CRITICISM AS PHILOSOPHY: CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN CH'ING DYNASTY EVIDENTIAL RESEARCH

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批判的哲學：清代考證學給與「仁」的新解釋

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1. INTRODUCTION

Among those who have evaluated Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) intellectual history, it has been common to blame Confucian scholars of that period for creating a climate of textual criticism that was primarily destructive. Such detractors, for the most part, deny Ch'ing Confucians the status of philosophers concerned with larger social and political issues and overlook the significance of their discoveries.

The general view is that Confucianism since the Sung dynasty (960-1279), that is, Neo-Confucianism, was a synchronic set of philosophical concepts and interpretations. Although it showed signs of change (or "unfolding" as the conventional wisdom has it), the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy during the Ming (1368-1644) and Ch'ing periods, according to this view, essentially was a reworking of themes and concepts set in place originally by Chu Hsi 朱熹 (1130-1200) and Wang Yang-ming 王陽明 (1472-1529).[1]

In a powerful indictment of Ch'ing dynasty scholarship, T'ang Chün-i 唐君毅 has contended that the intellectual triumph of Marxism-Leninism in contemporary China grew out of the rejection of Sung dynasty humanistic philosophy by bookish and empirically oriented Ch'ing philologists:[2]

> In Ch'ing dynasty philosophy, the aim was to have everyone stress practical aspects of human life. Although this was not a bad idea, [Ch'ing Confucians] erred by using this [stress on practice] to oppose Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism [lit., "studies of moral principles" li-hsueh 理學].

During an earlier era, Fang Tung-shu 方東樹 (1772-1852), a staunch advocate of the Ch'eng-Chu (Ch'eng I 程頤, 1033-1107, and Chu Hsi) Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, condemned the intellectual currents of the Ch'ien-lung (1736-95) and Chia-ch'ing (1796-1820) reign periods in ringing fashion:[3]

(1) See, for example, Hsu Fu-Kuan's 徐復觀 attack on Ch'ing dynasty Han Learning entitled "Ch'ing-tai Han-hsueh heng-lun" 清代漢學衡論, *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 大陸雜誌 54, 4 (April 1977): 1-22. For rebuttal, see Yamanoi Yū 山井湧, "Min-shin no tetsugaku to shuyō" 明清の哲學と修養, *Rekishi kyōiku* 歷史教育 2, 11 (November 1954): 82-83. For discussion, see Wm. T. de Bary, "Introduction," in *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism* (N. Y., 1975), pp. 1-32.

(2) T'ang Chün-i, *Chung-kuo jen-wen ching-shen chih fa-chan* 中國人文精神之發展 (Taipei, 1974), pp. 37-38.

(3) Fang Tung-shu, *Han-hsueh shang-tui* 漢學商兌 (Taipei reprint, 1977), 2A. 16b.

The Han Learning scholars all have evidence to back up every state-ment and research to support every word. However, they are only debat-ing on paper with the ancients over glosses, phonetic elements [in Chinese characters], scholia, and textual corruptions. They adduce from various books ancillary evidence by the hundreds and thousands of items. Yet, if they were to apply to themselves their attitudes and activities, or extend them to the people and the country, it is of no benefit whatsoever. It only causes people to become deluded and inconstant so that they are good for nothing.

Much is at stake in these critiques. From the point of view of the Neo-Confucian humanist tradition, the Ch'ing dynasty evidential research movement (*k'ao-cheng-hsueh* 考證學) represented a decisive break with the ethical values and humanistic ideals of the state orthodoxy based on the Ch'eng-Chu tradition. From another perspective, however, this seeming betrayal of the Confucian philosophical tradition by Ch'ing evidential research scholars can be turned inside out.

The debilitating aspects of the imperial orthodoxy, which by the late Ming had degenerated into a powerful formalism dedicated to enhance the prestige and power of autocratic rulers, was first described by Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲 (1610-95):[4]

In antiquity, the people of the realm were considered the hosts and regarded the ruler the guest. Everything that a ruler managed to accom-plish in his lifetime reverted to the realm. Today the ruler is host and those in the realm his guests....

In antiquity, the people of the realm loved and supported their ruler. They compared him to their father. They emulated him as they do heaven and could not go far enough to demonstrate their sincerity. Today, the people of the realm harbor nothing but hatred for their ruler. They view him as an enemy....

Can it be that the greatness of the realm, with all its millions of people and myriads of lineages is to be enjoyed privately by one man, by one lineage?

Tai Chen 戴震 (1724-77), polymath and philosopher, continued, from a histor-ical perspective, Huang's exposé. Using the text of the *Mencius* as a foil to criticize the creeping autocracy since Sung times, Tai contended that in the final analysis the fundamental problem lay within the ideological nature of the Neo-

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(4) Huang Tsung-hsi, *Ming-i tai-fang lu* 明夷待訪錄, pp. 1b-2a, in *Li-chou i-chu hui-k'an* 梨洲遺著彙刊 (Taipei, 1969). See also the discussion of Sung-Ming enhancement of the imperial institution and the corresponding rise in autocracy in my forthcoming study entitled *To Interpret the Past and Reform the Present: The Rise and Development of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China* (Ann Arbor, forthcoming), Part 1, Chapter 2.

Confucian orthodoxy and its support for an autocratic state that dominated Chinese political culture: [5]

> The high and mighty use *li* 理 [moral principles] to blame the lowly. The old use *li* to blame the young. The exalted use *li* to blame the downtrodden. Even if they are mistaken, [the ruling groups] call [what they have done] proper. If the lowly, the young, and the downtrodden use *li* to struggle, even if they are right they are labelled rebellious. As a result, the people on the bottom cannot make their shared emotions and desires [in all persons] in the world understood by those on top. Those on top use *li* to blame them for their lowly position. For these uncountable throngs of people, their only crime is their lowly position. When a person dies under the law, there are those who pity him. Who pities those who die under [the aegis] of *li*?

Later, Fang Tung-shu, outraged by the audacity of Tai's remarks, retorted: [6]

> [To say] that the principles of heaven are not dependable and that one should rely on the emotions and desires of the people, that they should have an outlet and be allowed to follow their desires, implies that *li* 理 [read "moral ideals"] is attained at the expense of *ch'i* 氣 [read "human desires"] and brings disorder to the Tao. However, [Tai Chen] is merely trying to make it difficult for the Ch'eng-Chu [school] without realizing that his is the way of great disorder.

In the twentieth century, the impact of Tai Chen's political critique was acknowledged by erstwhile radicals such as Chang Ping-lin 章炳麟 (1868-1936) and Liu Shih-p'ei 劉師培 (1884-1919). Before his infatuation with anarchism in 1907, Liu Shih-p'ei, for example, admired Tai's criticism of oppressive aspects of the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. Liu contended that Tai had effectively liberated himself from the autocratic aspects of the Ch'eng-Chu imperial ideology (see further below). [7]

Were Ch'ing *k'ao-cheng* scholars sterile philologists? Or were they liberators? Did they commit the crime of overturning Confucian ethical values, leaving a moral vacuum in their wake? Or did they deconstruct an ideological tradition that had provided theoretical support for the increasingly autocratic nature of the Confucian imperium since the Sung dynasty?

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(5) Tai Chen, *Meng-tzu tzu-i shu-cheng* 孟子字義疏證 (Peking, 1961), p. 10. We might note that Ming T'ai-tsu 明太祖 (r. 1368-98) wanted to have the text of the *Mencius* removed from the official examination system because it placed the people over the ruler. His objections were met by Confucian scholars who removed the offending passages from the official text.

(6) Fang Tung-shu, *Han-hsueh shang-tui*, 2A. 19a.

(7) See Kawata Teiichi 河田悌一, "Shimmatsu no Tai Shin zō" 清末の戴震像, in *Tōyōgaku ronshū* 東洋學論集, compiled by the Committee in Commemoration of Mori Mikasaburō (Kyoto, 1979), pp. 1015-34.

In the discussion that follows, we will evaluate these different interpretations by examining the content and methodology of Ch'ing dynasty evidential research studies. In particular, the empirical methodology and philological deconstructionism of the *k'ao-cheng* movement will be analyzed from the standpoint of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Han Learning versus Sung Learning debate, which dominated philosophic discussion in China before the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864).

2. THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Michel Foucault has noted that periodically a society suddenly stops thinking the way it did and its leading voices strike out in new and different directions:[8]

> Thus, in place of the continuous chronology of reason, which was invariably traced back to some inaccessible origin, there have appeared scales that are sometimes very brief, distinct from one another, irreducible to a single law, scales that bear a type of history peculiar to each one, and which cannot be reduced to the general model of consciousness that acquires, progresses, and remembers.

In European intellectual history, such discontinuities in discourse reveal how the formation of concepts and their modes of connection and coexistence can change dramatically from one epoch to another. More often than not, what we frequently refer to as a *zeitgeist* or "spirit of an age" is a shorthand method for discerning the modes of thinking peculiar to a particular historical epoch. Such a "map of the mental universe" of an age presents us with its predominant concerns and new directions. In Foucault's terms, an "archaeological" analysis of knowledge reveals that at any given moment there are discernable prerequisites that define epistemologically the conditions for acceptable knowledge and inference, whether expressed in theory or "silently invested" in practice.[9]

The seventeenth century in Europe marked such a discontinuity in the history of western philosophy. The "great grid of empirical knowledge" that emerged three centuries ago represented a fundamental shift in the common codes of knowledge through which the world was perceived. Mental vocabulary of Europeans during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in turn reinforced this shift from Christian rationalism to skeptical and secular empiricism.[10]

After the great British empiricists John Locke (1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), and David Hume (1711–76) set up the principle that prior to all other philosophic considerations it must be determined how far human reason extends,

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(8) Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (N. Y., 1972), p. 8. See also Foucault, *The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (N. Y., 1973), p. 50.

(9) Foucault, *The Order of Things*, p. 168. See also Patrick Hutton, "The History of Mentalities: The New Map of Cultural History," *History and Theory* 20, 3 (1981): 237–59.

(10) Foucault, *The Order of Things*, pp. 76–77.

epistemology, the theory of knowledge, was raised to the highest level of philosophic priority. Until then, with exceptions, the philosophic outlook or program that stressed the power of a priori reason to grasp substantial truths about the world, that is rationalism, had dominated Scholastic and Renaissance thought.[11]

By making experience rather than reason the source of acceptable knowledge, empiricists contended that the legitimate reach of human ideas should be evaluated by the manner in which they arise. This program was possible only by exact delineation of the sources from which knowledge derived, and of the course of development which brought it about. An epistemological position that stressed that valid knowledge must be corroborated by external facts and impartial observations in turn added impetus to study of the natural world and the concomitant emergence of the scientific revolution.

I have argued at length elsewhere that a similar epistemological turn occurred in seventeenth-century China.[12] For reasons quite different from the European case, there occurred in Confucian discourse a remarkable turn from Neo-Confucian rationalism, typified by the philosophy of Chu Hsi, to a commitment to empirically based philological inquiry.

In sharp contrast to their Neo-Confucian predecessors, Ch'ing k'ao-cheng scholars stressed exacting research, rigorous analysis, and the collection of impartial evidence drawn from ancient artifacts and historical documents and texts. Abstract ideas and a priori rational argumentation gave way as the primary objects of discussion among Confucians to concrete facts, verifiable institutions, and historical events.[13]

Although their position was not as clearly articulated as by their European contemporaries, Ch'ing evidential scholars also made verification a central concern for the emerging empirical theory of knowledge they advocated.[14] This program involved the placing of cheng 證 [proof] and cheng 徵 [verification] at the center of the organization and analysis of the classical tradition. A full-blown scientific revolution did not ensue, but it is interesting that k'ao-cheng scholars made

(11) Wilhelm Windelbandt, *A History of Philosophy* (N. Y., 1901), Vol. 2, pp. 447ff. See also Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. The Rise of Modern Pagonism* (N. Y., 1977), p. 408, and Basil Willey, *The Seventeenth Century Background* (N. Y., 1953), pp. 11–30.

(12) See my *From Philosophy To Philology: Social and Intellectual Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, 1984), *passim.* For discussion of social and political factors, see pp. 88–169.

(13) For more detail, see my "The Unravelling of Neo Confucianism," *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, New Series 15 (1983): 67–89.

(14) By "empirical" I mean an epistemological position that stresses that valid knowledge must be corroborated by external (textual and otherwise) facts and impartial observations. Ch'ing evidential scholars were not "empiricists" in the strict philosophic sense, although they were in favor of knowledge based on experience, that is, *wen-chien chih chih* 聞見之知.

astronomy, mathematics, and geography high priorities in their research programs.[15]

Animated by a concern to restore native traditions in the precise sciences to their proper place of eminence, after receiving ridicule and little attention during the Ming dynasty, evidential scholars such as Tai Chen, Ch'ien Ta-hsin 錢大昕 (1728-1804), and Juan Yuan 阮元 (1764-1849) successfully incorporated technical aspects of western astronomy and mathematics into the Confucian framework. Ch'ien Ta-hsin, in particular, acknowledged this broadening of the Confucian tradition, which he saw as the reversal of centuries of focus on moral and philosophic problems:[16]

> In ancient times, no one could be a Confucian who did not know mathematics... Chinese methods [now] lag behind Europe's because Confucians do not know mathematics.

In contrast to their Neo-Confucian predecessors, Ch'ing evidential research scholars inhabited a climate of criticism stimulated by their discovery of precise empirical methods to verify and evaluate knowledge drawn from a wide variety of sources. In general, they took Sung and Ming Neo-Confucian discourse to be an obstacle to verifiable truth because it seemed to discourage further inquiry along empirical lines. During this time, scholars and critics had begun to apply historical analysis to the Confucian Classics. Classical commentary by now had yielded to textual criticism.

As Foucault perceptively has noted, "commentary halts before the precipice of the original text, and assumes the impossible and endless task of repeating its own birth within itself: it sacralizes language."[17] Criticism, on the other hand, can analyze a text, however sacred, only in light of truth, accuracy, or expressive value. It desacralizes or, in more recent parlance, "deconstructs" language so that the textual monuments of classical traditions are reduced to their vocabularies, their syntaxes, or the sounds of their languages.

In the late seventeenth century, Yen Jo-chü 閻若璩 (1636-1704) dramatically demonstrated that the Old Text chapters of the *Documents Classic* were a later forgery and not the original chapters discovered in the second century B.C. Hu Wei 胡渭 (1633-1714), Yen's friend and colleague, exposed the heterodox origins of Neo-Confucian cosmograms. Such studies brought in their wake corrosive implications that would not end in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A

(15) Kondo Mitsuo 近藤光男, "Shinchō keishi ni okeru kagaku ishiki" 清朝經師における科學意識, *Nihon Chūgoku gakkai hō* 日本中國學會報 4 (1952): 97-110. See also Nathan Sivin, "Wang Hsi-shan," in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography* (N.Y., 1970-78), Vol. 14, pp. 159-68, and my "Geographical Research in the Ming-Ch'ing Period," *Monumenta Serica* 35 (1981-83): 1-21.

(16) Ch'ien Ta-hsin, *Ch'ien-yen-t'ang wen-chi* 潛研堂文集 (Taipei, 1968), III, pp. 94-95.

(17) Foucault, *The Order of Things*, pp. 80-81.

form of criticism emerged that would one day exceed the Confucian boundaries Ch'ing scholars attempted to impose.[18]

Language itself became an object of investigation. So much so, that the foundations of contemporary Chinese linguistics and phonology were laid during this period.[19] Tai Chen described such investigation as follows:[20]

> The Classics provide the route to the Tao. What illuminates the Tao is the words [of the Classics]. How words are formed can be grasped only through [a knowledge of] philology and paleography. From [the study of] primary and derived characters we can master the language. Through the language we can penetrate the mind and will of the ancient sages and worthies.

The distinguished classicist and historian Wang Ming-sheng 王鳴盛 (1722-98) echoed Tai's words:[21]

> The Classics are employed to understand the Tao. But those who seek the Tao should not cling vacuously to "meanings and principles" [i-li 義理] in order to find it. If only they will correct primary and derived characters, discern their pronunciation, read the explanations and glosses, and master the commentaries and notes, the "meanings and principles" will appear on their own, and the Tao within them.

Their program was taken quite literally by thousands of Confucian scholars trained in k'ao-cheng methods during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this way, students of evidential research were determined to pierce what they considered the thick veil of Sung and Ming metaphysical and cosmological systems of thought (known popularly as Tao-hsueh 道學 [studies of the Tao, that is, Neo-Confucianism]). They hoped thereby to recapture the pristine meaning formulated by the sage-kings of antiquity in the Confucian Classics. They were in effect calling into question the dominant imperial ideology, the Ch'eng-Chu tradition, which Manchu rulers had enshrined as the proper norm in imperial examinations and official ideology.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the prestige of the Classics, though outwardly unchanged, had actually diminished appreciably. Using the phrase "liu-ching chieh shih" 六經皆史 [the Six Classics are all Histories], Chang Hsueh-ch'eng 章學誠 (1738-1801) placed the timeless Classics within the framework

(18) Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy* (Berkeley, 1968), I, p. 94.
(19) See my "From Value to Fact: The Emergence of Phonology as a Precise Discipline in Late Imperial China," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 102, 3 (July-October 1982): 493-500.
(20) *Tai Chen wen chi* 戴震文集 (Hong Kong, 1974), p. 146.
(21) Wang Ming-sheng, "Hsu" 序, in *Shih-ch'i-shih shang-ch'ueh* 十七史商榷 (Taipei reprint, 1960), p. 2a.

of the endless flux of history, but even in the eighteenth century Chang was not unique in his appraisal.[22]

Philosophic concepts were not immune to this sort of empirical analysis either. Though most *k'ao-cheng* scholars preferred the comfortable confines of an empirical program for research that left little room for theoretical discussion, a few led by Tai Chen saw in linguistic analysis (*hsun-ku* 訓詁 [glossing of terms]) a key for a new and more precise etymological approach to traditional philosophic questions. Important Confucian concepts and ideals, as a result of Tai Chen's influence, were subjected to philological study. A methodology that had proven fruitful in textual criticism it was hoped would prove equally productive in moral philosophy.

3. THE REVALUATION OF *JEN*

One of the most telling classical passages, associated with Confucius himself, was the master's response to his disciple Yen Yuan's 顏淵 query concerning *jen* 仁 [benevolence].[23]   According to D.C. Lau's translation, Confucius responded:[24]

> *To return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self con-stitutes benevolence.* If for a single day a man could return to the obser-vance of the rites through overcoming himself, then the whole Empire would consider benevolence to be his. However, *the practice of benevolence depends on oneself alone,* and not on others.

The keys to this passage in the *Analects* were the two phrases *k'e-chi fu-li wei-jen* 克己復禮爲仁 and *wei-jen yu-chi* 爲仁由己 italicized in the translation above.

In his commentary to this passage, Chu Hsi gave the following glosses for the phrase *k'e-chi* 克己: "*K'e* 克 means to conquer [*sheng* 勝]. *Chi* 己 refers to the selfish desires of the self [*shen chih ssu-yü* 身之私欲]." According to Chu Hsi, this meant that "to practice *jen* [*wei-jen* 爲仁], one must conquer the selfish desires of the self and return to the observace of the rites." In this manner, the "perfect virtue of the original mind" (*pen-hsin chih ch'üan-te* 本心之全德), which Chu equated with heavenly principle (*t'ien-li* 天理), could be attained.[25]

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(22) Tu Wei-yun 杜維運, *Ch'ing Ch'ien Chia shih-tai chih shih hsueh yü shih chia* 清乾嘉時代之 史學與史家 (Taipei, 1962), *passim*.

(23) See *Lun yü yin te* 論語引得 (Taipei, 1966) 22/12/1. Translations for *jen* are many. In addition to "benevolence" (D.C. Lau), other translations include "perfect virtue" (James Legge), "goodness" (Arthur Waley), "humanity" (Wing-tsit Chan), "human-heartedness" (Derk Bodde), etc. For discussion, see Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept *Jen,*" *Philosophy East and West* 4 (1954-55): 295-319, Wei-ming Tu, "The Crea-tive Tension Between *Jen* and *Li,*" *Philosophy East and West* 18, 1-2 (January-April 1968): 29-39, and Lin Yü-sheng, "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of *Jen* 仁 and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy," *Monumenta Serica* 3 (1974-75): 172-98. For discussion of the Confucian concept of man and *jen*, see Donald Munro, *The Concept of Man in Early China* (Stanford, 1969), pp. 70-73.

(24) Translation by D.C. Lau, *Confucius. The Analects* (N.Y., 1979), p. 112.

(25) See Chu Hsi, *Lun-yü chi-chu* 論語集注 (Taipei reprint of Ming edition), 6.10b-11a.

It was precisely Chu Hsi's gloss "to conquer the selfish desires of the self" for *k'e-chi* 克己 to which Ch'ing critics objected. As Mizoguchi Yūzō 溝口雄三 has pointed out, Tai Chen saw in this gloss confirmation of Chu Hsi's bifurcation of human desires from heavenly principle. Chu was in effect reading into this passage from the *Analects* has own bifurcation between *li* 理 [moral principles] and *ch'i* 氣 [variously rendered as "material force," "ether", "stuff"; to encompass all these meanings we will use the Chinese term].[26]

Tai's critique of Chu Hsi's latent dualism drew on his philological training. He contended that if Chu Hsi's gloss of *chi* 己 as "selfish desires of the self" were correct, then it made the following phrase in the text *wei-jen yu-chi* 爲仁由己 incomprehensible. How could the "practice of *jen*" (*wei-jen* 爲仁) proceed from the "selfish desires of the self" (*yu-chi* 由己)? This is what followed if Chu Hsi's gloss were used for both the *chi* 己 in *k'e-chi* 克己 and in *yu-chi* 由己. Accordingly, Chu Hsi's interpretation, Tai argued, was contradictory.[27]

Chu Hsi's definition of human desires (*yü* 欲) was the key issue for Tai Chen. In his discussion of the *k'e-chi* 克己 passage, Tai noted:[28]

> Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and the Buddha [spoke of] "having no desires" [*wu-yü* 無欲], not of "having no selfishness" [*wu-ssu* 無私]. The way of the sages and worthies was "to have no selfishness" and not "to have no desires." To equate [the self] with selfish desires is therefore a notion the sages totally lacked.

The theoretical debate was drawn over the affirmation or negation of human desires. For Tai Chen, the Chu Hsi line of inquiry had scorned the essential characteristics of humanity in favor of attention to heavenly principles:[29]

> The sages ordered the world by giving an outlet to people's feelings [*ch'ing* 情] and by making it possible for them to realize their desires [*yü* 欲]. In this way, the Tao of the sages was brought to completion....
> With regard to the Sung Confucians, however, [the people] believe in them, thinking that they are the equivalent of the sages. Everyone can talk about the distinction between moral principles [*li* 理] and human desires. Therefore, those who control the people today pay no attention

(26) Mizoguchi Yūzō, "*Mōshi jigi soshō* no rekishi teki kōsatsu" 孟子字義疏證の歴史的考察, *Tōyō bunka kenkyūjo kiyō* 東洋文化研究所紀要 48 (1969): 144-45, 163-65. See also Yamanoi Yū 山井湧, "*Mōshi jigi soshō* no seikaku" 孟子字義疏證の性格, *Nihon Chūgoku gakkai hō* 日本中國學會報 12 (1960): 108-26. We should note that James Legge took Chu Hsi's gloss as "an acknowledgement of the fact—the morally abnormal condition of human nature—which underlies the Christian doctrine of original sin." See Legge, *The Four Books* (N. Y., 1966), p. 156 for the note on *k'e-chi*.
(27) Tai Chen, *Meng-tzu tzu-i shu-cheng*, p. 56.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Ibid., pp. 9-10.

to the sages giving an outlet to people's feelings and making it possible for them to realize their desires.

Tai's political stance, presented briefly in introductory remarks, was a direct result of his revaluation of the Chu Hsi interpretation of classical terms such as *jen* 仁.

Tai Chen's followers, as we shall soon see, picked up where he had left off. We should recognize, however, that Tai's critique was not altogether unique. Although it is hard to demonstrate any direct link to Tai Chen, both Yen Yuan 顏元 (1633-1704) and Li Kung 李塨 (1659-1733) had already taken Chu Hsi to task for his interpretation of the *k'e-chi fu-li wei-jen* 克己復禮爲仁 passage. Yen Yuan had said:[30]

> The ancient glosses for *k'e* 克 were "able" [*neng* 能] and "overcome" [*sheng* 勝]. I have never heard of the interpretation "to get rid of" [*ch'ü* 去] for *k'e* 克. The ancient gloss for *chi* 己 was "self" [*shen* 身]... I have never heard of the interpretation "selfishness" [*ssu* 私] for *chi* 己. Probably Sung Confucians took material form [*ch'i-chih* 氣質] as containing evil. Therefore, they saw the self [*chi* 己] as selfish desires.

Li Kung also noted before Tai Chen the problem of the passage *wei-jen yu-chi* 爲仁由己:[31]

> Question: [Chu Hsi's] *Collected Notes* [*to the Analects*] uses "selfish desires" [*ssu-yü* 私欲] to gloss *chi* 己. Why can't this be used?

> My reply is: Never before was this gloss of "selfish desires" used for interpreting *chi* 己. Moreover, in the following phrase *wei-jen yu-chi* 爲仁由己, is it permissible to gloss the former [use of *chi* 己] as "selfish desires" and gloss the latter as "my self" [*wo-shen* 我身], thereby giving different glosses [for the same word]? Followers of the sages emphasized the study of rituals. This was called "to use rituals to control the self" [*yüeh-chih i-li* 約之以禮]. Sung Confucians stressed "getting rid of selfishness and studying rituals" [*ch'ü-ssu hsüeh-li* 去私學禮].

Like Tai Chen, Yen Yuan had earlier linked Chu Hsi's mistaken interpretation to his tendency to view human desires in light of the bifurcation between *li* 理 and *ch'i* 氣. In remarks entitled "To Refute That the Nature of Material Form Is Evil," Yen said:[32]

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(30) Yen Yuan, *Ssu-shu cheng-wu* 四書正誤, 4.5a, in *Yen-Li ts'ung-shu* 顏李叢書 (Taipei reprint, 1965), Vol. 1, p. 70. For discussion, see Mizoguchi Yūzō, "*Mōshi jigi soshō* no rekishi teki kōsatsu," pp. 145-58. Hu Shih 胡適 and others have claimed a direct link from Yen Yuan to Tai Chen, but Ch'ien Mu 錢穆 in his *Chung-kuo chin san-pai-nien hsüeh-shu shih* 中國近三百年學術史 (Taipei, 1972), pp. 355 ff., has dismissed this. Mizoguchi (p. 158) sees only a historical connection.

(31) Li Kung, *Lun-yü chuan-chu wen* 論語傳注問, p. 21b, in *Yen-Li ts'ung-shu*, Vol. 3, p. 904.

(32) Yen Yuan, *Ts'un-hsing p'ien* 存性編, "Po ch'i-chih-hsing o" 駁氣質性惡, 1.1a, in *Yen-Li*

If one claims that *ch'i* 氣 is evil, then *li* 理 is too. If one claims that *li* is good, then so is *ch'i*. In all likelihood, *ch'i* is the *ch'i* of *li* [理之氣], and *li* is the *li* of *ch'i* [氣之理]. How can one argue that *li* alone is good and that material form on the other extreme is evil?

In addition, Yen Yuan accused Chu Hsi of bringing in Hsun-tzu's 荀子 theory that human nature was evil through the back door, thus compromising Mencius' correct view that human nature was good.[33] Tai Chen, several decades later, did much the same. Affirming that material form (*ch'i-chih* 氣質) was inherent in the nature of man, Tai wrote:[34]

Sung Confucians in establishing their theories appear the same as Mencius, but in reality they differ. They appear different from Hsun-tzu, but in reality they are the same.

Then Tai added:[35]

Today we see that Mencius was the same as Confucius and that Ch'eng [I] and Chu [Hsi] were the same as Hsun-[tzu] and Yang [Chu]... What the latter called nature [*hsing* 性] was not what Confucius and Mencius had called nature. What [Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi] called the nature of material form [*ch'i-chih chih hsing* 氣質之性], isn't this what Hsun-[tzu] and Yang [Chu] called nature?

From a discussion of the meaning of *jen* 仁, the debate with Chu Hsi had carried over into the nature of man and the problem of human desires. That was not where it was to end, however. Mizoguchi Yūzō has pointed out that Tai and his followers were reevaluating and continuing, in historical terms, a major philosophic debate that had animated late Ming Confucianism as well. In the process, *k'ao-cheng* scholars like Tai Chen, Juan Yuan, and Chiao Hsun 焦循 (1763–1820) were throwing their weight behind a rejection of what they perceived as the pernicious influence of Ch'eng-Chu dualism in favor of a more practical and down-to-earth interpretation of classical values and ideals.[36]

4. FROM TAI CHEN TO JUAN YUAN

The emergence of *k'ao-cheng* philosophy took a while before it was accepted

ts'ung-shu, Vol. 1, p. 156. See also Wei-ming Tu, "Yen Yuan: From Inner Experience to Lived Concreteness," p. 532, and Chung-ying Cheng, "Reason, Substance, and Human Desires in Seventeenth-Century Neo-Confucianism," pp. 490–96, both in *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism.*

(33)   Yen Yuan, *Ts'un-hsing p'ien*, 1.11a (Vol. 1, p. 161).
(34)   Tai Chen, *Meng-tzu tzu-i shu-cheng*, p. 34.
(35)   Ibid., p. 37.
(36)   Mizoguchi Yūzō, pp. 171–76, 181–207. See also Yamanoi Yū 山井湧, "Min-Shin jidai ni okeru ki no tetsugaku" 明清時代における氣の哲學, *Tetsugaku zasshi* 哲學雜誌 56, 711 (1951): 82–103.

by more empirically minded scholars. In addition, more orthodox contemporaries of Tai Chen, such as Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, were troubled by attacks on Chu Hsi. Chang thought it permissible "to correct the flagrant errors of Sung Confucians," but Tai was going too far in his dismissal of Sung moral teachings. Chang accused Tai of "forgetting where his ideas ultimately came from."[37]

The popularity of moral philosophy and practical statecraft in the nineteenth century has usually been explained as a revival of Sung and Ming Neo-Confucianism. By opposing the earlier turn to philology, nineteenth-century Confucians are said to have initiated a reaffirmation of Neo-Confucian forms of moral cultivation. The reappearance of philosophical concerns among Ch'ing literati, however, was also the result in part of an important turn in the evidential research movement in the late eighteenth century.

Initially, the k'ao-cheng program for research was sharply biased by its powerful methodology. Its ostensible goal of philosophic reconstruction based on meticulous philological analysis was ignored. With Tai Chen, however, a viewpoint began to emerge from the philological results that had accumulated. In a discussion of Hui Tung 惠棟 (1697-1758), the Soochow founder of the Han Learning movement, Tai stated the credo for a philosophy based on the k'ao-cheng theory of knowledge:[38]

> Thus, if ancient glosses are clear, the ancient Classics will be clear. If the ancient Classics are clear, the meanings and principles [i-li 義理] of the worthies and sages will be clear. Moreover, what unites my mind [with these meanings and principles] will accordingly also be clear. Meanings and principles of the worthies and sages refer to nothing else but the fact that they reside in the statutes and institutions [set up by the worthies and sages].

For Tai Chen, the role of philological deconstruction was only preliminary. If it did not serve as a first step to philosophical reconstruction, then its agenda was bankrupt: "If ancient glosses are not used to illuminate meanings and principles, what function do they serve?"[39] Philological rebellion added impetus to a philosophic rebellion against the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy.

In his philosophic works, Tai was writing for a limited audience in the late eighteenth century. Attacked for their views by orthodox Sung Learning scholars

(37) Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, *Chang-shih i-shu* 章氏遺書 (Shanghai reprint, 1936), Vol. 8, p. 25. See also Yü Ying-shih, "Tai Chen and the Chu Hsi Tradition," in *Essays in Commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of the Fung Ping Shan Library* (Hong Kong, 1982), pp. 376-77.

(38) *Tai Chen chi* 戴震集 (Shanghai, 1980), p. 214. See also Yang Hsiang-k'uei 楊向奎, *Chung-kuo ku-tai she-hui yü ku-tai ssu-hsiang yen-chiu* 中國古代社會與古代思想研究 (Shanghai, 1964), Vol. 2, pp. 920-61.

(39) *Tai Chen chi*, p. 214. Yü Ying-shih 余英時 in his *Tai Chen yü Chang Hsueh-ch'eng* 戴震與章學誠 (Hong Kong, 1979), pp. 82-123, has thoughtfully discussed this aspect of Tai Chen's thought. See also Chung-ying Cheng, "Introduction," in *Tai Chen's Inquiry Into Goodness* (Honolulu, 1971), pp. 3-53.

on the one hand, evidential research scholars who took an interest in philosophic problems were criticized by their colleagues for dealing with unverifiable issues usually associated with *Tao-hsueh* 道學. Chu Yun 朱筠 (1729–81), an influential patron of Han Learning, ridiculed Tai Chen's excursion into theoretical issues: "[Tai] need not have written this sort of thing. What he will be known for has nothing to do with such writing."[40]

In the nineteenth century, however, the academic climate changed. Scholars were increasingly receptive to philosophic issues, and once again they stressed the theoretical aspects of Confucian discourse. Nor could the *k'ao-cheng* agenda remain untouched by the political and social tremors that began to affect the society at large. The revival of Sung Learning and New Text studies was paralleled and in part provoked by an intense moral concern for the state of the country and involvement with administrative problems growing out of the social and political pressures of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[41]

Juan Yuan, a distinguished Han Learning scholar from Yangchow,[42] composed three major essays on Confucian philosophy between 1801 and 1823. Modelled after Tai Chen's etymological approach to philosophic terms, Juan's best known treatises included philological examination of the graph *jen* 仁 in the *Analects* and *Mencius*.

In his examination of the meaning of *jen* 仁 in the *Analects*, Juan reconstructed Han dynasty glosses of its meaning at the same time that he deconstructed the later overlay of what he considered mistaken interpretations that had begun after the fall of the Han dynasty in the third century A.D. According to Juan, later scholars had read into the meaning of *jen* 仁 metaphysical notions that were theoretically so disembodied from practical reality that they misrepresented the concrete social aspects of Confucius' use of *jen* 仁.[43]

Juan based his reconstruction on the gloss for *jen* 仁 first given by the Later Han dynasty classicist Cheng Hsuan 鄭玄 (127–200), who had defined it as "people mutually concerned for each other" (*hsiang-jen ou* 相人偶, lit., "people living together"). Juan noted:[44]

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(40) For Chu Yun's remarks, see Chiang Fan 江藩, *Kuo-ch'ao Han-hsueh shih-ch'eng chi* 國朝漢學師承記 (Shanghai, 1927–35), 6.6a.

(41) See my "The Ch'ang-chou New Text School: Preliminary Reflections," in *Chin-shih Chung-kuo ching-shih ssu-hsiang yen-t'ao-hui lun-wen chi* 近世中國經世思想研討會論文集 (Taipei, 1984), pp. 253–71.

(42) Tai Chen lived and taught in Yangchow from 1756 to 1762. The city became one of the leading centers of evidential research in the Ch'ing period. See my "Ch'ing Dynasty 'Schools' of Scholarship," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* 4, 6 (December 1981): 12–14.

(43) Juan Yuan, "*Lun-yü* lun jen lun" 論語論仁論, in *Yen ching-shih chi* 揅經室集, (Taipei, 1964), Vol. 1, p. 160. Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept *Jen*," pp. 305–07, on Sung treatment of *jen* as a metaphysical reality. On Chu Hsi's treatment of *jen*, see Chan's "Lun Chu-tzu chih jen shuo" 論朱子之仁說, *Che-hsueh yü wen hua* 哲學與文化 8, 6 (June 1981): 383–96. For discussion of Juan Yuan's philosophy, see Yang Hsiang-k'uei, *Chung-kuo ku-tai she-hui yü ku-tai ssu-hsiang yen-chiu*, Vol. 2, pp. 1007–30.

(44) Juan, "*Lun-yü* lun jen lun," p. 157.

In all cases, *jen* 仁 must first be exhibited in personal actions before it can be observed. In addition there must be two people involved before *jen* can be seen. If a person shuts his door and lives peacefully alone, closes his eyes and sits still with a peaceful attitude, although his mind contains virtue and principles, in the end this cannot be counted for what the sagely gate called *jen*.

To buttress this rejection of quietism and private meditation, which he associated with Sung Learning, Juan Yuan cited the explanation of the graph *jen* 仁 given in the *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu* 說文解字 [Analysis of Characters as an Explanation of Writing] dictionary, compiled in the Later Han by Hsu Shen 許慎 (58-147). In the latter, a primary source for the paleographical reconstruction of over nine thousand different graphs arranged according to 530 radicals, it was noted that the graph *jen* 仁 was written in two parts, *jen* 人 [person] and *erh* 二 [two], a combination meaning "two people" that literally represented the social dimensions of *jen* 仁.[45]

Like Tai Chen, Juan focused on the *k'e-chi fu-li wei-jen* 克己復禮爲仁 passage. Taking the opposite tack from Chu Hsi, Juan argued that what Confucius had meant by *jen* 仁 was the fulfillment of human desires, not their denial:[46]

If for a single day one *controls* the self and returns to the observance of the rituals, then the whole empire would consider *jen* 仁 his. This is the way whereby maintaining one's personal desires one maintains others, whereby developing one's personal desires one develops others.

For his gloss of *k'e-chi* 克己, Juan cited the definition *yueh-shen* 約身 [to control the self] given by Ma Jung 馬融 (79-166), who along with Cheng Hsuan and Hsu Shen, was one of the most important Later Han classical scholars.

After discussing the occurrence of the *k'e-chi fu-li* 克己復禮 passage in the *Tso chuan* 左傳, which he compared to its meaning in the *Analects*, Juan Yuan then turned to a direct attack on the Ch'eng-Chu reading of *chi* 己 [self] as *ssu* 私 [selfishness], which was the accepted gloss for the imperial examination system. To do this, Juan cited Mao Ch'i-ling 毛奇齡 (1623-1716), an earlier critic of the Ch'eng-Chu school, who had written:[47]

As a result of [Ch'eng I's and Chu Hsi's glosses], all writings after the Sung annotated *chi* 己 as *ssu* 私. They then cited the *k'e-chi fu-li* 克己

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(45) Ibid., p. 159. See also, Chan, "The Evolution," p. 311.

(46) Juan, p. 161, paraphrasing the *Analects*. See *Lun-yü yin-te*, 11/6/30.

(47) Juan, p. 162. For the occurrence of the *k'e chi fu-li* passage in the *Tso chuan*, see *Ch'un-ch'iu ching-chuan yin-te* 春秋經傳引得 (Taipei, 1966), 379/Chao 昭 19/9 *Tso* 左, where Confucius refers to the earlier origins of this maxim. For discussion of Juan's decision to use "control" to gloss *k'e*, see Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, 1963), p. 38 note 128. See also the analysis of this issue by Wei-ming Tu, "The Creative Tension," p. 30, especially note 3. Tu notes that the typical meaning of *k'e* in the *Tso chuan* is "conquer."

復禮 passage in the *Analects* as proof [for this gloss]. This is an error of extreme magnitude. If goes without saying that the meaning of the graph [*chi* 己] never had this [meaning of *ssu* 私]. Based on the original text, [we note] that the graph *chi* 己 also appears in the expression *wei-jen yu-chi* 爲仁由己. If one uses *shen* 身 [self] to gloss the latter [use of *chi* 己] and *ssu* 私 to gloss the former, how can this make any sense?

By reiterating Yen Yuan's and Tai Chen's earlier analysis of this issue, Juan in his citation demonstrated how a questionable gloss had become the orthodox interpretation. If this veil of interpretation could be lifted, then more accurate definitions given by Han dynasty classicists could be revived. The deconstruction process revealed the pernicious influence of Ch'an Buddhism on Sung and Ming Confucians. The latter had coopted the *wu-yü* 無欲 [having no desires] doctrine from the former and read it into the teachings of Confucius. The process of reconstruction demonstrated that Cheng Hsuan had been right in his down-to-earth gloss of *jen* 仁 as *hsiang-jen ou* 相人偶 [people mutually concerned for each other]. The key to this virtue was not its metaphysical status but the manner in which one man governed his relations with another.[48]

In his discussion of the meaning of *jen* 仁 in the *Mencius*, Juan turned to the relation of the mind (*hsin* 心) and *jen* 仁. Mencius had given two significant glosses for *jen*. In one he had said: "*Jen* is [the distinguishing characteristic of] man" (*jen yeh che jen yeh* 仁也者人也). In the second he claimed: "*Jen* is the human mind" (*jen jen-hsin yeh* 仁人心也).[49]

In Sung commentaries to these passages, commentators saw in Mencius' linkage of *jen* 仁 and mind justification for the metaphysical claim that identified *jen* 仁 with a human nature (*hsing* 性) endowed by heaven. Chu Hsi had noted:[50]

> *Jen* 仁 is the virtue of the mind. Ch'eng I had been correct when he said the mind is like the seed for grain and *jen* 仁 is the nature of its growth. If one only spoke of *jen*, however, people would not know that it is in close contact with the self [*ch'ieh yü chi* 切於己]. To contrast [*jen* from *chi* 己], one therefore calls *jen* "the human mind." Accordingly, one can see that the mind is the ruler of the self's [*shen* 身] social relations and myriad transformations.

Wang Yang-ming and his followers had stressed the link between *jen* 仁 and the mind because this gloss confirmed them in their claim that the mind was the key to Confucius' teachings. Taking the Sung Confucians' metaphysical interpretation to its logical end, Wang Yang-ming, when discussing the *k'e-chi fu-li wei-*

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(48) Juan Yuan, p. 173.
(49) *Meng-tzu yin-te* 孟子引得 (Peking, 1941), 56/7B/16 and 45/6A/11.
(50) Chu Hsi, *Meng-tzu chi-chu* 孟子集注 (Taipei reprint of Ming edition), 11.12b.

jen 克己復禮爲仁 passage with Ch'en Chiu-ch'uan 陳九川 (1495-1562), said:[51]

> The man of *jen* 仁 regards all things as one body. If one fails to achieve this unity, it is because his selfishness has not been eliminated. If the true nature of *jen* is preserved, then all under heaven will come under this *jen*, or "the whole universe is inside my room."

Juan Yuan objected to such metaphysical interpretations. Instead he appealed to a more concrete and limited understanding of the relation between *jen* and the human mind:[52]

> *Jen* 仁 is complete in the mind, but what is complete in the mind is [only] the beginning of *jen*. It must be enlarged and filled so that it will be manifested in actions and human affairs, before it can be called *jen*...
>
> Mencius spoke of innate moral potential [*liang-neng* 良能] and innate moral knowledge [*liang-chih* 良知], but these are only the beginnings of *jen*. Innate moral potential refers to practical human affairs. To put aside practical affairs and speak only of the mind is not Mencius' original lession.

The gloss "*jen* 仁 is [the distinguishing characteristic of] man" (*jen yeh che jen yeh* 仁也者人也) also appeared in the *Doctrine of the Mean* (*Chung-yung* 中庸). Juan Yuan noted that Cheng Hsuan's Han dynasty gloss for this passage again defined *jen* 仁 as *hsiang-jen ou* 相人偶 [people mutually concerned for each other]. As before, Juan appealed to a more down-to-earth reading, one more in line with Han dynasty commentators who were closer to the time of Confucius and Mencius and thus more likely to have transmitted the ancient meanings of classical texts intact.[53]

Juan then dismissed the doctrine of *liang-chih* 良知 [innate moral knowledge], which Wang Yang-ming and his school had made a central tenet in their "studies of the mind" (*hsin-hsueh* 心學), as an unimportant term that appeared very few times in the *Mencius* text. Because it was not a very important term in the *Mencius*, it was odd that Wang Yang-ming would single out *liang-chih* as the "secret for the sages' and worthies' transmission of the mind." Juan concluded that Wang Yang-ming, although he was not the first, was guilty of reading Buddhist doctrine into this term and turning it into a key moral and metaphysical doctrine. After the fall of the Han dynasty, native traditions of "mysterious teachings" (*hsuan-hsueh* 玄學) had been mixed together with Buddhism. Later

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(51) *Wang Yang-ming ch'üan chi* 全集 (Taipei, 1972), p. 85, translated by Wing-tsit Chan in *Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming* (N. Y., 1963), pp. 284-85. See also Chan, "The Evolution," pp. 305-09.

(52) Juan Yuan, "*Meng-tzu* lun jen lun" 孟子論仁論 in *Yen-ching-shih chi*, Vol. 1, pp. 175-76.

(53) Ibid., pp. 180-81. Cf. Wei-ming Tu, *Centrality and Commonality:, An Essay on Chung Yung* (Honolulu, 1976), pp. 71-73. See also *Shih-san-ching chu-shu* 十三經注疏 (Taipei reprint of 1797 edition), 52.18b.

Confucians had fallen under the spell of such otherworldly teachings and mistakenly incorporated them into Confucianism.[54]

Juan Yuan's best known treatise, entitled "Hsing-ming ku-hsun" 性命古訓 [Ancient Glosses on "Nature" and "External Necessity"], made use of etymology and phonology to analyze the key concepts of *hsing* 性 [nature, human and otherwise] and *ming* 命 [external necessity, predetermined forces, etc.]. Going through what he considered the earliest references to these terms, Juan discovered that *hsing* unlike *ming* did not become an important concept until relatively late in the classical period. When it did appear with its meaning of "nature," it was invariably coupled with *ming* as complementary and mutually related concepts.[55]

Nature was what heaven imparted to all living and inanimate things in the world. The *Doctrine of the Mean* had made this clear when it stated: "What is called nature is the external necessity imposed by heaven" (*t'ien-ming chih wei-hsing* 天命之爲性). According to Juan Yuan, this meant that "external necessity is that by which nature is formed, and nature is that by which external necessity is formed."[56]

Chu Hsi, when commenting on this passage in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, placed particular stress on *hsing* 性 and mentioned *ming* 命 only in passing. The gloss Chu Hsi gave for *hsing* was his famous *hsing chi li* 性卽理 [nature equals principle] equation, which raised the formulation for *hsing* to equal status with Chu's definition for *li* 理. The problem of nature in turn became an important element in Chu's bifurcation of *li* 理 from *ch'i* 氣.[57] Chu Hsi went on to assimilate this gloss into his discussion of human nature:[58]

> ...[T]he reason for making a distinction between the human and moral mind is that some [perceptions] arise from personal concerns, which derive from material form; others have their origin in the correct ways of nature [*hsing*] and predetermined forces [*ming*]. The way perceptions are formed are thus different.

Tai Chen, as we have seen, took Chu Hsi to task for this dualistic reading of human nature. Chu had distinguished between *ch'i-chih chih hsing* 氣質之性

(54) Juan Yuan, pp. 182–84. We might note that Chu Hsi had also stressed Mencius' use of *liang-hsin* 良心. See his *Meng-tzu chi chu*, 11.9a.

(55) Juan Yuan, "Hsing-ming ku-hsun," in *Yen ching-shih chi*, Vol. 1, pp. 193–95. For a survey of the evolution of *hsing*, see Fu Yun-lung 傅雲龍, *Chung-kuo che-hsueh-shih-shang te jen-hsing wen-t'i* 中國哲學史上的人性問題 (Peking, 1982), *passim*. For a continuation and critique of Juan's essay, see Fu Ssu-nien 傅斯年, *Hsing-ming ku-hsun pien cheng* 性命古訓辯證, in *Fu Ssu-nien ch'üan-chi* 傅斯年全集 (Taipei, 1980), Vol. 2, especially pp. 165–71. See also Lin Yü-sheng, "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of *Jen*," p. 174 note 4.

(56) Juan Yuan, p. 204. See Wei-ming Tu's discussion in *Centrality and Commonality*, pp. 39–40, and *Shih-san ching chu-shu*, 52.1a.

(57) Chu Hsi, *Chung-yung chang-chü* 中庸章句 (Taipei reprint of Ming edition), p. 1a. For discussion, see my "Philosophy Versus Philology: The *Jen-hsin Tao-hsin* Debate," *T'oung Pao* 69, 4–5 (1983): 179–81.

(58) Chu Hsi, "Hsu" 序, in *Chung-yung chang-chü*, pp. 1a–1b.

[nature of material form] and innately good nature (*li-i chih hsing* 理義之性) drawn from heavenly principle (*t'ien-li* 天理). Evil derived from the former via selfish emotions (*ch'ing* 情) and human desires (*jen-yü* 人欲), according to Chu Hsi. Tai rejected Chu's reading as untrue to the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. Instead, he replaced Chu Hsi's gloss with the formulation "nature is formed by [the action of] yin and yang and the five phases. Principles and meanings derive from nature." This reading meant that *ch'i* 氣 had priority over *li* 理 and that the latter was subordinate to the workings of *ch'i* via yin and yang and the five phases. Human desires and emotions were endowed by heaven and thus were the most important constituents of human nature. To label them as evil was contrary to sagely teachings.[59]

While agreeing on all counts with Tai Chen's analysis, it is interesting that Juan Yuan used Li Ao 李翶 (d. ca. 844), not Chu Hsi, as the foil for his critique of post-Han interpretations of *hsing* 性 and *ming* 命:[60]

> When people of the Chin [265–420] and T'ang [618–907] mentioned *hsing* and *ming*, they wanted to infer from these [terms] the most metaphysical aspects of the self [*shen* 身] and the mind [*hsin* 心]. Shang [1766–1122] and Chou [1122–221] persons, when they spoke of *hsing* and *ming*, saw their scope limited to features closest at hand.

Li Ao's doctrine of "recovering nature" (*fu-hsing* 復性), according to Juan, had overturned the concrete teachings of Confucius and Mencius. In the process, Taoist and Buddhist speculations had been incorporated into the heritage of the sages and worthies.

In his "Fu-hsing shu" 復性書 [Treatise on the Recovery of Nature], Li Ao had explicitly blamed human feelings (*ch'ing* 情) for betraying man's innately good nature. Only through quiescence and purification of the mind (lit., "fasting of the mind") could evil feelings be overcome:[61]

> Man's feelings are the evil aspect of his nature. If one realizes that they are evil, then this evil will not exist in the first place. If the mind is in the state of absolute quiet and inactivity, depraved thoughts will cease of themselves.

Juan Yuan used Li Ao's formulations to lash out at the Buddhist penetration of Confucian teachings:[62]

> Heaven gave birth to humans, endowing them with flesh and blood, and mind and knowledge. Thus it is impossible to have no desires [*wu-yü*

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(59) Tai Chen, *Meng-tzu tzu-i shu-cheng*, pp. 25–26.

(60) Juan Yuan, p. 197.

(61) Li Ao, *Li Hsi-chih hsien-sheng wen-chi* 李習之先生文集 (Shanghai, 1920), 1.4b, translated by Wing-tsit Chan in *A Source Book*, p. 457.

(62) Juan Yuan, p. 206.

無欲]. Only Buddhist teachings first spoke of "cutting off desires" [*chueh yü* 絕欲]. If all persons in the Empire were to cut off their desires like the Buddha, then in all the world there would be no births of humans. Birds and animals would proliferate.

In contrast to the ancients who only spoke of concrete affairs, Li Ao and those who followed had reached the point where it was no longer possible to distinguish any difference between Confucianism and Buddhism.[63]

Such overlay had to be removed in order to realize the practical teachings from which the Confucian meanings for *hsing* 性 and *ming* 命 derived. Taoists and Buddhists had been so adept at citing passages in the *Changes Classic and Doctrine of the Mean* to justify their heterodox doctrines that Confucians had been swindled of their birthright. Li Ao had been the first in a long line of Confucians who had "preached Buddhism under the guise that it was Confucianism" (*yin-Shih yang-Ju* 陰釋陽儒).[64]

5. FROM JUAN YUAN TO CHIAO HSUN

Juan Yuan's fellow townsman (Yangchow), Chiao Hsun added very little new to the theoretical debate in his discussion of the *Analects* and *Mencius*. He did, however, make it clear that Tai Chen had opened a new path to understanding classical teachings, which went beyond the limits that philologically minded Han Learning scholars had imposed. Refuting the claim that Tai Chen was simply continuing the Neo-Confucian tradition of learning, so-called "studies of meanings and principles" (*i-li chih hsueh* 義理之學), Chiao held that Tai had struck out in new directions:[65]

> Of the works that Tai Tung-yuan [Chen] wrote during his lifetime, his *Evidential Analysis of Meanings of Terms in the Mencius* in three chapters and his *Inquiry Into Goodness*, [also] in three chapters, were the most outstanding. Seeing that he had especially investigated these issues, then his achievements [in this area] were bound to be profound. Thus, just before he died, [these issues] were always on his mind. Hence, what Tai called "studies of meanings and principles" were a means to cultivate the mind. The meanings and principles that Tai managed to grasp on his own, accordingly, were not the meanings and principles of the "Western Inscription" or "Supreme Ultimate" of discursive [*chiang-hsueh* 講學] scholars [such as Chang Tsai 張載, 1020–77].

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(63) Ibid., pp. 194, 205, 211.

(64) Ibid., pp. 213–14.

(65) Chiao Hsun, *Tiao-ku chi* 雕菰集 (Shanghai, 1935–37), Vol. 2, p. 95. Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, as we have seen above, linked Tai Chen to Chu Hsi, a position that Yü Ying-shih accepts. See note 37 above.

Chiao was creating distance between Tai Chen and Sung Neo-Confucians, even those like Chang Tsai who had advocated a monistic philosophy based on the priority of *ch'i* 氣 over *li* 理. Tai's philosophy, according to Chiao, was based on precise classical scholarship, which drew its methodology from such tools as the six rules for graph formation (*liu-shu* 六書), investigation of institutions, and analysis of ancient texts and artifacts (*wen-wu* 文物). Sung and Ming Neo-Confucians had merely argued discursively, giving little or no justification based on concrete evidence for their theoretical positions. For Chiao, Tai was a *k'ao-cheng* philosopher, not a *Tao-hsueh* scholar.[66]

On the other hand, Chiao Hsun was equally dissatisfied with the lack of philosophical discussion among Han Learning scholars. The latter "preserved the sayings of the ancients intact but missed the thought-world [*hsin* 心] of the ancients." Members of the Han Learning camp had lost sight of what their program for research was supposed to achieve:[67]

> When I say that I learn from Confucius, how shall I say I do it? "By means of Han Learning" [is the reply]. Unfortunately, the Han is many years after Confucius. Moreover, the Han is many years before today. Scholars learn from Confucius. Those scholars who study Han [Confucians] use the latter to discuss Confucius. Then they shunt Confucius aside and discuss [only] Han Confucians. Are the teachings of Han Confucians in fact equivalent to those of Confucius?

Clearly the answer was "No!" As Sakade Yoshinobu 坂出祥伸 has pointed out, Chiao Hsun was unhappy with both sides in the Han Learning debate. Both sides were more concerned with loyalties to their respective schools than with the fundamental issues themselves. On this level, Tai Chen had surpassed both sides in his efforts to work out the theoretical implications of *k'ao-cheng* inquiry.[68]

In addition to carrying on Tai Chen's interest in mathematics and astronomy, Chiao Hsun compiled a detailed commentary to the *Mencius*, which he entitled *Meng-tzu cheng-i* 孟子正義 [Orthodox Meanings in the *Mencius*]. A careful philological analysis of the text of the *Mencius*, the *Meng-tzu cheng-i* represented the culmination of years of painstaking research based on the fruits of Han dynasty sources and Ch'ing dynasty evidential research.

On technical matters, Chiao relied heavily on Juan Yuan's famous *Shih-san-ching chiao-k'an-chi* 十三經校勘記 [Collation Notes to the Thirteen Classics], which was based on Juan's private Sung dynasty edition of the *Shih-san-ching chu-shu* 十三經注疏 [Notes and Annotations to the Thirteen Classics]. For geographical terms,

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(66) Chiao, *Tiao-ku chi*, Vol. 2, p. 95.
(67) Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 104-05, 109.
(68) Sakade Yoshinobu, "Shō Jun no *Rongo tsūshaku* ni tsuite," 焦循の論語通釋について, in *Chūgoku tetsugaku kenkyū ronshū* 中國哲學史研究論集, compiled by the Committee in Commemoration of Araki Kengo (Tokyo, 1981), pp. 636-41.

Chiao frequently cited Yen Jo-chü's definitive *Ssu-shu shih-ti* 四書釋地 [Explanations of Geography in the Four Books]. Others cited included Tuan Yü-ts'ai 段玉裁 (1735-1815), Tai Chen's disciple, and Wang Nien-sun 王念孫 (1744-1832), who were quoted as expects in the fields of paleography and etymology respectively.[69]

On questions of theory, however, it was Tai Chen who provided the evidence for the "orthodox meanings" in the *Mencius*. Over and over again, quotations from Tai's *Meng-tzu tzu-i shu-cheng* 孟子字義疏證 [Evidential Analysis of Meanings of Terms in the *Mencius*] were given in full to overturn heterodox Sung interpretations of the text. With regard to definitions of *jen* 仁, the nature of man (*hsing* 性), and the role of human desires (*jen-yü* 人欲) Sung interpretations were rejected in favor of Tai Chen's formulations.[70]

Using Tai Chen as a weapon to refute Sung and Ming interpretations, Chiao himself rarely cited any Neo-Confucian sources in his voluminous notes. He let Tai do the talking for him. He was, however, more meticulous in his use of Han dynasty sources than Tai Chen had been. For an example we might note that he agreed with Cheng Hsuan's definition for *jen* 仁 as *hsiang-jen ou* 相人偶 [people mutually concerned for each other], which Juan Yuan had cited as the correct gloss for the passage *jen yeh che jen yeh* 仁也者人也 (see above).[71] As we shall see, this particular gloss took on added importance in the late nineteenth century.

When he turned to the *Analects*, Chiao gave his fullest statement for the affirmation of desires in human life. In the *Analects*, Confucius had been asked about shame (*ch'ih* 恥) by one of his disciples:[72]

"If a man refrain from ambition, boasting, resentment, and desire, it may, I suppose, be counted to him for *jen* 仁?" The master said: "It may be counted as difficult, but whether for *jen* I do not know."

To elucidate this reply, Chiao quoted from the *Mencius* and then concluded with a remarkably strident affirmation of human desires:[73]

Mencius said of King Liu that he loved wealth, and of King T'ai that he loved feminine beauty, and that yet by allowing the common people also to gratify these feelings, they were able to maintain their ricks and granaries, while there were no dissatisfied women or unmarried men.[74]

(69) Chiao, *Meng-tzu cheng-i* (Taipei, 1979), *passim*, especially 30.6a-6b.

(70) Ibid., 7.8b, 15.1a-1b, 15.4a-4b, 22.5a-6a, 22.11a-12a, 22.13a-13b, 22.15a-15b, 22.19b-23b, 23.12a-12b, 26.2a, 28.21b-22a, for a sample of citations from Tai's *Meng-tzu tzu-i shu-cheng*.

(71) Ibid., 28.14a.

(72) *Lun-yü yin-te*, 27/14/1, following the translation by Derk Bodde in Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, 1962), Vol. 1, p. 70.

(73) Chiao Hsun, *Lun-yü pu-shu* 論語補疏, in the *Huang-Ch'ing ching-chieh* 皇清經解 (Taipei reprint of 1860 edition), 1165.9b-10a, translated by Bodde in Fung Yu-lan, *A History*, Vol. 1, p. 70.

(74) *Meng-tzu yin-te*, 7/1B/5.

In his learning, Mencius succeeded in fully comprehending the doctrine of Confucius, and his idea in this statement is: "Developing oneself one develops others, and maintaining oneself one maintains others."[75]

To insist on having no desires oneself, and at the same time to be indifferent to the desires of others, is to be nothing more than a "dried-up gourd."[76] Therefore, men who refrain from ambition, boasting, resentment, and desire are ascetics whom Confucius did not like. Such men are not equal to those who through their own desires come to know the desires of others, and who through their own dislikes come to know the dislikes of others. To make analogies [in this way] is not difficult, and yet *jen* 仁 already consists in this. But if one cuts off one's own desires, he will be unable to comprehend the hopes of others, and such is not to be considered *jen*.

Desires were the bedrock of human nature. As Chiao noted, "nature is nothing but eating and passion, and that's all. Drinking and eating, male and female, [in these] people and things are all the same."[77] The sages had brought order to these innate conditions in man. Through their wisdom (*chih* 知), human values (*jen-lun* 人倫, lit., "human relations") had been realized and correct rituals (*li* 禮) established:[78]

At the time of our human predecessors, they knew they had a mother but did not know they had a father. Hence, there was no distinction between male and female. They ate birds and beasts uncooked. They did not know of the efficacy of fire. Thus, there was no etiquette for drinking and eating. Sages appeared and demonstrated [to the people] the ritual of marriage. Accordingly, people realized there were [indeed] human values.

Rituals were contrasted sharply with the moral principles (*li* 理) of Sung Learning. In a phenomenal genealogical analysis of the origins and evolution of *li* 禮 and *li* 理, Chiao sharpened the edge of his powerful historcist deconstruction. The sage-kings had used rituals (*li* 禮) to bring order to the empire, by basing rituals on human feelings (*yin jen-ch'ing* 因人情). Later ages abandoned rituals, and people spoke only of *li* 理.[79]

According to Chiao Hsun, the logicians (*ming-chia* 名家) of the late classical period had emerged from earlier court officials in charge of ritual (*li-kuan* 禮官).

(75) *Lun yü yin te*, 11/6/30.
(76) Ibid., 35/17/6.
(77) Chiao, *Tiao-ku chi*, Vol. 3, p. 127.
(78) Ibid. One can see a good deal of Hsun-tzu, who was then being revived by Ch'ing Confucians, as well as Han Fei in these words. For discussion, see Sakade Yoshinobu, pp. 646–47.
(79) Chiao Hsun, Vol. 3, p. 151.

Legalists (*fa-chia* 法家), on the other hand, had been court officials in charge of criminal law (*li-kuan* 理官). Thus in its origins, *li* 理 had been associated with *hsing* 刑 [criminal law] and contrasted sharply with ritual, which was used to give expression to human desires.[80] Over the centuries, legal punishments had taken precedence over ritual in dealing with the people. The triumph of *li* 理 [read "law"] over *li* 禮 [ritual], Chiao contended, had been disguised in the association of *li* 理 with "moral principle" by later Confucians. But if one saw through the disguise, then it was clear that the antisensualistic metaphysics of the Sung Neo-Confucians was in part derived from earlier legal institutions that had imparted a tradition of criminal punishments to control the people and keep them in line.[81]

Let us recall what Tai Chen had said: "When a person dies under the law, there are those who pity him. Who pities those who die under [the aegis] of moral principle?"[82] Chiao Hsun's deconstructions echo ominously Tai Chen's picture of an imperial orthodoxy that had betrayed its roots in the humanism of Confucius and Mencius.

6. OUTRAGE: FANG TUNG-SHU

Perhaps, as a result of seeing the extremes to which *k'ao-cheng* philosophers such as Tai Chen, Juan Yuan, and Chiao Hsun were willing to go to deconstruct the teachings of the Ch'eng-Chu school, we can better understand the threat they posed to their more orthodox contemporaries. Neither Weng Fang-kang 翁方綱 (1733–1818) nor Yao Nai 姚鼐 (1732–1815), for instance, felt comfortable with the *k'ao-cheng* agenda.

Weng and Yao correctly perceived that the fundamentalist thrust behind Han Learning threatened the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy, without satisfying the need for moral order and certainty. Chiao Hsun and Wang Chung 汪中 (1745–94), a Yang-chow partisan of Han Learning, had long been involved in reviving nonorthodox texts, including the long-neglected *Mo-tzu* 墨子 and *Hsun-tzu* 荀子. Wang Chung, in particular, blamed Mencius for the eclipse of Mo-tzu's writings. Although Weng Fang-kang was sophisticated enough to recognize the importance of ancient sources for historical reconstruction (during the initial stages he had been involved in the collation of the *Mo-tzu* text), he was infuriated by Wang Chung's attack on

(80) Ibid. Chiao's analysis is not so farfetched. We might note that the institution known as *Ta-li-ssu* 大理寺, whose function was the general supervision of criminal law administration, had existed by tradition since the Three Dynasties (Hsia, Shang, and Chou), and remained part of the imperial bureaucratic structure through the late empire. See *Li-tai chih-kuan piao* 歷代職官表 (Hong Kong, n. d.), p. 107, and H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China* (Taipei reprint, 1971), pp. 79–80. Whether or not Chiao's analysis is correct, however, is another matter.
(81) Chiao Hsun, Vol. 3, p. 151.
(82) See note 5 above.

Mencius. Such audacity forced Weng to label Wang Chung "a criminal" who went against orthodox teachings.[83]

It was not until Fang Tung-shu, a follower of Yao Nai and the T'ung-ch'eng 桐城 school, first published his *Han-hsueh shang-tui* 漢學商兌 [Assessment of Han Learning] in 1831, however, that moral outrage translated into a point-by-point rebuttal of the case Tai Chen, *et al.*, had raised against the Ch'eng-Chu school. In the process, Fang accused those who called themselves Han Learning scholars of serious mistakes and woeful ignorance.[84]

Although he was willing to grant the importance of Han dynasty Confucians for their role in maintaining intact the classical tradition, Fang Tung-shu regarded this effort only as preliminary. It had not been until the Sung dynasty when Confucians had harvested the fruits of their Han predecessors and successfully reconstructed the thought-world (*hsin* 心) of the sages:[85]

If not for Han Confucians nurturing [the classical tradition], Sung Confucians would not have been able to draw sustenance from it. If Sung Confucians had not removed the husk and drawn sustenance, the grains still on the stalk would have remained unrevealed and useless.

Fang Tung-shu invoked Mencius in his defense of Sung Learning. Han Learning *k'ao-cheng* scholars had "in the name of ordering the Classics actually brought chaos to them, in the name of defending the Tao actually betrayed it." To end slanderous talk and rectify human minds, Fang, like Mencius before him, struck out at those responsible: "Do I do so because I am fond of disputing? I am compelled to do it."[86]

As Fang noted, Han Learning scholars invariably appealed to their methodology of *shih-shih ch'iu-shih* 實事求是 [to seek the truth from actual facts] to justify their stress on concrete studies (*shih-hsueh* 實學). Juan Yuan and others used this approach to denigrate Sung Confucians for their efforts "to fathom principles by means of empty talk" (*k'ung-yen ch'iung-li* 空言窮理). Seeing this stress on "actual facts" as the "first principle of Han Learning," Fang Tung-shu launched into an impassioned defense of the Ch'eng-Chu methodology for "the investigation of things" (*ko-wu* 格物).[87]

According to Fang, principles (*li* 理) were equivalent to facts (*shih* 事). To get at the truth (*shih* 是) of facts meant that one had to get at the principles as well:[88]

(83) Weng Fang-kang, *Fu-ch'u-chai wen-chi* 復初齋文集 (1877 edition), 15.9a.
(84) Fang Tung shu, "Ch'ung-hsu" 重序, in *Han-hsueh shang-tui*, pp. 2b-3a.
(85) Ibid., p. 3a.
(86) Ibid., "Hsu-li" 序例, p. 1b. See also *Meng-tzu yin te*, 25/3B/9, translated by Legge in *The Four Books*, p. 681.
(87) Fang Tung-shu, 2A.38b.
(88) Ibid., 2A.39.a. It is worth noting that Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩 (1811-72), a Hunanese partisan of the T'ung-ch'eng school of Sung Learning, defended the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy

If one does not fathom principles, then how can one know where the truth one is seeking resides? Master Chu [Hsi] therefore said: "It resides in fathoming principles on the basis of phenomena" [chi-wu ch'iung-li 即物窮理]. Isn't this [statement] the equivalent of "seeking truth from actual facts?"

To fathom principles meant to apply all knowledge obtained to practical affairs. There was nothing "empty" or esoteric about this approach, Fang contended. If one were to "seek the truth" (ch'iu-shih 求是) without first orienting oneself by "fathoming principles," then the resulting knowledge would diverge from the teachings of the sages and worthies. Han Learning scholars like Juan Yuan thus were guilty of gathering heaps of facts with no direction or purpose. A purposeless mass of facts could only lead to moral depravity.[89]

Tai Chen, Fang thought, was to blame for the methodological attacks on the Sung Learning approach to knowledge. By stressing etymology (ku-hsun 故訓, lit., "ancient glosses") and phonology (yin-sheng 音聲, lit., "pronunciation and tones"), Han Learning scholars had marched down a mindless road of empirical research, divorced from the "meanings and principles" inherent in the Classics. This approach had led Tai Chen and others to their second great principle: Sung Learning had fallen into the grips of Ch'an Buddhism.

From this view, all "meanings and principles" were merely Confucian disguises for Ch'an doctrine. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth, Fang argued. Han Learning scholars "had no intent to seek the truth. All they wanted to do was to establish their own theories, and through disputation overthrow [the teachings of] Sung Confucians." The path of Sung Learning was correct: to honor moral nature (tsun te-hsing 尊德性) had priority over following the path of inquiry and study (tao wen-hsueh 道問學).[90]

From methodological issues, Feng Tung-shu then turned to the revaluation of jen 仁 that Juan Yuan had proposed. Juan's stress on concrete practice, Fang maintained, was only one side of the coin. Moral principles were a wedding of practice (yung 用) and essence (t'i 體). The definition of jen that Juan Yuan subscribed to, namely "people mutually concerned for each other" (hsiang-jen ou 相人偶), was acceptable in practice, but it was insufficient to describe the essential characteristics of jen that made it one of Confucius' central teachings.[91]

Chu Hsi had accepted Mencius' linkage of the mind and jen in his formulation that the mind was the container of jen. According to Fang, Chu's formulation thus gave the essential characteristics of jen: the virtue of the mind (hsin chih te 心之德) and the principle of love (ai chih li 愛之理). Juan Yuan, by stressing only

in an 1845 afterword to T'ang Chien's 唐鑑 (1778-1861) Ch'ing hsueh-an hsiao-chih 清學案小識 (Taipei, 1975), pp. 1-2, in almost identical terms.

(89) Fang Tung-shu, 2A.39a-40b.
(90) Ibid., 2A.41a-42b.
(91) Ibid., 2A.45a.

the external practice of *jen*, had missed the point of Mencius' criticism of Yang Chu, who had insisted that morality was simply an external manifestation of human nature. Mencius deemed it necessary to demonstrate that the essential elements of moral values, including *jen*, were internal to human nature. Why else would he have argued that human nature was innately good in the face of Kao Tzu's 告子 claim that nature was neither good nor evil?[92]

In defense of Chu Hsi's gloss of *ssu* 私 for *chi* 己 in the *k'e-chi fu-li* 克己復禮 passage in the *Analects*, Fang Tung-shu took Juan Yuan to task for claiming that the graph *chi* 己 must have the same meaning in the two expressions *k'e-chi fu-li* and *wei-jen yu-chi* 爲仁由己. One of the common meanings for *k'e* 克 was indeed *sheng* 勝 [conquer], for example. Why should Juan, therefore, choose instead to follow Ma Jung's gloss of *yueh* 約 [control]? Fang thought this position contradictory. Why could *k'e* 克 have two glosses and *chi* only one? Fang argued that partisanship in favor of Han Learning was not the proper way to arrive at correct glosses of ancient texts.[93]

Yet, even if Juan's gloss of *yueh* 約 for *k'e* 克 were granted, this still did not refute Chu Hsi's gloss of *ssu* 私 for *chi* 己. After all, what was it that needed to be controlled, if not the selfish aspects of the self? In the end, "to conquer the self" or "to control the self" amounted to the same thing.[94]

As we noted in our preliminary remarks, Fang Tung-shu was appalled by the unqualified affirmation of human desires championed by Tai Chen. The Ch'eng-Chu position, Fang retorted, was not based on partiality the way Han Learning was. Because Ch'eng I's and Chu Hsi's views accorded with heavenly principle (*ho yü t'ien-li* 合乎天理), it was patently absurd for Tai Chen to say that Ch'eng and Chu had used personal views to kill others (*i i-chien sha-jen* 以意見殺人). Such statements were pure vituperation.[95]

Fang Tung-shu also found Tai Chen's comparison of the Ch'eng-Chu tradition with the Legalists offensive. Like Chiao Hsun, Tai had noted similarities between the manner Sung Confucians sought after principles (*ch'iu-li* 求理) and the way the Legalists Shang Yang 商鞅 and Han Fei 韓非 had used laws (*yung-fa* 用法). Sung Confucians had never advocated cutting off desires, Fang argued. They had followed the sages in directing desires toward moral ends. Natural desires (*sheng-yü* 生欲), if left without proper direction would end in depravity (*yeh-yü* 邪欲):[96]

Today there are those who say that one should not use meanings and principles as teachings. Instead, they advocate that one should follow the

(92) Ibid., 2A.45b–47a.
(93) Ibid., 2A.48a–49a.
(94) Ibid., 2A.49b.
(95) Ibid., 2A.19a–19b.
(96) Ibid., 2A.20a–20b.

desires of the people. If one accords with [this doctrine] and leads the empire [in this manner], then chaos will reign.

In the seventeenth century, Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武 (1613-82) had singled out Li Chih 李贄 (1527-1602) as the most outrageous and unabashed anti-Confucian to have appeared in Chinese history. Li Chih, Ku argued, had deluded his age and helped to bring on the decadent intellectual trends that had precipitated the fall of the Ming dynasty.[97] It is interesting that Fang Tung-shu's conclusion about Tai Chen was the same:[98]

> To use principles to seek principles is seen as using personal views to kill people. Such talk is a level of heterodoxy and depravity that since ancient times has never been equalled.

It is equally intriguing, as Mizoguchi Yūzō and others have pointed out, that Tai Chen's position on human desires was indeed remarkably similar in content, if not in manner of argumentation, to Li Chih's. In concluding remarks, we will explore some of the implications of this convergence of views.[99]

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS: POLITICS AND PRECEDENTS

Debates between Han Learning and Sung Learning were not simply over textual issues. Different interpretations of the same key Confucian terms, based on different sources and inspiration, could yield different ideas about the nature of man and his relation to his world. Enough so that Han Learning scholars accused Sung Learning of Buddhism, and Sung Learning scholars accused Han Learning of depravity and mindlessness. Such extreme views often were more rhetorical than accurate, but they do reveal how eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Confucians evaluated the debates.

The realm of politics was not immune from this theoretical altercation. Let me give a concrete example of how the debate affected public policy. Fang Tung-shu's *Assessment of Han Learning*, first published in Canton in 1831 and revised in 1838, was closely associated with the growing recognition of weakness in the Ch'ing bureaucratic structure before the Opium War (1839-42). In an 1824 letter to Juan Yuan, Fang made it clear that his opposition to Han Learning was tied to the chaotic situation in Canton. Moral passivity and useless erudition fostered by Han Learning, Fang contended, had come home to roost in the opium policy in Canton.[100]

As the foreign threat in Canton mounted in intensity during the 1820s, Juan Yuan, the governor-general in Canton, and members of the Hsueh-hai-t'ang 學海堂

(97) Ku Yen-wu, *Jih-chih lu* 日知錄 (Taipei, 1974), pp. 540-41.
(98) Fang Tung-shu, 2A.21a.
(99) Mizoguchi, "*Mōshi jigi soshō* no rekishi teki kōsatsu," pp. 181-207.
(100) Hamaguchi Fujio 濱口富士雄, "Hō Tōju no Kangaku hihan ni tsuite" 方東樹の漢學批判につ
    いて, *Nihon Chūgoku gakkai hō* 日本中國學會報 30 (1978): 165-78.

academy, which Juan had helped to finance, were drawn into foreign affairs and the problem of opium trafficking in Southeast China. Juan adopted what seemed at the time a strict policy toward opium in 1821, arresting sixteen opium dealers in Macao and temporarily forcing the opium trade out of the Pearl River.

Although Juan's policy marked the end of the first phase of the trade, in reality the prohibitions meant very little. Opium trading continued uninterrupted at Lintin Island. At most the crackdown was a face-saving device for Juan Yuan after attention had been directed to the opium problem by the Tao-kuang Emperor (r. 1821-50). The latter had just ascended the throne in a reformist frame of mind, and the opium evil was one of his chief concerns.[101]

Having had a firsthand view of Juan Yuan's opium policies in the 1820s, Fang Tung-shu recommended in the 1830s that the policies which for a decade had been proven a failure be rescinded. Han Learning scholars, when appointed to office, had proven themselves morally bankrupt, according to Fang. He became associated in the 1830's with the policy for the complete eradication of opium in Southeast China. In Canton, the teachers and students at the Yueh-hua 越華 Academy were leaders of the anti-opium movement.

Hsu Nai-chi's 許乃濟 famous 1836 memorial, recommending legalization of opium for all except civil servants, scholars, and soldiers was connected with earlier proposals by a number of directors at the Hsueh-hai-t'ang that opium restrictions be relaxed. Juan Yuan himself leaned toward the legalization of the trade. These apparent capitulations by the Han Learning group at the Hsueh-hai-t'ang angered Fang and others in Canton who took a hard line on the opium question. It was no accident that when Lin Tse-hsu 林則徐 (1785-1850) took office in Canton as plenipotentiary to deal with the opium issue, he established his headquarters at the Yueh-hua Academy where Sung Learning hardliners were the majority.

The "legalizers" versus the "moralists" in the Canton opium debate reflected in many ways the rift between Han Learning and Sung Learning. We should not be surprised that Juan Yuan's group favored legalization. This decision was a realistic appraisal of the practical solutions then available. In part, Juan's stance reflects the more liberal view of human desires and needs that Han Learning scholars advocated. Nor should we be puzzled that the Sung Learning group, to which Fang Tung-shu was connected, favored total prohibition and confiscation of opium, no matter how hard this policy would be to implement. Moral principles were moral principles, after all. The evils of opium were only adding fuel to the selfish desires of those who indulged in or profited from the addicting drug. Too often we overlook the theoretical presuppositions, however tacit, that determine how political problems will be dealt with.

(101) See my "The Hsueh-hai T'ang and the Rise of New Text Scholarship in Canton," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* 4, 2 (December 1979): 51-82. See also Hamaguchi Fujio, pp. 172-76.

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Earlier we have described the influence Tai Chen's views had on late Ch'ing radicals such as Liu Shih-p'ei, Chang Ping-lin, and others. Mizoguchi Yūzō suggests that the strains of liberalization, which had begun in late Ming reactions by Li Chih and other members of the T'ai-chou 泰州 school against Neo-Confucian formalism, were continued by k'ao-cheng scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Call for recognition of individual desires and needs in institutions that would grant self-interest (tzu-ssu tzu-li 自私自利) as a basic premise of human aspirations was not fully articulated in China until the late nineteenth century. The roots of this position, however, lay not only in the adoption of western notions (via Japan) of "rights" (ch'üan 權). Tai Chen's affirmation of human desires and Juan Yuan's stress on the social commonality of jen 仁 were used to define notions of "rights" and "self-interest" by late nineteenth-century reformers.[102]

In his influential Jen-hsueh 仁學 [A Study of Jen], T'an Ssu-t'ung 譚嗣同 (1865–98), martyred during the abortive 1898 Reform Movement, made clear from the outset that he accepted Cheng Hsuan's gloss for jen: "people mutually concerned for each other" (hsiang-ou 相偶).[103] According to Takeuchi Hiroyuki's 竹内弘行 recent findings, T'an Ssu-t'ung's affirmation of Cheng Hsuan's reading indicated that T'an opposed Chu Hsi's gloss of "virtue of the mind" (hsin chih te 心之德) for jen. Thus, in T'an's analysis we can see the influence of the Han Learning revaluation of jen. Discussing human lust, T'an had the temerity to write:[104]

Ordinary women, deluded by moral principles [mei yü li-tao 昧於理道], revere the absurd platitudes of corrupt scholars as if they were inviolable truths. If they ever take a wrong step in life, or are suspected of having an affair with someone, then, because of this, they are seized, and even die saying nothing. In the end, they become the playthings of others; they are forced to flee; they are sold as goods; they are forced to work as maidservants; they sink into prostitution; and they even cut their

(102) Following Mizoguchi Yūzō's influential thesis presented most fully in his Chūgoku sen kindai shisō no kussetsu to tenkai 中國前近代思想の屈折と展開 (Tokyo, 1980), passim, but especially 3–48. Mizoguchi is of course continuing from Shimada Kenji's 島田虔次 provocative thesis concerning "modernism" in late Ming thought in the latter's Chūgoku ni okeru kindai shii no zasetsu 中國における近代思惟の挫折 (Tokyo, 1949).

(103) T'an Ssu-t'ung ch'üan-chi 全集 (Peking, 1981), Vol. 2, p. 289. Cf. Chan Sin-wai (trans.), An Exposition of Benevolence: The Jen hsueh of T'an Ssu-t'ung (Hong Kong, 1984), p. 54, where hsiang-ou is translated "to pair." No reference to the Cheng Hsuan origin of this gloss is given.

(104) T'an's discussion of sexual gratification is an interesting mix of Buddhism and liberal views on sexual relationships. See T'an Ssu-t'ung ch'üan chi, pp. 304–05. Cf. the translation by Chan Sin-wai, pp. 86–87, which I have modified. See also Takeuchi Hiroyuki, "Tan Shidō Ningagu to Shimmatsu no nin shisō" 譚嗣同仁學と清末の仁思想, Tōhōgaku 東方學 68 (July 1984): 100. Takeuchi also stresses the impact of Wang Fu-chih's 王夫之 (1619–92) ideas on T'an's metaphysical articulation of jen.

throats out of shame and anger. They do not realize that sexual inter-
course between men and women is just the turning of two mechanisms;
there is absolutely nothing to be ashamed of, let alone to lose one's life
for. Practitioners of Chinese medicine have a theory that men have three
climaxes in sexual intercourse and women have five. This theory is so
excellent that it ought to be known by everybody.

Moreover, T'an Ssu-t'ung's reading of equality (*p'ing-teng* 平等) into the
meaning of *jen*, according to Takeuchi, draws in some ways on the notion of
commonality, which Juan Yuan had stressed in his use of *hsiang-jen ou* 相人偶 to
discuss the social characteristics of *jen*. T'an's use of the gloss *hsiang-ou* 相偶
apparently was mediated by his links to K'ang Yu-wei 康有爲 (1857–1927), who
was indirectly influenced by Juan Yuan.[105]

K'ang Yu-wei, in his *Ch'ang-hsing hsueh-chi* 長興學記 [Notes on Studies at
Ch'ang-hsing], a collection of notes for lectures K'ang gave in 1891 to his students
in Canton, forcefully equated *jen* 仁 with *hsiang-jen ou* 相人偶. K'ang then pushed
this gloss further to include a notion of "human community" (*ch'ün* 羣, lit., "social
grouping"). *Jen* in concrete social terms was the manner in which humans
associated with each other and formed communities.[106]

Yeh Te-hui 葉德輝 (1864–1927), a staunch advocate of Sung Learning and
opponent of K'ang Yu-wei's reform initiative, linked K'ang's formulations back to
Juan Yuan:[107]

> In the *Doctrine of the Mean*, *jen* 仁 is [the distinguishing characteristic
> of] man. Cheng [Hsuan] noted that *jen* 仁 should be read *hsiang-jen ou*
> 相人偶. Neither in T'ang annotations nor in works on the Classics from
> the Sung and later was this meaning grasped. Recently, Ch'en Tung-pi
> [Li 陳澧 (1810–82)], basing himself on the theories of his teacher Juan
> Wen-ta [Yuan], said that the graph *jen* 仁 is composed of *erh* 二 [two]
> and *jen* 人 [person], which means "people who are mutually concerned for
> each other" [*hsiang-jen ou*]. The author [that is, K'ang Yu-wei and his
> *Ch'ang-hsing hsueh-chi*] has changed and brought chaos to this line of
> interpretation by saying that *jen* 仁 means "forming communities" [*ho-
> ch'ün* 合羣]. His intent is not to broadly propagate or teach [the truth].
> All he selfishly wants to do is to establish his own party.

Yeh connected K'ang's gloss to the ideas that were popping up among
reformers in Hunan, who were under the influence of K'ang Yu-wei's ideas via

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(105) Ibid., p. 101.

(106) K'ang Yu-wei, *Ch'ang-hsing hsueh chi* (Canton, 1891), pp. 9a–9b. For discussion, see Hao
     Chang, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China 1890–1907* (Cambridge,
     19771), p. 45.

(107) Yeh Te-hui, "Ch'ang-hsing hsueh-chi po-i" 長興學記駁義, in *I-chiao ts'ung-pien* 翼敎叢編,
     compiled by Su Yü 蘇輿 (Taipei reprint, 1970), p. 274. Cf. Takeuchi, pp. 98–100.

his disciple Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啓超 (1873-1929), then teaching in Changsha in the 1890s. Among those under Liang's influence was of course T'an Ssu-t'ung.

Accordingly, the gloss of *hsiang-jen*. . . in the late nineteenth century, Ch'en became one of the most respected scholars in Canton. Forward the gloss could be carried to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and T'an Ssu-t'ung, who both incorporated a notion of commonality as the distinctive feature of *jen* 仁 into their own evolving ideas.[108]

For his part, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao made K'ang Yu-wei's formulation of *ch'ün* 羣 [community] a centerpiece for his own stress on political renovation. In an essay entitled "On Community" (Shuo-ch'ün 說羣), Liang, as Hao Chang perceptively has noted, placed less stress on the moral aspects of *jen* 仁 and analyzed instead "the vital problems of political integration, political participation and legitimation, and the scope of the political community."[109] With Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Confucian discourse yielded its place of pre-. . . theory.

Liu Shih-p'ei also saw in Han dynasty glosses of *jen* 仁 confirmation of a notion of equality in the Confucian tradition. Seeing *jen* 仁 as the heart of public ethics in China, Liu reiterated the importance of the notion of "people mutually concerned for each other" (*hsiang-jen ou* 相人偶):[110]

> Westerners see ethics in light of the individual vis-à-vis the common group. In China, we view ethics in light of the individual vis-à-vis another individual. . . Individual ethics are extended to be part of family and lineage ethics. . . Family and lineage ethics are then extended to social and national ethics. Confucians, however, in their statements on ethics stressed private conduct and de-emphasized public morality. Social and national ethics were always extended from the family and lineage. That is why [social ethics in China] differs from western learning.

After locating the notion of "equality" (*p'ing-teng* 平等) in classical social ethics in China, Liu Shih-p'ei blamed Sung Confucians and their stress on "empty principles" (*k'ung-li* 空理) for the loss of this classical ideal. Sung Confucians so exalted the imperial institution that traditional egalitarian ideals that had operated in relations between rulers and their subjects in ancient times were overturned. Liu noted: "This is the reason why Tai Tung-yuan [Chen] pointed to the horrors of empty principle, and why he took [such notions] as a crime [*tsui* 罪] exceeding

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(108) Takeuchi, pp. 99-100.

(109) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Yin-ping shih wen chi* 飲氷室文集 (Taipei, 1950), Vol. 1, Part 2, pp. 3-4. See also Hao Chang, pp. 95-100.

(110) Liu Shih-p'ei, *Liu Shen-shu hsien-sheng i-shu* 劉申叔先生遺書 (Ning-wu, 1934), *ts'e* 册 18, "Jang-shu" 讓書, pp. 21a-21b.

[even the Legalists] Shen [Pu-hai] and Han [Fei]."[111]

Sung Confucians, in contrast to Han Confucians, spoke only of absolute principles derived from heaven, according to Liu Shih-p'ei. This absolutist (chueh-tui 絕對) stance caused Chu Hsi and others to see human desires in direct conflict with moral principles. Such mistaken views manifested themselves in Sung interpretations of jen 仁. Han Confucians defined jen simply as "people mutually concerned for each other" (hsiang-jen ou 相人偶), which Liu took to be very close to "reciprocity" (shu 恕) in meaning. Sung Confucians overturned this view and defined jen as "conquering desires" (k'e-yü 克欲). Liu preferred, instead, Tai's position, which is worth repeating: "The sages ordered the world by giving an outlet to people's feelings and by making it possible for them to realize their desires."[112]

<p style="text-align:center">*   *   *</p>

Traitors of liberators? This was the dichotomy I posed in opening remarks. In closing, let me return to the relation between Ch'ing dynasty k'ao-cheng studies and Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism.

It seems to me that there is an important misunderstanding at the heart of our usual evaluations of the reaction against Neo-Confucianism by k'ao-cheng philosophers such as Tai Chen, Juan Yuan, and Chiao Hsun. When we speak of the Ch'eng-Chu school, for instance, we normally mean both the Ch'eng-Chu school of philosophy, based on the writings of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, and the state orthodoxy entrenched in public life and the examination system, which drew from Ch'eng-Chu annotations of the Classics and Four Books.

Although related, these two aspects of Neo-Confucianism are analytically distinct. When Sung Learning is treated strictly as a philosophy, a collection of theories about the nature of man and his relation to the cosmos, its standing as a humanistic set of ideas is readily apparent. When, however, we look at Sung Learning as the ideological bulwork for the Confucian imperium, then we cannot help but note how often humanistic ideals contained in the Ch'eng-Chu tradition were compromised to the tactics and goals of political opportunism and preservation of imperial power and prestige.[113]

We can dismiss Tai Chen's charges against Chu Hsi as a flagrant

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(111) Ibid., p. 22b. For discussion, see Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, pp. 1–22.

(112) Liu Shih-p'ei, ts'e 冊 15, "Han-Sung i-li-hsueh i-t'ung lun" 漢宋義理學異同論, pp. 3a–3b. In his discussion, Liu described the differences and similarities between Han Learning and Sung Learning. He was critical of Tai Chen for stressing only the differences. See p. 4a. See also ts'e 冊 18, p. 22b, for Liu's citation of Tai's remarks, and note 29 above for the original.

(113) For discussion of Neo-Confucian types of orthodoxy, see William T. de Bary, "Introduction," in Principle and Practicality. Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning, edited by de Bary and Irene Bloom (N.Y., 1979), pp. 15–22.

misrepresentation of Chu Hsi's philosophy. But can we so easily dismiss his charges in light of the ideological uses to which Chu Hsi's ideas were applied? I think not. At this level of analysis, Tai Chen's critique, which was driven home by Juan Yuan and Chiao Hsun, certainly was liberating. As we have seen, reformers at the end of the Ch'ing were so impressed with the critical ideas developed by Tai Chen, as well as Ku Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi, and Wang Fu-chih 王夫之 (1619-92), that they used many of their predecessors' formulations to interpret and adapt western ideas and theories.

That Han Learning scholars were partisan cannot be denied. Sung Learning scholars, however, were equally partisan. Can we agree with Fang Tung-shu that Tai Chen was a traitor to the Confucian cause? From a philosophical point of view, Tai misrepresented many subtle aspects of Chu Hsi's thought, but in view of the willful political manipulation of the Ch'eng-Chu tradition by formalistic political hacks in the imperial bureaucratic state, Tai's outcry "who pities those who die under [the aegis] of moral principles" is more than just poignant. It points to the inevitable manipulation of philosophic doctrine when it enters the political arena.

K'ao-cheng philosophers were not simply attacking Neo-Confucian philosophy. They were deconstructing a powerful imperial ideology that even in their own day continued to dominate Chinese political culture. We can readily see now the preliminary contributions Ch'ing scholars, building on late Ming currents of criticism described so well by Shimada Kenji 島田虔次, made to the ultimate rejection of the Confucian imperium in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

批判的哲學：清代考證學給與
「仁」的新解釋

艾　爾　曼

據一般人的看法，中國傳統裏最重要的哲學以宋明理學為主，尤其以朱熹的學說為重心。因此，研究中國思想史的東西方學者，大多以為清朝在哲學方面沒有什麼重要的貢獻。

在這篇文章裏，我企圖分析清朝考證學的哲學意義。一般而言，雖然考證學的主流在說明古書的真偽，古音和文字的來歷，及古訓的定義，但是這樣的研究精神也反映了它的哲學背景和思想史的發展方向。

考證學家，例如戴震、阮元、及焦循，一方面批判宋明理學家給與「仁」的解釋；另一方面，他們想同復孔孟思想的真面目。他們以為，宋明理學家與心學家因受禪學的影響太大，而有「陰佛陽儒」的結果。根據戴震的孟子字義疏證而言，朱熹完全誤解孔孟的「仁」的思想，而造成了新儒學絕對性的「以理殺人」的正統。

阮元在他分析論語與孟子裏的「仁」思想時，否定「仁」是形而上的觀念。他提出漢朝經學家給與「仁」的古訓為證據，說明漢朝以前的「仁」是具體的，表示人跟人之間的道德關係。焦循繼續戴震及阮元的論調，指出了孔孟「仁」的思想，肯定一般人的私欲。阮元與焦循可以說是以「氣之哲學」來批判程朱學派的「理之哲學」。從這個角度來看，可知考證學家文獻學的方法給與儒家的根本觀念一個新的解釋。他們批評的研究態度有它的哲學內涵。無論考證學家的新解釋是否比宋明理學家的解釋可靠，但就思想史而言，至少可看出清代漢學及宋學之不同處。

桐城學派的方東樹覺得戴震等反對宋明理學的正統，是完全違反了儒家道德的精神。因此，在方氏的漢學商兌中，他譴責考證學家的知識方法和思想內容的意義，想維護新儒學的正統。

清末時期，儒家思想的動搖，不只是因西方思想的侵略而發生的。考證學家的批判態度是儒家思想動搖的初步。從劉師培及譚嗣同的著作內容，可發現他們受乾嘉時期考證學的影響也不少。劉、譚強調「仁」與「平等」的關連，也是反對新儒學絕對以理學為主的正統。

總而言之，考證學家的看法有它的哲學意義，也在思想史上發生了不小的影響，所以應承認考證學有其思想價值所在，而不只是為學問而學問的學術現象。