PREFACE

The student essays included in this issue were submitted as term papers for the Princeton University seminar “Anxious Megalopolis: Shanghai's Urban Cultures (1842-2012),” which took place in the fall of 2012 and included a trip to Shanghai over fall break. The course was a pedagogical experiment, aimed at bringing together students from several different departments both within and outside the humanities, whether they had chosen Western or non-Western areas of study. One of its goals was to break away from an increasingly obsolete division into East and West by focusing on a great metropolis that served for decades as a crucible for a vibrant cosmopolitan culture. Shanghai was an ideal laboratory for such a project, as it grew over the centuries to become a bustling port, colonialist beachhead, a hub of international commerce in the 1930s, a showcase for the Communist regime, and a major testing ground for contemporary urban culture. As a crucial interface between East and West, Shanghai was a place where stereotypes were forged and discarded, and both national and transnational cultures and counter-cultures flourished.

Yet if the city straddled the divide between East and West, it did so under the ugly face of imperialism due to the opium wars that brought Europe, the United States, and Japan to China. It is a particularly exciting to work on this material now that traditional narratives of the city, as framed by Western scholars, are being challenged. It was in this spirit that the students approached their work, which tried to bring fresh perspectives to the written history of this great urban center. Their papers range widely across the last hundred years or so, and are the fruit of new research supplemented by a trip to Shanghai. Taken as a whole, they reflect different aspects of the city’s multiple urban cultures, such as the buildings erected by the Europeans in the International Settlement, the community of Jewish exiles fleeing Nazi persecution who were granted refuge in the city, the new themed towns in Western styles built by the Shanghai Municipality in the outskirts, gated communities, and the reconfiguration of a large swath of urban fabric to make way for Shanghai Expo 2010. The diversity, originality, and new approaches reflected in these papers are a tribute to the students’ enthusiasm and engagement with the project of the class as a whole and their commitment to broaden the ways in which this great city is seen.

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The Canidrome to the Culture Square: Creating Modernity in Shanghai

Cara Eckholm

Shanghai of the 1930s and the Shanghai of the last decade are often juxtaposed as “Old” and “New” Shanghai. The two periods have much in common: in both eras, Shanghai was a commercial hub. As investments poured in from the rest of the world, so did people coming both to glimpse and to reap the rewards of this center of international trade. In response to this, Shanghai expanded anxiously, and, in incorporating “foreign” elements into industries like architecture and entertainment, its cityscape began to change. Native power structures, however, reacted very differently to these parallel metamorphoses; the Nationalist Guomindang party and the elites in power in the 30s were fearful of outside influence, and tried to suppress the desires of the average Chinese, who would have been captivated by the light, heat, and power of the new megalopolis. In contrast, the current ruling Chinese Communist Party has actively promoted Shanghai’s globalization, matching the current attitude of the public.

A dog racing stadium called the Canidrome, built in 1928 Shanghai, provides an interesting lens through which to evaluate these reactions. The Canidrome became a metaphorical “battle ground”—where “old” and “new” concepts, influences both indigenous and foreign, were hashed out to create “the modern.” In the 1930s, this competition was overt: the average people supported a modernity based on spectacle, breaking from the elites and the Nationalist government that wished to quash “Westernized” vices, including dog racing.

Ultimately, though, the Canidrome’s future was decided through a power struggle, where a native-based underworld of Chinese gangsters succeeded in co-opting the space from its French founders and dragging the Nationalist party’s “traditional” values down with it. In the present, the players are different and the clash more subtle: the CCP’s repurposing of the Canidrome structure as a world-class musical theater with an accompanying “Culture Square,” is endemic of the desire to morph Shanghai into a “global city” with all the amenities of a “modern” capital. The building tries to adopt the latest technologies, yet preserve a sense of history; it strives to integrate stereotypically “Western” architectural elements, yet remain distinctly “Chinese.” The structure is reflective of a struggle to define a path forward for a “New” Shanghai that carefully balances both the old and the new.

The Canidrome Era: 1928-43

The 1842 Treaty of Nanjing opened Shanghai to the world: previously a small fishing village, the city was established as one of five “Treaty Ports”—a point of entry into China, where the British were granted the privilege of living and trading. Other nations, including France and the United States of America, were quick to sign similar agreements with the Chinese. The inner walled city remained under native control, but the colonial forces carved out extra-territorial “concessions” in other
Two emerged prominent: the International Settlement, which was dominated by the British, but with representatives from a number of other countries on its Municipal Council, and the French Concession, under control of the Consul-General of France in Shanghai and taking orders from Paris.ii

Soon, a number of wealthy foreigners began to arrive to do business in China. For these early expatriates, Shanghai was a paradise: they paid next to no taxes—to their own government, to the concession government, or to China—and set up enclaves where they replicated lavish European lifestyles.iii Their arrival defined the beginning of a time period that literature often refers to as “Old-Shanghai.”iv

The city rapidly became a global commercial hub. From the 1890s until the outbreak of World War I, Shanghai grew faster—both in terms of geography and population—than any other Chinese city.v By the 1930s, no other Chinese city had a demographic consisting of immigrants from such a wide array of different places.vi In addition to the British “Shanghailanders” in the International Settlement, and the Francophone residents in the French Concession, White Russians and Japanese had begun to flow into the city.vii

Shanghai had become the fifth-largest city in the world, with almost four million inhabitants.viii And it was the number one city for commerce in Asia: in 1933, over one-half of China’s foreign trade and one-fourth of all domestic shipping passed through Shanghai’s port.ix

Shanghai’s transformation also revolutionized the social lives of many of the city’s inhabitants. Once a small town where pleasure was centered on “teashops and courtesans’ quarters,” Shanghai morphed into a neon-lit metropolis full of cabarets, dance halls, and bordellos.x Sex, alcohol, and gambling were widely available—and the city became known in tour books as “the Paris of the East,” mostly for its thriving nightlife.xi

Native resistance arose to these changes: the Nationalists Guomindang (GMD), who came to power in 1927, and groups of other “elite” locals believed imperialist forces had created a den of vice and corruption, and resented that foreigners controlled much of the city. They set out on a mission to “purify” Shanghai.xii The city, they argued, symbolized the debasement of China: citizens were thrust into an environment full of the temptations of gambling, drugs, and prostitution—all products of excessive “Westernization.”xiii They argued for a new “civic” culture: a form of “modernity” that, perhaps paradoxically, had its basis in traditional simplicity.xiv

A particular source of contention was the city’s extraterritorial enclaves. The unique legal status of the concessions was conducive to building and operating a criminal network: police were limited in their jurisdiction and could operate only in their own area.xv Extradition of criminals from one area to another required complicated legal proceedings and was rare.xvi Thus, it was easy for criminal operations to just shift elsewhere in the city when the police were on their tail.xvii This made Shanghai an ideal location for illegal operations, both political and gang-centered.xviii The Nationalists often argued that once the concession governments were stripped of their extra-territorial rights, Shanghai’s crime problem would be solved.xix Furthermore, if the GMD were capable of bringing law and order to the city, it was thought that it would be useful ammunition to prove that the Chinese
deserved to take back control of these regions. xxiii

One “vice” industry that quickly came under fire was gambling. The British had brought gambling on horse races to Shanghai in the 1860s, setting up the Shanghai Race Club. xxiv By the 1920s, Portuguese, Spanish, and Latin American nationals were operating a number of successful roulette casinos. xxv The growth of Shanghai had resulted in the replacement of traditional game-houses for Majiang by racecourses and casinos for betting. xxvi Some claimed that Shanghai had surpassed Monte Carlo as the gambling center of the world. xxvii

The introduction of greyhound racing in 1928 brought gambling in Shanghai to a whole new level, igniting a power struggle that would come to a head over GMD attempts to regulate the pastime—in particular, at the Canidrome stadium in the French Concession.

Gambling over greyhound races first appeared in the US in 1922, and in the UK in 1926. xxviii In 1928, it was brought over to Shanghai by British expats, who were eager to indulge in the tradition, and also to make a profit. xxix In this year, three major courses sprung up, each located in a different corner of foreign-controlled Shanghai: the first was Luna Park, in the International Settlement, built by members of the British-run Shanghai Race Club. xxx After the initial success of Luna Park, another group of British investors was quick to open up a second racecourse at the other end of the International Settlement, called the Stadium. xxxi The last and biggest of the three opened in November: located in the heart of the French Concession, it was called the Le Champs de Courses Francaise, or, in English, the Canidrome. xxxii The project was largely financed by Henry E. Morris Jr., proprietor of the North China Daily News. xxxiii The 50,000-person racecourse and connected complex spanned a full 13 acres, a space that used to be filled by Mr. Morris’s garden. xxxiv

These race tracks—and the Canidrome in particular—epitomized the spectacular lifestyle of wealthy expats in Shanghai. More than just a racetrack, the Canidrome was an entertainment complex, with a lavish hotel, nightclub, and ballroom. xxxv The hotel's terrace overlooked the racetrack, giving the city’s most privileged spectators a superior vantage point. xxxvi Musical acts were imported from around the world. xxxvii The most famous, and also one of the most frequent performers was black jazz artist Buck Clayton and his Harlem Gentlemen from New York City. xxxviii According to Clayton, while there were other clubs in Shanghai, the Canidrome was the apex, and you were not admitted unless you had “some kind of status.” xxxix The building's façade also kept up with the latest trend in international architecture. First gaining prominence in 1925 at the International Exhibition of Modern Decorative and Industrial Arts in Paris, Art Deco soon caught on in Shanghai, and Frenchman Félix Bouvier, the architect of the Canidrome, embraced the movement by designing geometric shapes and simplified lines, which at once expressed the dynamism of the mechanical age and that of the dog races. xl

Closer analysis, however, suggests that the Canidrome and its fellow stadium-complexes were much more than Colonial-era impositions on Shanghai’s cityscape. They were capitalist ventures, reflecting the new desires of local Chinese. Breaking from the strict moralism of Shanghai’s gentry, the average Chinese embraced the dog races, drawn in by a modernity based in spectacle.

From the outset, the proprietors of the Canidrome were intent on avoiding the mistakes of their predecessors: the welcoming of the modern sophistication of Art Deco in and of itself was, in a way,
a rejection of the colonial constructions of an earlier time. But, more importantly, they designed a racing complex that catered to a new era—one in which natives would participate in nightlife, alongside their former oppressors.

The Shanghai Race Club had very much stood for the dominance and affluence enjoyed by the British—a fenced-in 72-acre patch of land occupying real estate at center of Shanghai, it was both a physical and metaphorical “escape” from China. The club was actually moved away from the city center twice so that the British could establish their own suburban enclave, only to be repeatedly engulfed by the growing city.

Chinese were at first denied entry to the premises, and when they were eventually allowed in, seating was strictly segregated. But in the end, this isolationist attitude proved untenable: the inclusion of locals was critical to the economic success of such a large-scale gambling venture.

Learning their lesson, the owners of the Canidrome took the opposite track: greyhound racing was fast to attract tens of thousands of Chinese, and only a “sprinkling” of foreigners by comparison. The result was wild earnings. Shareholders in the Canidrome stadium profited 150 percent just from pre-sale tickets to upcoming events, before the stadium had even opened.

“Going to the Dogs” became one of the most popular activities of the city, drawing patrons from across the socio-economic spectrum. The mass appeal was in part a function of effective advertising and timing of races, a wide range of ticket prices, and cheap betting options: the foreign owners of the racetracks all had extensive political connections, which they used to gain billboard space for advertising and run flyers in both foreign and Chinese newspapers. Races were frequent—the three tracks collaborated with one another so as to avoid competition. This meant that races occurred nearly every day, and the average person usually attended multiple times a week. Entry fees were low (about 10 cents), and free admission was granted to children, who would then take their tickets home and pass them along to their parents. Unlike the horse races, which focused on cash sweep betting where the top few winners take all, the dog tracks featured pari-mutuel betting, in which all the money bet was divided between multiple winning tickets. In pari-mutuel betting, the stakes were generally low (bets of only one or two Yuan could be placed) and chances of winning high, boosting its appeal to ordinary people. All were lured in with the promise of riches and minimal risk of loss—even primary school students would run to the tracks after school was let out.

Much like a fashion trend, racing was an exotic novelty for the Chinese “copied from Europe and the USA”—an emblem of “modernity.” The dogs were imported from England and Australia, and foreign “experts” were brought in to act as kennel staff. Newspaper and magazine commentary highlight the racetrack’s role in modernizing Shanghai. When the racetracks became a political hot-topic, a trend which will be discussed later, the attendance increased. When interest was down, absurd promotions were effective at drawing new patrons: business dropped off during the Japanese occupation, so the stadium staged races with trained monkeys as jockeys. The Canidrome was shortly thriving again.

The races were about a new type of spectacle, well illustrated in the literary commentary of Chinese authors from the time period. During the 20s and 30s, a group of Chinese writers called the “New Perceptionists” sought to depict aesthetic modernity in urban life. According to Shi Zhicun, a highly recognized writer
among the group, the racetrack became an image that was particularly influential for the movement. In his 1933 novel Midnight, famous Chinese author Mao Dan depicts Shanghai as a city of “LIGHT, HEAT, and POWER” (all three words are capitalized in the introduction of his book)—words meant to demonstrate a development-based progress that set Shanghai apart from the rest of China, which was still quite tradition-bound. The races well encapsulated Dan’s phrase: neon arch lamps illuminated the dazzling track, the stadiums were packed with excited, sweaty patrons who were awed at the speed of the greyhounds, and incredible amounts of cash were perpetually flowing, with some becoming rich and some losing all. In the short stories of two acclaimed New Perceptionist writers, Liu Na'ou and Mu Shiying, middle class Chinese participated in Shanghai’s “modernity” through engaging in the economy of the spectacle, including races. The thrill of a dog race, ironically, provided respite from the hectic pace of city life.

Though imported by foreigners, these tracks were much more than playgrounds for expatriates. The stadiums were shockingly inclusive in comparison to most entertainment venues in Shanghai at the time. This also meant that the races played a significant role in causing a collapse in the distinction between “high” and “low” culture; regardless of economic background, all enjoyed the festivities.

Though a popular and financial success, this type of activity did not sit well with certain factions of the Chinese population—the Nationalists in particular, and other “elite” organizations, such as the Chinese Ratepayers Association (CRA), a group of wealthy natives originally formed in the early 20s to lobby for Chinese representation on the Municipal Council of the International Settlement. They viewed dog racing, and gambling more generally, as undermining morality and social order.

In the mid 1920s, the two groups began to campaign against roulette and were largely successful at suppressing the activity by 1929. Next, they refocused their attention to dog racing, which would prove to be a much tougher battle. In a 1929 article, the CRA claimed: “Night greyhound racing is responsible for an increase in the number of robbers in Shanghai… the cheapness of the prices of admittance and the pari-mutuel sweeps are enticing thousands of members of the laboring classes to spend money which is badly needed for the support of their families.” Greyhound racing was a “western” practice that destroyed a traditional Chinese identity.

There was, in fact, some factual basis to these statements: it was estimated that Greyhound racing caused net losses of around US$250,000 a month, and that these losses were incurred mainly by Chinese. Suicide rates in Shanghai were at an all-time high, with an unusually large number of young men choosing to launch themselves into the Huang Pu River or leap off the roof of the Great World amusement center; many of the deaths were reportedly incentivized by bankruptcy and large sums of debt due to gambling.

The GMD and the CRA pinned the failure to prevent these deaths on foreign authorities, and urged Chinese to adopt a cleaner form of modernity. The two groups attempted to shut racing down, but were met with the barrier of extraterritoriality: since the tracks were located in the foreign concessions, they were immune to the Chinese administration. The Shanghai Municipal Council, dominated by British interests that were tied to the racecourses, and the French government, also generously profiting off the Canidrome,
refused to act. The concession police had only been willing and able to suppress roulette because the casino owners had come from countries with too little political influence to protest.

In response, the GMD and the CRA sought other means of limiting gambling’s influence: in an ironic turn of events, they lobbied for a ban on Chinese entry to the racetracks. When this effort failed, they tried to limit the days on which the races could occur, but this just had the effect of prolonging the events on race days.

Eventually, however, their stubborn efforts began to pay off. In late 1929, a new policy commissioner, who had no affiliation to any racecourse, was appointed in the International Settlement. Noting that the type of pari-mutuel betting used at the tracks was actually illegal in Britain, he took a stance against the practice. It was only with the push of American officials—again, with no economic ties to the track—that the Municipal Council fully cracked down. After three years of racing, in 1931, the Council ordered Luna Park and the Stadium to close their doors, charging the clubs with having “deliberately fostered gambling,” despite “known Chinese opposition.”

Events played out very differently at the Canidrome in the French Concession. Ultimately, the GMD was not able to stick to its traditional (yet supposedly modern) values: after shutting down all competition, officials proved reluctant to make efforts to regulate the Canidrome, because the stadium’s main proprietor at the time, the Green Gang, was a political ally.

Governed largely by diplomats in Paris with limited oversight, the French concession was a place where the underworld could thrive. Groups like the “Green Gang,” Shanghai’s most powerful crime ring, prospered with revenue from gambling, prostitution, opium and the kidnapping of wealthy Chinese. “Big Ears” Du Yu Sheng, the big boss of the Green Gang, built ties with law enforcement officers and senior Chinese officials. He worked with “pockmarked” Huang Jinrong, the senior Chinese officer in the French Police force, to ensure that the Concession’s vice-driven establishments were profitable and well-ordered.

The French goal was to control rather than eliminate activities of debauchery, thereby ensuring handsome profits for the expatriates. They demonstrated a colonial era indifference that tolerated obvious criminality (for instance, the French Concession had become the center of the opium trade by the 1920s) in exchange for bribes and favors.

As a result, nothing much was done to deter gambling at the Canidrome by the French police, who had investments in the facility. Shortly after the stadium’s opening, the French proprietors of the Canidrome sent mob boss Du Yu Sheng a winning greyhound as a gift, and he eventually acquired a large stake in the complex. Control slowly slipped further and further into the hands of the Green Gang. As a result, the French police, who were dominated by mob interests, had no interest in shutting the stadium down. Though started by foreigners, the Canidrome thus ended up under the control of indigenous (and corrupt) forces.

Eventually, the Chinese Nationalists lost interest in shutting down the stadium, too: though the group had lobbied hard to get the Concessions’ authorities to close down the track in 1928 and 1929, the campaign soon began to wane—specifically as the Green Gang began to build influence.

In the wake of the 1927 Communist uprising, Du Yu Sheng sided...
with the Nationalists, effectively putting him and his network in the good graces and under the protection of the GMD, including Chiang Kai-shek, who became a close friend.\textsuperscript{xvi} Green Gang’s ties to the Nationalist party meant that the Canidrome was given special protection.

The French Concession Chinese Ratepayers Association had formed a militia to protect Chinese citizens from the Green Gang’s activities (namely robbing and kidnapping), but the GMD was not interested in providing assistance.\textsuperscript{xciv} Though the GMD’s efforts to police society culminated in the New Life Movement in 1934, when they began to regulate private mores, including offenses as minor as spitting on the street and wearing provocative clothing, through it all, the Canidrome remained untouched.\textsuperscript{xcii} In fact, with all potential competition eliminated by GMD policies (Luna Park became an amusement park, while the Stadium was used as a football ground), the Canidrome flourished.\textsuperscript{xciii} Even Chiang Kai Shek and his wife frequented the establishment, attending Buck Clayton performances.\textsuperscript{xciv} Though the GMD claimed to care about a cleaner form of modernity, ultimately, they seemed to care more about political alliances. Just like the French, they were comfortable with criminal elements so long as they were “controlled” in a profitable manner.\textsuperscript{xcv}

The Canidrome continued to hold its races, and the masses continued to turn out in hordes. A version of modernity supported by the Chinese, accepted by the GMD and the French, and implemented by the Green Gang would dominate until the Stadium’s eventual closure during the Japanese war.

THE IN-BETWEEN: 1943-76

And yet, the Canidrome’s success would not last forever. Although the documents are unclear, it seems that the racetrack was eventually shut down when the Japanese took over the French Concession in 1943 and decided to use the stadium as an arsenal and barn for ammunition.\textsuperscript{xcvi} From then until 1976 (the end of the Cultural Revolution), Shanghai was largely closed off to the outside world, with the Japanese and then the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in firm control of the city.

During those dark years, the Canidrome served various functions: it was at first an arena for public show trials and mass executions, but was then rebranded a “Culture Square,” becoming a primary locus of state-sponsored “entertainment” and rallies.\textsuperscript{xcvii} With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the “Culture Square” was renamed the “Cultural Revolution Square;” unfortunately, destruction of much of the stadium ensued due to Mao’s targeting of the arts and attempts to wipe out the old China.\textsuperscript{xcviii}

But the death of Mao in 1976 meant a new lease on life for China and, ultimately, for the property. Over the next decades, Shanghai emerged once again as a uniquely international city, and the area of the old Canidrome became a stage where different conceptions of modernity for China once again vied for prominence.

BECOMING THE CULTURE SQUARE: 1976-PRESENT

As the Cultural Revolution fizzled, Deng Xiao Ping came to power, calling for an “Open Door” policy, in which China would integrate itself into the world, through the development of a “socialist market economy” that included vast economic liberalization.\textsuperscript{xcix}

Shanghai was at first sidelined in the push for economic development by national authorities.\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered} It was still associated with the imperialism of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early
20th century, and its reputation was further tainted because it had been a hub for some of the most radical Cultural Revolution persecutions. \textsuperscript{a} Chinese authorities focused on developing cities further to the South, like Canton and Shenzhen. \textsuperscript{b} But by the 1990s, it was clear that the existing strategy was not working—these other cities were too proximate to Hong Kong to ever thrive as “global” metropolises. \textsuperscript{c} Deng re-focused his attention on Shanghai, determined that the city should reclaim the reputation it had lost between 1940 and 1980: a great center of international trade. \textsuperscript{iv} In 1992, he proclaimed that the city would be the "dragon's head" of China’s quest for modernity.\textsuperscript{v}

Economic development exploded. \textsuperscript{vi} New business dramatically increased the number of foreigners in the city; these expatriates were sometimes workers brought in by Western companies, but were oftentimes the employees of Chinese establishments. \textsuperscript{vii} “Borrowing” qualified foreign workers was promoted by the local government, which in 1994 described the city as “The Highland of International Talents.”\textsuperscript{viii}

Certain industries were particularly affected by these economic changes: real estate, for example, underwent rapid growth as Shanghai officials successfully pushed the national government for a loose regulatory environment. \textsuperscript{ix} Construction firms from around the world descended on the city and the “shabby socialist skyline morphed into a vision of ‘modernity.’”\textsuperscript{xc} At the turn of the 21st century, an astounding 20 percent of the world’s cranes were located in Shanghai. \textsuperscript{ci}

Two milestone events were to occur in the first couple of years of the new millennium. In December of 2001, China finally gained full membership in the World Trade Organization, and new investments began to flood into the country. \textsuperscript{cxi} In December of the following year, Shanghai successfully bid to host the 2010 World Expo. \textsuperscript{cxi} For the CCP, this was a huge development: according to Chen Liangyu, then Shanghai’s CCP Secretary, the goal of the Expo was to introduce China to the world. \textsuperscript{cxiv} Around this time, people began referring to the city as “New Shanghai.”\textsuperscript{cxv} The phrase was at once a reference to the glory days of “Old Shanghai,” but also clear sign of departure from the past: New Shanghai was to create a modernity that celebrated China. Rather than operate in accordance with the age-old system of imperialism, “New Shanghai” would operate in a world of globalization. For the CCP, foreign investment was a valuable opportunity; external actors could boost economic growth, and China could poach the best practices by observing and inviting companies and experts from other countries. \textsuperscript{cxvi} Unlike the GMD, which wanted modernity without Westernization, the CCP strongly desired to integrate worldly influences. Shanghai, the “global city,” appears in many official documents, slogans, and publications.\textsuperscript{cxvii}

This time, the politicians’ thinking seems to be in sync with that of much of the native population. Economic development has led to a rising Chinese middle class, which has been eager to participate in this new culture of mass consumption. Over the past 10 years, incomes have quadrupled, and Chinese social life has made a 180 degree turn, morphing from “stagnation and silence” to “robust vitality.”\textsuperscript{cxviii} Eating out one or two times a week is common, and even the average consumer tends to shop in a “brand conscious” manner. \textsuperscript{cxix} Helen Wang, author of The Chinese Dream: The Rise of the World's Largest Middle Class and What It Means to You, explains that “buying Louis Vuitton, Apple or other cool stuff is important for many Chinese,
showing off that they're modern, sophisticated and have status.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{3XXI}

One of the signature projects undertaken for the 2010 World Expo was the building of a state-of-the-art theater, which would cater to the CCP’s desire for global status and the public’s desire for worldly entertainment. This theater would come to be housed in the Canidrome.

Theater in China has a complicated history: in the 50s and 60s, theater was politically motivated and played before captive audiences which were required by their work units and schools to attend as part of “mental education.” The Canidrome was indeed used for these grand, propaganda-type shows in this period.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXI} But during the Cultural Revolution, even this theater was suppressed—the trashing of the Canidrome demonstrating the lengths to which the CCP went to kill entertainment.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXII}

In the 80s, after Mao’s death, theater was revived across the city with the re-opening of venues like the Canidrome, but it still failed to thrive. Actors and writers were de-motivated by the purges, and audiences lost interest in an activity they associated with forced propaganda and state indoctrination.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXII} Furthermore, a long history of state censorship seemed to have had the effect of limiting creativity, hindering the development and spread of new ideas.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXIV}

But culture is critical to modern society, and the CCP was fast to realize that it needed to cultivate the arts. The government erected an opera house in 1998 and an arts center for musical performances was put up in Pudong in 2004.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXV} Still, there were few serious forays into the world of theater, as spoken plays ran a greater risk of sending dangerous political messages.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXVI}

Eventually, though, the government decided it needed something more “hip”—operas and orchestra music were pegged as too formal and stuffy.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXVII}

So, in 2003, Han Zheng, then mayor of Shanghai, decided to build a grand new theater surrounded by a “Culture Square.”\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXVIII} The theater was necessary to present to the world a cultured image of the city, indeed, critical to “its larger image as a global economic powerhouse.”\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXIX}

The focus of the theater would be musicals—with their commercial tint, risk of political subversion was low.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXIX} And musicals, which tend to draw big audiences, would make for a “blissful marriage of art and money.”\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXCI} As officials of the CCP explained to scholars and brand managers at a 2009 meeting at the Four Seasons Hotel: “Drama culture serves as a catalyst to bring about a synergy among the business district, brands and culture industry. Culture is power. Culture creates business opportunity.”\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXCI}

But before the government could put its plan into action, they needed a location: the old Canidrome seemed a perfect fit.

As previously mentioned, the stadium had already been used as a performance space: In the late 70s, prime minister Zhou En Lai had approved the reconstruction of parts of the venue that were ruined during the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXX} The stadium became one of the first venues in China to bring international performers in from abroad, including a number of ballet companies; this reflected the culture in China at the time, one that was tentatively beginning integration into a “Western” world order.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXX}

But the theater had been replaced by a stock market in the early 90s.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXXV} Infrastructure could not keep up with economic growth, and the CCP temporarily placed Shanghai’s first securities exchange in the stadium so that traders would not have to wait for a new venue to be built.\textsuperscript{N}\textsuperscript{CXXXV} Soon, the stock market upgraded to a far classier building
than the old, decrepit stadium. A flower market took its place, which catered to the rising Chinese middle class that, for the first time, had money to spend on luxury goods.\textsuperscript{cxxxvii} The winning of the 2002 World Expo caused the CCP to think very carefully about the planning of Shanghai. They decided that the flower market was not worthy of such prime real estate, and relocated it to the Putuo district, on the outskirts of the city.\textsuperscript{cxxxviii} The old “Culture Square,” with the dreary Canidrome frame still standing in its center, was about to be brought into the 21st century.

But how would the design be decided upon? Han Zheng invited architects from around the world to develop proposals for the former Canidrome site.\textsuperscript{cxxxix} This sort of “design competition” is frequently used by officials in Shanghai, who selected buildings like the Jin Mao tower from a slew of submissions by international architecture firms.\textsuperscript{cxl} These competitions allow Shanghai to pull the best designs from the rest of the world, yet still allowing Chinese officials to maintain oversight, appointing Chinese groups to work on projects with their foreign counterparts.\textsuperscript{cxli}

For the redevelopment of the Culture Square, ultimately Beyer Blinder Belle, a New York based firm with an office in Beijing at the time, won out.\textsuperscript{cxlii} They worked in conjunction with Xian Dai Architectural Design Group, a firm indigenous to Shanghai, whose name roughly translates to “Modern Era.”\textsuperscript{cxliii}

The two firms set about the task of developing a building that at once kept up with modern design concepts and technical innovations, but still preserved tradition.

The scale and wealth poured into the project was unprecedented: the theater cost 1.1 billion RMB to build; it contains 2011 plush maroon velvet seats in honor of the year it opened; its stage—at 8,890 sq ft—is bigger than that of New York’s Metropolitan Opera House; and the building plunges an astonishing 26 meters below ground.\textsuperscript{cxliv} It is environmentally friendly (the depth providing natural heating and air conditioning), and the theater is equipped with state-of-the-art sound and lighting, a revolving platform in the center of the stage, and even a rain-sprayer and dry-ice cannon to dramatize productions.\textsuperscript{cxlv} Surrounding the square, the government installed lines of quaint bars, coffee shops, restaurants and trendy boutiques to complete the transformation of the space.\textsuperscript{cxlv}

But, of course, developing a theater of the future required an attention to the past: a nostalgia for “Old Shanghai” in particular—the last time period in which Shanghai was a lavish, global city— informs and infuses the building structure.\textsuperscript{cxlvii} The project included the preservation and adaptive reuse of six buildings that were originally part of the Canidrome complex.\textsuperscript{cxlviii} The long-span space frame structure of the stadium was used as the base of the new theater.\textsuperscript{cxlvix}

Concerns for effective integration into the preexisting landscape of historic Shanghai were key when planning the surrounding plaza, too. The theater is surrounded by green spaces, and there are no fences; it is part of the community.\textsuperscript{cl} The structure’s 26-meter plunge was a product of local zoning restrictions, which prevent buildings from being higher than six stories to preserve the feel of the area.\textsuperscript{cl} Paths and waterways were built to flow around the theater building, intended to soften the impact of the new edifice.\textsuperscript{clii}

The structure also needed to position Shanghai as a “global” city, yet maintain a distinctly “Chinese” feel.

To that end, the Chinese architects involved in were eager to integrate stereotypically “Western” motifs; while the lobby is lit by sunlight in day, Chinese
artist Ding Shaoguang’s massive blue-green rainforest painting glows with LED light at night; his intent was for the painting to echo the stained-glass windows of European cathedral. The foreign architects, on the other hand, were keen to “China-fy” the structure: Richard Blinder, the original designer, pictured the building as a “Phoenix spreading its winds.” A glass and steel funnel that extends from the roof (the sky) to the pit of the building lobby, hovers right above Shanghai’s water table. Surrounding the tube, a stream detail references the river that is hidden underground. These features highlight the importance of flowing water in Chinese culture, and the development of Shanghai, in particular.

The effort to integrate these differing features has certainly been valiant. Whether it has been successful is an entirely different question.

In terms of history, some was retained but much was destroyed. Though the architects attempted to integrate the Canidrome base, its Art Deco façade was torn down. This is a trend we see across Shanghai: in a rush to “catch up,” historic structures that would have been cherished in other areas of the world are demolished. It is also important to note the parts of the Canidrome’s history are understandably avoided, such as the stadium’s role as an execution facility; for Chinese of a certain generation, the stadium structure will always be “full of ghosts.” Furthermore, the CCP’s planned vision of modernity often seems to require a somewhat traumatic rupture with the past, since wrecking crews tend to level all that gets in the way of state projects. The decision to build the new theater required the eviction and closing of the shops of over 200 flower sellers at the popular Jingwen Flower Market. The new bars and restaurants that surround the venue came about in a similar manner: Maoming Lu (one of the streets bordering the Square) was a famed party area, but all 28 bar and club owners were told that they had to “kill the music, change your style, and become quiet-style lounge bars” to better coordinate with the tone of the theater.

Further, the odd combination of stereotypically foreign and Chinese design elements confuses some. Foreign architects have been accused of a tendency to “rummage through the China closet,” blindly splicing imagery that is stereotypically “Chinese,” despite the fact that they barely understand the culture. At times, this strategy seems to produce visually pleasing results: for instance, the Jin Mao Tower, designed to look like a “pagoda,” received an overwhelmingly positive reception from the Chinese. Reactions to the Culture Plaza have been more mixed: local media has compared the building to a turtle from outer space more often than a “rising phoenix.” Its oval roof resembles the shell of a giant tortoise, and the stark white color and reflective glass—which becomes iridescent at night—makes the building appear alien against the grey backdrop of the surrounding buildings. The space turtle comparison is one of the more mild analogies: the structure has also been referred to as “a giant toilet seat” and “an eyesore.”

Yet we must take all these complaints and criticisms with a grain of salt: perhaps not all elements of history are worth preserving as China tries to define its own style of modernism. And the sort of eminent domain for the purpose of urban renewal practiced in this instance is also practiced all across the world as cities strive to reinvent themselves. Furthermore, it is not necessary to conceive “Western” and “Chinese” design flourishes as clashing, or even assign these labels at all. Rather than analyze the origins of architectural elements, one might view the Culture...
Square’s form as becoming a Chinese standard. After all, similar developments are beginning to be seen across the country: cities like Chengdu and Nanjing are now building copy-cat structures, so that they too might have “culture.” Ultimately, rather than being made modern by outside forces, the Culture Square is part of an ongoing attempt to forge a new notion of modernity—one that celebrate China’s rise as a nation.

The theater finally opened in 2011. The debut event at the theater was an “Ultimate Broadway” show: an amalgamation of songs from Broadway’s biggest hits, performed by imported talent around the world, that took full advantage of the advanced sound system and lighting. In a stroke of familiarity, the goal was spectacle: Thomas Yee, whose firm designed the interior, explained that, “Shanghai loves to latch on to something trendy and push it over the edge with scale, texture and visual imagery.”

Despite the fact that the songs were in English, the advertising was all done in Chinese, and natives were the target audience. In an attempt to make sure all had access, ticket prices ranged widely in cost, from the starting price of 80 Yuan to the top price of 1,280 Yuan. The theater was trying to draw in the new middle class that has repeatedly proven eager to embrace the exotic.

Ironically, in an effort to create a new form of modernity, the Culture Square seems to have morphed into an entertainment space much like the original Canidrome.

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EXPLORING A SHANGHAI SPACE:
From Racecourse to People’s Square and Beyond
Cameron White

INTRODUCTION

Cities change—this seems to be a fact of human history. Whenever there is a shift—an influx of immigrants, a change of regime, waves of new building regulations, a sudden natural disaster—stasis eludes. It is only when we stop to reflect on a physical structure and its immediate use that we pry it away from the greater space that it occupies.

Before anything else is said, there is an important differentiation to be made here between the words “space” and “place”. In the words of anthropologist Yi-Fu Tuan, “if we think of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into place.” Thus, “place” can be treated principally as denoting geographic presence at a particular moment in time. “Space”, on the other hand, can be used with the intent to describe a physical structure on a greater timescale, one that includes the past, present, and future, as well as variations in utility over time.

Shanghai’s People’s Square (Renmin guangchang 人民广场) and People’s Park (Renmin gongyuan 人民公园) today comprise an area that harbors vivid memories. When the square and park are written up, it is common to refer to what occupied their site before them. One article in the Chinese journal Urban Roads, Bridges, and Flood Control (城市道桥与防洪) begins, “People’s Square, Old Shanghai’s racecourse, is situated in the city center.” In a similar manner, Lonely Planet’s China guidebook lists People’s Square and People’s Park as points of interest, with the description reading: “Containing the newfangled Shanghai Museum of Contemporary Art, the park and the adjacent Renmin (People’s) Sq were once the site of the Shanghai Racecourse.” In these examples and others, the past identity of the land is mentioned mainly as a way to give context to and explain People’s Square and never be elaborated upon, with the reverse also being true of articles covering the Shanghai Racecourse. The ultimate result is that the any concept of continuous space is undermined.

Scholarly interpretations of the structures have furthered the sense of differentiation. Both of them, it seems, have been assigned vastly dissimilar symbolic roles. Writing on the Racecourse, Yuezhi Xiong explains, “It had, in short, become a diabolic symbol of a multitude of evils.” Other scholars have also traded on this focus on vice, though in the case of Nomi Braester, it is from the perspective of how it was established in Communist propaganda. He emphasizes that “the races stood for a deceptive economy in which simulacra of time, space, money, and sex were perpetually exchanged for one another.” People’s Square and People’s Park, though, are given a very different portrayal. Zhang Xiaochun, for instance, gives the area the moniker of “Shanghai’s Heartland” (Shanghai de xinzangdidai 上海的心脏地带), while Cai Xiaofeng and Zhi Wenjun refer to it as “The City Parlor” (Chengshi keting 城市客厅). While there is not necessarily anything
wrong with finding symbolic meaning in a place, there is again something lost in the repeated pigeonholing of two disparate images of a racecourse of infamy and a park/plaza at the heart of the city. Very rarely do we get a sense its overall trajectory.

To that end, this paper attempts to assemble a general narrative of the development of this particular space in Shanghai. By no means is the summary meant to be exhaustive—too much has happened in Shanghai over the past century and a half for that to be possible. Nor does it attempt to be the “definitive” tale of the space; historians’ accounts vary widely, especially concerning the earlier years, as will become apparent. The aim here is to assemble enough to at least gain a fuller picture than that afforded by concentrated examinations of just the Shanghai Racecourse or People’s Square and People’s Park. With the resulting product, it may be possible to better contextualize the way in which people have come to interpret parts of the space and understand how it exists on a continuum rather than as a characterization within a fixed moment in time.

THE STORY OF A SPACE

With the arrival of the British in Shanghai, it was perhaps inevitable that a racecourse would appear. According to Linda Cooke Johnson, nearly all the Asian cities in which the British had a colonial presence had one constructed at some point, with the intention being to give local Brits a place to engage in physical activity. Evidence suggests that the earliest one in Shanghai was already in use by 1847, but it was not a full-fledged racing club; rather, it was a rudimentary track behind the land that would eventually be occupied by the British consulate. In the case of Shanghai, it was actually important that the British have a track this early on, for as Johnson points out, at that point Westerners were not allowed to venture outside the bounds of the treaty port. This early track was not without its flaws, though; encircling an area a tenth of the entire foreign concession, it actually drifted into land not intended for foreign use. It thus traveled into the vicinity of patches of farmland, and some of the British riders had a tendency to go off the track. This damaged crops and subsequently led to tension between locals and the British. Also, as time passed, the land became more attractive for construction and development. It seemed the best solution was to formalize a track space elsewhere.

In 1850 or 1851, a racecourse committee was set up to take care of the issue. They found a patch of land that was ideal, but it was where the Fujian guild had a cemetery, and thus marked at a high price. The British tried to circumvent the issue by explaining that they only wanted the track, and not the field in the middle, but the Fujian guild would not relent. The British tried to move on anyway. At this point, a sense of the flow of events becomes a bit jumbled, for historians disagree on how things exactly played out. Linda Cooke Johnson describes a small conflict that ended in a peace of sorts, with the British ultimately paying for the land—though at a cheaper price than was asked before. Wu Zhiwei, on the other hand, describes a situation where the farmers living in the center of the new racetrack felt like they would eventually lose their land and become homeless, and thus rose up in arms. The British responded in kind, taking the land by force.

Whether or not money was used in the actual acquiring of the land, there was certainly some needed for building the track and its facilities. The financing was made possible by offering
memberships to the racecourse and its inner park, thus forming the Shanghai Race Club. However, even with the membership dues, most Westerners were allowed in regardless of whether or not they paid them, while Chinese were almost unequivocally kept out, making what Johnson deems both a public and private space.\textsuperscript{xvi} Records indicate that in fall of 1850, the first official horserace was held here. However, the park function was perhaps immediately more important. As soon as it opened, it offered a place for Westerns to walk about and play sports.\textsuperscript{xvii} Accounts suggest that the Chinese saw this tendency to exercise among the British and thought it bizarre.\textsuperscript{xviii}

Over the years, the racetrack was forced to move twice. The biggest motivation for this, it would seem, was land values. Over time, the land closer to the Bund became more expensive, so as one 1920s Shanghai guidebook explains, the racecourse had to move inland.\textsuperscript{xix} The first move, in 1854, was aided by a series of serendipitous events—at least for the Racecourse owners. The Battle of Muddy Flat (Nicheng zhi zhan 泥城之战), which pitted the Americans and British against the locals, led to the destruction of houses and land on the outskirts of the city, with many citizens fleeing. Capitalizing on the fallout from the conflict, the Shanghai Racecourse Committee was literally able to buy the land at firesale prices, securing each lot at 50 yuan.\textsuperscript{x} The racecourse then moved one more time in 1861/1862, reaching its ultimate home, the area that would eventually become People’s Square and People’s Park.\textsuperscript{xxi}

Given the reputation that the Racecourse later receives, it is important to emphasize that at its inception and up through the 1860s, the Shanghai Racecourse was centered around leisure and the outdoors. This can be established, as Xiong Yuezhi points out, by how Shanghaianders of the time referred to it more as a “park” or “garden” than as a racecourse.\textsuperscript{xxii} Braester reads a parallel role in the Racecourse, explaining that it “moved the suburban setting into the city itself.”\textsuperscript{xxiii} However, the function of the Racecourse soon evolved. According to Johnson, social events and parties built up around race days, making it a stage for conspicuous consumption.\textsuperscript{xxiv} Then, in the 1870s, gambling was introduced to Shanghai. Anyone—member or non-member, Western or Chinese—could buy horse racing gambling tickets. The most attractive gambling occurred during the Spring and Autumn Race Meets, a time when a lucky bet could pay out as high as $70,000 to $125,000. Thus, through the racecourse and other outlets, by the end of the 1920s, the amount of gambling in Shanghai far outstripped that of other world cities.\textsuperscript{xxv}

Gambling brought with it a host of problems. Because of the promise of riches, many people invested in them. In some cases people became obsessed with the process, even committing crimes to help feed their addiction. Probably one of
the best examples of this comes in the form of Yan Ruisheng, as discussed by Xiong Yuezhi in his paper on the Racecourse. After having squandered his money on gambling, Yan sought out means to acquire more tickets. He engaged in a slippery slope of debauchery, first tricking a prostitute out of a diamond ring and then killing a pimp for his jewelry. He was eventually brought to justice, though not without first spurring much media attention and discussion of gambling culture.\textsuperscript{xvi}

The Western reaction to the Chinese complaint of gambling not only displays a level of apathy, but also a belief that the Chinese were somehow inferior. A passage on the Racecourse from a 1920s Shanghai guidebook reads, “The Chinese, a nation of born gamblers, have unfortunately taken as kindly to betting as they have their own gambling games, and crowds surround the course.” \textsuperscript{xvii} The image elicited by this passage not only portrays the Chinese as a people innately prone to vice, but also as a mass of people that one must pass through in order to enjoy the Racecourse.

Discrimination against the Chinese existed not only in Westeners’ guidebooks, but also in Racecourse policies. As already mentioned, Chinese participation in the racecourse was limited at the outset. While not allowed to be members, they sometimes acted as hired jockeys. \textsuperscript{xviii} They were also allowed to gamble. However, their ability to view the races themselves were a bit limited. Initially they could watch from the roadside, but this was made less convenient as the racecourse was built up. Chinese living in the area were even restricted in their building of windows to look at anything but the road. It took until 1909 for a viewing platform to be added for which the Chinese could buy tickets, and until 1911 for a selected number of rich local Chinese to join the Shanghai Race Club. \textsuperscript{xxix}

It is important to keep in mind that even for all the negative attention that the Racecourse received, the actual racing were lauded by many, Chinese and Shanghailander alike. Xiong shares the lyrics to a Chinese horse racing song published in 1909, which began:

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Today the horses are racing,
Today the horses are racing,
Everyone comes to the course.
The course is really bustling,
The course is really bustling.
Ears hear the lofty tones of Western music.
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From the words alone, one can read level of excitement, as well as a pro-Western mentality in the description of foreign music.

Bird’s-eye view of Shanghai, 1937 (Virtual Shanghai)

The Shanghai Racecourse also continued to be a multi-purpose space. The center area was a field not only for sports like soccer, cricket, and polo, but
was also a parade ground for Western militia. However, with the sensationalized crime attributed to the rise of the Shanghai Racecourse, as well as some its more blatant forms of discrimination, it is not surprising that opposition against it began to mount. By the 1920s, there were public calls from the Chinese for reappropriation of the land. A popular suggestion was that the Racecourse be turned into a park. Of course, a park was already a component of the Shanghai Racecourse; there had been one since in its 1850 iteration. However, the Chinese were perpetually excluded from it.

In December of 1941, the Japanese invaded Shanghai. The army of the Land of the Rising Sun took the Racecourse, occupying it for the duration of World War II. During this time they appeased the local Chinese by allowing them access to the Racecourse. While the legacy of horseracing would only continue a few more years, the Chinese would never again find themselves barred from this 530-acre plot of land.

Once the war ended, the United Sates military used the inner section of the racecourse land for a brief time, while the outer track was neglected, though still under control of the Racecourse Association. With the track in such a state, the land’s future led to a fierce public debate. In Xiong’s treatment of the Shanghai Racecourse, this conflict is given a central focus, for he sees it as indicative of the tensions surrounding the use of the space. For instance, while the public seemed largely in favor building a park—with notable name recommendations including “Roosevelt Park” and “Kai-shek Park”—the mayor of the city, Wu Guozhen, hoped to revive the racecourse so as to provide a source of revenue (i.e. through gambling ticket sales). The rhetoric for the debate was intense, with the anti-racecourse faction’s calls for change focusing on the moral turpitude of the activities surrounding it. As one man wrote in his recommendation to the city, “Transform a swamp of wickedness into a place of joy.”

The Nationalist Shanghai government never got to make any decision on the Racecourse, however. With “liberation” (jiefang) coming in 1949 in the form of the defeat of the Nationalists by Mao Zedong’s troops, its future was thus left to the incoming Communists. On August 27th, 1951, the Shanghai Military Control Committee (Shanghai shi junguan hui 上海市军管会) seized the Racecourse and nationalized it. Before long, the southern portion had been converted into People’s Square. A year later, People’s Park was built in the northern part, separated from People’s Square by People’s Avenue (Renmin dadao 人民大道).

Initially, People’s Square’s functionality was very straightforward. Large and spacious, it was ideal for political rallies. These were necessary, as there was a perceived need to change Shanghai from an imperialist’s city without ideological backbone to one in line with Party principles. A 1953 city plan for Shanghai drawn up for the city by Soviet Union engineers took things a step further, emphasizing People’s Square’s role as the “center of the city” (chengshi de zhongxin 城市的中心). In 1963, the Municipal Government Building (Shi zhengfu bangong dalou 市政府办公大楼) was planned for the square, along with a reviewing platform intended to hold at least 5,000 people. In 1964, the office building was completed, though apparently not to the full extent of its architectural plans, stopping a few floors short. While the building and platform faced out on People’s Square, the land it was built on was taken from People’s Park.
People’s Park was also developed a fair amount within the first decade or so of its inauguration. It opened for the first time in October of 1952 and was free to the public. Visitors were greeted by flowing streams, hillocks, and displays of flowers that bloomed across the seasons. Within the first month, there were days when one hundred thousand people would come through. The park was closed in 1953 for renovations. The municipal government proceeded to invest ¥217,000 in park, adding a fish viewing platform and two small bridges. People’s Park was opened again in May of 1954, but now with an admission fee.\

During the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, both People’s Square and People’s Park witnessed change. For People’s Square, it came not necessarily in terms of restructuring, but in the form of the evolution of its use. While the large expanse had been used as a place for political assemblies in the decade before, during the Cultural Revolution, it was taken to a new level. In 1967, when the first major faction in Shanghai, the Writers’ Group, rose up against the mayor of the city, it chose People’s Square as its demonstration zone. Gradually, the plaza became the place for new movements to declare themselves, with both the Scarlet Guards and the Shanghai People’s Commune using it as a platform to initially declare their existences.\

People’s Park, on the other hand, did see major structural reconfiguration. At the time, classical gardening forms like the “Water Bridge Landscape” (xiaoqiao liushui jingguan 小桥流水景观) were declared feudalistic and were thus erased in many public garden. In the case of People’s Park, this meant the leveling of hillocks, the blocking of streams, and the cutting of vegetation. In its place a major path was built, and in 1970 an air raid bunker was planned, with the park closing in April of that year. In 1971 the bunker was completed, and some greenery was once more added to the park. Finally, in 1975, the park was divided into three areas: in the first, cultural and propaganda facilities were built, in the second there was a rest area for travelers, and in the third was a play area for children.\

In the 1980s, Shanghai embarked on the journey of economic and ideological reform along with the rest of the country. The municipal government drew up a new city plan in 1982, reacting to calls for the modernization and greening of urban spaces. People’s Square was still considered the center of the city, so naturally there were a large number of changes outlined for it. The principal focus was to construct new buildings and facilities for the government, economic development, and cultural activity, while also adding vegetation. Perhaps the most notable building outlined in the plan was the Shanghai Museum (Shanghai bowuguan 上海博物馆). However, in the plan it was slated to be built southeast of the square. The government made it clear that People’s Square was to remain a public assembly point for citizens, saying that it should ideally fit 200,000 people. It is interesting to note that even with these calls for the greening of Shanghai, People’s Park began losing area. It had originally been 51.8 acres in the 1950s when it opened, but over the course of time it lost area to projects on its edges, such as the aforementioned Municipal Government Building. By the 1980s, it was 35.9 acres, and after the construction of the nearby People’s Square metro stop in 1995, it reached its contemporary size of 29.8 acres.
The 1990s saw an acceleration in the change of People’s Square that had begun in the 1980s. In December of 1990, a revised plan from the one drawn up in 1982 moved the Shanghai Museum to the center of People’s Square, while also designing a new building for the municipal government that would act as a high point within the square as a whole, looking down on the central axis of People’s Avenue. This structure, the Shanghai People’s Government Building (Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu bangong lou 上海市人民政府办公楼), was completed in 1995.

The actual renovation of the plaza portion of People’s Square began in earnest in 1993. In accordance with calls for greening the city, parts of park were designated for being turned into green spaces. The Shanghai Landscape Design Institute (Shanghai yuanlin sheji yuan 上海园林设计院) aided in the process, resulting in the layout of the lawns in People’s Square as seen today. The next step was adding the Shanghai Museum, proportions that, according to material printed by the Chinese government, evoke the “round heaven, square earth” principle of Chinese philosophy. Along with two other buildings—those being the Shanghai Grand Theater (Shanghai da juyuan 上海大剧院), completed in 1998, and the Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Hall (Shanghai guihua zhanshi ting 上海规划展示厅), completed in 1999—the Shanghai Museum contributed in fulfilling the Shanghai government’s desire to make People’s Square a cultural space.

In the 21st century, People’s Square and People’s Park have continued to be used in a variety of ways, in some ways beyond those suggested by the shops, park space, museums, and other cultural structures that occupy them. In tacking them, the sheer volume of human beings in People’s Square and People’s Park is an important dimension to consider. Thousands of people—from across the city, the greater country, and even the whole world—travel through every day. It is, as sociologists Yangle Song and Takayuki Ikeda write, “the biggest traffic hinge in Shanghai.” In light of this, Song and Ikeda used the space as a surveying ground in trying to better understand how Chinese urban consumers spend their leisure time.

This flow of people also opens up opportunities to the more nefariously minded. Many tourists, at some point on their visit to Shanghai, visit People’s Square. This makes the area a useful site for scammers. Probably the most well known of these scams is the “tea scam.” Although rather benign, it often gets a foreigner to spend 200 RMB on a tea ceremony in a dingy shop that is made at first to seem much cheaper. However, it all begins in People’s Square. One American expatriate blogger describes the setup as follows:

If you look and act like a foreigner...
around People’s Square, odds are that you will be approached by some younger Chinese girls and it will begin…

Chinese Girl 1: “Hi, where are you from?”
Foreigner: “I am from the USA.”
Chinese Girl 2: “Oh, I love the USA! Are you here on vacation?”
Foreigner: “Yes…”
Chinese Girl 1: “So are we!”

…

Chinese Girl 1: “We heard about this nice tea ceremony nearby. It gives the full Shanghai experience. Want to join us?”
Foreigner: *thinking that he should get the Chinese experience and enjoying the company of Chinese girls* “Sure!”

The interaction outlined above is actually one full of meaning. Clearly, tourists come to People’s Square in order to participate in the acts of sightseeing and tourism, but incidentally, they are the ones being watched. Nearby, Chinese scrutinize them, trying to gauge if they “act like a foreigner.” It also appears that the scammers try to trade on a sense of camaraderie in being fellow-travelers, and in the case of female Chinese approaching male travelers, perhaps a bit of flirtation. There might even be cases where the foreigner involved does not even realize that he has been scammed.

The location and number of people in People’s Square and People’s Park also offer a shot at another form of anonymous interaction, though perhaps one with the possibility of greater mutual gain: the marriage market (xiangqin jiao 相亲角). Quite the spectacle for tourists, the marriage market takes place every Saturday and Sunday. Parents and grandparents from across the city show up regularly, proffering credentials, body measurements, and salary figures as evidence of their child or grandchild’s potential worth as a spouse. They then negotiate with each other, trying to set up a date. Rarely do the offspring themselves go to the marriage market, and sociologist Tang Wei documents the success rate as being rather poor. Nonetheless, people continue to participate.

**Contextualizing Characterizations**

At this point, it may be beneficial to step back from historical narrative and use it to help evaluate the conclusions that scholars have drawn about different historical periods of the space.

Most visibly, there is the demonizing of the Racecourse as it existed in the twilight years of its glory. As noted before, Xiong views the structure as symbolic of much of the moral disgust held by the contemporary Chinese towards the city they live in, as evidenced by the crescendo of petitions for change that began in the 1920s. However, Braester, while also insistent on this image of the Racecourse as a place of vice, sees the negative images of old Western structures like the Racecourse just as much a product of Communist propaganda after the result of actual experiences. Both scholars, it seems, are arguing on two sides of a point in history where there exists a moment of major physical change, namely from Racecourse to People’s Square and People’s Park.

Is one clearly correct? Perhaps we can accept both if we appreciate the space...
as a space, meaning not just for its immediate physical attributes on two side of a moment time, but for how it exists as a continuum of constant tension between the expectations of desires for the future use of the space and the ways it was constructed and used in the past. For instance, moving into the advent of the space, given the presence of racecourses in other British colonial settlements, the Shanghai Racecourse first existed in the minds of incoming British expatriates as a desire for a place to exercise. Once it had been established, this tradition of physical activity continued as the primary focus of the Racecourse for a few decades, arguably yielding in prominence to other activities like dances and gambling as the expatriate population grew and developed a diversity of needs and desires. However, adopting a space to satisfy these desires, the Shanghailanders not only perpetuated tensions with the local Chinese—as evidence by the conflicts over the acquiring of land—but also created new tensions that would stir desire within the hearts of the Chinese, desires that would later be imprinted on the space.

This appreciation of the space as a continuum can also help in contextualizing contemporary claims of People’s Square being “Shanghai’s Heartland” or the “City Parlor.” To be sure, the sheer variety and scale of activity that currently takes place in the place would perhaps lend credence to these titles, however, looking backwards, we can also read them as echoing the early desire of Shanghai’s Communist government to make People’s Square the center of the city, a place that would help form a city that reflects “a New China’s might, majesty, democratic rights, wealth, power, and peace” (新中国的伟大，壮丽，民主，富强与和平). When the government articulated this dream, People’s Square was not the center of the city; that was an identity imposed upon it. However, it is now an identity reflected in modern discourse on it.

This identity of the space also has major implications for its future, for its story of evolution is by no means over. As Shanghai tries position itself as a “World City”, does it not also need a city center to match? Some portions of People’s Square may already suffice, notably the four buildings added to the center in the 1990s. Kirk A. Denton analyzes them as follows:

Taken together these represent the official face of Shanghai: the government headquarters is the political and economic present; the Urban Planning Exhibition Centre embodies, both in its exterior and its interior exhibitions, a progressive commercial future; and the Shanghai Museum conveys a glorious past. The museum and the Grand Theatre present to the world a culture image of the city that is crucial to its larger image as a global economic powerhouse.

However, even with this being the case, Shanghai seems decidedly anxious about relying purely on domestic conventions for displaying its ascendance. For instance, the Shanghai Museum is famous for its collection of Chinese art, with the conservationist of the department of Asian Art at New York’s Metropolitan Museum calling it “the finest museum of Chinese art in the world.” However, a book published by the Foreign Language Press (long associated with the Chinese government) skips over mentioning the Chinese collection, but rattles off “300-odd pieces of Cartier jewelry including the 47.75-carat ‘Star of South Africa’ diamond, 143 national ancient Egyptian treasures, the Wheat Field by Vincent van Gogh and Monet’s Waterlilies” as recently being displayed there. In the same
passage, the Shanghai Grand Theater is noted for hosting performers like Luciano Pavarotti and Itzak Perlman, as well as shows like Les Misérables and Cats. This preoccupation with the world abroad has carried over into proposals for improvement of People’s Square as a whole. Two recent architectural studies of People’s Square—one by Cai Xiaofeng and Zhi Wenjun and the other by Feng Xu—have looked at in comparison to perceived cultural equivalents (“plazas”) in Venice, Florence, Vienna, and elsewhere, and have ultimately come away with recommendations they believe could improve People’s Square. One common suggestion between the two is that the square itself and the surrounding buildings clash, and should be made to harmonize. This issue, it seems, is already taken care of in Western plazas, for as Feng writes, “[In Western cities] the plaza is a part of the architecture, and the architecture is a part of the city” (广场是建筑的一部分，建筑是城市的一部分). What suggestions such as these actually mean for the future of People’s Square, however, can only be imagined.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to piece together the history of a space, one that was once occupied by the Shanghai Racecourse but is now filled by People’s Park and People’s Square, before trying to contextualize the popular and scholarly characterizations of the space’s structural occupants. While the Shanghai Racecourse has developed a reputation for being a symbol of the city’s moral degradation, People’s Square has been labeled the heart of the city. By deconstructing these perceptions within the continuum of the space rather than at specific moments, the space can be appreciated not just for the physical structures that have occupied it throughout time, but also for the way it has acted as a vessel for the desires and memories of a wide array of people who have had a stake in the city.

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1 Yi-fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 6.
2 Chen Dekang, “Shanghai renmin guangchang” [Shanghai’s People’s Square], Chengshi dao qiao yu danghong no. 2 (2002): 95.
3 Damian Harper & others, China, 1st ed. (Singapore: Lonely Planet Publications Pty Ltd, 2009), 248.
4 See: Yuezhi Xiong, “From racecourse to People’s Park and People’s Square: historical transformation and symbolic significance,” Urban History 38, no. 3 (2011): 475, 490; even though both identities of the space are mentioned in the title, the article focuses only on the time period when it was the Racecourse, with People’s Square and People’s Park being regarded as the fallout of decades of popular Chinese disapproval of the Racecourse, and not for its own functionality.
5 Ibid., 490.
7 Ibid., 196.
One of the larger challenges in mapping out the history of the early racecourse is setting dates. Most Chinese sources on the matter, including those of Wu, Xiong, and Yang, describe the initial riding circuit as merely a track, with the sequence of the building and movement of the racecourse and club happening in 1850, 1854, and 1861/1862. Johnson, however, describes the initial track as the first racecourse, with the subsequent two more moves happening in 1852/1853 and 1860.


Johnson, Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 261.

Yang, “Huoge xiongdi sanjian paomating,” 62.

Johnson, Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 204.

C. E. Darwent, Shanghai: A Handbook for Travellers and Residents to the Chief Objects of Interest in and Around the Foreign Settlements and Native City (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1920), 179.

Yang, “Huoge xiongdi sanjian paomating,” 62.

Xiong, “From Racecourse to People's Park and People's Square,” 477.

Xiong, “From Racecourse to People's Park and People's Square,” 477.


Johnson, Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 328-329.


Xiong, “From racecourse to People’s Park and People’s Square,” 480-481.


Xiong, “From Racecourse to People's Park and People's Square,” 481.

Qtd. in ibid., 484.

Zhang, Wenhua shiyin yu zhongxin zhuanyi, 140.

Ibid., 484.

You Yi, “Paomating de san ci yi kuojian” [The Racecourse’s three moves], Dangan chunqiu, December 2008, 46

Xiong, “From Racecourse to People’s Park and People’s Square,” 477, 486.

See Yang, “Huoge xiongdi san jian paomating,” 65; You, “Paomating de san ci yi kuojian,” 46

Xiong, “From Racecourse to People’s Square and People’s Park,” 486-489.


Zhang, Wenhua shiyin yu zhongxin zhuanyi, 142.


Zhang Xuesen, Yuanlin Ji (Park and Forest Diary) (Shanghai: Shanghai huabao chubanshe, 1991), 33-34; Cheng Xueke & Wang Dao, Shanghai Yuanlin Zhi [Shanghai Parks and Forests Record] (Shanghai: Shanghai sheluixue yuan chubanshe, 2000), 111.


Zhang, Wenhua shiyin yu zhongxin zhuanyi, 143.


Zhang, Wenhua shiyin yu zhongxin zhuanyi, 143-144.

Zhou Xiangpin, Shanghai gongyuanxue shi jilve [A Brief History of Public Park Design in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Tongji daxue chubanshe, 2009), 148.

Zhang, Wenhua shiyin yu zhongxin zhuanyi, 144.


Zhang, Wenhua shiyin yu zhongxin zhuanyi, 144.


The author of this paper himself has twice been approached by tea-ceremony scammers in People’s Park, and was once even duped. The scammers was indeed very friendly, and other than the hefty pricetag, nothing seemed amiss; the scammers even shared their QQ numbers, saying they wanted to stay in touch and practice their English.


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Shanghai Down the Centuries, 103.


AN UNLIKELY COLLISION:  
*The Intercultural Dynamics of Shanghai’s Jewish Refugee Population and the Chinese During World War II*  
Jeremy Blair

The story of Shanghai’s Jewish refugee population is one only recently coming to light in scholarly writing, primarily fueled by first person accounts and memoirs from the now scattered survivors of the period. It is a story characterized by a multiplicity of narratives, from early arrivals who briefly found in Shanghai a new world of opportunity to once-prosperous intellectuals who soon languished without livelihood only blocks from where they had first disembarked. But even from this varied source material, it is possible to illuminate some aspects of the shared refugee experience. Much of the current scholarship focuses on the distinct and often conflicting Jewish communities that arose in the city. Though relatively new to the canon of Jewish diaspora studies, these texts admirably bring into focus the geographic, socio-economic, and cultural forces that determined why the communities formed, functioned, and interacted as they did. What is often left out from historical investigations, however, is the role of the Chinese in the Jewish refugee experience. Even though the stateless Jews viewed the city almost exclusively as a temporary “way station” in their search for a new home and were primarily motivated to form tight social enclaves based on religious sect, place of origin, and shared language, scholarly examination of the Jewish refugee experience in Shanghai currently underrepresents the interaction between Central European refugees and Chinese inhabitants in the cultural and commercial spaces of the city.

The motivation behind this line of inquiry arose directly from an assertion made by a prominent historian of Shanghai’s Jews, Irene Eber, near the end of her comprehensive study, *Wartime Shanghai and the Jewish Refugees from Central Europe.* In her final remarks, she writes, “whatever interaction there was between refugees and Chinese seems to have ended with the establishment of the [Hongkew] ghetto in February 1943.” Although the scope of the statement is specifically defined to the ghetto period of the Jewish refugee presence in Shanghai, it inflamed rather than soothed what seemed to be an overall lack of investigation into refugee-Chinese relations. While the refugee experience was certainly dominated by interactions between refugees themselves, Eber’s conclusion did not seem to coincide with the accounts of daily life from the memoir records. And while memoirs are by nature biased and cannot broadly represent the multitude of refugee experiences, patterns emerged that cast Eber’s assertion into doubt and caused the question of refugee-Chinese relations to come to the fore as worthy of comprehensive investigation. While it will be difficult to draw far-reaching conclusions from the individual accounts of survivors, and while this paper does not endeavor to overturn the generally accurate consensus that the Jewish refugee population avoided cultural assimilation, it will seek to add nuance and
In order to analyze the cultural retreats and encounters that took place in the wartime refugee community, it is first necessary to understand the factors that brought Central European Jews to Shanghai in the first place and to briefly examine the timeline of relevant events that unfolded between the 1840s and the period of interest. While the Jewish refugees were certainly a unique presence in Shanghai’s history, they were by no means the first Jews to come to the city. The first Jewish immigrants were a group of wealthy merchant families who came from India and the Middle East during the 1840s and 1850s. These families, including the Sassoons, Hardoons, and Kadoories, quickly established themselves as elites in Shanghai’s social and business circles and were later major supporters of refugee aid organizations during the war period.

The second influx of Jewish émigrés was composed of Ashkenazi Jews that arrived in the early 1900s, a population soon inflated by larger numbers of Jewish and non-Jewish white Russians fleeing the 1917 rebellion. Like the Sephardic population before them, these Jews established a physical and spatial presence in the city, constructing synagogues and establishing cultural organizations. These two communities were firmly entrenched in Shanghai’s social and business circles and were later major supporters of refugee aid organizations during the war period.

The first trickle of what Tang Yating refers to as the “third wave” of Jewish immigration began in 1933, when a small group of prominent German physicians decided to immigrate to the city. They had been forced out of state institutions once Hitler came to power and may have been drawn by news of a shortage of doctors in Shanghai. This small but steady stream of immigrants was to turn into a flood in 1938, with the Anschluss and events of Kristallnacht convincing many in Germany and Austria that they were no longer welcome in their home countries. During this period, the Nazi policy for addressing “the Jewish problem” was one of forced emigration rather than extermination. The rabidity of Austrian anti-Semitism quickly forced the Jewish population out of the nation’s economy, causing close to 50,000 to emigrate from Austria by 1938. Even while stripping Jewish families of their financial resources and livelihoods, the German government vigorously pursued methods for transporting Jews out of German territories and eased diplomatic channels to ensure that Jews could and would emigrate. For example, Austrian Jews who were arrested and interned in the period after Kristallnacht would be released directly if they could furnish either a foreign visa or travel tickets out of the country. When Shanghai was identified as a potential destination and became the focus of significant Nazi effort, officials went so far as to charter additional ships to the Chinese port city in order to augment the Italian, Dutch, French, and Japanese ships already providing service.

The height of emigration from Central Europe to Shanghai occurred between 1938 and 1939, despite growing concern and pushback among groups receiving the refugees in Shanghai. During this period, approximately 20,000 refugees were able to reach Shanghai. Of this number, about 18,000 would stay until the end of the war. By late 1939, however, German ships had stopped sailing to Shanghai, and the last few families departed Europe for the city in the summer of 1940 from Marseilles. What these families found in Shanghai was as variable as the types of refugees that embarked on the journey. Early
refugees often found the local Jewish population receptive and helpful, but as the city became more and more overwhelmed by the influx, an increasing number of refugees ended up living without resources or support in crowded, converted barracks called Heime.

The period of refugee inhabitation in Shanghai was brief but can be bisected by the creation of and forced relocation to the Hongkew ghetto in 1943. The region itself was already home to many of the Jewish refugees, including the Heime-dwellers, and despite being badly damaged by Sino-Japanese fighting in 1937, was partially revitalized into a “Little Vienna” by wealthy refugees in the pre-ghetto period. For the refugees already living in Hongkew, Ross argues that “the proclamation [of the ghetto] had little immediate impact on their lives.” Nevertheless, the move was exceedingly disruptive to those refugees who had managed to find homes, start businesses, and earn a living outside of the circumscribed area. It was also a major psychological blow to the refugee population as a whole. The event serves as an important pivot point in the investigation of refugee-Chinese relations.

In the period before the establishment of the ghetto, the most important area of interaction between the refugees and Shanghainese was undoubtedly the economic sphere. However, Eber’s observation that “memoirs tell frequently of Chinese-Jewish cooperation in business enterprises and work situations” does not fully illuminate the nature of these partnerships nor does it detail the types of businesses created. In fact, the relationships that emerged were diverse in both industry and power dynamic.

Some refugees were able to find positions as employees in already extant Chinese businesses. Chinese laundries, for example, would sometimes hire refugee help. Ignatz Grunbaum, a refugee from Vienna, worked as a helper in the storeroom of a Chinese dry goods wholesaler. On the far side of the spectrum from this kind of unskilled labor, Chinese businessmen would occasionally court refugee craftsmen known for their workmanship to join Chinese enterprises.

Entrepreneurship was common among the refugee population as well. By 1943, over 300 refugees had founded businesses outside the Hongkew area. While many of these Jewish enterprises employed only fellow refugees, a number of them employed Chinese workers as well. A few examples may help to illustrate the range of ventures that refugees initiated with Chinese employees. One particularly successful refugee knitting operation employed over 350 Chinese workers and only a small number of Central European emigrants when it opened in 1940. A German refugee named Hermann Hammerschlag started a highly successful hat factory that also offered employment to both Chinese nationals and refugees. On a smaller scale, the Zunterstein family was able to rent a sewing machine in late 1939 and employed a Chinese tailor to sew hospital uniforms that soon came to be in high demand. Another small refugee partnership, an ultimately unsuccessful reupholstery business, relied entirely on Chinese labor until the partners were unable to pay even those minimal salaries and had to close down. Finally, the Eisfelder family from Berlin opened the successful Café Louis not long after arriving in Shanghai and the bakery quickly became an important meeting place in the refugee community. Of note is that the Eisfelders hired a staff of Chinese bakers, pastry chefs, and waiters, and in Horst Eisfelder’s account of his time in Shanghai, he includes a photograph of his multiethnic staff. The
narrative is difficult to follow for an English reader, as it is written entirely in German, but the caption of the photo reads, “the salaried workers of Café Louis, third from the right is Erwin Eisfelder, with Herbert Fabian next to him.” XXX Ernest Heppner, who was a young man during his time in Shanghai, reports that it was rare for Chinese businessmen to start enterprises on their own and instead readily entered into partnerships to pool resources and reduce risk. XXX In fact, he facilitated a deal between a refugee acquaintance, his Chinese boss at a bookshop, and another Chinese businessman to jointly open a used typewriter and calculator shop. XXXII Heppner’s account of his experience in Shanghai also adds a more personal dimension to the discussion of business relationships. After working for some time at a toyshop owned by a Russian-Jewish family, he was appointed manager of a Chinese bookshop in which the Russian family also had a stake. XXXIII Over time he became friendly with the Chinese staff, in particular the bookkeeper, Mr. Liu. As lunch, or tiffin, was included in the salary, he regularly ate with his Chinese colleagues, becoming proficient with using chopsticks and growing accustomed to drinking plain hot water instead of more expensive tea. Throughout his recollection of his time at the bookshop, he refers to his co-workers as “friends,” not merely fellow employees. He remembers “enjoying the unusual opportunity to work closely with the Chinese. [He] got to know his fellow workers quite well and grew extremely fond of them.” XXXIV Mr. Liu was in turn curious about Heppner’s home and the Nazi’s rise to power, and he would inquire frequently about Heppner’s childhood in Germany. Mr. Liu even invited Heppner to his home for a family dinner.

Wealthier refugees also interacted with the Chinese by hiring Chinese women as amahs to look after children and see to household tasks like grocery shopping. XXXV The role itself varies slightly depending on the account. The memoir of Heppner’s wife Illo does not mention any particular relationship that developed between her and the part-time amah that helped her mother buy food. In this account, the amah is specifically referred to as a maid, but would have played an important role in the functioning of the family when they first arrived, since Illo’s mother was initially unwilling to leave the house alone. XXXVI Meanwhile, the testimony of Berlin-born refugee Renate Guschke, which like Horst Eisfelder’s, is included in a collection of German-language accounts, includes a picture of her family and their amah, this time identified in the caption as a Kinderfrau or nanny, enjoying the swing-set in Jessfield Park in 1941. XXXVII By inference, this amah likely would have played a larger role in the children’s lives than Illo Heppner’s amah did in hers. While the number of Chinese women employed as amahs is not referenced in any of the scholarly or anecdotal sources, these women played a role in easing the transition to Shanghai for a number of refugee families and represent another facet of the Jewish-Chinese relationship.

Beyond merely employment, there was also a small degree of cultural
interchange facilitated by the shared participation in Shanghai’s economy. For example, yahrtzeit candles, a kind of small votive used in the Jewish community to commemorate the anniversary of a relative's death, became popular in Chinese homes due to their ability to burn for 24 hours. Meanwhile, Chinese peddlers learned select phrases in German, with shoe cobblers shouting the German “Schumacher, Schumacher” on the streets of Hongkew, as well as more complicated phrases like “Porzellan kaputt ganz macher,” which translates roughly to “completely broken porcelain repairer.” The man using the phrase in question would mend broken plates and bowls for refugees. Other Chinese craftsmen were less specific in their trade and capitalized on the fact that refugees rarely had the resources to buy new items, calling out “Kaputie – ganz machen,” which meant that they would fix whatever was broken. Heppner, in turn, remembers picking up some Chinese by the time he had started working at the toyshop. It may be that he found himself in the minority, however, as most other personal accounts of language acquisition only concern refugee children picking up Shanghai-dialect curse words.

In general terms, the international community, including the Chinese, frequented refugee stores to purchase items “previously unobtainable in Shanghai,” while refugees often bought merchandise from Chinese and Japanese establishments. Some refugees even tailored their economic activities to cater to Chinese customers. One refugee started a snake farm to produce “serum” for Chinese drugstores. A photograph of street advertisements for Jewish physicians circa 1940 shows Chinese characters on the top sign for a Dr. Freidmann, indicating that he served Chinese patients. Additionally, despite some reluctance on the part of Chinese doctors to share their knowledge of Chinese herbal medicine for fear of increasing competition, a small number of refugee doctors slowly gained mastery of the local practices and applied them in their clinics.

Not every interaction in the business sphere was a positive one, however. Door-to-door peddling brought Jews into direct competition with Chinese and Japanese businessmen, who resented the fact that refugees would disproportionately buy from fellow Jews. Meanwhile, white-collar positions sought by refugees, Russians, and Western-educated Chinese alike caused tension between the communities, especially since the market was already saturated with well-qualified applicants from the long-established communities of Shanghai. An inventory of the professional backgrounds of 7,052 refugees reveals that close to 19 percent had previously been clerks and executives, a category with the least number of potential openings in Shanghai. The refugees, while mostly destitute, were also not immune from Shanghai’s legions of pickpockets, thieves, and con artists.
Beyond the business world, the reported interactions in the cultural life of Shanghai were almost exclusively positive, though perhaps less widespread. Although there is little mention of art in the memoirs, besides Illo Heppner’s description of being “introduced to the beauties of Chinese art” by a Chinese gallery owner, ™ there was significant refugee activity in the realm of music. The refugee musicians that arrived in Shanghai were often highly qualified and brought with them a strong tradition of musical education. ™ A refugee composer named Wolfgang Fraenkel, for example, assumed a teaching position at the National Conservatory of Music and lectured his Chinese students on modern music theories and European composers such as Schoenberg. ™ Alfred Wittenberg, a renowned concert violinist from Berlin, also taught in the Conservatory. By the time these refugees departed from the city, they had trained a “cadre” of Chinese musicians in classical music, and many of these former pupils are the teachers of Shanghai’s current generation of musicians. ™ In this way, the refugee presence can be said to have had a long-range impact on Shanghai’s musical community.

Sports were another realm of public life in which cultural interchange was common, with soccer being the most popular game. ™ For unemployed residents of the Heime, sports could “achieve the status of an obsession,” and crowds of up to 1,600 would gather to watch soccer games. ™ But it was not only refugees who enjoyed the spectacle. Thousands of Chinese soccer fans would attend Shanghai league games and “mob the well known players [such as German star Leo Meyer] when they walked through the city.” ™ Some refugees were able to attain celebrity status as a result of their exploits on the soccer pitch, and in doing so, found both Chinese and refugee fans eager for someone and something to rally around.

A number of refugees also took an academic interest in their new environs, and the active Jewish press contained frequent articles about Shanghai and its inhabitants. While most newspapers were oriented towards refugee affairs, an issue of Shanghaier Morgenpost included a historical background of the city’s street names. Another periodical, Die Lanterne, featured an article titled “Are the Chinese Anti-Social?” which sought to explain the poor living conditions seen in the alleyways of Shanghai. By extension, the article reveals the refugees’ interest in the behaviors of their Chinese neighbors. ™ Meanwhile, issues of the Shanghai Jewish Chronicle from 1942 contained “stories and legends of old China and Japan to familiarize the refugees with Chinese culture.” ™
The most scholarly of the publications was the Gelbe Post, founded by refugee A. J. Storfer in 1939. Taking the form of an intellectual periodical, the publication sought to cover Chinese themes and offer a Sino-centric outlook unique from other refugee print materials of the time. Among other topics, it included articles about the “Jews of Kaifeng, Chinese peasants, the warlord Wu Beifu, how to translate Chinese poetry, and the nature of Chinese music.” Furthermore, Storfer was able to gather around him a community of intellectuals as contributors, including historians and journalists. As its central mission, the Gelbe Post hoped to “awaken an interest in China and provide knowledge of China to its readers, [but also to] develop a capacity for self-evaluation among its readers, with which they could watch European culture through Chinese eyes.” Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the Gelbe Post was not a major success. Despite the passion of Storfer and his collaborators’, the majority of refugees did not see the necessity of a high level periodical, and once the war broke out, were keenly interested in news from the warfront instead.

One of Storfer’s collaborators, on the other hand, made a significant contribution to the refugees’ engagement with Chinese culture. Willy Tonn, a German refugee and amateur Sinologist, had studied Chinese and other Asian languages in Berlin, and he described his journey to Shanghai not as seeking refuge but as being “driven by a longing for the East.” He intended to open a small seminar for Asian studies when he arrived in the city, but it did not open until after the establishment of the ghetto in 1943. Despite the poor timing and delay, he employed approximately thirty lecturers by 1944, and unlike the Gelbe Post, which failed to gain a following, the Asia Seminar had a high level of enrollment. As evidence of its popularity, the institute operated until 1948, well into the postwar refugee exodus. The success of the Asia Seminar demonstrates that refugees were enthusiastic about the opportunity to engage with Chinese culture and language, and perhaps more unexpectedly, that the interest was sustained even through times of crisis in the refugee community.

Thus, after the establishment of the ghetto in 1943, Eber is correct only in her assertion that there was reduced Chinese-refugee interaction insofar as the refugees were forced to create a self-contained economic sphere in Hongkew that was sustained by the small amount of money that “leaked in from outside.” It is not accurate to say that all interaction ceased, even with regards to economic interactions. The ghetto area itself was home to roughly 18,000 Jews and over five times as many Chinese. While most of the lanes were de facto divided into purely refugee or purely Chinese inhabitants, there were some with mixed occupation. For instance, Heppner had Chinese neighbors. Additionally, while
the relocation was a significant setback for most of the employed refugees, some were able to adapt with help from, and interaction with, the Chinese. Ignatz Grunbaum sewed clothes for refugee and Chinese customers using materials supplied by the Chinese wholesaler for whom he had previously worked. Meanwhile, Heppner was able to find a new position at a Russian-owned bakery and worked alongside ten Chinese bakers and a foreman. While he does not express the same level of affection for his coworkers as he did previously in the bookshop, there remained a daily work interaction.

The bombing of the Hongkew ghetto by American fighter planes on July 17th, 1945 is an episode featured in nearly every memoir examined for this paper, but the interaction between the Chinese and refugee populations is absent from Eber’s treatment of the event. Allied forces did not initially target the Hongkew area during the war, and the exact reason for the bombing differs depending on the historian describing the incident. Ross’s account, academic in tone but structured as a collection of biographies, blames an accidental early release of the bombs. In contrast, Eber provides the explanation that a Japanese radio transmitter or ammunition factory in Hongkew may have been the intended target.

In any case, what occurred in response to the bombing is of primary interest in this investigation. According to Heppner’s eyewitness account, while the refugee population quickly mobilized to extract refugees and Chinese alike from the rubble, the Chinese did not aid in the process. Heppner tells the story that hundreds of Chinese victims were taken to the nearby hospital, but the Chinese physicians on call at the time refused to operate on the basis that no one was paying for the care. It was only after one of the Jewish doctors punched the lead Chinese surgeon in the face and demanded instruments that the Chinese doctors gave the refugees access to the necessary supplies. Far from changing their stance, they still refused to help in the medical procedures and stayed in another room smoking cigarettes and playing mah-jongg. In turn, it was not uncommon for the Chinese patients to quickly ask how much they were being charged for a medical procedure, even after severe amputations or rescue from a pile of rubble. While the account of Chinese reluctance to help is not specifically corroborated by other memoirs, the divergently positive aftermath is widely documented. The Chinese responded to the refugees’ act of solidarity by bringing food, fruit, and cakes to the refugee families who had helped them without payment.

This episode illustrates, and is in many ways characteristic of, the unlikely cultural collision between the two communities, which maintained a veneer of “polite separation” but was fraught with competing affinities and disconnects. Heppner attributes the lack of action on the part of the Chinese to a completely different structure of social norms, one centered around family and close friends with little concern for strangers. However, in the aftermath of this large-scale failure to bridge cultural differences, the two groups were briefly brought together through what, by the same token, would have been an uncharacteristic act of appreciation towards outgroup members. Consequently, the largely positive interactions in the economic sector may have been a result of shared business goals smoothing over and providing structure to an otherwise difficult dynamic to navigate.

Nevertheless, business relationships could give rise to personal friendships, and offhand references to Chinese “friends” are a relatively common...
occurrence in the pages of memoirs. On the other hand, romantic relationships between Chinese and refugees are more difficult to find evidence for. Ross notes that after the end of the war in 1946, there was an upsurge in marriages, including a number of unions between refugees and Chinese presided over by a fellow refugee, Rabbi Silberstein. Hepner too notes in an offhand story that one of his refugee friends fell in love with a Chinese prostitute, but there were no laws in place that would allow him “to free her, and he never succeeded in making enough money to get her released from her owners.”

In the literature produced during the time, however, interracial relations emerge as a kind of trope, although whether they were representative or allegorical in nature remains unclear. The story The Wedding, written in Yiddish by Jacob Fishman, tells the tale of Kurt Stein and his relationship with Luozhen, the daughter of a poor carpenter. Although Kurt is a wealthy Jewish refugee, Luozhen’s father does not approve of her relationship with a foreigner. Kurt’s father also thinks that Kurt should be pursuing European girls for marriage. Although the Jewish father would normally have been disdainful even of a Polish match for one of his children, he later consents to let his daughter Elsa to marry a Polish yeshiva student due to the delicious kosher food that the Polish family serves him. Eventually, the relationship between Kurt and Luozhen causes Kurt’s family to disinvite him from Elsa’s wedding ceremony and ruptures their once cohesive familial bonds.

The story sheds light on the nature of Chinese-Jewish relationships in Shanghai and serves as a contemporaneous commentary on the prevalent attitudes. The story was intended as a critique of those refugees who, for all of their proclaimed liberalism, would still choose food over liberal values. While the story dramatizes the conflict between different Jewish populations, it also brings to the fore the “hypocrisies and animosities” between the refugee and Chinese communities.

Another original refugee work, a play entitled Foreign Soil by Hans Schubert and Mark Siegelberg, focuses on a refugee couple struggling to adapt to Shanghai and features an interracial relationship as a central plot device. The refugee husband was formerly a physician, but since he is unable to open a practice, he works as a door-to-door salesman. Meanwhile, his wife has taken a job at a bar, inducing patrons to buy more drinks through flirtation and conversation. A Chinese patron of the bar begins to court her, giving her enough money in return for sexual favors that her husband can open his medical practice. However, once the husband discovers the source of the money, their relationship unravels and the husband closes the clinic. It is only after he realizes that his wife entered into the relationship with the Chinese man for her sake that they reunite.

Livni frames the play as an outlet for discussing marital or sexual problems that were likely widespread but were “taboo in a petit-bourgeois society.” Eber adds that the play treats the Chinese suitor sympathetically, as he sincerely appears to be in love with the wife. Perhaps due to the sober themes and moral ambiguity contained in the play, it was only performed twice.

The appearance of Jewish-Chinese relationships in refugee writing of the period demonstrates that even if not a widespread practice, the topic emerged as a controversial, uniquely Shanghai challenge to defining and maintaining cultural identity. In The Wedding, the relationship seems to be generally supported, but is primarily employed to comment on the traits inherent in the refugee community itself. In doing so, the
story reveals the range of attitudes that were present in the Shanghai refugee community with regards to association with local inhabitants. Meanwhile, in Foreign Soil, the affair may act as a manifestation of fears and anxieties that refugees could have felt in trying to define themselves, their relationships, and their values in the ambiguous cultural milieu of Shanghai. In the cultural life and literary output of the Jewish refugee community, then, the idea of intercultural encounter and exchange was a sometimes potent, rather than consistently overlooked, concept and source of inspiration.

The generational divide evidenced in The Wedding, however, could also shed light on the potentially disproportionate amount of references to Chinese acquaintances and friends in the memoir records. While survivors who spent their childhood, adolescence, or young adult years in Shanghai author the majority of the memoirs, 68 percent of the refugee population was over 31 years of age and 23 percent was over 50. In interviews, most of the older refugees recall the hardships of the period, in contrast to those who spent their youth in Shanghai and are more apt to remember it as the “kingdom of excitement” that they perceived as children. A common scene in refugee memoirs is the young protagonist looking out in wonder at the city as his or her parents struggle to comfort each other, depressed, and scared to venture out of their homes. Additionally, close to 2,500 refugees were never able to earn a living outside of the Heime, and their experience would have been largely confined to the few blocks around these makeshift shelters. Thus, there is the distinct possibility that rather than an underrepresentation in the scholarly writing, there is an overrepresentation of interaction in the selection of memoirs.

It is interesting then to compare the selection of European source material to the writing of Chinese scholar Pan Guang, who provides for this paper the lone Chinese perspective on the Jewish refugee experience due to the limitations of language and accessibility. Guang’s contribution is notable in its unequivocally positive tone, featuring as its conclusion a section entitled “The Bridge of Friendship Between the Chinese and Jewish People.” He writes of the infusion of creativity and variety that came from the arrival of so many European intellectuals, and highlights “the mutual respect, sympathy, and support between Shanghai Jews and Chinese people.” According to Guang, “the natives of Shanghai tried their best to help Jewish refugees in various ways.”

In this same section, Guang provides evidence of Shanghai Jews joining Chinese nationals in fighting for democracy. Indeed, this aspect of Guang’s account is buttressed by the memoir of a Jewish refugee doctor who would conduct physical exams on Chinese recruits for the underground resistance. Guang identifies Jacob Rosenfeld as one that came from Austria to the city in 1939 and joined the Chinese cause. He served in the Chinese army for ten years, eventually rising to the position of Commander of the Medical Corps. Guang speculates that had Rosenfeld not died suddenly from cardiac arrest in 1952, he may have been appointed Vice-Minister of Health for the People’s Republic. Guang’s paper concludes with the line “We are very proud that today’s Shanghai continues to be the bridge of friendship between the Chinese and Jewish people,” casting the refugee period as the beginning of a still evolving history of friendship.

Guang’s paper, while not factually incorrect, does not entirely mesh with the descriptions of Chinese-Jewish interaction that emerge from the survivor’s memoirs.
or the collection of scholarly writing from European and American historians. Could the disjunction be an echo of the different social and cultural assumptions that led to such misunderstanding during the Hongkew bombing of 1945? Perhaps, being unsuited to aiding strangers, the Chinese viewed their response to the refugee population as actively welcoming and hospitable, rather than vaguely indifferent as the refugees themselves perceived. Any attempt at reconciliation at this point is speculative in nature, but the question is certainly deserving of further study. As with many of the questions that swirl around the history and development of Shanghai as explored through the eyes of historians, it is the Chinese voice that is most lacking.

Though the Shanghai refugee experience was dominated by cultural insulation, restrictive ingroup-outgroup definitions, and the goal of eventually moving to a more suitable home, the Central European Jews nevertheless interfaced with their Chinese neighbors in various spheres of influence and in various ways throughout their time in the city. It remains undetermined what the frequency of interaction truly was, but at least in individual cases, Chinese-Jewish interactions were directly responsible for connecting Jews to Shanghai’s economic sector, fostering academic inquiry, and enriching the social and cultural lives of both parties. While the examples taken from memoirs cannot be, and are not meant to be, representative of the entire refugee community, the glimpses into intercultural exchange as illuminated by personal narrative provide examples of the type of encounters that took place on an one-on-one basis and serve to enrich our understanding of the refugee experience in its totality.

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\(^1\) Irene Eber, Wartime Shanghai and the Jewish Refugees from Central Europe: Survival, Coexistence, and Identity in a Multi-ethnic City (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 123.
\(^{ii}\) Ibid., 208.
\(^{iv}\) Ibid., 105.
\(^{v}\) Ibid., 105.
\(^{vi}\) Eber, 40.
\(^{vii}\) Ibid., 55.
\(^{viii}\) Ibid., 80.
\(^{ix}\) Ibid., 57, 77-78.
\(^{x}\) Ibid., 87-98.
\(^{xi}\) Ibid., 79.
\(^{xii}\) Ibid., 79.
\(^{xiii}\) Ibid., 118.
\(^{xvi}\) Eber, 174.
\(^{xvii}\) Kranzler, 492.
\(^{xviii}\) Eber, 208.
\(^{xix}\) Ibid., 208.
\(^{xx}\) Ross, 71.
\(^{xxii}\) Kranzler, 290.
\(^{xxiii}\) Ross, 198.
\(^{xxiv}\) Entrepreneurial failure was not uncommon, however. During the refugee period, over 900 small enterprises failed (Kranzler 285).
\(^{xxv}\) Kranzler, 288.
\(^{xxvi}\) Hannah, 255.
\(^{xxvii}\) Eber, 121.
\(^{xxviii}\) Ross, 156.
\(^{xxix}\) Ibid., 23; USHMM, "Holocaust History," German and Austrian Jewish Refugees in Shanghai, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Web, 13 Jan. 2013.
\(^{xxx}\) Barzel, Amnon, Leben Im Wartesaal: Exil in Shanghai 1938-1947 (Berlin: Jüdisches Museum Im Stadtmuseum Berlin, 1997), 86.
\(^{xxsii}\) Ibid., 64-65.
\(^{xxsiii}\) He humorously notes that the title of manager was given to nearly “every foreigner working in any supervisory capacity in Shanghai” (Heppner 60).
\(^{xxsiv}\) Heppner, 62.
\(^{xxsvi}\) Ibid., 50.
\(^{xxsvii}\) Barzel, 52.
\(^{xxsviii}\) Ross, 71.
\(^{xxsviii}\) Ibid., 40.
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The six-week, global mega-event Expo 2010 Shanghai had big shoes to fill from its very inception. As NPR’s program All Things Considered documents, critics and Shanghai residents alike anticipated Expo 2010 to be “Shanghai’s moment in the sun.” In the international eye, the Expo would be “even better than the [Beijing 2008] Olympics,” bolstering the reputation of Shanghai and China by “win[ning] glory for Chinese people all round the world.”ii Others voices, such as architectural historian and critic Frank Kaltenbach, heightened levels of anticipation by reminding us of the architectural legacy of previous World Expositions. A World Exhibition, Kaltenbach argued, is a “laboratory for architectural experiments” and, at its very core, a “projection into the future” of architecture.ii As a mega-event in the league of historical World Expositions and the recent Beijing Olympics in 2008, it is no surprise that critics often attempt to discuss the impact of Expo 2010 in terms of its effects on global branding, architectural advancements, or even environmental advocacy.

However, I argue that the most successful element of Expo 2010’s narrative is its localized impacts on the urban form, infrastructure, and residents of Shanghai. More broadly, I contend that the aspirations of Expo 2010, which can be generally summarized by its motto “Better City, Better Life,” are most tangibly realized through the acceleration of modernization within the city. There are two main components of this paper: The presentation of supporting evidence to suggest that the Expo 2010’s greatest legacy is its acceleration of local urban transformations; and the narrative of these local transformations.

To argue that the Expo 2010’s greatest impact is of local, rather than global or symbolic, proportions, I first examine the heritage of the Expo 2010. Through relationships with previous global mega-events such as World Expositions and the Olympic Games, I explore potential factors which may cause critics to fixate on the global branding and architectural innovation aspects of Expo 2010. I then present a counter-argument against this fixation, suggesting that the Expo 2010 did not create any radical or substantial changes to China’s international reputation or to architectural styles worldwide. As an alternative, I argue that the local urban transformation associated with the Expo is the most promising and vital part of its legacy.

After having established my reasons for focusing on the local, urban aspects of Expo 2010 developments from the millennium onwards, I craft my narrative of the Expo through investigations of historical satellite imagery, newspapers, and scholarly articles. I frame Expo 2010 as a global mega-event whose record-setting financial investments were channeled into city projects, producing tangible changes to the urban landscape and individual lives. At the levels of the city, the expo site, and the individual, I show that Expo 2010 accelerated the development of metropolitan Shanghai towards its own vision of “Better City, Better Life.” Specifically, in this section I will discuss: the significance of the Expo site; the evolution of the Expo site (pre-2010) and
the fate of its former residents; contributions to infrastructure and areas outside of the Expo site; and the pending future of Shanghai.

Through my call to re-focus scholarly attention on the local stories of Expo 2010 and my contribution to Shanghai’s urban narrative, I argue that the Expo’s greatest legacy is not to be found in improvements to China’s global reputation, nor innovations in the discipline of architecture, but rather the past and future transformations in urban Shanghai.

THE HOPED-FOR LEGACIES OF EXPO 2010

In response to the common hopes for Expo 2010’s legacy — global reputation building and/or innovations in architecture — I argue in this section that these hopes will go largely unrealized; instead, the true legacy of Expo 2010 is local and fulfilled within Shanghai city boundaries.

It is helpful to begin by situating the Expo 2010 in the context of previous World Expositions and the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. In other words, I establish the perspective of critics and observers in the years between 2008 and 2010. The Beijing Olympics was widely regarded as China’s “coming out party… an explosive self-announcement of [the Chinese] presence on the global superstage.” However, in the years between 2008 and 2010, rumors of the ballooning Expo 2010 budget led to the speculation that the Expo 2010 would be an “economic Olympics” more spectacular than Beijing 2008 or any previous World Expo. Rumors of the excessive cost of the Expo heightened anticipations; and, indeed, final estimations of the Expo 2010 budget range from a conservative $44 billion (US dollars) to $58 billion, not completely including additional investments to city infrastructure. This level of investment places Expo 2010 slightly ahead of the $42 billion price tag of the Beijing Olympics, and dwarfs Japan’s $3 billion spending on the 2005 World Expo in Aichi. As the six-month mega event progressed from May 1, 2010 to October 31, 2010, tourist attendance statistics seemed to hold up to inflated expectations for the Expo. Final tallies reported 73 million visitors to Expo 2010, in contrast to only 6.52 million for the Beijing Olympics and 22 million in Aichi 2005.

The global impact of Beijing 2008 was fresh in the mind of the common observer, while most scholarly critics would be familiar with the architectural legacies left by successful World’s Fairs and Expositions in history. Since the first World’s Fair in London 1851, Nicholas Dynon writes, the “World Expo [has been] an exercise in nation branding … an opportunity for a city to gain domestic and international exposure and to be placed on the world travel map.” For example, the World’s Fair in Philadelphia 1876 was the first official exposition hosted by a non-European country and is regarded as a significant historical marker for the continued rise of the United States. Indeed, Expo 2010 was expected to be a star amongst the league of global mega-events which had long served to “boost global visibility by promoting the image of the city as a vital and dynamic place,” assert the vitality and advancement of the host country, and produce innovations in architectural design.

Ultimately, however, the impact of Expo 2010 on Chinese global branding was limited relative to the precedents set by Beijing 2008 and previous successful World’s Fairs. The Expo’s legacy on global branding was unimpressive for two major reasons: The failure to attract a substantial global audience, and the
existing strength of the reputation and architectural image of Shanghai.

How is it possible that Expo 2010 had more than ten times the number of visitors than Beijing 2008, and yet had a smaller impact on global branding? A closer look at audience statistics reveals that the record-setting admissions rate of the Expo 2010 tells a misleading story about the success of the Expo’s brand image in the global realm. Of the 73 million Expo visitors, fewer than 6% were visitors from outside China, according to a final report produced by Australia’s Shanghai World Expo Unit.\textsuperscript{xii} Furthermore, the Shanghai World Expo also received little international media coverage, further diminishing its potential to communicate a national or city brand across borders. The Opening Ceremony Beijing Olympic, in contrast, attracted over 1.5 billion viewers worldwide.\textsuperscript{xiii} Contrary to the levels of global nation branding achieved by the Beijing Olympics and historical World’s Fairs, Shanghai’s failure to attract global attention suggests that the mega-event and its branding efforts would be received by a primarily domestic audience, thereby limiting its impact on international relations.\textsuperscript{xiv}

A second factor responsible for an unremarkable change in the global collective image of Shanghai and China is the existing strength of Shanghai’s reputation and architectural imagery. In an article titled “Images of Power,” Anne-Marie Broudehoux writes that global events like the Beijing Olympics leave behind architecture which “brand[s] the urban skyline and is considered vital to enhance the prestige and desirability of place.” Signature buildings become “tradable symbols of value” and “essential tools of city marketing.”\textsuperscript{xv} While the 2008 Olympics put Beijing on the global radar by scattering memorable, monumental architecture across the cityscape, the 2010 Expo had no analogous effect in Shanghai. Even prior to Expo 2010, Shanghai was in no shortage of architectural icons. The Oriental Pearl Tower, Shanghai World Financial Center, and the Jin Mao Tower created a modern (or even futuristic) skyline in Pudong; and the image of the Bund’s gothic and art deco waterfront in Puxi is no less recognizable. As Maura Cunningham and Jeffrey Wasserstrom point out, “Perhaps more than any other city in the world, Shanghai already resembles a futuristic fairground even when no circus is in town.”\textsuperscript{xvi} While favorable critics of Expo 2010, such as Shaun Rein of Shanghai’s China Market Research Group, are eager to proclaim, “The Expo showed that Shanghai is ready to be a prime-time modern global city,” I would caveat his statement by suggesting that the Expo is merely one example of Shanghai modernity. Moreover, the modest scale and impermanence of the Expo allows its imageability to be rather easily eclipsed by the dominating and iconic Pudong skyline. In other words, the developments of the Expo site south of Pudong-Lujiazui were unlikely to substantially impact Shanghai’s global image simply because Shanghai already had the architectural tools to market itself.

As indicated earlier, another hoped-for legacy of Expo 2010 would be its contribution to architectural design. In the long history of World Expositions, the Crystal Palace, Eiffel Tower, and Barcelona Pavilion set precedents for the debut of architectural innovations in the World’s Fairs. Joseph Paxton’s Crystal Palace (1851 World’s Fair) is considered by some the “prelude to modern architecture;”\textsuperscript{xvii} Gustav Eiffel’s Eiffel Tower (1889 World’s Fair) was the tallest man-made structure at the time of its completion; and Mies van der Rohe’s Barcelona Pavilion (1929 International Exposition) “introduced flowing space
coupled with non-load-bearing room dividers. Whether permanent or temporary, architectural legacies like these three are immortalized in architectural canon. Presently, however, Expo 2010 does not appear to have been a particularly visionary Expo in the field of architecture. Based on interviews of architects and designers responsible for each country’s pavilion, available in the text Beyond Design: 2010 Shanghai Expo Architecture and Space Design, the UK’s “Seed Cathedral” pavilion was among the most acclaimed designs. Yet, despite its elegant, textured skin, its appropriation of comfortable outdoor space, and its clear message in support of global biodiversity, the Seed Cathedral simply cannot be considered to represent a new architectural paradigm. Architectural critics were similarly unconvinced of the Expo’s impact on architecture. As Kaltenbach criticizes, “Does this expo advance architecture? Even the best of the pavilions [at Shanghai 2010] have no intention of establishing a new architectural vocabulary – as was the case, for example, for the Barcelona Pavilion.”

If I am to suggest that hopes for Expo 2010 legacies in global branding or architectural innovation remain unfulfilled, I must, of course, offer an answer to the questions: What are we to make of the significance of Expo 2010, and how should we better narrate its legacy? I begin my answer with an example of how I believe we should react to statements like the following, from architect and critic Sarosh Pradhan: “Factories, docks, and shipyards have given way to innovative and experimental iconic architectural creations that seems to stress the arrival of China.”

I contend that we should react to critics like Pradhan by, first, suggesting that “factories, docks and shipyards” is an inaccurate oversimplification of the site composition; the life of the site pre-Expo needs to be understood more completely and holistically. Furthermore, having already made my case against innovative architectural creations and global brand building, I would suggest that we focus our attention to the legacy that Expo 2010 created in its redevelopment of the expo site and its surrounds. In other words, I propose that we investigate the narrative of the Expo and its site in the past, present, and future.

DISCOVERING THE LOCAL NARRATIVE OF EXPO 2010

In this section, I examine the legacy of Expo 2010 at the local scale. Through a local narrative of urban Shanghai, I illustrate Expo 2010’s role in destabilizing Chinese lives in efforts to advance the development of Shanghai. Specifically, I identify and track changes of local urban life, infrastructure, and development directly associated with Expo 2010. I aim to bring together satellite imagery, newspapers, and scholarly research to compile a local narrative of the Shanghai Expo that is not yet told.

The relevant narrative begins shortly before 2002, the year Shanghai won the bid to host the 2010 Universal World Exhibition. As I hinted earlier, the proposed site was not home to only “factories, docks, and shipyards.” The 5.28 square kilometer site, an area larger than any previous expo, was home to 18,000 families and 272 companies (Image A1). The site was also prime real estate: Only four miles downriver from the heart of Shanghai’s Lujiazui financial district, the expo site straddled both banks of the Huangpu River in the region surrounding the Lupu Bridge and Nanpu Bridge. For the Chinese government’s goal of continued modernization of Shanghai, this real estate was key. As
Shanghai’s traffic demands required more and more automobile and subway connections across the Huangpu River in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Expo 2010 appeared to provide an opportunity to destroy a former port district and residential area in order to integrate the zone into the traffic network of the Shanghai metropolitan area.

To make way for this redevelopment, the mass evictions of families and businesses on the riverfront site began, and ended, before November 2005, according to satellite imagery (Image A4). The story of government-mandated evictions in China is, of course, not unique to Expo 2010, but the investigation of these events is nevertheless part of the local history and legacy of the Expo 2010 and must be told. Evicted Chinese who cooperated with government evacuation timelines were relocated to a number of apartment compounds called “Expo Homelands” (Sanlin Expo Homeland, Yiyangyuan Expo homeland, and Pujiang World Expo Homeland, to name a few) scattered several miles to the south / south-east region of Pudong (Image B1). While some Chinese newspapers report that relocated families received “reasonable compensation … determined by the real estate market” and an increase in apartment size from 30 square meters to 70 square meters, international human rights groups have also petitioned the United Nations to investigate Chinese “victims who were forcibly removed from their homes — without compensation or fair notice — in order to make room for the exposition.” Thus, sources are not only limited but also conflicting, and the true impact of the living conditions of relocated Chinese is unfortunately unclear. At the very least, however, details of the story untold by newspapers and articles emerge from historical satellite imagery (Image A1, Image B1): The lifestyles and social connections that may have thrived in the irregular, narrow alleyways characteristic of the old shipyard neighborhoods were forced to yield to the systematically linear streets forming a grid between medium- and high-rise towers in the new Homelands. The accompanying demolition of the shipyards only increased the trauma of the relocation by severing access to work for shipbuilding and shipyard families. For example, the Jiangnan Shipyard on the Expo Site employed over 10,500 Chinese before it was forced to move to Shanghai’s Changxing Island — a distance too far from the Homelands for a daily commute.

The forced evictions challenged the dignity and respect of some, if not most, residents. Those who chose to dissent or be uncooperative with the government’s terms and timeline of relocation would forfeit any relocation “benefits.” Instead of Expo Homelands, activists, petitioners, and rebels found themselves under surveillance, detention, programs such as “Re-Education through Labor,” or homeless. PRI’s The World, for example, tells a story of Li Guan Rong, a former housekeeper who was evicted as a result of Expo construction. Uncompensated for her relocation, she and her husband went to Beijing to petition the evictions; but the government responded by temporarily detaining her and terminating her husband’s job for allegedly disturbing the peace in Tiananmen Square. Her family lived on the streets for years before finding an unoccupied apartment in the Homelands to illegally occupy. While the forced evictions of over 18,000 families and businesses make clear the cost of developing the Expo site, its short and rapid timeline also reminds us of the speed with which the Chinese government could operate to develop its vision for the Expo.
With an authority that needed no tolerance for “uncooperative” residents such as Li Guan Rong, local transformations to the Expo site were almost immediately apparent. Satellite imagery of the Expo site in July 2002 (Image A2) shows a half-finished Lupu Bridge laying across the Huangpu River and a road extending through the Pudong side just beginning to be paved. Here, an unexpected chronological ordering of events occurs: The date of China’s winning bid for Expo 2010 was December 2002, at least three full months later than the satellite image depicting the construction of the Lupu Bridge. Shanghai’s determination to extend its infrastructure are made shockingly clear; infrastructural developments were already taking place in this region, and Expo 2010 took a role as an opportunity to accelerate the development of modern Shanghai.

As the Lupu Bridge was completed above ground in 2003, Shanghai extended its underground infrastructure with the construction of a metro line running through the eastern portion of the expo site. A satellite image from May 2004 (Image A3) reveals that at least the first wave of evictions has taken place; the foundations of a new metro line are visible now but will be fully underground and undetectable in future years. By 2007, this Yangpu Metro Line would open as a major north-south corridor for the city.\textsuperscript{26}

By November 2005 (Image A4), the forced evictions discussed earlier would be complete, leaving behind temporary voids on the site. The form of the expo site would be drastically and permanently changed by the time a satellite image is recorded in 2009 (Image A6). What was once an erratic and disorderly landscape developed through accretion is now a series of neat, orthogonal subdivisions. A curvilinear boulevard sweeps across the Pudong side of the Huangpu riverbank, sectioning off valuable riverfront real estate for the future Expo Park in the area that was once the site of docks, shipyards, and factories.

While the transformations to the Expo site landscape and the infrastructure network of Shanghai comprise part of the most tangible and indisputable legacy of Expo 2010, the narrative of Expo 2010’s local impacts are not yet complete. The mega-event also financed the facelift of parts of Shanghai outside of the 5.3 square kilometer site. A notable part of the Expo’s legacy reaching beyond the boundaries of the expo site is the bankrolling of the Bund Renovation project between 2006 and 2009. In this three-year project, the Expo budget invested an estimated $732 million to make the Bund more pedestrian friendly, increase tourist attractions, and build a more environmentally friendly image. In 2006 (Image C1), Zhongshan Road (the street on the Bund) was an eleven-lane highway with a modest waterfront pedestrian promenade. Pedestrians, as well as the surrounding art deco architecture, were dwarfed by the terminus of the Yan’an Road Elevated Expressway, a raised structure which merged to street level less than 10 meters away from the Huangpu waterfront. By 2008 (Image C2), the terminus was dismantled and existing traffic was redirected to a reduced four lanes as the construction of a subterranean road begins. By October 2009 (Image C3), the underground construction is hidden from view — just as the Yangpu Metro Line disappeared from the surface of the Expo site years earlier. The Bund re-opened to the public in March 2010, and a satellite image from April 2010 (Image C5) shows the renovation project near completion. The eleven-lane highway was diminished to four lanes, the pedestrian promenade was widened substantially on both sides of
the Zhongshang Road, and an undetectable bi-level underground tunnel with eight lanes hides underneath. By the beginning of the Expo on May 1, 2010, the waterfront pedestrian promenade would finish its facelift to include trees, benches, and storefronts as nearby attractions for Expo visitors.

Together, the transformations to the Bund, subterranean and surface-level infrastructure, and exposition site comprise the major local legacies observable to date. These developments were inextricably linked to the Expo 2010 timeline, vision, and budget, but they were also designed to be integral parts of Shanghai’s long-term development. These local legacies will only continue to grow in importance as the future of the Expo site and metropolitan Shanghai take hold.

While satellite imagery is not yet available for 2011 and 2012, the demolition of the Expo pavilions has already begun, setting the stage for the next phase of the Expo 2010 legacy. Of the more than 200 pavilions, only five are expected to remain: The China Pavilion, Cultural Performance Center, Expo Axis, Expo Center, and Theme Pavilion will live on as cultural, entertainment, shopping, and convention centers. According to Jones Lang LaSalle, a multinational real estate services firm, official documents label the Pudong site as an “Urban residential mixed development zone.” The 5.3 square kilometer site “forms the single largest downtown [waterfront location] for residential construction,” and with many of the key cultural facilities already in place, the expo site appears to be an ideal site for high-end and luxury residential towers. Given its “mixed development” zone status, the future of the Expo site could also include commercial developments to complement the long-term goals for the Shanghai metropolitan area, which call for a city with many downtowns and nodes of activity.

A “Better City, Better Life” for Shanghai?

In this paper, I have argued that the most important legacy of Expo 2010 is in its transformation of local, urban elements of Shanghai. I have presented concrete data and images that suggest the relatively low impact of Expo 2010 on global reputation and architectural innovation, while documenting the Expo 2010’s key role in the physical development of Shanghai. The current account of the Expo 2010 local legacy includes: the improvement of pedestrian life through the creation of a new waterfront park (Expo Park) and the renovation of an existing waterfront (the Bund); the expansion of infrastructure and mass transit, which will benefit future projects (e.g. Disneyworld Shanghai); and the opportunity to re-develop a key plot of land in the heart of central Shanghai. The value of this legacy will also only grow over time as new construction on the former expo site begins.

However, the local legacy of the Expo 2010 has its undeniable dark side, too: the destabilization of families and businesses formerly occupying the expo site. The negative urban legacies of Expo 2010 are by no means limited to what I have discussed. For example, a future exploration on this topic could explore the positive and negative effects of the gentrified Expo site in 2015. As such, I must recognize that the work I have done in this paper is only one step towards understanding the legacy of Expo 2010. While I believe that I have brought a focused historical narrative to attention, I have purposefully refrained from over-emphasizing judgments on the value or ethicality of Expo 2010’s legacy in urban Shanghai. It is my hope that time and further investigations into Expo 2010 will
continue to add information to the narrative and allow for critics and scholars to advise cities hoping to host any future global mega-event.

APPENDIX: IMAGES

IMAGE A1: EXPO SITE, YEAR 2000

IMAGE A2: EXPO SITE, YEAR 2002

IMAGE A3: EXPO SITE, YEAR 2004

IMAGE A4: EXPO SITE, YEAR 2005

IMAGE A5: EXPO SITE, YEAR 2006

IMAGE A6: EXPO SITE, YEAR 2009 (APRIL)
IMAGE C4: INTERSECTION OF YAN’AN ROAD AND ZHONGSHAN ROAD, YEAR 2009 (OCTOBER)

IMAGE C5: INTERSECTION OF YAN’AN ROAD AND ZHONGSHAN ROAD, YEAR 2010

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xiv I note here that domestic brand-building is a potential legacy of Expo 2010, but it is not studied extensively in this paper because domestic brand-building does not appear to be a topic frequently covered in discussions of Olympic Games and World Expos.


xviii Ibid.


xviii The complete set of satellite images is presented as a detachable visual companion to this text, and can be found at the end.


xxxii UN Watch. “JOINT NGO APPEAL FOR 18,000 VICTIMS OF FORCED EVICTION BY 2010 SHANGHAI WORLD EXPO.” July 22, 2010.


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ARCHITECTURE AS A MEANS OF FOSTERING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 

The Employment of European and North American Architectural Styles in the Suburbanization Process of Shanghai

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Shanghai, currently ranked as the world’s largest city proper with a population of almost 18 million people, has also possessed the greatest rate of urbanization with 86.8 percent in 2006 and 88.7 percent in 2010. What contributes most to this extremely high rate is the urbanization in the massive suburban areas of Shanghai, which was the product of a long and intensive planning process that spanned the past two decades.

In 1999, to propel the development of Shanghai in its quest to become a major metropolis of the world, the Master Plan for Shanghai foresaw the urbanization of the countryside in order to deal with the high number of inhabitants in the city’s core. In the same year, the ‘One City - Nine Towns Development Plan’ was conceived, as well as the 10th Five-Year-Plan (2001-2005) of the Chinese state, signifying the importance of the project for China as a whole. Even the architectural styles of these new towns were decided from top down: each new town was to be modeled after authentic Western European and North American architectural styles, namely that of Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Scandinavia, and North America. As a testing ground and a tool to form a favorable public opinion for suburban development, the new towns were also “assigned... billboard function[s]” by Mayor Liangyu Chen in 1999 “to enable the new towns to compete with the cosmopolitan qualities of the Central City. The international architectural style of the city center would be extended to the suburbs with European spatial and architectural qualities.”

Given the scale of the project and the context it was created in, extending the aesthetic tradition of the Bund and the concessions to the countryside do not seem to be a complete answer, mainly because the employment of the Western architectural styles in urban housing projects are not unique to Shanghai. A similar development is also apparent in Beijing, for example. More importantly, the urbanization rate of Shanghai lies at the core of the Chinese state’s economic policies, and considering the city’s role in the post-Socialist era as the “Head of the Dragon,” pulling the country into the future as Deng Xiaoping described in 1992, every decision related to the city’s development needs to be examined through a bigger picture involving political and economic aspects.

According to the policies of a top-down authority regarding the expansion of the city in the suburbs and opening up new land for the real estate sector in a country that is in a process of rapid development after switching to a new neoliberal economy, selection of the Western architectural types acted as a facilitator towards achieving the desired urban development. This development was achieved through careful evaluation of the...
social cultural realities such as people’s tendencies, assumptions, and economic and social aspirations that were evident in the urban population, which has also been changing like the Chinese state.

The three main areas that constitute the situation described above can be identified as political economic, social cultural, and architectural marketing. This paper will analyze these aspects and their relationships with one another to explain how architecture was used as a political tool to foster economic development in the context of social changes. In order to understand the political and economic aspects of the particular method of suburbanization involving gated communities and creating self-sufficient cities, we need to start by looking at the historical background of Shanghai in terms of policies regarding urbanization since 1978.

In late 1978, after the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping started the process of integrating China into the global economy by reopening its ports to capitalist markets. This marked a strong transformation from a production based economy to one based on consumption or, in other words, a shift from state socialism to capitalism\textsuperscript{ix}. The role of Shanghai in the context of this radically transformed approach had to be redefined. Following the Cultural Revolution that “put an end to the development of both cities and new towns in China,” a new Master Plan for Shanghai was prepared in 1986 with a long-term vision extending as far as 2020. “The plan’s objective was to develop Shanghai into an economic, scientific and cultural center... and [return] Shanghai to its status as an international metropolis, just as in the beginning of the twentieth century.”\textsuperscript{xvi}

The reform “led to a series of institutional changes which not only included the break-up of the state monopoly on resource allocation, but also rapid devolution of power to the localities”\textsuperscript{xii} in order to allocate resources in a more efficient manner. Land was one these resources which makes this authority shift extremely important for urban development because in 1990 it became possible to lease land from the government for a period of 40 to 70 years. Around the same time, the opportunity for land and home ownership was introduced. These changes led to a revised Master Plan for Shanghai in 1994 which called for a “polynuclear regional network” to replace the old centralistic model\textsuperscript{xiii}. Consequently, in the 1999 Master Plan, the hierarchical structure of the decentralization was laid out with the 1-9-6-6 Model (one Central City for the service sector, nine new decentralized key cities as administrative centers, sixty small towns and six hundred central villages)\textsuperscript{xiv}.

In other words, the decentralization in the fiscal authority structure was followed by spatial decentralization.

As a result, suburbanization in Shanghai was based on creating new towns, which is different than satellite towns because the nine new towns were imagined as self-sufficient cities, performing as “independently functioning nuclei”\textsuperscript{xv} in the space that makes up the urban area. In this new order of spatial and fiscal decentralization, the local governments were much more effective in urban development. Tingwei Zhang\textsuperscript{xvi} argues that these newly forming players have created a dynamic decision-making structure in which “the central government’s decentralization policy as a top-down initiative meets localization as a bottom-up response.”\textsuperscript{xvii} Shen describes this relationship as follows: “On the one hand, the municipality retained the power of decision on key issues for the whole region, as well as appointments and removals of district leaders. On the other hand, however, local district governments were granted great autonomy to deal with
This also led to a new set of relationships between the municipality and suburban district governments. The independent local governments competed with each other for projects initiated by the municipality. This type of development that took advantage of the free nature of the market economy was intended from the beginning.

How exactly was this type of suburbanization based on decentralization going to help Shanghai in developing and fostering economic growth? The answer lies in the factors that led to the creation of the 1994 Master Plan of Shanghai which have already been mentioned, namely the leasing of land and introduction of land and home ownership. Even though an important goal of the One City – Nine Towns as the pilot program of the 1-9-6 model was to deal with the congestion in the Central City by rehousing a portion of the residents to these “nine new key cities which together have a capacity of 5.4 million residents,” the suburbanization of Shanghai should not be seen only as a natural result of urban growth but also as a solution that resembles the classical methods of dealing with urban congestion. It was a very deliberate decision rooted in the economic interests of the new state.

Connected to the introduction of home ownership, the household registration system hukou, which made it possible for the authorities to control urban and rural population, was modified. The residents of the new towns were “automatically granted an urban hukou registration, with increased privileges”, unlike the first implementation of satellite town projects in Shanghai in late 1950s where "the new residents lost their urban hukou after moving... As a result of their urban sovereignty, local governments now had increased powers.” With regulations like the relative relaxation of the hukou system and the possibility of land leasing, the urban development was commodified, which attracted capital investment leading to the creation of a land market. The creation of the land market also indicates the emergence of a housing market as a result of real estate investments. Therefore, the land market played a key role in the economic development in the post-Socialist era because, as Ma and Wu point out in their book Restructuring the Chinese City, “since the mid-1980s, the Chinese economy has struggled to find an engine of growth. Real estate was one such engine.”

On a related note, Xiangming Chen writes, “The massive scale of land lease amounts to a highly rational, calculated move by the government to use its sole control over non-priced land to create a lucrative land-lease market to finance rapid urban build-up” and these regulations “opened up domestic property to global investors and firms.”

With the administrative decentralization, the central state, as the sole owner of all land in China, allocated the land as a resource to local governments in the post-Socialist period. “As the city is staged at the center of accumulation, the outcome is severe economic competition between cities and within the city.” Consequently, suburbanization in the areas that had not been used and urbanized constituted a very strong potential for creating a massive income for the newly emerging capitalist state through the hands of the local governments. As Shen points out, “the government urgently needed money to fill the gap in local finance and continue investing in infrastructure to sustain growth. By building new towns, land and property development could provide an important means of generating land income.” New town development, as the core of the suburbanization in Shanghai, was therefore very closely
associated with local governments’ usage of land development to stimulate economic growth.

So the One City – Nine Towns project was developed in such an economic setting where suburbanization was utilized as a growth machine for Shanghai and, as this paper tries to demonstrate, the mission it claimed was central to the development goals of the capitalist state. Given the degree of importance of the project to the economic goals of the new state system, the realization of the project was facilitated by all means possible. For example, the municipality, as the authority in charge of the region as a whole, made investments to develop the infrastructure necessary for suburbanization, such as the 300-km-long Suburban Ring Road. On the other hand, the local governments function “not only as market regulators, but also as indispensable market players themselves,” as did the land owners. This is what distinguishes the local governments in China from their counterparts in other countries: city governments became entrepreneurial actors and nowadays compete with each other to attract capital. However, since they are still tied to the central state, local governments are “unable to convert as much rural land as they wish, so they widely use place promotion and marketing to present the suburbs as a nice place to live and work in order to encourage demand, which could help raise land prices and thus maximize land revenue.”

This is the point where the political and economic development and the social and cultural aspects of the population come together in the narrative of suburbanization of Shanghai. In order to guarantee the fulfillment of the critical role of suburbanization and new towns to spur financial growth, one of the means that was manipulated to the fullest potential possible was marketing. Suburban living, previously looked down upon, was promoted through marketing strategies employed by the local governments and the private companies they partnered with to indicate a better living. Thus, demand would be created for the houses which were built on land that had to gain real estate value and bring the maximum revenue.

However, before going into the marketing strategies and where Western architecture fits into this context, it is necessary to look at the transformations in the social structure of the urban population in the post-socialist era, namely the creation and rise of the middle class and their social and cultural assumptions, especially towards the “Western” products and lifestyle, that are key to the success of the marketing strategies.

Before the reform, the dominant form of housing was the work-unit compounds called danweis which were monotypic welfare houses that were compatible with the socialist state’s sole focus on production, with the slogan “Live a plain life and wage a hard struggle to build our country.” However, after the neoliberal reform, there was a need to create, motivate, and sustainably increase consumption in order to achieve economic growth. This required an urban middle class and the creation of a culture that favors consumption, which is radically different from that of the socialist period.

How is the middle class defined? In a recent CNN interview Helen Wang, the author of the book The Chinese Dream: The Rise of the World’s Largest Middle Class and What It Means to You, answered this important question in a way that relates to both home ownership and the consumerist culture: “A rule of thumb is a household with a third of its income for discretionary spending is considered
middle class.” Therefore, a house and the ability to do non-need based spending are the two characteristics according to the writer. Going off this definition, it would be convenient to first look at the consumption habits of the emerging middle class population, followed by how this relates to the housing market, and finally what aspirations are formed and addressed with the promotion of that particular type of lifestyle. While examining these issues, the role of the Western culture in the process of changing socioeconomic circumstances will also be considered.

The advent of the middle class in China starting in the 1980s entails some very interesting anthropological findings. First of all, the popular culture was elementary in the process of making the dramatic shift from a population with a set of socialist values to one that is compatible with the global capitalist way of life. In her paper Politics of Chinese Mass Culture, Dai Jinhua writes that “the movements in popular culture around the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, bespeak the fall of socialist ideology as well as the end of hope for imminent political reforms or political democracy. As a result, economic salvation has become the only path leading to the future, and it has replaced socialist or democratic salvation. As a by-product of the progress of globalization, commercialism has become the most powerful contributor to the social and cultural panorama of the 1990s.” Accordingly, the conceptions of a “good life” also have undergone serious questioning and metamorphosis. The minimalistic lifestyle of the socialist era that was devoted to bringing the country forward to a better future through production was replaced by a more material approach that defined the goodness of a life through owning certain products of symbolic social value.

In her paper Urban Consumer Culture, Deborah Davis, Professor of Sociology at Yale University and an expert on contemporary Chinese society, describes the situation in the socialist era as follows: “During the first 30 years in which the Chinese Communist Party monopolized political power, the national leadership defined modernity in terms of increased industrial output and the triumph of collective ownership […] For urban residents, the Maoist vision of a “new” China de-commercialized city life and concentrated consumption within locations of production.” The intentional creation of a nationwide goal, taking advantage of the state of poverty the country was in as a source of motivation while Mao was in power, gave way to an individualistic view of life that is more along the lines of the dominant Western culture in the global context and favored economic growth in the post-Socialist city.

While tracing the manifestations of this change in the physical urban space, Jinhua looks at billboard advertisements, coffee shops, and a particular restaurant named “Global Village” to make the conclusion that “there is a really profound displacement and transformation: no more mass movements and political rallies (either for the government or against it), and no more leadership by the elite culture and elite intellectuals; rather, it is leisure, shopping, and consuming that are serving the important function of mobilizing and organizing Chinese society. The shopping space has become the space of reorganizing and reconstructing the social order.” In Shanghai, the spatial change catalyzed by the financial change is obvious in the city’s core where urban gentrification projects are taking place, the most famous of them being the Xintiandi area, now mostly occupied by the stores of global brands.
The popularity of these areas signifies the shift towards the consumerist culture. Consequently, popular culture and mass media play a key role in this endeavor of creating a consumerist middle class as the Chinese society becomes more global. Especially in the first half of 1990s, “popular culture and mass media [...] defined their marketing targets in terms of the so-called middle class taste and consumption levels.” The word “taste” here is important because with the integration into the neoliberal economy, the people started to choose; they could decide for themselves on what to consume, which wasn’t the case in general in the socialist era. However, the consumption behaviors did not depend on need; rather, they were dependent on what people thought they needed in order to make their life "better." Jinhua goes on to explain this interesting phenomenon: “This is a matter of cultural imagination rather than actual need. As a reversal of the law of supply and demand, the Chinese media try to create and nurture a Chinese middle class community.” So the market was creating the taste that it was targeting, and it was bringing up, at least in terms of mentality, the new middle class as its own target audience.

As this new and growing Chinese middle class society revolves more and more around activities of leisure, shopping, and consuming, the sophisticated advertising campaigns of Western based multinational companies turn out to be effective in determining the consumption patterns. As Helen Wang states in her CNN interview, “A lot of Chinese, especially younger consumers, are really into the luxury brands. They associate Western luxury brands with quality of life and sophistication.” In order to witness this first hand, a walk on the Nanjing Road would be more than enough for one to see such instances as long lines in front of an Apple Store at ten in the morning on a Saturday.

How was this consumerist culture centered around Western products reflected on the preferences for domestic space? Davis points out that unlike the housing assigned to people by the municipal offices from the mid-1950s to late 1980s in which amenities like showers, bathrooms, and kitchens had to be shared with another family that allowed little possibility for personalized space, self-contained flats that appeared after the explosive growth of commercial housing after 1992 introduced urban residents to a range of possibilities to decorate their homes. For example, “magazines published in 1994 and 1995 routinely provided extensive directions on dimensions and use of each piece of hardware needed to hang a new door, install a sink or lay a wood floor. [...] a new language of style and taste as well as personal distinction rhetorically framed the practical instructions.” To give a sense of the scale of the effect of the change, by the end of 2002 self-contained flats made 87.4% of all households in Shanghai.

As an important component of the marketing strategies, these products were associated with a lifestyle that was promoted as desirable. “In one introduction, the editors promised readers who carefully planned each step of their renovation that they would experience feelings of greater openness and refinement. In another, they offered to instruct readers on how to possess a cozy and harmonious family life. [...] These practically oriented magazines published in the mid-1990s also reproduced images from European and North American magazines to illustrate the importance of careful design and placement of furnishings. Thus, as they browsed magazines, Shanghai residents visualized domestic settings that connected them to
global consumer practices and furnishings.\textsuperscript{xlv}

This example clearly indicates the middle class’s strong desire for a better living environment, and this desire is a pivotal element in the self-identification of this social group since “the new bourgeoisie and the new petite bourgeoisie—seek to establish their identity through a distinctive taste and lifestyle.”\textsuperscript{xlv} Housing is obviously very relevant as it “has become a new-found valuable private space, an inside that is importantly outside the official surveillance.”\textsuperscript{xlvi} Through marketing and branding that was embedded in the mass media and popular culture, Western products and lifestyle were considered as a way for them to adapt to global trends and represented the quality of life that the new middle class was aspiring to possess, as a result of a recursive process of the market players trying to create demand to advertise their products.

Interestingly enough, this “reverse” relationship of the “supplier” also creating the demand is evident in suburban housing production as well, which further clarifies the interconnectivity of social cultural changes and the urbanization policies. We have already mentioned that suburbanization of Shanghai cannot be seen merely as a consequence of urban growth, and that it was a deliberate move that took into account the multiple dimensions of the issue. Going hand in hand with the creation of the middle class and its preferences through media, suburbanization was also a product of “manipulation or exaggeration of the consumer demand by the suppliers,”\textsuperscript{xlvii} meaning private companies and governments. This is usually how suburbanization comes about: the same can be said about the process in the United States of America.\textsuperscript{xlviii}

Going back to Chen’s definition of the middle class in addition to a tendency and desire to consume, another given feature was home ownership, which is an essential variable in the question of suburbanization. To make the conception towards homeownership favorable for suburbanization, a break from the socialist period was needed. The media and popular culture were again key actors in the process. “Homeownership, which was once despised and regarded as the sign of an unfavorable ‘bourgeoisie’ class, is now consciously promoted as a symbol of well-being by both the government and the developers.”\textsuperscript{xlvi} Daan Roggeveren, An architect of Dutch origin practicing and teaching in Shanghai,\textsuperscript{1} confirms that this is the case. In an email interview conducted with Roggeveren, upon being asked about how the media is effective on the consumption of housing of the new middle class urban residents and how this consumption is linked with the view of life of the population, he responded that “The idea of a middle class that is striving to get their own apartment and car is very much the case. The whole real estate industry is also trying to promote this idea of ‘new living’ etc. by an amazing amount of advertisements; in the streets, in flyers and by text messages.”\textsuperscript{xi}

What factors are effective in the conceptions of this “new lifestyle” of the emerging middle class when it comes to their living spaces? Just like the overall consumption pattern, home preferences are also an important element in forming a self-definition of the middle class, and there are general patterns and ideas that a “good life” is founded upon, which are manipulated to the fullest by the market players to attract the buyers. “To capture the new market, developers attempt to create higher quality living environments by using distinctive themes such as ‘low-density’, ‘greener’, ‘ecological’, ‘luxury’,

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and 'livable'." According to Harry den Hartog, "within the luxurious partly Western-designed areas, the improvement of the quality of life is the biggest impetus to move: the homes are bigger, the sky is bluer and cleaner."

In his book The Concrete Dragon, while talking about the marketing strategies of the gated communities, Thomas Campanella writes "the projects actively exploit the symbolism of globalization as they attempt to sell a distinctive lifestyle to upwardly mobile urban elites." If we focus on the description of the buyer profile "mobile urban elites," we will see that some of the themes listed above carry deep connotations within themselves that indicate the transforming social structure of the population with the changing preferences in living spaces. For instance, some of the themes listed in Wu’s quote, such as "low-density", "luxury", and "livable" imply the population’s aspiration to live in an exclusive environment. The exclusivity that the middle class “urban elites” use to identify themselves is elementary in their efforts to acquire the desired modern, global, and sophisticated lifestyle.

Exclusivity presents a problematic side of the gated communities, namely the creation of urban enclaves where a certain portion of the population below a certain financial threshold is excluded from the community. “The vision of ‘new-generation towns’ is exclusively targeted for ‘successful people.'” James Lee from the Department of Public and Social Administration at the City University of Hong Kong addresses this issue: “while housing reform has facilitated a major mobilization of resources in housing investment in the last two decades and has generally improved the living condition of a good proportion of Chinese families, it has at the same time generated more uneven distribution and greater inequality in terms of housing allocation and access.” Zhou and Logan, by quoting Feng Jian, extend the concept of exclusivity and tie it to the consumer culture: “Feng notes two types of social changes. One is in the class structure – the growing class inequalities that are manifested in spatial inequalities and represented in both practical and symbolic terms by growth in the use of private automobiles. The other is in residents’ attitudes toward the use of space, which provide support for a mix of high-class and moderate-income housing in suburbs.

Friederike Fleischer, a social anthropologist who has carried out a 14-month-long ethnographic study in a Beijing suburb observed that “housing choices in China today are deeply embedded in and related to a larger socio-cultural and spatial reconfiguration of Chinese society. The new urban middle class has developed specific ideas about their living environment and life-style. […] China’s previously relatively homogenous urban society is subject to both residential differentiation and dramatic socio-economic stratification.”

Fig 1: Consumption Patterns: Apple Store on the Nanjing Road
This need for exclusivity stems from two reasons: first, the middle class’s need to identify itself through the elements of its lifestyle which also has to do with the profile of the people that they share their community with and secondly, security. Talking about the gated communities, Shen and Wu write: “Such communities quickly came to represent higher residential prestige, a distinctive lifestyle, private governance, and a truer sense of community for those able to buy in.” Fleischer compounds on this kind of stratification with the following observations from her research: “the ‘quality’ (suzhi) of residents was a criterion for choosing a residential area. […] The changes in the affluent urban residents’ evaluation of people’s suzhi appeared to reflect their own changing perspectives, and were therefore an indicator of the emerging class structuration of Chinese society.” As for security, Pi Miao, a professor of architecture at the University of Hawaii, Manoa, states that “although today’s China has maintained a lower crime rate when compared internationally in absolute numbers, Chinese residents increasingly feel insecure as they compare their life with that of yesterday,” a problem which he claims is caused by the increased levels of inequality after the switch to the neoliberal economy.

There is scientific proof of increase in inequality, stimulated by the exclusivity of living spaces. Looking at the Gini index, a standard measure of income inequality with the number of 1.00 representing complete inequality, for Pudong, Shanghai reveals that income inequality “rose from .37 in 1994 to .45 in 2001, approximating the high level of inequality in the United States.”

This problematic side of the gated communities shows that in the process of the middle class formation and preference for lives within gated communities in the suburban areas of the city, there has been an increase in social stratification that resembles the spatial inequalities that was also evident in the suburbanization process of the United States of America, especially with African-American communities. In the case of the 1 City – Nine Towns Plan, another reason was the fact that the western firms that design these towns were unfamiliar with local conditions and residential preferences, and “many ‘western’ problems such as social segregation, discontinuity of the townscape and a lack of (usable) public spaces were apparent.”

After pointing out the problems that are carried on by the gated communities model, the paper can be concluded, bearing in mind the context presented in this paper so far, by finally answering why Western typologies were selected for the suburbanization project of Shanghai by the state officials. Let us...
revisit what has been discussed in this paper up to this point: first of all, the municipality directed urbanization to the suburbs in order to take advantage of the potential of revenue of the land in those areas, which became available to use after land leasing and ownership came into action. After 1999, the primary economic growth mission was investing on the built environment, and suburbanization was seen as the growth machine of the rapidly developing city. With the One City-Nine Towns Plan, the self-sufficient cities that were going to be formed would be in charge of the land they would be established on, which would make allocation of resources easier. However, due to regulations of the state, who was still the ultimate owner of the land, local governments could not convert as much rural land as they wanted, so they had to compete with each other to promote their land in a highly competitive real estate market to attract buyers for project that were realized with public-private partnerships.

These partnerships, consisting of local governments which were functioning like another set of entrepreneurial players in the real estate market, had to compete for buyers' interests. Therefore, the most common way to package and advertise a project was by the appropriation of Western architectural styles. Why Western styles appealed that much to the Chinese middle class, as analyzed, lies in the establishment process of these middle class and the consumption habits that had been developing, primarily towards Western products. Western lifestyle, therefore, had a strong potential to create brands. Fulong Wu, in his article on gated communities built in Western architectural styles, writes: “in the ‘transplanted’ landscapes of gated communities, these Western architectural motifs are used to develop a niche market for the nouveaux rich.”

The symbolic value of the Western culture and its association with the desired lifestyle by the middle class, which is again rooted in the middle class’s assumptions that have been developing since the neoliberal reform, is indicated by Pow and Kong: “in particular, European and American-style villa houses are believed to be symbols of prestige that confer social status and distinction on its inhabitants.” In the New Towns, the state wanted to use Western architecture because of these trends present in the population. “They wanted something ‘visible’ and followed examples from Western countries to project an image of cosmopolitanism. Consequently the towns were built to represent (stereotypical) authentic Western townscapes.” Another reason was local to Shanghai, which was rooted in the history of the city: “Above all, recalling the distant but no less influential past, advertising tropes emphasize again and again the Western style so admired in Shanghai in the early 20th Century, offering those who can afford it an opportunity to relive the glorious days of ‘old Shanghai.’”

However, there is one question that shouldn’t be overlooked. Even though the sales in these projects have been very good, life has never fully started as it was projected. According to Roggeveren, “current estimations (based on electricity bills for example) show that 65 million apartments in China are unoccupied - as much as the total housing stock in Germany.” This makes up about 15% of all the housing stock in China, which may not seem like much but a very large portion of the properties in New Towns such as Anting and Songjiang are vacant even though they are owned. This leads to the question: how successful was the One City – Nine Towns Plan? The answer is two-fold, depending on the angle the question is approached from.

First of all, from the point of view of residents, it can be considered a failure
in projects such as Anting and Songjiang. “In certain new towns within the One City - Nine Towns Development Plan, a commerce driven, picturesque language of shapes developed that refers to old European city centers but, at other locations, only rational, well-considered plans were developed. In Quinpu, the starting point was Chinese cultural history. At other locations, such as Pujiang and Chengqiao, the surrounding landscape and spatial context was taken into account. But most locations use the tabula rasa method. Thames Town is even radically isolated from its environment; […] Thames Town was consciously built far from the metro to reduce the unwanted urban influences.” Compared to the ones built with the tabula rasa method, the ones that have some sort of base in the local traditions seem to do better in terms of the happiness of the residents: “Inhabitants particularly appreciate Quinpu New Town and the southern part of Pujiang New Town.”

Why did the plan fail? Was it not Western culture what made these houses get sold very quickly, and was Western lifestyle not associated with modernity? The trends in consumption do lead to that conclusion. However, Fulong Wu notes something very interesting about the Chinese middle class: “the Chinese consumers are not well-established social groups with clear preferences for particular types of living, although they have a strong desire for a better living environment.” Going off of that statement, it can be speculated that the buyers had assumed an investment value in these European theme towns because of the certain trend that was evident in the consumption culture. However, these towns had functional errors, as we have discussed before, such as not being integrated into the transportation system to increase exclusivity. These New Towns were an experiment project, and it was understood that the aesthetic features are not enough by themselves to provide the good life that they connote.

Also, when a closer look is taken at these theme towns that were described as prototypical European or North American towns, one sees that they also have some Chinese elements implemented. For example, the interiors of one of the restaurants in Anting were decorated with Chinese elements, even though it was housed in a modified version of Bauhaus architecture. In Thames Town, there is a bridge decorated with motifs that resemble traditional Chinese motifs. These two observations suggest that there is a duality between Western and Chinese aesthetic choices.
which might be related to Fulong Wu’s statement that the middle class’ preferences are not yet clearly defined. Fulong Wu gives an example to this situation from Beijing: “Despite the Western-looking gate, the landscape of Beijing Sun City is artfully blended with a set of traditional Chinese culture and values, such as ‘filial piety, benevolent moral integrity, and sincerity.’”

On the other hand, the new towns were a major success in fulfilling their economic goals. For example, “the prices (that the houses are sold for) are very high given Thames Town’s location well beyond the outer ring of Shanghai; in fact, prices today have almost reached the average level of the central districts (Table 1). Yet sales have been strong, and all properties in Thames Town were sold out immediately upon completion.” So it can be concluded that these projects fulfilled their purpose to increase the land value as much as possible in order to provide economic growth for the city. How they did it was again through architecture: Western architecture was manipulated to construct an imagination that would lead to real estate speculation and get the previously unurbanized land sold for over-priced value. “The Western-looking properties of the One City-Nine Towns Development Plan are highly desirable investments, especially because of their exotic character. High building costs and architectural fees mean that these homes are extremely expensive. That exclusivity gives the impression that this is a safe investment. A relatively large number of homes are empty as a result of speculation.[...] The big winners are property developers, the propertied middle and upper class and local authorities (thanks to tax revenue based on land ownership.)”

The suburbanization process of Shanghai is a highly complex interdisciplinary question in which three different aspects were interwoven; the aim of achieving economic development, the changing structure of the society and culture, and, as we have seen in relation to those two, the third element of architecture also contributed to the political economic goal while being based on the social cultural realities in the society, proving architecture’s symbolical ability in people’s imaginaries to be used as a powerful political tool. Gated communities and suburban living are dominant phenomena in developing countries, such as India and Turkey, as the middle classes gain power, where Western influence in aesthetics and social life is evident in those countries as well. Therefore, the case of Shanghai is a worthwhile example to investigate.

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iv The word “Western” is used to imply Western European and North American in most of the academic works consulted in this research. For practicality, this paper will carry that on.


vi den Hartog, 30.


ix Shen, 59.

x den Hartog, 20.

xi Ibid, 22.

xii Shen, 59.

References


The Yan'an Elevated Road runs from Shanghai’s Bund to Hongqiao International Airport and forms the central artery of Shanghai’s highway system. The first two districts crossed by the road are Jingan and Huangpu. Until recently, Jingan and Huangpu have been composed mainly of lilong. In these two districts, the Yan’an Elevated Road, along with the skyscrapers and gated communities visible from it, cuts through the urban fabric of the city, destroying and dissecting lilong (Figure 1). Continuing outward along the road toward the airport, workers’ housing built in the 1960s comes into view, as does a further profusion of newly built commodity housing (Figure 2). With the economic reforms of 1978 and introduction of the land sales program and private housing market in the 1980s and 1990s, privately developed commodity housing has proliferated in Shanghai. These commodity-housing enclaves in post-Socialist Shanghai are rapidly transforming the urban landscape and unraveling the social-spatial fabric of the city, changing lives in the process. This paper seeks to examine commodity housing in Shanghai and its effects on the cityscape and lives of citizens. The paper begins with a background on urban housing in Shanghai prior to economic reforms, and will then trace economic reforms and their effects on housing, highlighting shifts that have occurred in the lifestyles of urban residents who have moved into commodity housing units, arguing that as a whole, commodity housing has led to greater autonomy.

Housing in Pre-Reform Shanghai

In 1949 and until the middle of the 1990s, most urban residents of Shanghai lived in lilong. After the 1949 Communist Revolution, the early 1950s witnessed the effective confiscation of all private housing. Unlike the Soviet Union, China did not see large-scale urban restructuring after the establishment of state socialism; as such, lilong were left untouched. Instead, the increasing urban housing demand was met, initially, through densification rather than the replacement of old housing with new. Within lilong and other pre-1949 housing, owner-occupiers from the pre-Socialist period could continue to live in their former residences, provided the dwellings were relatively small in size. However, in most cases, housing was partitioned, with several households living in quarters that previously housed one family. Sharing communal spaces such as kitchens and washing facilities, the residents of lilong developed strong attachments to the community, which contained large arenas for interaction while reducing residents’ ability to lead private lives. Furthermore, neighborhood organizations played an important role in governance and in monitoring the lives of the residents, reporting any “misconduct,” especially during the Cultural Revolution.

 Whereas the municipal bureau managed the distribution of pre-existing
lilong housing, the Socialist state, through work units or danwei, monopolized the production and allocation of new housing as the city expanded. Following the Soviet microrayon model, Shanghai expanded in the form of a mosaic composed of self-contained housing units. These new housing units, danwei, built by state-owned enterprises to house workers, resemble gated compounds from their appearance; The danwei is walled and gated and secured by guards. Each danwei contained rows of barrack-like, six to seven-story apartment buildings built in concrete. Danwei evolved into self-sufficient micro-societies characterized by high levels of functional integration, supported by schools, shops, clinics, transport systems, and other basic services, affording residents very little autonomy in their personal decision making. The Chinese state defined modernity in terms of increased industrial output and the triumph of collective ownership. Increased industrial output called for forced industrialization, with urbanization a “necessary cost” of industrialization. Within this project of economic modernization, state rhetoric glorified the industrial proletariat and celebrated the state’s ability to meet the material needs of the masses. As such, the state emphasized the sphere of production, concentrating consumption within locations of production, forcing workers to live, work, and consume on the same site, the danwei.

Whereas in the Western literature gating is viewed as a means of creating social exclusivity and exclusion, such was not the case with the danwei. Danwei walls and gates existed mainly to delineate work-units from one another, and residents could move freely in and out of the gates. However, while physical barriers were not enforced, psychological barriers existed. The danwei became the basis of the “totalitarian” society, whereby people were bound to their danwei—to their careers, to their homes, and to the state. The existence of the danwei led to the “organized dependence” suggested by Walder, through which workers became dependent upon and inseparable from the danwei and its services and provisions. As such, under socialism, gating—be it physical or psychological—reinforces political control and collective consumption organized by the state, undermining the autonomy of the people and binding them ever closer to the state.

**REFORM**

Following Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform initiatives in 1978, the Chinese government began to implement a series of housing reform policies aimed at the full privatization and re-commodification of urban housing, partly to alleviate a severe housing shortage and partly to promote home ownership and private consumption. Homeownership was thought to release the state and underperforming state enterprises from their burden of welfare provision. Prior to 1999, the dominant route of acquiring housing was through a system of welfare housing distributed by either danwei or municipal governments, as outlined before. The end of 1999 marked a turning point for China’s housing distribution system when the provision of all welfare housing (through both municipal and danwei) ended. The result was a hybrid approach to housing provision wherein workplaces purchased commodity housing and then sold houses to staff at a discount price. Furthermore, sitting tenants of public housing could buy out the property rights of their apartments or opt to pay higher rent than the welfare rent. Individuals who bought their public housing at market prices could enjoy a full ownership right, including the ability to sell their home, in turn creating a market
for “secondhand” homes. This has consequently led to the commodification of former danwei housing, wherein danwei have been repurposed as commodity housing aimed at the lower middle class.

The housing provision system in China rapidly shifted from one being dominated by danwei to one of mixed commodity housing and public and private rental housing. Since the reform, there have been at least three methods for urban residents to obtain accommodation in Shanghai: firstly, being assigned public housing, secondly, acquiring commodity housing through market mechanisms, and lastly, participating in the Economic and Comfortable Housing (ECH) project. However, with the discontinuation of public housing assignment in 1999, only commodity housing and ECH project remain viable options for housing. Commodity housing has since emerged as the dominant form of housing in post-reform Shanghai. With commodity housing, housing is sold on the market and private ownership exists. While lilong and danwei units have been sold, for the most part commodity housing consists of new commercial housing developed and sold by real estate companies, both public and private. These new commercial housing units are typically sold to either danwei or directly to urban residents. When sold as danwei, the danwei owners can then sell the commodity housing to their employees at discounted prices. In most cases, however, housing has become disaggregated from the danwei, and most homeowners purchase their homes directly from the market, choosing to live in spaces separated from their work.

In a 1985 census, 90 percent of the urban housing stock was public rental housing of various types including both danwei and municipal units. By 2000, public rental housing comprised only 16.3 percent of the housing stock in cities, a decrease of 73.7% in just 15 years. Private rental stock comprised 6.9 percent and various forms of homeownership accounted for 72 percent of all housing. Home ownership through purchase of former public housing was 29.4 percent, self-built housing was 26.8 percent, commodity housing was 9.2 percent, and economic and comfortable housing, which was built with tax and land premium concessions sold at a discount, was 6.5 percent. As such, in just 15 years China transformed from a nation reliant on welfare housing to a nation of home owners—home owners increasingly living in commodity housing.

**COMMODITY HOUSING AND GATING**

A Chinese commodity housing development usually covers 12 to 20 hectares of land and holds 2000-3000 families, although in inner-city districts of Shanghai the figures are significantly lower. This huge size creates economies of scale and, as such, very rarely are there developments consisting of fewer than two towers. Consequently, most developments there follow the same model. In Shanghai, even the most expensive commodity housing enclave, Tomson Riviera, follows the same model as a less prestigious enclave, with four identical towers built in a gated parcel (Figure 3). Typically, 5 to 10 residential clusters constitute a gated residential quarter and several gated residential quarters make up a residential district. While residential areas in the periphery of the city often follow this model, it is more difficult for such residential districts to exist in inner-city districts simply because of land constraints and pre-existing development such as lilong. Within these residential areas, the buildings are primarily high-rise and mid-rise buildings,
with 120 to 180 families per hectare.

Although in most of the world the gated community caters to upper and middle classes, it is the housing form for the majority of urban Chinese residents. In Shanghai, gating is not reserved for the wealthy—it exists across all social classes. All new commodity housing in Shanghai has been walled and gated. In 2003, the state-run Xinhua News Agency announced that it is mandatory for all newly-built residential estates in Shanghai to be gated and secured in an attempt to improve social order in the city. XV Furthermore, in 2000, 83% of the residential communities in Shanghai were already gated. XVI There exist explanations at both the state and consumer level for the proliferation of gating. For the state, gating provides safety and stability while for the consumer, gating provides privacy and security. While enclaves designed exclusively for the well-to-do such as Tomson Riviera receive significant media attention, most gated communities, especially retrofitted danwei built before the reform, have mixed income levels among their residents.

Gating is of paramount importance to the state. From the perspective of the state, gating provides safety and stability. From its birth in 1949, the People’s Republic of China has sought legitimacy, both internally and externally. Abroad, it sought recognition as a state; domestically, it drew its mandate from Communism, promoting it as the only viable political ideology and economic model. XVII However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the close of the Cold War compromised the legitimacy of the Chinese state by revealing communism’s “bankruptcy” as a political ideology and as a viable economic model. XVIII The Chinese state itself had disavowed Communist economic models for market-oriented reforms, stripping the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of its ideological legitimacy. Even without its central ideology, the CCP lacked neither the mandate nor legitimacy to rule. Beijing’s top political leaders sought to restore the CCP’s legitimacy by ensuring and driving economic growth, deriving its mandate from economic success. As such, instability and economic slowdowns pose a major threat to the legitimacy of the CCP. Since the 1978 economic reforms, however, there has not been a dearth of uncontrollable outcomes as a result of economic reform. Guaranteed employment and housing is now gone, with unemployment in Shanghai increased by 52% from 1978 to 2000. Between 1985 and 1995, income inequality in China increased more quickly than in any other country since the end of the Second World War, with the wealthiest 20% of Chinese households in 1994 earning 50.2% of the national income, a rate higher than even that of the U.S. (44.3%). XIX With rising economic disparities came instability: the rising economic inequality contributed to the 212% increase in recorded crimes from 1979 to 1998. XX

In the face of rising crime, the CCP saw gating as an easy means of alleviating crime—much of it stemming from economic inequality—thereby enhancing stability, yet at the same time further intensifying class divides. Governments of all levels across China have included gating residential areas as a priority. For example, the CCP’s Central Committee on the Comprehensive Management of Public Security and the Ministry of Public Security have made gating one of the important measures in evaluating the performance of local governments. XXI In Beijing, three bureaus of the municipal government, including the Bureau of Public Security, jointly issued an order in September 2001...
requiring that all residential quarters be gated.\textsuperscript{xii}

**Commodity Housing and Autonomy**

Gating can be viewed as an imposition from the hegemonic CCP, compromising the autonomy of urban homebuyers who no longer have the option of buying an un-gated new home. However, gating and, more generally, commodity housing has increased the autonomy of homebuyers by giving them some degrees of freedom from both the state and the market. The rise of the commodity housing market, which by government decree must be gated, has created domestic spaces in which increased private-personal autonomy from state control is given relative private venues in which to consume and to act. Behind private walls exists greater freedom to live outside the auspices of the state.\textsuperscript{xxiii} This has been exemplified by the ability of commodity housing dwellers to install illegal satellite dishes and, some argue, to bypass state family planning regulations, namely the One Child Policy. Furthermore, modern living conditions in commodity housing estates provide privacy from neighbors, offering a greater delineation between what is private and public, individual and communal. Lastly, in a shift from assigned housing, homebuyers now have the autonomy to choose their own housing, able to make seemingly personal decisions on location, aesthetics, and the size of the house.

**Autonomy from the State Interference?**

Commodity housing potentially offers sites where greater household autonomy and personal freedom may be grasped away from the totalitarian control of the CCP.\textsuperscript{xxiv} Examples of state interference into the private sphere include the Chinese state’s control of family planning, limiting households to just one child, the Household Registration System (hukou), which determines and restricts where each and every household can reside, and widespread censorship of the internet and media. Within gated compounds, residents are able to bypass some of these restrictions put in place by the state. Personal satellite television dishes that receive programs from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. are commonly found in the private homes in Shanghai’s gated communities, despite state regulations that forbid the installation of personal satellite dishes at home.\textsuperscript{xxv} The gating of commodity housing enclaves makes it difficult for authorities to detect the illegal installation of satellite dishes. While the Public Security Bureau mounted periodic raids in Shanghai to confiscate these dishes, dishes are often reinstalled; as such, the state has chosen to ignore the issue.

In addition to difficulties regulating satellite dishes, Choon-Piew Pow, a specialist on Chinese gated communities, has suggested that the government has also encountered difficulties in enforcing family planning policies and in soliciting for census data. While Pow bases his argument on the fact that commodity housing has led to greater autonomy from the state on these factors, these shifts in state interference are fairly insignificant and trivial. The state can continue to interfere on matters more pressing to it than the viewing of “contraband” Taiwanese soap operas. Furthermore, even when it comes to family planning—unless residents have the means to give birth outside of the China—hospitals serve as a more important place of government surveillance and interference than the home.
PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND THE REDEVELOPMENT OF THE INNER CITY

While households may not be wholly free from the interference of the state, commodity housing provides homeowners with the ability to make choices seemingly independent of the state, as well as live more autonomous lives than were available in the danwei and lilong. Within lilong, the lack of personal space and privacy is an issue for many residents. As a result of a crowded living environment, where entire families often live in spaces of less than 110 sq. ft., domestic and commercial activities often permeate onto the streets. Furthermore, because of limited space and housing constraints, spaces for cooking, bathing, and washing are often shared among families. Due to this lack of personal and intimate space, Shanghai’s lilong blur public and private boundaries, with the boundaries “routinely transgressed.” xxvi When describing lilong, a new resident of a Shanghai commodity-housing enclave, who recently moved out of a lilong, commented:

“In lilong, everyone knows about even the private things about one another. For example, where I grew up, my neighbors knew how well I scored in my school exams, whether my family has bought new furniture, and even what we cook for dinner. In my own apartment now, I do not have to face nosy neighbors who query endlessly about your private life.”xxvii

Another resident in the same community commented similarly:

“In the old neighborhoods, the elderly women would just sit along the lanes and alleyways to observe and gossip about everything that goes on in the neighborhood. They have absolutely no respect for your privacy. If they want, they can know about your whole life.”xxviii

Both transplants describe the lack of privacy present in the lilong. As such, when people buy commodity housing, they acquire not just a home, but also a personal and private space, freed from the nosiness of neighbors. Commodity housing is also often described as self-contained housing, as none of its features are communal: each house contains its own bathroom and kitchen. As such, greater privacy is ensured for residents who no longer have to endure the public gaze. The spacious commercial apartments also mean that residents no longer deal with the noise or interference from neighbors.

In 1990, only 31.6 percent of Shanghai households lived in self-contained flats, with the vast majority of households living in communal spaces within lilong. xxi By the end of 2002, the percentage of Shanghai households living in self-contained flats rose to 87.4 percent. xxx One such project that saw the shift of residents from lilong housing was the redevelopment of Fukangli, a dilapidated lilong neighborhood in Jingan. The redevelopment of Fukangli in 1999 came as a result of the Housing Amenity Fulfillment Initiative (HAFI) enacted by the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG). HAFI sought to provide local residents with basic living space and amenities through renovation of dilapidated housing that had small living space and lacked private kitchens and sanitation facilities. Initially, between 1991 and 1996, HAFI projects involved just limited renovations of existing facilities. However, beginning in 1997, the SMG issues a circular calling for stronger involvement from both district governments and developers in housing improvement; consequently, HAFI
extended to large scale renewal of entire housing blocks, with most lilong demolished and rebuilt. The cost of these projects was funded from a package of subsidies from governments and the work units of residents, as well as from the direct contribution of residents. A resident of Fukangli described living conditions before redevelopment as such:

“I had lived in Fukangli since I got married. We lived in a house of about 400 sq. ft—it included a living room downstairs and a loft. Three generations lived in this house, including my mother-in-law and a my son and daughter. The toilet was put in by ourselves, but there was no drainage, just a separate small room...Our living conditions were so bad that we could not invite guests around. We had to share the kitchen with three other families. It was very crowded at meal times and caused frictions and quarrels among the neighbors. Because of poor noise insulation disputes with our neighbor downstairs were inevitable.”

With the Fukangli redevelopment, current residents could be compensated 1 sq. m. of new housing for every sq. m. of demolished floor space. Allowed to buy housing at the new development at discounted rates, more than 50 percent of old residents purchased housing in new redevelopment, with the rest of the units sold at market prices. With the Fukangli redevelopment, residents were able to improve their living standards significantly at minimum cost. The resident who once lived in a 400 sq. ft. lilong unit moved into a 710 sq. ft. self-contained flat at a cost of just 100,000 RMB (roughly $12,5000 then). New Fukangli offered residents spacious apartments in midrise buildings with elevators, as well significant green space, arguably a significant improve in living standards from old Fukangli (Figure 4). While New Fukangli was praised around the world for its integration of various social classes and for its improvement of the lives of former residents, it has been the exception rather than the rule when it comes to inner city developments in Shanghai.

With housing reform, the housing market in Shanghai became differentiated geographically, with housing prices varying widely from place to place, whereas geographic desirability had never been a factor pre-reform, when residents had little freedom to choose their geography. Now elite homebuyers in Shanghai with the means to do so sought access to parks, “historic ambiance,” and up-market consumer services such as Starbucks, Louis Vuitton, and the Ritz Carlton. With this, land in inner city districts such as Jingan, Huangpu, and Luwan became increasingly desirable and expensive, and former residents have been priced out. Just two years after the construction of Fukangli, the adjacent plot of lilong was developed into International Ladoll City. However, this time residents were relocated to increasingly distant districts as developers sought to maximize potential profits by pushing the upper end of the property market. Consequently, in Ladoll most original residents were relocated to the fringe of the central city and replaced by wealthy homebuyers. While urban Shanghai residents have been given the freedom to choose their geography within the city, because of pricing differentiations only those with means have this freedom.

**Autonomy to Consume**

With housing reform and the conversion of dilapidated communal urban spaces into commodity housing, living conditions for residents improved, and residents were able to move into
spaces with greater privacy and autonomy from the communal spaces they lived in. Furthermore, in these new spaces residents acquired not merely a domicile, but a haven that fosters a “greater sense of individual entitlement that is often expressed through consumption.”

Even when residents of old neighborhoods were displaced and moved into the periphery, they, for the most part, moved into newly built self-contained apartments. Residents in these new spaces could now decorate and remodel as they pleased. For residents buying their own homes, they could forsake the homogeneity of danwei and choose their own architectural styles. This lifestyle marked by consumption and choice disavowed the severe constraints on personal life imposed by the Socialist danwei.

In Shanghai and across China, new apartments were sold as concrete shells outfitted with just water and sewage pipes. New residents needed to purchase and install every item to make a livable space. In this process, homeowners had free reign: they could make their home their own. A home renovation industry arose overnight, with entire districts in Shanghai devoted to selling décor and home goods; home decoration magazines multiplied; international retailers from Ikea to Poggenpohl rushed to gain market share. In Shanghai, even among those without the means to purchase new commodity housing, homes became a new focus of consumer spending and want.

Furnishing a home and purchasing items to improve comfort, value, and cache would have been unimaginable in the previous decades of danwei. A former resident of a danwei in Beijing described the transition from danwei to her new commodity housing unit:

“All of the buildings were the same; no character, no decoration. Bare cement floors, a wooden bed, wooden chairs, and tables; every family was the same. But in my generation we have decorated walls, wooden floors, sofas, and all kinds of other decorations. It’s more similar to the pictures in the foreign magazines and movies.”

Knowing the desire of homebuyers such as this one to live in differentiated spaces of consumption and personal choice, real estate developers recognized the importance of packaging and branding. They sought to market a sense of community and panache in their developments, seeking to differentiate themselves from other developers by drawing upon the rhetoric of “landscapes of privilege” marked by “Western” forms and comforts. With this, consumers with the means to do so can choose the architectural style of their commodity housing, be it the style of a Provençal chateau or an Orange County tract house.

However, the freedom to consume and to choose geography is still beyond the reach of many. While economic reforms have produced a consumer cornucopia, wherein consumers have abundant choices in their consumption—for real estate, for refrigerators, for backpacks—consumer abundance lies beyond the reach of the young migrant factory workers whose labor produces the abundance of goods now available. For these migrant workers, commodity housing remains a distant vision. Indeed, the factory workers producing the goods that drove China’s economic growth still live lives with little autonomy. Living conditions in Foxconn—the manufacturer that produces Apple goods and Playstations, among other electronics—remains cramped, with rights constrained. In
Foxconn’s dormitories, 20 or 30 workers share 200 sq. ft. flats, forbidden to use the very electrical items they produce. As such, the repression associated with the danwei continues to exist, with limitations on who in Chinese society has the freedoms borne out of the economic reforms of 1978.

Since the opening of the Chinese economy in 1978, the Chinese housing market has experienced a significant transformation from a market dominated by welfare housing in the forms of municipal and work-unit housing to a society with one of the highest rates of homeownership in the world. In this process, homeowners have been able to gain significant freedoms—some degrees of autonomy from state interference, privacy, freedom to consume. However, while it would seem that homeowners have gained autonomy from the Chinese state, they remain tied to it. By spending money on renovations, homeowners become implicated in the state's attempt to grow its economy. A society once dominated by work-units and production has been replaced by one dominated by consumption and economic growth, wherein consumption has become a “new mode of governmentality” that exploits the desires of the people to consume. However, inherent in the ability to consume and to live in commodity housing is a freedom that previously did not exist.

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Jingan and the Yan’an Elevated Road

Figure 2: Commodity Housing from the Yan’an Elevated Road

Figure 3: Tomson Riviera, viewed from the Bund.
Li and Long are two Chinese words meaning neighborhoods and lanes, respectively. Lilong settlements have low-rise, ground-related housing organized in a dense, grid-like pattern with east-west and north-south lanes, tucked away from main thoroughfares. Lilong houses characterize the traditional urban housing form of the City of Shanghai.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Pu, “Migrant Housing in China,” 95.

Ibid.

The magnitude of this practice, however, has significantly cut down since 1999 as many work units have ended the practice of providing housing of a welfare nature. Employees buying at discounted prices often do not receive a full right to their housing because the work unit retains an interest. Some state work units, using a different approach, provide cash payments to help their employees purchase fully priced commercial housing.

Li, “Transition to Homeownership,” 145.

Ibid.


Ibid., 58.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 49.


Ibid., 815.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Fleischer, “”To Choose a House Means to Choose a Lifestyle”: The Consumption of Housing and Class-Structuration in Urban China,” 12.

But how much choice do consumers have? Most commodity housing enclaves are as homogenous as danwei, each commodity housing project mirroring the other save for minor embellishments. Furthermore, given the involvement of many state-owned real estate developers, have many homebuyers not been spoon-fed a rhetoric and aesthetic by the state? How autonomous are these homeowners in their decision making?


“Apple’s efforts fail to end grueling conditions at Foxconn factories,” The Guardian, 30 May 2012.

Foxconn is based in Taiwan.


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THAMES TOWN:
The Successes, Failures, and Implications of Designing the Model Middle-Class Lifestyle in (Post-)Socialist and Post-Concession Shanghai
Katherine Gregory

Architectural scholar Duanfang Lu wrote that architecture gives frame and form to the material world and defines the structure of human flow and activity by dictating how we move through the world, creating a visual elaboration of power and providing the arena for performing everyday life. Thus, reshaping the built environment transforms the social experience, and in Shanghai, there exists a modernist vision of social transformation through spatial reorganization, in which innovative modern technology and techniques are employed to create a new suburban lifestyle for Shanghainese citizens. Shanghai’s New Towns project was created as an effort to diffuse overcrowding in Shanghai by presenting attractive housing options outside of the City Center, and Thames Town is one of nine new towns built outside Shanghai, each designed in the theme of a foreign culture. In this paper, I will be analyzing Songjiang’s Thames Town as a case study to examine the legacy and re-negotiation of Maoist work unit housing models, the changes incurred in the Chinese economy, the ways in which Thames Town is exemplified and is built to suit the needs
of a new upwardly mobile and consumption-oriented middle class, and the implications of Thames Town’s appropriation of British architectural styles, monuments, and cultural symbolism. Harry den Hartog wrote that Thames Town is “the most sublime translation of the Shanghai central government’s wish to export the international influences from the Central City to the suburbs” (Hartog, 122), and I will conclude my analysis by outlining some of the major problems that Thames Town has and will continue to struggle with. Overall, I hope to create a thorough and intelligent rendering of Thames Town, the forces that have encouraged and sustained it, and the issues it needs to address in order to ensure its stability.

The first question I want to address is how the legacy of the danwei, work unit housing model, has been incorporated into post-Cultural Revolution (or, post-1978) China. I want to inquire how Thames Town is planned for a new kind of “modern” life that falls within a master plan for a new socialist China, but also reflects the intense changes the Chinese economic, political, and class structures have endured since the late 1970s. I will begin by discussing the phenomenon of “sprawl” as Shanghai radiates rapid urbanization out from the city core. Thomas Campanella addresses this in his chapter “Suburbanization and the Mechanics of Sprawl” from the book Concrete Dragon: China’s Urban Revolution and What it Means for the World; he writes that sprawl, also called tan da bing (“make a big pancake”) is a hallmark of contemporary Chinese urbanism, as demonstrated by the fact that the urban built-up area of Shanghai has increased ninefold since 1982, or the early reform era. Although Shanghai is a powerful commercial postmodern metropolis that is building up industry, infrastructure, global trade, and construction at a breakneck pace, it deals with the problems of undeveloped countries such as pollution, water quality, indoor plumbing, and construction quality. Under the Three Concentrations banner, Shanghai aims to cluster industry in planned industrial parks, farm residents in cities and towns, and land development under large scale management, in order to develop satellite towns at a certain scale, contain urban sprawl, optimize metropolitan region’s spatial structure, and facilitate growth of the urban economy. As the city becomes increasingly congested and its resources exhausted, government-orchestrated sprawl is a way to lighten the immense pressure on the Center City. The One City, Nine Towns strategic plan was introduced in 2001 as an effort to coordinate the development of the rural and urban together, alleviating density while protecting rural areas; in this plan, Shanghai aims to restructure one smaller city, Songjiang, including themed Thames Town, to create attractive and pleasant living and working conditions outside the Center City. China proves to be the ideal arena for this mass planned sprawl. In his book Shanghai New Towns, Harry den Hartog writes, “China is at the moment possibly the only place on earth where there is space for renewal in urbanism and planning; it gives economic growth, there is mass migration, and the government owns all the land” (Hartog, 64).

Shanghai’s contemporary ideology of urbanism through new town construction enters into a critical dialectic with the Mao-era danwei model, in which living space, social activities, and personal needs are consolidated into an enclosed micro-city surrounding one’s work. Though the danwei model is a “socialist production machine with a physical layout intended to facilitate
shared living and cohesion among workers” (Campanella, 191), and in the 1960s, 90 percent of the Chinese urban population was living in a danwei. Campanella argues that the danwei resembles “ancestral” Chinese urbanism, by miniaturizing the courtyard city or house enclosed by a wall. These communities, in which residents receive every personal service they would need, tend to be “deeply paternalistic” with an emphasis on surveillance and control over all aspects of work and life, and there is little need for communication between danweis, or between the danwei and the larger city. The danwei-filled city features a cellular spatial structure, which we still find in the gated community of Thames Town. While today’s insulated residential enclave can be designed to compliment an employment hub, such as universities in Songjiang, the new towns are a product of a completely privatized realm, where residents choose and pay to live there. The danwei, by contrast, is entirely furnished and controlled by the state. In her book Remaking Chinese Urban Form: Modernity, Scarcity, and Space, 1949-2005, Duanfang Lu argues that the post-danwei models of urban living still orbit around the same work-life balance: as the state builds, monitors, and encourages or discourages housing development, it is always trying to orchestrate how one’s home relates to one’s work and affects all elements of social life. The vast majority of the post-danwei housing models retain the high density, large scale, and high-rise features of the danwei, yet Thames Town presents low density, low-rise alternatives as a different kind of domestic lifestyle. As the danwei model is ever present, Lu argues, China’s urban residential landscape is unfolding according to its inherited blueprint rather than becoming Western” (Lu, 161). As housing in China now offered by the free market, the housing market must adopt a profitable structure in order to conform to supply and demand policies.

Thames Town was born under a completely reorganized Chinese economic structure, which came to be in today’s reform era. First, the government has adopted a new policy of decentralization, which increases the power of local and municipal governments to profit from their own independently driven entrepreneurial practices. Though the land is owned by the central government, the Songjiang local government leases land to private developers to turn large profits that are reinvested in Songjiang through infrastructure, local administration, and public services, which are then the responsibility of the municipality. Though they were introduced through a massive urban plan, new towns like Thames Town are outgrowths of Songjiang’s entrepreneurial strategies to stimulate development and construct an attractive, livable image for the city. The Songjiang municipality features a smaller branch to oversee development in Thames Town and the Old City, and this locally driven management approach allows for greater efficiency and profit margins in residential developments. This decentralization is met with newborn privatization, in which private property like Shanghai Songjiang New City Construction and Development Co. Ltd. (SNCD) developers lease, build on, market, and sell housing. The urban fringe of central Shanghai is an ideal tabula rasa for suburban development, as Mao-era urbanist policies left this rural land essentially untouched. The process of suburbanization has become a land-enclosure movement, as municipalities claim eminent domain, force out existing residents (poor farmers), and divide the land into packages of gated communities and housing developments. Songjiang officials promote home ownership as a symbol of well-being, and improvements
to infrastructure, public green spaces, and transportation are used to boost the domestic demand for new housing.

The free-market liberalizations of the Chinese economy have permitted the formation of a brand-new middle class, characterized by increasing incomes and purchasing power and a general pride in their upward mobility. Contrasting sharply with severe Cultural Revolution ideologies, there is a new emphasis in China today on personal life and leisure, and the middle class is the perfect consumer group for this transformative lifestyle advertising. The middle class is eager to establish a group identity that displays their economic achievements and market power, and home ownership has been a crucial outlet for this desire. In this next section of my analysis, I want to argue that residency in Thames Town is a way to display this new class identity, and the plans, buildings, infrastructure, and amenities of the town craft a paradigm of middle class lifestyle.

Chinese suburbs operate at an ambiguous locus of both independence from and subordinance to the city. Shanghai suburbs offer an escape from the stressful city, with less traffic, less density, safer surroundings, and more pleasant green space. Campanella argues, however, that there is not a strong anti-urbanism sentiment like that in the United States (as the American Dream takes place outside the city), but that the city is still the center of orbit for its satellite towns. In a somewhat contradictory fashion, however, the goal is that the city and suburb will be mutually beneficial to each other, in that both will flourish without competing. This is understandable because Shanghai suburbs are under the Center City’s jurisdiction, so that any gains made by the local municipalities (revenue from housing development, improved quality of life and desirability of the town) will benefit downtown Shanghai as well.

Songjiang’s distance from Shanghai, however, prevents easy commuting into the city, and is thus designed to be a self-contained planet with its own industries (local government and universities) orbiting the sun.

The post-Cultural Revolution reforms allowed the middle and upper classes to seek out houses as purchasable status symbols. As of 2010, almost 60 percent of Shanghai residents own their homes, as opposed to virtually zero percent before the 1999 change in land laws, which now allow 40- to 80-year land leases (which, for all intensive purposes, are equated with ownership). 1978 saw the initial economic reform by Deng Xiaoping, the 1980s featured experimentation of property sales and ownership, and in 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji began widespread the privatization of state housing, introducing tools such as mortgage loans (which are the most important factor in facilitating a property market). These market liberalizations were done to alleviate the overstressed government-operated danwei units and work toward China’s new goal to embrace commercialization and consumption to emerge as a global superpower.

Consequently, home ownership has become a desirable commodity with intense emotional and psychological implications. In the article “Marketing the Chinese Dream Home,” authors Choon-Piew Pow and Lily Kong analyze how competitive free-market advertisements for luxury housing developments create and sustain ideologies about the perfect middle class lifestyle. The authors argue that a house is a physical structure while the home is a social and emotional entity, and the luxury home, also known as “symbolic capital,” creates an “actively sought and cultivated” façade where “homeowners are intent on creating an enclave of difference, an aura of distinction, and status for themselves”
Owning a new home (shangpingfang) in Thames Town broadcasts an image of having attained “the good life,” known as xingfu shenghuo or meihao shenghuo. The middle class is known for high valuations of upward mobility, the stability of home ownership, and membership in an exclusive community, and Thames Town as a holistic entity expresses residents’ aspirational group identity. Choon-Piew and Kong also argue that the endless postmodern concern of reinforcing identity through obtained possessions is somewhat anxious, in that the middle class is so newly formed and thereby somewhat fragile in its definition. As the sparkling gem of Songjiang, luxurious and attractive Thames Town is intended to be the “billboard” for the rest of the new city, attracting people to the housing developments across Songjiang; Hartog explains, “The thematically connoted parts have a germinal function, stimulating larger-scale development” (Hartog, 36).

In March 2001, the British architectural firm Atkins Corporation was announced the winner of a design competition to build a small themed town in Songjiang. They were told to prepare a strategic plan for the whole 60 square kilometers surrounding Songjiang, featuring a detailed urban-design schemes for a central business district, transportation hub, and a themed housing community that embodies those essential qualities and values of its home country. The project consulting fees ran over $6 million. The area was envisioned as a “paradise for investors” that would be not only an ideal residential area for those living there, but would also take the lead in boosting the tourism volume, the quality of living environments, and the progress of housing development in nearby areas.

Thames Town broadcasts its exclusivity through its physical gates and security force, as well as through the price of the homes, which ensures class homogeneity and its resulting sense of stable safety. The gated villa complex, or bie shu qu, is less common than the gated community enclosing mid- to high-rise multifamily housing units, called zhu zhai xiao qu; less dense single-family villas are associated with the upper class, who can afford the higher cost per square foot. Thames Town possesses those essentials of a master-planned gated community, including a definable boundary, consistent character, overall control during the development process by a single development entity, private ownership of recreational amenities, and enforcement of covenants (conditions and restrictions by master community association). The master-planned community also promises a total aestheticization of the living experience with high-taste design characterized by gracefulness, youya, and nobility, zungui, permeating all functional and decorative elements of the living experience.

Thames Town features amenities that make it as attractive as possible to potential homeowners who are seeking a luxurious suburban lifestyle. Atkins implemented these specific characteristics, which can be decorative or design-related (or both), to make Thames Town desirable and exemplary of a model middle class, as the beautiful and thoughtful design details represent the hybridization of nostalgic charm and hi-tech contemporary conveniences. The in-home amenities include private elevators, modern kitchen and home appliances, building materials imported from the United Kingdom, and personal garages. The community also features shared amenities such as underground car parks, security guards, recreational facilities, kindergartens, health clinics, performance spaces, mature and meticulous landscaping, and open common areas and

(Choon-Piew and Kong, 135).
greens. Additionally, Songjiang is situated near nine new university sites (relocated from central Shanghai), several high-tech and industry parks (modeled after Special Economic Zones), and one of China’s largest shopping malls. The town, of course, also includes a myriad of British-themed amenities, some of which include football pitches; a garden maze; statues of famed British figures, ranging from Harry Potter to Winston Churchill; a market of covered shops inspired by Covent Garden; pubs modeled on originals in Birmingham; streets lined with London plane trees, and yew and hawthorn hedges; and a sandstone cathedral, perfect for "fashionable" white weddings, that is a replica of one in Clifton, Bristol.

According to Campanella, Chinese homebuyers judge the housing estate based on the appeal of the amenities, rather than by the quality indicators of the whole area, such as schools. Most of the homeowners in Thames Town are private entrepreneurs and senior local government officials, for whom practical factors like location, access to work, and community environment matter less; the decision to buy is made according to the charming English appearance tranquil environment, and pleasurable, luxurious details that improve a resident’s quality of life.

As somewhat of an aside, it is important to note the role of cars in Shanghai suburbanization. Songjiang is 30 kilometers away from central Shanghai, and it is necessary to own a car to travel into the city hub, as well as around the 36 square kilometers of Songjiang. As Thames Town has had minimal success sustaining retail, dining, and personal service facilities (such as supermarkets and kindergartens), town residents must own cars to sustain basic living needs. Like houses, cars are purchasable status symbols that express wealth and class distinction; Campanella cites the example that parking on sidewalks is permissible because car ownership is a sign of higher class and therefore entitlement. Thus, the wide circulation roads, in-home elevators to personal garages, and underground parking facilities are not only practical infrastructure in Thames Town; they are symbolic capital that display the prestige and class of the town’s residents.

Since the 1997 Kyoto Conference on Climate Change, there has been a new emphasis in China on energy conservation and the improvement of green spaces, and in 1998 the central government set standards for environmental practices and energy consumption. The issues have been popularized in the press and media, and housing developments like Thames Town capitalize on these trends by promising greener living and closer proximity to nature. In 2004, the central government launched another campaign encouraging a “conservation-minded society,” or jieyuexing shehui, to combat the perceived rising materialistic desires that coincide with the rise of the middle class and buying power. Thames Town does not subscribe to this conservation campaign in its low-density layout, in which residents consume the maximum square footage they can afford. Freestanding suburban homes such as those in Thames Town are the least environmentally friendly, but the promised tranquility of lush English countryside plays into this desire to live closer to nature.

Circling back to the abundance of themed amenities and the highly orchestrated master plan, I want to now talk about the implications of the omnipresent British stylistic influence. I argue that the consumption of British architectural features and “lifestyle” elements is more than an acceptance of the colonialist legacy that the British exerted during Shanghai’s concession period. The themed stylization of the
town is a valuation of the “exotic” as a class symbol rather than an acceptance of those cultural symbols of British or Shanghailander colonial presence in Shanghai; the British theme instead speaks to a new consumer culture targeted to the middle class, in which foreign architectural models (the “exotic”) are desirable in their luxurious, modern novelty and signification of class status. In this way, the themed nature of the towns can be seen as, most importantly, a marketing ploy to attract residents seeking to self-identify with a certain way of life, and in Thames Town, the British theme functions to serve this desire for rebranding class identity as capable of consuming that ultimate luxury good, a home. Hannah Beech interviewed Zhou Jin, an executive living in Shanghai, who plans to move into a home in Thames Town; he says he cannot wait to begin a new life there, as “life in such an exotic atmosphere will be fun” (Beech).

Choon-Piew and Kong’s article outlines the appealing qualities of the British theme, arguing that the town is exotic without leaving China and the design details enchant like a fairytale. As more middle-class Chinese travel around the world and visit countries like England, it is possible to appropriate highly recognizable symbols of British culture in housing communities, and the appeal of the delightful, exotic details transform Thames Town into “valued” symbolic capital that is worth more than just construction costs. Choon-Piew and Kong also argue that the “modern lifestyle” is often conflated with a “Western lifestyle,” in that Western-style communities and amenities are the most desirable accoutrements with which to furnish a “forward-looking” middle-class way of life.

It is also crucial to consider the role of European architecture imported to Shanghai in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. “Western-style living” originated in Shanghai in the garden houses (huayuan yangfang) of the concession period; while this period was embarrassing for Shanghai, as it was forced to open up as a trade port on American and European terms, this period is looked back on fondly as one of cosmopolitan glamour, in which Shanghai was known as the commercially booming and internationally welcoming “Paris of the East.” Thereby, the re-importation of European architecture can be seen not as an attempt to recover the allure of the concession period, but instead as appropriating and putting up European architecture on China’s own terms.

Thames Town exemplifies this “nostalgia for the future,” which Choon-Piew and Kong describe as a fusion of “state of the art” modern conveniences and “old-world charm” in the delightful themed design. Shanghai has a long history of foreign-styled villas built in the concession period as “international residences” for diplomats, businessmen, and government officials. In 1930, Laszlo Hudec designed the Great Western Road Circle subdivision for wealthy Shanghainese businessmen. American architect Frank J. Raven built Columbia Circle in Shanghai in 1932; inspired by architectures of France, the English countryside, and of course the United States, these “garden homes promised the comforts of rural living with city conveniences,” and he christened the development with street names such as Los Angeles, Florida, and San Diego. These European- and American-inspired housing developments foreshadow contemporary trends in suburb construction, but also speak to a legacy of the desirability and charm of exotically themed housing in globally minded Shanghai.

Going beyond the superficial charm of enchanting themes, archaeologist Jack Carlson argues that
wholesale architectural copying may have its roots deeper than commercial borrowing, and that these practices are instead “monumental assertions of China’s global primacy” (Wainwright). Carlson cites the premier ancient historian Sima Qian, who described Qin dynasty rulers commissioning replicas of palaces and halls of their conquered rivals; these rulers would reconstruct their replicas on a slope north of the capital, creating a miniature city that incorporated built representations of the vast reach of the empire’s power. Carlson argues that this clone culture is a “triumphalistic” way for China to show it has equaled and even transcended the achievements of foreign cultures. The Qianlong emperor (circa 1750) undertook a similar task, commissioning French and Italian Jesuits in his court to design and build a European palace complex. His Xiyang Lou, translated as “Western Mansions” or “Western Palaces,” was based on the Trianon at Versailles and featured an expansive collection of Baroque gardens and stone palaces. Though destroyed by French and British forces in the 1860s, the structures “had been symbols of China’s wealth, far-reaching influence, and central position in the cosmos: exotica on the grandest of scales” (Carlson). Carlson writes:

By appropriating the monumental trappings of power from distant places and times, the Chinese do not merely place their own country on a symbolic par with historical Western superpowers, but suggest that China has mastered and transcended their levels of achievement… The imitation palaces were the most outlandish spoils of war, reconstructed and presented by proxy to the home audience. They were expressions, in concrete terms, of the Qin’s invincibility and inevitable ascendance (Carlson).

Thus, this argument posits architectural copying as entirely opposed to the theory that Shanghai has embraced the legacy of its colonizers; instead, this theory claims that Chinese architects appropriate exotic architecture and even monuments to show that China consumes these cultural products as an internationally dominant power. Thames Town, however, is not a government-sponsored monument to China’s global reach, but its exotic theme is used to brand the middle class as globally-minded, financially powerful, and highly cultured appreciators and consumers of exotic architecture and lifestyles. Campanella links this Chinese dominance with market competition, arguing that housing developers’ efforts to be inventive mean that every architectural style has been quoted; he uses the term “unplundered” to call back to China’s plundering the architecture of conquered peoples.

The Shanghainese taste for the exotic show an awareness of luxury lifestyles from around the world; as this middle class is so new, it is helpful for it to define its own prosperity by adopting models of luxury products from other countries that have a continuous history of high-class commodity consumption. This is a possible explanation for the English names that are attached to luxury housing developments, as it lends authenticity to the communities by calling directly upon foreign models. Though the English development name may not be correct or sensical in English, or appropriately describe the architectural appearance of the development, it lends the developments a sense of authentic worldly intelligence and sophistication; Campanella links this to the American practice of sprinkling French phrases into daily conversations in order to seem more erudite. In 2004, Shanghai issued a...
regulation demanding the removal of all English and Chinese housing development names deemed “feudal, aristocratic, foreign, and immoral,” yet the law was unanimously ignored; this proves that these names are crucial to housing’s branding and desirability, as the names reflect a global understanding of luxury culture. Furthermore, by adapting these names that are associated with previous semi-colonial presences in Shanghai, Shanghai demonstrates its strength in moving beyond shame from this occupation; they have claimed those colonizer’s most legible and iconic symbols of power and class hierarchy and integrated them into their own proud Shanghainese society.

At the outset of the commission, Paul Rice from the Atkins Corporation said he was aware of the danger of this £200 million project becoming “Disneyfied,” but claimed Thames Town would be built in the right way and would be an utterly pleasant place to live compared with other Chinese towns. We can define “Disneyfication” as a sort of false stylization, where garishly themed façades and appearances conceal an inner falseness; the design calls on visible cues that call to another culture, city, or era, but the inauthenticity is visible everywhere. Many critics have linked Thames Town and other themed towns to Disneyland “countries” or “kingdoms,” and a possible explanation is that Atkins compressed 500 years of British architectural history into one town, which could be a reason for the feeling of authenticity, as each building is in fact the same age. Local officials disagree, claiming residents and visitors won’t be able to tell where Britain ends and China begins.

In an article for Time Magazine, Beech says that unlike some towns that incorporate Chinese architectural models (such as feng shui or extra bedrooms for parents living with newlyweds), Thames town is too Disney, describing the themed amenities and events as superficial and only important in the advertisements. She writes:

At Thames Town… an ad campaign advises that anyone fond of steeplechasing, Premier League soccer and the Beatles should consider joining the 8,000 fortunate folks who will ultimately live in this housing complex. Naturally, Thames Town will have a British exhibition hall where planners envision screening a James Bond film festival, and a church where, says one promotional poster, “you can adopt exotic marriage customs in which you exchange vows in front of a pastor” (Beech).

Writing in a similar vein, an article by Jonathan Glancey in Britain’s news source The Guardian calls Thames Town a “grotesque” and “extremely funny parody.” Saying Thames Town is designed in “potty national dress,” he mocks the “crude miniature” replicas such as St. Stephen’s Tower, dismissing them as cheap and inauthentic props to furnish this “residential wheeze.” In this way, he implies that the British sources were randomly chosen without thinking of a sensical design scheme, and that the British firm was “in on the joke” and made the town “intentionally off” and “canny;” his argument, however, belittles his own cultural property and its ability to be translated and appreciated by other cultures. He calls the homes “mock Tudor” or “mock Victorian,” but I want to ask if we can truly call these buildings “mock” if they are built by British architects; does Chinese occupancy make these homes inauthentic? Or is it the transplant of British design halfway around the world that makes Thames Town a mockery? I believe it is not so simple, and the work of British designers
in China cannot be dismissed as a false copy of British architecture; instead we need to more delicately unpack the potential problems with this direct vernacular quotation.

Perhaps we can trace that sour taste of inauthenticity or “Disneyfication” to the appropriation of particular details that are unique to local English design vernacular. For example, in an article unfortunately titled “The Chinese have Shanghaied my pub,” Gail Caddy from Dorset, England discovered that her pub had been replicated down to every detail (except for one missing window) in Thames Town without her knowledge or consent. China has an unabashedly thriving counterfeit culture, and they have been criticized for their attitude toward intellectual property rights. There are, however, no specific laws to protect architecture, because it has a weakly defined definition as “applied art;” only artistic, not functional, qualities are protected under law. This is an inherent contradiction, however, that “overlooks the fact that the two can rarely be separated: a facade could be an integral part of a building's structure, as well as providing its main artistic thrust. So China, like a global architectural magpie, helps itself to the biggest and best bits of cities the world over” (Wainwright). In her forthcoming book about the phenomenon of architectural copying in China, Bianca Bosker coins the term “duplitecture,” in which she describes the Chinese’s astounding attention to detail in copying, an example of which can be seen in the Queen's Guard doppelganger that presides in Thames Town. Perhaps the presence of these incessantly precise details is the origin of architectural copying being seen as uncomfortable cloning or Disneyfication, and maybe a British town without the red phone booths and statues of Princess Diana would be seen as less theme-park, full of uncanny details that seem alien outside their home country, and more theme-inspired, quoting and adapting iconic architectural models.

At this point in my analysis, I want to discuss several of the problems that Thames Town has faced before, during, and after the construction process. To begin this section, I will bring up this possibly contentious anecdote: according to Beech, most urban planners in Shanghai were against the foreign-themed new towns project that emerged in 2000 as the brainchild of Huang Ju, Shanghai’s former Communist Party Secretary. The local Shanghai urban planners, however, were not called in for their opinions, but to execute the proposal and make it work according to Huang’s wishes. Compared with other themed new towns, Thames Town is one of the most successful in the program, as it is reported that all units sold out on the day of the developer's first sales event. Thames Town’s goal to elevate the image of the entire area and raise land prices accordingly has been lucrative, yet the fact that the town is primarily an investment depository means that it has not flourished into the vibrant living community that Atkins and SNDC intended it to become. There is little full-time or part-time residency in Thames Town, which calls into question the town’s success as a pragmatic residential community. In 2006, all 1,100 units had been sold, but in May 2010, only 468 households had moved in, which means that more than 60% of buyers bought the homes primarily for investment purposes. Furthermore, many who have moved into the houses are using them as second or vacation homes, demonstrating that there are even fewer permanent residents than indicated by sales figures. Previously, the danwei system acted as the only form of social security offered to Chinese citizens, so after the demise of the system, home ownership has emerged as a
popular investment method as the future sale of one’s property can provide one with a sense security and a source of income. The extremely high property values in Thames Town give the homes the impression of being a safe investment, so many who have bought homes never intend to live there, and plan to re-sell the property at a later date for a profit.xxvii

The lack of permanent residency in Thames Town is a vicious cycle, because without residents, essential businesses and public services will not commence operations, but without access to services providing indispensable daily needs, people will not move into these homes full-time. These essential services include things like taxis, a street vendor culture, supermarkets, daycares, schools, and pharmacies. An article by Jie Shen and Fulong Wu offers a possible explanation for the lack of full-time residency, arguing that Thames Town suffers from the “new mismatch between the political economy of producing consumption landscapes and the realities of consumers’ daily lives in balancing home and work on the outlying urban fringe” (Jie and Fulong, 202). Jie and Fulong argue that Thames Town is a playground for delightful consumption, but is not accurately suited to the practical needs of residents.

There is also the problem of miscommunications or translation errors between the Atkins master plan and the actual execution and construction of Thames Town. According to Hartog, these mistranslations are the result of a confused relationship between the private developers and the overarching control of the central government; the author argues, “Frictions arise because of unfamiliarity and inexperience with this new mixture of public and private interests, resulting in speculation, poor design, and poor construction quality” (Hartog, 66). As housing developments used to be controlled by the central government, most Chinese private developers lack experience with property building, and will often employ inexperienced workers, whom they can pay less and work harder. xxviii Out of date building regulations and shoddy core materials such as poorly mixed concrete for home frames also contribute to the often-short life spans of the buildings in Thames Town and other new towns. Finally, in the extremely rapid construction, the developers of Thames Town have changed elements of the design to fit local building codes and cut costs, such as fabricating the houses out of poorer quality concrete frames and adding a vernacular veneer of imported British materials to the homes; this defies Atkins’ original vision for the buildings to be constructed out of thoroughly local British building materials such as the white Jurassic limestone of the Cotswold villages, the red sandstone of central England, Cornwall's local granites, and flint-faced homes in Norwich; or even the dense red brick popular throughout Victorian England. xxi

Rapid design changes can lead to marked defects in the finished town, including the forced widening of the downtown cobblestone, which the Atkins group claimed inadequately quoted more narrow roads in Britain. SNCD also added fences and barriers designed in a traditional stark and utilitarian style, which brutally clash with the quaint British environment.xxx There is an abundance of high quality landscaped space in Thames Town, but the planned function does not always align with the eventual use; for example, the green around the Cathedral is used as an outdoor wedding photo studio, while the Atkins group had intended it to be a common meeting and gathering area, more similar to the historical use of church grounds in England. Hartog argues that these mistranslations of design and compromises in building quality can
be prevented in the future by a clearer balance between free market innovation and creativity and government control and regulations; without these lines clearly drawn, architects and developers do not know what they are able to implement, and the local and central governments will intervene randomly to clamp down on the town with inflexible policies.

Though the homes in Thames Town are entirely sold, the developers and project managers at SNCD did not seek out any market research or audience testing, and thus did not know what the demand or wishes for a housing development were. Trends like these mark the larger problem of Shanghai's housing bubble, in which housing valuations have rapidly increased and will continue to do so until they reach unsustainable levels and then decline. Many in China fear the onset of a house price crash, in which homeowners will hold mortgages and loans that exceed the values of their houses. In recent years, the Shanghai government has imposed restrictions to cool the frenzied property sector, slowing the rate of developments and the rate of price increases. These property curbs and restrictions include raising down payment and mortgage requirements for second homes and imposing a property tax for the first time in Shanghai. The housing bubble in Shanghai demonstrates, again, these confused competing roles of the state and free market, and foreign investors hope that the Shanghai government will loosen its chokehold on the housing market, so that property values can be adjusted to adequately reflect the needs of the consumer market.

Though prices of luxury homes like those in Thames Town have skyrocketed, there is a serious lack of housing for lower to middle income Shanghai citizens. Municipalities want to lease land to high-end developers who will build expensive homes, so that both local governments and developers can make their profits as large as possible; it is inherently unglamorous and unprofitable to build housing to suit the needs of the lower classes. In an article for the Wall Street Journal, James Areddy writes, “Despite China’s explosion of new housing over the past decade, an estimated one third of China's 225 million urban households are without kitchens and plumbing.” While government measures to control speculation and price increases have worked to an extent, these regulations have yet to affect those who live without basic necessities. Authorities have begun to subsidize developers to build more affordable housing and encourage banks to provide financing for home ownership, but even things like lowering interest rates keep most market properties too expensive for the vast majority of Shanghai locals; since the record highs of 2010, the average price of a home has only dropped 1.7 percent. In Shanghai, the per capita income is about $13,000, but the average Shanghai residence is sold for $276,000; this incredible disparity in wage and home prices is one possible reason why home ownership in Shanghai is lower than in other Chinese cities like Beijing. The severe affordable housing shortage in Shanghai is demonstrated by the statistic that the amount of residential space per capita (including the suburban areas, all claimed as part of Shanghai) is only 183 square feet per person, roughly the size of four king size beds. According to Lui Haisheng, the director of Shanghai Housing Support and Building Administration Bureau, the government will expand the affordable housing program “despite difficulties which include inadequate land resources and a shortage of capital for home construction” (Rapoza); however, it seems that these excuses are not airtight, as there is an abundance of land and capital for the
creation of high-profit luxury developments, and a great lack of incentive to build multi-income housing.

Furthermore, those peasants and farmers who were formerly living around Songjiang can no longer afford to stay in their hometown; these former residents and other barefoot migrant workers endured backbreaking labor to construct Thames Town, then were excluded from continuing to live in their homeland, as their minimal compensation for eviction does not come close to covering home prices. Thus there is a bitter gap between the vast expanse of empty luxury homes and the great demand for lower income housing; an intense segregation system arises and the fencing, guards, and gates around Thames Town reinforce the misery of this divide. Duanfang Lu’s book Remaking Urban Form outlines China’s constant struggle to move beyond its historical obsession with “scarcity” and move into the world of “the modern.” Thames Town can be an example of how China has moved beyond fears of scarcity and used a tabula rasa to build up an environment praising progressive globalism and consumption excess; however, profits made from developing and commodifying Thames Town have not been directed to renegotiate the “poor and blank” poverty-stricken rural communities. Luxury suburban developments instead make these rural communities poorer and blanker by pushing them out of their homes with paltry compensation.

In conclusion, Thames Town wants to be a model of quick and profitable development, forward-thinking globalism, an idealized middle-class consumer lifestyle, and Chinese cultural ascendancy, yet it occupies this position with anxiety and ambiguous outcomes. Vernacular British architecture and cultural tropes have been adopted to elaborate a paradigm of modernity, taste, and luxury, yet Shanghai’s colonial past cannot be ignored; Thames Town thus constantly works to present itself as a beacon of globalist cooperation rather than an acceptance of past colonial practices. Hungry for status symbols and luxury goods, Shanghai’s upwardly mobile middle class has pounced on Thames Town, but it has yet to become the thriving close-knit residential community it was designed to be, as it lies mostly vacant. According to sales figures, Thames Town has been a commercial blockbuster, but the town is more reminiscent of rows of safe-deposit boxes rather than a booming metropolis. Each of these tensions outlines a way that Thames Town is successful in theory but not in practice, in that towns need to be full of people and activity in order to be considered truly flourishing. If other Chinese cities copy this model of new town development, China could be faced with more local housing bubbles and lower-income housing shortages. Other new towns face similar problems of emptiness and speculation, but Thames Town is far and away the most successful of all the new towns, which shows that the problems I have described have much deeper and more sinister implications in other Shanghai suburbs. In Anting, for example, buildings are crumbling and boarded up, the town is hauntingly empty, and locals and travel websites alike unabashedly call it an unpleasant place to visit or live.

Over the next ten years, it will be fascinating to see what becomes of Thames Town. As the housing shortage in Shanghai becomes more pronounced and Center City home prices rise, perhaps more people who purchased houses in Thames Town as investments will move there to escape the growing pressures of city life. The increasing density of the Center City will also undoubtedly continue to push businesses and industries
out into the urban fringe, seeking cheaper land and room for expansion, and cutting down on commute time would encourage white-collar workers to live suburban lifestyles. The continued importance of the eco-conscious movement could also attract homeowners to live full-time in Thames Town, where they can escape the oppressive City Center pollution and grow their own vegetables, live in more energy-efficient homes, and spend more time outdoors. Finally, perhaps Thames Town will adapt to embrace those unlikely entrepreneurs who have claimed it as Shanghai’s premier wedding destination; as of 2012, 19 weddings studios were in business in Thames Town, bringing much-needed commercial activity to the picturesque town. Though it presents luxurious living on a charming and intimate scale, Thames Town cannot rely on its good looks and class status forever; if it is to become the crown jewel in Shanghai’s suburban planning projects, it needs to be flexible and receptive to change in order to assuage Shanghai’s affordable housing crisis, suit both the everyday needs and consumer whims of middle-class residents, and engage freely with Shanghai’s increasingly liberalized economy.

viii Jie and Fulong, "The Development of Master-Planned Communities in Chinese Suburbs," 188.
xiv Choon-Piew and Kong, "Marketing the Chinese Dream Home," 156.
xix Choon-Piew and Kong, "Marketing the Chinese Dream Home," 150.
xviii Choon-Piew and Kong, "Marketing the Chinese Dream Home," 150.
xxvi Hartog, Shanghai New Towns, 66.
xxviii Hartog, Shanghai New Towns, 126.
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