PHILOSOPHY (I-LI) VERSUS PHILOLOGY (K’AO-CHENG): THE JEN-HSIN TAO-HSIN DEBATE*

BY

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1. Introduction

Historians gradually have recognized that an important shift in intellectual and philosophic orientation began in seventeenth-

Abbreviations:

CIK  Ch'ing-i K'ao 聖義考 [Analysis of Meanings in the Classics], compiled by Chiu I-ch'un 趙惠穿 (1629-1709), SPPY edition.
HOCC Huang-Ch'ing cheng-chih 明清經解 [Ch'ing Exegesis of the Classics], compiled by Juan Yuan 阮沅 (1704-1849) and others, 1860 edition.
HOCCHP Huang-ch'ing ch'eng-chih hsien-pien 明清經解續編 [Ch'ing Exegesis of the Classics, Supplement], compiled by Wang Hsiien-ch'ien 王先謙 (1842-1918), 1888 edition.
SKSTM Sun-tzu ch'un-chien-shu ti-ou 四庫全書總目 [Catalog of the Complete Collection of the Four Treasuries (in the Imperial Library)], compiled by Chi Yun 趙雲 (1724-1805) and others. Shanghai: Ta-t'ung shu-chi, 1930 edition.

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century China. In my own research, I have attempted to document how this shift in philosophic orientation transformed Confucian inquiry from a quest for moral perfection to a programmatic search for empirically verifiable knowledge.1

In the discussion below, we will examine a specific instance of this transformation. We will try to reconstruct how changes in intellectual orientation during the Ming-Ch'ing transition period, i.e., the seventeenth century, lead to alteration of earlier exegesis of the Confucian Classics. In particular, we will focus on the famous jen-hsin Tao-hsin 心性 [the human mind and the moral mind] passage in the “Ta Yü mo” 大禹謨 [Counsels of Yu the Great] chapter of the Shu-ching 書經 [Documents Classic, henceforth simply Documents]. The debate over the correct meaning and interpretation of this provocative passage provides us with a precise case example of the vicissitudes in Chinese intellectual history from the eleventh century to the nineteenth.

Considered a complement to the I-ching 易經 [Changes Classic, henceforth simply Changes], the Documents was regarded by Confucian scholars in all dynasties as the most important statement, among the texts that comprised the orthodox Five Classics, of the concrete institutions and practical teachings of the sage-kings of antiquity. Venerated as a sacred Classic (sheng-ching 聖經) since the Former Han dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 8), the Documents became a centerpiece of the Confucian examination system from the T'ang dynasty (618–906). Frequently the Changes and the Documents were paired and given special attention. Many contended that the Changes reflected the “essence of the Tao” (Tao chih ti 道之體), while the Documents contained “its practical efficacy” (Tao chih yung 道之用) in the world.2

2. Sung Exegesis: The I-li Approach

Among the many teachings and doctrines in the Documents, the distinction between the human and moral mind enunciated for the first time in the “Counsels of Yu the Great” attracted major attention beginning in the Sung dynasty (960–1279). In this chapter, the


2 GIK, 88/6a, where Chu I-tsun cites the remarks of Wang Ch'ung-ch'ing 王充 興.
sage-king Shun 舜 (r. 2253–2206 B.C.) admonished the soon to be crowned Yu (r. 2205–2198 B.C.) as follows: 3

The human mind is precarious. The moral mind is subtle. Have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose. Hold fast the mean.

The long-accepted K'ung An-kuo 孔安國 (156–74 B.C.) commentary to this passage stated very matter-of-factly:

[The human mind] is precarious and thus hard to pacify. [The moral mind] is subtle and therefore hard to illuminate. Hence, one must have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose in order to hold steadfastly to the mean.

K'ung Ying-ta 孔顏達 (574–648) in his definitive T'ang dynasty commentary to the Five Classics, which was written and accepted under imperial auspices, added nothing to the An-kuo commentary and let the interpretation of the sixteen characters that made up the passage stand according to earlier exegesis. 4

In the Sung, however, the passage received new interpretations. So much so that Wm. Theodore de Bary, cit. Chu Hsi, has recently described the distinction between the human and moral mind as the essence of the orthodox tradition. Chu Hsi 朱熹 (1130–1200), building on interpretations developed by Ch'eng I 程頊 (1033–1107), gave the sixteen characters a new theoretical twist by subsuming Shun's intent into Chu Hsi's own philosophy of li-bi 孔學 [studies of principle].

Those who speak of the precociousness of the human mind mean that it is the spout of human desires. The subtlety of the moral mind is the place of honor for heavenly principle. The mind is of course unified. It is only a matter of its being correct or not, which differentiates its name. “Have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose,” and you will reside in what is correct and be able to


4 Shang-ch'ueh Shang-chien 孫書德 [Chu Hsi's Commentary to the Documents], SYPY edition, 2/2b. See also K'ung Ying-ta, Shang-ch'ueh ch'ing-i 孫書正義 [Orthodox Meanings in the Documents], Shih-shan-ch'ing chu-k'ou 十山後筏 suffered edition (Taipei: Shih-ch'ieh shu-chu, 1973), 4/21a.

judge your errors. It's a matter of ridding yourself of the difference [between the human and moral mind] and returning to what unifies them. If you can achieve this, then you can steadfastly hold to the mean and not commit extreme errors. It is not that you take the Tao to have one mind and a person to have another; nor [do you require] still another mind to achieve absolute refinement and singleness of purpose.

Chu Hsi was suggesting that his bifurcation between li 理 [principle, reason, inherent pattern, etc.] and chi 氣 [variously rendered as “material force,” “ether,” “stuff”; in order to encompass all these meanings we shall use the Chinese term] had its counterpart in Shun's declaration of the distinction between the moral and human mind. Chu was quick to point out that just as li and chi were inherently unified in all things, so the mind was a unity, i.e., the container of li. One of its aspects could be described as moral, i.e., the source of li, and the other as human, i.e., the source of desires—hence the source of evil.

Su Shih 苏轼 (1037-1101) had earlier taken up the jen-hsin T'ao-hsin passage in his commentary on the Documents. There he had argued that this passage described the distinction between feelings (ch'ing 情) and the “fundamental mind” (jen-hsin 情心). He linked the passage to the doctrines of equilibrium and harmony in the Doctrine of the Mean. Yet, Su Shih concluded that this apparent dualism ultimately collapsed: “The moral mind is the human mind; the human mind is the moral mind.”

It was left to Ch'eng I to draw the explicit bifurcation between the human mind as uncontrolled desire (ju 欲) and the moral mind as heavenly principle (tien-li 天理).

Master Ch'eng said: “The human mind equals human desires; therefore it is very precarious. The moral mind equals heavenly principle; therefore it is extremely subtle. Only through refinement can the [moral mind] be observed. Only through singleness of purpose can it be preserved. In this manner only can one hold to the mean. These words say it all.”

Chu Hsi developed his own views by drawing on Ch'eng I's more clearly articulated dualism, although Chu tempered Ch'eng's position—perhaps with Su Shih in mind.6

Chu Hsi was faulted by many for seeming to indicate that moral principles were metaphysically prior to, and thus in some sense


7 For Ch'eng I’s remarks, see Chu-tzu pi-pei, 78b/30a. For the original, see Erh Ch'eng ch'en-shu 二程全書 [Complete Writings of Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I], Hsien-chi ch'ing-shih shu 存齋類書 [Bequeathed Writings of Ch'eng I], SPPY edition, 19/7a-7b.
separate from, the material world of ch'i. In the 1189 preface to his
Chung-yang chung-chi 中糧章 (Parsuing Phrases and Sentences
in the Doctrine of the Mean), Chu made more explicit his reason for
linking Shun's distinction between the moral mind and human
mind to his philosophy of li-kueh:* 

In the Classics, [the orthodox transmission of the Way] can be seen in [the
statement] "hold fast the mean," which Yao 羿 (r. 2356-2256 B.C.) used to
instruct Shun. [The statements] "the human mind is precarious, and the moral
mind is subtle; have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose; hold fast the
mean" are what Shun used to instruct Yu. Yao's single statement was already to
the point and complete. But Shun reiterated [Yao's] point in three statements so
that he could clarify Yao's single phrase. This is the way it had to be before [Yi]
could be capable and virtuous.

It has been no doubt said that with regard to the unclouded essence of the mind
and its perceptions [of the world], there is only a unity between them. However,
the reason for making the distinction between the human and moral mind is that
some [perceptions] arise from personal concerns, which derive from material
forms; others have their origin in the correct ways of nature (liang 性) and pre-
determined forces (xing 性). The way perceptions are formed are thus different.
This is why some are precarious, dangerous, and unsettling, while others are
subtle, ingenious, and hard to see.

All persons, however, have their material [form]. Even if they are endowed
with superior intelligence, they therefore all have a human mind. Moreover,
everyone has a [correct] nature. Even if they are endowed with the basest stupid-
ity, they all have a moral mind. The two are dispersed evenly in the space of
the mind. If one does not know how to control the mind, then it is precarious. The
more precarious [the human mind becomes] the more subtle the subtle [moral
mind] becomes. The universality of heavenly principle thus has no way to over-
come the personal concerns of one's human desires. With refinement, one observes
the distinction between the two [aspects of the mind], and they are no longer
mixed together. With singleness of purpose, one preserves the correct [ways] of
the fundamental mind, and [the two aspects of the mind] are no longer separated.
If one obeys this [teaching], then there will not be the slightest break [between
the human and moral mind].

One must cause the moral mind always to be the master of the person and the
human mind always to obey it. As a result, the precarious [human mind] will be
pacified; the subtle [moral mind] will appear clearly, and all impulses, talk, and
behavior will of themselves not reach extreme error.

Yao, Shun, and Yu were great sages in the world. ... From this time, sages
have all inherited [this doctrine], including rulers such as Ch'eng-t'ang 宋庚
(r. 1766-1744 B.C.), Wen 武 (r. 1231-1157 B.C.), and Wu 武 (r. 1122-1116).

* Chu-tzu hsü-chien, 76/21a-22a. Chu Hsi's predilection for dualism is of course
a highly debated issue. Chu-chi-tsu Huang recently has argued, for example, that
Chu Hsi was a dualist in the sense that his concepts of li and ch'i are mutually
irreducible. See Huang's "The Synthesis of Old Pursuits and New Knowledge:
Chu Hsi's Interpretation of Mencian Morality," Hsin-Ya kueh-chi 孝義
and the Analects, No. 3 (1982): 214, especially 214a 89, where: Huang discusses
the debate over whether Chu Hsi is a dualist or a monist.

* See the Lü-yü jia-t'ou 荊語引例 [Concordance to the Analects] (Taipei: Ch'eng
Wen reprint, 1966), 41/201, for the earliest source of Yao's admonition to Shun.
and officials such as Kao Yao 嘉賀, I [Yin] 伊, Fu [Yueh] 許, and Chou Chao 邰詠. All have used this doctrine to continue the orthodox transmission of the Tao (Tao-te-ling 道徳經).

In this lengthy attempt to wed a classical passage to his analysis of heavenly principle and the orthodox transmission of the Tao, Chu Hsi successfully developed a classical sanction for his philosophic ideas. Chu’s efforts culminated with Ts’ai Shen 蔡沉 (1167–1230), his student, who used the Jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage as the basis for a holistic interpretation of all the chapters in the Documents. In the 1209 preface to his annotations of the Documents, Ts’ai wrote: 10

In the winter of 1199, Master [Chu] Wen-kung ordered me to prepare the Shu-chi-chuan 禪要原 [Collected Commentaries on the Documents]. The following year Master [Chu] passed away. It took me another ten years to complete the task. In all, there were several tens of thousands of words. Oh my! It isn’t easy to discuss the Documents. The great ordering pattern and methods [of governing], which the two emperors [Yao and Shun] and the three kings [Yu, Wen, and Wu] used to order the world, are recorded in this book.

The world-ordering of the two emperors and three kings drew its roots from the Tao. The Tao of the two emperors and three kings drew its roots from the mind. If one gets their mind, the Tao and world order can be gotten and articulated. What is this mind? It is “absolute refinement and singleness of purpose, [thereby] holding the mean.” These are the methods of mental discipline (hui-fa 助法), which Yao, Shun, and Yu transmitted to each other.

The two emperors and three kings are ones who preserved this mind. Chieh 諧 (r. 1818–1767 B.C.) of the Hsia dynasty and Shou 舜 (r. 1154–1123 B.C.) of the Shang dynasty are ones who lost this mind. Tai-chia 太甲 (r. 1753–1721 B.C.) and King Ch’eng 景 (r. 1115–1079 B.C.) are ones who bored through difficulties and still managed to preserve this mind. When [the mind] is preserved, there is order; when it is lost, then chaos ensues. The distinction between order and chaos depends simply on noting whether or not the mind [of the sage-kings] is preserved.

Rulers of later ages, when they wanted the world order of the two emperors and three kings, had to seek the latter’s Tao. If they wanted [to seek] the Tao of the two emperors and three kings, they had to seek the latter’s mind. To find the essentials of the mind, one must not overlook this book. The mind of the sages is revealed in the Documents.

Referring specifically to the Jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage in the “Counsels of Yu the Great.” Ts’ai made his point even more explicit. Mental discipline (hui-fa) was the essence of Shun’s admonishment to Yu: 11

The mind is a person’s knowledge and perception. It is controlled from within [the body] and responds to the outside. Pointing to its inception in material forms (heng-qi 形氣), it is called the “human mind.” Pointing to its inception in moral

11 Shu chi-chuan, p. 14. Chi’en Mu, in his Chu-tzu hsin kung-an, II/116–18, notes Ts’ai used Chu Hsi’s earlier comments for his own excerpts, but Chi’en Mu contends that Ts’ai misconstrued some key points in Chu Hsi’s interpretation of the human and moral mind.
principle (i-li 義理), it is called the "moral mind." The human mind easily becomes selfish and is hard to keep universally-minded. Therefore, it is precarious. The moral mind is hard to illuminate but easy to cloud over. Therefore, it is subtle...

If the moral mind is always made the master and the human mind obeys it, then the precaution (human mind) is pacified and the subtle [moral mind] manifests itself. ... Probably, when the ancient sages were about to hand the empire over to a successor, they always brought together and transmitted their methods of world-ordering to [him]. This is why [the passage] appears in the Classic as it does. How can later rulers of the people not but reflect deeply and earnestly keep to [these words]?  

Both Chu Hsi and Ts'ai Shen connected the discovery of the Tao and its appearance in the mind of the sage-kings to the theory of the orthodox transmission of the way (Tao-t'ung). In other words, Chu Hsi and his followers decisively left Han and T'ang dynasty Confucians out of the line of transmission from the sages to themselves. Apparently, Chu felt that Han and T'ang Confucians had nothing to contribute to the philosophic orientation he had adopted in his reconstruction of the thought-world of the ancients. As Wing-tsit Chan has pointed out, the theoretical linkage between the techniques for mental discipline taught by the sages-kings and the procedures for self-cultivation devised by Sung Tao-hsueh 道學 [studies of the Tao, i.e., Neo-Confucian] philosophers represented an intellectual lineage for orthodox Confucian doctrine, rather than an historical or textual justification for the Tao-t'ung.  

The Sung transformation of earlier classical exegesis began as a rejection of the Han-T'ang chu-chu 注疏 [scholia] line-by-line glosses to the Classics. Instead, Sung Confucians favored expositions of i-li 義理 [meanings and principles, i.e., moral philosophy]. They stressed the theoretical and moral issues that the Classics presented, not the lexical problems that earlier Confucians had dealt with.  

There were misgivings about this line of interpretation, however. Huang Chen 黃敦 (1213–80) generally agreed with Ts'ai Shen's exegesis of the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage, but he feared the consequences of an overemphasis on doctrines centering on studies of the mind (hsin-hsin 心學) by court scholars such as Chen Ts-hsiu 蕭曦秀 (1178–1238). Huang wrote:  

In modern times, those who revel in discussing on hsin-hsin disregard the fundamental message of the whole passage [of sixteen characters] and speak only of the human and moral mind. In the extreme, they only take up the two graphs

12 Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," pp. 73–81. See also Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tao hsien hsing-shu, II/104.
13 Huang Chen's remarks are cited in Ku Yen-wu 虎延武, Jih-ch'iu by Il-jungji [Record of Knowledge Gained Day by Day] (Taipei: Ping-p'ing ch'uyuan-shu, 1974), pp. 528–29 (ed. 20). For the original, see Huang's Huang-shih jih-ch'iu 黃氏日記 [Daily Jottings by Master Huang] (Taipei Reprint), 5/1a–1b.
of T’an-hui and straightforward say “the mind equals the Tao.” Probably they have unwittingly fallen into Ch’ian [Buddhist] studies. They have left the fundamental message, which Yao, Shun, and Yu used to instruct the world, far behind.

T’ai Chi-hsiang [i.e., Shen], in preparing his commentary on the Documents transmitted Master Chi [Hsi’s] words to the effect: “When the ancient sages were about to hand the empire over to a successor, they always brought together and transmitted their methods of world-ordering to him.” We can say that [T’ai’ai] has deeply penetrated into the fundamental message of the passage. Although [T’ai’ai] Chih-hsing also used this [passage] to illuminate the mind of the [two] emperors and [three] kings, still the mind [for T’ai’ai] is the basis for ordering the nation and bringing peace to the world. His words thus are the correct principles.

Later, others who presented this commentary of the Documents before the throne used it to speak only of the “transmission of the mind” (d’yang-hui 循旨) of the three sages. Accordingly, scholars of the time pointed to these sixteen characters of the Documents as the essentials for transmitting the mind. As a result, Ch’ian scholars borrowed this passage and based [their doctrines] on it.

Huang voiced a fear that was to be realized in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) with the rise of the Wang Yang-ming 王陽明 (1472–1529) school of hsien-hsueh. As we shall see below, K’u Yen-wu 顧炎武 (1613–82), a pioneer in philological techniques for reconstructing the past (fe-ku 復古), returned to Huang Chen’s interpretation in the seventeenth century as a means to verify that what Huang had feared had indeed come to pass.

3. The Uses of Philology: The First Step

Interestingly enough, however, the philosophic reconstruction of the doctrines in the Documents was also accompanied during the Sung by an increasing questioning of the authenticity of the Old Text (ku-ten 古文, “ancient script”) chapters of the Documents, which had been supposedly recovered in the first century B.C. from the wall of Confucius’ residence. Wu Yu 吳域 (fl. ca. 1124), who left his mark in the development of precise procedures for investigating ancient phonology, was the first to voice suspicions concerning the Old Text portion in his Shu pei-chuan 番神傳 [Commentary to the Documents].

Wu pointed out that the Old Text version presented by Mei Tse 梅澔 (fl. ca. 317–23) to the first Eastern Chin dynasty (317–420)

emperor, was easier to read than the New Text (chün-wen 今文, lit. "modern script") version, which had been recovered by Fu Sheng (fl. ca. second century B.C.) after the Ch'in dynasty's (221–207 B.C.) "burning of the books." The opposite should have been the case, because chronologically many of the Old Text chapters—including the "Counsels of Yu the Great"—were documents from the third and second millennium B.C. The New Text chapters, on the other hand, were mainly from the first millennium B.C.

Wu Yu concluded that the Old Text chapters were from a much later period. Implicit to this conclusion was the realization that the Old Text version probably was a forgery. Moreover, the forger had been so anxious to copy the style of the then extant New Text chapters of the Documents that he had overdone it and not allowed for variation in styles for texts from different periods.18

Chu Hsi took careful notice of Wu Yu's claims. Although he criticized Wu for not stressing the "meanings and principles" in the Documents, Chu still praised him for his critical scholarship. In his own analysis of the problem, Chu also puzzled over the obvious differences between the Old Text and New Text chapters. He conceded that there were easy to read and hard to read parts of the Documents. It was also odd, Chu thought, that all the easy to read parts were from the Old Text version.18

The problem, according to Chu Hsi, was to explain why the easy to read parts almost all came before the mid-eighteenth century B.C., whereas most of the hard to read parts only began in the fourteenth century B.C. Was it possible for the chapters associated with the Haia (2205–1767 B.C.) and Shang (1766–1123 B.C.) dynasties to be easier to read than those from the Chou (1122–221 B.C.)? Conceding that the problem could not be resolved conclusively, Chu tentatively explained that the documents were easy to read or difficult because of the way they had been compiled.

The New Text chapters were hard to read because Fu Sheng had hidden the Documents in a wall during the Ch'in inquisition. When he retrieved the text in the early Han period, many of the chapters had been lost. In addition, he had been forced to recite from memory what he could remember of the chapters hidden in the wall so that the twenty-eight chapters he recovered could be deciphered and taught to others.

The Old Text chapters were easier because K'ung An-kuo had

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18 GIK, 80/6a. Cf. Chu-lee yü-lê, 70/1a-10b, but especially 1a-2a.
access to the texts recovered from the wall of Confucius' house when King Kung of Lu 魯恭王 (r. 154–127 B.C.) took the throne there and wanted to enlarge his palace. The Old Text version recovered by An-kuo had been written in ancient seal (chuan 篆) script, i.e., "tadpole-like" Old Text graphs. It had been deciphered and written in the contemporary (i.e., New Text) clerical (li 莊) script only after comparing the text with Fu Sheng's version, by then written down in clerical script. Exactly why this different method of reconstruction should have left the Old Text chapters easier to read still left Chu Hsi nonplussed and suspicious.17

Despite these doubts, Chu did not conclude that the Old Text chapters were a forgery. He noted, for example, that the "Counsels of Yu the Great" was an Old Text chapter recovered from Confucius' residence. Although it was relatively easy to read, the chapter still contained "meanings and principles" that deserved careful scrutiny. Hence, he was indirectly justifying his use of the Jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage as a classical sanction for his philosophic position.18

Nevertheless, Chu Hsi conceded that K'ung An-kuo's preface to the Documents was probably not written by An-kuo. Stylistically, the preface resembled the more refined writings of the Wei-Chin period (220–420) and not the coarser, more straightforward style associated with the Han dynasty. In addition, Chu acknowledged that the An-kuo commentary to the Documents was also suspect. Chu concluded that the commentary was probably also written by a person living during the Wei-Chin period. The compiler had used An-kuo's name to give his commentary stature and the aura of orthodoxy.19

Ts'ai Shen included Chu Hsi's philological points in his own commentary. Although philological niceties took a backstage to the more important philosophic issues enunciated in the Documents, Ts'ai still carefully indicated in his opening note to each chapter whether it belonged to the New Text or Old Text portion. He pointed out very clearly that the "Counsels of Yu the Great" was an Old Text chapter by adding the remarks: "The New Text version lacks this chapter; the Old Text version has it" (chien-uen wu kw-uen ju 今文無古文蕩). In addition, Ts'ai indicated in his notes that Chu Hsi had concluded that An-kuo's preface and commentary were both forgeries. The philosophic "meanings and principles" outlined above remained the central concern, but the concerns of precise textual scholarship, i.e., hsiao-hueh 小學 (lesser learning), were also served.

Both Pi Hsi-jui 皮錫瑞 (1850–1908) and Wing-tsit Chan have

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17 Chu-tsu yi-pei, 78/2a-4a.
18 Ibid., 78/3a.
19 Ibid., 78/5a, 7a-8b.
described the emergence of a wave of skepticism and of attacks on the authenticity of classical texts in the eleventh century. No doubt Chu Hsi’s and Ts’ai Shen’s mention of the textual problems attending the elucidation of the essential doctrines in the Documents were a continuation of philological concerns of the century before.28

Scholars such as Ou-yang Hsiu 南陽先生 (1007–72), Su Shih, and Su-ma Kuang 司馬光 (1019–86) also had employed disciplined textual approaches in their analytical study of the Classics. Many of their questions were later taken up again by Chu Hsi, Yeh Shih 葉適 (1150–1223), Wang Po 王柏 (1197–1274), and Wang Ying-fen 王應麟 (1223–96). The genre of pin [critical essays] was particularly prominent during this period as scholars vied with each other to ascertain the “new meanings” (hsia-i 新義) of classical texts.21

Wang Po, for instance, attacked the authenticity of portions of a number of Classics, including the Poetry Classic and the Documents. Citing Ou-yang Hsiu, Su Shih, and Chu Hsi in the introduction to his Shu-i 善疑 [Doubts on the Documents], Wang wrote:22

How can one dare to doubt the Classics of former kings? Unfortunately, the burning of the books during the Chin dynasty had already done its damage. Later generations were not able to see the intact Classics of former kings. Because of their incompleteness, the Classics must be called into doubt. One does not doubt [the inherent authenticity of] the Classics of former kings. One only doubts Fu Sheng’s oral transmission of the Classics.

Wing-tsit Chan perceptively has pointed out that “the growth of skepticism toward the Classics” during the eleventh and twelfth centuries must be seen in conjunction with “the direct return to Confucian and Mencian for basic philosophical teachings.”23 Hence, in the development of their theoretical positions, Sung Tao-kueh scholars turned to the Four Books, consisting of the Analects of Confucius, the Mencius, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean (the latter two were taken from the Li-ke 录記 [Record of Rites]), instead of stressing the Five Classics. Chu Hsi, for example, gave his fullest exposé of the Ten-hsin Tao-hsin passage in prefatory remarks to his explication of the Doctrine of the Mean, not in a separate commentary to the Documents. Clearly the authority of the Classics now lay more in their cor-

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22 CIK, 84/3b.
roboration of doctrines enunciated in the Four Books, rather than in their sacred position as Classics. This devaluation of the authority of the Classics is a frequently overlooked connection between Chu Hsi’s school of li-hueh and the Lu-Wang (Lu Hsiang-shan 陸象山, 1139–92, and Wang Yang-ming) school of hsing-hueh.\(^{24}\) During the Sung-Yuan transition period, i.e., the thirteenth century, many scholars continued to question the Documents text. Chin Li-hsiang 金履祥 (1232–1303) nonetheless acknowledged that the Documents, as Chu Hsi and Ts’ai Shen had shown, contained the doctrine of the mind, which the sage-kings had taught. Summarizing the philological difficulties in understanding the meaning of the text, Chin contended that the full implications of the mind of the sages had not been illuminated until Northern Sung (960–1127) Confucians were able to articulate fully the “meanings and principles” in the Documents. Chu Hsi and Ts’ai Shen, according to Chin Li-hsiang, had filled out the teachings of their Northern Sung predecessors, and the exegesis of the Documents was now complete.\(^{25}\) Chao Meng-fu 趙孟頫 (1254–1322), better known for his calligraphy and painting than for his classical scholarship, wrote in the preface to his commentary on the Old and New Text Documents that, after the Ch’in burning of the books, only the Changes was left intact. Scholars therefore have had to guard against forgeries, especially concerning the Documents—so much of which had been lost. Chao noted that the New Text version lacked the principles stipulated in the Old Text chapters. In addition, the fact that K’ung An-kuo’s preface and commentary to the Documents were both forgeries threw considerable suspicion on the Old Text chapters themselves. Chao favored Chin Li-hsiang’s commentary over Ts’ai Shen’s, but his final evaluation of the Documents followed Chu Hsi’s exegesis very closely. Chao argued that the doctrines “have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose; hold fast the mean” were the Tao of the Documents.\(^{26}\) Undercurrents of skepticism broke out into the open when the Yuan dynasty (1280–1368) Tao-hueh scholar Wu Ch’eng 吳澄 (1249–1335) concluded that the Old Text chapters of the Documents, including the “Counsels of Yu the Great,” were forgeries. As David Gedalcia has indicated, “Wu Ch’eng first of all established the classical texts he studied in terms of organization and authenticity.”\(^{27}\)

\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 85.

\(^{25}\) CJK, 84/4b-5a.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 85/1a-2a.

\(^{27}\) Gedalcia, “Neo-Confucian Classicism in the Thought of Wu Ch’eng,” Bulletin of Sung and Yuan Studies, 14 (1978): 13. See also Gedalcia’s “Wu Ch’eng
Both Ch'ien Chen-sun 陳振孫 and Chao Meng-fu earlier had separated the New Text chapters of the Documents from the Old Text ones, but Wu Ch'eng was the first since the Han dynasty to explicate only the New Text version. In the preface to his 1318 Shu ts'uan-yen 寶訓言 [Observations on the Documents], Wu stated that he was keeping to the Han dynasty format of the text. He would therefore annotate only Fu Sheng's twenty-eight New Text chapters, because they were the only ones that Han Confucians had seen. No Han scholar had mentioned the twenty-five Old Text chapters, which suddenly appeared in the fourth century A.D. 24

Wu Ch'eng included the Old Text chapters, without annotations, at the end of his compilation. In his preliminary remarks he added: 25

I was once reading Fu Sheng's [New Text] Documents. Although it is difficult to master in its entirety, nevertheless its words and meanings have an ancient flavor. There can be no doubt that it represents documents from higher antiquity. The twenty-five [Old Text] chapters that Mei Tie added [ca. 317-23] have a literary style that appears the work of a single hand. [This version] has a cut and paste [air]. Although each character has its origins [in ancient texts], yet its style is dilatory and weak. It does not resemble writings from before the Former Han [dynasty]. This thousands of years old Old Text version was the last to appear. Its graphs have no omissions or errors. Its literary qualities show no irregularities. Doesn't all this merit suspicion?

Wu Ch'eng went on to cite the findings of Wu Yu and Chu Hsi to back up his decision to accept only the New Text chapters as authentic. Then Wu wrote: "This is not my private opinion. I have heard it from earlier Confucians." 26

Despite his decision not to annotate the forged Old Text chapters, Wu Ch'eng does not seem to have permitted his philological conclusions to influence his Neo-Confucian sympathies. Although he stressed classical philology, i.e., hsiao-hsueh, more than his predecessors, he was wary of knowledge not acquired through T'ao-hsueh techniques for self-cultivation. Trying to balance philological and philosophic concerns, Wu placed a dual emphasis on "honorone's virtuous nature" [ts'ou le-hsing 修身性) and "pursuing inquiry and study" (ts'ou shen-hsueh 修身言). Though he considered the


24 Wu Ch'eng, "Hsu" 序 to the Shu ts'uan-yen, in the T'ung-chih T'ang ching-chih 道徳常經 [The T'ung-chih Hall's Exegesis of the Classics], compiled by Hsu Ch'ien-hsueh 宏哲學 (1651-94), 1873 Yueh-tung shu-chü 尋壑齋局 edition, p. 5a.

25 Ibid., pp. 7b-8a.

26 Ibid., p. 8a.
"Counsels of Yü the Great" to be a later forgery, he still emphasized the importance of the mind for moral cultivation.31

Broad and eclectic in his intellectual orientation, Wu Ch'eng stressed study of the Five Classics rather than the Four Books. This was unusual for the early Yuan period, as was Wu's attempt to infuse the hsien-kueh teachings of Lu Hsiang-shan with new life. What especially interested Wu was Lu's methods of mental discipline (hsien-fa). Thus, we can conclude that Wu still held to the essential spirit of the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage, if not to the letter.32

Other Yuan Confucians had their doubts about the Old Text chapters, but few challenged the Neo-Confucian doctrines of mind that had been read into the Documents. Tung Ting 蹇聘 conceded that the K'ung An-kuo commentary to the Documents was totally unreliable, but this carried no major philosophic implications. Chi'en Li 陳烈 (1252–1334) maintained that the chief teaching in the Documents was exactly as Chu Hsi and Ts'ao Shu had explained: "World order depended on the Tao, and the Tao was based on the mind." There was no need to separate the Old Text chapters from the New Text ones. The Documents afterall encompassed the major doctrines in each of the other Classics.33

Wang Ch'ung-yun 王充耘 built on Wu Ch'eng's suspicions, but for the first time, the authenticity of the "Counsels of Yü the Great" was directly impugned. Wang argued that the chapter was itself a composite that lacked continuity in style and content. He contended that the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage had been added to Yao's admonishment to Shun recorded by Confucius in the Analects.34

According to the Analects, Yao had simply said: "Hold fast the mean" (yun chih ch'i chung 尤執其中). The bifurcation between the human and moral mind thus did not represent the authentic words of the sage-kings but had simply been added by the forger to fill out Confucius' quotation. What was at stake here was that Wang Ch'ung-yun was claiming that the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage did not really reflect the authentic transmission of the sages' methods for mental discipline (ku-sheng chih ch'uan hsien-fa 古聖之偹心法). He was directly challenging the classical sanction Chu Hsi and his followers had invoked to justify their philosophic positions.35

The gauntlet that Wang Ch'ung-yun had thrown down was not

32 Ibid., pp. 198–201, 210–11.
33 CJK, 85/4b-5b.
34 Cited in Yen Jo-chu's Shu-chung, 8/22a. Cf. CJK, 86/2b, and SKCSTM, 12/8a-8b.
35 Yen, Shu-chung, 8/22a. See also Lun-yi yi-ku, 41/20/1.
picked up again until the sixteenth century. Until then, Yuan and Ming T'ao-hsin scholars, for the most part, overlooked the philological implications that had been drawn by Wu Yü, Chu Hsi, Wu Ch'eng, and Wang Ch'ung-yun. Instead, they debated the “meanings and principles” in the Jen-hsin T'ao-hsin passage.

4. Ming Exegesis: Reaffirmation of I-li

In the fourteenth century, Chu Yu 朱震 (1314–76) stressed the link between illuminating the Tao in the Classics and thereby effecting order in the world. Chu noted in his commentary on the Documents that the essentials for world order were in the Classics: 36

The workings of the Tao should be grasped by first understanding the Classics. Mastery of the Classics should begin by penetrating their words [for their meaning]. By penetrating the words, one knows the mind of the sages. Their mind can be used to put into effect the Tao.

What unites the [human] mind? It is principle and morality (義). Sages are simply those who get what unites our individual minds. If one can get the unity of the mind, even though one may leap beyond heavens and earth and encompass antiquity and today, it is all just like a single day.

Wang Yang-ming continued the Sung-Yuan emphasis on elucidating the theoretical significance of the Documents. Although he subordinated the role of the Classics to an intuitive grasp of reality by the mind, he nonetheless stipulated: “A History deals with events while a Classic deals with the Tao. Events, however, are really [the workings] of the Tao, and the Tao manifests itself in events.” 37

Wang, however, found certain aspects of earlier exegesis of the Jen-hsin T'ao-hsin passage unsatisfactory. Responding to Hsu Ai's 設艾 (1487–1518) complaint that Chu Hsi's interpretation of the investigation of things ( investigator) seemed to have the classical support of Shun's instructions to Yu “to have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose,” Wang said: 38

Chu Hsi's teaching on the investigation of things is forced, arbitrary, and far-fetched, and is not what the investigation of things originally meant. Refinement is the work of achieving restraint. Since you already understand the principle of the unity of knowledge and action, this can be explained in one word: exert one's mind to the utmost, know one's nature, and know heavens. These are acts of those who are born with such knowledge and practice it peacefully.

36 SJK, 87/4a-4b.
When Hsu Ai quoted Chu Hsi to the effect that “the moral mind is the master of the person, and the human mind always obeys it” (see above), and pointed out how this interpretation contradicted Wang’s teaching of refinement and singleness of purpose, Wang responded powerfully: 39

There is, however, only one mind. Before it is mixed in persons, it is called the moral mind. After it is unnaturally mixed in persons, it is called the human mind. When the human mind is rectified, it is called the moral mind; when the moral mind loses its correctness, it is called the human mind. There are not two minds to start with. When Master Ch’eng [1] said that “the human mind is due to selfish desires, while the moral mind is due to heavenly principle,” he made it sound as if he was dividing the mind into two, but his intent was actually correct. Now to say that the moral mind is the master and the human mind obeys it is to say there are [indeed] two minds. If heavenly principle and human desires cannot stand together, then how can heavenly principle act as the master and at the same time human desires obey it?

By dismissing what he considered Chu Hsi’s dualist misinterpretation of the moral and human mind, Wang was applying the text of the Documents to his own purposes. He imitated Chu Hsi and appealed to a classical sanction for his own philosophic views. In a letter in reply to Ku Lin (1476–1545), Wang appealed to the “Counsels of Yu the Great” as corroboration of his philosophy. 40

The reason Shun took delight in questioning and examining was to put the mean into practice and extend absolute refinement and singleness of purpose to the moral mind. By the moral mind is meant “the innate knowledge of the good” (liang-shih li). When has the learning of the superior man departed from practical affairs and discarded discussions? However, whenever he is engaged in practical affairs or theoretical discussion, he insists on the task of knowledge and action combined (chih-kung hsii-t chih). The aim is precisely to extend the innate knowledge of the good in his fundamental mind (hsieh-hsin). He is unlike those who devote themselves to merely talking and learning as though that were knowledge, and divide knowledge and action into two [separate] things—as if they really could be placed in order and take place one after the other.

Like Chu Hsi before him, Wang Yang-ming used the classical sanction provided by Shun’s instructions to Yu to express his own philosophy. Shun’s remarks became a foil for expressing such patent Wang Yang-ming teachings as the unity of knowledge and action and the innate knowledge of the good.

Wang Yang-ming’s contemporary, Lo Ch’in-shun 高其運 (1465–1547), a defender of the Ch’eng-Chu (Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi) school of li-kuan 欽廉 at a time when Wang Yang-ming’s school of hsieh-lun was the rage of the times, received considerable criticism when he upheld, in modified form, Chu Hsi’s bifurcation of li and ch’i. Although he stressed that Chu Hsi’s doctrine did not have to be

39 Ch’an-shih lu, pp. 5–6 (No. 10), and Chan, pp. 16–17.
40 Ch’ang-shih lu, p. 40 (No. 140), and Chan, pp. 112–13.
dualistic, Lo was forced to take a decidedly more monistic view and thereby admitted that Sung Confucians too often gave "two names for one thing."

Lo's modification of Chu Hsi's philosophy was reflected in his interpretation of the Jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage. Lo could no longer accept the orthodox bifurcation that Ming dynasty followers of the Ch'eng-Chu school made between human desires and heavenly principle. Instead, Lo Ch'\textsuperscript{\textsubscript{n}}-shun contended that human desires and heavenly principle were unified. Neither could exist without the other, and both were rooted in nature (\textit{kiung}). In effect, Lo was challenging Chu Hsi's linkage of evil in the world to human desires in the mind.

At the very outset of his \textit{K'un-chih chi} [Notes on Knowledge Painfully Acquired], Lo described the moral and human mind:

The moral mind is quiescent and does not move. It's substance, which is most refined, cannot be seen. Therefore it is subtle. The human mind when it is stimulated moves unobstructed. Its function, which is changing, cannot be fathomed. Therefore it is precarious.

The moral mind is nature. The human mind is feelings (\textit{ch'ing}). The mind is one, but one speaks of it as two because of the distinction between activity and tranquility and the difference between substance and function. Whenever the tranquil controls the active, it is always suspicious. When in activity there is confusion about returning [to tranquility], it is insidious. It is only through absolute refinement that one probes incipient forces (\textit{ch} \textit{kiung}); it is only through singleness of purpose that one preserves his sincerity. "Hold fast the mean" is the same as "following the mind's desires without transgressing the bounds of propriety." This is what the sages and men of spirit were able to act on.

Harking back to Su Shih's distinction between feelings and the mind (see above), Lo refused to read Ch'\textsuperscript{\textsubscript{eng}} I's bifurcation between human desires and heavenly principle into the passage. Instead, he pointedly controverted Ch'\textsuperscript{\textsubscript{eng}} I's position by appealing to the efficacy of desires as means to an ethical life, not an obstruction to it. Here Confucius was invoked as the paradigmatic sage who had learned to direct his desires toward moral ideals and not just deny them.

We find Lo in remarkable agreement with one of the major themes stressed by members of the sixteenth-century "left-wing" T'ai-chou school. Members of this school affirmed the legitimacy of human desires and their fulfillment. They were revolting against what they considered the orthodox Ch'\textsuperscript{\textsubscript{eng}}-Chu position, which

\footnote{Irene Bloom, "Notes on Knowledge Painfully Acquired": A Translation and Analysis of the \textit{K'un-chih chi} by Lo Ch'\textsuperscript{\textsubscript{n}}-shun (1468–1547)" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Univ., 1976), pp. 42–82.}

\footnote{Lo Ch'\textsuperscript{\textsubscript{n}}-shun, \textit{K'un-chih chi}, 1522 edition, 1/20. I have followed with modifications the translation in Bloom, "Notes," pp. 161–62.}

\footnote{Lau-yeh jen-yu, 2/2/4.}
linked desires to evil and depravity. Referring to Shun’s instructions on the human mind, Li Chih 李贄 (1527–1602), an outspoken member of the T’ai-chou school, later wrote:44

The sages did not blame persons on the basis of what they were required to be able to do. Hence, all persons could become sages. Therefore, Master [Wang] Yang-ming said: “The street is full of sages.” The Buddha also said: “The mind is the Buddha; all persons are the Buddha.” This is simply [to say] that everyone is a sage.

Shun from the beginning had no desire to present others with a mind that would practice goodness. If Shun had first preserved [for himself] the mind of goodness that he wanted to present to others and [then] used it to select [capable] persons, then his selection of goodness would have been insincere. When the human mind is at its most spiritual, it accordingly cannot be presented [as a gift]. Even Shun could not present it. Throughout his life, Shun was aware that goodness was in persons themselves. It’s just a matter of my choosing [not receiving] goodness.

Persons who are farmers or fishermen all can choose [goodness]. Therefore, can’t they choose the goodness of a thousand sages and ten thousand worthies? If so, then why must one concentrate on studying Confucius and then become part of the orthodox system?

Although a conscious member of the Ch’eng-Chu tradition, Lo Ch’in-shun, as Irene Bloom has demonstrated so well, arrived at an uncompromising stance of intellectual independence from one of the central themes of orthodox Neo-Confucianism during the Ming dynasty. He did not agree with some of the more radical conclusions reached by the T’ai-chou scholars, but he shared their concern with the authoritarian morality that pervaded the Ming Ch’eng-Chu school.45

5. The Uses of Philology: K’ao-cheng Vs. I-li

Unbeknownst to Wang Yang-ming and Lo Ch’in-shun, however, some contemporaries of theirs were picking up where Wu Ch’eng and Wang Ch’ung-yun had earlier left off. Chu Hsi (fl. ca. 1481) and Mei Tzu 梅堯 (fl. ca. 1513), both relatively unknown textual scholars, reopened the philological case against the Old Text

Documents with new vigor and with new research techniques. Cheng Yuan, reiterating Chu Hsi’s suspicions, wondered why the New Text chapters were so difficult to decipher and the Old Text chapters so easy. The Record of Rites, he noted, had also been compiled in the Han dynasty—when K’ung An-kuo worked on the Old Text chapters. Despite this relatively late date, there were still numerous places in the text of the Record where the meaning could not be clearly understood. Wouldn’t the same phenomenon be even more likely for documents purported to come from the Hsia and Shang dynasties?

Cheng also added that if one compared the poems in the Poetry Classic from the Shang dynasty with those from the Chou, the Shang poems were much more difficult to decipher. Now, if one did the same comparison with the Documents, one found that the opposite was the case: the Shang documents were actually easier to understand than the Chou. There must be a reason for this discrepancy, i.e., the Old Text chapters were forgeries. 44

A pioneer of the evidential research studies (k’ao-cheng-hsueh 考證學) that were to become prominent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Mei Tsu, for the first time, added philological precision to earlier accounts of the Old Text chapters. He exposed the stylistic, geographical, and chronological anachronisms that the forger of the Old Text chapters had unwittingly allowed to enter his version. More importantly however, Mei Tsu went on to show the textual origins of the material the forger had worked into his forgery. This involved a case by case examination of the cut and paste techniques the forger had cleverly wielded to prepare the Old Text chapters in the third century A.D. In the preface to his remarkable Shang-chu k’ao-i lbls考異 [Investigation of Variances in the Documents] completed in about 1543, Mei wrote: 45

Since the Sui (581–618) and T’ang dynasties, for over a thousand years, with the exception of Master Wu [Ch’eng’s Observations on the Documents], there has not been a single person who was a loyal follower or righteous knight of the sacred Classics. This is very disheartening indeed!

When he came to the jen-hsin T’ao-hsia passage in the Old Text “Councils of Yu the Great,” Mei Tsu located the source for the first twelve characters in the Hsün-tzu 荀子. Hsün Tzu (ca. 298–238 B.C.) had cited a text called the Tao-ching 道經 [Classic of the Way], which described how Shun had ordered the world. The text read: 46

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44 Cheng Yuan’s position is cited in Yen Jo-ch’ü, Shu-cheng, 8/19a–19b.
45 Gik, 8/6b–7a, and Yen, Shu-cheng, 8/24b–20b.
Hence the Classic of the Way says: “There should be fearfulness (畏) in the human mind; there should be subtley (易) in the moral mind. One must have the enlightenment of a gentleman before he can comprehend the signs of such fearfulness and subtley.”

The forger had pasted these twelve characters together with the four for “hold fast the mean” from the Analects to form the passage in the Documents. Mei Tsu contended that the distinction between the moral and human mind was not one made by the sage-kings. In fact, the bifurcation represented Huai-tsu’s analysis of human nature as evil and thus requiring modification to become good. Nothing could have been further from the sages’ intentions. Nor from the intentions of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucians, we might add.49

Moreover, Mei Tsu went on to pinpoint Huang-fu Mi 皇甫谧 (213–232) as the likely forger of the Old Text version. Mei noted that all the great Han Confucians, when they referred to the sixteen Old Text chapters that Kuang-an-kuo had recovered from the wall in Confucius’ residence, either referred to them as “missing chapters” (失者 逸書) or “lost today” (失之 今亡). Hence, Cheng Huan 鄭玄 (127–200) and other Han followers of the Old Text tradition only annotated Fu Sheng’s New Text chapters. No Han scholar ever mentioned the twenty-five Old Text chapters that Mei Tse presented to the Eastern Chin court. According to Mei Tsu, Huang-fu Mi, because he was concerned that An-kuo’s Old Text version would be permanently overlooked, forged this version in twenty-five chapters and added his own version of An-kuo’s preface and commentary.50

Remarkably, Mei Tsu’s challenge caused little more than a ripple until the late Ming. In fact, Mei Tsu’s Shang-shu k’an-i, never published, was almost lost. It was recovered from manuscripts preserved in the T’ien-i ko 天一閣 [Pavilion of Everything United Under Heaven] library in Ningpo in the Shu-lu ch’ien-shu 序補全書 [Complete Collection of the Four Treasuries (in the Imperial Library)] project in the 1780s. Most Ch’ing scholars only got to see Mei Tsu’s less definitive Shang-shu p’u 舊書譜 [Treatise on the Documents]. As Yu Ying-shih has pointed out, precise philological research remained only a minor secondary current in a sea of philosophic writings during the fifteenth century.51

49 Mei Tsu’s analysis is cited in Ch’en Ti’s 程炳 (1541–1617) Shang-shu shu-yan 尙書説苑 [Annotations and Elaborations of the Documents], 1720 edition, 14b–5a, and Yen, Shu-cheng, 8/28b.
50 CKSTM, 12/15b, and Ch’en Ti, Shang-shu shu-yan, 14b.
The tenor of intellectual life began to change, however, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Emergence of k'ao-cheng studies as a self-conscious field of academic discourse was vaguely apprehended during the last century of Ming rule. A common field of inquiry developed gradually among late Ming scholars who insisted on the centrality of philological research, an area of concern that others still found marginal, i.e., hsiao-hsueh. Wu Ch'eng, for instance, despite his use of philology to determine the authenticity of texts, had attacked excessive refinement in textual research as superficial.  

Late Ming precursors of evidential studies were convinced of the need for an exact philological understanding of Confucian texts in place of earlier philosophic concerns. Although they continued to defend Neo-Confucian doctrines, these early evidential scholars rejected a strict i-i, i.e., philosophic, orientation to the Classics in favor of a critical analysis of scholia (chu-shu) prepared by Han through T'ang dynasty Confucians. These, they felt, had been overlooked in the interpretations of the Classics made by earlier Tao-hsueh scholars. The k'ao-cheng approach required a careful and systematic analysis of pre-Sung exegeses, e.g., shu-cheng 儘釋 [verifications of annotations], which would in turn provide a firm basis for elucidating the Classics themselves. In works such as Mei Tsu's Shang-shu k'ao-i arguments and analysis replaced glosses and annotations or philosophic reconstructions.  

The influential literary man and essayist Kuei Yu-kuang 饒有光 (1507–1571) acknowledged in the preface to his research on the Documents that he had been suspicious of the Old Text chapters since childhood. Later when he heard about Wu Ch'eng's research, Kuei carefully studied the problems in the Old Text chapters and concluded that Wu had been right not to include them on an equal basis with Fu Sheng's authentic chapters. Kuei wrote:  

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82 Gadelecia, "Wu Ch'eng and the Perpetuation of the Classical Heritage in the Yuan," pp. 203–05.  
84 CJK, 89/8b. Evidence suggests that a close link between the training required to master the art of composing ancient-style prose (kao-wei 古文) and the ability to carry out a philological examination of ancient texts existed in the late Ming period.
Accordingly I recalled how the documents of the sages had been preserved for ages. Many of these documents had been ruined, however, by several Confucians. What can be relied on to distinguish between the authentic and forged [parts] is simply the differences in phrasing (new-te’s 文飾) and style (ku-chih 言辭). Later persons, although they tried to imitate [the original] with all their might, in the end they could not get it correct right down to the minutest detail. Scholars, on the basis of the phraseology, can reach the sages and not be deluded by heterodox theories.

Today, the fact that the phraseology transmitted in Pu Sheng’s [New Text] Documents and that of the [Old Text] version recovered from the wall in Confucius’ house are different does not require [extensive] discrimination to understand. Formerly, Pan Ku 蘭咕 (32-92) in the bibliography [to his History of the Former Han Dynasty] listed a Document in twenty-nine chapters and an ancient Classic in sixteen scrolls. This “ancient Classic” in Han times was already [known to be] a forgery [by Chang Pa 章脯 (fl. ca. first century B.C.)]. It was separated from the other Classics and not mixed up with them.

Probably Confucians of that time were already able to take precautions to this degree; yet several officials of the early T’ang were not able to examine the matter thoroughly. They wanted to take the variegated and distorted [Old Text] Documents of the Later Chin dynasty and prepared an authoritative annotation of it. In the process, the specialized studies of the Han-Wei (220-64) period were discarded and cut off.

Ch’u Hsi probably was uneasy about certain aspects, but he did not get it right and correct. Master Wu [Ch’eng] certainly brought [the questioning] to completion. . . . The Documents, which had been variegated and distorted for hundreds of years, was brilliantly honored at the hands of one dynasty’s great Confucian. Yet, for ages no one has been able to honor and respect him. How sad!

Kuei evidently did not know about Mei Tsu’s work. Otherwise, his praise of Wu Ch’eng’s achievements would have been more moderate. Nevertheless, Kuei shared with Mei Tsu a keen respect for Han dynasty scholarship. Together they foreshadowed the turn to what would be called “Han Learning” (Han-ku’sh 學漢學) during the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911).

Ch’en Ti 錢跌 (1541-1617), however, did see Mei Tsu’s work. Despite the fact that he was a pioneer in the application of k’ao-cheng techniques to the reconstruction of ancient phonology by examining the rhyme scheme in the Poetry Classic, Ch’en was dismayed by Mei Tsu’s use of similar methods to prove portions of a Classic a forgery.34

What especially perturbed Ch’en Ti was that his close friend Chiao Hung 蕭俀 (1541–1620) had accepted Mei Tsu’s contentions and was now calling for the removal of the Old Text chapters from the official text of the Documents used in the imperial examination system. Moreover, Chiao Hung had pointed out in his proposed

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33 See Ch’en Ti’s Maw-shih ku-jen k’ao 文書稽古音考 (Examination of Ancient Pronunciation in the Mao Recension of the Poetry). See also my “From Value to Fact: The Emergence of Phonology As a Precise Discipline in Late Imperial China,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 102, 3 (July-October 1982): 495-500.
changes that the Jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage had been cut and pasted to the expression "hold fast the mean," which the forger had taken from the Analects. The entire "Counsels of Yu the Great," Chiao charged, was simply a composite produced by a clever forger. 36

In rebuttal, Ch'en Ti prepared his Shang-shu shu- yen 向書疏衍 [Annotations and Elaborations of the Documents]. Defending the Old Text version of twenty-five chapters, which appeared for the first time in the Eastern Chin, Ch'en began by attacking the reliability of Han Confucians. Because most critics of the Old Text chapters used the fact that Han Confucians never mentioned the twenty-five chapter version, Ch'en Ti tried to demonstrate that this did not prove that this version was a forgery. Returning to K'ung Ying-ta's magisterial T'ang dynasty account of the transmission of the Old Text chapters, Ch'en argued that Cheng Huan and other Han Confucians had only seen the Former Han Chang Pa forgery of the Old Text chapters. They did not annotate Chang Pa's version, but they did not know that it was an earlier forgery either. Rather than the culprit, Huang-fu Mi became one of the heroes in the post-Han, who undeterred by Chang Pa's forgery, rescued K'ung An-kuo's authentic chapters. 37

Next Ch'en Ti reviewed criticisms voiced since the Sung dynasty. He summarized Wu Yu's, Chu Hsi's, and Wu Ch'eng's points about the uncanny coherence of the text and phraseology of the Old Text version, the curious fact that Han Confucians never mentioned the twenty-five chapter version, and the derivation of much of the text of the Old Text chapters from other sources. All these claims, Ch'en contended, "reversed what was the root and what was the branch and took the branches as the foundation." 38

On the Jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage, Ch'en Ti defended its authenticity. It was not the case that the forger had lifted the passage from the Hsun-tzu, as Mei Tzu had charged. Rather, Hsun-tzu was citing a text that correctly quoted the words of Shun. The Tao-ching, which Hsun-tzu gave as his source, was not just any text. It probably meant "a Classic that contains the Tao" (ju Tao chi-ching 有道之經). Thus it represented a text from higher antiquity. What Ch'en was saying was that the "Counsels of Yu the Great" and the Tao-ching were both canonical expositions of Shun's teachings. Both derived from the third millennium B.C. The bifurcation between the human

37 Ch'en Ti, Shang-shu shu- yen, 1/1a-2b. K'ung Ying-ta's views are cited in GiK, 74/4a-5a.
38 Shang-shu shu- yen, 1/3a-4a.
and moral mind represented Shun’s true words and not Hsün-tzu’s theory that human nature is evil.\(^{29}\)

Ch’en Ti went on to adduce several other reasons why the Old Text chapters were authentic. He was especially irked that Mei Tsu’s lies threatened the world-ordering principles bequeathed by the sage-kings. The defense Ch’en prepared was philological, not philosophic per se. His argumentation and grouping of texts and facts were a \(k’ao-chêng\) defense of the Old Text version. He was in effect using evidential research methods, which Mei Tsu had been so successful with, to controvert Mei’s allegations.

Much is at stake here. Earlier attacks on the authenticity of the Old Text chapters had not represented direct assaults on the theoretical formulations contained in the \(D\)ocuments. Sung and Yuan Confucians who questioned the Old Text version, with the exception of Wang Ch’ung-yun, had not permitted their philological doubts to affect their philosophic reconstruction of the holistic meaning of the text. With Mei Tsu, philological arguments directly threatened philosophic doctrine. Ch’en Ti clearly saw this threat, and he tried to reverse it. To do this, he used philology to defend doctrine, not subvert it. Philology, however, was becoming a dangerous double-edged field of inquiry. The best Ch’en Ti could hope for, once the grounds for the authenticity of the Old Text chapters were philological, was that the evidence marshalled would yield the truth. But what if the truth turned out otherwise? Ch’en Ti apparently hadn’t thought that far yet.\(^{40}\)

Philology was now being used to break through the veil of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian interpretation. Normally this began with an effort to explicate “names and their referents” (\(m\)ing-\(z\)eu \(f\)ê) in classical and historical sources. Interest in “names” had a long history in China. The Confucian doctrine of “rectification of names” \((c\)h\(e\)ng-\(m\)ing \(\text{正名}\)) pointed to a social order in which human behavior must correspond to clearly defined names of social functions. This statement was perhaps the first recognition of the important role study of words, i.e., philology, might play. The \(k‘ao-chêng\) scholars’ fixation on philological verification of names was thus not petty or peripheral. For them, names were concrete evidence. The historicity of the recorded past could be corroborated or refuted by chronologically and geographical evidence.\(^{41}\)

\(^{29}\) Ibid., l/4b-5a.

\(^{40}\) See my “The Uraevalling of Neo-Confucianism: From Philosophy to Philology in Late Imperial China,” \(Ts\)ing-hua \(J\)ournal of Chinese Studies, 15 (1983).

\(^{41}\) Lan-jo ym-\(u\), 25/13/3, and translated in Arthur Waley, \(T\)he \(A\)nalects of \(C\)onfucius (N.Y.: \(V\)intage Books, n.d.), pp. 171–72.
The emergence of evidential research involved the placing of proof (ch'eng 證) and verification (ch'ing 證) at the center of the organization and analysis of the classical tradition. In their "search for the truth in actual facts" (tshih-shih ch'iu-shih 實事求是), scholars during the Ming-Ch'ing transition period stressed scholarship based on detachment and impartiality. Verification became a central problem in the emerging k'ao-ch'eng theory of knowledge.42

This orientation to knowledge represented not merely new knowledge and appreciation for higher antiquity, but a major reorientation in thought as well. The early evidential scholars favored a return to the most ancient sources available to reconstruct the classical tradition. Rapid strides in research were made in the seventeenth century. The key was a philological methodology, whether it was applied to the Documents debate or in research on ancient phonology. Once methodology became an important concern, and not something simply taken for granted, the tension between scholars moving toward the new scholarship based on empirical criteria for verification and scholars still holding fast to the moral and discursive concerns of Tao-kuang began to emerge.43

An important clue to this tension was the beginning in the late Ming of movement away from stress on the Four Books to a reemphasis on the Five Classics. Miyazaki Ichisada has pointed to the philological character of the revival of the Classics as the cornerstone of Confucian scholarship in the late Ming. Many scholars, according to Miyazaki, called for study of the Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean only as parts of the Record of Rites (from which they had originally been taken), thereby effectively challenging the legitimacy of the Four Books as an independent group of texts. The Four Books as a single compilation was criticized as a Sung concoction that did not accurately portray the orthodox Confucianism of the Five Classics.44

42 For the origin of the expression tshih-shih ch'iu-shih, see the Hsiao-shu 漢書 [History of the Former Han Dynasty] (Taipei: Shih-hsueh ch'iao-pen-chieh, 1974, 7 vols.), 5/2410 (33/1a), where it is said: "Liu Te 論題, when he took the throne as K'ang Hsi of Ho-chien in 135 B.C., restored scholarship and honored antiquity. He sought the truth in actual facts."

43 By empirical I mean an epistemological position that stresses that valid knowledge must be corroborated by external (textual and otherwise) facts and impartial observations. Hence, evidential scholars were empirically oriented because they searched for an external source for the legitimation of their knowledge. Reason was becoming regarded as a limited measure of knowledge, especially as it was used in the speculative conclusions debated by Tao-han scholars.

44 Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定, "Shinpo kōshōgaku" 出品考古學 [Evidential
Classical studies (ching-hsueh 経學) became the center of inquiry for the understanding of higher antiquity. Frequently, this change in emphasis was reflected in a rejection of Sung-Ming sources in favor of study of Han dynasty materials, because the latter were closer in time to the composition of the Classics and thereby more likely to reveal the authentic meaning they conveyed. Scholars of the Classics were in effect precursors of the Han-Learning wave to come.

Both Hao Ching 胡敬 (1558–1639) and Lo Tun-jen 劉敦仁, for example, used philological methods to demonstrate once again that the Old Text Documents was a forgery. In prefatory remarks to his analysis of the Documents, Hao was even critical of Chu Hsi for his superficial analysis of the problem.65

However, what Chu [Hsi] said was easy to read [in the Documents] was in fact the forged portion, which did not deserve any annotation. Moreover, what Chu said was hard to read were exactly the original texts, which he cut out or revised [because of their difficulty]. Is it permissible, however, to get rid of excellent grain and keep weeds?

Hao was upset that Chu Hsi, despite his doubts about their authenticity, had instructed Ts'ei Shen to annotate the Old Text chapters. In addition, he was angry that Chu Hsi had told his students that much of the New Text version—the authentic words of the sages—was indecipherable.66 Hao also repeated the business about the stylistic problems in the Old Text version and its composite nature. He added little new, but his account was tinged with a distinct anti-Sung flavor.

Lo Tun-jen challenged the claim that the jen-hsin Tsao-hsin passage was authentic. His stance was essentially the same as Mei Tsu's, and, like Mei's position, provoked a heated response. Chang Yun-chang 張雲章, a follower of the Ch'eng-Chu scholar Lu Lung-ch'i 陸龍其 (1630–93), rejected Lo's accusations about the composite nature of the “Counsels of Yü the Great” in a stinging reply:67

(Lo's) intention is to claim that the “human mind, moral mind; have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose” [doctrines] are not the [authentic] words of the Classics. Is it permissible in one morning suddenly to get rid of a work of thousands and hundreds of years, which the sages used to illuminate [our] delusion?


65 Hao Ching, “Tu-shu” 阅書 [Reading the Documents], in Hao's Shung-shu pien-chih 時書辨輯 [Analysis of Scholia to the Documents], in Hu-pei t'ung-shu 湖北叢書 [Collectanea of (Scholars From) Hupeh], 1891 edition, p. 3b.

66 See, for example, Chu-tzu yü-lèi, 7b/3a.

67 Clk, 90/3a–3b.
To defend the Old Text chapters, Lu Lung-chi had written a brief essay entitled “Ku-wen Shang-shu k'ao” 古文尚書考 [Examination of the Old Text Documents]. His account was defensive in posture. Essentially a summary of the accepted standard transmission of the Old Text chapters, which K'ung Ying-ta and much later Ch'en Ti had outlined in more detail, Lu Lung-chi’s account served as an authoritative restatement of the orthodox position.68

A restatement was not enough, however. Because Chu Hsi was frequently cited for his suspicions concerning the K'ung An-kuo preface and commentary, and even the Old Text chapters themselves, Lu Lung-chi—an upholder of the Chu Hsi orthodoxy—found it necessary to get around Chu Hsi’s opinions. Lu persuasively maintained that Chu Hsi’s remarks about the Old Text version and its transmission were not reliably recorded by Chu’s students in the Chu-tzu yü-chie 朱子語類 [Conversations with Master Chu (Hsi) Classified Topically]. The remarks that his students jotted down therefore did not provide sufficient evidence for Chu’s official position.

In addition, Lu made a fundamental error by agreeing with K'ung Ying-ta that Han Confucians had not seen the authentic Old Text version. What they did see, Lu argued, was a forged version prepared by a follower of Chang Pa (see above). The forger of this version had used Cheng Hsuan’s annotation and division of the Documents as the basis for adding new chapters. Many had already pointed to Ying-ta’s inconsistent chronology here: Cheng Hsuan, a scholar of the second century A.D., came two centuries after Chang Pa, a Confucian of the first century B.C. How could the forger in the Former Han know about Later Han scholars? A lack of careful analysis could lead to major embarrassment.69

With the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, philological studies gained in stature and acceptance. Although the increase in textual scholarship has usually been adduced to the repressive measures employed by Manchu conquerors to force Confucian literati into submission, this externalist perspective misses much of the internal theoretical significance in the upsurge of k'ai-cheng research after 1644.70

Ku Yen-wu, for instance, blamed what he called the empty ch'ing-t'an 聊談 [pure discussion] style of learning popular during

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68 Lu Lung-chi, “Ku-wen Shang-shu k’ao” 古文尚書考 [Analysis of the Old Text Documents], in Suo-mei T'ang li'ung-shu 道穗堂著書 [Collectanea of Huang Chih-nuo 黃執柯], 1851 edition, 1/1a-4a.
69 Ibid., 1/2a. See also K’ung Ying-ta’s account in CIK, 74/4a-4b, and SKSTM, 16/15b-16a.
70 See my From Philosophy to Philology: Social and Intellectual Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China, Chapter 1.
the Ming for the collapse of the dynasty and its fall to the Manchus. His contemporaries, rightly or wrongly, interpreted the debacle as the result of the moral decline and intellectual disorder brought on by what they considered airy and superficial Tao-hsueh speculation. Many immediately recognized conditions during the late Ming that were similar to the decadence that had preceded the fall of the Han dynasty in 220 A.D.

The transition from Ming to Ch'ing represented in philosophic terms a decisive intellectual turn in Confucian scholarship. Evidential scholars exhibited in their work an almost complete rejection of the public lecturing (ch'iang-hsueh 講學) and "questions and answers" (seen-te 問答) styles of teaching and writing that pervaded Neo-Confucianism. Writings based on "solid learning" (p'u-hsueh 模學), which required the dedication of a specialist rather than a moralist, replaced the yu-lu 説錄 [record of conversations] genre.71 Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲 (1610–95) attacked the Ming emphasis on public lecturing because such an approach failed to take the Classics as the point of departure. Tao-hsueh scholars tended to use the Four Books as the framework for discussion. What was needed, Huang thought, was a return to book-learning and precise scholarship. This approach would enable one to recover the exact meanings of the texts themselves, rather than wasting time on metaphysical speculation. The ancient content of the classical tradition could be revived, Huang thought, through exacting research and analysis.72

This perspective caused Huang some problems, however, when it came to the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage in the "Counsels of Yu the Great." At first he contended:73

The sayings of the sages do not rest simply on graphs and phrases but rather on their meanings and principles (s-4). If there are no flaws in the meanings and principles, then the graphs and phrases do no harm by being different. For example, the saying concerning the human and moral mind in the "Counsels of Yu the Great" could not have been forged by someone coming after the Three Dynasties [Hsia, Shang, and Chou].

Presumably, the bifurcation between the moral and human mind was of such theoretical significance that it overrode philological considerations. Later, however, Huang changed his mind. In Huang's preface to Yen Jo-chü's 燕居士 (1636–1704) influential Shang-shu ku-ssu t'ai-cheng 舜書古文疏證 [Evidential Analysis of

73 Cited in Yen,Jo-chü, Shu-chung, 8/26b.
the Old Text Documents, henceforth simply Shu-ch'ing], he related how Chu Ch'ao-ying 朱朝英 (1605–70), a colleague and friend, had once voiced his fears concerning attacks on the Old Text chapters: "If not for the 'Counsels of Yu the Great,' li-hsueh would never have survived. How can it be a forgery?" Huang then summarized how Yen had demonstrated to his satisfaction that the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage represented a forged composite taken from the Hsin-lzu and Analects. Huang concluded: 74

Therefore, these sixteen characters represent a serious swindling of li-hsueh. [Chu] K'ang-liu [i.e., Ch'ao-ying] may not agree, but as for me, [Yen's demonstrations] deserve my words of support for posterity. All of [Yen] Pai-shih's [i.e., Jo-ch'o] proofs are accurate.

Even Chu Ch'ao-ying seems to have been impressed with philological analysis of the Old Text chapters. He wrote a work on the Documents in which he also argued that the Old Text chapters—including the "Counsels of Yu the Great"—were forgeries. 75

Ku Yen-wu linked the Sung-Ming penchant for a public lecturing style of teaching to the impact Ch'an Buddhism had on Tao-hsin scholars. He contended: "Classical studies (ching-hsueh) are what studies of principle (li-hsueh) were called in antiquity." 76 Ku equated emphasis on oral ratification of the type associated with fourth-century A.D. Taoists and Buddhists with speculative discussion that would lead nowhere. Ku contended that the Sung-Ming adoption of the "pure discussion" approach was not only evidence of the influence of Ch'an Buddhism on Confucian discourse but was also phony li-hsueh. 77

Ku prepared his own account of the Old Text Documents. He pointed to the differences between the Old Text version of sixteen chapters, discovered in the Former Han, and the version of twenty-five chapters that suddenly appeared in the early years of the Eastern Chin dynasty. His summary was straightforward, deliberate, and unemotional. 78

When he came to the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage, however, Ku's tone changed dramatically. Citing Huang Chen's Sung dynasty fears for how the doctrines of the moral and human mind could be misused by Confucians and Ch'an Buddhists (see above), Ku

74 See Huang's "Hsin" 序 [Preface] included in the 1796 Tientsin edition of Yen's Shu-ch'ing, pp. 2b-3a. See also the HCCHP edition, 6:290.
75 SKCSTM, 14:88r-9a.
77 Ku, Jih-chih lu, pp. 51–54 (chapter 2).
concluded: "The mind does not require transmission." He was employing Huang Chen as a foil to attack the doctrines of the mind (hsin-hsiun) and its transmission (hsin-ch'üan), which had been read into the "Counsels of Yü the Great" since Chu Hsi. In the process, Ku radically redefined the content and meaning of li-hsiun.²⁸

Principles are what flow between heaven and earth, remain uniform and consistent from antiquity to today, and are always the same. They are complete in my mind and produce effects in affairs and phenomena. Mind is that which governs and controls these principles and discriminates between right and wrong. Whether a person is worthy or not, whether an affair succeeds or fails, whether the world is ordered or chaotic all are judged accordingly. This is why the sages focused on the middle ground between precariousness and subtlety, between absolute refinement and singleness of purpose. Hence, they transmitted to each other the Tao of holding to the mean. They saw to it that all affairs would be in accord with principles and that there would be no extreme errors.

Although he continued to use the terminology of Sung li-hsiun in his exegesis of the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage, his delineation of principles was immanent and not metaphysical. Concluding his assessment, Ku wrote:²⁹

When ["T'ang P'o-yüan 唐伯元 (fl. ca. 1574)] spoke of study (hsieh 誠), he meant the mind and that's all. From the beginning I have heard that in antiquity one studied the Tao; I have not heard that one studied the mind. In antiquity one took pride in study; I have not heard that one took pride in the mind. The two graphs hsin-hsiun are not discussed in the Six Classics or by Confucius or Mencius. Today those who speak of study probably mean by this [the Buddhist doctrine of] "the mind equals the Tao."

Ku's reinterpretation was a philosophic reconstruction, with some philological analysis added to confirm his exegesis. Apparently he did not think it sufficient to dismiss the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage on the grounds that it was a forgery. He was still arguing on the basis of "meanings and principles," while at the same time turning li-hsiun into classical studies.

Ku Yen-wu's stress on practical matters, however, was an indication of the decline in emphasis on moral cultivation after 1644. Indeed, Ming loyalists and their followers stressed practical statecraft (ching-chih 聲政) as the key element of the classical legacy. By statecraft, Ku Yen-wu and Huang Tsung-hsi meant something more than just political concerns. Statecraft in their view was closely tied to a variety of fields of expertise. These included astronomy for


²⁹ T'ieh-chih lu, p. 529 (chüan 20).
calendrical reform, hydraulics for flood control, cartography for military purposes, and the like.

Emphasis on practical statecraft during the Ming-Ch'ing transition provided k'o-ch'eng scholarship with the social justification for the broad learning and inductive research methods that triumphed in the eighteenth century. According to Yamanoi Yu, what grew out of the Ming collapse was not evidential research per se, but rather a commitment to a broader range of scholarship within which empirical methods were promoted and refined. The crystal-
lization of a full-blown, conscious k'o-ch'eng movement had to wait for a generation less concerned with the political and social issues that dominated the mid-seventeenth century.80

Men such as Huang Tsung-hsi and Ku Yen-wu, according to Yamanoi, were committed above all to ameliorate the chaos of their turbulent times. What united them in their criticism of T'ao-
hsüeh intuitional studies was their sense of the urgent need to resolve the political, social, and economic decay that accompanied the fall of the Ming. Huang studied astronomy and mathematics; Ku was proficient in military geography. Although their aims were dominated by statecraft issues, Ming loyalist scholars tended to employ evidential methods in their scholarship.81

As a result of the attack on Sung-Ming methodology and pre-
occupations, moral cultivation, once central, was less and less mentioned in the late seventeenth century. A primary commitment to empirical research and scholarship, within which moral cultivation could have a secondary place, was the result. Cultivation was no longer the primary road to knowledge. It had become episte-

mologically suspect.82

There were important exceptions, however. Wang Fu-chih 王夫之 (1619-92), writing in almost total isolation in Hunan, attempted another philosophic reconstruction of the Documents. This he entitled the Shiang-shu yin-i 向書引義 [Gisting Meanings in the Documents]. He had no qualms about the authority of the Old Text chapters and made the jen-hsin T'ao-hsi passage an important focus of his elucidation of the philosophic meanings in the "Counsels of Yu the Great."

82 Yamanoi, "Min-Shin no testogaku to shuyo" 明清の哲學と訓詁 [Ming-
Ch'ing Philosophy and Moral Cultivation], Rendai kyoiku 歷史教育, II, 11 (Nov.
Wang began with an analysis of the mind’s role in the world:  

Whatever may be said and thought about changing the world all takes its source from the mind. To follow its branches and put it to use is to order the mind (chih-hsin lii(2)). To follow its root and establish its essence is to see the mind (hsien-hsin Hsü). When one sees what is not seen, then one orders what is not ordered. Shun’s words were: “The human mind is precarious and the moral mind is noble.” This is to express the reason for seeing the mind, but it is not something those who speak [of the mind] can attain. Why? All in the world who speak of the mind speak only of the human mind.

Then Wang explained how the moral mind differed from the human mind:  

Now with regard to feelings (ch’ing), there is a clear distinction between the human and moral mind. Happiness, anger, remorse, pleasure—these are the human mind. Compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong—these are the moral mind. These two reside in the same house together and reciprocally manifest their purpose. Despite this [unity], one must acknowledge there is a difference between them.

Written to refute the Buddhist doctrine of mind and its influence on the Lu-Wang school of hsü-hsueh, Wang Fu-chih’s account affirmed Chu Hsi’s claim that, although the mind was essentially unified, it contained divisions between desires and heavenly principle (see above). Wang did not use the same terminology, and his orientation on the whole was less dualistic; nonetheless, he affirmed the theoretical significance of Shun’s teachings. Philosophy still outranked philology.

Wang wrote, but few listened. The decline in emphasis on moral philosophy among Ch’ing scholars was balanced by a resurgence of interest in philology, astronomy, geography, and mathematics. John Henderson has described how Ch’ing literati “were more interested in the sage-kings as initiators of technical traditions in astronomy, divination, hydraulics, and mensuration than as paragons of virtue.” The anti-metaphysical tone of Ch’ing scholarship signalled a disenchantment with theory and a decline in the speculative side of knowledge.  

A stress on experiential knowledge (sun-ch’ien chih chih 觀見之知) was closely linked during the seventeenth century to the important role of doubt (i 疑) as the starting point for scholarly inquiry (kao 考). Suspension of judgment and detached scrutiny of beliefs were expected of evidential scholars. Yen Jo-chü’s definitive but still shocking expose of that the Old Text Documents was a forgery of the

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third or fourth century A.D. caused a major sensation both when his work on the subject was distributed privately in the late seventeenth century and when it was finally published posthumously in 1745. Yen stipulated how his philological principles related to the Classics. When asked how he could dare question the authenticity of the Classics, Yen replied:

What Classics? What Histories? What Commentaries? My concern is only with what is true. If the Classic is true and the History and Commentary false, it is permissible to use the Classic to correct the History and Commentary. If the History and Commentary are true and the Classic false, then it is impermissible to use the History and Commentary to correct the Classic? ... What is not what it appears to be [i.e., the rectification of names] is what Confucius despised. What comes close to being true but in fact throws the true principles into disarray is what Chu Hsi despised. My demonstration for the forged Old Text [chapters] is just as Confucius and Chu Hsi would have wanted it.

Seeing k'ao-cheng techniques as a tool (kung I), Yen Jo-chü contended that this research aid enabled him "to employ the speculative to verify the concrete and the concrete to verify the speculative." He decried the self-serving ends toward which earlier scholars such as K'ung Ying-ta had manipulated the Classics. Yen noted that a scholar had to "set his mind at rest" (p'ing ch'i' k'ao) and "compose his temperament" (i ch'i' ch'i' 易氣氣), if classical texts were to be properly understood. Since the T'ang dynasty, he contended, there had not been any impartial scholars who had employed empirical methods to analyze the Old Text Documents. Had there been such scholars, they would have found:

A forger for the most part relies on what his age thinks highly of, and his phraseology and style are also limited to [those current] in his age. Although he may put great effort to cover his tricks and escape detection, in the end he cannot escape the predetermined constraints [of language and grammar used in his forgeries]. These elements can serve as the basis of inductive reasoning [to detect forgeries].

Rigorous, systematic use of data, although still rudimentary outside the fields of calendrical science and related mathematical subjects, was already common among textual scholars in the seventeenth century. Yen Jo-chü, for example, made use of what loosely might be called statistical methods to verify his claims. After demonstrating that the jen-hsin T'ao-hsin passage in the "Counsels of Yu the Great" had been taken from the Hsüan-ts'un, Yen went on to

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48 Yen, Shu-cheng, 2/2a-2b.
49 Shu-cheng, 1/7a, 1/10b, 8/10b, 8/31a. See also Tai Ch'üen, 蔡居仁, "Yen-Mao 因毛論 (The Case of Yen [Jo-chü] Versus Mao (Ch'i-lung) On the Old Text Documents)" (Hong Kong: Chi Sheng Book Co., 1963), pp. 58-59.
prove why the T’ao-shing, which Hsun-tzu had cited as his source for the passage, could not be a reference to the Documents.

Noting every instance where Hsun-tzu quoted from the Documents, Yen showed that out of the sixteen total references he located in the Hsun-tzu, twelve gave the Documents itself as the source (Shu yueth 書曰 [The Documents says]), three mentioned a particular chapter of the Documents, and one source cited the Documents as Chuan yueth 傳曰 [The Commentary says]. Yen concluded:88

Why only in the case of the “Counsels of Yu the Great” chapter would [Hsun-tzu] change his mode of reference and cite the T’ao-shing? In this way I know that “the human mind is precarious, and the moral mind is subtle” passage must necessarily come from an authentic [text entitled] the T’ao-shing. Moreover, the forger of the Old Text [passage] probably just copied the whole of it because he was unable to construct subtle words to this degree.

Yen Jo-chü’s research and the definitive conclusions he drew had wide impact. Scholars realized that if a complicated problem such as the possible forgery of the Old Text Documents could be resolved using empirical methods, such an approach might prove valuable for many other long-standing textual puzzles. Once again memorials were sent calling for the elimination of the Old Text chapters from the official text of the Documents used in the imperial examination system.89

Mao Chi’-ling 毛奇齡 (1623–1716) vainly tried to stem the tide. In his Ku-toen Shang-shu yuan-tz’u 古文尚書原詞 [In Defense of the Old Text Documents], he marshalled a complicated series of philological arguments, which aimed at reversing the conclusions reached by Mei Tsu and Yen Jo-chü. He was particularly distressed at the call for the elimination of a sacred portion of the Five Classics from imperial authorization.90

In a letter written after receiving a manuscript copy of Yen Jo-chü’s Shu-cheng in 1693, Mao countered with a direct attack on Yen’s position vis-à-vis the jen-hsin T’ao-hsin passage: “Yesterday I received a copy of your work called the Shang-shu shu-cheng. It is a complete perversion of our predecessors. It mistakenly makes the Documents no more than a forged book.” On the key issue of the “Counsels of Yu the Great,” Mao challenged Yen’s demonstration that the human and moral mind passage was taken from the Hsun-tzu: “Moreover, although the Hsun-tzu contains the human and moral

88 Shu-cheng, 2/47a–48a.
90 Mao Chi’-ling, Ku-toen Shang-shu yuan-tz’u, in Hsi-ho hsü-chi 西河合集 [Combined Collection of (Mao) Chi’-ling], K’ang-hai edition, ca. 1699, 1/1a–6a.
mind [passage], Hsün-tzu is citing the text of the [Documents] Classic. It is not a case of the Classic citing the Hsün-tzu." According to Mao Ch’i-ling, the T’ao-ch’ing that Hsün-tzu cited as his source was in fact a reference to bequeathed texts of the sages that had been used in higher antiquity. Mao took Yen’s attack on the Old Text chapters as an affront to the “sacred Classics” (sheng-ching).  

Later in 1699, Mao Ch’i-ling sent Yen Jo-chü a letter accompanying a copy of his recently completed In Defense of the Old Text Documents. In the letter, Mao wrote that he had given the matter careful consideration and concluded that the entire text of the Documents was authentic. Furthermore, Mao had discussed the question with Li Kung 李塯 (1659–1733), who had travelled from North China to study under him after studying with Yen Yuan 頤元 (1635–1704). Mao summarized some of his key arguments and added: “Even if Ch’ien-ch’iu’s [i.e., Yen Jo-chü] scholarship surpasses mine by [a factor of] ten thousand upon ten thousand, still it cannot be said that he surpasses the Six Classics.”  

Both Li Kung and the bibliophile Yao Chi-heng 梧桐 (1647–1715) studied under Mao Ch’i-ling. Yao, although very close to Mao and his elder brother Mao Wan-ling 毛萬齡, regarded the Old Text chapters as a forgery. After Yao met with Yen Jo-chü in 1693 (Mao Ch’i-ling introduced them) to discuss the issue, Yen copied down some of Yao’s findings for inclusion in his Shu-cheng. Yen discovered that Yao Chi-heng had made use of sources in very much the same way that he himself had, i.e., to demonstrate where the forger of the Old Text chapters had gotten his material. In fact, Yen quoted Yao to the effect that both the text and the K’ung An-kuo commentary were the work of the same hand, and “Yao had laughed at the fact that persons before had known only enough to question the authenticity of the commentary but not the Classic itself.” In effect, Yen was citing one of Mao Ch’i-ling’s associates to solidify his own stand against Mao’s position.  

Li Kung, on the other hand, wrote a preface for Mao’s defense of the Old Text chapters. There, Li described how Mao had answered many of the doubts he had concerning the text of the Documents. Later in 1699, Li Kung stopped on his way home and met and talked with Yen Jo-chü about this debate. In a 1700 letter to Mao Ch’i-ling, Li wrote that he had informed Yen of Mao’s research on

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92 Hsi-ho hsü-chi, shu-wu 試稿, 7/5b-6a.  
93 Ibid., 5/1a-3b.  
94 Mao, “Hsü” (Preface) to his Ku-wen Shang-shu p’ien-tz’u, pp. 1a-1b, and Yen, Shu-cheng, 8/11b, 8/8b. See also Murayama Yoshiai 佐古出典, “Yō Seiko no gakumon (ち） – 被図匠の理門（ち）” [Yao Chi-heng’s Scholarship (11)], Kanbunshū kenkyū 業文研究, 8 (1960): 41.
the Old Text chapters. Li also added that Yen had said that Mao’s work was no doubt intended to refute Yen’s own work on the subject.64

In an earlier letter to Huang Tsung-hsi, Mao Ch’i-ying discussed certain aspersions cast on the authenticity of the Old Text chapters and diplomatically (unusual for him) wrote:

Chu Yen-kung [Hsi], Wu Yu, Wu Ch’eng, Chao Meng-fu, Kwei Yu-kuang, Mei Tsu, and Lo Yu-i 羅庚惠 have successively pointed out that [the Old Text chapters] were forgeries. Their [views] are all based on mistaken evidence growing out of an incorrect reading of the works of earlier men . . . In addition, they want to destroy the books of our earlier sages and kings. . . . I have heard that you [Huang] also have pointed out on occasion that [the Old Text chapters] are forgeries. Perhaps there is some new evidence [I am not aware of]. . . .

Mao then mentioned Yen Jo-ch’u’s (referred to by Mao as an “old friend”) attempt to discredit the An-kuo preface to the Documents. Contending that Yen’s evidence was unreliable, Mao urged Huang to reconsider his position. Mao argued that the arguments contained in his letter were based on solid empirical evidence (ch’unk-ch’t’iu shih-chi 研究實據), which would soon lay the matter to rest. He was attempting by use of philological criteria to refute Yen Jo-ch’u and line up Huang Tsung-hsi on his side of the debate.65

Yen’s meeting and debate with Wan Shu-t’ung 魏叔同 (1638–1702) at about this time was another element in this intriguing example of proof and counter-proof, rejoinder and surrejoinder. Wan Shu-t’ung’s nephew Wan Yen 魏言 (1637–1705) took Yen’s side on the Documents debate, and Shu-t’ung’s son Wan Ching 魏靜 (1659–1741) studied geography under Yen. Infuriated by Yen’s attack on the Documents, Wan Shu-t’ung, when asked by Yen for his opinion, replied.66

Since the T’ang and Sung and extending to the Yuan and Ming dynasties, several tens of scholars have attacked the Old Text [chapters]. You [Yen] are certainly aware of all of this. However, their writings are not worth debating. If one causes the Documents not to have the Old Text [chapters], then it does not deserve to be included among the Five Classics. How can one acclaim [the Documents] in


65 Mao, Hsiao hao-chi, shu-mu, 7/13b-14b.

the Confucian temple and emphasize it equally with the Changes, Poetry, and Spring and Autumn Annals? ... Moreover, the principles in the Old Text [version] are sufficient and its words are pure. In addition, how could anyone have falsified it?

These encounters reveal the careful research and care of detail that lay at the heart of the Documents debate. Philology could no longer be dismissed—even by upholders of the “sacred Classics.” Standing on opposite sides of the Old Text Documents debate, both Yen Jo-chü and Mao Ch'i-ling were committed to the use of empirical philological criteria to prove their claims. After meeting and debating the issue, both men returned to write down their views. Beneath the different conclusions lay a unity of methodology and discourse.97

Thinking they had the final say on the matter, the editors of the Sun-k'u ch'üan-shu project concluded in the 1780’s:

Going to [Yen] Jo-chü, it was he who adduced material from the Classics and other old works to set out one by one the reasons for the contradictions in the text. The falseness of the Old Text portion became quite clear. ... Mao Ch'i-ling wrote his Defence of the Old Text Documents, in which he used a hundred schemes to crush Yen, but in the end Mao’s forced words could not overcome true principles. Arguments based on evidence were finally established in an unshakable position.

Philology not philosophy now determined doctrine.98

7. Han Learning in the Eighteenth Century

By the eighteenth century, a k'ao-cheng methodology was linked to the growth in numbers of practitioners of relatively mature academic disciplines. These were men trained in a sophisticated body of philological, historical, and astronomical methods. They constituted a special community, principally in Kiangnan and Peking, one whose informal members were the exclusive audience for and judges of each other’s work. The problems on which they worked were no longer posed by the society at large but rather by an internal challenge to verify and increase the scope of knowledge about the Confucian past. The statecraft problems peculiar to the seventeenth century had been left behind.

Scholars in the eighteenth century routinely associated evidential scholarship with the ascendancy of Han Learning. Strictly speaking, Han Learning denotes a school of scholarship that came into fashion in Soochow with Hui Tung 惠棟 (1697-1758). This movement represented the culmination of a turn away from Sung sources to

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98 SKSTM, 12/25b-26a
Han writings, which we have seen building since the sixteenth century. Hui Tung and his followers spurned Sung sources, i.e., Sung-huaiah 學 [Sung Learning], as unreliable and tainted with Taoist and Buddhist interpretations.

On the Documents question, Hui Tung renewed the attack on the Old Text chapters. Because Yen Jo-chii’s Shu-cheng was passed around only in manuscript form until 1745, Hui wrote that he did not see it until 1743. By then, Hui, was already deep into his own analysis of the Old Text chapters in a work entitled Ku-teen Shang-shu k’ao 古文尚書考 [Analysis of the Old Text Documents]. Hui admitted that much of Yen’s work agreed with his own findings, and he cited Yen as an authority to corroborate textual questions that overlapped in their research. Appending Yen’s points of agreement, Hui noted that it had taken several centuries for suspicions concerning the Old Text Documents to lead anywhere conclusive.99

On the Jen-hsin Taou-hsin passage, Hui Tung reviewed the evidence and concluded that the passage was indeed a forged composite taken from the Shun-tzu and Analects. He cited Yen’s evidence and essentially agreed with Yen’s analysis of the Taou-ching, which was Hua-tzu’s source for the passage. Hui added, however, that the forger had gotten his doctrines mixed up—something that Yen Jo-chii had overlooked. Hua-tzu had intended that one first have “singleness of purpose” and then “absolute refinement.” The forger, in his ignorance, had reversed the order.100

Hui Tung’s followers continued research on the Old Text chapters. Initially, Hui’s publications on the topic won more support than Yen’s, especially in Soochow, until Yen’s Shu-cheng was finally published and more widely distributed in the eighteenth century. Chiang Sheng 江醇 (1721–99), Wang Ming-sheng 王鳴盛 (1722–98), and Tuan Yu-ts’ai 諧玉裁 (1735–1815) picked up where Hui Tung had left off and tried to restore the authentic New Text chapters to their Han dynasty appearance. The “Concords of Yu the Great” and the other Old Text chapters were disregarded and mentioned only at “the forged Old Text version” (teri ku-teen 古文).101

Sun Huang-yen 孫星衍 (1753–1818), with his Shang-shu chu-kun shu-shu 舊書今古文注疏 [Notes and Annotations to the New

99 Hui Tung, Ku-teen Shang-shu k’ao, HCCC edition, 351/17a/17b.
100 Ibid., 352/3b.
and Old Text Documents brought to virtual completion the attack on the spurious Old Text chapters "discovered" by Mei Tse in the fourth century A.D. Begun in 1794 and completed in 1815, Sun's analysis of Former and Later Han sources marked the high point of the Han-Learning assault on Sung-Ming doctrine and exegesis.128

By 1800, the consensus of opinion of most evidential scholars was that the Old Text chapters were forgeries. Chiang Fan 江藩 (1761-1831), afollower of Hui Tung's Han Learning, went further than most when he asserted that the acceptance of Yen Jo-ch'iu's proofs and conclusions concerning the Old Text Documents was one of the requirements for consideration as Han-Learning scholarship. In his genealogy of Han Learning entitled Kuo-ch'iao Han-hsiung shih-ch'eng chi 國朝漢學聖承紀 [Record of Han-Learning Masters in the Ch'ing Dynasty], Chiang Fan gave Yen eminence of place by including him as the first important Han-Learning scholar.129

Undertowons of dissatisfaction with this consensus were evident, however. Upholders of the official Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy, as we have seen, continued to accept the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage as the authentic words of the sages. Chiang Yu 江虞 (1706-1770), for instance, argued that the Old Text version contained doctrines that were so profound that only a sage could have uttered them. Ku Tung-kao 魯藻高 (1679-1759), an important textual scholar in his own right, contended that the human and moral mind passage in the "Counsels of Yu the Great" must be authentic (pi chen 必真). Others such as Ku Ping 魯評 maintained that the passage was so theoretically so powerful that it would have been impossible for someone living in the post-Han era to articulate.130

Chuang Ts'ung-yu 莊存與 (1719-88), then serving in the Hanlin Academy, and later the patriarch of the Ch'ang-chou school of New Text Confucianism, at first supported Yen Jo-ch'iu's findings on the Old Text Documents. When proposals were sent to the imperial court in 1750 to remove the Old Text chapters from official use, however, Chuang thought this was going too far. He used his position in the Imperial Study to defend the imperial authorization that the Old Text version received on the grounds that the doctrines contained in these chapters were essential for social and political order.

Chuang noted that if the "Counsels of Yu the Great" were impugned, then the doctrine of the human and moral mind, as well as Kao Yau's injunction, which stated: "rather than put to death an innocent person, you [Shun] would rather run the risk of in-

129 Lun Ming, "Kao-hsia-lou t'ai-shu-chi," p. 482. See also Chiang Fan, Kuo-
ch'iao Han-hsiung shih-ch'eng chi, SPYP edition.
130 SKGSM, 14/24a, 14/27b, 14/33a.
regularity,” would be subverted. These were teachings, Chuang argued, that depended on their classical sanction. To remove them now would only serve to undercut the theoretical underpinnings of the state.183

The historian Chao I 趙.I (1724–1814) defended the Old Text version on the grounds that the philological reasons for considering it a forgery were not conclusive. What troubled Chao was not doctrine so much but the curious fact that if indeed the forger had combed through many sources for his forged version of the Old Text chapters, he had suspiciously overlooked many passages that he could have included. An ingenious forger, Chao contended, would not have been so sparing in his use of earlier materials. To say that the Old Text chapters were composites from earlier quotations was not necessarily true. For every quotation the supposed forger did use, there were others that he could have used to reconstruct additional chapters but didn’t.184

Similarly, the distinguished scholar Weng Fang-kang 翁方綱 (1733–1818) in an introduction to Liang Shang-kuo’s 梁上國 (1748–1815) defense of the authenticity of the Old Text chapters contended:185

All of the Old Text chapters are the [true] words of the sages. Because their words are an aid to the people and the state and a boon to learning, they cannot be lightly criticized. Mister Yen [Jo-chü] used many spiteful and provocative words [in his account]. Therefore, Master Liang [Shang-kuo] also has used spiteful and provocative words to oppose him. This [lack of moderation] is not Master Liang’s fault. The blame rests on Mister Yen.

For the most part, however, the authenticity of the Old Text chapters was not widely defended during the eighteenth century. Sung Chien 宋堅 (fl. ca. 1748), an eighteenth-century follower of Yen Jo-chü, rewrote Yen’s somewhat hard to follow comments on the Old Text chapters for a more general audience. Sung’s Shang-shu k‘ao-pien 向書考辨 [Analysis and Criticism of the Documents] also delineated in more detail the primary classical sources for each phrase the forger had used to compose the “Councils of Yu the Great” and other Old Text chapters. Likewise, Sun Ch’iao-nien 孫喬年 agreed that the human and moral mind passage was derived

185 Weng’s remarks are from Ch‘ing-chih shih-chên 江盛列傳 [Collection of Ch‘ing Dynasty Biographies] (Taipei: Chung-hua shu-chi, 1962), 68/50b.
from the Hsün-tzu. Its use in the Classics had given an unfortunate and mistaken classical sanction to the rise of studies of the mind (hsin-huaeh). Hence, Sun argued that the source of the passage had to be exposed before hsin-huaeh could be shown in its proper light.108 Chuang Yu-k'e (1742?–1822), a follower of the Ch'ang-chou New Text tradition initiated by his more senior relative Chuang Ts'un-yü, did not hesitate to dismiss the validity of the jen-hsin Ts'ao-kia passage. Chuang Ts'un-yü, as we have seen, thought the passage essential for political and social order. Yu-k'e, however, decried the Buddhist doctrines that presupposed the bifurcation between the human and moral mind.109

What makes a person a person is simply his mind. The mind is equivalent to the principles of heaven. Accordingly, it is the master of the person. Thus, all the sense organs and the body obey it. Heaven does not have two principles. A person does not have two rulers. The mind therefore is not two things. How can there be two names for it? When the forged Old Text Documents appeared, [the forger] lifted remnants of the Hsün-tzu [into the Document] and thereby misled the point. . . . If Confucius and Mencius did not have this theory, how can one say that Yao and Shun had it? When the Buddha spoke of 'many minds' (to-hsin 多心) and 'conquering the mind' (hsing-fa shih hsin 視法息心), this is probably in agreement with the human mind passage in the [forged] Old Text Documents.

In fact, scholars in the late eighteenth century, especially those connected with the Ch'ang-chou school, began to push back the frontiers of their knowledge and focus on the Former Han and pre-Han periods as better sources for classical research. Some maintained that even the sixteen chapter version of the Old Text Documents, which K'ung An-k'uo recovered from Confucius' residence in the second century B.C. and was subsequently lost, had been a forgery. Many now claimed that there had been three forgeries of the Old Text chapters: An-k'uo's, Chang Pa's, and Mei Tse's. This movement toward Former Han and pre-Han sources brought in its wake a revival of the New Text Confucian orthodoxy established by Tung Chung-shu 論仲舒 (179?–93 B.C.) during the Former Han.110

Tai Chen's 戴震 (1727–77) philosophic writings also demonstrate the impact philological research now had on theoretical writings.


109 Chuang Yu-k'e, Mu-liang tai-tsan 墨良泰藻 [Miscellaneous Collection in Adoration of Goodness], in Chung Ts'ai-chiu hsien-sheng i-chu 付大久先生藻著 [Bequeathed Writings of Chuang Yu-k'e] (Ch'ang-chou: Chuang family publication, 1930), 2/9a-9b.

Tai’s excursion into philosophy late in his life illustrates how k’ao-cheng methods could be used to justify a philosophy critical of the Ch’eng-Chu orthodoxy. His vehement attack on the authoritarian nature of k-hsun further indicates that philological research could include serious social criticism.

Tai agreed with his predecessors that the twenty-five Old Text chapters of the Documents were forgeries. In addition, he acknowledged that the Han appearance of the text was the closest one could get to the authentic Documents—after the Ch’in burning of the books. With regard to the Jen-hsin T’ao-hsin passage, Tai charged that Sung Tao-hsun scholars had read Taoist and Buddhist doctrines into the text:211

Because Sung Confucians were deluded by the Taoist and Buddhist doctrine of “having no desires” (wu yé 無欲), they referred to [Mencius’ statement that] “righteousness is also what I desire” as the moral mind, as heavenly principle. All the rest they referred to as the human mind, as human desires. ....

With regard to desires, [however], one worries not about their being fulfilled but their going astray. If they go astray, they are the slave of self-interest and forget [the interests of other] persons. One’s mind is weakened; one’s behavior becomes shameful. Mencius therefore said: “To nourish the mind, nothing is better than having few desires.”

Tai Chen took issue with the orthodox penchant for linking human desires to evil. In many ways, this outlook was a continuation of Lo Ch’in-shun’s earlier critique of Chu Hsi’s stance on human desires (see above). Tai, however, raised the stakes. His use of the Mencius as a foil for the articulation of a philosophy of ch’i had serious political implications:212

The sages ordered the world by giving an outlet to people’s feelings (ch’ing) and by making it possible for them to realize their desires. In this way, the Tao of the sages was brought to completion. People know that Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and the Buddha differed from the sages. When they hear [the theory of] “having no desires,” [the people] still do not believe the Taoists and Buddhists. With regard to the Sung Confucians, however, [the people] believe in them, thinking that they are the equivalent of the sages. Everyone can talk about the distinction between moral principles (li) and human desires. Therefore, those who control the people today pay no attention to the sages’ giving an outlet to people’s feelings and making it possible for them to realize their desires. ....

The high and the mighty use moral principles to blame the lowly. The old use

211 Tai Chen san-chi 戴震文集 [Tai Chen’s Collected Essays] (Hong Kong: Chung-hua shu-chi, 1974), pp. 3–5 (shih li), and Tai’s “Ta Peng chin-shih shu” 莘原論十書 [Reply to Presented Scholar Peng (Shao-sheng)], appended to the Shih-chih shu-chi (Taipei, 1974) edition of Tai’s Meng-tzu tsai-shu-cheng 孟子字義疏證 [Evidential Analysis of the Meaning of Terms in the Mencius], pp. 92–93. For the quotations from the Mencius that follow, see the Meng-tzu yen-te 五子引得 [Concordance to the Mencius] (Taipei: Ch’eng Wen reprint, 1966), 44/6A/10, and 50/7B/35.

212 Tai Chen, Meng-tzu tzu-i-sha-cheng, p. 36 (shih li).
moral principles to blame the young. The exalted use moral principles to blame the downtrodden. Even if they are mistaken, [the ruling groups] call what they have done proper. If the lowly, the young, and the downtrodden use moral principles to struggle, even if they are right they are labelled rebellious. As a result, the people on the bottom cannot make their shared feelings and desires [in all persons] in the world understood by those on top. Those on top use moral principles to blame them for their lowly position. For these uncountable thousands of people, their only crime is their lowly position. When a person dies under the law, there are those who pity him. Who pities those who die under [the aegis] of moral principles?

8. Sung Learning Vs. Han Learning

Fang Tung-shu 方東樹 (1772–1831), a follower of the orthodox Ch‘eng-Chu tradition as taught by members of the T‘ung-ch‘eng school in Anhwei, was outraged by the audacity of Tai Chen’s remarks. He retorted:113

[To say] that the heavenly principles are not dependable and that one should rely on the feelings and desires of the people, that they should have an outlet and be allowed to follow their desires, implies that it [read “moral principles”] are attained at the price of ch‘i [read “human desires”] and brings disorder to the Tao. However, [Tai Chen] is merely trying to make it difficult for the Ch‘eng-Chu school, without realizing that his is the way of great disorder.

Fang was critical of what he considered the antiquarian nature of Han Learning. He attacked k‘au-cheng research as mere industry, devoid of intellectual and moral content. His ancestor Fang Pao 方僼 (1668–1749) had upheld the authenticity of the Old Text Documents, and Fang Tung-shu followed suit in what remains the most powerful Ch‘eng dynasty defense of the Ch‘eng-Chu interpretation of the Classics.114

In his Han-k‘au shang-tai 漢學商兑 [An Assessment of Han Learning], Fang took dead aim at Ku Yen-wu for his attack on the “transmission of the mind” (ch‘uan-hsien) doctrine. As we have noted above, Ku saw this doctrine as a Ch‘an Buddhist assimilation into the Confucian tradition. Fang replied in defense:115

[They] claimed that there was no mention of studies of the mind (hsin-hsiau) in the Six Classics or by Confucius or Mencius. . . He proceeded to claim that in the Paring of Phrases and Sentences in the Doctrine of the Mean, [Chu Hsi] used Buddhist terminology when he cited Master Ch‘eng [I] as the transmitter of mental discipline (hsiu-fei). This is all nonsense.

112 Fang Tung-shu, Han-k‘au shang-tai (Taipei: Ch‘eng Wen reprint of the 1900 edition), 2A/19a.
113 SKSTM, 14/24a. See also Hamagusu Fuji 袋有富雄, “Hō Tōjō no Kangaku hihan ni tsuite” 方東樹の漢學批評について [Concerning Fang Tung-shu’s Criticism of Han Learning], Nippon Chigaku gakkai hō 日本哲學會報, 30 (1978): 165–78.
115 Fang, Han-k‘au shang-tai, 2A/10a–10b.
Master Ku [Yen-wu] only wanted to point out the errors in Master Wang [Yang-ming's] studies of the mind. This caused him to write his plea for curing the errors of studies of the mind. His intent was of course honorable, but his words were too extreme. For all his efforts, the effect was the opposite. Accordingly, [Ku] maligned the ancient sages, the Six Classics, Confucius and Mencius by saying they had not spoken of the mind. He resembles someone who, having been burned by hot soup, must blow on cold vegetables before he eats them. In straightening the bent part, he has gone too far in the other direction.

Fang also gave an impassioned defense of the human and moral mind passage in an attack on Huang Chen, Ku Yen-wu’s source for criticism of Sung studies of the mind.\textsuperscript{116}

Some say that the Tao-ching [that Hsun-tzu cited] was definitely close to the Buddha’s theory of “enlightening the mind” (ming-hsin 仏心). Master Huang [Chen’s] attack on this theory was very apt. ... Huang Chen, however, was aware of an illness; but he failed to recognize its source. Rather than get rid of the poison [causing the illness, i.e., Buddhism], he wanted to use it as an opportunity to get rid of the entire body [i.e., Confucianism] as well.

In conclusion, Fang Tung-shu struck at the heart of the philosophic/philological tensions that lay at the heart of the centuries-old controversy over Shun’s jen-hsin T’ao-hsin teaching.\textsuperscript{117}

It doesn’t matter whether the Old Text [version] is worth believing or not. Nor [does it matter] whether or not what Hsun-tzu cited is worth taking seriously. Even if these two expressions arose from street rumors and village gossip, one should still evaluate them with an even mind and believe positively in their purity and flawlessness. They do not betray the Tao and are sufficient to verify the ancient sages. There is no need to doubt or replace [these two expressions] in order to protect [Confucianism from Ch’an doctrines].

With one swing, Fang was cutting through the knot of centuries of accumulated philological wisdom. Yet his argumentation was decidedly intellectualist and based on a clear understanding of the textual issues involved. The domains of philosophy and philology were not irrevocably severed, but philosophy again had clear priority.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 2A/5a-5b.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 2A/5a-5b.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 2A/16b.
It only causes people to become deluded and inconsistent so that they are good for nothing. Thus, although [Han-Learning scholars] may be "searching for the truth in actual facts" (shih-shih ch'iu-shih), in reality they are performing the most extreme form of empty activity.

By 1850, external and internal threats to the survival of Confucian China occasioned a widespread reaction against philological studies. Scholars such as Fang Tung-shu reiterated their concern with moral philosophy and practical statecraft. Numerous literati called for a more comprehensive vision of Confucianism, one that would go beyond the limited textual studies in typical evidential research. In the hands of many nineteenth-century scholars, K'ao-ch'eng scholarship was informed by theoretical and ethical issues, and no longer was an end in itself.

Juan Yuan (1764–1849) was typical. Although his reputation had been made as a distinguished Han-Learning scholar and patron, Juan contended that the Old Text Documents was authentic. Moreover, he tried to bring Han and Sung Learning together into a single Confucian vision.219

To sum up, the Tao of the sages is like the house of a teacher. The [study of] primary and derived graphs and their etymology is the entrance. If one misses the path, all steps lead away from it. How can one reach the hall and enter the studio? If a student seeks the Tao too high and regards with scorn the art of parsing a text, it is just as if he were a bird soaring into the heavens from the roof of his teacher’s magnificent studio. He gets high all right, but then he doesn’t get to see what lies between the door and the inner recesses of the room.

Others seek only to classify names and their referents (ming-ou) and do not consider the sacred Tao. This [failure] is just like living out one’s life between the gate and entrance, never recalling that there remain a hall and studio [to enter].

Efforts to reassert the validity of Sung-Learning ideals did not entail wholesale rejection of K’ao-ch’eng methods, however. Evidential scholarship remained popular, but it was becoming difficult to justify on its own terms. Many of the defenders of the Confucian tradition by the middle of the nineteenth century took a stand somewhere between the extremes of Han and Sung Learning. They contended that reform of institutions would be successful only if it were based on a moral commitment that reintroduced moral cultivation and a concern for statecraft to Confucian discourse. For example, Tseng Kuo-fan (1811–72), the leader of the self-strengthening movement after 1850, patronized Sung Learning in local and national academies. In particular, he was a partisan of the T’ung-ch’eng school, from which Fang Tung-shu had risen

to prominence. In an 1845 afterword to a pro-Sung-Learning account of Ch‘ing dynasty scholarship, Tseng had written:\textsuperscript{120}

In the recent Ch‘ien-lung (r. 1736–95) and Chia-ch‘ing (r. 1796–1820) eras, Confucians have insisted on broad scholarship. The followers of Hui T‘ing-yi [Tung] and Tai Tung-yuan [Chen] deeply investigated ancient gloses. Relying on the [former Han] dictum enunciated by King Hsien of Ho-chien [to the effect that] “one must search for the truth in actual facts,” they denigrated the worthies of the Sung for empty scholarship.

What they called “facts” (shih 理), are these not “phenomena” (wu 物)? Isn’t [what they consider] “truth” (shih 理) “the principles underlying phenomena” (li)? [The doctrine that] “one must search for the truth in actual facts”—isn’t this [process] precisely what Chu Hsi called “fathoming principles on the basis of phenomena” (chi-kan ch‘ang-t‘i 驚悟經義)?

A balance had been struck. On the eve of western imperialism, the virtues and deficiencies of the battle between philosophy and philology had been carefully weighed. Moral philosophy and k‘ung-cheng research were now regarded as two sides of the same coin. The moral mind could not be explained away—whatever its philological pedigree.

In the last half of the nineteenth century, many Confucians reasserted that the Old Text chapters of the Documents were not only philosophically valuable but also philosophically authentic. It is interesting that these defenders of the Old Text Documents blamed Yen Jo-ch‘u in particular as the culprit who had deluded their age. In a 1904 preface to his vitriolic assault on Yen Jo-ch‘u’s influential writings, Chang Hsien-ch‘ih 章念之 spoke for many when he linked earlier attacks on the authenticity of the Classics to China’s recent difficulties:\textsuperscript{121}

In recent years, K‘ang Yu-wei 菅有為 (1857–1927) has emerged and claimed


that the Six Classics were all works forged by Liu Hsin [劉歆, 45 B.C.-A.D. 23]. As a result, the calumny precipitated by Yen Pai-shih's [殷בי서] delusions and deceptions [concerning the Old Text Documents] has reached its most extreme expression.

Once again philology defended moral orthodoxy.

9. Epilogue

The balance sought by many nineteenth-century syncretists did not last for very long. Most were totally unaware that a relatively obscure scholar named Ts'ui Shu [崔述] (1740–1816) had already pulled the rug out from under them. In the process, Ts'ui produced a major reinterpretation of all ancient Chinese history, which was destined to influence twentieth-century skeptics of China's ancient pedigree. Ts'ui's meticulous excavation of ancient strata of beliefs and myths was motivated by a sense of doubt concerning the historicity of events recorded in ancient texts. His commitment to uncovering the beliefs, and not just the words or written graphs, of the past was clearly indicated in the title of his tour de force: K'ao-hsin lu [考信錄, Record of the Examination of Beliefs].

Ts'ui Shu noted, for example, that the genealogies of the sage-kings varied from period to period in the texts of middle antiquity. Over and over, Ts'ui demonstrated how the details of an event or the character of a sage had been expanded over time without any historical justification. With each new discovery of a layer of counterfeit history, Ts'ui became convinced that he was restoring the Tao, the sages, and the Classics to their true ancient forms.

Ts'ui evaluated, for example, the jen-hsin Tso-hsin passage from within the framework of his revision of ancient history. At the outset of his analysis of this passage, he noted that the forger of the Old Text chapters of the Documents had made every effort to emulate the literary style of the authentic chapters but had failed. Nonetheless, because of the success of the forgery, "the affairs of the two emperors [Yao and Shun], three kings [Yu, Wen, and Wu], and the followers of Confucius had as result lost their factual basis (ta shih ch'i shih 大失其實)."

After summarizing Chu Hsi's interpretation of the human and

124 K'ao-hsin lu, "Ts'i-yao," I/A/2.
moral mind, T‘uii attacked the latent dualism of Chu’s account:125

The teachings of the sages and worthies stated: preserve the mind; complete the mind; humanity is the human mind. What is preserved and completed is just the single mind and no more. No one [in antiquity] ever took the human mind as immoral and sought another mind over and beyond [the human mind]. Only Chuang-tzu and the Buddha referred to the mind as a burden to the self; hence, they called for its elimination or forgetting it, before one could reach the Tao. [Chu Hsi], however, looked with disdain on the human mind and separately established the words “moral mind.” Accordingly, this is a heterodox teaching, and it is absolutely clear that this [distinction between the human and moral mind] is not what the sages and worthies taught.

Finally, T‘uii appended philological points concerning the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage prepared by Li Fu 李紆 (1675–1750) in the latter’s analysis of the Old Text chapters. Again the culprit was Chu Hsi:126

Master Chu at times also doubted [the authenticity of the Old Text Documents]. In the end, however, he honored it and did not dare discard it. He thought the words “human and moral mind” represented the mental discipline, which the [two] emperors and [three] kings passed on to each other. Accordingly, this is what all Confucians since the Sung who [followed] Hsi-kueh honored and looked up to.

Master Chu honored the Way of Confucius and Mencius and castigated heterodox theories. However, he used Taoist doctrines as the basis for the theory that the sages had transmitted the mind. No wonder then that Ming dynasty lecturers [on the Classics] all partook of Ch‘an Buddhism:

To say that Chu Hsi’s interpretation was heterodox was no small matter. However, T‘uii historical research did not produce the impact that it deserved until early in this century. By then, the philosophic content of Confucianism, whether Han or Sung Learning, was openly challenged in a growing tide of skepticism concerning China’s authentic past, a tide in which evidential scholarship had played a preliminary role. Ku Chieh-kang 胡適, Hu Shih 胡適, and others who participated in the Ku-shih pien 古史辨 [Critiques of Ancient History] debates in the 1920’s and 1930’s reduced the golden age of the sage-kings to legends that had been produced and manipulated by later scholars for their own purposes.127

The moral mind was now interesting as a historical clue that revealed the world-view of Sung and Ming Confucians. To venture any further into the past with this doctrine was precarious. Not only was the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage not the authentic words of Shun to Yu, but the sages were not sages anymore.

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125 Ibid., ‘‘T‘ang Yu’’ 君蕆 [Yao and Shun], I/4/26–27.
126 Ibid., I/4/26–28.
127 Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang, pp. 218–517.