in how we understand the gradually diffused power structure involved in globalization today. In the process of transnational cultural flows, the export country and import country do not necessarily have a center-periphery relationship, but the relationship gets complicated as cultural power gets diffused. Iwabuchi concludes:

...globalization brings about, as Hannerz (1996, 102) put it, “an organization of diversity rather than a replication of uniformity,” or a “repatriation of difference,” which is produced by the local absorption and indigenization of homogenizing forces.^{xxxvi}

Iwabuchi also asserts that the diversity and multiplicity of difference, created in this process of decentering globalization,

breaks up boundaries of nation-states and boundaries between “us” and “them.”

Even though he focuses on the transnational cultural flow from Japan to the rest of Asia, Iwabuchi’s approach is still relevant to analyzing similar forms of cultural flow from South Korea to other Asian countries, including Taiwan. Since Japanese fashion was and, to some extent, still is popular in Taipei, I researched other scholarly articles investigating this cultural phenomenon. Japanese visual culture authority Sharon Kinsella’s article “Cuties in Japan” notes the Japanese female fashion based on a unique “cuteness,” described as “childlike, sweet, adorable,” and its spread to other Asian countries.^{xxxvii}

Many other studies have been done with regard to the distinct transnational cultural phenomenon of the Korean Wave. The panel, “The Korean Wave: *Hallyu* in Transnational Perspective,” at the 48th Annual meeting of the Southeast Conference of Asian Studies in 2009 included a fruitful discussion about the Korean Wave as both a national and a transnational phenomenon. In this panel, Mark Ravina defined the Korean Wave as “a surge in the international visibility of Korean culture, beginning in East Asia in the 1990s and continuing more recently in the United States, Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Europe.”^{xxxviii} It is widely acknowledged that television serials and pop music (K-pop) are the two major forms of media, although Korean feature films and other music forms are also part of the Korean Wave. Ravina believes that the Korean Wave is not only a cultural but also a commercial phenomenon undergirded by the South Korean government’s effort to promote its entertainment industry and overall economic growth. Ravina mentions briefly that certain media products are not inherently “Korean,” but are marked as

Korean before being exported to other countries in order to raise the visibility of South Korean popular culture overseas.

In the same vein, “Transnational Korea: A Critical Assessment of the Korean Wave in Asia and the United States” by Eun-Young Jung argues that the hybridity in transnational cultural flows from South Korea to the rest of Asia and the world challenges the validity of the Korean popular cultural elements produced at home. Jung attributes the success of South Korean television dramas in Asia to its concentration on “family-friendly” values. However, when it comes to the reason why Korean popular music has spread more and more rapidly, Jung states:

...the reasons behind this new craze have very little to do with traditional Asian family values or uniquely Korean musical elements; instead, interest in Korean popular music seems to be due to its increasingly transnational and hybrid aspect. ^{xxxix}

Jung suggests that in the midst of transnational flows from South Korea to the rest of Asia and the world, the multi-layered and multi-directional mobility and hybridity of Korean popular culture has been shaped. On hybridity, Jung quotes cultural scholar Marwan M. Kraïdy’s definition that it is “the fusion of two hitherto relatively distinct forms, styles, or identities... which often occurs across national borders as well as across cultural boundaries.”^{xi} As a result, in the 21st century, when popular cultural products and consumption have become increasingly transnational and hybrid, national and ethnic boundaries around the world have become less clear-cut. Furthermore, Jung borrows Homi K. Bhabha’s term “Third Space,” a liminal space between “Ourselves and Others,” to

locate the symbolic interaction in transnational cultural flows.^{xli} In the context of the Korean Wave, popular cultural forms, including television dramas and music, undergo processes of localization and reconstruction when they are exported to other countries and intermingle with local cultural forms. It is observed by scholars such as Jung that this mechanism of repackaging and reproducing Korean popular culture is particularly seen in Asian and Asian American communities around the globe. Therefore what local people see as Korean popular culture is no longer intrinsically Korean, but is instead a hybrid mixture. Jung believes that embracing the hybrid nature of cultures encourages us to “move away from the problematic qualities of essentialism and exclusionism inherent in notions of cultural ‘purity’ and ‘authenticity.’”^{xlii}

Regarding the reason for the rising popularity of Korean television dramas in Asian countries, Jung agrees with the theory of cultural proximity developed by Iwabuchi, and also adds that, unlike Japanese culture, Korean culture is not associated with a colonial legacy or with offensive content. Finally, Jung concludes that the Korean Wave may not be as “authentically Korean” as expected or imagined, and that most of the characteristics of Korean Wave are hybrid and intertwined with local cultures.

In *East Asian Popular Culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave* (2008), written by Chua Beng Huat and Iwabuchi Koichi, one of the most common reasons for South Korean television dramas’ ability to attract a huge female audience is that they allow space for personalization. The process of personalization, according to Chua and Iwabuchi, entails “putting oneself in the drama scenario and identifying with the situation and character.”^{xliii} Chua and Iwabuchi also argue that these processes of identification

and personalization create fantasies that bridge the gap between reality and wish.^{xliv} Females constitute the majority of South Korean television drama fans, and Chua and Iwabuchi think that those television dramas provide a channel through which women can escape from reality and “express their desires—desires for a pure society, for pure romance, for being pampered and loved by men.”^{xlv} Chua and Iwabuchi state that the yearning for “*qing*,” pure and absolute love, “in a society that privileges rationalist efficiency discourses and non-compassionate approaches to work” determines the success of Korean television dramas among modern women. Female viewers on the one hand strive to fit into male-dominated workplaces and, on the other hand, want to escape to a safe fantasy world of traditional/Confucian femininity.^{xlvi}

In addition to the above scholarly work, Mark Russell, a freelance writer who lived in Korea for thirteen years and specialized in Korean pop culture, has also commented on the Korean Wave in *Pop Goes Korea: Behind the Revolution in Movies, Music, and Internet Culture* (2008). In his introduction, Russell considers the rise of Korean popular culture domestically and internationally that started in the 1990s as a shift away from a conservative and work-oriented culture in South Korea.^{xlvii} Russell traces the growth of Korean popular culture to South Korea’s democracy movement, which began in the 1970s. During South Korea’s struggle for a democratic government, restrictions on the development of popular culture and entertainment industry were gradually loosened. The 1970s in particular witnessed the rise of television in South Korea, “where it quickly displaced cinema as the center of people’s cultural lives, much as it did everywhere around the world.”^{xlviii} Russell also delineates the path of Korean popular culture breaking away

from the Japanese model to reach today’s booming level. The rest of Russell’s book narrates seven stories to “encompass the breadth of Korean popular culture,” which cover a media conglomerate, a blockbuster, a film festival, television, the pop music scene, the Internet Revolution, and comic books and animation.^{xlix}

In the chapter “The Actor and the television Drama,” Russell weaves together the story of a prominent South Korean actor, Lee Byung-hun, and that of the whole South Korean television industry. According to Russell, the birth of television channels in South Korea was very much shaped by the American media in the 1950s. There was a short period in the 1960s, before the military regime increased its control over life in South Korea, when the South Korean television industry enjoyed diversity and independence.¹ However, according to Russell, even though the development of the movie industry was hindered by government censorship in the 1970s, that period is still considered the first great era of television in South Korea, with the flourishing of daily dramas, detective mysteries, and historical dramas. The accelerating growth of Korean television dramas happened in the 1990s, when they were exposed to competition from their counterparts in Japan. The industry of television dramas in Korea was forced to move away from the Japanese models, because it did not want to be seen by foreign audiences as mere followers of the Japanese industry. Meanwhile, Russell points out that the rising popularity of Korean television dramas benefits not only the television and entertainment industries, but also the manufactures who have been taking advantage of this “drama wave” to expand their markets across Asia.

When it comes to the reason that Korean television dramas are spread so extensively in other Asian countries,

Russell also touches on Iwabuchi's notion of "cultural proximity," arguing that Korean dramas share a lot of cultural elements that people around Asia can relate to, such as Confucian values, family-oriented atmospheres, and modest sexuality.^{li} More importantly, the theme that runs through Korean television dramas, *jeong* (*qing* in Chinese), which is literally translated as "emotion" but specifically suggests an ambiguous emotion and empathic love, contributes to the success at home and overseas. Russell interprets *jeong* as follows:

The idea of *jeong* exists around much of Asia...However, the word's meaning in Korean is bigger, broader, and more powerful, as well as more ambiguous...*Jeong* is like kindness or love, but it also means sympathy, attachment, and obligation. *Jeong* is not just an emotion you feel, it is a condition that possesses you. *Jeong* is not just your emotion, it is a relationship, an interaction of emotions between two people, a denying of the self in favor of the bond...*Jeong* is the opposite of individualism, and as Korean society modernizes, *Jeong* is slowly disappearing.^{lii}

This emphasis on anti-individualistic and traditional love particularly attracts female audiences to South Korean television dramas, both in Asia and overseas.

The literature that I have reviewed so far discusses gender, the female body, globalization, and Korean popular culture. My ethnographic research weaves these themes together by looking at how certain aspects of Korean popular culture shape the construction of beautiful women in Taipei.

METHODOLOGY

In June 2013, I did a month of fieldwork in Taipei on female fashion consumption under the sway of Korean Wave. The background of my research was that the exports of not only Korean fashion, but also Korean popular music and television dramas (all of these are included in Korean Wave), have shaped understandings of the beautiful female body in places where the Korean Wave has swept across, such as Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwan itself has been undergoing a shift: Korean popular culture has been taking over the Japanese popular culture that was prevalent starting in the 1990s. In my research, I explored the way that Korean popular culture has influenced understandings of beautiful female bodies among young Taiwanese women.

My initial step was to visit and do observations in several places where young Taiwanese females usually go shopping. The so-called "white-collar office ladies" usually shop in the top-end department stores in the Xinyi District of eastern Taipei, and clothing stores there are geographically distributed according to the targeted age groups. In order to search for cheaper clothes, these women also shop in trendy street stores featuring Korean and Japanese styles in the East District (west of Xinyi District). College and high school girls, who have a strong thirst for fashion but less disposable income, usually choose well-known night-markets near universities such as National Taiwan University (NTU) and National Taiwan Normal University, where they can find clothes at wholesale price but of mostly lower quality. Wufenpu Garment Wholesale Area near Songshan Train Station, also known as Wufenpu Fashion Zone, is known as a fashion landmark to both local Taiwanese as well as tourists. By talking to street store owners in the

places listed above and by reading both scholarly articles and fashion magazines, I found out about the cultural influence of neighboring countries in East Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, on fashion trends in Taipei. I had short conversations with twenty young Taiwanese females in the clothing stores mentioned above, as well as pharmaceutical stores selling cosmetic and weight-loss products, metro stations, and in NTU. Among them, I chose five young Taiwanese women as well as one young Taiwanese man (all of them in their early to mid-twenties and with a college education) to have in-depth interviews in order to deeply investigate their perceptions of the beautiful female body. Questions that I asked owners of clothing stores in night-markets and on streets include:

“What kind of fashion do you think is in vogue now among young Taiwanese females?”

“How would you define their characteristics, respectively?”

“What are the clothes like in each of the fashions?” (If they mention several types within each fashion)

“Can you describe some characteristics (such as age) of the group of girls that like xxx type?”

“What type of female figure would look good in xxx type/fashion?”

Questions that I asked in my short conversations with young Taiwanese females (in their early and mid-twenties) in clothes and pharmaceutical stores, metro stations, and in NTU include:

“What kind of clothes fashion do you think is in vogue now among Taiwanese females in your age?”

“How would you define their characteristics, respectively?”

(Since all of them mentioned Korean fashion in response to the first question), “Why do you think Korean fashion is now so popular among young Taiwanese females?”

“Can you describe the type of clothes fashion you like and/or wear often? Why this type, if you pick intentionally?”

Questions that I posed in all of the longer and deeper interviews with the five young Taiwanese females and one young Taiwanese male include all of the questions listed above and the following:

“How do you like your appearance—facial traits and body shape? What do your friends and family think about them?”

“Do you ever think about improving your appearance and body? If so, how? What have you started doing to reach this goal?”

Depending on each person’s narrative in his/her conversation with me, I asked different follow-up questions in order to delve deeper into each individual’s experience and perceptions.

I ended up with limited interview data, but several factors justify this. First, the grant and fellowship I got from East Asia Center and Raven Society, as well as my visa, could support me to stay in Taipei only for a month. Second, I realized that my interview data started to show repetition shortly after fieldwork began. For example, among the first three people I talked to, part of the response to the question what a beautiful young female looks like was the same proverb in Mandarin Chinese, “looking pale rules out every possibility of looking ugly,” which I will analyze later.

ETHNOGRAPHY

I found out, through one month of fieldwork, four areas of influence that the “Korean Wave” exerts on the construction of female attractiveness in Taipei: clothing and clothing style, paleness of skin, slender bodies, and use of plastic surgery. I am going to organize and present my ethnographic data in this order.

Fashion and Korean styles in Taipei

I still clearly remember the first day of my stay in Taipei. I was very jet-lagged and woke up quite early. Excitedly searching for bus and metro transportation information online in my friend’s house, I was getting ready to experience a busy morning in this metropolitan city. I put my “field notebook” in my purse and went outside to take an early No. 1 bus to a nearby metro station where I ended up experiencing culture shock for the first time. I was wearing what I often wear in school—sporty tank top, running shorts, and a pair of flip-flops—while most of the young Taiwanese women at the metro station were professionally and stylishly dressed. I knew they were on their way to work, so I was not that surprised that they were better dressed than I. What impressed me was that many Taiwanese young women look really stylish, which even compelled me to go back and change. Later that night, I talked to my friend’s father, a man in his fifties working as an economic analyst, about the “dressy” culture. He said, “You barely see people wearing flip flops in metro station, where people are supposed to look well dressed. In general, I think the dressing culture in Taipei is between that of America and Japan, the former of which is

very casual and the latter of which is very formal.”

On the next day, I visited National Taiwan University and my friend’s mother, who works there in the administration department, introduced me to a young lady in her office, who she claimed was “a dedicated follower of fashion.” We sat down at a table and started our chat. According to her, the rising influence of “Korean Wave” in Taipei should be attributed to the popularity of Korean television dramas and pop music as well as shopping-oriented tourism in South Korea. I then remembered young women watching Korean television dramas on their smart phones and tablets in subway trains. She said, “Many Taiwanese girls, when traveling in Korea, go shopping in *dongdaimon*, a clothes wholesale area and fashion landmark in Seoul. Those girls bring the clothes there back to Taipei, which helps spread the Korean fashion out.” What she meant by fashion was different types of clothing and styles of dressing up. She also commented on the role fashion magazines, especially those promoting Korean and Japanese fashions, play in shaping young females’ idea of what they should wear in order to look nice in the eyes of other people. Her description of what she called “Korean-style office lady” resembles pictures that can easily be found online, in which the women look “mature, elegant, and professional” (see Figures 1-2). In comparison, she described the Japanese “cute” fashion to be a style of looking “infantile, girly, and pure” (see Figures 3-4). The images that I included here are only examples of an ocean of pictures that one can get by just a rough search, using the words such as “Korean office lady style” and “Japanese cute style.” My friend’s brother, Dennis, shared similar stereotypes of Korean and Japanese female fashion: “Girls dressed in Korean

fashion tend to look more mature and professional while Japanese female fashion sometimes reveals exaggerated cuteness such as that in Japanese costume play.” His words formed images of different femininities in my mind. I have never been an expert on fashion, so I started looking at fashion magazines and websites.

Vogue is one of the most popular fashion magazines in Taipei. Yura, a host of an entertainment television program in South Korea, was once interviewed by Vogue about the Korean fashion in Taipei during her first visit to the city. In an article published on VOGUE.com in June 22, 2012, she herself manifested the following types of Korean fashion that are popular in Taipei (see Figures 5-7; below each image is my translation of her words).^{liii} During that interview with *Vogue* magazine, Yura expressed being very impressed by the fact that Korean clothes fashion dominated the street stores in the East District of Taipei. As a native South Korean and a fashion connoisseur, she understood the essence of Korean female fashion to be “non-extravagant, comfortable, and elegant.” According to her, in daily settings Korean young females tend not to look too “feminine,” and they do not wear clothes in order to show their body curves. Foreigners observe that many Korean young women, such as Yura, are so slender that they do not have a curvy or plump body compared to women in the West. Yura also agreed that many Korean women have more slender and less curvaceous bodies than women in the West. These slender women think wearing tight clothes would reveal their lack of plumpness and curves. For them, the combination of a very loose pullover and skinny pants/jeans can show less of their “unsatisfactory” (according to Western standards) body curves, and create a balanced view of their body shape.

At the same time, celebrities seem to be found more approachable when they are dressed up in this way, and this style is very popular on streets in Taipei. Fashion magazines that update young females with the newest styles from abroad, such as those from South Korea, inundate newsstands on streets, pharmacy stores, and bookstores in Taipei.

In order to be exposed to different Korean female fashion styles that are popular in Taipei, I spent a good amount of time doing observations and short interviews in the fashion landmark, Wufenpu Garment Wholesale Area. I always went there in the early afternoon, when the stores were just opening and owners were organizing their clothes and getting ready for a big flow of customers starting in the late afternoon. Streets in this area were quite narrow, with stores adjacent to each other, and this area could get very crowded from late afternoon until midnight. When I was wandering in different stores and browsing the clothing, I heard Korean popular music and found a lot of clothes with the tags “made in Korea” or “designed in Korea,” which are generally much more expensive than clothes without those tags. By talking with some storeowners, I learned that many of the clothes without those tags could still be shipped from South Korea, because storeowners themselves would pick out clothes of different styles while they were traveling in Seoul and bring them back to Taipei to sell.

After several trips to Wufenpu I mustered the courage to have longer and deeper conversations with some storeowners. Right after I entered this area, the owner of the first store on the right invited me to come in. We introduced ourselves to each other, and he told me that I could call him Henry (almost every Taiwanese person has an English name). He was wearing a black T-shirt, a pair of tight jeans, and a pair of

glasses with big black frames, and this type of frame glasses is generally considered to be part of the Korean fashion for both males and females. He showed me around the store, picking out clothes that he felt would fit my small size and personal preference. He guessed from the clothes that I was wearing at that time—plain grey tank top with an orange workout jacket outside and jean shorts—that I would prefer “comfortable clothes of casual styles.” I was impressed that the clothes he picked for me were exactly the ones to which I would pay more attention. I asked him, “Why are you so good at quickly sensing your customer’s preference?” He responded, “I used to work as a hair stylist, and was already very obsessed with clothes and styles back then. Because you can see that I don’t have a fitting room in my store [which is true for most of the stores in Wufenpu], I need to be able to help a customer make judgment about the sizes of the customer and of the clothes, just using my eyes.”

When I asked him to show me clothing of South Korean fashion, he told me that clothes authentically designed or made in South Korea were very expensive. He picked out one slim and plain T-shirt and said, “This T-shirt is from South Korea. It would be tight for you to fit in, and you can see from this T-shirt that clothes of Korean fashion are very demanding in terms of body shape because of their small sizes.” In contrast, he described Japanese styles to be less oriented towards showing a mature female body’s curves and more towards displaying a “cute” and “girly” character. What he said seemed to contradict what Yura, the South Korean television entertainment program host, had said about Korean fashion. I suspect that this indicates diversity within the category of Korean clothes styles. Later he commented on Taiwanese young females’ growing passion for buying clothes,

pursuing fashion, and creating a “beautiful” appearance. When I asked him what type of female’s appearance he personally preferred, he responded that Taiwanese guys today like girls who are more “individualistic” (*you gexing*), with the connotation of independence and maturity. It reminded me of my friend’s brother’s preference for girls dressed in Korean fashion, who look sophisticated and professional, over those dressed like Japanese high-school girls. Furthermore, he associated Japanese and Korean fashions with two different age groups: “If you are a girl younger than twenty-two, you could wear colorful, multi-patterned, and loose clothes of Japanese fashion, and embody its cuteness and casualness. However, when you are above twenty-two or twenty-five, you would want to look ‘lightly mature’ in clothes of simple patterns and plain colors.” He also suggested that this group of “lightly mature” females make more use of Korean fashion.

Similarly, another informant of mine named Emily, a 24-year-old Taiwanese girl who studied abroad in Canada for almost 10 years and now works in a department store, made the distinction between females that dress to look “girly and cute” and those that dress to look “lightly mature.” However, she did not believe it was necessarily due to age, but attributed the distinction to how a female felt about herself. In her case, she considered herself to belong to the “cute girl” category, and most of the clothes that she wore and bought were brightly colored and designed to fit her body loosely. When describing her personal style, Emily used the popular term, *xiaoqingxin*, which was coined by young people to refer to the style of freshness, purity and naiveté.

Paleness and slenderness

Young Taiwanese females, like their counterparts in other parts of the world, are working hard to pursue beautiful images that include a good-looking face and the ideal slender body figure. When I asked both young females and males about prevalent beauty standards—what a beautiful Taiwanese young woman should look like—I got answers that repeated the words “pale” and “slender.” My informants often mentioned a popular Mandarin Chinese saying: “looking pale rules out every possibility of looking ugly” (*yi bai zhe bai chou*). Observing Taiwanese girls on Taipei’s streets, I was very impressed by young Taiwanese females’ efforts to maintain pale skin. Despite the fact that each of the girls walking on the streets was already holding an umbrella to prevent her skin from sunshine, most of them were wearing tops with long sleeves and pants or leggings. I once asked one of my Taiwanese female friends, a girl in her early twenties working in a department store, why young Taiwanese females would want to wear long-sleeved clothing and pants/leggings when the temperature outside was almost 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Without hesitation, she stated matter-of-factly, “You just don’t look nice when you get tanned.” Compared to South Korea, where the average temperature is lower and sunshine is less intense in the summer, girls in tropical areas such as Taipei need to make more of an effort to maintain pale skin under the sun.

Young Taiwanese women can easily get access to products that help them maintain pale skin in convenience stores, the most popular being Seven-Eleven stores. The products that sold out very quickly in Seven-Eleven stores during my stay included skincare products that help girls stay pale. Many of those products are Korean, or, to a lesser extent, Japanese brands. All of the skincare products that

were advertised to prevent one’s skin from getting tanned were advertised with pictures of mostly Korean female celebrities who had pale faces.

The ideal beautiful woman exalted by society not only has pale skin but also a slender body shape. During my stay, a television news program reported that when some men saw only the back of a random female passerby with a very “hot”—slender and curvy body figure—in a metro station, they extensively searched online in order to find out who she was. After finding her through collective efforts, netizens used words like “goddess” (*nüshen*) to describe her “perfect” body shape. Some male netizens expressed their wish to date girls with such a body shape, and some female netizens revealed their jealousy of her body. Seven-Eleven stores also sell weight-control pills that help women achieve or maintain a slender body, many of which are pills taken before or after meals or that directly replace meals. I found on the packages of these products that some explicitly advertise their effects to be able to help females lose weight quickly, while others describe their effects as “facilitating metabolism.” In order to demonstrate how effective these products are in terms of maintaining a slender figure, pictures of female celebrities with the ideal slender body shape are shown on packages of these products. These pictures always visually emphasized celebrities’ small faces and curvy bodies with narrow waist and legs. Television programs and boards in metro stations show many advertisements of those skincare and weight-control products. In a funny television advertisement video for a weight-control product, a young woman urged the audience to be cautious of getting fat, because one’s significant other would turn to thinner women if one did not keep a good body shape.

The Korean Wave has not only brought Korean-style clothing to Taipei, but has also strengthened the society's obsession with slender women, which was not as powerful when Japanese fashion was dominant. Magazines featuring Korean fashion reinforce the beauty standards of looking slender among young Taiwanese females, which coincides with the impression of South Korean females' own obsession. For example, I once noticed a fashion magazine with illustrated articles teaching how to work out in order to make a female's legs five centimeters narrower, how to use certain types of makeup techniques to make one's face look smaller, and how to dress in order to look slender. Dennis noted that a lot of young Taiwanese women value their figures so much that they work out after every big meal to prevent gaining weight: "Taiwanese girls with small and slender figures look nice in Korean- and Japanese-style clothes." When he said that, I was reminded of the comment of a storeowner in Wufenpu Fashion Area that Korean clothing/fashion is very demanding in terms of female body shapes. The young Taiwanese woman in her mid-twenties working at the administrative department at NTU stated at the end of my interview with her: "As long as a girl has a perfectly slender body figure and a good-looking face, she will look nice no matter what she wears."

Though at first sight I felt as if both Taiwanese males and females were deeply absorbed in constructing and reinforcing the norms of paleness and slenderness, I often heard complaints from my female informants. For example, a female owner of a clothing store in the night-market near NTU even used the word "freaks" when she was telling me how she felt about the girls who were obsessed with maintaining pale skin and slender body figures, no matter how much effort it required. Her words reminded me of a

conversation with Dennis in a gym in Taipei. When I saw a girl biking very hard there, probably for over an hour, I told Dennis that I was very impressed by her. Dennis replied, "Yes she is very impressive. However, this is very common among young Taiwanese females now. They work out so hard, especially after having a big meal, because they want to keep slender."

Plastic surgery and facial reconstruction

Under the sway of the "Korean Wave", cultural exports—which include Korean television dramas, popular music, and fashion industries such as clothing and beauty-products—highlight many beautiful Korean female celebrities, the majority of whom have undergone plastic surgery. The ongoing and fervent debate about those females getting plastic surgery in order to have the "perfect" face and body has already extended from Asia to Western countries such as the US. For example, the episode of *This American Life* that aired on January 4th, 2013, featured observations by Julie Lurie who teaches English in an all-girls high school in Gwangju, South Korea. Lurie reported that there is a full-length mirror and a scale on every floor of the school because the school principal wants all the girls to become skinny. She also reported that plastic surgery in Seoul is so common that almost one-in-five women have done it.^{liv}

I noticed that there were many plastic surgery hospitals on the streets in Taipei, and several informants told me that the number of plastic surgeries has been rising exponentially. Young Taiwanese people, both male and female, seem to be quite at ease talking about females getting plastic surgery in order to achieve the "ideal" appearance or to sustain it despite aging. In Mainland China (which is where I am from), people can be judgmental and tend to tease

females who have had plastic surgery, which some South Korean celebrities are known for. For example, the news in Mainland China reported that some technology experts developed a game aiming to find differences in terms of facial characteristics among twenty candidates of Miss Korea in 2013, all of whom are suspected of having had plastic surgery. Players acknowledged that without keen discernment, one could even form an impression that all of those candidates were the same person dressed in different ways.

I did not sense that my Taiwanese informants were making fun of females who have had plastic surgeries, and Dennis even estimated that one-in-four girls in Taipei has had plastic surgery. However, when talking to female informants about plastic surgery, I sensed frustration, because they felt the need to make judgments about their natural appearance and improve “unsatisfactory” parts of their body—such as the lack of a “double eyelid,” the size and shape of their eyes, a flat nose, or a chubby face. Plastic surgery, however, could help females obtain an ideal body shape/curve.

ANALYSIS

In the context of Taipei, female beauty and fashion is not only interesting in itself as a tool for females to create specific kinds of imagery, but also functions as a mirror reflecting the social norms that govern females’ physical attractiveness and the production of femininity. More importantly, dynamic beauty and fashion trends influenced by foreign popular cultures, such as the Korean Wave, also display the interaction between the norms themselves and the adoption and refusal of them by individual females. Though the Japanese style of cuteness started to emerge in Taipei in the early 1990s, Korean styles of beauty and fashion have

gradually been taking over in Taiwan. The increasing importation of these Korean styles, intertwined with other aspects of Korean popular culture such as television dramas and music, has set itself apart from the preexisting Japanese influence with respect to female imagery. Both Taiwanese males and females that I talked to in Taipei stereotypically related the Japanese influence among young Taiwanese females to the image of a “cute high-school girl,” while they related the Korean influence to the image of a more mature, professional, sophisticated, and elegant “lightly-mature lady.”

How a female creates her physical appearance is influenced by not only popular beauty and fashion trends, but also by how she views her body and her selfhood, which is in turn influenced by her age, education, profession, and personality. The category of “lightly mature ladies” (*qingshunni*)—females from their mid-twenties to mid-thirties who are economically self-reliant and pursuing independence both in their professional and personal life—has become a more and more pronounced category of femininity in Taipei. Femininity is culturally constructed, and comes not in singular form but as a spectrum of diverse features and types. In Taipei, the influences from both Japan and South Korea on female beauty and fashion contribute to a variety of ways in which femininity is performed on the part of young women, and the Korean influence is gradually taking over the Japanese influence. From my male informants, I got the impression that the Japanese style of cuteness is more “feminine” because it is less threatening to male authority, whereas the Korean style helps create a female image that is more independent and has more agency and which therefore could be more threatening to male authority. Even though “less feminine” is often used by my informants to compare

the Korean fashion embodied by “lightly mature ladies” to Japanese “cuteness,” I think the Korean style helps “lightly mature ladies” perform a type of femininity that is distinctively associated with professionalism, sophistication, and self-reliance. This type of femininity is distinguished, by both my male and female informants, from the stereotypical Japanese “cuteness”—the image of females as infantile, darling, and innocent.

With this recent gradual shift from Japanese to Korean female fashion, especially among “lightly mature ladies,” young Taiwanese females in Taipei now seem to have more latitude to shape their physical attractiveness, and have different choices about how to be “female” and how to enact “femininity.” This social trend influenced by transnational cultural flow coincides with the rise of the concept of individuality (*gexing*) that gets recognized and acknowledged by both males and females. Based on each individual female’s agency—the cultural capacity to act—culturally constructed individuality (*gexing*) is constantly reinforced and recreated through dress and the crafting of different types of imagery.

At the same time, Korean fashion and female imagery promoted by media exports, such as television dramas and popular music, are restricting Taiwanese females’ understanding and interpretation of what an attractive female looks like and how she should be dressed. What comes with Korean fashion as well as the image of beautiful females in Korean television dramas and popular music is a culturally constructed system of standards that defines female production of a particular kind of physical attractiveness. Korean fashion did not originally bring those standards to Taipei, but the Korean Wave has reinforced them. To perform the type of femininity that belongs to “lightly mature ladies,” young Taiwanese females

are now comparing themselves to the kind of physically attractive female highlighted by Korean popular culture: for example, a pale and slender young woman dressed stylishly in Korean fashion.

Slenderness gets emphasized more and more as Korean influence increases, because the clothing “made in Korea” or “designed in Korea” that one can find in shopping areas in Taipei are either of smaller sizes or their styles implicitly necessitate a slender body. Also, when many young Taiwanese women see slender bodies with narrow waists and legs in Korean television dramas, music videos, and fashion magazines, they tend to compare this “ideal” female body to her own. They may feel compelled to get closer to this “perfect” body and therefore start to calculate the calories in their diets, work out in a gym more often, and take medicines or pills that help with weight loss. Due to the influence of both clothing fashion and of media celebrities, many young Taiwanese females feel that they must meet certain standards of *physical* attractiveness in order to look good when they are pursuing certain types of fashion. Slenderness already governs female physical attractiveness and the definition of a perfect female body in Taipei, and the Korean influence has pushed this standard one step further in shaping female imagery among Taiwanese women.

Moreover, the trend of plastic surgery has come to Taipei with the Korean Wave, and young females who see themselves as unable to meet standards of the ideal beautiful face and body (or maintain them as they age) are turning to this type of facial and body reconstruction. Since it is getting more and more popular, Taiwanese are becoming more accustomed to the “artificial faces and bodies” either of South Korean female celebrities or of young Taiwanese females around them.

CONCLUSION

Even though Korean styles of beauty and fashion give young Taiwanese females more freedom to create physical variations, they more importantly strengthen social norms of a distinct type of female physical attractiveness. Just like girls in Western societies approach the standards of female physical attractiveness by looking at Barbie Dolls, young Taiwanese females today turn to “beautiful” Korean female celebrities in media in order to learn how they are supposed to look. When they are enjoying shopping for Korean-style clothing, they are also striving for a “perfect” body that looks good in those clothes. The Korean style promotes the image of an independent, mature, and professional “lightly mature lady” that seems to have more agency than that of a “cute high-school girl” promoted by the Japanese influence. However, because they feel compelled to abide by the social norms coming with the Korean style of beauty and fashion, young Taiwanese females are still restricted in the extent to which they can create their own appearance, pursue physical attractiveness, construct their femininity, and express their individuality.

APPENDIX

Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 6



“elegant”

Figure 5



“tomboy-like/less feminine”

Figure 7



“professional/office lady”

ⁱ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 2.

ⁱⁱ Butler, 45.

ⁱⁱⁱ Butler, 8.

^{iv} Butler, 20.

^v Butler, 12.

^{vi} Butler, 45.

^{vii} Butler, 195.

^{viii} Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, 2nd Vintage ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 136.

^{ix} Susan Bordo, *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 33.

^x Bordo, 35.

^{xi} Bordo, 198.

^{xii} Bordo, 141.

^{xiii} Bordo, 143.

^{xiv} Bordo, 166.

^{xv} Bordo, 164.

^{xvi} Bordo, 205.

^{xvii} Bordo, 207.

^{xviii} Bordo, 208.

^{xix} Rose Weitz, ed., *The Politics of Women's Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1.

^{xx} Sandra Bartky, "Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power," in *The Politics of Women's Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior*, ed. Rose Weitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 50.

^{xxi} Bartky, 52.

^{xxii} Bartky, 53.

^{xxiii} Weitz, 123.

^{xxiv} Kathryn Morgan, "Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the Colonization of Women's Bodies," in *The Politics of Women's Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior*, ed. Rose Weitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 103.

^{xxv} Morgan, 104.

^{xxvi} Morgan, 115.

^{xxvii} Morgan, 123.

^{xxviii} Miejeong Han, "Body Image Dissatisfaction and Eating Disturbance among Korean College Female Students: Relationships to Media Exposure, Upward Comparison, and Perceived Reality," in *The Politics of Women's Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior*, ed. Rose Weitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 134.

^{xxix} Han, 139.

^{xxx} Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 4.

^{xxxi} Iwabuchi, 10.

^{xxxii} Iwabuchi, 11.

³³ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

^{xxxiv} Iwabuchi, 50.

^{xxxv} Iwabuchi, 72.

^{xxxvi} Iwabuchi, 198.

^{xxxvii} Sharon Kinsella, "Cuties in Japan." in *Women, Media, and Consumption In Japan*. Ed by Lise Skov and Brian Moeran. 220-254, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), 220.

^{xxxviii} Mark Ravina, *Southeast Review of Asian Studies: a Publication of the Southeast Conference* (Association for Asian Studies, 2009), 4.

^{xxxix} Eun-Young Jung, "Transnational Korea: A Critical Assessment of the Korean Wave in Asia and the United States" (paper presented at the 48th Annual meeting of the Southeast Conference of Asian Studies, 2009).

^{xl} Jung, "Transnational Korea. "

^{xli} Jung, "Transnational Korea. "

^{xlii} Jung, "Transnational Korea. "

^{xliii} Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi, *East Asian Popular Culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 108.

^{xliv} Chua and Iwabuchi, 105.

^{slv} Chua and Iwabuchi, 108.

^{sxvi} Chua and Iwabuchi, 123.

^{sxvii} Mark James Russell, *Pop Goes Korea: Behind the Revolution In Movies, Music, and Internet Culture* (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2008), vi.

^{sxviii} Russell, xi.

^{slix} Russell, xiv.

^l Russell, 102.

^{li} Russell, 117.

^{lii} Russell, 131-132.

^{liii} “韓國美女主持人Yura 帶你逛台北韓流小店變身100%韓系女孩穿搭實戰”. *VogueFashion*. 22 June 2012. Web. 10 June 2013. <<http://www.vogue.com.tw/fashion/trends/content--7073.html>>

^{liv} “Self-improvement Kick,” narrated by Julie Lurie. *This American Life*. *Chicago Public Media*. 4 Jan 2013. <<http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/483/self-improvement-kick>>

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CHINA'S GLOBAL ANIMATION AMBITIONS:

Cultural Flows and Soft Power in East Asia

Rick Marshall

Royal Roads University

ABSTRACT

Successes in cross-cultural media flows in the East Asian culture market have provided soft power resources for producing nations, a model that can inform China's ambitions. Despite large government investments and policies directed to support China's animation industry, returns have been minimal. An independent route in building economic hard power has proven successful, but this model has yet to be successful in the cross-cultural dissemination of cultural goods as a potential soft power resource.

INTRODUCTION

The global animation industry is a multi-billion dollar cultural enterprise, and China has stated intentions and initiated policy toward establishing its presence in this creative economy.ⁱ Through the establishment of a domestic production base that can produce proprietary cultural content, China's animation ambitions (situated in their overall culture industry reforms) serve the purpose of supporting national cohesion in resistance to cultural globalization, as well as participating in the lucrative global animation market.ⁱⁱ Successes garnered through these reforms factor in the development of China's international influence through soft power.ⁱⁱⁱ

Due to China's historic position of isolationism and its contemporary desire to reengage with the world economically through the production and export of cultural products, the concept of soft

power bears significance for China's ambitions.^{iv} Successful media flows throughout the East Asian region, with content originating in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, have translated into soft power resources for their host countries.^v Otmazgin contends that these nations have developed production and distribution models that have mutually benefited the media industries for participating states, an entrepreneurial-driven model that has effectively constituted the East/Southeast Asian culture market.^{vi} The author argues that the dissemination of shared images and ideas creates like-mindedness in those consuming the cultural goods.^{vii} As entrepreneurs instill cultural products "with certain images, motifs, and feelings associated with 'Asia,'" they effectively create a pan-Asian identity across the region,^{viii} establishing a primary market in which China can target its cultural commodities.

Scholars contend that a number of factors limit China's equitable participation in this transnational flow of cultural commodities in East Asia.^{ix} Keane identifies that in order to protect and promote its nationalist interest and identity, socialist China has long-established state controls and indigenous practices in its cultural production and distribution industries.^x These control structures now inhibit China's ability to participate equitably in the transnational culture flows in East Asia. Using a systematic literature review as its method, this study seeks to discover how soft power successes in the East Asian culture

market can inform China's global animation ambitions.

REVIEWING THE LITERATURE

Within the East Asian region, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea exemplify how nation branding and cultural export successes can provide soft power resources for host nations.^{xi} This understanding can inform China's global animation ambitions as situated in its culture industry reforms and its greater soft power initiative. This investigation situates itself in the scholarship by organizing an initial review of literature exploring these phenomena into five themes. *Scholarly discourse on soft power* provides context in which to situate *China's soft power: goals, strategies, and measures*. *East Asian culture markets and soft power* positions the regions successful flows of cultural products for comparison with *China's creative culture industry*. Lastly, *East Asian animation industry* identifies factors that have contributed to the success of Japanese anime in both the regional and global animation markets, providing a juxtaposition of a historical and contemporary view of China's animation industry.

SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE ON SOFT POWER

Nye and Wang broadly define power as, "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcome one wants."^{xii} They contend that threatening coercion, offering inducements or payments, or setting and promoting an example that persuades others to want what one wants are the three means by which power is wielded in order to influence others.^{xiii} In world politics, categorizing these three conditions under the headings of "hard power" and "soft power" separates a nation's military and economic influence

from its ability to influence other states through attraction. Intangible soft power resources, such as "national cohesion, culture, ideology and influence on international institutions,"^{xiv} are the assets that facilitate this influence-by-attraction.^{xv} Both hard and soft powers have the ability to influence, and some resources that are available and can be wielded by countries can produce both versions of power.^{xvi} For example, economic strength produces the ability to coerce others through payments, as well as providing a positive model that others want to emulate.^{xvii} Nye and Wang's conception of a nation's soft power is comprised of three primary resources: its culture (and the attractiveness of this to others), its political values (how it lives up to these), and its foreign policy (where the nation is viewed as a legitimate and moral authority).^{xviii} As soft power is dependent upon a nation's image and reputation, Barr posits that "nation branding" (with "brand" understood as a defined identity and reputation composed of persons, symbols, colours, and slogans) leverages intellectual property to attract buyers for exports, build tourism, and support national unity at home.^{xix} This literature identifies the elements that constitute soft power for a nation and the benefit derived from these resources.

Despite soft power's ability to provide a nation with influence through attraction, scholars Huang and Ding, Holyk, Wang and Lu, and Nye and Wang identify the difficulty in measuring the effects and outcomes of soft power.^{xx} Nye and Wang contend that calculating results from polls and focus groups that ask if one group likes another measure whether an asset is a soft power resource or not.^{xxi} However, Huang and Ding argue that the intangible qualities of culture, ideology, and institutions are difficult to measure compared to the tangible economic and

military resources of hard power.^{xxii} Holyk attributes this immeasurability to reliance on general questions of influence or feeling in soft power surveys rather than empirical findings.^{xxiii} Furthermore, Wang and Lu argue that the link between a nation's attractiveness and its ability to influence or persuade others in international relations is a leap to begin with.^{xxiv} As an example, the authors cite Nye in identifying that Japan's cultural power in Asia has not resulted in political influence regionally or globally, and that American music and fashion are popular in the Middle East where there is also a strong hostility toward American politics.^{xxv} This understanding of Nye's conception of soft power; a nation's ability to influence others through the attraction of its culture, political values, and foreign policy, provides a context in which to view China's unique approach to hard and soft power.

CHINA'S SOFT POWER: GOALS, STRATEGIES, AND MEASURES

China has declared its desire to develop soft power resources to complement its accumulated hard power, represented by its rapid economic rise of the past two decades.^{xxvi} Nye and Wang and Su point to Chinese President Hu Jintao's October 15, 2007 keynote speech to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China as a marker of this official position.^{xxvii} In this speech, Hu declares, "the Party must 'enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests.'"^{xxviii} Further, Huang and Ding cite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC's pronouncement that China's soft power goals are to preserve sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and to "create a favorable international environment for China's reform and opening up and

modernization construction."^{xxix} These official statements recognize the dual objectives of soft power in China: for national cohesion through cultural sovereignty, and for its significance for China's overall strength within the international arena.^{xxx}

Wang and Lu posit that China's embrace and extension of Nye's soft power concept addresses fundamental concerns faced by China in recent years.^{xxxi} These concerns are: (1) China is interested in what makes a great power, in relating the decline of the Soviet Union to a loss of soft power, and in considering how America maintains its global position due to its soft power resources.^{xxxii} (2) The obsolescence of major wars places more importance on soft power, as nations must now compete in beliefs, institutions, cultural attraction, and human resources, rather than military might.^{xxxiii} (3) China's rapid economic rise generates international concern and fears as to how China will wield this power, and soft power is seen as a path to China's "peaceful rise."^{xxxiv} (4) A Chinese cultural rise can defend against perceived American cultural imperialism domestically and regionally, signified in the attention paid by Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan to Western culture and policy.^{xxxv} To facilitate this peaceful rise, China extends Nye's "America-centric" soft power concept to a "soft power theory more acclimated to China's situation,"^{xxxvi} a conception that shapes both foreign and domestic policies.^{xxxvii} Cho and Jeong argue that China's soft power prospects are dependent upon three resources: the Chinese development model (the "Beijing Consensus"), foreign policy (peaceful rise/peaceful development theories), and the exploitation of traditional Chinese culture and civilization.^{xxxviii} The following section

will discuss these three resources individually.

“Beijing Consensus,” the title of a report authored by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004, distinguishes China’s unique economic and political development model (authoritarian government plus a market economy) from the liberal democratic model (market economics) of the “Washington Consensus.”^{xxxix} Through tripling its GDP over the past 30 years,^{xl} China’s economic model has proven attractive to governments and populations of developing nations in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.^{xli} China’s economic strength provides a hard power resource in the ability to coerce others through payments, and it provides a soft power resource in the attractiveness of their successful economic model.

In foreign policy, China has operationalized its soft power strategy through active membership in regional and global institutions and organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the East Asia Summit.^{xlii} These efforts complement China’s acceptance in the World Trade Organization in 2001.^{xliii} In an effort to build global goodwill and influence through foreign policy, China has forgiven \$1 billion in debts.^{xliv} Additionally, it has contributed 3,000 troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations, has aided non-proliferation diplomacy through hosting talks with North Korea,^{xlv} and settled territorial disputes with its Russian and Vietnamese neighbors.^{xlvi} These efforts support China’s peaceful rise claims, as they represent an external manifestation of their soft power discourse.

Chinese academics and policy analysts stress that China’s most valuable

soft power resource is in its cultural traditions.^{xlvii} Its language, literature, philosophy, medicine, art, architecture, cuisine, and martial arts represent a major world civilization with unique characteristics,^{xlviii} a culture which can be utilized to increase China’s soft power “by creating common, imagined identities and values for Asians.”^{xlix} In promoting its culture, China has established 24-hour radio and television stations broadcasting to Southeast Asia,^l and Chinese Radio International broadcasts in English 24-hours a day.^{li} China has taken steps to attract international students, and their enrollment has tripled in the past decade from 36,000 to 110,000.^{lii} China has also promoted Chinese language studies abroad.^{liii} In efforts to manage its identity, it has undertaken a number of branding exercises, such as the 2010 Shanghai Expo, the production of promotional films,^{liv} and the successfully host of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games.^{lv} In support of its peaceful rise/peaceful development theories, China has re-established “...Confucianism as an inherently Chinese value and vision.”^{lvi} Confucianism and its values have universal meaning in East Asia, comparable to Western human rights and democracy.^{lvii} To this end, China has established 155 Confucian Institutes and classrooms in 53 countries as of 2007.^{lviii} These examples represent China’s efforts in promoting Chinese culture as a pillar of their external soft power strategy.

As the literature in the opening of this section identifies, China’s soft power ambitions also incorporate internal strategies to promote national cohesion. Wang and Lu argue that a country can gain international status only when the population backs its government, and this can only occur when the government satisfies the people’s needs in terms of social justice and equality.^{lix}

Operationalizing this internal directive, China has strategized and implemented various policies to achieve its domestic soft power goals. Since 2002, under the slogan “putting people first” (*yi ren wei ben*), China has launched a series of domestic economic and socio-political programs that include anti-corruption campaigns, support for farmers, legal and equal status for migrant workers in major cities, and dealing with education, public health, and environmental issues in government policy.^{lx} In the cultural sector, the government acknowledges culture as a “source of national cohesion, creativity, and overall national strength.”^{lxi} In 2002, the 16th National Congress formally acknowledged “the market value and the cultural industrial role of the film sector,” which has led to a dramatic transformation in China’s film industry.^{lxii}

Although scholars have noted the difficulty in measuring soft power success,^{lxiii} studies point to survey results indicating China’s soft power strategies are improving its image internationally. Huang and Ding cite a BBC poll in which 14 out of 22 countries surveyed held a positive view of China’s influence in the world, and that no country, including Western democracies, had a majority negative view of China’s influence.^{lxiv} Cho and Jeong point to further survey results indicating a “palpable improvement of China’s image in the world,” and posit that China’s rapid economic growth and its “good neighbor” policies aimed at easing concerns in the region are two dominant factors supporting China’s soft power rise.^{lxv} Nye and Wang point to Chinese novelist Gao Xingjian’s Nobel Prize for Literature, Ang Lee’s film, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, becoming the highest grossing non-English film and winning an Academy Award in 2000,^{lxvi} and 17 million tourists visiting China in 2008, to further exemplify China’s

increasing soft power via popular culture.^{lxvii}

As the literature cited in this section identifies, China has taken purposeful steps in the development of its soft power resources to complement the hard power gains realized through its unique economic development model. It further identifies China’s efforts in developing and promoting its culture and cultural heritage as a pillar of its soft power strategy. The following section reviews soft power successes realized in the East Asian culture markets as a framework from which to compare China’s culture industries.

EAST ASIAN CULTURE MARKETS AND SOFT POWER

Of key importance in the analysis of China’s ambition to participate in the global and regional cultural trade market through animation is the role “soft power” plays in the dissemination and local appropriation of cultural goods. Yu, Takata, and Dryland contend that “...cultural products have become a form of ‘soft power’ that enables nations to improve their image on the world stage,”^{lxviii} and point to Japan’s use of *manga* (Japanese comic books) and *anime* (Japanese animated cartoons) “as novel instruments of global outreach and appeal” in its cultural diplomacy efforts.^{lxix} Although Lukacs argues that fragmentation in local Asian media markets factors into the rise of Japan’s cultural exports,^{lxx} it does not negate the popularity of Japanese cultural products in the East/Southeast Asian region, throughout which US \$40 million in Japanese television content is exported.^{lxxi} Nakano identifies Taiwan as the biggest foreign consumer of Japanese popular culture, where five of 70 cable channels are dedicated to Japanese dramas and

variety shows.^{lxxi} These figures show the popularity of Japanese cultural products in East Asia. Their production and distribution model has informed other nations that strive for economic and soft power benefits associated with the export of cultural products.

Tong contends that along with Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore have initiated strategies in support and promotion of their creative industries, which have effectively constituted a creative economy within the East Asian region.^{lxxiii} In explaining this phenomenon, Otmazgin links entrepreneurship with the production and dissemination of East Asian popular culture in that, entrepreneurial vision transforms the local cultural markets by connecting trans-regional production systems and has the unintentional result of stimulating feelings of “Asian” sameness across the region.^{lxxiv} The entrepreneurial commodification of popular culture molds the ways in which people perceive their own culture and provides a context for a regional self-identity.^{lxxv} Jin attributes Korean success in exporting its television drama, film, and pop music commodities throughout East and Southeast Asia to this cultural similarity.^{lxxvi} He points to the regional success of Korea’s television drama series *To See You Again and Again* (depicting the stories of three generations living under one roof), as an example of Korean producers tapping into cross-culturally relatable Asian themes.^{lxxvii}

This literature identifies that the success of Japanese and Korean cultural exports has not only produced economic and soft power benefits for their host nations, but has effectively constituted an Asian market in which to distribute their products. This understanding can inform China as it reforms its creative culture industry as a pillar of its soft power ambitions, as it identifies not only a successful regional model of cultural

commodification, but also the primary market in which China can export its culture products.

CHINA’S CREATIVE CULTURE INDUSTRY

The promotion of Chinese culture through the production and export of its creative industry products, such as those of the animation sector, can provide China with potential soft power resources, serving both its domestic and international objectives. However, Keane identifies a number of factors in China’s creative culture industry that hinder progress in achieving these goals. China is less insulated from global competition in its media and culture industries since its 2001 entry to the World Trade Organization and the opening of its markets, which has engendered what Keane describes as a “cultural trade deficit,”^{lxxviii} meaning that China imports more media content than it exports. The author describes three historical, systems-level characteristics that limited China’s ability to create innovative content as “*structure, dynamics, and performance.*”^{lxxix} *Structure* refers to the division of labor and administrative boundaries.^{lxxx} People were appointed to jobs because a position needed filling, not based on skills, by bureaucrats far removed from the process.^{lxxxi} Adding to this was structural duplication, in which models of cultural and media production were duplicated in numerous provinces. For example, each province had its own propaganda department, state administrators, and regulatory authorities, all guided by a central body.^{lxxxii} These structural restrictions affected the *dynamics* of innovation because companies were unable to compete across organizational boundaries or into different media, and “fragmented authoritarianism” led to over-regulation and confusion.^{lxxxiii} The

planned system's structure therefore had a negative effect on *performance*, as content followed state directives with little attention paid to economic efficiency, sales, ratings, or audience satisfaction.^{lxxxiv}

The legacy of these restraints in China is a media and culture industry that did not know how to be competitive, how to break out of the established command system, or how to exploit value in creating innovative content.^{lxxxv} However, Ooi points to Singapore as an example of a nation effectively promoting its creative economy while maintaining tight political and social control.^{lxxxvi} Although democracy is most often a prerequisite to the establishment of open, creative environments, Singaporean authorities maintain limits on the freedom of expression within political, ethnic, and religious realms, while supporting the development of its creative industries.^{lxxxvii}

Keane argues that competitiveness in the global culture economy will require change to China's control structure.^{lxxxviii}

Through market correction, control over piracy, and policy liberalization, China can move from the currently perceived low-value production model to one of high-value.^{lxxxix}

These systematic limitations identified in China's control structure within its culture industries are reflected in its output of poorly envisioned cultural content. In the multidirectional culture flows across East Asia, where mutual consumption, coproduction, and copromotion are common among Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, China's value in the chain is providing cheap labor for regional industries.^{xc} Iwabuchi argues that, unlike Taiwan and South Korea, China has yet to master globalized styles, which limits the export value of their cultural commodities.^{xcii} Despite China's developing economic power, Japanese mass media depict China

as a coarse nation in cultural and democratic terms because of its propensity to copy rather than innovate, and its blatant intellectual property rights violations.^{xcii} However, Iwabuchi believes that these perceptions can change, as he argues they did with South Korea, if China can adapt to globalized formats, and "[work] more collaboratively with transnational media and cultural industries."^{xciii}

An understanding of the factors contributing to successful media flows across East Asia illuminates the limitations in China's creative culture industries. The preceding literature reveals that China's embedded control structure precludes equitable participation in the East Asian culture market. A deeper examination of the Asian animation industry and China's role in it demonstrates how these systematic control structures restrict innovation and the ability to create and produce original content capable of competing in the international and domestic animation market.

EAST ASIAN ANIMATION INDUSTRY

Japanese *anime*, an abbreviation of the word 'animation,'^{xciv} accounts for 60 percent of the world's animation content^{xcv} and provides Japan and Asia with what Schiller identifies as "an antidote to US cultural imperialism."^{xcvi} Gan distinguishes anime from Western animation by highlighting the following characteristics: being based on *manga* (Japanese comics); voiced with specific mannerisms; using selective animation; using camera work to provide motion to still drawings; employing specific character design and facial conventions, and using storylines with long episodic narratives.^{xcvii} Nakano contends that Asian children have grown up watching Japanese cartoons

more than American or local productions, and supports this claim by pointing out that 80 percent of animation aired on Hong Kong's four national broadcasters is produced in Japan.^{xcviii} As with other Japanese cultural exports, anime, and the manga from which they derive, were originally created almost exclusively for the domestic Japanese market.^{xcix} Yet they found receptive audiences in other Asian societies. Yu, Takata, and Dryland point to cultural proximity (a term developed and used by Straubhaar, 1991, and cited in Yu et al. 2012) to explain the cross-cultural acceptance of anime in the region.^c In this, they argue that East and Southeast Asian audiences found "pleasure in the consumption of cultural products from culturally similar nations."^{ci} *Pokémon* provides an example of this, where embedded Japanese values, such as responsibility, empathy, cooperation, obedience, and respect for elders, are also rooted in Chinese culture.^{cii} Cultural proximity explains anime's success with Asian audiences, but cannot account for the attraction for Western anime consumers.

Yoon and Malecki argue that when media embeds content with globally unfamiliar cultural codes, it is difficult for that content to tap into global markets.^{ciii} However, the global acceptance of Japanese anime provides an example of a national style that has succeeded with international audiences. In the United States alone, anime and offshoot merchandising generate \$4 billion annually.^{civ} Lu points to "de-politicized internationalization" in making anime palatable for Western audiences, a term identifying the lack of specific cultural characteristics associated with Japanese anime.^{cv} Iwabuchi argues that a cultural product "must lose much of its original 'cultural odor' so as to be promoted in the international market."^{cvi} Therefore, the

lack of a perceptible "Japanese-ness" in the anime style makes the characters more approachable for Western reception. Cooper-Chen identifies these stylistic features as non-Asian hair colours and big eyes, features the manga pioneer, Osamu Tezuka, based on the American designs of Betty Boop and cute characters from Disney.^{cvii} This transnational blending of styles can account for the cross-cultural acceptance of Japanese anime in Western audiences. An understanding of Japanese anime's production and reception with international audiences provides a base from which to compare China's animation industry.

China's animation sector, situated within its creative culture industry, contends with the systematic control structures that limit other media production forms. Wu's 2009 study of China's animation history exposes the effects overt ideology and state policy can have on a creative industry. The author examines how the nationalized form of *meishu* (fine arts) animated film conceptualized and mediated the Chinese *minzu* style.^{cviii} *Minzu*, in film studies scholarship, refers to China's ethnic/national style of animation,^{cix} where "conceptualization connects with socialist ideology and aesthetic escape."^{cx} National policies dictated the linking of animation with Chinese classical painting and folk art forms and furthermore defined animation primarily "as a didactic paradigm with which to educate children."^{cxii} Wu argues that the institutionalizing of ideological consciousness and collective patriotism in Chinese animation shackled animators with an inherited convention for decades.^{cxii} Zhang criticizes Chinese animation's focus on children, as its didactic intent alienates adolescent audiences who "find the animation bereft of dramatic artistry, 'monotonous and

boring'...and lack[ing] a sense of modernity.”^{cxiii} Furthermore, Yoon and Malecki point out that the emergence of CGI (computer-generated imagery) technology in lucrative animated features has raised the aesthetic standard of audience expectations and broadened audiences to include adults,^{cxiv} an audience China’s restrictive policy effectively excludes for Chinese animation producers.

Countering China’s concern that foreign animation has negative effects on its children, Donald argues that Chinese children are emerging as cosmopolitan, demanding consumers: an audience able to maintain a local, national identity, but also competent in an internationalized media environment.^{cxv} Therefore, a challenge for China’s animation industry is to create innovative content that appeases state guidelines, can creatively compete in the East Asian regional market, and can attract a domestic audience already internationalized due to the borderless nature of cultural flows. Chinese children’s film scholar and scriptwriter Qin Yuquan outlines six problematic areas in contemporary children’s film in China.^{cxvi} These are: (1) Chinese filmmakers are interested in the art of film, not in children; (2) they make films to make money; (3) they make films to express their own ideas on something in which children are not interested; (4) they do not respect their audience and think they can make children happy by cheating them. (5) The films’ settings are not appropriate for children, and (6) they emphasize “significance” in scripts rather than plots and storylines, which tend to be too simple and not funny. The East Asian production model of coproduction, joint venture, and division of labor supports the internationalization of local audiences, as the diverse East Asian market itself creates the demand for intercultural themes.^{cxvii}

METHODS

This systematic literature review, investigating how soft power successes in the East Asian culture market inform China’s global animation ambition, borrows systems of meta-synthesis in order to provide focus and systematic procedure to the review of the literature. An exploration of both primary and secondary reports provides a comprehensive review of scholarly research related to this site of inquiry.

SITE-SPECIFIC TERMS

In the context of this systematic literature review, a number of site-specific concepts and terms require operationalizing. *Soft power* is the term coined by Joseph Nye, describing a nation’s ability to get “others to want the same outcomes that you want.”^{cxviii} His theory, based on the power of external influence in international diplomacy, rests on three primary resources: a nation’s culture, its political values, and its foreign policy.^{cxix} However, China’s official position on soft power extends this definition to include an internal strategy designed to promote national cohesion.^{cxx} As the dissemination of a nation’s culture is one pillar of soft power, *nation branding* is a strategy employed for the international promotion of a state. In this, popular culture is employed as a public relations tool endorsing a positive image of a nation.^{cxxi} In the context of this study, *cultural globalization* refers to the hybridization of cultures, as producers target international audiences in the production of cultural goods.^{cxxii} In the global animation sector, *anime* is used to define the distinctive style of Japanese animation.^{cxxiii}

DATA COLLECTION

Meta-synthesis seeks to understand and synthesize prior research on a phenomenon.^{cxv} Data collection for this study encompasses comprehensive literature and archive searches through several online databases: Sage Journals Online, Academic Search Premier@Ebscohost, Oxford Journals, and Taylor & Francis Online via the Royal Roads University library database. These databases were used between February and March 2013. Peer-reviewed academic journals publishing research incorporated in this study are: *Chinese Journal of Communication, Media, Culture & Society, International Communication Gazette, Cinema Journal, International Journal of Cultural Policy, Japanese Studies, Asian Studies Review, and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*. Keywords employed in the data search include 'soft power' or 'cultural soft power' or 'China soft power' or 'Asia soft power,' and 'animation' or 'China animation' or 'anime,' and 'East Asia culture market.' A review of sources cited in relevant published works identified further studies to consider, resulting in a pool of 69 articles for consideration. A sample size of ten studies was determined for analysis based upon studies following a similar meta-synthesis methodology.^{cxv} Identification of and arguments for inclusion of these ten studies appear in Table 1 in the appendix of this report.

CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

Inclusion criteria limited studies to those (1) investigating creative industries and transnational culture flows in East Asia, and those (2) investigating China's animation industry as situated in its culture economy. These were further limited to studies published in the past ten years to keep the analysis relevant to current discourse, and aware of China's official recognition of developing its soft

power resources, as seen in Hu Jintao's 2007 speech to the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.^{cxvi} Exceptions to the inclusion criteria of the past decade are Iwabuchi (1998) and Iwabuchi (2002) because of the author's contributions to knowledge regarding the cross-cultural acceptance of Japanese popular culture in East Asia and globally. This understanding has bearing on China's culture export ambitions, as Japan's culture industry success has provided a model that others, such as South Korea, have followed with similar success. Excluded are studies focusing on soft power and culture industries outside of East Asia, Western audience acceptance of Asian animation, and aesthetic or sociological analyses of animated content, in order to keep the sample focused on the East Asian market and on the political economy of culture. The themes identified above were broken down into three sub-themes each (identified below in the *Results and Discussion* section of this report), where data was further grouped and arranged on a chronological timeline in order to understand the evolutionary aspects within the main themes. Grouping the studies by publication date was not a significant factor due to the small sample size, and the study's narrow focus on East Asia. Similarly, grouping studies by method factored little in providing a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The process of deconstructing the studies in this sample and reconstructing the findings in a systematic manner has provided a deeper understanding of how cultural exports in East Asia serve as a soft power resource for individual states. Although these resources are not necessarily transferable to international

political influence, they do facilitate the branding of a nation as creative and attractive, which can provide economic benefits, a sense of national pride, and legitimacy in international diplomatic relations. This understanding can serve as a model through which to compare China's animation initiatives as situated in its creative economy, and national soft power goals. As China's soft power ambitions mirror these outcomes (situating its culture as internationally attractive in order to boost its creative economy, instill national pride, and present the nation as legitimate on the global diplomatic stage), this synthesis serves to answer how soft power successes in the East Asia culture market can inform China's global animation ambition.

Data in the ten studies comprising this research sample is coded under two main themes: *Media flows in East Asia*, and *China's animation industry as situated in its culture economy*. Both of these themes are broken down into three sub-themes. *Media flows in East Asia* analyzes Japan's rise as a cultural power, South Korea's success in appropriating the Japanese model, and how popular culture success transfers to soft power resources for producing states. *China's animation industry as situated in its cultural economy* analyzes the government's policies and support for its culture industries, the outcomes of government support in China's cultural sector, and the limitations affecting desired outcomes in China's culture economy.

MEDIA FLOWS IN EAST ASIA

Some scholars situate the successful transnational dissemination of cultural goods within a globalization of culture framework.^{cxxvii} Keane argues that as culture is disseminated and consumed

internationally, it becomes "*thingified*" (italics in original), and that "globalization has led to cultural entities spinning out of control of their makers: they are added to, modified and innovated upon."^{cxxviii} Data contend that, rather than local cultures' domination by foreign invasion, there is local capacity to assimilate influence, which spurs innovation.^{cxxix} Iwabuchi argues that "cultural borrowing, appropriation, hybridization and indigenisation are...common practices in the global cultural flow."^{cx} Iwabuchi claims further that the globalization of cultures is facilitated by transnational media corporations disseminating content to global markets, communication technologies connecting the world-over, the emergence of an affluent middle class in non-Western countries, and people moving about through migration and tourism.^{cxxi} Huang points to three ways that cultural products sell across national borders: cultural transparency, cultural difference, and hybridization.^{cxiii} In cultural transparency, products targeting world markets are generally not culturally specific, permitting audiences to project their own values and beliefs into them. In cultural difference, he identifies that foreign distinctiveness is attractive as a part of the global "cultural supermarket," and in hybridization, foreign influences are amalgamated into local cultural products, or alternatively, imported goods and services are tailored to a specific market through a process known as "glocalization" (global localization). Otmazgin asserts that, as Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and American commodities disseminate across East Asia, they represent the multi-directional cultural confluence in the region.^{cxviii} Huang points to a fondness for all things Japanese and Korean across East Asia as an example of cultural globalization reflecting the convergence of tastes in media, signified by the buzz-phrases,

“Japan-mania” and the “Korean wave.”^{cxixiv} This understanding of the globalization of culture provides a framework upon which to base the following analysis of soft power successes in the East Asian culture market—an analysis informing China’s animation industry ambitions as a part of their comprehensive soft power strategy.

JAPAN’S RISE AS A CULTURAL POWER

The data collected in this study’s sample supports the claim of Japan’s position as a cultural power in the East Asian region and beyond. Scholars contend that Japan is not only a successful economic model of industry, recognized for its marketed “hardware” products (automobiles, electronics, and telecommunication devices), but has also developed cultural power through the successful dissemination of its cultural “software” forms (animation, comics and characters, fashion, pop music, and television dramas).^{cxixv} Otmazgin cites 2005 figures from Japan’s Digital Content Industries that identify Japan as the world’s second largest producer of culture, capturing 9.5 percent of the global culture market, compared to the United States at 41 percent, China at 1.6 percent, and South Korea at 1.2 percent.^{cxixvi} Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry reports that three Japanese companies (Sony, Nintendo, and Sega) dominate the world’s computer games market, and Japan produces 65 percent of the world’s animation series, with offshoot sales of licensed goods reaching US \$17 billion.^{cxixvii} These statistics support claims of Japan’s cultural power, and the following analysis identifies factors that contribute to this rise.

Otmazgin contends that the popularity of Japanese culture with East

Asian audiences derives from Japan providing a “competitive alternative to American pop culture,”^{cxixviii} an alternative that offers East Asian audiences a “concrete and accessible model of what it is like to be modern.”^{cxixix} Iwabuchi claims that the basic model for Japan’s popular culture was American, where Japan “localized” (imitated and partly appropriated) Western influences “rather than being dominated by American products and colonized by America.”^{cxli} Huang argues that efforts in constructing a Japanese national identity, via the domestication of Western culture, established the model on which Japan based its culture production industry.^{cxlii} As Japanese cultural producers indigenized American culture in order to become “interpreters of the West for Asia,” there was an awareness that other East Asian culture industries could similarly appropriate and localize Japanese cultural products.^{cxliii} Researchers identify this influence as the region’s indigenous culture industries appropriating and localizing the Japanese model.^{cxliiii} This tells us that the power of Japanese popular culture in East Asia reaches beyond the popularity and sales of its products; it has shaped the region’s cultural market through its overall influence.

Otmazgin writes that the success of Japanese popular culture in East Asia through the 1990s “was driven by market forces, facilitated by the mechanism of commodifying and distributing culture, and invigorated by piracy.”^{cxliiv} The author identifies that East Asian governments recurrently banned or controlled the importation of American and Japanese cultural products in an effort to resist cultural imperialism, allegedly violent content, and the potential of ideological threat, as well as to protect their domestic industries.^{cxliiv} However, protectionist policies did not hamper the flow of

Japanese media in the region. This study's data provides an example of the role piracy played in Japan's cultural export successes, that is, others pirating Japanese content to consume. Scholars identify that, following Japan's reestablishment of diplomatic ties with China in 1972,^{cxlv} Taiwan banned all Japanese music, movies, and television programs until restrictions began lifting in 1993.^{cxlvii} Otmazgin observes that South Korea had similar restrictions until the establishment of a four-stage opening-up-policy in 1998.^{cxlviii} However, the author contends that throughout these periods of restriction, Japanese cultural products were widely available in both countries through pirate markets, distributed through street vendors, satellite broadcasting, illegal cable, and karaoke bars.^{cxlix} The outcome of this piracy was that, once restrictions lifted, a ready market led to wider consumption of Japanese products.^{cl} This example illustrates that, rather than negatively affecting Japan's culture industry, piracy in the East Asian culture market facilitated the dissemination and appreciation of Japanese media in the region. The impact of this dissemination went beyond simple consumer appreciation for Japanese media products, as Japanese entrepreneurs had established a successful production model that other producers in the region would emulate.

Otmazgin observes that, as East Asia presented expansion opportunities for Japan's cultural industries, Japanese collaborations with local East Asian media companies facilitated a knowledge transfer of Japanese-style cultural production and marketing.^{cli} Iwabuchi posits that, "because [Japanese cultural products] are universally consumed, they are destined to be copied and indigenized outside of Japan."^{clii} Ota (2004) provides South Korea as an example of this in its

appropriation of the Japanese television drama format, "a package of setting, cast, and music' with a tragic story of unrequited love."^{cliii} Scholars contend that Korea's appropriation of the Japanese model has successfully attracted audiences across East Asia, initiating what they identify as the "Korean wave."^{cliv}

SOUTH KOREAN SUCCESS IN APPROPRIATING THE JAPANESE MODEL

Chua argues that, along with Japan and China, South Korea has been striving to increase its regional soft power through the export of popular culture.^{clv} Shim contends that in a market once dominated by Japanese and American cultural products, a "Korean wave" has washed over East and Southeast Asia as audiences consume Korean TV dramas, movies, pop songs, and their associated celebrities.^{clvi} The author posits that media liberalization across the region, from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, facilitated the emergence of a strengthened domestic Korean culture industry, as well as success in the international dissemination of their media products.^{clvii} Scholars differentiate between the roads to Japanese and Korean success as, "Japan-mania [being] initiated by the ardent consumers of receiving countries (Nakano, 2002), while the Korean wave was facilitated by the Korean state in order to boost its culture industry (Ryoo, 2008)."^{clviii} Clearly, through the appropriation and indigenization of the Japanese model, other regional producers can find success in their cultural production and the dissemination of their products. The following section provides a deeper analysis of South Korea's cultural rise informed through the Japanese model.

Huang contends that media liberalization flooded the Korean market

with American products in the mid-1980s, raising fears that Korea's national culture would be overrun in modernization.^{clix} Data supporting this claim shows that Hollywood's share of the local film market rose from 53 percent in 1987, to 80 percent in 1994.^{clx} Shim attributes this imbalance to Korean audiences finding local films "poorly made, boring and often maudlin," as compared to Hollywood products.^{clxi} Data from the Korea Press Foundation shows that the Korean television industry was in equally dire straits due to channel expansion and satellite broadcasting, reflected in the rise of imported content from a monetary volume of US \$19.86 million in 1994 to \$42.82 million in 1995.^{clxii} To combat these trends, scholars identify the Korean government's establishment of a Culture Industry Bureau in 1994 to lure "corporate and investment capital into the local film industry," leading to major Korean business groups, such as LG, Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo expanding into the media sector.^{clxiii} To provide a legal basis for this governmental support, Choe points to the Basic Law for the Cultural Industry Promotion, enacted in 1999, which allocated a budget of \$148.5 million to the task of supporting and promoting Korea's culture industries.^{clxiv} Shim acknowledges that the large Korean companies folded their media operations following the economic crisis of 1997, but suggests that the industry had learned lessons in market research, production, distribution, and exhibition.^{clxv} He further argues that an influx of young talent from international film schools, combined with more lenient censorship policies (artists could now explore sensitive issues, such as North-South Korea relations or homosexuality), led to a string of critically recognized and profitable films.^{clxvi} This tide change in Korea's film industry led to similar initiatives in the development of its TV

and music industries, which are analyzed in the following section.

Shim identifies the official mantra for Korea's culture industry rejuvenation as "learning from Hollywood."^{clxvii} However, Huang argues that domestic and pan-regional success in copying the Japanese formula for "trendy" or "idol" television drama reveals how affected the industry was by Japanese media culture.^{clxviii} As with the successful dissemination of Japanese media in the region, Shim claims that a blending of Western and Asian beliefs (such as family values) allowed Korean cultural products to tap into Asian sentiments.^{clxix} As an example of Korea's export success, Shim points to a 1997 airing of the Korean drama *What is Love All About?* on China Central Television Station (CCTV), which proved so popular that it was re-broadcast in 1998 to the second highest ratings ever in Chinese television.^{clxx} Scholars observe that, since then, a string of Korean television dramas have filled airtime across East and Southeast Asia as broadcasters feed audience demand for Korean idol dramas, programs that are cheaper to purchase than Japanese or Hong Kong-produced television drama.^{clxxi} Shim argues that the Korean music industry saw a similar renaissance through media liberalization, as Korean musicians hybridized global styles, increasing a domestic interest that spread throughout East Asia via the regional music TV broadcaster, Channel V.^{clxxii} Macintyre notes that early "K-pop" music successes led to an "endless crop of imitation groups" that established Korea as the second largest music market in Asia, with \$300 million in album sales per year, as of 2002.^{clxxiii} Shim posits that market liberalization freed the Korean culture industries from public service, thereby allowing them to maximize profit by targeting the largest audiences possible for their cultural commodities,

domestically, regionally, and globally.^{clxxiv} Clearly, the indigenization of international styles and production models can inform China's global animation ambitions as situated in its cultural economy, and in support of its soft power goals. An analysis of how Japanese and Korean media successes translate to soft power resources follows.

SUCCESS OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN POPULAR CULTURE AS SOFT POWER RESOURCES

In identifying popular culture as a potential soft power resource, Otmazgin suggests that Nye's theory illuminates America's ability not only to intimidate and persuade others via hard power resources (military and economic strength), but to "entice, attract, and fascinate other countries and societies by its mass culture and ideals."^{clxxv} In this, the author argues that culture is a means of public relations, where commercial products carry and distribute values and beliefs, and if found attractive in foreign consumption, become soft power resources for their producers.^{clxxvi} Otmazgin presents Hollywood as an example of American culture as a soft power resource, as it "constantly extracts artistic innovations, translating them into accessible consumption products and marketing them worldwide."^{clxxvii} Huang offers East Asia as another example, where a fondness for all things Japanese and Korean, spawned by the popularity of these nations' exported television idol dramas, among other cultural commodities, underscores "how popular culture helps polish the image of a nation."^{clxxviii} As Hollywood provides soft power resources for America through the dissemination of an attractive Western culture to global markets, Japan and Korea derive soft power benefits from their idol dramas, as these products also

disseminate positive images of their national cultures to East Asian audiences. Chua argues that a positive influence on targeted foreign audiences is achievable through the attractiveness of one's culture.^{clxxix} However, Otmazgin suggests that there are limitations in cultural export success transferring to soft power resources for diplomatic use, because market forces, not governments, control the creation and dissemination of cultural products, and even when these products carry messages of cultural values, they do not oblige consumers to accept these ideals.^{clxxx} This tells us that nations can build soft power resources through the dissemination of their cultural products, but foreign audiences must appreciate these products in order to achieve this desired outcome. This is an important understanding that can inform China's soft power strategies.

The spread of Japanese popular culture in East Asia has arguably reasserted Japan's cultural superiority in the region, and the acceptance of its animation and video games globally stimulates what Iwabuchi claims is a "soft" nationalism in Japan: "a narcissistic discourse celebrating the transnational dissemination of Japanese 'software,' set against technical 'hardware.'" ^{clxxxi} As an example, the author cites Japanese scholars identifying young consumers of *Pokémon* in American markets regarding Japan as a "cool nation capable of producing such wonderful characters, imaginaries, and commodities."^{clxxxii} However, Iwabuchi argues that the "culturally odorless" nature of Japanese animation and video games drives their universal appeal, and that this appreciation does not necessarily equate to an appreciation of Japanese lifestyle or ideas, as there is little "Japaneseness" perceptible in them.^{clxxxiii} By "culturally odorless," Iwabuchi refers to the "erasure of racial or

ethnic characteristics and any context that would embed the characters in a particular culture or country.”^{clxxxiv} This data can address China’s domestic goal of developing national cohesion as a part of its soft power strategy, but further identifies that cultural attractiveness through the appreciation of media exports does not necessarily equate to marked cultural influence on global audiences.

As the dissemination of culture is a pillar of Nye’s conception of soft power, and in light of Japan’s international media industry success through the 1990s, Otmazgin identifies the Japanese government’s recognition of cultural products as profitable exports, as well as having the ability to boost Japan’s image overseas, as contributions to the nation’s diplomacy.^{clxxxv} Chua points out that in the early 2000s, recognition of Japan’s culture economy successes led to state financial and administrative support for the media industry, aimed at keeping Japan’s global pop culture (anime, J-pop music, film studios, game developers, and toy producers) competitive.^{clxxxvi} Otmazgin contends that the economic value of cultural exports is the government’s priority, and the diplomatic benefits are complementary.^{clxxxvii} Scholars suggest that prior to the 1990s, Japan’s government held back from framing cultural export successes as “soft power” due to regional memories of Japanese aggression during World War II, and fears of stoking a perception of Japanese cultural imperialism in the region.^{clxxxviii} In arguing that Japan’s governmental support of its culture industries was a result of the commodities’ transnational success, and not a pre-planned strategy, Otmazgin writes that there was “no obvious intention to disseminate subliminal Japanese values or ideals through popular culture.”^{clxxxix} The successful dissemination of these products was constituted through

consumerist choice, not a conscientious attempt of coercion by the state.^{cxc} The author further posits that, “Japanese cultural products represent a group of highly appreciated commodities which effectively disseminate new images of Japan,” providing East Asian youth with an alternative, contemporary view of Japanese society and culture, without generating authority, nor Japanese dominated “spheres of influence.”^{cxcii}

Data in this study’s sample relates soft power resources, accumulated through Japan and Korea’s cultural industries, with statistics identifying their regional cultural attractiveness. Taiwan’s Tourism Bureau reported that the number of Taiwanese tourists to Japan rose from 498,565 in 1995, to 1,309,847 in 2006, and in the same time frame, Taiwanese tourists to Korea rose from 100,959 to 363,122.^{cxciii} Scholars point to trendy dramas, in part, encouraging these visits, as regional travel agencies package TV drama-themed group tours to visit the shooting locations of the shows.^{cxciii} This attractiveness is further exemplified in Asians’ desire to learn the Korean language, where Sage (2005) reports that the Singaporean Inlingua School of Language witnessed a 60 percent increase in students learning Korean from 2001 to 2003.^{cxciv}

The data cited above provides examples of cultural attractiveness transferring to soft power resources, but does not explain the process that achieves these results. Huang argues that “nation branding” (the promotion of a nation through a planned marketing strategy) is not only a profile-raising tactic of a host nation, but is also a process where cultural influences are appropriated by receiving nations as a pattern of consumption.^{cxcv} In this, the author argues that Japanese-ness (and Korean-ness) is a transnational process, exemplified in the Taiwanese

consumption of Japanese and Korean cultural commodities.^{cxvii} In the Taiwanese example, scholars identify three steps in this process: (1) trendy dramas promote trans-Asian entertainment idols depicting positive images of Japan and Korea. (2) Taiwanese media signify Japanese and Korean cultures as stylish, commodifying and feeding the audience's obsession, and (3), local businesses exploit this popularity through product packaging, promotion, and advertising depicting positive images of Japanese and Korean culture, thereby encouraging the craze for all things Japanese and Korean.^{cxviii} Huang summarizes this data, contesting that the dynamic interaction of the cultural policies of nation states, marketing strategies of culture industries, and local appropriation supported by profit making in Taiwan's consumption of Japanese and Korean cultural products exemplifies how national cultures transcend borders and creates a hybrid form of consumption that does not result in cultural homogenization.^{cxviii}

Numerous factors that constitute the establishment of East Asia's culture market, and the production models and practices that have facilitated the successful dissemination of cultural products in the region can be identified in the above analysis. This data further relates how cultural attractiveness represented in media export success transfers to soft power resources for the producing states. This analysis provides a base from which to compare China's animation industry ambitions, as situated in its culture economy and overall soft power goals.

CHINA'S ANIMATION INDUSTRY AS SITUATED IN ITS CULTURE ECONOMY

In addressing the impetus for China's reformation of its culture sector,

Keane argues that China's motivation rests on two prevailing concerns. First, China's integration into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 led to worries of its culture industries being overrun by transnational media giants such as Time Warner and News Corporation.^{cxix} Second, China needed content to feed its expanded information and technology industries (China has ten million broadband subscribers, 70 million internet users, over 200 million cell phone subscribers, and many million digital TV subscribers), and this content is currently supplied by Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea.^{cc} This tells us that China's motives in reforming its cultural sector align with its stated soft power goals: building national cultural cohesion to resist the threat of media globalization, and an ability to compete economically in the regional and global cultural markets. In support of these goals, China has instituted policy and provided support for its culture industries, including its animation sector, described below.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND SUPPORT FOR CHINA'S CULTURE INDUSTRIES

Chua identifies China's official call to raise the nation's cultural soft power through the export of its popular culture products, and cites Li's argument that "China suffers from a general 'deficit in cultural trade.'" ^{cci} In addressing this shortcoming, Keane reports that China's government encourages its film industry to be self-reliant and engage with the economy.^{ccii} The author points to China's 11th Five Year Economic Development Plan, where focus shifted from technological infrastructure to the generation of media content, by identifying China's official efforts to stimulate the domestic animation and film sectors as a part of its soft power

strategy.^{cciii} This shift has resulted in increasing critical acclaim and box office success for China's film industry products, triggering official calls for the television, animation, and video games industries to follow suit.^{cciv}

Scholars contend that China's trump card in the global culture industry is its market size, with a potential base of 1.3 billion consumers.^{ccv} Chua writes that, in order to access this market, Chinese policy obliges regional and global companies to relocate or co-produce with local partners in order to by-pass official obstacles, such as bureaucracy in the state-owned industries, ideological content controls, and import quotas.^{ccvi} Chan argues that to limit competition for domestic producers, and despite economic reforms and an emphasis on openness, China's government maintains strict controls on media imports (books, newspapers, terrestrial television, satellite TV), and further, the government views television as a tool "to cultivate socialist values and weed out bourgeois influences."^{ccvii} Ishii suggests this data reflects the nationalistic leaning in China's media policy.^{ccviii} However, Lee (1991) argues that China's concern for the unidirectional nature of cultural imports, or the fear of cultural invasion, is unfounded, as empirical studies show that imports do not have so marked an effect.^{ccix} Rather than globalization weakening national culture and local knowledge, there is synergy where internationals work with locals to derive mutual benefit.^{ccx} Furthermore, as noted in the example of Taiwan, Ishii asserts that restrictive policies on cultural imports feed the piracy markets.^{ccxi} This data reveals China's defensive stance in its media policy. This restrictive policy runs counter to the examples set in the open Western and Japanese media markets, but is in line with Korean media policy. Ishii contends that China points to the Korean

example in defense of their restrictive media policies, where limiting competition through government restrictions on imported foreign content supports an official recognition of cultural industries as "wealth-creating" resources.^{ccxii} However, Keane points out that in China's case, over-protection and censorship has effectively alienated audiences.^{ccxiii} Data identifying China's official policies in its cultural sector provide grounding upon which to frame its specific policies and support for its developing animation industry.

In 2006, China's State Council announced its aim "to become a strong world power of creation, development, and production in the animation industry, and to develop the international market while gradually occupying the main domestic markets."^{ccxiv} This declaration reflects China's internal and external soft power goals, as it speaks to the desire of resisting external cultural influence in its domestic market, as well as the goal of positioning China as a cultural power in the global animation marketplace. Fu and Wang (2009) report that since 2006, China's government has invested large amounts of money in its animation sector "to boost the creation of original animation and development of domestic companies."^{ccxv} Keane identifies China's regard for animation as a new growth industry, and to fast track this growth, both national and regional governments support animation companies with financial incentives, as well as provide resources for the construction of animation "bases" (organized clusters established in industrial parks, grounded in the industrial economy model).^{ccxvi} Data in this study suggests that the formation of animation bases facilitates innovation through intellectual networking and the generation of original content, much in the manner that Silicon Valley and

Hollywood represent hubs of innovation in America.^{ccxvii} Keane points out that the grouping model pulls media and culture activity toward regional centres that support efficiencies through “network consolidation, research and development capacity, distribution management and joint venture management,”^{ccxviii} with a goal of producing “national champions” with the ability to challenge international media conglomerates.^{ccxix} Keane argues that the grouping model is a “deliberate attempt to refashion the Chinese bureaucratic network...into a new quasi-oligopoly that is informed by global business trends,”^{ccxx} a model that Keane further argues facilitates supervision by government officials.^{ccxxi} The following section will discuss results of China’s policy and support for its cultural industries.

OUTCOMES OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR CHINA’S CULTURAL SECTOR

Data in this study’s sample report on early results of China’s strategies to boost its animation industry through financial incentives, the institution of animation bases, and restrictive content import policies. Ishii confirms the establishment of 70 animation parks where more than 6,000 comic and animation companies are primarily based, employing 200,000 workers.^{ccxxii} Wu reports that these efforts have increased the production of animated content from 46,000 minutes between 1993 and 2003 to 200,000 minutes in 2008.^{ccxxiii} In addition, Ishii points out that, as of 2009, the government has supported a number of animation contests and festivals, as well as offering animation and cartooning majors at 1,800 schools, including 447 universities.^{ccxxiv} This tells us that government support has had some positive results in the expansion of

China’s animation industry infrastructure. However, these successes can be partially attributed to China’s restrictive media policy. Ishii reports that in 2006, China’s government banned all domestic broadcasters from airing foreign animation during the prime-time hours of 5-8 PM in efforts to protect the development of domestic animation production, and to counter the perceived negative effects of Japanese anime on China’s youth (criticized for promoting violence and obscenity).^{ccxxv} Ishii contends that these control policies cannot be justified simply by their economic effects and that they reflect the nationalistic requirements the government imparts on the animation industry.^{ccxxvi} The author acknowledges that these broadcast policies have been effective in limiting foreign animated content on television, as domestic productions constitute 70 percent of all animation broadcast in China.^{ccxxvii}

Despite government investment and broadcast control policies, Ishii argues that China has yet to achieve its intended results in the animation sector, as many Chinese consumers of animation remain devoted fans of Japanese anime (downloaded or streamed online), and the few domestic animated shows that have been popular are primarily targeted at young children.^{ccxxviii} Furthermore, government-dictated educational and patriotic themes in Chinese animation have difficulty in attracting buyers in export markets, as regional audiences relate such pedagogy with socialism.^{ccxxix} Keane further argues that, despite the large market, revenue generated from selling animation in China can be less than 15 percent of production budgets, due to the low rights fees paid by the state-owned broadcasters.^{ccxxx} Keane notes that, to help close this gap, incentives such as one year’s free rent are offered to

companies located in the regional animation bases, and financial bonuses are paid to productions airing on CCTV.^{ccxxxii} Keane further identifies that companies can also generate returns through the merchandising of branded content, however, with success comes imitation, and “fake” brand products can flood the market.^{ccxxxiii}

LIMITATIONS AFFECTING THE DESIRED OUTCOMES IN CHINA’S CULTURE ECONOMY

Keane argues that, “China’s cultural economy is situated precariously between innovation and imitation.”^{ccxxxiii} He contends that, despite government-sanctioned slogans promoting innovation, this innovation is primarily occurring in the formatting and distribution stages of the value chain, and not in the creative/conceptual stage where innovation leads to the creation of proprietary goods that hold value.^{ccxxxiv} He writes, “Decades of regimented conformity and state regulation have created an ‘innovation deficit effect’” (restrictive policies in the parameters of innovation provide little motivation to innovate), and where innovation does exist, it is due to “entrepreneurial opportunities and economic liberation,”^{ccxxxv} not governmental policy. Keane further argues that impediments in the distribution segment of the value chain have a negative effect on China’s creative/cultural industry success.^{ccxxxvi} In this, large numbers at either end of the chain (creators at one end, consumers at the other) exert pressure on the middle links (government officials who control licensing and permits for television, or make funding decisions), which are “stymied by institutional rigidities.”^{ccxxxvii} Furthermore, data points to piracy and the bartering of services and content as restricting the capacity for creative

enterprises to grow, and “*guanxi*” (informal relationships and networks) hinders professionalism and the implementation of international standards and best practices.^{ccxxxviii} This data identifying the limitations in China’s overall culture economy is applicable to China’s animation industry as well, as can be seen in the following section, which analyzes the specific limitations in this sector.

In 2006, China’s State Council announced that China’s animation industry “is important in terms of satisfying the spiritual and cultural requirements of the Chinese people,” and therefore must promote socialism, provide moral and ethics education for children, and meanwhile advance the economic strength of the culture industry.^{ccxxxix} In operationalizing this proclamation, Keane identifies the government charging “small screen” industries to target domestic markets to reduce the impact of foreign influence and competition.^{ccxl} Ishii points to official slogans, such as “rejuvenation of Chinese animation,” as an indicator of the nationalistic interests motivating control policies.^{ccxli} Supporting this, Ishii points to China’s government approving “almost no new foreign animation programmes since 2006.”^{ccxlii} However, Fu and Wang (2009) claim that despite the large government investment in China’s animation sector, only 15 percent of the companies producing animation and comics were profitable in 2009.^{ccxliii} Keane argues that this is due to the Chinese animation industry as being raw, adept at cutting corners, and creatively constrained by government content prescriptions.^{ccxliv} He further contends that China’s position in the global animation economy is that of a low-cost service provider for international television animation production.^{ccxlv} Over the past decade, the

global animation industry has transformed from a focus on children's cartoons, to an industry attracting older audiences through the mature themes provided in anime and 3D/CGI films.^{ccxlvii} Through general findings of a questionnaire survey, Ishii reveals that pirated Japanese animation is widely viewed by China's adolescents online, while televised domestic animation is only popular among children.^{ccxlviii} Keane identifies three factors that limit China's ability to create original, popular animated content: (1) The prescribed market for animation in China is children, thereby limiting the business development model, leaving a large market of teens and adults untapped. (2) Pedagogical content with educational and patriotic themes in Chinese animation restricts regional exports, as audiences in Taiwan, Japan, and Korea are not interested in the socialist-leaning content. (3) The government predetermines the criteria for themes and ideas, so there is no motivation in the industry to be creative or innovative.^{ccxlix} Furthermore, attaining government support for production is based on adherence to policy, not on the quality of the product. As a result, "the industry is locked into [a] low-value circular flow of product and ideas."^{cccl}

Data in this study sample identify Japan's cultural power in East Asia, where regional appreciation of their cultural products translates into soft power resources for the state. The successful dissemination of Japanese media products has shaped the East Asian culture market and provided a model for regional producers to emulate. South Korea exemplifies this in the successful export of their television drama, movie, and pop music commodities, where the Japanese model informs production and dissemination. This understanding is juxtaposed with China's reformation of its

cultural sector in support of its soft power goals. China has instituted policy in support of its culture industry and financed the promotion of Chinese culture internationally. However, a tendency to imitate rather than innovate, restrictive policies on domestic content and foreign media imports, a systematic lack of professionalism in employing international best practices, and a combination of wide-spread piracy and low rights fees paid by state broadcasters limit China's equitable participation in the regional culture market. In its animation sector, financial incentives, and the establishment of animation bases and schools support the goal of developing and producing original animated content. Yet government policy dictates that animation be produced only for the education of children, limiting the domestic audience base, as well as restricting exports due to regional lack of interest in the didactic paradigm of Chinese animation.

CONCLUSION

China's official and academic discourse on soft power acknowledges the necessity for the development and promotion of its creative industries and culture, domestically and internationally, to complement its hard power resources represented in its rapid economic rise. These efforts are designed to nurture a cohesive national identity through which to unite China's numerous ethnicities, as well as support China's "peaceful rise," offsetting regional and global fears of a "China threat" in its ambition to establish itself as a global power. Japan's cultural power in East Asia presents a successful model for the production and dissemination of cultural commodities, a model replicated by the creative industries of South Korea. Entrepreneurs expanding the market potential of their

products initiated Japan's cultural rise, and the widespread appreciation of these commodities, initially supported by the piracy of goods, not only established an international culture market in East Asia, but also helped construct a pan-Asian identity through the dissemination and appropriation of these products. Successes in the East Asian culture markets have provided soft power resources for host nations exporting their media commodities, and can inform China's global animation ambitions. China has some global success in its film sector, but its creative industries remain challenged by official structural and systematic restrictions. Ideological concerns remain a lingering obstacle for innovation in the creative sector. The monitoring and control of imported media limits the ability to assimilate global styles into local products and encourages the piracy markets, which further limits any return on investment. Tasking small screen industries with targeting domestic audiences and animation with educating China's children further limits innovation and constrains creators and producers ability to target export markets. These controls hamper innovation in China's creative industries and, therefore, restrict the ability to create high value, proprietary products and services. An understanding of globalization and the transnational nature of cultural media flows informs the challenges facing China's ambition to participate in the lucrative global animation industry. China's geographic and cultural proximity with the East Asian market (especially with Mandarin-speaking audiences in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and dispersed across the globe) provides a massive potential audience for China's cultural commodities. As China's political and economic influence grows, a soft power approach to the dissemination of animated content permits localization of the Chinese culture across the East Asian

region and beyond. As there is a long return cycle on investment in animated content, future studies will be better able to gauge the success of China's initiatives and policies in support of its animation industry.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Studies included in the systematic literature review

Included Studies:	Purpose of Study	Research Design	Findings
Chua, B. (2012)	To analyze the East Asian pop culture industry through the context of broadcast television in China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary research • Content analysis 	China's control policy on media imports facilitates an ability to determine the content of transnational productions, due to regional producers' desire for the large Chinese market
Huang, S.(2011)	To analyze Taiwanese acceptance of Japanese and Korean cultural imports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary research • Content analysis 	The dynamics of state-sponsored policies promoting a nation's cultural industries, and consumer acceptance in receiving nations, contribute to the globalization of culture in East Asia
Ishii, K.(2013)	To study audience preference for either domestic or foreign animated content in China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary research • Intercept surveys 	Chinese adolescents prefer pirated Japanese content (which does not significantly correlate with anti-government attitudes), and domestic animation is primarily favored by China's children
Iwabuchi, K. (1998)	To explore factors contributing to Japanese media export successes in the East Asian culture market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary research • Content analysis 	Producers' marketing strategies, local industries finding economic value in promoting Japanese products, and the "culturally odorless" nature of Japanese media products contribute to Japanese

			success in the East Asian culture market
Iwabuchi, K. (2002)	An examination of the effects global acceptance of its popular culture has on nationalism in Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary research • Content analysis 	Japanese popular culture export successes engender a nationalist, narcissistic discourse in Japan. However, these successes only look strong when one discounts the contemporary, decentered nature of global culture
Keane, M. (2004)	To identify factors affecting China's efforts in developing its creative economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary research • Content analysis 	Identifies the creativity deficit challenging China's global animation ambitions, and the ideological, political, and economic factors that will determine China's ability to brand its culture for export to regional and global markets
Keane, M. (2009)	Examines the challenges facing China's animation industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary research • Content analysis 	Identifies the systematic changes required (transfer of ideas and tacit knowledge) for Chinese animation success
Keane, M. (2010)	Examines the importance of cultural soft power in the reformation of China's creative industries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary research • Content analysis 	The success of Japan and Korea's cultural exports exemplify how soft power can promote a sense national pride and economic success through the regional commodification of cultures

Otmazgin, N. K. (2008)	An exploration of Japan's cultural power in East Asia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary research • Mixed methods • Content analysis • Market surveys • Interviews 	Japan provides new varieties of cultural consumption options for regional consumers, establishing a successful industrial model for others to follow, rather than creating Japanese-dominated "spheres of influence"
Shim, D. (2005)	Analyzes factors contributing to the dissemination and acceptance of Korean pop culture in Asia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary research • Content analysis 	In the shift toward globalization, the author identifies the potential of Asia's cultural hybridization to counter imperial domination (primarily American)

ⁱ Wenjie Li, "An Analysis on the Diversified Extension Strategy for China's Animation Industry," *Asian Social Science* 5, no. 3 (2009): 178.

ⁱⁱ Kenichi Ishii, "Nationalism and Preferences for Domestic and Foreign Animation Programmes in China," *International Communication Gazette* 75, no. 2 (2013): 227.

ⁱⁱⁱ Michael Keane, "Keeping Up with the Neighbors: China's Soft Power Ambitions," *Cinema Journal* 49, no. 3 (2010): 130.

^{iv} Michael Keane, "From Made in China to Created in China," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 9, no. 3 (2006): 285,6.

^v Ibid., 131.

^{vi} Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, "Commodifying Asian-ness: Entrepreneurship and the Making of East Asian Popular Culture," *Media, Culture & Society* 33, no. 2 (2011): 259, 60.

^{vii} Ibid., 259.

^{viii} Ibid., 260.

^{ix} See: Stephanie H. Donald, "Little Friends: Children and Creative Consumption in the People's Republic of China," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 7, no. 1 (2004): 45-53; Ishii, "Nationalism and Preferences;" Beng Huat Chua, "The Regionalization of Television and China," *Chinese Journal of Communication* 5, no.1 (2012): 16-23; Koichi Iwabuchi, "'China.' Japan's Chimera, and Media Cultural Globalization," *Cinema Journal* 49, no. 3 (2010): 149-153; Keane, "From Made;" Michael Keane, "Between the Tangible and the Intangible: China's New Development Dilemma," *Chinese Journal of Communication* 2, no. 1 (2009): 77-91; Weihua Wu, "In Memory of Meishu Film: Catachresis and Metaphor in Theorizing Chinese Animation," *Animation: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 4, no. 1 (2009): 31-54.

^x Keane, "From Made."

^{xi} See: Michael Barr, "Nation Branding As Nation Building: China's Image Campaign," *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 29, (2011): 81-94, doi:10.1007/s12140-011-9159-7; Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, "China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects," *Asian Survey* 48, no. 3 (2008): 453-472; Joseph Nye and Jisi Wang, "Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties for China's Soft Power," *Harvard International Review* 31, no. 2 (2009): 18-22; Su Tong, "Cultural Resources, Creative Industries and the Long Economy," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 9, no. 3 (2006): 307-316; Xiaojiang Yu, Kazuyuki Takata, and Estelle Dryland, "Cultural Attraction, 'Soft Power' and Proximity: the Popularity of Japanese Language in Hong Kong Since the 1980s," *Journal of Cultural Geography* 29, no. 3 (2012): 315-336.

^{xii} Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 18.

^{xiii} Ibid., 18.

^{xiv} Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly: An Analysis of China's Soft Power," *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 23, no. 4 (2006): 23.

^{xv} Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 18.

^{xvi} Ibid.

^{xvii} Ibid.

^{xviii} Ibid., 19.

^{xix} Barr, "Nation Branding," 83.

^{xx} Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly;" Gregory G. Holyk, "Paper tiger? Chinese Soft Power in East Asia," *Political Science Quarterly* 126, no. 2 (2011): 223-254; Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions;" Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, "The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: A Comparative Study of China and Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary China* 17, no. 56 (2008): 425-447.

^{xxi} Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 18.

^{xxii} Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly," 24.

^{xxiii} Holyk, "Paper tiger?" 227.

^{xxiv} Wang and Lu, "The Conceptions of Soft Power," 446.

^{xxv} Ibid.

^{xxvi} Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 458.

^{xxvii} Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions." Wendy Su, "New Strategies of China's Film Industry as Soft Power," *Global Media and Communication* 6, no. 3 (2010): 317-322.

^{xxviii} Barr, "Nation Branding," 82.

^{xxix} Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly," 33.

^{xxx} Barr, "Nation Branding," 82; Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 20.

^{xxxi} Wang and Lu, "The Conceptions of Soft Power," 434.

^{xxxii} Ibid., 435.

^{xxxiii} Ibid.

^{xxxiv} Ibid., 435, 6.

^{xxxv} Ibid., 436.

^{xxxvi} Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 456.

^{xxxvii} Barr, "Nation Building," 81; Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 458; Wang and Lu, "The Conceptions of Soft Power," 445.

^{xxxviii} Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 461.

xxxix Ibid., 462-5; Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 19.

xl Ibid., 19.

xli Holyk, "Paper tiger?" 225; Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly," 29.

xlii Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 454; Holyk, "Paper Tiger?" 225; Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly," 29.

xliii Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 19.

xliv Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly," 38.

xlv Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 19.

xlvi Wang and Lu, "The Conceptions of Soft Power," 439.

xlvii Ibid., 427.

xlviii Ibid.

xlix Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 470.

l Ibid., 454.

li Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 19.

lii Ibid.

liii Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 454.

liv Barr, "Nation Building," 81.

lv Alan Hunter, "Soft Power: China on the Global Stage," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, (2009): 373.

lvi Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 471.

lvii Ibid.

lviii Wang and Lu, "The Conceptions of Soft Power," 439.

lix Ibid., 429.

lx Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly," 29.

lxi Su, "New Strategies," 318.

lxii Ibid.

lxiii Barr, "Nation Building," 87.

lxiv Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly," 35,8.

lxv Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 454.

lxvi Su, "New Strategies," 319.

lxxvii Nye and Wang, "Hard Decisions," 19.

lxxviii Yu, Takata, and Dryland, "Cultural Attraction," 326.

lxxix Ibid.

lxxx Gabriella Lukacs, "Iron Chef Around the World: Japanese Food Television, Soft Power, and Cultural Globalization," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 13, no. 4 (2010): 418.

lxxxi Yoshiko Nakano, "Who Initiates a Global Flow? Japanese Popular Culture in Asia," *Visual Communication* 1, no. 2 (2012): 233.

lxxxii Ibid., 234.

lxxxiii Tong, "Cultural Resources," 309.

lxxxiv Otmazgin, "Commodifying Asian-ness," 259.

lxxxv Otmazgin, "Commodifying Asian-ness," 272.

lxxxvi Dal Yong Jin, "Reinterpretation of Cultural Imperialism: Emerging Domestic Market vs Continuing US Dominance," *Media, Culture & Society* 29, no. 5 (2007): 753.

lxxxvii Ibid., 760.

lxxxviii Keane, "From Made," 288-90.

lxxxix Ibid., 288.

lxxx Ibid.

lxxxxi Ibid., 289.

lxxxii Ibid.

lxxxiii Ibid.

lxxxiv Ibid., 290.

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cxlvi In October 1949, following a twenty-year civil war between China's Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung, the Communists overthrew the Nationalists and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole ruler of mainland China. The Nationalist government retreated to the island of Taiwan and set up a separate independent government, the Republic of China (ROC), also claiming to be the sole ruler of all China. Following US President Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to mainland China, both the United States and Japan abandoned Taiwan politically, and established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Alice Shih, "A Brief History of Taiwan's Film Industry," *Cineaction 85* (2011): 63,7.

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clv Chua, "The Regionalization," 20.

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cxciiv Huang, "Nation-Branding," 15.

ccxcix Keane, "Brave New World," 268.

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EAST ASIA'S CURRENT CHALLENGES

An Interview with Ezra Vogel, Professor Emeritus, Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University

Alan Hatfield

Princeton University

On March 29th, 2014, Alan Hatfield (Princeton University Class of 2015), interviewed Ezra F. Vogel concerning the early days of East Asian studies in the United States, changing U.S. perceptions of Asia, and the challenges the region now faces. Vogel is author of *Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968* (1969), *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (1979), and more recently, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (2011) and *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (2011), among other books.

AH: *So, I want to start off by asking you about your work in general. How would you describe yourself in a professional capacity?*

EV: Well, I'm retired now, but I got my tenure at Harvard in 1967. I was the successor to John Fairbank as the second head of the Harvard East Asian Research Center, with a main objective of trying to oversee work that Harvard did in East Asia. Since I was a specialist on both China and Japan, I felt that it was my responsibility to introduce both to Harvard and to the broader world information about East Asia. So, I've taught courses in Chinese society and Japanese society, and when Harvard developed a core curriculum committee, I was in charge of a course called Industrial East Asia, which tried to compare with Western industrial development with what was happening in East Asia as it was just emerging. So we looked at not just one,

but a number of Southeast Asian nations and tried to find what was the nature of those industrial societies. In 1972, Harvard started the concentration in East Asian Studies for undergraduates, and I was in charge of that. So, for about 18 years, my job was to build up the program for undergraduates. Specialists in East Asia numbered about 15 a year initially, and by the time I retired there were over 50 graduating annually. In the late 70s, when Japan was seen as the giant threat, I thought I ought to help warn Americans by writing about Japan and putting it in a constructive way, saying, "Here are some things that Japan does well. Why don't we use this competition in a way that serves us for the better?" In the end, that became my book *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America*.

AH: *So, the book was meant to prevent a generally negative and unconstructive reaction to Japan caused by national competition?*

EV: Well, we were in trade wars at the time to try to cope with the first country that really seemed to be a threat to our economic balance. When I retired in 2000, I decided that rather than continue to teach, my main responsibility was to try to write something that really deepened American understanding of East Asia, and of course the biggest thing at the time was the rise of China. I felt if I could help Americans and the rest of the Western world understand what was going on in China, then that would be a contribution.

So, I wrote a book on Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China, and I think that has played a role in helping inform Americans about the rise of China. Harvard Press publishes about 100 books a year, and my book was the bestseller of its year. Then when it was translated into Chinese in Hong Kong, it did very well. It also did well in Taiwan, Singapore, and many places with significant Chinese diaspora communities. Then, I found a Chinese publisher who was able to get the essence of the book through censors in mainland China for a January 2013 publication.

AH: *What was the response to the book like in China? Did you face any opposition or backlash for diverging from the CCP's historical narrative at times?*

EV: In its first year, the book sold 720,000 copies across China and was the best seller of any foreign scholar. I think it was used by China to describe Deng in the context of the transformation and as a means of defining what China is. I was also allowed to publish some things on Tiananmen that others Chinese authors were not able to publish. They used my book as a way of letting the public understand more about the period and some of the context. It was an awful thing to gun down students. The book describes that horror, giving an overall objective account of how Deng responded in his attempt to keep stability but also continue reform and opening. Since that time, I've been inundated by invitations to go to China, and I try to respond as best I can. The book is not just a full-length biography, but attempts to give an understanding of Deng the person to explain the context for the major decisions he made during reform and opening.

AH: *You have a piece in the Japan Times in which you discuss the intimate impact of historical interactions between Japan and China on diplomacy between the two countries. Is China's growing assertiveness catalyzing a radicalization of rhetoric in the region and strengthening this sense of history?*

EV: When a country rises, it always disturbs the surrounding status quo. But, in the end, the response of the surrounding countries determines how big of a problem it can be. And since the United States is still the dominant power in that part of the world, I think that the resolution of the problem is also affected by the American response. Right now, the Obama Administration is trying to preserve the perspective that has predominated since Nixon, namely that the United States needs to remain engaged with China. In case they should become too aggressive, the U.S. would certainly use the system of alliances built up in the region to defend territory. The U.S. has continued that policy and tried to be prepared even when China becomes very assertive. I suspect there's a dispute within China now whether, because of the pushback from neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam, the country should stick to a more peaceful process of growth. As you know, there are tensions with many countries, especially with Japan over territories like the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Tokyo at this point is worried. Recently the Prime Minister of Syria said Japan is their best friend in the region, so I think there are many places where you can sense the rising concern with China's willingness to cooperate. That being said, there are still many voices within China that advocate peaceful solutions.

AH: *How relevant will American patronage and the system of alliances in the region remain? Do you feel the general mindset of American*

policymakers to be conducive to a cooperative relationship with China in the future?

EV: Various top leaders in the State Department understand that we have to engage positively with China and get them involved in a constructive way as a stakeholder in global affairs. But as you know, in Congress, there are a lot of voices that prioritize their political party and interests above the national good by using generally unconstructive rhetoric. There are real problems in the U.S. in the political realm that provide obstacles to a working relationship with China. If only rational people were in charge in various countries, then that would be one thing, but all of these people are moved by other forces as well. China has now ramped up patriotic appeals toward Japan, so you have a situation where a lot of people have become victims of their own propaganda, giving their government less flexibility at the same time.

AH: Do you also interpret a parallel rise in Japanese nationalism and militarism?

EV: There is an increase in nationalism in countries that feel threatened, so as China overtakes Japan in overall GNP, spends a lot more on its military, and puts pressure on Japanese-administered territories, it will have ramifications on Japanese policies. For instance, within the last few years China once allowed students to throw stones at Japanese consular officials in Beijing for a few hours. Many Chinese people still feel World War II very strongly, and this sentiment has also seen a recent increase with patriotic education, which includes frequent airing of anti-Japanese movies about World War II. In 1980, shortly after Deng visited Japan, 78% of the Japanese population polled had a favorable rating of China. It's now down to below 10%.

AH: With recent outbursts in violence across China, including those in Xinjiang, what challenge is regionalism leveling against China's political and social hierarchies? Do you think persuasive competing regional identities in China might come out of the woodwork in the near future?

EV: If one thinks back to the 19th and early 20th centuries, regionalism then was a natural function of people's lack of geographic mobility. People in one locality didn't know much outside of their own localities, so one region did not necessarily oppose another. Rather, people generally had very limited horizons. In the traditional Chinese imperial system a unified official class represented the nation as a whole. Officials were cycled between the capital and various regions, but most people were bound to their locality. After the centralization of power at the end of 1949, there was a concerted government effort to control regionalism more tightly. Unlike in the case of the Soviet Union, in which half of the total population had local ethnic identities, only seven percent of the Chinese population identified as a distinct ethnic minority. Despite diversity of language within specific regions, those regional identities did not severely threaten the idea of the Han Chinese people. For instance, the dominant language of much of the South before Mandarin was Cantonese. If one went the Pearl River and its main tributaries, Cantonese was dominant. However, in the mountainous areas, languages like Hakka and Chaozhou were more prominent. Then, in addition there were small numbers of Li and Miao. So even within Guangdong, there were lots of sub-identities.

AH: Do you see regionalism as more of a threat to these solidified national identities in the region as a whole or in China more specifically?

EV: China's most dangerous regional threats come specifically from Tibet and Xinjiang. I wouldn't be surprised if 10 to 15 years from now the Korean minority of Northern China experiences a similar regional conflict. However, as a whole, national culture has grown since 1949 and especially since 1978 with reform and opening that increased mobility. As in the United States, regional accents have declined since the advent of television, so that Mandarin has become more entrenched across China. The regions have been brought into a more extensive state system. When Mao took over the country in 1949, he tried to get people from a local region who were part of the Communist ruling structure to dig Communist roots at the local level. Several years later, he transferred them back to Beijing, just as governors in the past traditionally wouldn't serve where they might work with locals against the central government. This prevented localism from developing into challenges to central authority. Of course local sentiments remain, but generally not so strong as in Tibet where you have a strong local identification of culture and, along with it, a desire for local autonomy. In Xinjiang with the Uighurs it's the same way, but across most of China, the Han civilizational identity has only been solidified.

AH: *I want to ask about urbanization and resource management, which I think are two really interconnected questions. The status quo is telling of issues in air quality, water quality, and in the management of other resources. Taking into account the historical imbalance in development between the coastal provinces and the interior, what kinds of pressures do you think will come into play? Do you think China will be able to deal effectively with the growth in its polluting, coal-fueled industries as well?*

EV: There are many serious problems that add to the pollution. One of the biggest is soft coal, which is a primary source of pollution. However, most people don't realize that the coal supply isn't predicted to last much more than 15 years, so there will eventually be a severe shortage of coal. The water shortage is much more severe. The water table continues to shrink, and the effects of global warming could also see the supplies from mountainous areas such as Tibet decline significantly as well. The air pollution now has suddenly gotten much worse in the last few years and this causes many other problems. Many foreigners working in Beijing and Shanghai who have families are considering moving outside China. Cosmopolitan, world-class scientists who have opportunities abroad may decide to take advantage of those opportunities. Now, to get pollution in control, the leadership has focused more on solar, wind, and other renewable forms of power, but their main goal is a vast increase in nuclear power. By 2050, they expect to generate about the same percentage of their energy from nuclear power as United States does today. So, they really do have a long way to go.

AH: *How does this play into urbanization? With such a huge mobile workforce shuttling to and from cities on an annual or seasonal basis, how is the state's ability to deliver key services affected?*

EV: They now have 50% of people living in cities compared to 20% back in 1979. I think the biggest problem is the growth of heavy industry, automobiles, and transport. Cities have now begun to install rapid transit as a means of curbing automobile sales. For several years, Guangzhou was installing one whole subway line per year. Despite measures intended to fight such a steep rise in automobiles, there are now more sold

annually in China than in the U.S., and the pollution from cars has become serious. At the same time, China's steel production has jumped from roughly 30 million tons a year in 1979 to 600 millions tons annually, or roughly half of global production, in the course of only thirty years. These kinds of growth rates in heavy industries and in automobiles require tremendous amounts of energy, so it's not the urbanization itself that has put such a strain on natural resources, but mostly the expansion of these two sectors.

AH: *What about the urban poor? Do these trends put strains on them in a way that might lead to the articulation of class tension?*

EV: The government has tried to slow down migration to major cities because it couldn't provide a sufficient level of urban services to new or temporary residents. Restrictions put in place were meant to avoid the difficulty of registering such a huge number of new residents, and economic policy was designed to reduce the geographic inequality of development between coastal provinces and those inland. In fact, even urban residents who do not have household registration remain optimistic and are willing to work very hard. If I were a leader, I would be less worried about these migrants without registration and more about the bright guys who go to school with kids who don't have to exert themselves to get a good job because their fathers are high officials. Nepotism and favoritism are actually the most provocative of inequalities and have been for quite a while now. So, I think the most serious tensions come from those people who work hard and see their opportunities taken away unfairly by their classmates.

AH: *As far as North Korea is concerned, how resilient is that state, and if it were to destabilize or take over-aggressive action, would China still*

see it in its best interests to continue to stand by as North Korea's main partner?

EV: Economic conditions are generally better than during the devastating famine in the early 1990s, but there are serious tensions in the transition of power to Kim Jong-Un, as one can see from the execution of his uncle. The Chinese are very aware that a nuclear North Korea could cause an arms race, especially the re-militarization of Japan and a similar re-armament in South Korea. Japan might even go nuclear depending on how large of a threat it perceives. So, China has already distanced itself from North Korea and has made very clear its concern for the future reunification of the peninsula and I think they have understood that they will have to work with and through South Korea in the future, making a shift in policy necessary in the short to mid-range future.

AH: *The other day, a UN report on human rights released and compared statistics on national use of the death penalty, placing China at the top. The issue of human rights does seem to appear frequently in debates surrounding China. Do you feel that criticism of China's human rights record will remain a rhetorical tool in the future or will there have to be a change in government policy towards the detained?*

EV: A lot of the people who make criticisms about human rights often don't think of the context or consequences of their actions. But, it can be a vicious cycle. For instance, in Tibet—Americans like to complain about the way that they are treated and then Tibetans, thinking that the United States will support them, agitate to the point of a crackdown. It just tends to keep the Tibetans in an unproductive cycle. A lot of people will feel good about themselves as they drive around with a bumper sticker, without thinking about the need for the

governments of other countries to act in the face of agitation. It is true that leaders now need to find a way to be more considerate, but at the same time you can't ignore the need of governments to respond in a certain way to internal unrest, especially if facilitated by outside interference.