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The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty

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3.1 MORAL UNCERTAINTY

Consider this case:

B believes that ϕ ing is morally required, while failing to ϕ would be morally wrong. B thinks that failing to ϕ wouldn't be deeply morally wrong; it would only be minorly morally wrong. B is only 90% sure that ϕ ing is morally required. B has 10% confidence that ϕ ing is actually morally wrong, and indeed is deeply morally wrong.

What should B do? It might seem that B should ϕ ; after all, B believes that ϕ ing is morally required. But consider this line of argument:

B ought to refrain from ϕ ing. Taking a 10% chance is taking a substantial chance of doing a deeply morally wrong thing. One should be very averse to risking doing a deeply wrong thing. It is better to do what is very likely a minorly wrong thing to do than to risk doing what is a deeply wrong thing to do. Suppose that B does ϕ , ϕ ing is in fact morally wrong, and a victim of B's ϕ ing were to later try to hold B responsible for ϕ ing. Could B defend him- or herself by saying "but I believed that ϕ ing was morally required"? No! B knew that B was risking doing a deeply morally wrong thing, only for the sake of what B believed was a minor moral requirement. For this reason, B is blameworthy for ϕ ing, and it is appropriate to hold B responsible for ϕ ing.

This way of thinking about cases like B's is attractive, and there is an interesting philosophical literature that takes this way of thinking to be correct and then seeks to answer further questions that arise. I will call a proponent of this line of argument an Uncertaintist, and the view that this line of thought is correct Uncertaintism. According to Uncertaintism, an agent's

moral uncertainty (and specific moral credences) are crucially relevant to how the agent should act.¹

Uncertaintism begins by considering and rejecting the following view: an agent should be guided by any moral claims she believes. Cases like B's bring out that sometimes an agent takes a big moral risk by being guided by what she believes. If her beliefs hold that very little of moral significance is at stake, but she has a small credence in the claim that a great deal is morally at stake, then she may be taking a big moral risk in simply ignoring her small credence. B's ϕ ing would be like a homeowner's failing to buy fire insurance: one believes that one's home won't burn down, but the small credence one gives to a fire makes it reasonable to buy fire insurance even though there is simply a net loss if no fire occurs.

Uncertaintists then consider the following view: one should maximize the expected moral value of one's actions. This is not a consequentialist view. Rather, the view is that some actions are morally worse than others, according to various moral claims. One should maximize the expected moral value of *one's action*. On this view, B has 90% credence that ϕ ing is morally good, but only minorly morally good, 90% credence that failing to ϕ is minorly morally bad, 10% credence that ϕ ing is very morally bad, and 10% credence that failing to ϕ is very morally good. The overall expected moral value of his action is maximized by failing to ϕ .

The view that one should maximize expected moral value faces a difficult puzzle, which can be illustrated by the following case. Suppose that a person has some credence in Utilitarianism and some credence in Kantianism, and she is trying to decide whether to push one person in front of a train to stop it from hitting five people. Utilitarianism holds that pushing is morally required, while Kantianism holds that it is morally wrong. Does Utilitarianism hold that letting five die is just as morally bad as the Kantian holds that killing the one is morally bad? The answer to this question matters if agents should maximize expected moral value; but it is very hard to answer it. More generally, it is hard to know how to compare the moral values that different moral claims or principles assign to an agent's options.²

This puzzle about how to compare moral value between conflicting moral views is interesting, but I will argue that this literature is based on a

¹ Uncertaintist thinking appears in Ross (2006) and Sepielli (2008, 2013). (Though these authors do not appeal to considerations of blameworthiness to support their claims.) Related thinking appears in Lockhart (2000), Guerrero (2007), and Moller (2011); all three of these authors claim that an agent's moral credences are relevant to how she should act. My argument against Uncertaintism can be adapted to target these three views, as I will explain in notes 5 and 6.

² Lockhart (2000), Ross (2006), Sepielli (2008, and n.d.) have offered solutions or partial solutions to this puzzle.

mistake: the mistake of thinking that Uncertainty is true. Once we see that Uncertainty is false, we will see that we do not really face this puzzle.

To see why Uncertainty is false, let's look more closely at the initial line of argument I laid out concerning B, which the Uncertainty endorses. I will make three observations about the Uncertainty's view.

First: In saying that B should refrain from ϕ ing, the Uncertainty is making a *moral* claim about B, not a claim about how B might best pursue B's goals. (The description of B does not mention whether B cares to do what is moral; though the description may imply that he does.) Suppose we consider Bill, a version of B who doesn't care about morality at all. We might run through that same line of argument about Bill, finding it just as compelling: Bill should be morally cautious, even though we know Bill won't be morally cautious.

Second: In saying that B should refrain from ϕ ing, the Uncertainty is making a moral claim that is *subjective* rather than *objective*. To see the distinction, consider the following case. Anne's husband is dying and Anne gives him what she has every reason to believe is the cure to his illness. In fact it is poison. The following normative claims both seem true of Anne:

Anne does something she shouldn't do. (She poisons him.)

Anne does something she should do. (She gives her husband what she has every reason to believe is his cure.)

The first normative statement is true, and it is an *objective* moral truth. The second normative statement is true, and it is a *subjective* moral truth. Loosely speaking, objective moral truths are made true by features of the world independently of anyone's (perhaps mistaken) beliefs about what the world is like, while subjective moral truths are made true by someone's mental states (which may be mistaken), often but not always the agent's mental states.³

When a subjective moral claim "A ought to refrain from ϕ ing" is true and is made true by A's beliefs and credences (rather than by an advisor's or an observer's beliefs and credences), one can express the same truth by saying "Given A's whole mental state, A ought to refrain from ϕ ing." That is what the Uncertaintyists are saying. They are saying: given the entirety of B's beliefs and credences, B ought to refrain from ϕ ing.

³ There is a rich literature on subjective and objective normative statements, and on subjective claims made by advisors and remote observers. Subjective statements may also have true readings relative to an agent's *evidence* rather than her *credences* (see section 3.7). See Dowell (2013), Jackson (1991), Kolodny and MacFarlane (n.d.), MacFarlane (2014), Smith (n.d.), and others.

My third observation is that the Uncertaintist is committed to the following claim: if someone is caught in the grip of a false moral view (if she is sure of that view), then she ought to act as her false moral view requires. This is simply the limiting, uninteresting case of one's moral credences determining how one should act. According to Uncertaintism, if one is sure that one is morally required to ϕ , then one should ϕ .

I will now argue that Uncertaintism is false. Uncertaintism is the view that in light of an agent's whole mental state—given all of her credences—she should do the morally cautious thing in cases like B's. Furthermore, someone caught in the grip of a false moral view should do what that moral view holds is morally required. These are subjective moral claims, made true by the agent's whole mental state. But the following principle holds regarding such subjective moral claims:

An agent is blameworthy for her behavior only if she acted as she subjectively should not have acted.

Consider Anne, who acts wrongly by poisoning her husband. She is not blameworthy because it is not the case that she subjectively should not have acted that way. Subjectively, she should have given him what she took to be the cure.

Of course, Anne might be blameworthy for *causing* the poisoning if she is blameworthy for having the credences she has. If Anne didn't look at the bottle before giving it to her husband, for example, she may be blameworthy. But Anne would not be blameworthy for *behaving* as she did; she wouldn't be blameworthy for poisoning him. Rather, she would be blameworthy for *causing* the poisoning to occur by failing to look at the bottle.⁴

Uncertaintism makes some subjective moral claims. They have implications for blameworthiness. They imply, for example, that in B's case, if ϕ ing is indeed morally required, as B believes, but B does not ϕ , then B is blameless for failing to ϕ , because B did as B subjectively ought to have done. According to Uncertaintism, B's failure to ϕ would be blameless for the same reason that Anne's poisoning of her husband is blameless: they did the right thing, given their beliefs and credences.

⁴ My discussion here illustrates a terminological choice I have made in this chapter. I distinguish *blameworthiness for behavior*, which I construe narrowly, from *blameworthiness for causing that behavior*. Other authors (including myself in other papers) count both kinds of blameworthiness as blameworthiness for behavior, sometimes distinguishing them as "original blameworthiness" and "derivative blameworthiness," respectively. Nothing hangs on which kind of terminology one uses, but it is important to bear in mind throughout the chapter that when I say a view implies that a person is *blameless for her behavior*, this leaves open that she may be blameworthy for having caused herself to engage in that behavior (she may be derivatively blameworthy for the behavior).

The Uncertaintist is committed to the view that those caught in the grip of false moral views, who do morally wrong things while sure that those things are morally required, are blameless for their behavior. According to Uncertaintism, these agents acted as they subjectively should have acted. Uncertaintism is committed to the view that being caught in the grip of a false moral view exculpates. That view is false, I claim, and so Uncertaintism is false.

My Main Argument:

1. Uncertaintism implies that being caught in the grip of a false moral view is exculpatory.
2. It is not true that being caught in the grip of a false moral view is exculpatory.

Therefore:

3. Uncertaintism is false.

This argument has a controversial premise: premise 2. I won't seek to *establish* that premise in this chapter, but in section 3.3, I will say some things to defend it and to make it seem plausible. (In section 3.6, I will discuss whether premise 1 can be denied.)⁵

In section 3.2, I will discuss the implications of my main argument by offering and explaining an alternative to Uncertaintism. In section 3.3, I will support my main argument by explaining and defending premise 2. In sections 3.4–3.7, I will discuss objections to my arguments. In section 3.4, I also offer another argument against Uncertaintism.

⁵ My main argument can be adapted to target the views of Lockhart, Guerrero, and Moller. Lockhart claims that an agent should minimize her chances of acting wrongly. Guerrero and Moller claim that, at least for cases of killing, an agent should avoid doing something she believes may well be morally wrong, if she believes her alternative is definitely morally permissible. As I read these authors, all three of their views imply that an agent caught in the grip of a false moral view should act as her moral view dictates; thus, all are committed to the view that being caught in the grip of a false moral view is exculpatory. (Though these authors do not necessarily embrace this commitment or agree with me that they are so committed.)

Weatherson (2014) argues against views along the lines of Lockhart's, Moller's, and Guerrero's by arguing that such views are implausible in cases of *prudential* uncertainty and then arguing that moral uncertainty is more analogous to prudential uncertainty than to non-moral uncertainty; he argues that such views inappropriately fetishize either prudence or morality, relying on Smith (1994).

3.2 THE ALTERNATIVE TO UNCERTAINTISM

In this section, I will discuss the implications of my argument.

Because Uncertainty is false, the puzzle we discussed above, about how to compare moral value between conflicting moral views, is not important. It may be interesting *as a puzzle*; but nothing normatively important hangs on solving it.

If Uncertainty is false, what is true in its place? Here is my proposal:

Actualism: A person's moral beliefs and moral credences are usually irrelevant to how she (subjectively) should act. How a person (subjectively) should act usually depends solely on her non-moral beliefs and credences; her moral beliefs and credences are relevant only insofar as they provide warrant for beliefs and credences about what her non-moral situation may be.⁶

Why is "Actualism" a good name for this view? Because according to Actualism, what a person (subjectively) should do depends crucially on what's *actually* the true moral theory, and not on what people *believe* is the true moral theory. The contrast is between what is *believed* and what is *actual*. "Actual" here doesn't have anything to do with *contingency*, as our moral requirements (at a sufficient level of generality) are necessary.⁷

What does Actualism say about B? As B's story stands, it is too underdescribed to settle what B should do. Different ways of filling out B's story (or a similar story) will lead to very different results as to how B should act. Consider this way of filling out B's story:

Barbara is a police officer who has bad marksmanship and has promised her superior that she'll practice today. She is at a shooting range, deciding whether to shoot at the target in front of her. She is 90% sure that this is a normal shooting range environment, in which no one would be in any danger if she shoots. But she has a 10% credence that there is a cleaning person moving around behind the targets, who would very likely be shot if Barbara were to shoot at the target in front of her. If the shooting range were empty, Barbara would be morally required to practice. If the shooting range had a person behind the targets, it would be

⁶ Actualism implies both that Uncertainty is false and that the related claims of Lockhart, Guerrero, and Moller are false. (See note 5.) In section 3.7, I offer a revised statement of Actualism which explicitly denies two possible revisions to Uncertainty; I endorse both the initial and the revised statements of Actualism.

⁷ "Actualism" is used as a name for various philosophical views, including even a view in ethics. I'm not using it in any of these already existing ways. I'm using it in a new, stipulative way.

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morally wrong to shoot. Barbara has a 90% credence that she's in a scenario in which it is morally required that she shoot (to practice, and to keep her promise) and she has 10% credence that she's in a scenario in which it is morally required to refrain from shooting. (These are the credences she has regarding the *objective* moral truth about her situation.)

In this case, it is obvious that Barbara should refrain from shooting, for the reasons given in the initial line of argument we considered. Barbara should not take the moral risk of killing someone just to be sure to practice and keep her promise. But what's important, according to Actualism, is not that Barbara believes (as any ordinary person does) that shooting an innocent cleaning woman in this context would be morally wrong, but simply that she knows that the cleaning woman might be there. What makes it the case, according to Actualism, that Barbara should refrain from shooting is simply that she'd be *taking a risk of killing someone*, not that she'd be *doing something that she knows is taking a risk of doing something objectively morally wrong*—though that is also true in this case.

Now consider this story which is very much like B's story:

Bob's daughter Sue has been asking him to teach her to drive and he has finally promised to do so. He already taught her twin brother to drive. Bob has a 90% credence that he is morally required to teach Sue to drive. But Bob has recently been listening to some conservative speeches about the morally appropriate place of women in society. According to the conservative speaker he's been listening to, women should not drive and no one should teach a woman to drive; in fact that is a grave moral wrong. The conservative speaker does not challenge any non-moral facts Bob already believes; the challenge is simply to Bob's normative beliefs. Bob thinks the conservative speaker is probably wrong; he's 90% sure of that. But Bob finds the conservative picture being offered somewhat compelling, so that he is 10% sure it is the correct picture. (He's quite sure that a compromise position is false; so he's simply torn between the liberal ideals he grew up with and the more conservative picture he's learning about.) Bob has a 90% credence that failing to teach Sue would be wrong, but not very seriously wrong; he has a 10% credence that teaching her to drive would be deeply morally wrong. (These are the credences he has regarding the objective moral truth about his situation.)

Uncertainty holds that, if the conservative picture holds that teaching a woman to drive is wrong enough, Bob should not teach Sue to drive. He would be taking a moral risk that he should not take.

But that is false. Bob should teach Sue to drive. Breaking his promise would be treating her badly, just because she is female, in a way that a father should not mistreat his daughter. (Let's not be distracted by the fact that it

wouldn't be a *minor* wrong to Sue, so it's not an elaboration of the initial case of B (but rather is a similar story). That's true. But just so long as the conservative picture holds that teaching a woman to drive is wrong enough, then Uncertainty will imply that Bob should not teach Sue to drive.)

Bob knows his situation. He knows that he would be treating his daughter differently from his son, simply because she is a woman. He knows that women are not inherently less good drivers, or less intelligent than men. (Remember, the conservative picture does not challenge the non-moral beliefs that Bob already had as a liberal.)

If Bob refuses to teach Sue to drive, breaking his promise, her resenting him for it would be reasonable and appropriate. Even if she knows that he refrains because he does not want to take this moral risk, her resentment is still appropriate. Bob would be blameworthy for refusing to teach Sue to drive.

These are the claims that Actualism makes about the case. Whether they seem plausible partly depends on what one thinks about whether being caught in the grip of a false moral view is exculpatory. If it is, then being "partly caught" in the grip of a false view, as Bob is, would also seem to be exculpatory. If it is not, then being "partly caught" is not exculpatory. Again, the dispute between Actualism and Uncertainty hangs at least in part on a dispute over whether being caught in the grip of a false moral view is exculpatory. I'll say more about that in section 3.3.

Here is another way of filling out B's case:

Bernard is a slaveholder in the early 1800s in the United States. Like every slaveholder in his community, once a week he beats his slaves if they have failed to do their work as well as he believes they can. He believes that he is morally required to continue this practice, because (as he has been taught) it is a crucial ingredient in sustaining his community's way of life, which he believes he is morally required to do. But lately Bernard has heard some compelling abolitionist speeches. He thinks abolitionism is misguided; but he's not sure. Bernard is 90% sure that he is morally required to beat his slaves if they disobey, though it is not seriously morally wrong to refrain. He is 10% sure that it is deeply morally wrong to beat his slaves. (These are his credences in the objective moral truth about his situation.)

What should Bernard do? As Uncertainty says, Bernard should refrain from beating his slaves. That's true. I believe that cases like Bernard's provide crucial and central motivation for Uncertainty. It does seem that Bernard should refrain from beating his slaves. Actualism holds that Bernard should refrain from beating his slaves, but not because of his moral credences. He should refrain because he knows it is *beating his slaves*, he knows it is beating people who are kept captive and who work for him without compensation and without freedom. One should not beat a person in this situation.

(One should almost never beat another person, of course. Nor should one keep slaves.) Bernard should refrain because he knows what he is doing, Actualism holds, and because what he is doing is actually wrong.

Uncertainty may be motivated in part by the thought that Bernard is blameworthy if he beats his slaves. But Actualism agrees that he is blameworthy and that he should not beat his slaves; the disagreement is over what explains these truths.

Here is another way of filling out B's case:

Betsy is presented with the option of pressing a red button, without knowing what the button does. Then an advisor speaks. The advisor says, "I'm 90% sure that pushing the button is morally required, though it wouldn't be a grave moral wrong to fail to push it. I'm 10% sure that pushing the button is gravely morally wrong." That is all the advisor says. *Betsy knows this advisor well. Betsy in fact has sound moral views, and knows that the advisor does too.*

Betsy should be cautious and refrain from pressing the button, for just the reasons offered in the initial line of thought we considered. Pushing the button is too risky. Betsy has reason to believe that the advisor is uncertain *what pushing the button does*, but that the advisor has a 10% credence that pushing the button does one of a number of things that the advisor and Betsy both think are gravely wrong—and these things are wrong, because they have sound moral views—while the advisor likely has 90% credence that pushing the button does one of a number of things that the advisor and Betsy both think are morally required, but not seriously morally wrong to do—and those things really are morally required but not seriously wrong to do. So, Betsy should have 10% credence that pushing the button is: killing an innocent person, seriously harming an innocent person, or etc. And she should have 90% credence that pushing the button is: breaking a minor promise, dividing a benefit unfairly, or etc. When a person's credences are distributed that way, her case is very much like Barbara's case, and she should be morally cautious.

What's crucial to our understanding of Betsy's case is that her moral uncertainty gives rise to non-moral uncertainty. Because she believes the advisor, she comes to be in a state of non-moral uncertainty that makes it reasonable to be cautious and refrain from pushing the button.

But consider this variant, involving an agent who holds a true moral view about helping hurricane victims but a false moral view about gay marriage:

It is the final moments of a U.S. state's legislative session. Unless a bill is delivered to the statehouse by midnight, the bill cannot be signed by the governor. In the statehouse, Ben is presented with the option of pressing a red button. He knows that the button delivers a piece of legislation to the governor, but he does not know what the legislation is. He knows that

two pieces of legislation were before the legislature, one providing aid to towns recently hit by a hurricane and one allowing gay marriage in the state. The governor has pledged to sign each bill if it is delivered to him in time. An advisor says, “I’m 90% sure that pushing the button is morally required, though it wouldn’t be a grave moral wrong to fail to push it. I’m 10% sure that pushing the button is gravely morally wrong.” That is all the advisor says. Ben knows that he and the advisor agree about the morality of both pieces of legislation: they agree that it is good to aid the hurricane victims; and they agree that it is seriously morally wrong for the state to allow gay marriage or for anyone to do anything to aid the state in allowing gay marriage. Ben is an ordinary person with no duties in the legislation, but due to an odd computer set-up, he alone is able to push this button in time to get the legislation, whatever it is, to the governor. If the governor does not get the legislation today, the voting will be re-done in one month by a newly constituted group elected in a recent election, who are expected to decide differently on both bills. In fact, both bills are good bills that should be enacted, though the hurricane bill is not terribly important because federal aid will also be provided.

In this case, Ben has a 90% credence that pushing the button is morally required though failing to push would not be seriously wrong, and a 10% credence that pushing is gravely morally wrong. But he also has credences regarding the non-moral upshot of each choice: he is 90% confident that pushing would provide the hurricane relief, and 90% confident that failing to push would withhold that relief; he is 10% confident that pushing the button would result in the legalization of gay marriage and 10% confident that failing to push would prevent that legalization. Uncertainty holds that Ben should refrain from pushing the button because it would be taking too big a moral risk. Actualism holds that Ben should push the button, because it is morally required to push the button *in either scenario he is considering*.⁸

3.3 DO FALSE MORAL VIEWS EXCULPATE?

In this section, I will defend premise 2 of my main argument.

It is controversial whether being caught in the grip of a false moral view exculpates. I will lay out the relevant issues and briefly argue for and defend

⁸ The following could seem like a counterexample to Actualism.

The oracle tells Arthur that pushing the green button is morally required. Arthur has lots of bad moral views, so Arthur forms the belief that pushing the button is X1, X2, X3, ... or Xn, where these are all in fact morally wrong to do.

Actualism holds that Arthur should be guided by his *non-moral* views, so Arthur *should refrain* from pushing the button according to Actualism. But, the objector says, pushing the button does a morally good thing, and the Oracle told Arthur that. Surely he should push.

the view that being caught in the grip of a false moral view does not exculpate. (A person is “caught in the grip of a false moral view” just in case she is *certain* the false moral view is correct.)

Some people have argued for this claim:

Moral Ignorance Exculpates: A person who acts wrongly is blameworthy for so acting only if she *believes* she is acting wrongly.

The claim that Moral Ignorance Exculpates is clearly false. Even if we take seriously that a person’s moral beliefs and credences can sometimes render her blameless for moral wrongdoing, it is implausible that mere ignorance—that is, failure to *believe* the relevant moral truth—is sufficient for blamelessness. Cases such as those that motivate Uncertainty show Moral Ignorance Exculpates to be false. The mere fact that someone does not believe her action is wrong does not rule out that she has some non-trivial credence that it is wrong, and so her moral beliefs and credences may not vindicate her action at all. One cannot defend one’s wrongful action later by saying, “I didn’t know it was wrong, though I had a 30% credence that it was wrong.” That is not a good defense, if one knew that one’s other option was morally permissible.^{9,10}

The more difficult question is whether *being caught in the grip of a false moral view* renders one blameless for wrongful actions:

False Moral Views Exculpate: If a person behaves in a morally wrong way, while certain of a false moral view according to which that behavior is morally required, then she is not blameworthy for her behavior.¹¹

Actualism implies that Arthur should not push the button. In fact, if Actualism is true, it seems that Arthur is blameworthy for pushing the button. This might seem bizarre, though in section 3.3 I offer a view on which false moral belief is typically blameworthy; that Arthur is blameworthy for pushing the button may seem less strange if he is also blameworthy for his moral beliefs.

If Arthur does not push the button, then Actualism implies he’s not blameworthy; whereas he may seem to be blameworthy. But at least the Actualist can say, in that case, that Arthur is blameworthy for his false beliefs, though not for failing to push.

⁹ The point that moral ignorance does not exculpate, because one might be *ignorant* while being *uncertain* as to whether one’s action is morally wrong, is made by Guerrero (2007).

¹⁰ Note that, on my view, this is definitely not a good defense because moral belief and credence is not exculpatory (except when it warrants non-moral credences that would be exculpatory). But my point is that *even if one thinks that moral belief and credence can be exculpatory*, one should not think that mere ignorance can be exculpatory.

¹¹ In my (2011), I discuss an argument that moral ignorance exculpates; I argue that the real issue is not whether moral ignorance exculpates but rather whether false moral belief exculpates, and I argue that it does not. Rosen (2003, 2004), Wolf (1987), and Zimmerman (1997) offer arguments that moral ignorance or false moral belief exculpates.

My main argument in this chapter holds that Uncertainty is committed to the claim False Moral Views Exculpate; and I claim that False Moral Views Exculpate is false.

How might we figure out whether false moral views exculpate? Some writers have seemed to suggest that we can learn that false moral views exculpate from the fact that false *non-moral* views exculpate.¹² Consider Anne, who poisons her husband, certain that she is curing him. Anne is not blameworthy for behaving in this way. What is the explanation of Anne's blamelessness? It does seem that Anne's *ignorance* renders her blameless. But how can we characterize the ignorance that renders her blameless? There are two competing principles that would explain Anne's blamelessness. (Note that we are looking for principles that explain why Anne is not blameworthy *for behaving as she did*; she might still be blameworthy *for having caused her behavior* if she is blameworthy for having come to be ignorant.) Here is the first principle:

A person is blameworthy for behaving in a particular way only if her behavior has certain features that make it morally wrong and she believes that her behavior has those features.

This principle implies that Anne is not blameworthy for her behavior. Anne's behavior was a poisoning of her husband, that makes it morally wrong, but she did not believe her behavior had that feature. Anne believed her behavior was an attempt to save her husband's life, but that feature does not make her behavior morally wrong. There is no feature of her behavior that both makes it morally wrong and is such that she was aware of it.

The second principle that would explain Anne's blamelessness for her behavior is this:

A person is blameworthy for behaving in a particular way only if her behavior has certain features that make it morally wrong and she believes *both* that her behavior has those features *and that they make it morally wrong*.

The second principle implies that false moral views exculpate. So, if cases of exculpatory non-moral false views like Anne's are explained by this second principle, then these cases can directly support the claim that false moral views exculpate.

But cases like Anne's are not explained by the second principle. These cases give us no reason to believe the second principle. Anne's blamelessness follows simply from her failure to know that what she is doing *is a poisoning*. (Importantly, she does not even know that it might be a

¹² Rosen (2004) seems to suggest this, though this may not be intended.

poisoning.) Anne's blamelessness is fully explained by the first principle, which is simply a weaker claim than the second principle. We do not need to make the stronger claim in the second principle to explain Anne's blamelessness.

Thus, while it might have seemed that the fact that false non-moral views exculpate can support the claim that false moral views exculpate, there is no support from the former to the latter.¹³

To know whether false moral views exculpate, we must confront cases involving false moral views head on, and ask whether they involve blameworthiness. When we do, we see that many cases of wrongful behavior by agents caught in the grip of false moral views are *paradigm* cases of blameworthiness.¹⁴ Consider these two cases:

Max works for a Mafia "family" and believes he has a moral obligation of loyalty to the family that requires him to kill innocents when it is necessary to protect the financial interests of the family. This is his genuine moral conviction, of which he is deeply convinced. If Max failed to "take care of his own" he would think of himself as disloyal and he would be ashamed.

Gail is a gang member who believes that she has a moral obligation to kill a member of a neighboring gang as revenge after a member of her own gang is killed, although her victim was not responsible for the killing. This is her genuine moral conviction, of which she is deeply convinced. If Gail failed to "take care of her own" she would think of herself as disloyal and she would be ashamed.

I claim that Max and Gail are paradigm cases of agents blameworthy for their wrongful actions. They know that they are killing innocent people; this is sufficient for the agents to be blameworthy.

A proponent of the claim that false moral views exculpate might respond as follows:

While these two agents are not blameworthy for *killing* the innocent people, they are blameworthy for *causing these killings to occur* because they must be blameworthy for having come to have these beliefs. Agents are blameworthy for their moral views if and only if

¹³ My point here does not depend on how the second principle is worded. We might instead consider the view that a person is blameworthy for acting in a particular way only if she *knew* she was acting wrongly. This principle is more concise than the second principle I state; but my objection to the second principle is not that it is too complicated, or that it *adds* a needless further condition, but simply that it is unmotivated by consideration of cases of non-moral ignorance exculpating. (Sliwa (n.d.) holds that moral knowledge is necessary for praiseworthiness; but I don't think she would endorse the strong claim that moral knowledge is necessary for blameworthiness.)

¹⁴ See my (2011).

they have violated *procedural moral obligations regarding learning the moral truth* (and these violations were themselves blameworthy).¹⁵ These include the obligation to think a reasonable amount about morality in general, the obligation to take seriously moral arguments one hears, etc., but do not include any substantive obligations to believe certain things. These two agents cannot possibly have fulfilled their procedural moral obligations regarding learning the moral truth.

I have two responses. First, it underplays the extent and gravity of these agents' blameworthiness to treat them as *merely* blameworthy for having come to have certain beliefs, and having thereby *caused* some deaths, while not seeing them as blameworthy for their *killings*, which occurred while they knew full well that they were killing innocent people. Second, it is a grave mistake to think that people cannot become convinced of deeply false moral views, such as these, without violating this kind of procedural obligation. Consider versions of Max and Gail who have thought an ordinary amount about morality and have taken seriously the moral arguments that have been presented to them. They are aware that many people think their moral views are false, but they believe they understand where others have gone wrong: others have been "suckered" into a "wimpy" morality, when what is really important is taking care of one's own. These versions of Max and Gail are certainly possible; they would be blameworthy for their wrongful behavior.

On my opponent's view, the question of whether false moral belief exculpates turns out to be intimately connected to the question: is ethics hard? Ethics is indeed quite hard, and this is why we see so many cases of false moral belief even among those who have fulfilled their procedural moral obligations regarding learning the moral truth. Some people do not think hard enough about morality in general, or they dismiss moral arguments that they ought to take seriously. But many people think hard about morality, take the arguments they hear seriously, and still *get it wrong*.¹⁶ A failure to appreciate how hard ethics is can make the claim that false moral belief exculpates seem less radical than it is.¹⁷ But that claim is very radical.¹⁸

¹⁵ Rosen (2004) offers this view of blameworthiness for moral beliefs.

¹⁶ I make this point in my (2011).

¹⁷ FitzPatrick (2008), in discussing whether false moral belief exculpates, assumes that ethics is only hard in special cases.

¹⁸ My paper "Ethics is Hard. What Follows?" (n.d.) expands on some of the arguments in this section.

I have argued that false moral views do not exculpate. In my view, people who act wrongfully are blameworthy not in virtue of what their moral beliefs and credences are, but in virtue of what their *non-moral* beliefs and credences are, and how these influence their choices. Someone who knows she is killing an innocent person, and does so anyway, does not care adequately *to avoid killing the innocent*.¹⁹ A view of blameworthiness that can undergird the claim that false moral views do not exculpate is this:

A person is blameworthy for her wrongful behavior just in case it resulted from her failure to care *de re* about what is morally important—that is, from her failure to care adequately about the non-moral features of the world that in fact matter morally.²⁰

A person cares *de dicto* about morality if she wants *to be moral*. A person cares *de re* about morality if she wants *to keep her promises, to help the needy, etc.*, and if keeping one's promises, helping the needy, etc. are in fact morally important.

A proponent of the view that false moral views exculpate holds the following:

(*) Someone who behaves morally wrongly while caught in the grip of a false moral view (according to which what she is doing is morally required) is not blameworthy for this behavior; she is blameworthy for *causing* this behavior *only if* and *only because* she is blameworthy for her false moral view.

I deny claim (*) but I grant that there is something intuitively compelling about it. I grant that the following claim is true:

(**) Someone who behaves morally wrongly while caught in the grip of a false moral view is blameworthy for this behavior *only if* she is blameworthy for her false moral view.

I grant that there is something odd about holding someone blameworthy for her morally wrong behavior while acknowledging that she is blameless for a false moral view according to which that behavior is morally required. I hold that people who do morally wrong things while caught in the grip of false moral views are blameworthy for their actions and are *also* blameworthy for their beliefs. But they are not blameworthy for their actions *merely because* they are blameworthy for their beliefs; and they are not blameworthy merely for having *caused* themselves to behave in this way. Rather,

¹⁹ Unless this is a case in which it is morally permissible to kill an innocent person.

²⁰ Here I am adopting a view along the lines of Arpaly (2003) and Markovits (2010).

they are blameworthy for both their actions and their beliefs for related reasons—because both their actions and their beliefs involve their failing to care adequately about what matters morally:

Believing that one's wrong action is morally required involves caring inadequately about the features of one's action that make it morally wrong, because believing that an action is morally wrong on the basis of the features that make it wrong is a way of caring about those features.²¹

False moral belief is blameworthy. Actions done on the basis of false moral belief are often blameworthy. On my view, they are blameworthy for similar reasons.

In this section, I have explained and defended premise 2 of my main argument, my claim that false moral views do not exculpate. I've argued that consideration of the way that false non-moral views exculpate in no way supports the claim that false moral views exculpate. I claim that if we look directly at some cases of wrongdoing due to false moral views, we see that these are paradigm cases of blameworthy behavior. And I've offered a view of blameworthiness on which false moral views do not exculpate, which accommodates the thought that if the behavior is blameworthy, then the false moral belief is blameworthy as well.^{22,23}

So far in this chapter, I have offered my main argument: If Uncertainty is true, then false moral views exculpate. But false moral views do not exculpate. So, Uncertainty is false. And I have articulated and explained an alternative to Uncertainty: Actualism. In the remaining sections of the chapter, I defend this argument in the face of some objections. In section 3.4, I discuss the objection that Uncertainty and Actualism do not really disagree; and I also offer a further argument against Uncertainty, based on an analogy with epistemology. In section 3.5, I discuss an objection that the analogy with epistemology can be used to support Uncertainty. In section 3.6, I discuss an objection to the first premise of my main argument, which holds that if Uncertainty is true, then false moral views exculpate. In section 3.7, I discuss whether either of two revisions of Uncertainty can resist my arguments.

²¹ As I understand it, this part of my view goes beyond anything in Arpaly (2003) and Markovits (2010).

²² I respond to some objections to this view in my (2011) and in my "Ethics is Hard. What Follows?"

²³ Michael Smith has argued that caring about morality, and acting in a certain way *because it is morally required* rather than because of the reasons that make it morally required, is being a moral fetishist, and is thereby objectionable. (See Smith (1994).) This is a different thought than the Actualist's thought that some concern for morality lacks moral value because it is in fact concern for things that do not matter morally.

3.4 IS THERE REALLY DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNCERTAINTIST AND THE ACTUALIST?

Let's focus on Bob, who must decide whether to teach his daughter Sue to drive. I have said that the Uncertaintist and the Actualist disagree about Bob. The Uncertaintist says:

(1) Bob should not teach Sue to drive

because teaching Sue to drive would be taking a serious moral risk.

The Actualist says:

(2) Bob should teach Sue to drive

because refusing to teach Sue to drive would be limiting her options because she is a woman.

The dialectic here is complicated. The Uncertaintist will grant that (2) is true, or has a true reading. To see this, remember the case of Anne, who poisons her husband thinking she is curing him. The following claim can be truly made of Anne:

(3) Anne should not give the drink to her husband

because it is poison. We can also truly say:

(4) Anne should give the drink to her husband

because one should do what one believes will save one's husband's life.

Claim (3) is true of Anne, *ignoring her beliefs and credences about her situation*, we might say; it is made true by what her situation really is. Claim (4) is true of Anne, *given her beliefs and credences about her situation*, we might say.

Similarly, the Uncertaintist can claim that there are three ways for claims about Bob to be true. First:

(2) Bob should teach Sue to drive.

This is true objectively. Ignoring Bob's beliefs and evidence about his situation, given what his situation really is, he should teach his daughter to drive.

But also:

(2) Bob should teach Sue to drive.

This is true for one kind of subjectivity. Ignoring Bob's *moral beliefs and credences*, just focusing on his non-moral beliefs and credences, Bob should teach Sue to drive. (The same claim is true on two different readings.)

Finally,

(1) Bob should not teach Sue to drive.

According to the Uncertaintist, this claim is true *taking into account all of Bob's beliefs and credences about his situation (including his moral beliefs and credences)*. This claim is true for a second kind of subjectivity.^{24,25}

The Uncertaintist may then claim that the Actualist and the Uncertaintist do not disagree. Rather, both agree that claim (2) is true. The Uncertaintist simply raises a third question that the Actualist does not appear to be interested in: suppose we do not ignore a person's moral beliefs and credences, but take into account her *whole mental state*. What should she do, on the basis of this whole mental state?

I believe that some Uncertaintists would see the dialectic this way.²⁶ But they are wrong. Actualism is a proposed answer to the very same question the Uncertaintists are interested in, namely: how should a person act, taking into account her beliefs and credences (including her moral beliefs and credences), given that one sometimes must act while experiencing moral uncertainty?

I will now draw a lesson using an analogy with epistemology.

²⁴ Here is an example in which three different moral claims might be true, one in each of these three ways, according to the Uncertaintist:

John's sixteen-year-old daughter wants to take the morning-after pill. John has two pills in front of him, A and B. John believes that A is an aspirin and B is the morning-after pill. In fact, it is the reverse: A is the morning-after pill and B is an aspirin. John is sure that taking the morning-after pill is wrong and that it is wrong to give it to one's daughter. Consider:

- (i) John should give his daughter pill A.
- (ii) John should give his daughter pill B.
- (iii) John should give his daughter neither pill.

(i) is true as an objective moral claim. John should give his daughter what is actually the morning-after pill: pill A. (ii) is true as a subjective moral claim relative to John's non-moral beliefs but ignoring his moral beliefs: a person should give his daughter what he takes to be the morning-after pill if she wants to take the morning-after pill. (iii) is true relative to John's entire mental state, according to the Uncertaintist.

²⁵ Now that we have distinguished these ways in which moral claims may be true, we can clarify the best interpretation of certain general claims that Uncertaintism makes, such as: "Someone who is 90% sure that ϕ ing is minorly morally wrong, but 10% sure that failing to ϕ is deeply morally wrong, should refrain from ϕ ing." Here the agent's two mentioned credences are best understood as credences in *subjective moral claims that are relative to the agent's non-moral credences, ignoring the agent's moral credences*; the final "should" claim, which the Uncertaintist makes, is best understood as a subjective claim relative to the agent's entire mental state.

²⁶ Seppieli (2008) distinguishes the "Non-Normative Belief-Relative 'Should'" from the "most belief-relative 'should' of all—relative to the agent's beliefs about both the normative and the non-normative" which seem to correspond to the two kinds of subjectivity I mention. He clarifies that his claims are in terms of the latter (as I say the Uncertaintist's claims are).

Uncertainty is a view about how a person should behave; consider the analogue of the Uncertainty regarding how a person should believe. The Epistemic Uncertainty holds that how a person should believe is determined by what she *believes* about how she should believe. If a person is sure that she should form her beliefs in accord with a certain rule, then indeed she should do so. If a person is unsure between two different ways of forming beliefs, then her beliefs should be formed in a compromise way between those two methods, etc. To see why this view fails, consider this case:

Mary believes that a particular way of reasoning is a good way of reasoning. In fact it's not. It involves coming to beliefs on the basis of claims that don't really support those beliefs. This way of reasoning is not a way of becoming justified in the newly formed beliefs. But Mary does believe it is a good way of reasoning. Now Mary considers following a particular line of reasoning. She correctly sees that it is an instance of that way of reasoning, the one she believes to be a good way of reasoning. She correctly sees that this line of reasoning would lead her to believe P. In fact Mary's evidence and the reasoning available to her (ignoring her false belief that it is a good way of reasoning) do not support a belief in P. Should Mary believe P?

Mary should not believe P. The mere fact that she believes a bad way of reasoning to be a good way of reasoning does not make that way of reasoning *a good way for her to reason* or a way that she now *should* reason. We can say this while *taking into account* that she believes that it is a good way of reasoning. The true epistemological view, whatever it is, will hold that Mary should not believe P. The claim that Mary should not believe P is an analogue of Actualism's claim that people caught in the grip of false moral views nevertheless should not do the particular deeply morally wrong things they believe to be morally required; and it is an analogue of Actualism's claim that Bob should teach Sue to drive, even taking into account his whole epistemic state.

Mary's case shows that the following general claim is false, where X ranges over either behaving in a certain way or believing in a certain way:

If an agent is convinced of principles that imply she should X, and she sees that these principles imply she should X, then all things considered, in light of her whole mental state, she should X.

While this principle would indeed imply that Uncertainty is right about cases involving certainty, consideration of Mary's case shows that this principle is false. Seeing how it is false in the epistemological case helps to see how it may be false in the moral case, I claim.

Mary's case also provides a counterexample to the following more general claim (again letting X range over either behaving in a certain way or believing in a certain way):

An agent's beliefs and credences about how she should X alone determine how she should X.

This general claim would imply that Uncertainty (or something like it) is true, and that Actualism is false; but this general claim is false.

For all I have said so far in this section, it might seem that we could state the disagreement between Actualism and Uncertainty as follows. Uncertaintyists believe that claims like (1) and (2) both have true readings. Actualists believe, rather, that claims like (1) are false on any reading. But the dialectic is not that simple. The Actualist need not deny that there is *any* true reading of (1), but simply that the Uncertaintyist's intended reading of (1) is false. The Actualist can grant that there is a true reading of (1), while denying both that it is what the Uncertaintyist says and that it is interesting.

How can the Actualist see (1) as having a true reading? The true reading occurs in a speech like this:

"If Bob were to decide what to do by being guided by his moral beliefs and credences, what should he do? He should refrain from teaching Sue to drive."

This isn't a crazy way to talk. But it doesn't tell us anything interesting about Bob, because he shouldn't be guided in that way. This speech is an analogue of the following.

"What should Mary believe, if she were to be guided by her beliefs about how she should believe? She should believe P."

The claim that Mary should believe P may be true in this context. But it's not an interesting truth. It is no more interesting that the last claim in this speech:

"Nora has a lot of evidence about whether the earth is more than 6,000 years old. She knows that Tom says the earth is only 6,000 years old. She knows that there is a scientific consensus that the earth is more than 6,000 years old. But let's ignore her information about the scientists. Focus on what she knows about what Tom says. If Nora's belief is to be guided by her knowledge of what Tom says, what should she believe? She should believe that the earth is not more than 6,000 years old."

The final claim in this speech is true. But it is not an interesting truth.

Actualism holds that there are contexts in which (1) expresses a truth, but it is as uninteresting as the claim that Nora should believe the earth is not more than 6,000 years old. Most importantly, Actualism holds that

Uncertaintists put forward claims like (1) in contexts in which those claims are not true. Uncertaintists claim that a person who faces moral uncertainty, such as Bob, is doing the best he can *in light of his full epistemic situation*, including both his moral and non-moral beliefs and credences, when he chooses not to teach Sue to drive. That claim is false.²⁷

3.5 OBJECTION: THE ANALOGY WITH EPISTEMOLOGY CAN BE USED TO ESTABLISH UNCERTAINTISM

At this point, someone might object as follows on behalf of Uncertainty. Consider the following case.

George follows a particular line of reasoning to a conclusion. It leaves him with a high credence in P. In fact, this is good reasoning. But George has recently been told, by someone he respects, that this kind of reasoning is bad reasoning. George was not convinced, but he has a small credence that this person was correct; his credence is 10%.

The objector's claim: George should be less confident in P than if he did not have this small doubt about this form of reasoning; his credence in P should be *lower* than it should be in the alternative.

If the objector's claim about George is right, then in the epistemic case, a person's beliefs and credences about how she should believe are relevant to what she should believe. This might seem to support Epistemic Uncertainty.

I will respond to this worry in two ways.

First, I will make a dialectical point. I brought up the epistemic analogy to make the following point: Mary's case is a *counterexample* to a general principle that would support both Uncertainty and Epistemic Uncertainty.

Mary's case shows that one's beliefs about whether one should X do not *alone determine* whether one should X. If the objector's claim about George is correct, then George's case shows that, at least sometimes, one's beliefs about whether one should X are relevant to whether one should X.

²⁷ It's a bit unclear how to read Sepielli (2008) on this question. On the one hand, he does say that his claims are in terms of the "most belief-relative 'should' of all—relative to the agent's beliefs about both the normative and the non-normative." That's how I read him. On the other hand, he comments that he is making claims about "local rationality" rather than "global rationality," explaining what an agent should do "relative to" her credences in claims of the form "action A is better than action B" etc. I take this to stipulate that an agent might have other *moral* beliefs that Sepielli's view doesn't take into account; I do *not* take him to be saying that his claims ignore the agent's *non-moral* beliefs.

The Actualist acknowledges that sometimes one's beliefs about how one should behave are relevant to how one should behave—in particular, in cases in which one's beliefs about how one should behave are themselves the warrant for further beliefs about what one's non-moral situation is.

The lesson of Mary's case and George's case is that there is a substantive *epistemological question* “how should this agent believe?” that is answered by consideration of the agent's whole mental state. The answer cannot be read off of the agent's beliefs about how she should believe. Similarly, there is a substantive *normative question* “how should this agent behave?”—which is in part a *moral question*—that is answered by consideration of the agent's whole mental state. The answer cannot be read off of the agent's beliefs and credences about how she should behave. But epistemology and morality are different, and the way that these substantive questions get answered may be different.

Now for my second response to the objection. It is not clear to me that the objector's claim about George must be true.²⁸

Nevertheless, I do find the objector's claim about George plausible and I am not going to deny it. *An Actualist does not need to deny the claim about George.*

3.6 OBJECTION: THE FIRST PREMISE OF MY MAIN ARGUMENT IS FALSE

In section 3.4, I distinguished several types of subjective moral claims. This provides a way for the Uncertaintist to object to the first premise of my main argument. My main argument is:

1. Uncertaintism implies that being caught in the grip of a false moral view is exculpatory.
2. It is not true that being caught in the grip of a false moral view is exculpatory.

Therefore:

3. Uncertaintism is false.

²⁸ The Objector makes his claim; my suggestion is that the Objector's claim may be false; a third option is that there is more than one sense of “epistemically justified” or “rational” and that the claim is true on one reading and false on another. Miriam Schoenfield (n.d.) develops a view according to which there are two senses of “rational.” One credence in P may be rational for George, in light of his evidence. Another credence for P may be rational for George, in light of his doubt about his reasoning process. Sepielli (2013) similarly offers a view on which there are various kinds of local rationality (rationality relative to some of an agent's evidence and other credences), but there is no such thing as a credence being globally rational, or rational in light of the agent's entire epistemic situation.

My argument for premise 1 can be unpacked as follows:

- (i) Uncertainty claims that agents should act as their moral credences dictate. (This is a subjective “should.”)
- (ii) A person is blameworthy for some behavior only if she should not have behaved in that way. (This is a subjective “should.”)
- (iii) Persons caught in the grip of false moral views, who behave in ways those views morally require, *should* behave as they do, according to Uncertainty.

Therefore:

- (iv) Persons who behave morally wrongly while caught in the grip of false moral views (that require their behavior) are not blameworthy for their behavior, if Uncertainty is true.

An objector might hold that this argument equivocates between two different kinds of subjective claims: subjective claims that are true relative to an agent’s moral beliefs *but ignoring her non-moral beliefs and credences*; and subjective claims that are true relative to an agent’s entire mental state, including all her beliefs and credences. Claim (ii) uses a subjective “should” that is relative to an agent’s entire mental state. But claim (i), the objector holds, uses a subjective “should” that is relative only to the agent’s moral beliefs and credences, ignoring her non-moral beliefs and credences. The objector holds that my argument for premise 1 equivocates.

My response to this objection is that if this objection is correct, then Uncertainty is an uninteresting claim. It is no more interesting than the claim that Nora should believe the earth is not more than 6,000 years old, discussed above.²⁹

3.7 TWO REVISIONS OF UNCERTAINTISM

In this section, I will consider an objection that offers two revisions to Uncertainty that may seem to avoid some of the worries I have raised and that provide some of what Uncertainty offers. They are:

Revision #1 of Uncertainty: An agent should be guided not by her actual moral beliefs and credences but only by her epistemically justified beliefs and credences.

²⁹ While my reading of Sepielli (2008) is that he does not make what I call the uninteresting version of his claim, my reading of Sepielli (2013) suggests he would prefer to embrace what I call the uninteresting version of his claim, while disputing that it is uninteresting.

Revision #2 of Uncertainty: An agent should be guided not by her actual moral beliefs and credences but by the moral beliefs and credences that she would be justified in holding.

The objector claims that one or both of these views does better than Uncertainty at addressing the worries I have raised.

The following question is relevant:

Is it possible for agents to be epistemically justified in being certain of false moral views according to which deeply morally wrong actions are morally required—including all such false moral views discussed in this chapter?

In other work, I have entertained an answer of “no” to this question.³⁰ I assume that those interested in rescuing Uncertainty by offering Revision #1 or #2 believe that the answer to this question is “yes”; let’s assume that is so. It seems this can only hold if *testimony* is a way to become epistemologically justified in believing false moral views, so let’s assume that it is.³¹

We should note that these revisions of Uncertainty abandon some of what might have motivated Uncertainty. The idea that a person cannot do better than use her own beliefs³² is given up as motivation for Uncertainty. One Uncertaintyist has suggested that we should separate the question of what credences a person should have from the question of how she should act in light of the credences she actually has and has said that Uncertainty answers the latter question only.³³ (But he has since changed his mind.³⁴) This is also abandoned by the revisions.

Can my main argument be revised to address these new views? It can.

My Main Argument, Revised to Target Revisions #1 and #2 of Uncertainty:

³⁰ In my (2011).

³¹ Yet another view is that some moral truths are such that it is not possible to be justified in getting them wrong, while other moral truths are such that it is possible to be justified in getting them wrong. This view may involve a misguided assumption that we ourselves occupy a privileged position, only wrong or unsure about moral truths that are deeply hard to know, while others get wrong truths that are *easy* to know. In fact, others in the future may themselves be able to see easily how we are going wrong. Even moral truths that are deeply obvious to some may be hard to see by others trying earnestly, and even moral truths that seem hard for us are obvious to others. Because there is no privileged perspective from which to separate the easy from the hard, there are no facts that some moral questions are easy and some are hard, and thus there is no privileged class of moral truths such that those—and only those—are the ones one can be justified in getting wrong.

³² Sepielli (2008: 8) writes: “we cannot base our actions on the correct normative standards ... we cannot guide ourselves by the way the world is, but only by our representations of the world.”

³³ Sepielli (2008).

³⁴ Sepielli (2013).

- 1'. If Revision #1 or Revision #2 of Uncertainty is true, then being epistemically justified in being certain of a false moral view is exculpatory.
- 2'. It is false that being epistemically justified in being certain of a false moral view is exculpatory.

Therefore:

- 3'. Neither Revision #1 nor Revision #2 of Uncertainty is true.

I endorse premise 2' of this revised argument for the same reasons that I endorse premise 2 of the original argument. First, consideration of the way that justified non-moral certainty exculpates gives us no reason to think that justified moral certainty exculpates. Second, the very same kinds of cases I discussed, the Mafia family member and the gang member who kill innocent people, provide counterexamples to the claim that justified moral certainty exculpates. If we take *testimony* seriously as a source of justification for false moral belief, then these agents may be epistemically justified while they are nevertheless paradigm cases of blameworthy agents. Finally, we can grant that it would be weird for their actions to be blameworthy while their beliefs are blameless, claiming that their beliefs are indeed blameworthy.

One might object that epistemically justified beliefs cannot be morally blameworthy. But why not?

One (controversial) example of an epistemically justified but morally blameworthy belief is a sister's belief in her brother's guilt of a serious crime given *just enough* evidence to make that belief epistemically justified; she should give him the benefit of the doubt and withhold belief. We can say this even while acknowledging that *more than enough* evidence to make the belief epistemically justified would make the belief blameless; the moral duty to give one's sibling the benefit of the doubt just requires being somewhat reluctant to believe badly of him.³⁵

One might think that epistemically justified beliefs cannot be morally blameworthy because a person who is epistemically justified *could not have believed differently*, and a person cannot be blameworthy for something if she could not have done otherwise. But it is not true that all epistemically justified beliefs are such that one could not have believed differently. I might take your word for something, and come to be epistemically justified in believing it, even though I was capable of thinking it through for myself, and had I done so, I would have realized it was false.³⁶

³⁵ Keller (2004) and Stroud (2006) argue that we owe our loved ones the benefit of the doubt, and that we may owe it to them to refrain from holding beliefs that would be epistemically justified. Lackey (n.d.) disagrees.

³⁶ See my (2011).

In response to Revisions #1 and #2 of Uncertainty, here is a revised statement of my view. (I endorse both the original statement and the revised statement.)

Actualism (Revised): A person's moral beliefs and moral credences (*whether justified or not*) are usually irrelevant to how she (subjectively) should act (*as are the moral beliefs and moral credences she would be justified in holding*). How a person (subjectively) should act usually depends solely on her non-moral beliefs and credences; her moral beliefs and credences (*or those she should hold*) are relevant only insofar as they provide warrant for beliefs and credences about what her non-moral situation may be.

3.8 CONCLUSION

I have argued that Uncertainty is false. If Uncertainty is true, then false moral views exculpate. But false moral views do not exculpate. So, Uncertainty is false.

There are two main ways of rejecting my argument. First, one might hold that false moral views do exculpate. If the Uncertainty goes that route, she takes on a significant commitment that Uncertainty has so far not acknowledged (as far as I know). Second, one might hold that Uncertainty is not committed to the view that moral false views exculpate. If the Uncertainty goes that route, it turns out that her claims are not interesting. The Uncertainty is not telling us how an agent should act, in light of her whole mental state (including both moral and non-moral beliefs and credences); rather, she is simply telling us how agents should act, ignoring their non-moral beliefs and credences.³⁷

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³⁷ I owe much thanks to Tyler Doggett, Peter Graham, Alex Guerrero, Sarah McGrath, Dan Moller, Gideon Rosen, Miriam Schoenfield, Paulina Sliwa, Andrew Sepielli, Brian Weatherston, and the participants at the 2013 Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop for comments on drafts of this chapter.

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